

CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE 1945-1985:

A MODEL OF PRESSURES AND CONSTRAINTS

By

Katha Miller-Winder

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

May, 2003

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:

George J. Graham

M. Donald Hancock

James Lee Ray

John A. Vasquez

Kathryn H. Anderson

Copyright © 2003 by Katha Miller-Winder  
All Rights Reserved

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DEDICATION.....	vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION AND MODEL.....	1
Overview of policy shifts.....	3
Factors in denominational policy making.....	5
The model.....	9
The dependent variable.....	16
II. DENOMINATIONAL POLICY AND CONSTITUENT OPINION.....	19
Public opinion and policy making.....	20
Denominational policy making and public opinion.....	21
III. DENOMINATIONAL POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.....	28
Morality of nuclear weapons possession.....	44
Acceptability of nuclear deterrence.....	48
Further testing of hypothesis two.....	51
Australia.....	54
Canada.....	56
New Zealand.....	56
United Kingdom.....	56
United States.....	57
Summary of emphasized policies in relation to hypothesis two.....	58
Policies that are not emphasized on denominational agendas.....	58
Australia.....	59
Canada.....	60
New Zealand.....	62
United Kingdom.....	63
United States.....	64
Conclusion.....	66

IV. DENOMINATIONAL POLICIES AND CONCILIAR MEMBERSHIPS.....	68
Overview of the data.....	73
National interdenominational conciliarism.....	81
International denominational conciliarism.....	84
Baptist World Alliance.....	84
World Alliance of Reformed Churches and World Methodist Council.....	86
Vatican.....	88
International interdenominational conciliarism.....	91
World Council of Churches.....	92
Combined conciliar effects.....	93
Conclusion.....	99
V. DENOMINATIONAL POLICIES, CONCILIAR MEMBERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.....	101
National interdenominational conciliarism.....	102
Denominations with congregational structure.....	102
Denominations with episcopal structure.....	104
Denominations with presbyterian structure.....	106
International denominational conciliarism.....	108
Congregational structure-Baptist World Alliance.....	109
Episcopal structure-Vatican.....	112
Presbyterian structure-Anglican Consultative Council.....	115
Presbyterian structure-World Alliance of Reformed Churches and World Methodist Council.....	115
International Interdenominational Conciliarism--World Council of Churches.....	117
Congregational Structure.....	117
Episcopal Structure.....	118
Presbyterian Structure.....	119
Combined conciliar effects.....	120
Conclusion.....	121
VI. DENOMINATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THEOLOGY.....	124
Overview of the data.....	125
Somewhat conservative theology.....	126
National interdenominational conciliarism.....	126
International denominational conciliarism.....	128
International interdenominational conciliarism.....	130
Combined conciliarism.....	131
Conclusion.....	132
Moderate theology.....	132
National interdenominational conciliarism.....	132
International denominational conciliarism.....	134
International interdenominational conciliarism.....	135
Combined conciliarism.....	137
Conclusion.....	138

Somewhat liberal theology.....	139
National interdenominational theology.....	139
International denominational theology.....	140
International interdenominational theology.....	141
Conclusion.....	142
VII. DENOMINATIONAL POLICIES AND PERCEIVED	
NUCLEAR THREAT.....	144
Denominational and conciliar attitudes toward nuclear weapons.....	148
Measuring Perceived Nuclear Threat.....	152
Overview of the data.....	156
Testing the hypothesis.....	161
Policies regarding nuclear deterrence and degree of perceived threat.....	162
Acceptability of nuclear deterrence.....	163
Australia.....	163
Canada.....	163
New Zealand.....	164
United Kingdom.....	165
United States.....	165
Summary.....	166
Morality of nuclear weapons possession.....	166
Australia.....	166
Canada.....	167
New Zealand.....	167
United Kingdom.....	168
United States.....	168
Summary.....	169
Usability of nuclear weapons.....	169
Australia.....	169
Canada.....	170
New Zealand.....	170
United Kingdom.....	171
United States.....	171
Summary.....	172
Conclusions.....	172
VIII. DENOMINATIONAL POLICY AND	
CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS.....	174
Overview of the data.....	179
Testing hypothesis seven.....	182
United Kingdom.....	183
Australia.....	187
Canada.....	195
New Zealand.....	203
United States.....	206
Official state religions and their sister denominations.....	210

Conclusion.....	212
<b>IX. ARE CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS MERELY ONE MORE TYPE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION? CONCLUSIONS.....</b>	
Review summary.....	214
Conclusion.....	231
Appendices	
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DATA.....	236
B. DEPENDENT VARIABLE.....	266
C. EXPERT OPINION ABOUT DENOMINATIONAL CONSTITUENCIES.....	271
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DENOMINATIONS.....	273
E. THE DENOMINATIONS AND THEIR CONCILIAR MEMBERSHIPS.....	277
F. PERCEIVED THREAT.....	282
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	288

Dedicated with love to Douglas, Alexandra, and David,

To my extended family,

And to all the Christians who take their faith seriously and think seriously about the issues that  
face our world.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge the generous assistance of the General-Secretaries, Moderators, Chairmen, Directors and staff of the denominations and conciliar organizations examined in this study. Without their willingness to search their files in order to provide all of the statements issued by their organization this work would not have been possible.

Thanks are also due the Student Affairs Committee of the Graduate Faculty Council of Vanderbilt University, for a Dissertation Enhancement Award granted in 1987. This award allowed me to travel to Toronto in order to personally conduct a search of the archives of the United Church of Canada and Canadian Council of Churches.

The author also wishes to acknowledge the tremendous support given me by my family and friends. Without them this work could not have gone forward. I would like to especially thank my grandmother, Jean B. Miller, who never stopped believing that I could do this (and wasn't ashamed to nag me into it).

Grateful acknowledgment is also due to Ann Eads whose assistance in properly formatting and copy editing this document was invaluable, Karla Sigrist for help with grammar and insight into computer programs and to Jamie Gordon for technical assistance in the area of electronic publishing.

And finally thanks are owed to the reference and inter-library loan staffs of the Kitsap County Library system especially to those of the Central Branch. Their assistance and patience in tracking down obscure volumes and dates has been essential.

--Katha Miller-Winder

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Total Number of Definite Policy Statements of All Denominations From 1945 to 1985 by Policy and Nation.....	35
2. Degree of Controversy Associated With Policy Positions .....	37
3. Number of Statements That Nuclear Weapons Can Never Be Used Issued By Each Type of Denomination .....	40
4. Years in Which Statements Were Issued Stating that Nuclear Weapons Could Never Be Used By Each Type of Denomination .....	43
5. Possessing Nuclear Weapons: The Policies Sometimes Moral and Never Moral by Nation and Denominational Structure.....	45
6. Years That Denominations Adopted the Position that Possessing Nuclear Weapons is Sometimes Moral by Nation and Denominational Structure .....	47
7. Years That Denominations Adopted the Position that Possessing Nuclear Weapons is Never Moral by Nation and Denominational Structure .....	48
8. Years That Denominations Adopted Positions Regarding Nuclear Deterrence by Denominational Structure.....	49
9. Frequency of Recommendations Etc. on Denominational Agendas .....	52
10. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	54
11. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	55
12. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	56
13. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	57
14. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	59
15. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	61

16. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	62
17. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	64
18. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type .....	65
19.1. Conciliar Memberships of Australian Denominations.....	75
19.2. Conciliar Memberships of Canadian Denominations.....	75
19.3. Conciliar Memberships of Denominations in New Zealand.....	75
19.4. Conciliar Memberships of Denominations in the United Kingdom .....	76
19.5. Conciliar Memberships of Denominations in the United States.....	76
20.1. Number of Times Each Variable Appeared on the Conciliar Agenda for International Denominational and International Interdenominational Conciliar Bodies.....	77
20.2. Number of Times Each Variable Appeared on the Conciliar Agenda for National Interdenominational Conciliar Organizations .....	77
21. Number of Documents Collected for Each Conciliar Body .....	78
22. R-Squared for Denominational Policies and National Interdenominational Conciliarism .....	83
23. Denominational Policies and International Denominational Conciliarism BWA .....	85
24. Denominational Policies and International Denominational Conciliarism WARC & WMC .....	87
25. Denominational Policies and International Denominational Conciliarism Vatican .....	89
26. Denominational Policies and International Interdenominational Conciliarism WCC.....	92
27. Combined Conciliar Effects of BWA and CCC .....	94
28. Combined Effects of WARC, WMC, WCC, CCC .....	95

29. Combined Conciliar Effects on the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand.....	96
30. Combined Conciliar Effects on the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand .....	97
31. Combined Conciliar Effects on the Church of Scotland .....	98
32. Combined Conciliar Effects of WARC, WCC, NCCCUSA .....	99
33. Effects of National Interdenominational Conciliarism on Congregational Type Denominations .....	103
34. Effects of National Interdenominational Conciliarism on Episcopal Type Denominations .....	105
35. Effects of National Interdenominational Conciliarism on Presbyterian Type Denominations.....	108
36. Effects of International Denominational Conciliarism on Congregational Type Denominations-BWA .....	110
37. Effects of International Denominational Conciliarism on Episcopal Type Denominations--Vatican.....	113
38. Effects of International Denominational Conciliarism on Denominations with a Presbyterian Structure .....	116
39. Effects of International Interdenominational Conciliarism on Policies of Episcopal Type Denominations .....	118
40. Effects of International Interdenominational Conciliarism on Presbyterian Type Denominations .....	120
41. Theologically Somewhat Conservative Church of Scotland and the Conciliar Pressure of the British Council of Churches.....	127
42. Denominations with Somewhat Conservative Theology and International Denominational Conciliarism.....	129
43. Somewhat Theologically Conservative Denominations and International Interdenominational Conciliarism .....	131
44. Theologically Moderate Denominations and National Interdenominational Conciliarism .....	134

45. Theologically Moderate Denomination and International Denominational Conciliarism .....	135
46. Theologically Moderate Denominations and International Interdenominational Conciliarism .....	136
47. Theologically Moderate Denominations and Combined Conciliarism .....	138
48. Somewhat Liberal Theology and National Interdenominational Conciliar Pressure .....	140
49. Somewhat Liberal Theology and International Denominational Conciliar Pressures .....	141
50. Theologically Somewhat Liberal Denominations and International Interdenominational Conciliarism .....	142
51: Number of Documents and Time R Squared.....	158
52. Number of References to the Nuclear Issue and Time R Squared .....	158
53. Number of Documents and Number of References to the Nuclear Issue R Squared.....	159
54. Total Systemic Perceived Threat and Time R Squared .....	160
55. Number of Documents and Total Systemic Perceived Nuclear Threat R Squared.....	161
56. Number of References to the Nuclear Issue and Total Systemic Nuclear Threat R Squared.....	162
57. Australia--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	163
58. Canada--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	164
59. New Zealand--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	164
60. United Kingdom--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	165
61. United States--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	165

62. Australia--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat.....	166
63. Canada--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	167
64. New Zealand--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	167
65. United Kingdom--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	168
66. United States--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	169
67. Australia--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	170
68. Canada--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	170
69. New Zealand--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	171
70. United Kingdom--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	171
71. United States--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat .....	172
72. Religious Liberty Index .....	180
73. National Church/State and Religious Liberty Standings .....	181
74. Number of Statements Issued by Each Denomination .....	182
75. United Kingdom--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence.....	184
76. United Kingdom--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession.....	185
77. United Kingdom--Expresses Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons .....	187

78. Australia--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence .....	187
79. Australia--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession.....	190
80. Australia--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons.....	193
81. Canada--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence .....	195
82. Canada--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession.....	199
83. Canada--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons.....	202
84. New Zealand--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence .....	203
85. New Zealand--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons.....	205
86. New Zealand--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons.....	206
87. United States--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence .....	206
88. United States--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession.....	207
89. United States--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons.....	209
90. Conciliar Organizations, Denominations and National Councils.....	237
91. Lists of all the Documents Collected from all the Denominations and Conciliar Bodies.....	238
92. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations in Australia.....	259
93. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations In Canada.....	260

94. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations  
in New Zealand..... 261

95. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations  
in the UK..... 262

96. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations  
in the United States..... 263

97. Number of Statements Issued By Year By the Average Denomination  
in Each Nation..... 264

98. Activist Ranking..... 265

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION AND MODEL

The state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence. Few, if any, would dispute this claim. It is the state that determines when it is necessary for reasons of national security or national interest to resort to war. War is understood to be the prerogative of the state; yet throughout history religions have concerned themselves with the proper moral conduct of war. War, the prerogative of the state, collides with the self-proclaimed prerogative of religion--ethics and morality.

It is when the ethical and moral imperatives of a religion collide with the security requirements of nation states that the dynamics of the tensions inherent between religion and politics becomes most apparent. In declaring that war may only be undertaken for certain causes, that certain implements may not be employed or placing any other restriction on war making or war fighting the religion is, to some extent usurping the prerogatives of the state. At the same time the religion remains, at least in part, reliant on the state. In particular it relies on the state to preserve secure and peaceful borders, which protect the adherents of the religion from outside aggression.

Much has been written about the efforts of religions to influence the state's conduct of war. Indeed, all the world's great religions have dealt with the issue of the moral conduct of war. Of all the major religions Christianity contains perhaps the most comprehensive range of positions on how war can be conducted morally. These positions range from total pacifism, which argues that war can never be conducted morally, to the crusade ethic, which believes that warring against the "enemies of God" is a moral imperative. The just war tradition is an intermediate position between these two extremes. Robert S. Woito provides the best summary of these positions and his words deserve to be quoted at length.

The strength of the pacifist tradition lies in its combination of moral commitment and the action which expresses that commitment. The pacifist is clear that, whatever else the State may require, it cannot ask him or her to engage in mass violence. The witness for that ideal can be compelling. Pacifist ideals can also be corrupted in their application as when the violence of one side in a conflict

is rejected while the violence of another side is condoned or unaddressed. But in its true form, the pacifist tradition condemns all organized mass violence.

A second tradition that offers an answer...is that based on just war theory. Here careful attention is paid to distinguishing the conditions under which violence is justified. If the circumstances match the criteria which have been developed, war is justified as a necessary or lesser evil. These criteria are stated concisely by Suarez:

. . . in order that a war may be justly waged, a number of conditions must be observed...firstly, the war must be waged by a legitimate power; secondly, the cause itself and the reason must be just; thirdly, the method of its conduct must be proper, and due proportion must be observed at its beginning, during its prosecution, and after victory.<sup>1</sup>

Although offensive war may meet these criteria according to Suarez, it is more likely that a "just war" will be defensive in character. A contemporary application of the criteria runs something like this: the overriding moral evil in world politics today is intervention by one State in the affairs of another; there is no real likelihood of building supranational institutions to prevent such intervention and to resolve conflict; nationalism is the prevailing creed and disarmament is impossible; what is possible and necessary in a world of sovereign States is to distinguish offensive from defensive war--unjust from just wars. Defensive intentions are established by developing defensive weapons systems. Thus, attack tanks are bad, anti-tank weapons are good. Strategic nuclear weapons are bad, strategic defensive weapons are good. Training soldiers to attack is bad but preparing to defend one's country is good.

The crusade ethic provides a third distinctive answer to the questions about the use of mass violence. The Crusades (1096-1291) sought to extend Christendom or, more, specifically, recapture the Holy Land from the Moslems. God himself was believed to authorize these expeditions. Their leaders believed in the moral rectitude of their ends and in the evil of the enemy. In modern times, some Americans have seen in "The Hun" or "The Communists" the embodiment of evil requiring war against them. Similarly, wars of liberation or revolution are sometimes interpreted as embodying absolute righteousness either because of the evil of the presumed oppressive power (usually the United States or multinational corporations) or because God is believed to take the side of the oppressed. In the crusade ethic, initiative lies with the moralist. The violence is a positive good (because a just punishment for iniquity) not an unfortunate last resort. The enemy is to be destroyed, not negotiated with, much less loved (as St. Augustine, a just war theorist, and Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., who were pacifists required).<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> War and Christian Conscience, Albert Marrin, (ed.), Chicago: Regency, 1971, p. 202. As quoted in Robert S. Woito, To End War: A New Approach to International Conflict, New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1982, 385-387.

<sup>2</sup> Robert S. Woito., To End War: A New Approach to International Conflict, New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1982, 385-387.

The Christian religion is, institutionally, a peculiar entity. It is sectarian, composed of different denominations, rather than monolithic. Although there are hundreds, if not thousands, of distinct denominations there is also a belief that all these denominations are part of an overarching fraternity.<sup>3</sup> This is referred to variously as "the Holy Catholic Church,"<sup>4</sup> "one holy, catholic and apostolic Church,"<sup>5</sup> the church universal and most often as simply the Church. Despite the belief in an overarching fraternity it is not possible to study the positions of the Church since it exists only in the abstract. Instead it is necessary to examine the position of denominations.

The various positions on the moral conduct of war described above are often the dominant position of specific denominations. The Mennonites, Quakers, and Brethren, for example, espouse pacifism while Presbyterians, Baptists, and Lutherans, to name a few, adopt the just war philosophy. While in the modern world no mainstream denomination preaches the crusade ethic of war conduct, Roman Catholic history contains numerous examples. In the Church today pacifism and just war theory dominate.

### **An Overview of Policy Shifts**

The just war tradition dominated Christian thought on the issue of war for many centuries although a clear strand of pacifism can also be discerned. The advent of nuclear weapons resulted in an increased interest in the concept of pacifism. With the discovery of the destructive power of nuclear reactions, the question of moral conduct of war gained new significance. A study of denominational policy statements on the nuclear question clearly reveals shifts in denominational policies. These shifts in policy have taken place as the denominations have sought to apply long held positions to weapons that are both qualitatively and quantitatively different from previous weapons. As weapons of unparalleled destructive ability, nuclear weapons, since their first use on August 6, 1945, have raised numerous moral and ethical questions. These are questions that denominations must consider in light of the position they take on the issue of war conduct.

---

<sup>3</sup> No matter how much denominations may fight among themselves, each claiming to most closely embody Christianity, none would dispute that there is a standard set of "Christian" beliefs.

<sup>4</sup> The Apostles Creed (Ecumenical version).

<sup>5</sup> The Nicene Creed (Ecumenical version).

Different positions regarding the nuclear issue have been advocated by different denominations as well as by the same denomination at different times. This is true not only in the United States, a nuclear superpower, but in other nuclear and non-nuclear nations around the globe. Throughout the world denominational policies on the nuclear issue have shifted and evolved. An oversimplified description of denominational policies on the nuclear issue begins with strong condemnation of United States' use of nuclear bombs on Japan. This was replaced largely by silence once the Soviet Union demonstrated nuclear capability. This silence began to be broken in the 1960s and 1970s with increasing questioning which in the 1980s frequently became rejection of the nuclear option.

These changes in policy can be illustrated by using a few quotes. Protestant churchmen in the United States declared, after the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Japan, that even if the attack could have been defended on grounds of military necessity:

We have never agreed that a policy affecting the present well-being of millions of non-combatants and the future relationships of whole peoples should be decided finally on military grounds...In the light of present knowledge, we are prepared to affirm that...the use of atomic bombs against Japan, is not defensible on Christian premises.<sup>6</sup>

This statement was issued in 1947. With the explosion of the first Soviet nuclear device in 1949 the churches began to retrench. A new Protestant commission in 1950 issued the following judgment:

If atomic weapons or other weapons of parallel destructiveness are used against us or our friends in Europe or Asia, we believe that it could be justifiable for our government to use them with all possible restraint to prevent the triumph of an aggressor. We come to this conclusion with troubled spirits but any other conclusion would leave our own people and the people of other nations open to continuing devastating attack and probable defeat.<sup>7</sup>

By the 1980s even this reluctant support had begun to wane. As Dr. James Will puts it,

The tacit political consensus of the last twenty years supporting the theory that possession of nuclear weapons is necessary to prevent their use by the other side is crumbling under the weight of the moral implications of the massive terror it depends upon.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical and Critical Re-evaluation, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1960, p. 233.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 234.

<sup>8</sup> James Will, "The Churches' Influence on Disarmament Decisions In East and West: Introduction", 1984(?), p.26.

The growing opposition to the policy of nuclear deterrence was based largely on the application of just war principles and a belief that the Church has a responsibility to the whole of humanity-- a responsibility that was not being met by supporting a policy that holds innocent non-combatants hostage to nuclear terror.

### **Factors in Denominational Policy Making**

There is a huge body of literature exploring the positions the Church has taken regarding the conduct of war. A corresponding body of literature examining the factors that influence how these positions have come into being, however, is lacking. While much has been written concerning the Biblical and theological foundations of church teachings about war and peace,<sup>9</sup> the impact of the political influences on the policy-making of Christian denominations has been studied only in a piecemeal fashion. Social scientists have collected statistics on religious memberships, attendance at religious observances, and the opinions of self-proclaimed Born-Again Christians,<sup>10</sup> to mention a few. Theologians and other religious thinkers, from the Apostle Paul to Edward Schillebeeckx, have debated the appropriate form for Church/State relationships and how this relationship should affect the conduct of war. In the international arena questions about Christianity and war have seen continuous discussion, with positions on the issue ranging from religious crusades to total pacifism. As yet, however, there has been no effort to provide an integrated comprehensive model of religious policy-making on issues that have a clear political dimension. There has been little or no work examining denominations strictly as non-governmental organizations. Only through consideration of an integrated model that applies the principles that would affect any non-governmental organization will it be possible to truly understand the policy-making of Christian denominations.

Denominations regard themselves as embodiments of the Church. As such they view themselves as somehow different from other non-governmental organizations. This work explores whether in fact denominations behave in a fashion that differs from how an integrated model of non-governmental organizational policy making would predict any non-governmental organization to behave.

---

<sup>9</sup> For a review of some of this literature see the annotated bibliography.

<sup>10</sup> Kant Patel, Denny Pilant, and Gary Rose, "Born-Again Christians in the Bible Belt: A Study in Religion, Politics and Ideology", *American Politics Quarterly*, Vol. 10 no. 2, April 1982, 255-272.

At this point it will be helpful to provide a brief overview of the role denominations see themselves as playing in the world. Christian theology holds that the world was created perfect, but when the first people disobeyed God and ate the fruit of the tree,<sup>11</sup> sin entered the world causing a flaw. God's creation which was created entirely good now contained evil. It had fallen from the perfection that was intended. Since this fall God has been working to redeem creation. The role of the Church in this effort can be summarized in the command to

Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you. And surely I will be with you always, to the very end of the age.<sup>12</sup>

The efforts of the Church to obey this command are hampered by the fact that it is operating in a fallen world. In setting policies, the Church, in the form of denominations, is torn between its calling to obedience to God and his purposes and the expediency that is often the hallmark of politics. This work examines the interaction of these two strands of denominational policy making. By investigating the evolution of Christian thought regarding the conduct of war during the nuclear age it is possible to discern the influence brought to bear as denominations operate in both the political and religious spheres.

Any model proposed for exploring organizational policy making would need to consider two principle elements, pressures and constraints. For denominations the pressures include such things as the Biblical and theological underpinnings of Christian attitudes toward war and peace. This provides the outlines of the framework within which Christian denominations see themselves as working. The constraints include the political aspects of Christian denominations, their institutional goals, organizational structure and relationship with the government of the nation-state in which they are located.

The positions advocated by the various denominations--positions that will affect the manner in which states conduct their wars--are not formed in a vacuum. Like all non-governmental organizations, denominational positions are influenced by both the events and activities taking place in the various political arenas and by their own organizational dictates.

While the denominations used in this study will be distinct from nation to nation, important insights can be drawn by examining them as if they are more or less uniform. Using a

---

<sup>11</sup> See the story of the fall of man in Genesis 3.

<sup>12</sup> Matthew 28:19-20 NIV

universally applied model reveals how the policies of denominations that are structurally and theologically identical (or nearly so) are impacted by differing political, cultural and historical climates. Some of the differences thus revealed can be explained by the model while others can be attributed to the varying climates in different nations. Using a hypothetical universal model to examine denominational policy making provides a useful organizing structure as well.

In this hypothetical universal theory it is necessary to begin with the differing perceptions of the nation states and denominations regarding the nuclear question. National security has always been an issue of crucial importance for nation-states. With the development of nuclear weapons and the formulation of the policy of nuclear deterrence, nation-states believed they had arrived at a policy that would assure national security. As a result nuclear deterrence became the most nationalist of policies. To oppose it was to seek to oppose the very notion of national security. By looking at the policy of nuclear deterrence in light of just war principles and Christian ethics, Christian denominations have found themselves facing the problem of whether the considerations of national security based on nuclear deterrence or considerations of Christian religious teachings based on justice for all mankind are the dominant concern.

Christian denominations are, like all non-governmental organizations, affected by a number of different factors: organizational identity, the actions of its membership, its organizational structure, geographical and national location, and even events in the international system. These factors are complicated by the number of different roles fulfilled by Christian denominations: social clubs, moral spokesmen, spiritual guides, governmental agencies, and international links, to name a few. Examining the influences and roles that contribute to the actions of Christian denominations can provide the student of politics valuable information about the way in which internal constraints combine with external pressures to create policy in non-governmental organizations, and especially how a non-governmental organization that views its primary function as expounding Christian moral and ethical behavior establishes policy positions on issues that have obvious political implications.

The policy-making of Christian denominations can best be understood by examining the influence wielded by the four primary political arenas: 1) individual, 2) organizational, 3) nation-state, and 4) international system. These arenas have differing effects on denominational policy-making; some of these arenas act as a source of impetus for policy change while others serve as braking forces, limiting or constraining the denomination's ability to make or change policy. On

the individual level the denomination needs to provide some form of service to its members--even if the service is no more than an intangible "good feeling." The need of individuals to get something for their participation in organizations has been well documented.<sup>13</sup>

Organizations, as such, have goals of their own.<sup>14</sup> An organization wants to increase its power, prestige, and resource base. One way of achieving these goals is to increase membership. In order to increase membership denominations appeal to their individual constituencies. While an official state religion might draw its constituency from the entire public, this is unlikely to be true for all denominations. It has been shown that denominations tend to have specific constituencies.<sup>15</sup> These constituencies are composed of individuals who are members of the denomination as well as non-members with similar characteristics. Despite the tendency for denominations to be comprised of individuals with similar characteristics, denominations still seek to appeal to as wide a range of people as possible to fulfill both the command to proselytize and instruct and the goal of increased membership. Appeals to constituents are not the only factor that must be considered, however, Christian denominations must operate within national boundaries. It is logical that they want to avoid unduly antagonizing the government of the nation-state in which they reside in order to avoid governmental crackdowns and coercion.

Events in the international system will also influence the Christian denomination. This influence comes both through the effect these events have on the individual members and the government of the nation-state and through the stresses these events can put on cross-national ties with other religious bodies and conciliar organizations.

Based on this analysis of the factors influencing the policy-making of Christian denominations, the following general model can be postulated. Christian denominations are essentially subject to two pressures: 1) organizational dictates and 2) international/inter-organizational bonds between denominations, i.e. conciliarism. These are the forces that drive the religious organization to take action. However, Christian denominations are not free to act

---

<sup>13</sup> Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965, 1971.

<sup>14</sup> Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974, and Graham T. Allison., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

<sup>15</sup> C.H. Dodd, G.R. Cragg, and Jacques Ellul, Social and Cultural Factors in Church Divisions, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1952, p. 13.

without regard to consequences; rather they are subject to certain constraints. Two principal constraints can be identified as follows: 1) national environment and 2) institutional structure.<sup>16</sup>

### **The Model**

Applying the model to denominational policy shifts on the nuclear issue will require further specification of the model. The first step is to identify the dependent variable, the population of the study, the time frame and the hypotheses that are generated by the model. The dependent variable is the attention paid to the issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Attention to the issues is represented by the number of official denominational statements or documents that contain reference to the nuclear questions.

In order to minimize variance among factors that are not under study, such as language and culture, the research is limited to five English-speaking nations. These nations share cultural and historical roots as well as similar governmental structures. They, nonetheless, vary on the important variables of level of threat by the nuclear powers, and Church/State relationships. The United States as a nuclear superpower might be expected to have the greatest reliance on nuclear deterrence while New Zealand and Australia with no nuclear weapons and not sharing a border with a nuclear neighbor might be expected to rely less on this policy. Canada sharing a long border with the United States and thus likely to suffer fallout damage should there be a nuclear war and the United Kingdom with its own small nuclear arsenal might represent intermediate positions regarding reliance on nuclear deterrence. These expectations will be addressed further in a later chapter.

In this study two of the five nations employed are defined as religious and three are secular states. The two religious states are Australia and the United Kingdom. In Australia there is not an official state religion while the United Kingdom has two official state religions, the Anglican Church of England in England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The Church of England has a closer relationship with the state than the Church of Scotland. The Church of England is part of the national government.<sup>17</sup> The Church of Scotland is the established church but it is not a part of the government.

---

<sup>16</sup> The model I am proposing has some similarity to the systems analysis models of the 1950's and 1960's.

<sup>17</sup> See discussion in Chapter VIII and in Appendix D.

The obvious criterion for selecting which denominations to study was to select those denominations common to all five countries. Unfortunately this criterion included a large number of very small denominations.<sup>18</sup> This number was further limited to those denominations with a large enough affiliated membership to possess some impact on governmental policy positions, set as a 1980 affiliated membership of at least 150,000. The 1980 membership was used since denominational membership has been relatively stable--large denominations have generally remained large--and the 1980 membership data were readily available for all the nations in the study. This left the following denominations: Roman Catholic, Anglican/Episcopal<sup>19</sup> and Presbyterian.<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately this method of denominational selection failed to provide a representative of the denominations that are traditionally regarded as conservative fundamentalists. In order to redress this imbalance, the Baptist denomination was added despite the fact that in one country, New Zealand, it does not meet the established criteria.<sup>21</sup>

In order to gain a clear picture of the evolution of denominational policy-making on the nuclear issue this model will be applied in a broad range of circumstances. The analysis will be both cross-cultural and cross-temporal. The time frame will be from 1945 to 1985. This has the benefit of covering a significant portion of the nuclear era. It also provides ample opportunities to examine denominational policy changes on the nuclear issue and allows for studying the effect of the emergence of additional nuclear powers into the system.

Before proceeding it is helpful at this point to say a few words about denominational policies. Denominations are in the habit of issuing written statements and documents that define their positions on issues with which they have chosen to concern themselves. These statements are usually written by committees dedicated to particular fields of denominational interest, e.g. international relations, race relations, poverty, ecumenism, etc. The statements are then reviewed by the denomination's national convention or dominant policy maker, which chooses to accept it

---

<sup>18</sup> These are denominations with an affiliated membership of two or three hundred.

<sup>19</sup> The beliefs, catechism, and order of worship of the Anglican and Episcopal denominations are the same, allowing them to be treated as the same denomination, despite the difference in names. Their difference in organizational structure contributes additional variance.

<sup>20</sup> The United States had two large Presbyterian denominations, the United Presbyterian and the Presbyterian USA, before they formed a new, reconciled denomination, United Presbyterian USA in 1982. Before 1982 both U.S. Presbyterian denominations will be included in the study.

<sup>21</sup> The largest Baptist denomination in each country is used in this study because, while differing in some areas, all Baptist denominations possess comparable theology.

as it stands or with amendments. In most denominations this statement then becomes binding upon the membership. The exception to this rule is the Baptist and other congregationally structured denominations. In these denominations statements are issued but they are merely guidelines which members are free to accept or reject as their own consciences dictate.

As a rule, denominations meet annually. Even when a denomination does not hold annual meetings there is an executive committee that does meet annually and this committee is authorized to issue interim statements that are then voted upon at the next denominational meeting. Mechanisms also exist for the calling of special meetings should events and issues confronting the denomination indicate a need for a general meeting. There is no set number of statements a denomination can or will issue at any given meeting. An issue of especial importance or concern might be the subject of multiple statements or a single very long statement. On any particular issue a denomination might issue anywhere from zero to 100 or more statements. Taking the mean<sup>22</sup> of all the statements regarding the nuclear issue issued each year by all the denominations in a nation provides a useful hypothetical denomination for comparison purposes.

Having described the selection of the nation-states, denominations, what constitutes a policy and time frame for the study, it is time to turn to an elaboration of the model of denominational policy shifts. Once this model has been set forth, it will be used to form and operationalize a number of hypotheses for testing. As indicated above, there are essentially two pressures to which denominations respond when considering shifts in organizational policy: 1) organizational dictates and 2) conciliarism. While the type of policy under consideration may cause one of these pressures to exert greater force than the other, it can be argued that both of these pressures are relevant whatever the policy. It should also be noted that these pressures are not necessarily forcing the denomination in competing directions. Denominations, however, are constrained by two principal factors: 1) national environment and 2) institutional structure. When organizational dictates and conciliarism are driving the denomination in opposing directions, the constraining factors should have a greater impact on the process. When the pressures are both flowing in the same direction, policy can be expected to move smoothly in that direction. These

---

<sup>22</sup> Total number of documents for all denominations for each year divided by the four denominations in the study equals the average number of documents for all the study denominations in a nation per year.

are the chief components of the model of denominational policy-making model. An elaboration of these components follows.

There are certain requirements an organization must meet in order to ensure its continued existence. Perhaps the most important of these organizational dictates is attracting new members. It is a well-documented characteristic of group behavior to seek to increase membership. By increasing membership groups gain a larger resource base upon which to draw as well as increasing their influence in political terms by becoming a larger voting bloc. In order to attract potential members, groups target specific segments of the public, i.e., each group addresses itself to the interests of a particular constituency. Through a variety of techniques the group endeavors to keep itself in step with this constituency by both following the prevailing opinion within the constituency, and, when conditions favor it, seeking to influence and lead constituent opinion.<sup>23</sup> Christian denominations are, in this respect, no different from any other group. While denominations may purport to accept members from all walks of life, recognizable types still adhere to each denomination. These recognizable types form the de facto constituency for the denomination.

The need to attract members, however, is not the only requirement an organization must meet in order to insure its continued existence. An organization must also fulfill its organizational purpose. In the case of Christian denominations this organizational purpose includes the biblical injunctions to be stewards of the earth.<sup>24</sup> Increasingly, the question was raised; how can the threat to destroy the world be considered good stewardship.<sup>25</sup> Thus another aspect of constituent opinion comes into play--the role of the organization in influencing opinion. As Chapter II will demonstrate, it is this aspect of constituent opinion that is of primary importance to Christian denominations. Not only does a denomination seek to attract new members by reflecting constituent opinion but at the same time they also seek to influence that opinion.

The pressure on denominations to attract and instruct members leads to the question of whether the members are also a pressure. In fact they are not. This is due to two factors. First,

---

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965, 1971; and David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, second edition, New York: Knopf, 1971.

<sup>24</sup> See for example Genesis 1:26, Luke 12:42 and Luke 16:2 for descriptions of stewardship (Luke) and the relationship of man to the earth (Genesis).

<sup>25</sup> See for example "Defense and Disarmament: New Requirements for Security," A Policy Statement adopted by the General Board, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., September 12, 1968, which reads in part "Responsibility for the created order is a responsibility to preserve and develop it, not abuse and destroy it."

individual members must press for policy changes they support within the structure of the denominational institution. In an episcopally organized denomination this might be individual lobbying of the dominant policy maker in congregationally structured denominations it would take the form of trying to organize discussion forums for the members that would influence others toward the desired position. The institutional structure would still act as a constraint and the need to act within such constraints would mitigate the pressure that a member or small group of members could bring to bear. Second, it is simpler to shift denominational allegiance than to shift denominational policies. In order for a group of members to apply noticeable pressure on a denomination it would need to be reasonably large. A group of members advocating a particular position that differed substantially from that of the denomination that would be large enough to actually pressure the denomination would be more likely to break away to form their own church. Throughout history splits in churches have occurred over issues ranging from the color of the choir robes to the indiscretions of the minister. If individual congregations can divide over such seemingly minor issues, a large group unable to accept denominational positions would most likely leave the denomination, probably to found a competing denomination, rather than serve as an effective pressure.

Conciliarism takes two forms: national conciliarism and international conciliarism. Within these two forms are the subdivisions, denominational and interdenominational. National denominational conciliarism is actually the national organizational structure of the denomination, its national government as it were. In other words, this type of conciliarism is identical to institutional structure and is discussed below. National councils of churches are a type of national interdenominational conciliarism in that they are composed of a variety of denominations residing within a single national border. International denominational conciliarism includes those organizations in which membership is restricted to specific denominations, e.g., the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, which extends membership to only the Presbyterian and Congregational denominations, no matter in which nation they reside. The World Council of Churches is representative of international interdenominational conciliarism. In this type of organization membership is open to virtually all denominations that want to join.

The affinity denominations have for comparable organizations are embodied in conciliarism. The strength of the ecumenical movement can be seen as a demonstration of the

desire of denominations to work together to further the teachings of the Christ. While there has been and occasionally still is antipathy on the part of one denomination for another, this is becoming confined more and more to the fringe denominations. The forces of conciliarism are drawing the mainline denominations closer together. This can be seen in the reconciliation movements within many fractured denominations including the successful 1982 reunion of the United Presbyterian Church of the United States of America. Even the so-called Evangelical Movement has a conciliar side. In many nations there are conciliar bodies that are composed entirely of the Evangelical Churches.

By following the official line of the conciliar bodies of which they are members, denominations are both reducing the dissonance among them and strengthening the power of the conciliar organization, and thus Christianity as a whole. This has the effect of increasing the power of that organization to be an effective political actor either within the nation-state (national conciliarism) or in the international arena (international conciliarism).

In the above discussion of organizational dictates and conciliarism, the potential for tension should be apparent. Organizational dictates for example, might indicate that a denomination should shift its policy closer to that of the nation-state in order to attract new members<sup>26</sup> but conciliarism might point to a need for the denomination to shift its policy away from the national policy. In this model, in these circumstances, where the pressures of organizational dictates and conciliarism are forcing the denomination in opposing directions, the factors constraining denominational policy shifts--national environment and organizational structure--should be the decisive factors in determining which way the denomination shifts or if it does.

National environment defines the external factors that constrain denominational policy shifts. It describes the environment in which denominations must function. This includes such things as the relationship between the state and the denomination and the level of threat to which a nation is exposed by another international actor. These are the factors that shape the opinions of denominational constituencies and thus affect denominational policy-making. The national environment, in addition, defines the effectiveness of a denomination as a political actor.

---

<sup>26</sup> Denominations desire increased membership in order to improve their resource and power base. The drive here is the same as that of political parties competing for votes in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957, where political parties seek to attract voters in order to win elections.

Just as national environment defined the external constraints, so institutional structure defines the internal constraints to which a denomination is subject. Institutional structure is primarily the administrative organization of the denomination, whether it is episcopal, presbyterian, or congregational. It determines the procedure for making and changing organizational policy. A denomination that has hierarchical institutional structure, whether final authority rests ostensibly with a single policy-maker,<sup>27</sup> e.g., Roman Catholic, whose ultimate decision is binding upon all members, is subject to constraints differing from those organized on congregational lines, for example Baptists. Institutional structure also includes the theology of the denomination and the socio-economic status (SES) of its membership.

The impact of these constraining factors should be obvious. A denomination that is being forced in opposing directions by organizational dictates and conciliarism is not operating in a completely free and unrestricted environment. It is subject to both internal and external forces that are, in the final analysis, the determining factors in denominational behavior. Despite a very strong conciliar pressure, for instance, the model expects that a theologically conservative, episcopal denomination in a nation experiencing great external threat will be unable to follow the conciliar path. Following the conciliar policy would, for this denomination, mean a radical rejection of its traditional attitudes toward the relationship of church and state as well as a loss of autonomy for the dominant denominational policy-maker. In addition, this denomination would be relinquishing political strength it might otherwise wield in its national arena. The constraints on this denomination would force it to behave in a particular fashion. The importance of constraints in determining denominational policy shifts can be seen in the hypotheses the model generates below.

The goal of this study is to explore the policy making of groups that regard themselves as obedient to a higher standard when the policy in question is largely political in nature. This is done by examining the policy making of Christian denominations in light of the pressures and constraints to which they are subject. The scope of the study has been restricted to a small sample of denomination in a few countries; the range of hypotheses generated by the model,

---

<sup>27</sup> Policies in this type of structure are issued in the name of the denominational leader rather than the denomination or the actual architect of the policy. In Walter M. Abbot, (general editor), The Documents of Vatican II, New York: Gull Press, 1966, p. 390, Paul J. Hallinan quotes the council of 1869-1870: "...the Roman Pontiff, as successor of Peter, enjoys supreme, full, immediate, and universal authority over the care of souls by divine institution...a primacy of ordinary power over all churches [i.e. dioceses]". This goes to the heart of the position occupied by the Pope in the Roman Catholic hierarchy.

however, will be large with many controlling factors introduced. In the interests of clarity the hypotheses generated by the model will be listed at this point. Listing them will provide a convenient reference and an overview of the chapters that will follow. A separate chapter has been devoted to the operationalization and testing of each hypothesis.

*1) Denominational policy positions will not differ substantially from those of their constituents.*

*2) Those denominations with a hierarchical government will be less constrained in making policy or introducing new aspects of an issue onto the agenda than those that are governed on either a pluralistic representative model or by the entire membership.*

*3) Denominations follow the policies of the conciliar organizations of which they are members.*

*4) Denominations with a presbyterian structure of government will be more likely to follow conciliar policies than either those that are episcopal or congregational in structure.*

*5) Those denominations with liberal theological outlook are likely to adopt the conciliar position.*

*6) The level of nuclear threat to the nation in which a denomination is located will affect the willingness of the denomination to support the policies of the nation-state.*

*7) The more closely associated a denomination is with the state the more unlikely it will be to shift its policy to one of opposition to the state. In other words, the greater the stake of the denomination in the existing order, the less likely it is to challenge that order.*

### **The Dependent Variable**

There are 17 variables that identify a denomination's position regarding the nuclear issue, (i.e. nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence); these are: 1) the nuclear threat as a problem, 2) the nuclear threat as part of a broader issue, 3) deterrence, 4) possession of nuclear weapons, 5) use of nuclear weapons, 6) general and complete disarmament, 7) nuclear disarmament, 8) unspecified disarmament, 9) the likelihood of nuclear war, 10) encouragement to negotiate, 11) endorsement/praise of specific treaties, conferences, talks or other governmental actions, 12) comprehensive testing ban (includes underground testing), 13) unspecified testing ban (does

not specifically include underground testing), 14) nuclear freeze and/or nuclear free zone, 15) reduction of armaments, 16) objection/criticism of particular governmental actions, and 17) other aspects of the nuclear issue. These variables are identified by considering the options available to the denomination once an issue has reached its agenda. These options are 1) acknowledge the issue, 2) fit the issue into a broader context--usually one already being addressed, or 3) consider particular solutions or strategies. It must be noted that these options are not mutually exclusive. A single document might contain statements indicative of all three actions. The specific denominational position for each of these variables is determined by applying the techniques of content analysis<sup>28</sup> of statements,<sup>29</sup> reports, and resolutions made by the denominations in the study. Coding the variable is done based on the themes<sup>30</sup> that are present in each statement. There are frequently multiple themes in a single denominational policy statement; thus, it may contain more than one variable. Themes in denominational policy statements are frequently separated from one another by semicolons or commas. Every effort is made to be as exact as possible, and except for obvious synonyms,<sup>31</sup> statements must contain the exact policy terms, e.g. nuclear disarmament, in order to be coded as that particular variable. The actual coding and detailed descriptions of the variables is provided in Appendix B.

Acknowledging the issue and placing the issue into a broader context are options that serve largely to recognize the existence of the issue and identify it as one with which the denomination may properly concern itself. These two options are ways of addressing the issue without getting into the myriad details of the problem and/or providing specific solutions. These options are ways of conceding that the issue is important and thus reassuring those that are concerned. By merely acknowledging the issue and thus not advocating a particular policy or approach or by treating the issue as part of a larger issue--placing it into the broader context of an issue that is already being addressed--conflict can be kept to a minimum. The variables--the nuclear threat as a problem and the nuclear threat as part of a larger problem--are representative of acknowledging the problem and/or placing it into a broader context. In my analysis these two variables serve merely to indicate the presence of the issue on the agenda. Consideration of particular solutions or strategies is a more complex option; it requires that the denomination identify the various facets of the issue

---

<sup>28</sup> The specific techniques of content analysis employed can be found in Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969.

<sup>29</sup> In the case of the Roman Catholic Church this includes papal speeches, addresses, homilies, etc.

<sup>30</sup> The concept conveyed in the individual sentences that make up the statements that compose the document.

<sup>31</sup> Negotiate, hold talks.

before considering and recommending particular solutions or strategies for dealing with these facets. In my analysis this option is represented by the variables deterrence, possession of nuclear weapons, use of nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament, nuclear disarmament, unspecified disarmament, encouragement to negotiate, endorsement/praise of specific treaties, conferences, talks or other governmental actions, comprehensive testing ban (includes underground testing), unspecified testing ban (does not specifically include underground testing), nuclear freeze and/or nuclear free zone, reduction of armaments, objection/criticism of particular governmental actions, and all other aspects of the nuclear issue. Examining these variables will enable me to determine which aspect of the nuclear issue the denominations in my study consider most important and most amenable of solution. The variable likelihood of nuclear war is included as a measure of how concerned denominations are about the possibility of a nuclear war.

Before detailing the coding of the data it is necessary to say a few words about the data to be coded. Data were collected largely through mail solicitations. The denominations and conciliar bodies were written to requesting copies of all policy statements that dealt with the issue of nuclear weapons/nuclear deterrence.<sup>32</sup> In addition each denomination and conciliar body was asked to state in writing that to the best knowledge available all relevant policy statements had been obtained.

In actually coding the data, the first step was determining which variables were present in each of the denominational statements that were collected. The second step was to determine how frequently each variable occurs in all the denominational statement(s) issued during each year. It is assumed that the more important the denomination considers a variable, the more frequent will be the references to it. The final step in coding is to count the number of documents relating to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence issued for each denomination for each year. This is done in order to provide a measure of importance of the issue to the denomination; the more statements issued the greater the importance the denomination has attached to the question.

---

<sup>32</sup> In the case of the Canadian Council of Churches and United Church of Canada I, personally, conducted on site research in their archives.

## CHAPTER II

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICY AND CONSTITUENT OPINION

*1) Denominational policy positions will not differ substantially from those of their constituents.*

The relationship between a denomination and its constituent publics is complex. Denominations desire to influence the views of their members, to be responsive to the wishes of members and to attract new members. All of these organizational pressures are at work in denominational policy making. Denominations are not immune to pressures such as the need to maintain a resource base (membership) sufficient to achieve their goals. In addition, as a denomination's resource base grows large enough to support current goals, their goals will expand so that their resource base must continue to increase in order to support these new goals.

Another compelling reason Christian denominations endeavor to increase their membership has to do with organizational goals and identity. All organized groups are formed for specific purposes.<sup>1</sup> The purpose for which the organization formed serves as its organizational identity and delineates its goals. For Christian denominations their purpose, as discussed in Chapter I, is expressed through Biblical injunctions issued by the one they recognize as the Christ. Jesus said:

Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you. And surely I will be with you always, to the very end of the age.<sup>2</sup>

In addition to the purely organizational needs that may require increased membership, Christian denominations, thus, have a direct command to proselytize and instruct; making these important organizational purposes.

---

<sup>1</sup> For more detail about the nature of groups and organizations see: Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971; Carol S. Greenwald, Group Power: Lobbying and Public Policy, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977; Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965, 1971; and David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, second edition, New York: Knopf, 1971.

<sup>2</sup> Matthew 28:19-20 NIV

Organizational pressures mean that if the positions taken by denominational policy makers differ substantially from the opinions held by their members, the members are likely to "vote with their feet" and change their denominational affiliation. For this reason it can be expected that the policy positions taken by denominations will not differ substantially from those of their constituent publics. This is the case because organizational realities will force denominations to respond to public opinion by either adopting the positions of its constituent public or by trying to lead public opinion incrementally rather than in large jumps if they are going counter to constituents' beliefs on an issue. In Christian denominations the policy-makers must be judicious when endeavoring to lead or, at minimum, guide constituent opinion to obedience to the commands of the Christ.

Policy-making in Christian denominations does not differ dramatically from that of any other organization. The principle difference lies in the impact organizational goals and identities have on the policy-making process. Jesus, the Christ, gave his disciples a number of commands. These commands can be distilled into three broad directives 1) worship God, 2) teach others about God, and 3) serve others. The Christian Church is the organizational structure that arose to facilitate implementation of these directives. The various denominations differ in the manner in which they practice these broad directives, not their acceptance of them. Before turning to an examination of the way in which the distinctive organizational identity and goals of Christian denominations influence policy-making and the role of public opinion a brief review of the interaction between public opinion within organizations and policy-making will be useful.

### **Public Opinion and Policy Making**

In broad terms two explanations exist for the working of public or constituent opinion within organizations. According to the first explanation, organizations lead rather than follow public opinion. This theory is in accordance with Almond's description of the formation of public opinion. He argues that there are certain people who are prominent and/or regarded as experts who serve as leaders of opinion. These opinion leaders are people whose views are respected and who influence the views of other less knowledgeable or less informed individuals. Organizational leaders, according to this theory, are viewed as opinion setters.<sup>3</sup> The second

---

<sup>3</sup> Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Fredrick Praeger Publishers, 1960, 140-141.

explanation is based on the ideas of legitimacy and responsiveness. Unless an organization responds to the wishes, needs, and desires of its members, the membership will withdraw its support (legitimacy). Withdrawal of support can either take the form of leaving the organization entirely or challenging and/or ignoring the rules and policies of the organization. These two theories are useful simplifications of the interplay between "the public" and "policy makers".

It is helpful to examine simplified explanations or theories such as these because they contain key components that describe the workings of public opinion. This allows a better grasp of the principles involved.<sup>4</sup> The relationship between the public and policy makers actually lies somewhere between the two explanations. Neither the public nor policy makers function in a vacuum cut off from feedback from any source. The relationship between public opinion and policy making much more resembles the old question of which came first, the chicken or the egg. Do policy makers influence and set policy or does public opinion determine both which issues policy makers address and how they are resolved?<sup>5</sup> In truth the answer is yes to both questions. There is feedback and reinforcement at work. Public opinion does not flow in only one direction.

In general, the salience of an issue has been shown to be the factor that most determines the direction of opinion flow.<sup>6</sup> Policy-makers are much more likely to follow the dominant opinion within the public when the issue is one that is of great importance or salience to the public. When the issue is one that is not especially salient policy makers tend to set policy guided by their own attitudes and opinions rather than the attitudes and opinions of the public. It is when salience is low that policy makers can have the greatest impact on public opinion. It is not always an easy task, however, to determine the salience of an issue.

### **Denominational Policy Making and Public Opinion**

Just as governments must, at least to some extent, follow the wishes of their citizens or face mass exodus or revolution, so too must Christian denominations satisfy the expectations of their membership. While religious faith itself tends to remain strong denominational loyalty does not exhibit the same tendency. Individuals change their denominational affiliation over a variety of issues. These issues range from perceived inadequacy of religious instruction to incompatible

---

<sup>4</sup> John C. Bennett (editor), Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962, p. 95.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 117.

<sup>6</sup> See John C. Bennett (editor), Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962.

political viewpoints to frustration with the social agenda of the denomination. A denomination that failed to be responsive to its membership would, after a time, lose its membership. Thus, to retain its membership, a denomination needs to know the attitudes and expectations of its members, this need applies equally to religious, political and social questions. Knowing the expectations and attitudes of members enables denominations to lead incrementally. One method it has of knowing the attitudes and expectations of its members is to take note of public opinion. Public opinion is, however a very broad category. Denominations concentrate on a specific aspect of this public opinion--constituent opinion.

Although the entire public might be considered as the constituency of an official state religion the same is unlikely to be true for other denominations. As noted in Chapter I denominations tend to have specific constituencies<sup>7</sup> composed both of individuals who are members of the denomination and non-members with similar characteristics. From this analysis it might be assumed that denominations are opinion followers. Indeed, Kenneth Wald provides an excellent analysis of the reasons denominations will follow constituent opinion.

To an extent possibly unparalleled in the modern world, the American citizen is confronted with a range of denominational options. . . . Given the availability of alternatives, the churches, in order to survive, must compete for followers. In religion, as in politics and economics, competition has stimulated the participants to bid for support with all manner of incentives.

. . . As part of this effort to embrace a wider community, the churches have also struggled to become compatible with dominant social values. Far from standing apart from society or condemning it, American churches for the most part have labored to integrate themselves into the American way of life.<sup>8</sup>

Wald's analysis of the competition between denominations in the United States applies as well to the denominations in the other nations in my study.

There exists a marked contrast between such academic assessment and the perceptions of denominational and conciliar organizations. Denominations and conciliar organizations view themselves as opinion leaders. This self-image is consistent with the command to proselytize and instruct cited above. It is reasonable to argue that by seeking to mold opinion denominations and conciliar bodies are endeavoring to draw the attitudes of potential constituents toward their own

---

<sup>7</sup> See C.H. Dodd, G.R. Cragg, and Jacques Ellul, Social and Cultural Factors in Church Divisions, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1952.

<sup>8</sup> Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1987, p. 16.

thereby fulfilling the command "teaching them to obey everything I have commanded you." In addition, it might be argued that when a person's opinions are already in line with those of a denomination it lessens the step that would be necessary to become a member. It might also make membership more attractive. This is the case due to the expectation that people will only join groups and organizations in which they share a commonality of interest.

From this analysis it is clear that the organizational goal of teaching others about God results in a belief among denominational and conciliar policy-makers that they must lead public opinion. The belief that denominations must help to form and lead public opinion can be seen in the statements of a number of conciliar bodies. Mrs. Alice Wimer of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA (NCCCUSA) addressed the Conference of European Churches stating "...our system of government is responsive to public opinion, and the churches help mold public opinion."<sup>9</sup> The NCCCUSA stated in a resolution on nuclear testing that it ". . . [urged] its program units and member churches to take immediate action to encourage mobilization of public opinion and encourage citizen action toward the accomplishment of these goals."<sup>10</sup> The World Council of Churches (WCC) in its June 1975 Memorandum on Disarmament urged

"the calling of a World Disarmament Conference. Member churches of the WCC, and individual Christians everywhere, can help to create the climate of opinion in which, at last, such a conference might have some hope of success."<sup>11</sup>

Denominational and conciliar leadership clearly perceives itself as a guide that has done the necessary research to become informed and reach educated opinions about the issue. Denomination members, by this perception, to minimize their own expenditure of time and effort and to "grow with God," accept the opinion of the leadership rather than forming their own opinion based on personal research and knowledge. Denominational leaders, here, function as trusted advisors and opinion guides.

A denomination that takes policy stands that diverge sharply from that of their members, however, will find its positions and teachings disregarded. This phenomenon can be seen in the

---

<sup>9</sup> Governing Board of the National Council of Churches of Christ U.S.A., Resolution on the Complete Cessation of all Explosive Nuclear Testing, May 4, 1977.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>11</sup> Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Peace and Disarmament: Documents of the World Council of Churches presented by Commission of the Churches on International Affairs; Roman Catholic Church presented by The Pontifical Commission <Justitia et Pax>, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982, p. 79.

conflict between the U.S. Catholic Church and the Vatican over such issues as contraception, abortion, and homosexuality. And when a denomination is not meeting the needs of its membership, by expecting members, for example, to abide by teachings that members regard as outmoded or wrong-headed, it will lose members.<sup>12</sup> The strength of an individual's religious convictions is not necessarily an indication of the strength of their denominational affiliation or institutional loyalty.<sup>13</sup> People are able to change denominational affiliation without disturbing their fundamental religious beliefs. In 1992, the research arm of the Presbyterian denomination, the Presbyterian Panel, reported that only one third of the members of the denomination had grown up in the Presbyterian Church (USA) while two-thirds of the membership came from some other background.<sup>14</sup>

Clearly, denominations act in a dual capacity both as opinion followers and opinion leaders. Opinion flows in both directions between leadership and membership. This bi-directional flow lends support to hypothesis one. As opinion followers denominations can be expected to adopt constituent opinions while as leaders denominations cannot depart too extensively from constituent opinion or the members may depart for more congenial denominations. Consequently, a relationship can be expected between denominational policy positions and constituent opinion. The flow of opinion leadership and members mean that denominational policy should not differ substantially from the opinions of its constituents. A true test of this hypothesis, unfortunately, requires data that were not available. Complete public opinion data are unavailable as most polls omit the denominational variable. These polls break religious affiliation down into Catholic, Protestant, Jewish and other, making it difficult to conduct a rigorous examination of the impact of constituent opinion on denominational policy except in the case of the Roman Catholic or Jewish denominations. There are some data available for the United Kingdom that include the denominational variable. These are from surveys by the United States Information Agency (USIA) surveys of the United Kingdom. These data exist for the years 1964, 1965, 1969, and 1971. The denominational variables are Church of

---

<sup>12</sup> This is illustrated in the media attention given to Catholic Priests and Nuns who leave the Roman Catholic Church over Vatican policy positions on contraception etc.

<sup>13</sup> For an excellent review of the literature addressing the communal versus associational aspects of religion see Wade Clark Roof, "Concepts and Indicators of Religious Commitment: A Critical Review," in Robert Wuthnow (editor), The Religious Dimension: New Directions in Quantitative Research, New York: Academic Press, 1979, 17-46.

<sup>14</sup> As cited in a 1992 sermon by Pastor Robyn Hogue at University Place Presbyterian Church, Tacoma, Washington.

England (Anglican), Church of Scotland (Presbyterian), Catholic, Free Church and other. Unfortunately the number of years available is so small the results could, at best, serve merely as indications.

An additional complication is the problem of question comparability. Public opinion poll questions are so focused and designed to measure such specifics that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to use them to look at broader concerns. Even though the dependent variables are based on broadly defined categories it is not possible to place the public opinion poll questions into these same categories.

Not only is it impossible to find questions that would fit into the same categories that were used in determining the dependent variables but also the same or even comparable questions were not asked consistently over the 41 years of this study. Sometimes a question would be asked for a few successive years before being replaced by a new one but the few years that a particular question was asked are not sufficient to yield meaningful results when used in regression analysis. Rather than being asked in successive years it is more common that a question will be asked at different times during the same year. Because the calendar year is the measure of time used in this work this raised an additional coding problem. If successive questions are coded as separate variables this results in a loss of data as missing variables are deleted. This is due to the fact that not every question that is asked sequentially in one year is asked sequentially in following years.

The biggest difficulty, however, is simply that the questions asked are not the same. When pollsters ask, "does the creation of atomic weapons make another world war more likely or not" it is not the same as asking "how worried are you about the chance of a world war breaking out in which atomic bombs would be used--very worried, fairly worried, or not worried at all." While both these questions deal with the question of world war the specific thrust of the questions is very different. The first question addresses nuclear deterrence; with atomic bombs in existence is a world war more or less likely. The second question confronts the fear that atomic bombs might be used if a world war breaks out.

Even when the question addresses the same issue there is still the problem of how the question is asked. When people were asked in 1956 "some people say that the United States should call off hydrogen bomb tests for the present. Do you agree or disagree with this

viewpoint?" only 24% agreed.<sup>15</sup> In 1957, respondents were asked "if all other nations, including Russia, agree to stop making any more tests with nuclear weapons and H-bombs, should the United States agree to stop, or not?" The response was 63% who thought the United States should stop.<sup>16</sup> It is possible that public opinion could have swung nearly 40% in less than one year but it is more likely that the way the question is posed is responsible for the change. In the first question it is an unqualified testing ban that is presented. In the second the question is directed at whether the United States should stop testing *if other nations do as well*. This qualification makes a great difference.

Data adequate for the task of testing hypothesis one within a formal model would require both the denominational variable and identical questions over time. As these factors do not exist it was reluctantly concluded that there is simply no way of using the available data. Without consistent questions over a substantial period of time analysis of public opinion data in relation to denominational policy making cannot yield results that will have any meaning.

While the available data were inadequate to effectively test the role opinion plays in influencing denominational policy-making, it clearly has a role to play. Logically as both opinion followers and leaders denominations can be expected to demonstrate a relationship between denominational policy and constituent opinion. The evolution of policy positions not only in denominations but also in the mass media, peace movements and academic thought can also be seen as adding credence to the hypothesis. Peace movements are a particularly interesting aspect of the question. While it has not been empirically tested there is believed to be a strong correlation between membership gains by peace movements and increased attention to the nuclear issue by denominations. This is a possible surrogate for constituent opinion but here again the data are inadequate for a true test. Reliable statistics on peace movement membership are not available across time.

As for the central question of how a religious organization handles political issues, it is revealing that denominations and conciliar organizations regard themselves primarily as opinion leaders. Rather than viewing themselves as subject to the pressure of constituent opinion they appear to give more weight to their organizational purpose of instructing. Denominational self-perception here is that they choose obedience to the directives of the Christ over political

---

<sup>15</sup> The Gallup Poll, *Public Opinion 1935-1971*, volume 2, survey #573-K, 10/18-23/56, p.1452.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, survey #582-K, 4/25-30/57, 1487-1488.

compromise and expediency. They see themselves as guided by a higher power rather than worldly precepts.

The actual direction and relative strengths of the flow between denominational policies and constituent opinions is beyond the ability of this work to determine. Yet, regardless of the direction and relative strengths of the flow there is no doubt that it exists and does impact denominational policy making.

## CHAPTER III

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

- 2) *Those denominations with a hierarchical government will be less constrained in making policy or introducing new aspects of an issue onto the agenda than those that are governed on either a pluralistic representative model or by the entire membership.*

Chapter II discussed the function of public opinion as a pressure on policy making. It described how public opinion might act as an important pressure influencing the organizational dictate of attracting and holding members. In that chapter public opinion alone was considered. Organizational dictates, however, are not factors that operate in isolation. As the model noted, there are a number of factors which act as constraints on denominational policy shifts. Hypothesis two examines the effect of one of these constraints--organizational structure--on the ability of the denomination to act in response to the pressures of organizational dictates and conciliarism.

In order to examine the role of organizational structure in denominational policy making it is necessary to define the term organizational structure. This will be accomplished by examining both organization and structure. Most definitions of organization have three features in common 1) predictability of actions<sup>1</sup>, 2) communication<sup>2</sup>, and 3) purpose.<sup>3</sup> These are the features necessary to the existence of an organization.

Predictability of action refers to the routinized forms of behavior that are needed if an organization is to carry out its tasks. These are both the standard operating procedures of those charged with implementing a policy<sup>4</sup> and the willingness to serve described by Barnard.<sup>5</sup> In order for an organization to function it must have certain routine behaviors that are present and it must have people willing to carry out those behaviors. Without these factors there is no organization.

---

<sup>1</sup> For the best description of this see Curt Tausky, Work Organizations: Major Theoretical Perspectives, Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1970, p. 7.

<sup>2</sup> On the role of communication in organizations see Chester I. Barnard, "Formal Organizations," in Joseph A. Litterer, (editor), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980, 45-55.

<sup>3</sup> See Herbert Kaufman, "Organization Theory and Political Theory," 93-105, Chester I. Barnard, "Formal Organizations," 45-55, and Talcott Parsons, "Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Formal Organization," 65-80, all in Joseph A. Litterer, (editor), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980.

<sup>4</sup> See Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

<sup>5</sup> Chester I. Barnard, "Formal Organizations" in Joseph A. Litterer, (editor), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980, p. 45.

Communication is simply the means of passing information through the organizational system. It is also the mechanisms by which the organization interacts with its environment. Organizations must recognize and respond to changes in the environment if they are to continue to exist and to fulfill their purpose. Once environmental changes have been identified and the appropriate response selected this information must be disseminated throughout the organization. Thus, communication is both an internal and external function that is necessary for the maintenance of an organization.

Purpose is perhaps the most important feature of an organization. Every organization that exists does so for a specific reason. This is true whether the organization is a manufacturing plant that exists to produce shoes or a social club that exists to provide an opportunity for members to meet and interact. There is an underlying purpose to each organization. The foregoing is something of an oversimplification. Organizations seldom have a single purpose. Both the manufacturing plant and the social club used as examples above have several purposes. The manufacturing plant, for instance, also exists to generate income, either for stockholders or private owners, provide employment, purchase resources, etc. These purposes, however, tend to be interrelated. Usually there is a primary purpose that the other purposes exist to support. An organization cannot thrive without a purpose even if the purpose is merely continuity.

The structure of an organization is the formal, intended, nature of the interactions necessary for carrying out its purpose. In short, structure provides the blueprint of the organization. The blueprint defines the manner in which the organization is governed--the mechanism used for making policy decisions as well as the other decisions necessary for the continued functioning of the organization. The mechanisms for making policy are important because these mechanisms determine the nature of the constraints which are in operation. These mechanisms also establish the speed with which an organization can respond to changes in its environment as well as its ability to make needed policy changes.

There are several forms that can be taken by organizational structure. These forms can be categorized employing Aristotle's parallel discussion of government into rule by the one, the few, or the many.<sup>6</sup> Thus the policy making organizational structure of denominations can be

---

<sup>6</sup> The connection between organizational structure and government systems is made based on the parallels between organizational theory and political theory recognized by Herbert Kaufman, "organization Theory and Political Theory," in Joseph A. Litterer, (editor), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980, 93-105

controlled by one dominant policy maker, a few elected representatives, or by the many members of the denomination. The single dominant policy maker corresponds to the episcopal structure (Roman Catholic),<sup>7</sup> the few representative policy-makers to the presbyterian model (Presbyterian, United, Uniting and Anglican/Episcopal),<sup>8</sup> and the membership as policy makers to the congregational form (Baptist).

It is possible for a single dominant policy-maker to act quickly and to ignore the need to gain the approval or consent of anyone else. There is, in a sense, no need for him to worry about either fulfilling his role obligations as a representative and the necessity of trade-off and compromise that is inherent in a pluralistic representative system or need to be concerned about reaching a consensus. A dominant policy maker can simply exercise the power vested in him by virtue of occupying his office. Thus, for an episcopally organized denomination it should be possible both to make changes in a shorter period of time and to make more changes. While he has the authority to make drastic shifts in policy, he is still subject--if he wishes to retain the support of the membership--to constraints. The policy maker can make changes more quickly and more often than his counter parts in the other denominations but would be wise not do so simply on a whim.

A single dominant policy maker does not achieve power on his own. There is a cadre of lesser powers that have cooperated to place him in authority, i.e. the College of Cardinals that elects the Pope. In a very real sense his power derives from the willingness of the rank and file membership and those who put him in power to follow where he leads. Consequently, the dominant policy maker must be careful not to alienate either the rank and file membership of the organization or those who put him in power. Alienating either or both of these groups would undermine the policy maker's own authority. Thus, while it is theoretically possible for an episcopally organized denomination to make more changes, enunciate more extreme policies, and address more aspects of the issues than the presbyterian and congregational denominations if it changes policies drastically too often, frequently taking positions that are very extreme, and/or tries to tackle every aspect of an issue all the time, the rank and file and/or those who put the policy maker in power are likely to be alienated. It is not simply policy changes that are of concern. There is also the sheer weight of tradition that must be taken into account. There is a

---

<sup>7</sup> In the episcopal form the leadership is organized hierarchically in succeeding ranks.

<sup>8</sup> Presbyterian is from the root presbyter, which means elder, presbyterian is government by elders.

strong reluctance to change the way things have always been done. This reluctance can be found in any organizational structure. The need to preserve his power base by not acting capriciously or altering tradition serves as the principal constraint on the single dominant policy maker.

This analysis neglects the impact of personal belief and attitudes on the decision-making of the dominant policy-maker. This is due to the fact that it is impossible to determine these beliefs within the scope of this work. The long term, in-depth interviews and/or extensive content analysis required to accurately evaluate the personal attitudes and beliefs of the dominant policy-maker are simply non-existent. As a result this work treats this possible contributory decision making factor as if it has no impact. The purpose of this work is to provide an initial look at the decision making of Christian denominations for issues that have clear political dimensions. It is intended to be a foundation work upon which future research can be built.

Unlike a dominant policy maker a few representative policy makers must first concern themselves with carrying out the will of those they represent or implementing the policy they believe to be most beneficial to those they represent. A single dominant policy maker should be more concerned with leading while representatives should be more concerned with reflecting the interests and needs of those they represent. When the interests or desired policies of one representative clash with those of others, then trade-offs and compromises must be worked out. Policy cannot be set by any single representative. It is a cooperative effort; while unanimous agreement is not required it is still necessary to obtain the agreement of a majority or in some instances a plurality. The process of compromise in order to form a majority can be long and difficult. For this reason presbyterian denominations should be slower to change policy and make fewer changes than their episcopal counter-parts.

Policy-making by the membership is perhaps the slowest form of policy-making. When each individual member has a voice in the process it is necessary to present arguments to every individual in order to persuade him/her of the desirability of a particular policy. This is the manner in which a consensus must be constructed. Without a consensus, the policy in question will not be accepted or implemented. The time and effort needed to inform each individual makes it virtually impossible for rapid or frequent policy changes to take place. Even when people are following an opinion leader, individuals still adopt the opinion leaders position at varying speeds and the process is not swift. As a result congregationalism should be the slowest

type of denominational organizational structure when it comes to making policy changes as well as the denominational structure least likely to make frequent changes.

The descriptions above refer to the pure or ideal types of each of these organizational forms. Unfortunately in the real world ideal types seldom exist. Of my denominations the Presbyterian and Roman Catholic come closest to the ideal types. The Presbyterian denomination is governed on presbyterian, pluralist representative lines and actually differs very little from the ideal type. In the Roman Catholic denomination the Pope is the dominant policy-maker, he is at the apex of the episcopal hierarchy, but as Vatican II made clear, policy-making is collegial in nature.<sup>9</sup> The National Councils of Bishops within each nation have the authority to issue policy statements about issues that affect their nation providing these statements do not depart from the policies established by the Pope.<sup>10</sup>

The Baptist denominations are congregational but sheer size makes policy-making by the entire membership extremely unwieldy at the national level. Congregational decision-making is the rule at the level of the individual congregations but in order to increase denominational power and resources, the local congregations have cooperated to form voluntary associations composed of elected delegates. These associations act as coordinating bodies of cooperative programs--foreign missions, etc. While their primary purpose is to distribute the resources contributed by the local congregations however, they are able to make policy pronouncements. These pronouncements represent the majority beliefs of member congregations and are not binding upon the local congregations. The majority opinion nature of policy positions means that getting a policy position endorsed by a Baptist association still necessitates that the majority of Baptists must share that position.

The Anglican/Episcopal denominations are least like their ideal types. While there are succeeding ranks the national denominations in each nation do not necessarily have a dominant policy-maker. In the United States, for example, the Episcopal denomination is governed by a General Conference that is composed of two houses, the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies. All policy is made at this General Conference and must be passed by both houses.<sup>11</sup> As a result the denomination, in the United States, functions much like a presbyterian denomination.

---

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix D.

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix D

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix D.

The Anglican denominations in other countries are organized along the same lines as the Episcopal denomination in the United States except within the United Kingdom.

In the United Kingdom the Anglican denomination, as the Church of England, is the official state religion. As a result the General Conference does not have the same authority as in other nations. In matters of doctrine the Church of England is subject to parliament.<sup>12</sup> Because of policy making in Anglican/Episcopal denominations more closely resembling the presbyterian organizational structure, it will be coded as presbyterian. This is true even of the Church of England since it is subject to Parliament which is a representative body. Care should be taken, however, in assessing the policy positions of the Church of England since it is also a branch of the government. This issue will be taken up more fully in Chapter VIII.

Testing hypothesis two relies first on determining the organizational structure of the denominations.<sup>13</sup> The second step is to identify policy positions in each denomination. Policy positions were determined as part of the dependent variable data.<sup>14</sup> Of the issue positions chosen to serve as the dependent variable, only three (acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of the possession of nuclear weapons and usability of nuclear weapons) measure definite policies. A denomination either accepts, accepts conditionally, or rejects a policy of nuclear deterrence, possession of nuclear weapons or using nuclear weapons in warfighting. The other variables, those that advocate particular strategies and recommend or condemn actions, also measure policies but because of the coding rules used<sup>15</sup> the policy positions are not as clear cut since they include discussion of the issue without a definite policy pronouncement. Due to this division in the type of variables available only the variables showing a definite policy will be used in the initial test of hypothesis two.

The available policy choices for the variables showing a definite policy are 1) complete acceptance, 2) conditional acceptance and 3) rejection (these choices can be regarded as always, sometimes and never). These positions can be ranked in terms of how controversial they are in terms of governmental policies. The more a policy position deviates from that of the government the more controversial it is said to be. This is because governmental policy is considered to represent the position of the nation.

---

<sup>12</sup> Parliament is in turn guided on these issues by the General Conference. Despite all this the Anglican/Episcopal denomination is still organized as in succeeding ranks and thus qualifies as an episcopal denomination.

<sup>13</sup> See Appendix D for a description of the organizational structure of the denominations.

<sup>14</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix B.

The most extreme position that a denomination can take is rejection of governmental policy. This is the most extreme since governmental policies in each of the nations in the study rely on the policy of nuclear deterrence with its underlying assumptions that possessing nuclear weapons is certainly necessary, if not moral, for implementing the policy and that if deterrence fails these weapons could be used. While Australia, Canada and New Zealand do not possess nuclear weapons of their own, by allying themselves with the United States and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom, who do possess nuclear weapons, they have placed themselves under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence.

If hypothesis two is correct then the episcopally organized denominations should make more policy pronouncements and/or take more definite or extreme policy positions (all other factors being equal) than presbyterian or congregational denominations. Before testing this proposition it is wise first to have a picture of the data being used. In examining the data it becomes apparent that there are actually very few instances when a definite policy on the variables acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession and usability of nuclear weapons has been enunciated by the various denominations in this study. In most years denominations have made no clear unequivocal statements about these issues.

The actual position of the denomination for the three variables (acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear possession and usability of nuclear weapons) was determined by examining the themes that dominate the variable, i.e. the theme most frequently found in the statements/documents issued by each denomination. In cases where two or more positions are present with identical frequency and when there was no position expressed during the year the policy position was considered to be indeterminate. Indeterminate was the largest category for each of these variables since few definite policy statements were issued.

The sum totals of all policy positions by all the denominations in the sample for all the years under consideration on the variables acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession and usability of nuclear weapons are provided in Table 1. This is broken down in the table by nation. Clearly, throughout the nuclear age denominations have been rather reluctant to state unequivocal positions on these aspects of the nuclear question. Table 1 represents all the available policy choices combined.

Table 1. Total Number of Definite Policy Statements of All Denominations from 1945 to 1985 by Policy and Nation

	Nuclear Deterrence	Weapons Possession	Use of Nuclear Weapons
Australia	2	5	4
Canada	7	4	8
New Zealand	2	2	1
United Kingdom	3	2	5
United States	2	5	4

Examination of the specific positions adopted reveals that over time the denominations have, with one exception, never given unconditional support to policies of nuclear deterrence, or possession of nuclear weapons or use of nuclear weapons. Only the United Church of Canada ever included in its statements the position that nuclear deterrence was always acceptable. This was the position in 1968. In stating that ". . . Canadians favour a policy of credible deterrence"<sup>16</sup> the United Church of Canada was not expressing overwhelming support for a policy of nuclear deterrence, but neither was this support qualified. No denomination in any country ever included a statement that possession of nuclear weapons was always moral. Nor has any denomination in any nation been willing to accept the use of nuclear weapons without reserve.

As Table 1 demonstrated there are very few data points that can be used in testing hypothesis two. Thus the hypothesis will need to be restated in order to test this aspect of the overall model. In the case of these variables the hypothesis becomes:

*Episcopally organized denominations are most likely to have taken definite policy stands on the questions of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession, and usability of nuclear weapons and to have taken these positions earlier than are the presbyterian and congregationally organized denominations; episcopal denominations are also most likely to have rejected these policies.*

There are essentially three aspects to this hypothesis; 1) the frequency with which denominations address the issue, 2) the extent to which a denomination's stated policy positions differ from those of the nation state and 3) the timeliness with which a denomination adopts its policy positions. Each of these aspects will be used in turn in testing the hypothesis.

Having determined how it is possible to rank these policy positions in terms of controversy it is time to specify these rankings more precisely. Government policy in all the

<sup>16</sup> CCIA Report, "Guidelines for Peace," 1968, p. 31.

nations in the study has been that of reliance on nuclear deterrence. Thus, the least controversial position that denominations might take is to say that nuclear deterrence is always acceptable. Conditional acceptance of the policy of nuclear deterrence would be ranked as somewhat controversial because to place conditions upon nuclear deterrence itself is an effort to limit government policy; support is qualified. Finally, rejection of the policy of nuclear deterrence is the most controversial and extreme position available to the denominations. This is active opposition to government policy.

The policy of nuclear deterrence relies upon the *possession* of nuclear weapons and the *threat* of using them. Nuclear deterrence cannot exist without the presence of nuclear weapons. The governments of the nations in this study believe that it is acceptable to possess nuclear weapons for use in deterrence. Possession of nuclear weapons is thus used in order to preserve the nation from nuclear attack. Saying that possession of nuclear weapons is moral only under certain conditions is slightly more controversial than accepting the possession of nuclear weapons as a moral position. Rejection of the possession of nuclear weapons is the most controversial since this undercuts the legitimacy of the policy of nuclear deterrence itself. Rejecting the possession of nuclear weapons as immoral implies, without expressly stating, a rejection of the policy of nuclear deterrence.

The question of usability of nuclear weapons is a bit more complex. A credible nuclear deterrence relies upon the threat to use nuclear weapons. Deterrence is not credible if there is any reason to believe that the threat is not meant. Therefore governments must believe or at least officially appear to believe that under certain circumstances nuclear weapons will be used. The United States and United Kingdom must believe that they will use nuclear weapons should deterrence fail. Australia, Canada and New Zealand are not able to use nuclear weapons themselves but they believe or officially appear to believe that under certain circumstances nuclear weapons should be used on their behalf by their nuclear allies.

The fact that nuclear weapons have only been used once, despite the fact that there have been numerous military conflicts involving the nuclear weapons possessing nations, indicates that governments believe that nuclear weapons can only be used under certain circumstances. The official government policy based on the reliance on nuclear deterrence is that nuclear weapons are sometimes useable. Thus the position that nuclear weapons can sometimes be used is the least controversial policy position that denominations can adopt.

The goal of nuclear deterrence is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The very nature of these weapons makes the idea of using them extremely frightening to any thinking individual. For this reason it is argued that taking the stance that nuclear weapons can never be used in a just and moral fashion is less controversial policy than accepting all uses of nuclear weapons. That nuclear weapons can always be used would be the most extreme and controversial position.

Table 2 summarizes all these positions and ranks them from least controversial to most controversial.

Table 2. Degree of Controversy Associated With Policy Positions

	Acceptability of Deterrence	Possession of Nuclear Weapons	Usability of Nuclear Weapons
No Controversy	Always Acceptable	Always Moral	Sometimes Useable
Slight Controversy	Sometimes Acceptable	Sometimes Moral	Never Useable
Great Controversy	Never Acceptable	Never Moral	Always Useable

As the overview of the data shows, the denominations have almost always adopted at least slightly controversial positions regarding nuclear deterrence. Denominational positions regarding possession of nuclear weapons have always been at least slightly controversial as well. Regarding the policy of using nuclear weapons should deterrence fail denominational positions have uniformly stated that nuclear weapons are never usable. This position ranks as slightly controversial. The fact that denominations, with the exception of one tepid endorsement of nuclear deterrence from the United Church in Canada, have consistently adopted positions that are at least slightly controversial is intriguing. It suggests that the denominations in the study seek to exert some sort of moral authority over these governmental policies. Examination of the specific denominational positions provides the following general overview.

The majority of specific policies adopted by denominations are that nuclear weapons cannot ever be used in a just and moral fashion. The most frequently adopted denominational policy position on nuclear deterrence is that it is conditionally acceptable. This raises the problem that to condemn all use while accepting the policy of deterrence under some circumstances is a contradictory position. How is it possible for denominations to say both that nuclear weapons may never be used and conditionally accept a policy that explicitly states nuclear weapons will be used in a strategy of massive retaliation should deterrence fail? It is

difficult to believe that both these positions can be held simultaneously and retain credibility. As Trond Bakkevig rightly points out

. . . Christian ethics must reflect beforehand upon the situation which will arise if deterrence fails, just as in earlier times it had to reflect upon what attitude was the right one for Christians if the authorities waged a war.

. . . There are, . . . ethicists who defend nuclear deterrence, but who retreat from facing the consequences of a possible failure of deterrence. That is of course because nuclear war implies mass-murder and mass-death of civilians.<sup>17</sup>

The most common method of dealing with this contradiction is to accept deterrence as an *interim measure* acceptable only as long as the ultimate goal of real nuclear disarmament is pursued.<sup>18</sup> This implies that the denominations adopting these contradictory positions are willing to allow the use of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails until such time as total nuclear disarmament can be negotiated. The denominations avoid explicitly recognizing this implication.

The willingness of denominations to concentrate their attention on some of these policies and ignore the implications certain positions have for other policies appears to indicate that it is possible to rank order acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession and usability of nuclear weapons in terms of the political costs associated with taking positions on these aspects of the nuclear issue. Ordered from least political cost to greatest they are ranked as follows; 1) usability of nuclear weapons, 2) morality of possessing nuclear weapons and 3) acceptability of nuclear deterrence. Any time a denomination takes a position on a political issue that is different from that of the government the denomination is spending some of its political capital. The more denominational policy diverges from governmental policy the greater the political cost. This is because the more the denominational policy position diverges the more the denomination is challenging the authority of the state. In addition choosing to address certain issues will cost more political capital than addressing others. Some policies are more fundamentally part of the fabric of national life than are others. Challenging these policies is therefore more politically expensive for the denominations.

No one wants to see nuclear weapons used. Indeed, the entire concept of nuclear deterrence is designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. In addressing this aspect of the

---

<sup>17</sup> Trond Bakkevig, "The Doctrine on Just War--Relevance and Applicability," *Studia Theologica*, Volume 37, number 2, 125-145, 1983, 134 & 136.

<sup>18</sup> See for example "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, The U.S. Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Conference, Inc., Origins, volume 13, number 1, May 19, 1983.

nuclear question denominations are dealing with an aspect on which there is fundamental agreement that use of nuclear weapons is to be avoided. The arguments made regarding the need to be willing to use nuclear weapons if deterrence is to be credible are to most people abstractions. Most people want to believe that nuclear weapons will never be used. When a denomination adopts the position that nuclear weapons can never be used it may be spending some political capital because this differs from governmental policy and does serve to undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence but the cost is fairly low since saying nuclear weapons should never be used is not really a very controversial position.

Possessing nuclear weapons is an issue with a bit more political cost attached. While nuclear deterrence seeks never to use nuclear weapons, without those weapons nuclear deterrence cannot exist. A denomination that says it is immoral to possess nuclear weapons is in effect rejecting the policy of nuclear deterrence without saying so in so many words. Since nuclear deterrence is at the heart of national security, challenging an essential component of that policy carries a higher political cost.

The highest political cost of course comes from confronting the acceptability of nuclear deterrence directly. In declaring nuclear deterrence unacceptable a denomination is contesting a key government policy. The challenge to governmental authority is clear and unequivocal; the denomination is declaring the government morally wrong. In terms of political capital this is the most expensive position a denomination can take.

These rankings, both in terms of controversy and political cost, should be identical in both the nuclear-armed nations and in those sheltering under the nuclear umbrella. The degree of controversy and of political cost might be arguably diminished in the non-nuclear nations but the reliance on the policy of deterrence that is inherent in Alliance strategies for these nations would result in the same rankings. This was true for all three non-nuclear nations until the election of a Labour government in New Zealand led to the introduction of a bill banning nuclear ships from New Zealand ports. This bill can be seen both as a desire by the New Zealand government to withdraw from a reliance on nuclear deterrence and a “not in my back yard” attitude designed to protect them from the consequences of reliance on nuclear deterrence. Either interpretation indicates a reluctance to fully support the policy of nuclear deterrence.

Ranking of the policy options leads to the expectation that if the restated hypothesis is to prove valuable episcopal denominations are likely to be the ones rejecting the entire policy of

deterrence. Episcopal denominations are also more likely to place conditions on nuclear deterrence policy and to reject the possession of nuclear weapons on moral grounds. These policies should seldom be advocated by presbyterian denominations and virtually never by congregational denominations. In addition the policies of placing conditions on nuclear weapon possession and forbidding the use of nuclear weapons should be expressed most often by episcopal denominations but it would not be unusual to find these positions advocated by presbyterian and even congregational denominations. This is especially true of the policy of forbidding the use of nuclear weapons.

The restated hypothesis is tested simply by determining the specific policy positions and its ranking, both in terms of controversy and political cost, that each denomination has taken on each of the three variables and correlating these positions with the denominational structure. Only discernible policy positions were used; indeterminate policies were omitted from the analysis.

The analysis will begin with the least controversial policy, that of the usability of nuclear weapons. It is helpful at this point to provide a summary table showing the breakdown of all the statements issued by all the denominations in all the nations on the question of the usability of nuclear weapons.

Table 3. Number of Statements That Nuclear Weapons Can Never Be Used Issued By Each Type of Denomination

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Congregational	0	0	2	0	0
Episcopal	2	2	0	3	3
Presbyterian	2	4*/2+	1	1**/1++	1

\*United Church in Canada                      \*\*Church of Scotland  
 +Anglican Church in Canada                  ++Church of England

This table reveals that the predictions of hypothesis two regarding the behavior of episcopally structured denominations are borne out only in the United Kingdom and the United States. In all other nations the episcopally structured denomination was no more likely than any other structural type to issue an explicit position rejecting any use of nuclear weapons.

Hypothesis two expects that the congregationally organized denominations would be the least likely to make explicit policy statements. The results show this to be the case in every

nation except New Zealand. In no other nation does a congregationally structured denomination issue any specific policy pronouncements on the questions of nuclear deterrence, possessing nuclear weapons or using nuclear weapons. The congregationally structured denomination in New Zealand, the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, has issued specific policy statements on each of these questions. It has also adopted the most extreme position on each for each of these variables rejecting nuclear weapons use, possession and nuclear deterrence. The statements establishing these positions were issued in 1982 and 1984.

It is important to place these statements in a historical context. The Labour party in New Zealand adopted a platform calling for a ban on the docking of nuclear warships in New Zealand ports. The election was seen as a referendum on such a ban. Victory by the Labour party demonstrated the popular appeal of this position and on September 25, 1984 a bill banning nuclear warships from New Zealand ports was introduced in parliament.

Popular support for the docking ban on nuclear warships might account for the willingness of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand to take positions opposing all aspects of nuclear deterrence. It does not, however, account for why the episcopally organized denomination in New Zealand, the Roman Catholic Church, did not issue definite policy statements about any of these questions. New Zealand is the only nation where the episcopally structured denomination does not take a stand on at least one of these issues. In the other four nations in the study the episcopally organized denominations issue explicit policy statements about the use of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear deterrence in general. Two of the four, Australia and the United States, also address the question of the morality of nuclear weapons possession. It appears that denominational policy making in New Zealand is somehow fundamentally different.

In Australia the episcopally structured denomination, the Roman Catholic Church of Australia, and a presbyterian type denomination both issued two statements stating that nuclear weapons could never be used. Both of the statements for the presbyterian structured denomination were made by the Uniting Church in Australia. The Anglican Church in Australia did not take any explicit stands regarding this issue.

Canada shows a marked difference, from Australia, with the Roman Catholic Church issuing two clear statements and the United Church of Canada four pronouncements against the use of nuclear weapons. The Anglican Church in Canada, the other presbyterian type

denomination in this sample, issued two explicit rejections of the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, one presbyterian type denomination issued the same number of pronouncements as the episcopal type while the other issued twice as many rejections of nuclear weapons use.

As discussed above the congregationally structured denomination has twice issued pronouncements against any use of nuclear weapons. The Presbyterian church in New Zealand also made a statement against the use of these weapons. It is remarkable that only in New Zealand does the Roman Catholic denomination not take a position on the usability of nuclear weapons.

The Roman Catholic denomination in the United Kingdom took explicit stands against the use of nuclear weapons more often, three to two, than did the Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) and Church of England (Anglican) combined, each of these denominations issued one statement. This result should be approached with caution, however, as it may be the result of the possible inadequacies of the United Kingdom data set.<sup>19</sup>

In the United States the Roman Catholic Church made explicit pronouncements on three occasions to the Presbyterian denomination's single statement. The Episcopal Church in the United States did not issue any official pronouncements regarding the usability of nuclear weapons.

It is interesting to note that both the nations that provide support for hypothesis two are nuclear armed nations. This suggests that the possession of nuclear weapons by the nation state in which an episcopally structured denomination resides might provide greater impetus toward addressing the question of usability. In other words, when there is a realistic chance that the national home of an episcopal type denomination could actually use nuclear weapons then the leadership of the denomination appears more willing to accept the political costs involved in taking an explicit position opposed to any such use. For these denominations the question may possess greater urgency. Episcopal type denominations in non-nuclear armed nations lack this impetus.

Thus far only the frequency of positions adopted has been examined. Hypothesis two also predicts that episcopally structured denominations will adopt positions sooner than their

---

<sup>19</sup> Complete data was only obtained for the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom. See Appendices A and B for additional information about the data sets.

presbyterian or congregational counterparts. Table 4 presents the years in which positions rejecting any use of nuclear weapons were adopted by the denominations in each nation.

Table 4. Years in Which Statements Were Issued Stating that Nuclear Weapons Could Never Be Used By Each Type of Denomination

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Congregational			1982 1984		
Episcopal	1981 1985	1982 1983		1970 1982 1983 1984	1976 1979 1983
Presbyterian	1963 1985	1962*/1958+ 1982*/1962+ 1983* 1984*	1978	1983**/1982++	1983

\*United Church in Canada

\*\*Church of Scotland

+Anglican Church in Canada

++Church of England

Two observations from this table are particularly striking. First, is the observation that not only did the episcopally structured denominations in the nations armed with nuclear weapons issue more statements in rejection of any use of nuclear weapons but also adopted this position much earlier than their presbyterian type counterparts. Second, is the fact that the bulk of statements in all nations came in the 1980s. Clearly, in the late 1970s and/or early 1980s something happened on the international scene which impelled denominations to explicitly express their opposition to any use of nuclear weapons.

The most noteworthy change that took place during this time period was the election of Ronald Regan as U.S. President. The Regan Administration marked a fundamental change in the language of nuclear deterrence. The previous position had been based on the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) an unwinnable scenario in which all parties involved suffered catastrophic, unacceptable losses and many believed the world, as they knew it, would itself cease to exist. The Regan Administration talked openly about winnable, survivable and limited nuclear war. It pursued strategies in keeping with this new scenario including the Strategic Defense Initiative and the placing of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. It is an inescapable conclusion that the change in the approach to nuclear strategy marked by Regan's election was at

least partly responsible for the actions of denominations in their post election rejection of any use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Having thus determined a reason for the observed activity in the 1980s it is time to return to an examination of the predictive power of the hypothesis as it relates to the earliness with which a denomination adopts a position. Overall the predictive power is not remarkable. As stated above, both the nations with nuclear weapons at their disposal followed the predicted pattern with the episcopal denominations adopting the position that nuclear weapons could never be used under any circumstances earlier than their presbyterian type counterparts. In the United Kingdom this policy was first enunciated by the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom in 1970 a full 12 years before the Church of England adopted this position. It must be remembered, however, that this gap may be due to inadequate data for the Church of England.

The gap between the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and the Presbyterian Church while still large was less than that in the United Kingdom. Here the Catholic Church first adopted the position that nuclear weapons could never be used in 1976, seven years before the Presbyterian Church adopted it in 1983.

In New Zealand, as noted previously, the Roman Catholic Church has never adopted a position on the question of the usability of nuclear weapons. However, the hypothesis does correctly predict that the presbyterian type denomination will adopt a policy sooner than its congregational colleague.

The hypothesis fails to accurately predict the behavior of the denominations in both Australia and Canada. The presbyterian type denominations in these nations both adopted the position that nuclear weapons could never be used much sooner than did the episcopally structured denominations. Indeed, in Canada both presbyterian type denominations adopted this position far in advance of the Roman Catholic Church in Canada.

### **Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession**

The easiest method for examining the policy positions of denominations on the question of the morality of nuclear weapons is to follow the course established in the previous section. A table detailing the denominations that adopted the position that possessing nuclear weapons is sometimes moral and that possessing nuclear weapons is never moral will be provided first and

following the analysis of those results will be a table indicating the years that these positions were adopted.

Table 5. Possessing Nuclear Weapons: The Policies Sometimes Moral and Never Moral by Nation and Denominational Structure

	Australia		Canada		New Zealand	
	Sometimes	Never	Some-times	Never	Some-times	Never
Congregational						1
Episcopal	3	1				
Presbyterian		1	1	3		

  

	United Kingdom		United States	
	Sometimes	Never	Never	Some-times
Congregational				
Episcopal			1	3
Presbyterian	1	1		1

As noted earlier, only in Australia and the United States do the episcopally structured denominations take any stand regarding the morality of nuclear weapons possession. In both nations there is a split between sometimes moral and never moral in the position taken by the Roman Catholic Church. In fact the results for these two nations are identical, three pronouncements supporting sometimes moral to one statement declaring nuclear weapons possession immoral under all circumstances.

It is interesting that these pronouncements come from denominations that are located in a non-nuclear weapons state, Australia, and a nuclear-weapons state, the United States. In both nations the Presbyterian (United States) or Uniting (Australia) Church issued one statement declaring possession of nuclear weapons immoral. In neither nation did the Anglican/Episcopal denomination issue a pronouncement. Here the four pronouncements to one provide support for the ability of the hypothesis to predict which denominational structure is more likely to take positions on the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. However, if this hypothesis is to be of use it must apply to more than these two nations.

When we consider the findings for the other nations we find that hypothesis two does not continue to be a good predictor of which denominational structure will be more likely to take positions on the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. In both the United Kingdom and

Canada all the pronouncements about the morality of possessing nuclear weapons came from the presbyterian type denominations. The nuclear/non-nuclear dichotomy present in the issue of using nuclear weapons has disappeared.

The denominations organized along presbyterian lines in the United Kingdom made two pronouncements, one allowing for possession under some circumstances and one rejecting possession of nuclear weapons as immoral.

In Canada the denominations with presbyterian structure of policy making held both the position that nuclear weapons possession could be moral under some circumstances and that it was never moral to possess nuclear weapons. However, in Canada nuclear weapons were held to be immoral in three statements and occasionally moral only once.

In both these nations the Roman Catholic Church is silent on the issue. This is true also in New Zealand. In fact both the presbyterian and episcopal type denominations are silent in New Zealand.

The Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand made one definitive statement against the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. It appears that this denomination is unique among both the congregational type denominations in this study and the other denominations in New Zealand.

From this analysis it is necessary to conclude that while there is limited support for hypothesis two in the results for Australia and the United States the same is not true of the other results. None of the episcopally structured denominations in the United Kingdom, Canada or New Zealand made any policy statements about the morality of nuclear weapons possession. Looking at all the results for this aspect of the nuclear issue the episcopally structured denominations are, in fact, less likely in three of the five nations, to issue policy pronouncements on the issue.

The aspect of hypothesis two, concerning which denominational structure will adopt the most politically costly position, fares even worse. In no nation does the episcopal type denomination take the most extreme position on the morality of possessing nuclear weapons that is associated with the highest political cost--the position that nuclear weapons possession cannot be moral under any conditions. The presbyterian type denominations are the most likely to take that extreme position.

In the final test of hypothesis two regarding the morality of possessing nuclear weapons we examine the years in which denominations adopted their positions on this issue.

Table 6. Years That Denominations Adopted the Position that Possessing Nuclear Weapons is Sometimes Moral by Nation and Denominational Structure

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Congregational					
Episcopal	1975				1976 1979 1983
Presbyterian		1962 1964		1982	

It is apparent from even a glance at this table that with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States the episcopally structured denominations are less willing than their presbyterian colleagues to pay the political costs of departing even somewhat from national policies. Indeed, as the following table demonstrates with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia, which followed its presbyterian counterpart in rejecting any possession of nuclear weapons, episcopal denominations failed to take any position on the morality of possessing nuclear weapons.

From Tables 6 and 7 it is clear that hypothesis two does not fare well at all when we examine the actual years in which denominations announced their policies. Only in the United States does the episcopal type denomination confront the issue earlier than the presbyterian type denominations. Here, the Roman Catholic Church in the United States first adopted the position that possessing nuclear weapons might be moral under some circumstances in the mid-1970s. The presbyterian denominations never adopted this position. In fact, the Presbyterian Church made its single statement rejecting any possession of nuclear weapons one year before the last year in which the Roman Catholic Church decreed possessing nuclear weapons could be moral in some circumstances and two years before the Roman Catholic Church joined it in rejecting any possession of nuclear weapons on moral grounds.

One explanation that presents itself for the behavior of the study denominations regarding the question of possessing nuclear weapons is that it is not regarded as a stand alone issue. It may be

that possessing nuclear weapons is regarded simply as a subset of the issues of use of nuclear weapons and of nuclear deterrence; after all both use and deterrence rely upon the possession of nuclear weapons by the nation or its allies.

Table 7. Years That Denominations Adopted the Position that Possessing Nuclear Weapons is Never Moral by Nation and Denominational Structure

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Congregational			1982		
Episcopal	1981				1984
Presbyterian	1963 1972 1985	1959 1960 1984		1983	1982

### Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence

It remains to examine the most controversial policy, the acceptability of nuclear deterrence. Consideration of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence is perhaps the most interesting of the definitive policy positions a denomination make take on the nuclear issue. This is true because it is the most controversial aspect of the nuclear question that a denomination can address and because departure from the position of the nation is associated with the greatest political costs.

As can be seen in Table 8 only the Catholic denomination in Australia made two pronouncements of conditional acceptance. Neither of the presbyterian type denominations nor congregationally structured denominations made any explicit pronouncements on this issue. This is in line with the expectation that episcopally structured denominations would be more likely to address the issue.

The Catholic Church in Canada made one pronouncement of conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence. It also issued one statement declaring nuclear deterrence unacceptable. It is surprising that the Catholic Church in Canada expressly rejected nuclear deterrence as this position is counter to that taken by the Vatican. This will be considered in greater detail in Chapter IV, which addresses the conciliar pressures on denominational policy making. The presbyterian denominations in Canada made three pronouncements of conditional acceptance, one of unqualified acceptance and one rejecting deterrence. All of these pronouncements came

from the United Church in Canada. In all the United Church in Canada issued more statements on the question of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence than did its Roman Catholic counterpart. This offers no support for hypothesis two.

Table 8. Years That Denominations Adopted Positions Regarding Nuclear Deterrence by Denominational Structure

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Congregational			1982 never 1984 never		
Episcopal	1975 some 1985 some	1982 some 1983 never		1982 some 1983 some 1984 never	1983 some
Presbyterian		1960 some 1968 always 1982 some 1983 never		1983 some	1971 some

As has been the case for the other variables New Zealand's Baptist denomination is unique. On the question of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence we see, in Table 8, that the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand declared it unacceptable on two occasions. No other congregational type denomination has taken any position on this issue of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence.

In the United Kingdom the Catholic denomination made two statements of conditional acceptance. Like the Roman Catholic Church in Canada the Catholic Church here issued one rejection, in 1984, of nuclear deterrence under any circumstances. This is again unexpected. It is interesting that a Roman Catholic denomination in both a nuclear armed nation, United Kingdom, and in a non-nuclear state, Canada, should depart from Vatican policy in this fashion. The fact that Canada does not possess nuclear weapons is perhaps less important when considering deterrence since the failure of deterrence would have consequences for Canada on par with those suffered by the United States.

The presbyterian type denomination made one pronouncement that nuclear deterrence is unacceptable. The first part of hypothesis two expects that the episcopally structured denomination will make more policy pronouncements than the presbyterian or congregational type. This is what we see in Table 8. Hypothesis two also expects that the episcopal type

denomination will take the more extreme position. This is not the case. It must be remembered, however, that this might be due to possible gaps in the data set for the United Kingdom.

In the United States the episcopally organized Roman Catholic Church and the Presbyterian denominations each issued one statement of conditional acceptance. The table, consequently, provides no support for hypothesis two. The Roman Catholic Church did not take more stands on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence nor did it take more extreme positions than its Presbyterian counterpart. It is fascinating that the denominations in the United States which have not hesitated to take the most politically costly position on the other aspects of the nuclear question do not reject nuclear deterrence. Instead, they regard it as conditionally acceptable.

Altogether four denominations endorsed the position that nuclear deterrence is unacceptable. Two of these denominations were presbyterian in structure. One was episcopal in structure. The other was the congregationally organized Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand. The presbyterian type denominations were in both the United Kingdom and in Canada. The episcopal type was the Roman Catholic Church in Canada, in all the cases except New Zealand, it was a single pronouncement.

It is worth noting that in each national sample all the presbyterian pronouncements used in the analysis of denominational positions on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence came from only one of the denominations coded as Presbyterian. The greater number of presbyterian type denominations did not account for the increased number of denominational pronouncements.

Overall, there is at best tentative support for the usefulness of hypothesis two. The congregational component of the hypothesis seems to have performed reasonably well except in the case of New Zealand. Only in New Zealand does a congregationally structured denomination take any explicit position on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of possessing nuclear weapons and the usability of nuclear weapons. The presbyterian and episcopal predictions of the hypothesis have not performed as well. In the United Kingdom and United States there were more policies on use of nuclear weapons expressed by episcopally organized denominations. This is in keeping with the predictions of the hypothesis. Although it must be remembered that in the United Kingdom this result might be due to the possibility of an incomplete data set.

In Australia and the United States the Roman Catholic Church made more pronouncements that nuclear weapons possession is moral under specific conditions. The number of statements that possessing nuclear weapons cannot be moral was the same for the episcopally structured Roman Catholic denomination and the presbyterian type denominations.

Considering the acceptability of nuclear deterrence, there were more total pronouncements by Catholics in the United Kingdom but the positions taken were less extreme. Again, however, this result must be regarded with caution because the data sets for the Church of Scotland and Church of England in the United Kingdom are not documented as being complete. In Australia only the Roman Catholic Church takes any position on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence. In the United States the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian denominations are equal in their number of pronouncements both denominational types giving conditional acceptance to this policy.

In summary, on all three aspects of the nuclear question under consideration, the congregationally structured denominations, except in New Zealand, behaved as expected in hypothesis two. The same cannot be said of the episcopal or presbyterian type denominations. These types of denominations have behaved as expected in some nations on some of the aspects of the deterrence question but in no case has that been consistently the case. It appears from this analysis that a denomination's organizational structure is not a determining factor in its willingness and/or ability to establish policies regarding issues that have a clearly political dimension.

The behavior of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand and the Roman Catholic Church in New Zealand are symptomatic of the failure of the hypothesis to be universally applicable. Both of these denominations behaved completely differently from their counterparts in other nations. While it might be interesting to speculate on the reasons for these differences, the fact is that the hypothesis does not predict at all for the sample denominations in New Zealand.

### **Further Testing of Hypothesis Two**

There are countless problems, issues and questions with which a denomination might concern itself. These can range from the plight of the homeless in their own nation to human rights violations on the other side of the globe and from national economic policies to feeding the

starving in a particular neighborhood or in a famine stricken nation. A denomination could concern itself with the needs of particular individuals or racial or ethnic minorities in general. Denominations have neither the time nor the resources to address all the potential issues, problems and questions that confront it. As a result it must choose from among these choices which will receive particular attention. Those a denomination selects for particular attention are placed on the denominational agenda. The denominational agenda represents those particular items that a denomination decides it needs to consider.

Another manner in which hypothesis two can be examined is to consider the frequency with which denominations placed all other aspects of the nuclear issue on their agenda. This is accomplished by determining how often each possible strategy has found its way onto denominational agendas and how this is broken down across denominational types. Table 9 lists the frequency of each strategy, recommendation, etc., being placed on the denominational agenda.

Table 9: Frequency of Recommendations Etc. on Denominational Agendas

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States	Hypothetical
Disarmament General	8	5	3	4	7	5.4
Disarmament Unspecified	18	23	4	1	21	13.4
Disarmament Nuclear	9	5	0	4	9	5.4
Encouragement to Negotiate	3	11	1	8	18	8.2
Endorsement Treaty/Action	11	17	4	3	20	11
Comprehensive Testing Ban	6	4	5	1	12	5.6
Unspecified Testing Ban	5	9	2	4	8	5.6
Nuclear Freeze Free Zone	7	6	11	4	8	7.2
Reduction of Armaments	4	13	2	5	18	8.4
Objection to Action	9	10	3	3	7	6.4
Other	18	28	10	7	18	16.2

In Table 9 a hypothetical nation state is provided for comparison purposes. This hypothetical represents the mean of the number of times that a particular aspect of the nuclear debate has been placed on denominational agendas. It serves to provide a baseline against which the behavior of actual denominations can be examined.

In looking at Table 9 it is clear that the denominational agendas of each nation each have specific aspects of the nuclear issue, which they like to emphasize. A policy is said to be emphasized if it is placed on a denominational agenda more than ten times. More than ten was chosen because it would be more than 25 percent of the 41 years the study encompasses.

In each country there are specific policies that are found more often on the denominational agendas than are others. It should be noted that Other is an emphasized policy category in each nation except in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom only encouragement to negotiate appears more often than Other on denominational agendas. In part this is no doubt due to the catchall nature of the category. Any specific strategy or recommendation that does not fit into one of the other categories is coded as Other.

The aspects of the nuclear debate that a denomination chooses to emphasize by placing it on the denominational agenda frequently are of particular interest. These aspects tell us a great deal about the concerns of denominations in the various nations. In New Zealand, for example, only Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Other are emphasized. New Zealand is a leader in the movement for a nuclear free Pacific.

Examining the hypothetical nation reveals that the most emphasized aspects of the nuclear debate are Unspecified Disarmament, Endorsement of a Particular Treaty or Action and Other. These are most likely to be found on denominational agendas with great frequency. They are likely to be of concern to all denominations in all nations. All additional aspects are of greater concern to specific denominations and in particular nations.

It must be kept in mind that there are two denominations in each nation that exhibit a presbyterian type organizational structure. In the tables that follow, the total number of years in which both presbyterian type denominations combined placed the policy on their denominational agenda will be listed first. This will be followed by the number of appearances on the Anglican/Episcopal denominational agenda and the number of appearances on the Uniting/United Presbyterian denominational agenda in parentheses.

### **Australia**

In Australia the emphasized aspects of the nuclear issue are Unspecified Disarmament, Endorsement of Specific Treaties or Actions and Other policy options. As Table 10 demonstrates, in Australia, only Unspecified Disarmament of these three policies is distributed between the episcopally organized Roman Catholic Church and the Anglican and Uniting

Churches, the presbyterian types. On both the Endorsement of Specific Treaties or Actions and Other the Anglican Church in Australia is silent. It did not greatly concern itself with the question of Unspecified Disarmament either placing this policy on its agenda only one year. The episcopally structured Roman Catholic Church has placed these policies on its agenda with much greater frequency than the Anglican Church. This observation provides some support for hypothesis two. Additional support for hypothesis two comes from the fact that the congregational type denomination in Australia did not place any aspect of the nuclear question on its agenda. This is in accordance with what hypothesis two would expect.

Table 10. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	Unspecified Disarmament	Endorsement of Specific Treaties or Actions	Other
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	8	3	7
Presbyterian	10 (1/9)	8 (0/8)	11 (0/11)

The behavior of the Uniting Church, however, is contrary to what the hypothesis would expect. For all three emphasized policies the Uniting Church with its presbyterian organizational structure has placed them on its denominational agenda with greater frequency than the denomination with an episcopal structure. It is necessary to conclude that despite the activism of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia on this issue the Uniting Church is more activist still. There is some factor beyond organizational structure at work in the behavior of the Uniting Church. It might be that the Uniting Church is more responsive to conciliar pressures than is the Anglican Church or that the Uniting Church possesses members with a more activist bent. These factors will be taken up in later chapters.

### Canada

Canada presents a different pattern than that of Australia. Like the denominations in Australia, those in Canada placed Unspecified Disarmament on their denominational agendas more often than any other policy with the exception of Other. Endorsement of Treaties and Actions and Encouragement to Negotiate and the Reduction of Armaments follow in frequency on Canadian denominational agendas.

Table 11 shows that with the exception of the United Church on the question of Reduction in Armaments, the presbyterian type denominations, the Anglican Church and United Church of Canada, are both substantially more activist than either the Roman Catholic Church or Baptist Union of Canada, the episcopal and congregational type denominations.

Table 11. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	Unspecified Disarmament	Endorsement/ Praise of Treaty or Action	Encouragement to Negotiate	Reduction in Armaments	Other
Congregational	2	0	0	2	3
Episcopal	3	2	2	2	4
Presbyterian	18 (8/10)	15 (7/8)	9 (5/4)	9 (7/2)	21 (16/5)

The Baptist Union of Canada is far more likely to have placed aspects of the nuclear question on its denominational agenda than the Baptist Church in Australia. Indeed, the Baptist Union of Canada is nearly as likely to have placed Unspecified Disarmament and Other on its denominational agenda as is the Roman Catholic Church and it has placed Reduction in Armaments on its agenda as often as the Roman Catholic Church has.

These findings are contrary to those expected by hypothesis two. The willingness of the episcopally structured Roman Catholic Church of Canada to place aspects of the nuclear weapons question on its agenda fails to exceed that of the denominations structured along congregational and presbyterian lines. Both presbyterian type denominations are decidedly more willing than the episcopal type denomination to address aspects of the nuclear debate on their denominational agendas. The Anglican Church of Canada and the United Church of Canada place the emphasized policies on their agendas with nearly equal frequency. Only in Reduction in Armaments and Other does the Anglican Church substantially exceed that of the United Church on the frequency with which these policies appear on denominational agendas. Hypothesis two must be considered a failure in predicting the behavior of denominations in Canada.

## New Zealand

New Zealand denominations most often placed the Nuclear Freeze and/or Nuclear Free zone on their agendas. Other, found ten times on New Zealand denominational agendas is the only policy that comes close to the importance of the Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone on denominational agendas in this nation. As mentioned above New Zealand is a strong proponent of a Nuclear Free Pacific and this fact is reflected in the behavior of New Zealand's denominations. Only the Roman Catholic Church in New Zealand failed to ever place this policy on its denominational agenda.

Table 12. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone
Congregational	2
Episcopal	
Presbyterian	9 (1/8)

Hypothesis two fares very badly when applied to the policy that is emphasized in New Zealand. In this nation the episcopal type denomination not only fails to address the issue more often than the presbyterian or Baptist denomination, it does not have the question of Nuclear Freeze and/or Nuclear Free Zone on its agenda at all. Contrary to expectation the congregational denomination placed Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone on its denominational agenda with greater frequency than its presbyterian type counter part the Anglican Church in New Zealand. The table also reveals that the Presbyterian denomination was very activist regarding this policy placing it on its denominational agenda nearly three times as often as all of the other denominations combined.

## United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom no policies reached the necessary 11 to be said to be emphasized on denominational agendas. This is most likely due to the fact that the United Kingdom has the smallest data set. It might also indicate that the denominations in the United Kingdom are less concerned about the nuclear debate than are denominations in other nations.

**United States**

As Table 13 shows in the United States six policies were emphasized on denominational agendas. These policies were Unspecified Disarmament, Endorsement/Praise of a Treaties or Action, Encouragement to Negotiate, Reduction of Armaments, Comprehensive Testing Ban and Other. In the United States we again find that the Presbyterian denomination is substantially more likely to have placed these aspects of the nuclear issue on its agenda.

The episcopal type denomination does place the emphasized policies on its agenda with greater frequency than either the congregationally structured Southern Baptist Convention or the presbyterian type denomination the Episcopal Church in the United States. This lends some support to hypothesis two but the substantially more activist approach of the Presbyterian denomination is contrary to what the hypothesis predicts.

Table 13. Number of Years that Policies are Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	Unspecified Disarmament	Endorsement/Praise of Treaty or Action	Encouragement to Negotiate
Congregational	1	2	2
Episcopal	6	6	4
Presbyterian	4 (1/13)	12 (3/9)	12 (0/12)

  

	Comprehensive Testing Band	Reduction in Armaments	Other
Congregational	0	1	1
Episcopal	1	6	5
Presbyterian	11 (0/11)	11 (1/10)	12 (2/10)

Why does the Presbyterian Church examine the nuclear question so much more frequently than any of the other denomination in the United States sample? Clearly, something more than denominational structure is at work here. Whether it is conciliar pressure or the political and/or social attitudes of the membership will be seen in future chapters. Further research is indicated in order to answer this question.

## **Summary of Emphasized Policies in Relation to Hypothesis Two**

Hypothesis two received some small support from the behavior of the congregational type denominations with the exception of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society in New Zealand. As the hypothesis would expect the congregationally organized denominations are least likely to have the policies that were emphasized in their nation placed on their denominational agendas. This could be seen in the policies that were emphasized except for the policy of Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, which dominated denominational agendas in New Zealand. In New Zealand the episcopally governed Roman Catholic Church is silent. This is contrary to what would be expected based on hypothesis two. In all other nations the emphasized policies appear on the agenda of the episcopally organized denomination.

Only in Australia and the United States do the emphasized policies appear with greater frequency on the agendas of the episcopal type denomination than on one of the presbyterian denominations. As the hypothesis predicts the Anglican Church in Australia and the Episcopal Church in the United States are both less likely to have placed the emphasized policies on their denominational agendas. The behavior of the other presbyterian type denominations in these nations does not support hypothesis two.

In Canada the presbyterian type denominations are more than twice as likely to have the emphasized policies on their agendas than are their episcopally structured counterpart. There is clearly no support for hypothesis two in the behavior of presbyterian and episcopal type denominations in Canada. There is little support, either, in the behavior of the congregationally structured denomination. It is nearly as likely to have placed the emphasized policies on its agenda as the episcopal type denominations with the exception of the policies Endorsement/Praise of Treaty or Action and Encouragement to Negotiate, policies that it did not address in any year of the study.

## **Policies That Are Not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas**

The emphasized policies, however, are not the ones of greatest interest. Hypothesis two would expect that the policies that overall appear least often on denominational agendas are the policies that are more likely to appear on the agendas of episcopally structured denominations when they do appear.

A more rigorous test of the hypothesis takes place with a consideration of those policies that do not dominate denominational agendas. Looking at those policies that are on denominational agendas ten or fewer times, the hypothesis would predict that the fewer times the policy is on the agenda the more likely it would be that it was on the agenda of a denomination structured along episcopal lines.

### Australia

As the hypothesis would predict on no occasion did the congregational type denomination in Australia place any of the non-emphasized policies on its agenda. With the exception of Encouragement to Negotiate all the non-emphasized policies appear on the agenda of the episcopally organized denomination.

Table 14. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	General Disarmament	Nuclear Disarmament	Encouragement to Negotiate
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	3	3	0
Presbyterian	5 (0/5)	6 (0/6)	3 (0/3)

  

	Comprehensive Testing Ban	Unspecified Testing Ban	Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	1	1	3
Presbyterian	5 (0/5)	4 (0/4)	4 (0/4)

  

	Reduction of Armaments	Objection /Criticism of Particular Actions
Congregational	0	0
Episcopal	3	5
Presbyterian	1 (0/1)	4 (0/4)

The table above provides mixed results. There is support for hypothesis two in the behavior of the Baptist Union of Australia and in the relationship between the frequency with which the Roman Catholic Church in Australia and the Anglican Church in Australia placed

these policies on their agendas. The Roman Catholic Church consistently placed these policies on its agenda with greater frequency than did the Anglican Church. The only exception is Encouragement to Negotiate, which neither denomination chose to place on its agenda. In fact the Anglican Church of Australia chose only to place the option of Unspecified Disarmament on its agenda.

This relationship is not to be found between the Roman Catholic Church and the Uniting Church of Australia. Only for the policies Reduction in Armaments and Objection/Criticism of Particular Actions do we find that the Roman Catholic Church of Australia placed them on its denominational agenda more frequently than did the Uniting Church. The presence of the Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone on denominational agendas is almost the same between the Catholic Church and the Uniting Church of Australia. However, the Uniting Church clearly is more activist in placing policy options on its denominational agenda. General and Complete Disarmament and Nuclear Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate, Comprehensive Testing Ban and Unspecified Testing Ban were predominately on the agenda of the Uniting Church rather than on the agenda of the Roman Catholic Church as the hypothesis would expect. Indeed, Encouragement to Negotiate was found only on the agenda of the Uniting Church; no other denomination in Australia placed this option on its agenda.

### **Canada**

From Table 15 we see that, contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis, in general the presbyterian type denominations are more activist than their episcopal counterparts. This is especially true when we see that the United Church of Canada is clearly more activist than the Anglican Church of Canada. For each of these aspects of the nuclear issue the United Church accounts for more than half of the number of times the aspect was placed on the agenda of a presbyterian type denomination. The exception is Comprehensive Testing Ban. Of the two presbyterian type denominations only the Anglican Church placed it on its denominational agenda. It is interesting to note that of the policy options Comprehensive Testing Ban and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, only one of the presbyterian type denominations had it on its agenda. These are also the policy options that are on denominational agendas with equal frequency between presbyterian and episcopal denominations.

The episcopally structured Roman Catholic Church in Canada exceeds the frequency of agenda placements of the Anglican Church of Canada on only three policies, Nuclear Disarmament (twice on the Roman Catholic agenda and once on the Anglican), Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone (three times on the Roman Catholic agenda and ignored by the Anglican Church) and Objection/Criticism of Particular Action (placed on the Roman Catholic agenda four times and only once on the Anglican agenda). The episcopally structured denomination places non-emphasized policies on its agenda with greater frequency than the Anglican representative of the presbyterian type denominations on only half of the non-emphasized policies. It fares even less well when compared with the United Church of Canada. Here it has placed Comprehensive Testing Ban on its agenda more often than the United Church which has not placed this policy on its agenda. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church places Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone on its agenda with equal frequency when compared to that of the United Church.

Table 15. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	General Disarmament	Nuclear Disarmament	Comprehensive Testing Ban
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	0	2	2
Presbyterian	5 (1/4)	3 (1/2)	2 (2/0)

  

	Unspecified Testing Ban	Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	Objection/Criticism of Particular Action
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	0	3	4
Presbyterian			

In Canada only the congregationally organized denomination behaves consistently in the fashion predicted by hypothesis two. While denominational structure is likely to contribute to the policy making behavior of denominations in this nation it is clearly not the only factor at work.

## New Zealand

As has proven to be the case consistently with New Zealand denominations, they do not conform at all to the hypothesis. While there is some tentative support to be found in the behavior of denominations in other nations there is none in New Zealand. On only one variable does the Roman Catholic Church in New Zealand place the policy on its agenda equally as often as its congregationally structured counterpart. Both the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand and the Roman Catholic Church of New Zealand placed Reduction of Armaments on their denominational agendas once.

Table 16. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	General Disarmament	Unspecified Disarmament	Nuclear Disarmament
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	0	1	0
Presbyterian	3 (0/3)	3 (0/3)	0

  

	Encouragemen t to Negotiate	Endorsement/ Praise of Treaty or Action	Comprehensive Testing Ban
Congregational	1	2	2
Episcopal	0	0	0
Presbyterian	0	2(0/2)	3 (1/2)

  

	Unspecified Testing Ban	Reduction of Armaments	Objection/Criticis m of Action
Congregational	1	1	0
Episcopal	0	1	1
Presbyterian	1 (1/0)	0	2 (0/2)

  

	Other
Congregational	2
Episcopal	0
Presbyterian	8 (1/7)

As usual the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand was far more active in placing policies on its denominational agenda in comparison with other congregationally structured denominations. In no other nation does the congregational type denomination place as

many aspects of the nuclear issue on its agenda. Even among New Zealand denominations it was highly active indeed, it was the only one to place Encouragement to Negotiate on its denominational agenda.

New Zealand, in what has become typical of the Catholic Church there, had only three aspects of the nuclear issue on its agenda; Unspecified Disarmament, Reduction of Armaments, and Objection/Criticism of an Action. This is completely contrary to the expectations of hypothesis two.

The Presbyterian Church, as has been frequently seen in other nations, has addressed many of the aspects of the nuclear question on its denominational agenda. The Anglican Church in New Zealand has also placed many aspects of the nuclear question on its denominational agenda but as has become typical the Presbyterian Church has placed more aspects, more often on its denominational agenda. Hypothesis two does not predict the behavior of presbyterian type denominations well.

### **United Kingdom**

Results for the United Kingdom may be somewhat misleading due to the fact that only data for the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom have been documented complete. In addition, only one document was collected for the Church of England, the 1983 Resolution passed at the end of the Church and the Bomb Debates. Given this caveat the results displayed in Table 17 are telling. The episcopally organized Roman Catholic Church is found to have placed aspects of the nuclear question on its denominational agenda more frequently than the Church of England on only five of the policies under consideration, General Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Nuclear Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate and Reduction in Armaments. In other words, despite potential limitations on the data set, one of the presbyterian type denominations placed six of the variables on its denominational agenda as or more frequently than did the episcopal type denomination. In fact, this same pattern holds true for the presbyterian Church of Scotland in comparison with the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom.

While there is little support for hypothesis two in these findings, it is regarding the policies of Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Other where the hypothesis fares especially poorly. On all three of these policy options the episcopal

denomination placed the policy on its agenda fewer times than did at least one of the presbyterian denominations or, in the case of Unspecified Disarmament and Other, the congregational denomination. The Baptist Union of Great Britain and the Roman Catholic Church placed the Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone on their agendas with equal frequency.

Table 17. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	General Disarmament	Unspecified Disarmament	Nuclear Disarmament
Congregational	0	2	0
Episcopal	2	6	2
Presbyterian	2 (1/1)	3 (1/2)	2 (1/1)

  

	Encouragement to Negotiate	Endorsement/ Praise of Treaty or Action	Encouragement to Negotiate
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	4	1	4
Presbyterian	3 (1/2)	1 (1/0)	3 (1/2)

  

	Comprehensive Testing Ban	Unspecified Testing Ban	Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone
Congregational	0	2	1
Episcopal	0	1	1
Presbyterian	1 (1/0)	3 (1/2)	3 (1/2)

  

	Reduction in Armaments	Objection/ Criticism of Action	Other
Congregational	0	0	3
Episcopal	2	1	1
Presbyterian	3 (1/2)	2 (1/1)	3 (1/2)

### United States

Only the variable Nuclear Disarmament provides any support for hypothesis two in the United States. As Table 18 clearly shows the Roman Catholic Church was more likely to have this policy option on its agenda than were any of the other United States denominations. Table 18 also shows the presbyterian type denominations to be substantially more likely to have the

Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy on their agendas. Overall hypothesis two fares no better here than it has in any of the other nations in the study.

Contrary to the expectations of hypothesis two the episcopally organized denomination is not more likely than presbyterian type denomination to have placed the less emphasized policy options on its denominational agenda. Only the behavior of the congregationally structured Southern Baptist Convention yields some support for the hypothesis. Of the less emphasized policies the Southern Baptist Convention has only included Nuclear Disarmament on its denominational agenda. The two years it was included were fewer than both the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian but more than the Episcopal Church.

Table 18. Aspects of the Nuclear Debate Present but not Emphasized on Denominational Agendas by Denominational Type

	General Disarmament	Nuclear Disarmament	Unspecified Testing Ban
Congregational	0	2	0
Episcopal	2	4	3
Presbyterian	5 (1/4)	3 (0/3)	5 (2/3)

  

	Nuclear Freeze/ Free Zone	Objection/ Criticism of Action	Nuclear Freeze/ Free Zone
Congregational	0	0	0
Episcopal	0	1	0
Presbyterian	7 (2/5)	6 (1/5)	7 (2/5)

In summary, as the hypothesis would predict congregationally organized denominations are generally the least likely to place the less emphasized aspects of the nuclear policy question on their agendas. Indeed, in Australia and Canada the Baptist denominations do not place a single less emphasized aspect of the nuclear issue on their agendas. In New Zealand six of the less emphasized policies are found on the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand. These are Encouragement to Negotiate (where only the Baptist Union had it on the denominational agenda), Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Unspecified Testing Ban, Reduction of Armaments and Other. Only four less emphasized policy positions found their way onto the Baptist Union of Great Britain's agenda. These were

Unspecified Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, and Other. It should also be remembered, however, that the data for the Baptist Union of Great Britain may be incomplete, a larger data set might have yielded more policy options addressed on the denominational agenda. In the United States there was only one of the less emphasized policies on the agenda of the Southern Baptist denomination, Nuclear Disarmament.

The Catholic denomination in each nation usually had the less emphasized policies on their denominational agenda. There are, however, exceptions to this general trend. In Australia Encouragement to Negotiate does not appear on the Roman Catholic agenda. Exceptions to the general trend in Canada are General Disarmament and Unspecified Testing Ban. While in the United Kingdom, Comprehensive Testing Ban was the exception and in the United States, the Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone is the only policy that did not make it to the agenda of the Catholic Church.

## **Conclusion**

Overall the discrepancy between the frequency with which policies that address the nuclear issue appear on the agendas of denominations with a presbyterian structure and on those with an episcopal structure indicates that hypothesis two is not a strong hypothesis. While it predicts reasonably well for the congregationally organized denominations it is weak in differentiating the presbyterian and episcopal structures. Denominations structured on presbyterian lines are at least as active placing policies on the denominational agenda as are the episcopally organized denominations. Indeed, on many of the less emphasized variables, notably Comprehensive Testing Ban, Unspecified Testing Ban (Australia), General Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban, (Canada), General Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Unspecified Testing Ban, Other (New Zealand ), Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone, Other (United Kingdom), General Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone, and Objection/Criticism of an Action (United States), at least one of the denominations with a presbyterian form of policy making was more likely to have these policies on the denominational agenda than were their episcopally structured counterparts.

Despite the expectations of hypothesis two the results show that the presbyterian type denominations have a much greater tendency to be activist than their episcopal or congregational

counterparts. In most cases the policies appear on a presbyterian type denominational agenda much more frequently than the hypothesis predicts.

What could account for this discrepancy? It could be that the salience of the issue makes it more likely to be placed on the denominational agenda and to more easily gain a consensus among representative policy makers. The episcopal method of policy making might contain more effective constraints than the presbyterian method. Indeed, these results suggest that might be the case. It is also possible that the pressures and constraints to be examined further might exert greater influence on policy making than organizational structure. This is especially likely given the discrepancy between policy frequency on Anglican/Episcopal and Presbyterian/United/Uniting denominations. The latter is usually substantially more activist than the former. In fact, if the Presbyterian/United/Uniting denominations were removed from the analysis the hypothesis would fare much better. These other pressures and constraints will be examined in subsequent chapters.

## CHAPTER IV

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICIES AND CONCILIAR MEMBERSHIPS

- 3) *Denominations follow the policies of the conciliar organizations of which they are members.*

The hypotheses examined so far have focused on the effect on policy of the pressures, organizational dictates, and public opinion and the effect of the constraining factor, organizational structure. However, this is not the whole picture. In addition to such organizational dictates as public opinion and organizational purpose denominations have to deal with the demands of conciliarism. Each of the denominations in the sample is a member of at least one conciliar organization. The role of denominations as members of conciliar organizations is significant in the formation of denominational policy. Hypothesis three was generated based on the potential influence conciliar organizations have on denominational policy. The importance of conciliarism when it is treated as the only relevant factor in determining denominational policy shifts is the subject of hypothesis three. The constraints here, as in hypothesis one, are absent.

Conciliarism is the formation of denominational Alliances or councils for the purposes encouraging ecumenism, and fostering consultation and cooperation. National and international groupings are the two basic forms of conciliarism. These can be further subdivided into denominational and interdenominational associations. Thus there are four types of conciliarism that must be considered: national denominational, national interdenominational, international denominational, and international interdenominational.

National denominational conciliarism is, for the most part, synonymous with the central governing and/or administrative<sup>1</sup> body of the denomination. In other words, the Southern Baptist Convention in the United States would be described as national denominational conciliarism since it is an Alliance of Southern Baptist congregations for the purposes of cooperation, consultation, and coordination; it is also the central administrative body of the Southern Baptist denomination. Because this study focuses on the policy pronouncements of the central governing and/or administrative apparatus of the denomination national denominations conciliarism is in

---

<sup>1</sup> In this work governing refers to the ability to speak for the entire denomination and to set policy that is binding upon all members of the denomination. Administrative, on the other hand, refers to coordinating the activities of the denomination and does not allow for the establishment of binding policy.

fact the source of the dependent variables. As the source of the dependent variables national denominational conciliarism is not used in examining hypothesis three as it cannot be used as both the independent and dependent variables.

National interdenominational conciliarism is a more useful variable in examining hypothesis three due to the fact that it embraces a variety of denominations within specific national borders. This enables consideration of the effects of national boundaries since the denominations within those boundaries can be expected to share comparable assessments of government policy and the national relationship to the international system. National interdenominational conciliarism exists when a variety of denominations within national boundaries cooperating to form a National Council of Churches. Councils can be open to all Christian denominations as the Canadian Council of Churches or restricted to certain types of denominations, for example the Australian Evangelical Alliance, which accepts as members only the evangelical denominations. The small number of denominations in this study limit the usefulness of national conciliar bodies that restrict membership to certain types of denominations. As a result only national councils with membership open to all Christian denominations are included.

International denominational conciliarism transcends national boundaries while being restricted to specific denominations. International interdenominational conciliarism, on the other hand, is unrestricted by either national boundaries or denominational limits.<sup>2</sup> These two types of conciliarism are perhaps the most interesting variables in assessing hypothesis three because they explore the extent to which international organizations influence the behavior of national organizations.<sup>3</sup>

In order to understand hypothesis three it is necessary to consider the interactions and ties between conciliar bodies and their denominational members. At the outset it should be noted that the positions adopted by conciliar bodies are not binding upon the members of the organization. This is true of all conciliar bodies in this study except the Holy See.

The Roman Catholic Church is the only truly universal church among Christian denominations. No other denomination has a central government with the authority to make policy that is binding upon all member congregations in whatever nation they make their home.

---

<sup>2</sup> International interdenominational conciliarism like national interdenominational conciliarism can be limited to denominations with specific characteristics.

<sup>3</sup> For a complete listing of the conciliar memberships of the denominations in my study see Appendix E.

The Roman Catholic Church is truly episcopal, the authority flows from the top, the pontiff, down. Here, unlike in other denominations which cede some of their national authority to an international coordinating body or conciliar organization, the central authority is international in character and cedes some of its control to the national Congregations of Bishops. The national Congregations of Bishops have the power to address particular issues of concern to their individual countries, provided they do not abrogate Vatican policies, and to perform the necessary administrative tasks to keep the denomination functioning. This unique nature of the Roman Catholic denomination makes it necessary, for the purposes of this study, to distinguish between the national Bishops Councils and the Vatican. In this study the Holy See will be treated as a conciliar body while the national bishops' conferences in each nation in the study will be treated as the denomination in that nation. This is done because although the policies of the Holy See are binding upon all Catholics the national bishops conferences are free to deal with issues pertinent to their nations so long as they do not adopt positions contrary to those of the Pope.

Even though the policies adopted by conciliar bodies<sup>4</sup> are not binding upon their members there are still a number of reasons why conciliarism can be regarded as a constraining factor in denominational policy making. The very purposes behind conciliarism, consultation, coordination, and ecumenism, after all, dictate that the policy-making of the denominations will at least consider conciliar policies. In addition to the purposes of conciliarism denominations have interests in following the conciliar line that range from increasing political clout to peer pressure to the belief that Christians should work together. In politics the more resources, money, votes, publicity, support etc., an organization can wield in the service of government policies the more influence it can bring to bear on the shaping of those policies. An organization that can mobilize a large number of people in support or opposition of a specific policy will have more influence in the governmental policy-making process. This is true in both the national arena and the international. The extent of the influence an organization has is determined by two factors: the resources that it possesses and its ability to effectively deploy those resources. Unless those resources can be deployed effectively in the pursuit of specific policy goals the possession of tremendous resources is of little use, they must be brought to bear in the service of the desired policy outcome.

---

<sup>4</sup> Except those of the Vatican.

The resources of an organization can be defined in a number of ways. It can be measured as monetary support by members, sheer number of members, human resources, expertise, the respect and legitimacy granted to the organization by governments, etc. All of these measures are useful, to some extent, because they help to get at the central issue--how effective the organization can be in influencing governmental policy. By banding together to form conciliar bodies denominations increase their political power--their ability to influence governmental policy. This is especially true in the international arena. A denomination in the United States cannot wield much influence over governmental policy-making in Australia. However, a conciliar organization such as the World Council of Churches (WCC) can have an impact on Australian policies due to its ability to mobilize its membership and apply both national and international pressure. It is important to recognize that unless the denominations who are members support the conciliar policies the power of the conciliar organization is diminished. The more power that can be mobilized the more likely is success. Thus, in order for denominations to increase the likelihood of the adoption of policies that further the "Christian mission" they must be willing to adhere to conciliar positions thereby strengthening the political clout of the conciliar body.

Another reason for denominations to support conciliar policies can be found in the organizational goals of the denominations. As the people God created and directed to be stewards of all the earth.<sup>5</sup> Christians should regard themselves as citizens of creation as well as citizens of particular nation-states. This implies the need for Christians to look beyond narrow national interests toward a greater good for all mankind. International conciliar bodies cross geographic boundaries and draw their membership from all parts of the world. As such, they are the nearest thing to representative of all creation that Christian denominations can realize since they are composed of fellow believers pursuing similar ideals and goals. In obeying conciliar policy positions denominations to some extent fulfill the organizational goal of being good stewards of creation, i.e. the goal of caring for all of creation rather than focusing exclusively on parochial national interests and goals.

One way that denominations have to act as good stewards is to seek to minimize conflict between nations. Wars, with the death and destruction that they entail, are to be avoided. This is especially true in the atomic era with the tremendous destructive potential inherent in nuclear

---

<sup>5</sup> Genesis 1:28-30; 2:15

weapons. Denominations have cross-national ties between the churches of one nation-state and those of others. There is also the common bond of Christianity between different denominations. By strengthening these ties through cooperation and following the shared policy of the conciliar bodies, the amount of conflict between states might be reduced. It is more difficult for a state to go to war with another nation when the populations of the nation-states are on friendly terms and share a mutual affection and regard. Such ties of friendship and regard also serve to reduce misunderstandings and confusion caused by cultural differences. Conciliar ties aid in creating such ties of friendship and respect.

Denominations might also follow conciliar positions due to peer pressure. When a number of denominations endorse a conciliar position, a denomination not adopting that position opens itself up to the possibility of an adverse reaction on the part of its membership or the general public. In other words, if the WCC adopts as its policy rejection of any use of nuclear weapons, and this policy is endorsed by the majority of denominations then a denomination that does not endorse the policy opens itself up to charges of being warmongers. In addition to opening itself to adverse reactions by members and the general public a denomination that opposes a conciliar position finds itself in the uncomfortable position of arguing that the majority of denominations--those supporting the position--is wrong. While a denomination may still oppose conciliar positions and believe that the majority that supports the position is in error this remains a step not undertaken lightly.

From this analysis it is clear that denominations have a number of reasons for following conciliar positions. It remains now to set about testing the hypothesis. Hypothesis three will be tested, using the conciliar memberships of each denomination in the sample.<sup>6</sup> The first step is to determine the policy position of the conciliar bodies to which the denominations in the study belong. The conciliar statements will be content analyzed using the same rules as were employed for the dependent variable.<sup>7</sup> The position of the denominations on each dependent variable will be compared to that of each conciliar body to which it belongs. Denominational conciliar

---

<sup>6</sup> See appendix E.

<sup>7</sup> See appendix B.

memberships were established based on the most authoritative published source, World Christian Encyclopedia copyright 1982.<sup>8</sup>

If hypothesis three is true then there should be a correlation between the salience of conciliar policy positions as measured by number of references and those of their member denominations.

### **Overview of the Data**

In looking at the data sets being used we find that the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, which was formed in 1970 issued only one statement, in 1983, on the nuclear issue during the time period of this study. As a result it is not possible to examine the effect of World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) positions on those of its member denominations. One pronouncement does not allow for any variance. WARC positions were coded as no policy on each of the variables prior to 1970 as well as those years from 1970 to 1985 when there were no policy pronouncements.

Two of the denominations in this study, the United Church of Canada and the Uniting Church of Australia are members of both the World Methodist Alliance (WMA) and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. For these two denominations WARC and WMA are used together in examining the relationship between conciliar and denominational policy positions.

The most effective test of the hypothesis would be a comparison of denominational and conciliar policies on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession, and usability of nuclear weapons. This is true because as established in Chapter III these are the variables that represent actual policies rather than merely the number of times a variable is mentioned each time it reaches the denominational or conciliar agenda. Unfortunately, after selecting for the conciliar body under examination not enough cases remain to provide any useful results. Consequently, the analysis will proceed using the variables the Nuclear Issue on the Agenda, Placing the Issue in a Broader Context, General and Complete Disarmament, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate, Endorsement/Praise of a Specific Treaty or Action, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, Reduction in Armaments, Objection/Criticism

---

<sup>8</sup> It was, oddly enough, not possible to determine the date that the denominations joined the conciliar bodies of which they are members letters elicited no response, there is not a published source with this information, and direct contacts elicited the fact that no one seems to really know when conciliar memberships occurred.

of a Particular Action, and Other. The analysis will proceed in the order, effects of national interdenominational conciliarism on its denominational members, effects of international denominational conciliarism on its denominational members, effects of international interdenominational conciliarism on its denominational members and the combined effects on the denominations of all the conciliar bodies of which they are members.

Since it was not possible to obtain more than one policy statement on the nuclear issue by the Anglican Consultative Council it cannot be used in assessing the effects of international denominational conciliarism on the Anglican/Episcopal denominations in this study. It is also impossible to determine the combined conciliar effects on the policies of these denominations. In addition, no policy statements have been collected for the Australian Council of Churches. The effects of national interdenominational conciliarism on denominational policies cannot, therefore, be determined for Australia and in the case of combined conciliar effects those in Australia will be less complete than for the other nations. It should also be noted that the Baptist Union of Australia has not made any statements relevant to the study at hand. It has issued some statements regarding uranium mining but these did not directly address the nuclear weapons/nuclear deterrence issue. This is remarkable because the Baptist World Alliance, to which the Baptist Union of Australia belongs, has taken positions on the nuclear question. In not issuing any statements dealing directly with the nuclear issue, the Baptist Union of Australia is failing to endorse the conciliar line by issuing concurring pronouncements. This is contrary to the expectations of hypothesis three. It should be noted, however, that the Baptist Union of Australia in not issuing any statements regarding nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence is not challenging Baptist World Alliance positions, it is instead avoiding the issue altogether. Whether this avoidance is the result of a sense that silence is consent or a reluctance to publicly challenge positions it does not agree with or whether it is due to other factors cannot be discerned from the data available.

The paucity of data for the United Kingdom makes it difficult to get accurate results when considering the effect of conciliarism on denominational policy making. Due to the fact that few statements are available for inclusion in the analysis it is frequently the situation that after selecting for conciliar membership so few cases remain that the R-squared is often one.

Tables 19.1 through 19.5 indicate the conciliar memberships of each of the denominations in my study for each nation.<sup>9</sup> As these tables demonstrate each denomination in the study is the member of at least one conciliar organization. In the instance of the Roman Catholic Churches this is the Vatican and for the Baptist denominations it is the Baptist World Alliance. It is interesting, however, that conciliar memberships are not always consistent across national boundaries. While all Roman Catholic denominations are members of the Vatican conciliar body, in Canada, New Zealand and the United States the Catholic Churches belong to no other conciliar body. In Australia and the United Kingdom the Roman Catholic Churches hold membership in additional conciliar organizations as well. Knowing the conciliar memberships of a denomination in one nation is not a reliable predictor of conciliar memberships of that denomination in other nations.

Table 19.1. Conciliar Memberships of Australian Denominations

<b>Australia</b>	ACC	BWA	VATICAN	WARC	WMC	WCC	ACCC
Anglican	x					x	x
Baptist		x					
Uniting Church				x	x	x	x
Roman Catholic			x			x	x

Table 19.2. Conciliar Memberships of Canadian Denominations

<b>Canada</b>	ACC	BWA	VATICAN	WARC	WMC	WCC	CCC
Anglican	x					x	x
Baptist		x				x	
United Church				x	x	x	x
Roman Catholic			x				

Table 19.3. Conciliar Memberships of Denominations in New Zealand

<b>New Zealand</b>	ACC	BWA	VATICAN	WARC	WMC	WCC	NZCCC
Anglican	x					x	x
Baptist		x				x	x
Presbyterian				x		x	x
Roman Catholic			x				

<sup>9</sup> For the complete list of all conciliar membership and the membership status (affiliated or full member) please see Appendix E.

Table 19.4. Conciliar Memberships of Denominations in the United Kingdom

<b>United Kingdom</b>	ACC	BWA	VATICAN	WARC	WMC	WCC	BCC
Anglican	x					x	x
Baptist		x				x	x
Presbyterian				x		x	x
Roman Catholic			x				x

Table 19.5. Conciliar Memberships of Denominations in the United States

<b>United States</b>	ACC	BWA	VATICAN	WARC	WMC	WCC	NCCC
Episcopal	x					x	x
Baptist		x					
Presbyterian				x		x	x
Roman Catholic			x				

In order to facilitate the analysis of hypothesis three the presence and absence on the conciliar agendas of each variable was established. The frequencies of the variables' appearance on conciliar agendas are listed in the following table. As in Chapter III, the frequencies listed below represent the number of years a variable appeared on the agenda.

Just as there will be specific aspects of the nuclear issue of particular concern in different nations, a concern that is revealed when the policy aspect appears frequently on the agendas of the denominations in that nation, there are certain aspects of the nuclear debate that the various conciliar organizations focus on more tightly than on others. For the National Councils of Churches these aspects should parallel the policies emphasized in that nation.<sup>10</sup> The international conciliar organizations will not be subject to the same national pressures as the National Councils of Churches making it somewhat more interesting in testing the hypothesis as here national interests and pressures will not be at work on both the conciliar body and the denomination. This will allow for greater confidence the perceived correlations are not the result of some other factor rather than denominational conformity to conciliar positions.

The first examination of hypothesis three will utilize the National Councils of Churches. First, the emphasized policies of each national council will be determined and compared with the policies emphasized in that nation. Then the policies of the denominations that belong to the national council will be considered in relation to the policies of the National Council of Churches. It should be remembered that the results of the analysis reflect both presence and

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter III for the emphasized policies.

absence on the conciliar and denominational agendas. If hypothesis three is a true reflection of reality the analysis should reveal that denominations are more likely to place aspects of the nuclear debate on their denominational agendas that have appeared on the agendas of the conciliar bodies to which the denomination belongs. Likewise, those aspects of the nuclear debate that do not receive attention from the councils to which the denomination belongs should receive little or no attention from the denominations.

Table 20.1. Number of Times Each Variable Appeared on the Conciliar Agenda for International Denominational and International Interdenominational Conciliar Bodies

	ACC	BWA	VATICAN	WARC	WMC	WCC
Acknowledge Issue	1	3	19	1	4	25
Broader Context	1	0	2	1	3	11
General Disarmament	0	2	8	0	0	12
Nuclear Disarmament	1	3	16	0	1	24
Unspecified Disarmament	1	1	4	1	1	7
Encourage Negotiation	0	2	9	1	1	8
Endorse/praise Action	1	1	7	0	1	21
Comprehensive Testing Ban	1	1	0	0	0	11
Unspecified Testing Ban	0	0	0	0	0	10
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	0	1	0	0	0	10
Reduction Armaments	0	2	12	1	2	11
Objection/Criticism	0	1	2	0	0	13
Other	2	3	2	1	1	21

Table 20.2. Number of Times Each Variable Appeared on the Conciliar Agenda for National Interdenominational Conciliar Organizations

	ACCC	CCC	NZCCC	BCC	NCCCUSA
Acknowledge Issue	NA	8	5	3	13
Broader Context	NA	5	1	3	2
General Disarmament	NA	0	0	2	7
Nuclear Disarmament	NA	7	0	3	4
Unspecified Disarmament	NA	1	4	3	10
Encourage Negotiation	NA	2	0	3	4
Endorse/Praise Action	NA	2	1	0	6
Comprehensive Testing Ban	NA	2	0	1	4
Unspecified Testing Ban	NA	3	0	3	4
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	NA	3	5	3	3
Reduction Armaments	NA	4	0	2	9
Objection/Criticism	NA	3	2	3	2
Other	NA	6	1	1	6

The initial step must be to ascertain which policies are emphasized on the agendas of these conciliar bodies. Because no statements were collected from the Australian Council of Churches, it will be omitted from this analysis. Initially the same criterion used in Chapter III to identify nationally emphasized policies--it must have been placed on denominational agendas more than 10 times--was applied to the national councils. In doing this only one policy emerged. The NCCCUSA placed Acknowledge the Issue on its agenda on 13 occasions. This indicated that the criterion used for nationally emphasized policies is inappropriate for conciliar policies. In part this is due to the fact that the nationally emphasized policies were a compilation of the policies of four denominations and here only one conciliar body is used. The obvious choice therefore was to follow as nearly as possible that used previously and consider a policy to be emphasized on the conciliar agenda if more than 25% of the available conciliar statements include it. The table below lists the number of statements collected for each conciliar body.

Table 21. Number of Documents Collected for Each Conciliar Body

	<b>ACCC</b>	<b>CCC</b>	<b>NZCCC</b>	<b>BCC</b>	<b>NCCCUSA</b>
Total Number	NA	<b>14</b>	17	5	20
Number of Years	NA	<b>11</b>	5	3	14
25%	NA	2.75	1.25	.75	3.5

Number of Documents Collected for Each Conciliar Body continued...

	<b>ACC</b>	<b>BWA</b>	<b>VATICAN</b>	<b>WARC</b>	<b>WMC</b>	<b>WCC</b>
Total Number	2	<b>3</b>	49	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>69</b>
Number of Years	2	<b>3</b>	27	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>28</b>
25%	.5	.75	6.75	.25	1	7

The boldface numbers in the tables above indicates those conciliar bodies for which data have been documented complete. The 25% figure represents a quarter of the years in which statements were issued since all documents are collapsed into yearly information. The policies Acknowledge the Issue and Broader Context were not considered when examining the policies emphasized by national denominations. This was due to the fact that these two policies serve merely to recognize the issue rather than addressing specific aspects of the nuclear question. Acknowledge the Issue and Broader Context are included in the analysis of the relationship between denominational and conciliar policies because the hypothesis expects that the more a

conciliar body recognizes the issue as one that is of concern to Christians the more likely the denominational members of that conciliar organization are to also recognize the issue and place it on their denominational agendas.

Examination of these numbers in relation to the emphasized policies results in the discovery that the policies emphasized by Canadian Council of Churches are Acknowledgment of the Issue, Broader Context, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone, Reduction of Armaments, Objection/Criticism of an Action and Other. Of these only Reduction of Armaments and Other were emphasized on the collective denominational agendas in Canada. The fact that only two of the policy options accentuated by the Canadian Council of Churches were also stressed on the collective denominational agendas is not in line with the behavior predicted by hypothesis three.

The New Zealand Council of Churches emphasized Acknowledgment of the Issue, Unspecified Disarmament, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone and Objection/Criticism of an Action. The denominational agendas in New Zealand emphasized only Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone. The New Zealand Council of Churches highlighted two more policy options than the denominations in New Zealand. Again, the predictions of hypothesis three are not borne out by the data.

The policies emphasized by the British Council of Churches were Acknowledge the Issue, Broader Context, General Disarmament, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone, Reduction in Armaments, Objection/Criticism of an Action and Other. In effect, because documents were collected for so few years if a policy option was placed on the agenda of the British Council of Churches even once it was on the agenda more than 25% of the time. Consequently, only Endorsement/Praise of a Particular Treaty or Action is the only policy option not emphasized under this criterion. For this reason the emphasized policies here will be those that appeared on the conciliar agenda in all three years for which data were collected. This leaves Acknowledge the Issue, Broader Context, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone and Objection/Criticism of an Action. Of these, only Encouragement to Negotiate appeared with much frequency on the denominational agendas, a total of eight years, though this was insufficient to be considered an emphasized policy under the criterion established. Hypothesis three fails here as well.

The National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA had a number of policies emphasized on the conciliar agenda. These are Acknowledge the Issue, General Disarmament, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate, Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Unspecified Testing Ban, Reduction in Armaments and Other. The hypothesis fares better in the United States. Here denominational agendas emphasized Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate, Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Reduction in Armaments and Other. Only three of the policy options highlighted by the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, General Disarmament, Nuclear Disarmament and Unspecified Testing Ban, are not also highlighted on denominational agendas.

It is interesting that the only major nuclear power in the study is the only nation where the denominations tend to emphasize the same policies as the national interdenominational conciliar body. Policies emphasized by of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA are often the same policies that are emphasized on denominational agendas. This is consistent with what is predicted by the hypothesis. Whether this observed difference is the result of a tighter cooperative relationship between the NCCCUSA and its member churches, is due to the environmental pressure of living in a nuclear superpower or some other factor as yet unidentified is unclear from the data.

The manner in which an issue is placed on the conciliar agenda is another factor in determining what issues are addressed. Whether the issue needs broad support or a single concerned policy maker undoubtedly has an effect on which issues are addressed but the scope of this effect is outside the bounds of this study. It would take a larger study to assess this question.

The failure of the policies highlighted by the collective denominations in a nation to parallel the policies emphasized by the National Councils of Churches might be the result of the method used to measure emphasized policies. Using only the number of years in which policies were on the denominational and conciliar agendas includes both those occasions when there were several references to the policy and those when there was one. A more detailed analysis is achieved by examining the correlation between the number of references on denominational agendas and the number of references on the agendas of the conciliar bodies to which the denomination belongs.

In the tables that follow the empty boxes signify variables that are constants or have missing correlations. They were not included in the analysis. The bold face in the tables that follow indicates results that are statistically significant at least at the .05 level. The fact that some of these variables actually vary little, indeed they remain almost constant at zero references in denominational and/or conciliar statements, means that the small number of cases available for use in the analysis does not provide enough data to accurately determine statistical significance. The limited variance of some variables can be seen also in the extent to which it was not possible to compute statistics for many of the variables. The problem of limited variance is compounded when there are few cases remaining due to the deletion of missing data. As a result, it is not possible to speak with confidence about the strength of the relationship between the variables. Nevertheless, these relationships remain useful in exploring the relationship between denominational and conciliar policies. They are useful in that they indicate trends that would benefit from further analysis.

### **National Interdenominational Conciliarism**

The analysis will begin with a consideration of the impact of national interdenominational conciliarism on denominational policy making. Table 22 presents the R-Squared for the policies of the denominations that belong to their National Councils of Churches and the policies of those National Councils of Churches. It provides a measure of the extent to which knowing an issue is present on the conciliar agenda can be used to predict the presence of that issue on the agenda of its member denominations. The data, however, are not coded simply as presence and absence of aspects of the nuclear issue on conciliar or denominational agendas. The coding also reflects the intensity of a conciliar and denominational interest in an issue by counting the number of references each year to each particular aspect of the nuclear issue. Thus, the R-squared results in the table represent not just how reliably knowing the presence of an aspect of the nuclear issue on a conciliar agenda in a year can be used to predict the presence of that aspect of the nuclear issue on member denominations' agendas but also the frequency of how often those aspects of the nuclear issue would appear in denominational statements. In other words, knowing the importance the conciliar body attaches to a particular aspect of the nuclear issue (as measured by number of references) can be used to predict whether the member

denomination will attach similar importance. R-squared is a measure of the reliability of such predictions.

It is interesting to note the relative consistency within nations. The fit between the policies of the Canadian Council of Churches and its member denominations is generally much tighter than that between the National Council of Churches of Christ USA and its member denominations. While the relationship is not relatively strong on every aspect of the nuclear issue measured by these variables, Canadian denominational policies can usually be seen to have a clear relationship with the policies of the Canadian Council of Churches. In the United States on the other hand there is very little relationship between the policies of the National Council of Churches of Christ USA and those of its member denominations as measured by these variables.

New Zealand and the United Kingdom each have statistically significant results only for the Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone variable. In the case of New Zealand the relationship is clear though not especially strong. In the United Kingdom the relationship is much stronger and would seem to be a good predictor. However, the strength of the relationship is possibly more the result of the few number cases used in the analysis than of the goodness of fit. Although the adjusted R squared is still a respectable .57017 the fact that a Nuclear Freeze or Nuclear Free Zone reached the agenda of the British Council of Churches a mere three times in the data I have managed to collect is cause for caution in relying too heavily on these results.

The results that do not achieve statistical significance in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand also demonstrate consistency within the nation. All results in New Zealand with the exception of the statistically significant Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone show a very small R-squared. Clearly, denominations do not pay the sort of attention to the positions of the NZCCC that the hypothesis expects.

In the United Kingdom the results are slightly more varied. In addition to the statistically significant Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone three other variables--Acknowledge the Issue, Broader Context and Reduction of Armaments--show a clear relationship between the policies of member denominations and those of the British Council of Churches. Of these Reduction of Armaments is the largest with an R-squared of .34770. Broader Context with an R-squared of .26408 explains slightly over 25% of the variance while Acknowledge the Issue explains a little more than 20%. The remaining variables display R-squareds indicating that less than 20% of the

variance is explained and in most cases the relationship hypothesized by hypothesis three does not exist in any meaningful fashion as less than 10% of the variance is explained.

Table 22. R-Squared for Denominational Policies and National Interdenominational Conciliarism

	Canada n <sup>11</sup> =164	New Zealand n=123	United Kingdom n=82	United States n=82
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.30141</b> (.0000)	.04026	.21715	<b>.06198</b> (.02)
Broader Context	<b>.38696</b> (.0000)	.08390	.26408	<b>.06895</b> (.01)
General Disarmament	.00005		.17361	.00632
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.22754</b> (.0000)		.11508	<b>.00173</b> (.001)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.40182</b> (.0000)	.13462	.00204	.11713
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.25057</b> (.0000)		.03972	.00010
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.27594</b> (.0000)	.08654		.01078
Comprehensive Testing Ban	<b>.39384</b> (.0000)			.01330
Unspecified Testing Ban	.01114		.00955	<b>.07815</b> (.01)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.39290</b> (.0000)	<b>.23233</b> (.05)	<b>.64181</b> (.03)	<b>.13943</b> (.006)
Reduction Armaments	<b>.22023</b> (.0000)		.34770	.03842 (.07)
Objection/Criticism	<b>.16562</b> (.0000)		.09084	<b>.08078</b> (.009)
Other	<b>.34700</b> (.0000)	.08499	.07292	.01905

Overall hypothesis three is a poor predictor of denominational policy positions when only national interdenominational conciliarism is considered. Of the four nations examined only denominations in Canada exhibit a clear relationship between the policies of member denominations and those of the Canadian Council of Churches.

<sup>11</sup> Where n=the number of study denominations belonging to the conciliar body times 41 (the number of years in the study). This applies to all of the regression tables.

## **International Denominational Conciliarism**

With the exception of the Canadian Council of Churches national interdenominational conciliarism did not display a significant impact on the policy making of member denominations. The relationship between the Canadian Council of Churches and member churches generally accounted for around 25% of the variance. This was not true in any other nation. National interdenominational conciliarism is only one form of conciliar pressure. In this section the effects of international denominational conciliarism are considered.

### **Baptist World Alliance**

The Baptist Union of Australia did not issue any relevant statements during the 1945 to 1985 period regarding the nuclear issue. The nearest it came to addressing the issue was some statements regarding uranium mining. Consequently the Baptist Union of Australia is omitted from the analysis. In the United Kingdom, selecting for membership in the Baptist World Alliance left very few cases. This made it impossible to do any analysis on the effect of international denominational conciliarism on the Baptist Union of Great Britain. This denomination is therefore also omitted.

Because Baptist denominations are congregational in structure and form national associations only in order to facilitate cooperation among the different local congregations it would be expected that the members of the Baptist World Alliance would be least likely to follow its positions. While this expectation is borne out to some extent in Canada and the United States, knowledge of the presence on the agenda and salience of the issue to the Baptist World Alliance is a reasonably good predictor of the agenda presence and salience of the variables to the Baptist Union of New Zealand. The results appear in Table 23.

The stronger correlation between the policies of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand and the Baptist World Alliance follows a previously observed pattern on the part of this denomination. Again it is observably a denomination that is more active on the issue than its denominational counterparts in other nations. While the Baptist denomination in both the United States and New Zealand are seen to have taken a stance on seven of the variables as opposed to the Baptist Union of Canada's position on only four of the variables, the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand demonstrates a clear and at times very strong relationship between its policies and those of the Baptist World Alliance.

In previous chapters we speculated that there might be political or socio-economic reasons for the greater activism of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand. From the above table it now appears that this observed behavior might be due a greater obedience to conciliar positions on the part of this denomination. Perhaps the relatively small size of this denomination results in a even greater willingness to follow conciliar positions in order to enhance its available political power. Future research should take up the question of the impact a denomination's relative size has on its willingness to align itself with conciliar positions. Specifically it should be considered whether smaller denominations accrue greater resources to their cause by following conciliar policies.

Table 23. Denominational Policies and International Denominational Conciliarism BWA

	Canada n=41	New Zealand n=41	United States n=41
Acknowledge Issue	.00270	<b>.39148</b> (.0000)	.01320
Broader Context			
General Disarmament			
Unspecified Disarmament			<b>.15275</b> (.01)
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.18418</b> (.005)		1.0
Encourage Negotiation		<b>.79605</b> (.0000)	.00235
Endorse/praise Action		.00128	.00115
Comprehensive Testing Ban		<b>.48750</b> (.0000)	
Unspecified Testing Ban			
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone		<b>.18418</b> (.005)	
Reduction Armaments	<b>.22502</b> (.001)	<b>.48750</b> (.0000)	.00128
Other	.01116	.01416	.00160

The same obedience is not found for the Southern Baptist Conference in the United States, a denomination of substantially greater size. On only one variable--Unspecified Disarmament--do the policies of the Baptist World Alliance and the Southern Baptist Conference show any relationship and with an R-squared of .15275 it is not a strong relationship. The R-squared of 1.0 found for Nuclear Disarmament is most likely the result of the very small number

of years it was on the agendas coupled with the substantial number of years it was not and not of a clear relationship. It must be borne in mind that the correlation between the absence of the issue on both denominational and conciliar agendas is meaningful as well. Both the Baptist World Alliance and the Southern Baptist Conference make one reference to Nuclear Disarmament in 1982. The Southern Baptist Conference makes a further reference in 1983 both the denomination and the conciliar body are silent on the Nuclear Disarmament variable in all other years.

Like its United States counterpart the Canadian Baptist Union does not closely follow the conciliar line. It demonstrates some relationship with Baptist World Alliance policies on both the variables Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction in Armaments. Of these Reduction of Armaments is the stronger relationship with an R-squared of .22502.

With the notable exception of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand the expectation that the congregationally organized denominations would demonstrate less obedience to conciliar positions is borne out by these results.

Continuing with the examination of international denominational conciliar pressures, the World Methodist Council and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches are examined next.

### **World Alliance of Reformed Churches and World Methodist Council**

As mergers of the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches, the Uniting Church of Australia and the United Church of Canada are members of both the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the World Methodist Council. They are the only denominations in this study that are members of both. All of the Presbyterian denominations in the study are members of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Unfortunately, this conciliar body has issued only one statement about the nuclear issue since its formation in 1970. Consequently, it cannot be used alone in analysis as there is insufficient variance. In the analysis in Table 24 the World Alliance of Reformed Churches is treated as if it existed throughout the period under consideration. It is coded as having taken no position on the issue. While this has the effect of slightly altering the results the alternative was to omit it entirely from the analysis. The pressures applied by the policy statement it issued were regarded as more important than the effects of including it throughout the period of interest.

It would seem initially that there is a clearly discernible relationship between the policies of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the World Methodist Council and the United Church of Canada on the variables Encouragement to Negotiate and Reduction of Armaments.

Table 24. Denominational Policies and International Denominational Conciliarism  
WARC & WMC

	Australia n=41	Canada n=41
Acknowledge Issue	.00893	.12081 (.08)
Broader Context	.00937	<b>.19896</b> (.01)
General Disarmament		
Nuclear Disarmament	.00359	.00128
Unspecified Disarmament	.00656	.03117
Encourage Negotiation	.00373	<b>.41211</b> (.0000)
Endorse/praise Action	.00465	.00306
Comprehensive Testing Ban		
Unspecified Testing Ban		
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone		
Reduction Armaments	.00197	<b>.43912</b> (.0000)
Other	.01073	

These results are not decreased substantially by employing the adjusted R-squared.

Encouragement to Negotiate becomes .41211 and Reduction of Armaments becomes .40960 using the adjusted R-squared. However, a glance at the frequency tables above shows that these variables were on the agendas of these conciliar bodies two and three times respectively. Caution should be used in speaking of the strength of these results. It is the absence of the variables from the agendas in question that are responsible for the goodness of the fit. This is still a valid finding though since the absence of these policies from the conciliar agendas is a reasonable predictor of absence of these policies from the denominational agendas. The other variables do not show any marked relationship, indeed, Broader Context, with an R-squared of .19896 is the largest of the remaining variables.

There are no significant results for the effect of these conciliar pressures on Uniting Church of Australia. In fact, there is virtually no relationship between the positions of the

Uniting Church of Australia and the World Methodist Council and World Alliance of Reformed Churches. Knowledge of the conciliar policy positions does not provide any assistance in predicting the policy positions of this denomination.

We turn now to an examination of the relationship between the policy positions of member denominations and those of the Vatican.

### **Vatican**

Vatican pronouncements are unique among conciliar bodies in that they are binding upon all Roman Catholic Churches. No other conciliar body has the ability to issue pronouncements that are binding upon its members. Because Vatican pronouncements are binding upon all Roman Catholic denominations these denominations should exhibit the tightest fit between denominational and conciliar policies.

The most striking feature of the above table is the lack of relationship found between the policies of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States and those of the Vatican. It is remarkable that only this Roman Catholic denomination does not ever follow Vatican policies. The United States Roman Catholic Church is widely regarded as being independent minded (many Catholics elsewhere would say too independent) and these striking results bear out this generally held expectation. Whether this independence of attitude is the result of the individualistic attitudes of U.S. citizens in general or some other factor is beyond the scope of this analysis. The fact remains that of all the Roman Catholic churches in this study only the U.S. Catholic Church shows no relationship between denominational and Vatican policies on any of the variables under study.

It should be noted however, that when the U.S. Catholic Bishops issued their pastoral letter on nuclear deterrence they were careful not to depart from the Vatican doctrine that allowed nuclear deterrence as an interim measure only. The U.S. pastoral echoed the Vatican position that nuclear deterrence could be permitted only as long as there was a real and sincere search for nuclear disarmament and other peace making arrangements.

Table 25. Denominational Policies and International Denominational Conciliarism Vatican

	Australia n=41	Canada n=41	New Zealand n=41	United Kingdom n=41	United States n=41
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.18603</b> (.01)	.06200	.02949	.41736	.01221
Broader Context	.05365	<b>.48387</b> (.0000)	<b>.48077</b> (.0001)	.09091	.00425
General Disarmament	.01620			.09091	.00783
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.24739</b> (.004)	<b>.20055</b> (.01)		.00080	.00716
Unspecified Disarmament	.02248	.00240	<b>.19921</b> (.01)		.00979
Encourage Negotiation		<b>.39193</b> (.0001)		.43860	.00371
Endorse/praise Action	.04007	.00740		.11111	.11360 (.06)
Comprehensive Testing Ban					
Unspecified Testing Ban					
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone					
Reduction Armaments	<b>.62160</b> (.0000)	<b>.43548</b> (.0000)	<b>.46215</b> (.0000)	<b>.88889</b> (.05)	.00093
Objection/Criticism	.03960	.00411	.00148		.00230
Other	.00877	.00194			.00137

Despite the independence of the United States Catholic Church on the variables in Table 25 it nevertheless chose not to depart from the fundamental tenets of Vatican policy on nuclear deterrence.

The same is not true of either the Roman Catholic Church in Canada or the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom. As noted in the previous chapter both these denominations have departed from Vatican policy on nuclear deterrence and declared that nuclear deterrence is an unacceptable policy that should be abandoned. They have done this despite clear indications that they follow the Vatican conciliar line on many of the variables used in examining the nuclear issue.

The Roman Catholic Church in Canada changed from a position of conditional support stated clearly in 1982 to one of rejecting nuclear deterrence in its 1983 statement "On Peace and

Disarmament." The exact language reads ". . .we must say without reservation that nuclear weapons are ultimately unacceptable as agents of national security. We can conceive of no circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons could be justified and consistent with the will of God, and we must therefore conclude that nuclear weapons must also be rejected as a means of threat and deterrence."<sup>12</sup> There is no placating or hedging, this is an unequivocal rejection of the policy of nuclear deterrence.

The Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom was only slightly more equivocal in rejecting nuclear deterrence when in a 1984 statement quoted in "The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Pack for Churches" put out by the British Council of Churches' Peace Forum. It stated "If it is immoral to use these weapons, it is also immoral to threaten their use."<sup>13</sup> Although the use of the if/then formula softens the rejection somewhat it is still unmistakably a rejection of the policy of threatening to use nuclear weapons in order to deter opponents from using these weapons.

Why should it be true that two denominations that both lack the reputation for independence of outlook that characterizes the U.S. Catholic Church and that demonstrably follows Vatican positions on many aspects of the nuclear issue should be the denominations that go beyond the Vatican positions when at the same time the U.S. Catholic Bishops are careful not to depart from stated Vatican policy? One possible explanation is political in nature. The Roman Catholic Church in the United States is already regarded as somewhat suspect among the more orthodox Catholic churches and Vatican functionaries. The Roman Catholic Church in the United States receives a great deal of media attention because of its independent outlook and conflicts with the Vatican. If the U.S. Catholic Church were to depart from Vatican doctrine on such a highly visible and politically explosive issue as nuclear deterrence it might invite a Vatican crackdown, which could devastate the denomination throughout the world.

Roman Catholic churches in Canada and the United Kingdom on the other hand do not receive the same type of media scrutiny as the Catholic Church in the U.S. If these churches choose to go beyond Vatican policies on the nuclear issue the result is not likely to be major controversy and conflict. Because the Catholic churches in Canada and the United Kingdom are generally regarded as faithful followers of Vatican doctrine they possess greater freedom to go

---

<sup>12</sup> Canadian Church Leaders, "On Peace and Disarmament: To the Prime Minister," Document 57, December 14, 1983, p. 436.

<sup>13</sup> Attributed to the Bishops of Scotland in "The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Pack for Churches," The Peace Forum, the British Council of Churches, 1984, p. 2.

beyond Vatican policies. In addition, we have seen that there is tendency among Canadian churches in general to adopt the more extreme positions rejecting nuclear deterrence and its attendant policies. The lack of certainty about the completeness of the data set for the United Kingdom makes it impossible to say for certain but the same tendency might be found among churches in the United Kingdom.

Overall the tightness of fit expected between Vatican and Roman Catholic denomination positions on the nuclear issue is reflected in the Reduction of Armaments variable. In four of the five nations there is a clear and definite relationship. This relationship might be inflated by the small number of cases used in the case of the United Kingdom but even the adjusted R squared of .83333 is very respectable. The tightness of fit expected is not maintained on the other variables. Canada and New Zealand show a moderate relationship between the denominational and Vatican efforts to place the issue in a Broader Context. There is also some relationship between Vatican and denominational consideration of the question of Nuclear Deterrence in Australia and Canada. Canada also exhibits a relationship between the Roman Catholic Church of Canada's preference for negotiated settlements and the Vatican's Encouragement to Negotiate.

Thus far we have examined both national interdenominational conciliarism and international denominational conciliarism. International interdenominational conciliarism remains to be considered before turning to an analysis of the combined influence of all the conciliar bodies to which a denomination belongs.

### **International Interdenominational Conciliarism**

The best known of the international interdenominational conciliar bodies is the World Council of Churches. Indeed, the World Council of Churches is probably the best known of all the conciliar bodies. This might be expected to result in this conciliar body exerting the greatest pressure on member denominations to follow conciliar policies. The results of examining the positions of the World Council of Churches and the positions of its member denominations are printed in Table 26.

## The World Council of Churches

Table 26. Denominational Policies and International Interdenominational Conciliarism WCC

	Australia n=112	Canada n=73	New Zealand n=114	United Kingdom N=76	United States n=75
Acknowledge Issue	.00103	.00005	.00254	.49794	<b>.07309</b> (.01)
Broader Context	.03025 (.06)	<b>.11210</b> (.003)	<b>.07937</b> (.002)	.49915	<b>.18738</b> (.0001)
General Disarmament	.00453	.00384	.01045	.62500	.00152
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.05754</b> (.01)	.01769		<b>.91014</b> (.01)	.00702
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.05847</b> (.01)	.03184	<b>.10130</b> (.006)	.31534	<b>.07957</b> (.01)
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.00458</b> (.003)	.00137	.02501 (.09)	.34341	.02450
Endorse/praise Action	.07637	.00606	.00100	.04255	.00522
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.00455	.00068	.00004	.01042	.00006
Unspecified Testing Ban	<b>.12508</b> (.0001)	.01813	.00405	.64286	.00229
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.00258	.00003	.00168	.73433 (.06)	<b>.13877</b> (.001)
Reduction Armaments	.00639	.01860	.00248	.56002	.00037
Objection/Criticism	.01124	.02632	.00111	.06148	<b>.08835</b> (.009)
Other	.03110 (.06)	<b>.05574</b> (.04)	.03086 (.06)	.67834 (.08)	<b>.05574</b> (.04)

Surprisingly, with the exception of the strong relationship between denominational members in the United Kingdom and the World Council of Churches on the question of Nuclear Disarmament there are not any relationships between the World Council of Churches position and denominational positions on the variables that are both significant and noticeable. Only in the United Kingdom do we find any strong relationships. In this nation there are numerous strong relationships on the variables, these are found on the variables Acknowledge the Issue, Broader Context, General Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone, Reduction in armaments and Other. Clear relationships are also found on Unspecified Disarmament and Encouragement to Negotiate. The relationships between policies of members of the World Council of Churches in the United Kingdom and the positions the World Council of Churches is

due almost entirely to the uncertain nature of the data set which leaves very few years available for analysis since those years for which data were not collected are coded as missing. This is the case since it is not certain that statements were not issued in those years.

The popular recognition of the World Council of Churches as an important conciliar organization does not confer any additional authority on its policies. Contrary to the expectation that this might be an important factor in conciliar pressure on denominational memberships the data, with the exception of the United Kingdom, show virtually no relationship between denominational and conciliar policies when the World Council of Churches and its member denominations are considered.

With very few exceptions, denominations claim membership in more than one conciliar body. The analysis above concentrated on the effects of the various types of conciliarism. It is time to turn now to an examination of the combined the effects of all the conciliar bodies to which a denomination belongs.

### **Combined Conciliar Effects**

Because no data have been collected for the Australian Council of Churches Australian denominations are omitted from the combined conciliar analysis. Anglican denominations are also omitted from the analysis due to the fact that data for this conciliar body are absent.

The Baptist Union of Canada is a member of both the Baptist World Alliance and the Canadian Council of Churches. It is therefore subject to the combined effects of international denominational and national interdenominational conciliar pressures.

The policy Reduction of Armaments is found on the denominational agenda in two of the three years in which it issued relevant statements. This policy is found on the agendas of the Baptist World Alliance and Canadian Council of Churches a combined six times. The strength of this relationship, in Table 27, is thus likely as much the absence of the issue on the agenda as its presence. Knowing that the policy, Reduction of Armaments, does not often appear on the agendas of the Baptist World Alliance and Canadian Council of Churches is a good predictor that the policy will infrequently appear on the agenda of the Baptist Union of Canada.

In addition there is a definite relationship between the Baptist World Alliance and Canadian Council of Churches and the Baptist Union of Canada positions on Other aspects of the nuclear issue. The Baptist Union of Canada placed Other policy options on its agenda in each of

the three years for which it issued relevant statements. There were two references to the policy in each year. Like the Baptist Union of Canada, the Baptist World Alliance issued relevant statements in three years. The number of references to Other policy options increased from the first statement to the second and dropped back down on the third. The Canadian Council of Churches placed Other policy options on its agenda in six years. The number of references fluctuated up and down. Consequently, here too, the strength of the relationship reflects the absence of this policy on the agendas as much as the presence.

Table 27. Combined Conciliar Effects of BWA and CCC

	Baptist Union of Canada BWA CCC
Acknowledge Issue	.01333
Broader Context	
General Disarmament	
Nuclear Disarmament	
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.18245</b> (.008)
Encourage Negotiation	
Endorse/praise Action	
Comprehensive Testing Ban	
Unspecified Testing Ban	
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	
Reduction Armaments	<b>.88801</b> (.0000)
Other	<b>.40498</b> (.0001)

The United Church of Canada is subject to a greater number of conciliar pressures than the Baptist Union of Canada. This is due to its membership in four separate conciliar bodies, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, World Methodist Council, World Council of Churches and Canadian Council of Churches. Membership in all four of these conciliar organizations means that the United Church of Canada is subject to all types of conciliar pressure.

Table 28. Combined Effects of WARC, WMC, WCC, CCC

	United Church of Canada WARC WMC WCC CCC
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.69095</b> (.0000)
Broader Context	<b>.87780</b> (.0000)
General Disarmament	.00883
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.56620</b> (.0000)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.96882</b> (.0000)
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.54820</b> (.0000)
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.85076</b> (.0000)
Comprehensive Testing Ban	<b>.97453</b> (.0000)
Unspecified Testing Ban	.07073
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.92497</b> (.0000)
Reduction Armaments	<b>.53854</b> (.0000)
Objection/Criticism	.12177
Other	<b>.86195</b> (.0000)

Table 28 demonstrates that on all but three variables, General and Complete Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban and Objection/Criticism of a Particular Policy or Action, knowing the agenda presence and salience, as measured by number of references, of the conciliar organizations to which the United Church of Canada belongs would enable us to predict with reasonable accuracy the presence and salience on the denominational agenda. Hypothesis three receives substantial support from this finding.

There were no statistically significant results for the combined effects of conciliarism on the policies of the Baptist Union of New Zealand, Presbyterian Church of New Zealand and Church of Scotland (Presbyterian). This is largely the result of the small number of cases remaining after the deletion of missing data. Consequently, these results are presented below in Tables 29 to 32 but their implications are not discussed in detail.

Table 29. Combined Conciliar Effects on the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand

	Baptist Union of New Zealand BWA WCC NZCCC
Acknowledge Issue	.85624
Broader Context	.18079
General Disarmament	
Nuclear Disarmament	
Unspecified Disarmament	
Encourage Negotiation	1.0
Endorse/praise Action	.43452
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.59420
Unspecified Testing Ban	.15625
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.43752
Reduction Armaments	1.0
Other	.45796

With the exception of placing the issue in a Broader Context and Unspecified Testing Ban all of the variables for which there are results in Table 29 exhibit substantial relationship between denominational and conciliar positions. Indeed, Encouragement to Negotiate and Reduction of Armaments both result in an R-squared of 1.0 implying that knowledge of the positions of the Baptist World Alliance, World Council of Churches and New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ will always predict the positions of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand. It would require a substantially larger data set than the one employed here to determine with accuracy the actual relationship between conciliar and denominational policies but the results shown in Table 29 do serve to indicate that there may be a relationship. This provides some support for the hypothesis and definitely indicates the need for further study. Inclusion of the effects of all forms of conciliarism on the policy making of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society has the interesting effect of greatly increasing the correlation of denominational and conciliar policies while reducing the significance of these findings.

The Presbyterian Church in New Zealand, like its Baptist counterpart is subject to conciliar pressure from three conciliar bodies. In this case the conciliar bodies are World Alliance of Reformed Churches, World Council of Churches and the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ.

While none of these relationships can be said to be statistically significant it is none-the-less interesting that of the seven variables that can be employed in the analysis four demonstrate strong relationships between the denominational and conciliar positions. This appears to add to the support for the hypothesis and definitely indicates the need for further study.

Table 30. Combined Conciliar Effects on the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand

	Presbyterian Church of New Zealand WARC WCC NZCCC
Acknowledge Issue	.19867
Broader Context	.99256
General Disarmament	.68750
Nuclear Disarmament	
Unspecified Disarmament	.65135
Encourage Negotiation	
Endorse/praise Action	
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.07853
Unspecified Testing Ban	
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.84850
Reduction Armaments	
Objection Criticism	
Other	.19935

The Church of Scotland is like the Presbyterian Church in New Zealand and is influenced by the same three types of conciliar pressure, national interdenominational, international denominational and international interdenominational. In Table 31 the impact of these conciliar pressures can be seen on denominational policies.

The caveats of small number of observations available for use in the analysis and possibly incomplete data set must be kept in mind when considering these results but the indications are nevertheless valuable. Although none of the findings are statistically significant there is a strong relationship demonstrated on several variables, indeed, the nature of the data involved results in a number of these variables showing an identity of policy flow between the conciliar and denominational policies.

Table 31. Combined Conciliar Effects on the Church of Scotland

	United Kingdom Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) WARC WCC BCC
Acknowledge Issue	.90782
Broader Context	1.0
General Disarmament	1.0
Nuclear Disarmament	.20183
Unspecified Disarmament	.79396
Encourage Negotiation	.61735
Endorse/praise Action	
Comprehensive Testing Ban	
Unspecified Testing Ban	1.0
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	1.0
Reduction Armaments	1.0
Objection Criticism	.10714
Other	1.0

Having examined the Baptist Union and Missionary Society, Presbyterian Church of New Zealand and the Church of Scotland and seen indications that hypothesis three might indeed be valid when all types of conciliarism are employed it is wise to turn now to an examination of the Presbyterian denomination in the United States. This denomination yields a number of observations and complete data sets for both the denomination and two of the conciliar bodies to which it belongs. The Presbyterian Church in the United States belongs to three conciliar organizations, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, World Council of Churches and National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA. It is therefore subject to all three types of conciliar pressure. Of these three types of conciliar pressure the data for the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA are the only ones that have not been documented to be complete.

The Presbyterian denomination in the United States is clearly very responsive to the effects of combined conciliarism. On fully five of the variables the R squared is greater than .7. On two other variables, Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone there is some relationship. This is clearly in accord with what the hypothesis would expect.

Table 32. Combined Conciliar Effects of WARC, WCC, NCCCUSA

	United States Presbyterian WARC WCC NCCCUSA
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.88591</b> (.0000)
Broader Context	<b>.84393</b> (.0000)
General Disarmament	.01351
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.01630</b> (.0000)
Unspecified Disarmament	.97360
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.89193</b> (.0000)
Endorse/praise Action	.01507
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.02603
Unspecified Testing Ban	<b>.17676</b> (.03)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.29645</b> (.002)
Reduction Armaments	<b>.82226</b> (.0000)
Objection/Criticism	<b>.29758</b> (.002)
Other	<b>.72907</b> (.0000)

### Conclusion

Overall there seems to be some support for the hypothesis; however, it is not consistent across all nations. Canadian denominations seem most responsive to national interdenominational conciliarism. The Baptist Union of New Zealand is most responsive to international denominational conciliarism with the United Church of Canada and Roman Catholic Church of Canada also exhibiting responsiveness to this form of conciliarism. The Roman Catholic Church of New Zealand also shows some responsiveness to this form of conciliarism. International Interdenominational conciliarism has the least effect on denominational policies. The United Church of Canada and the Presbyterian denomination in the United States are clearly strongly responsive to the combined effects of conciliarism. A responsiveness that also seems to be apparent in the findings for the Baptist Union and

Missionary Society, Presbyterian Church of New Zealand and the Church of Scotland. In addition the Baptist Union of Canada shows responsiveness to the combined effects of the different types of conciliarism

While there is the greatest degree of responsiveness when the combined effects of conciliarism are examined not all the denominations considered are strongly responsive to the combined effects. Different denominations are responsive to different forms of conciliar pressure. While there is clearly some relationship between conciliar pressures and denominational policies there are other factors at work that might be responsible for the failure of hypothesis three to apply consistently to all denominations.

## CHAPTER V

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICIES, CONCILIAR MEMBERSHIPS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

- 4) *Denominations with a presbyterian structure of government will be more likely to follow conciliar policies than either those that are episcopal or congregational in structure.*

This chapter examines how denominational response to conciliar pressures is constrained by the organizational structure of the denomination. The constraints that applied when considering organizational dictates are equally valid when looking at the influence of conciliarism. The argument in hypothesis four is that presbyterian denominations are more able to adopt conciliar policies than either episcopal or congregational denominations. This is likely to be the case because in an episcopal denomination the dominant policy-maker(s) will be jealous of giving up their absolute authority to set policy, which they would do by following the conciliar position. A congregational denomination will also have difficulty adopting conciliar policies. The reason for this is the slowness with which congregational denominations makes policy. As discussed in Chapter III a congregational denomination relies on the views of the entire membership rather than simply elected representatives when making policy. Like the dominant policy-maker in an episcopal type denomination, the congregational denomination's membership, due to its direct involvement in policy-making, is likely be suspicious of giving up any of its own power in policy-making by following the conciliar line. Denominations organized on presbyterian lines will be more flexible about limiting their autonomy in this way.

Presbyterian denominational structure relies upon the principals of elected representation and majority rule. These principals presuppose competition, flexibility, and compromise. All of the representatives are, to some extent, in competition to have their positions adopted as the majority position. However, in order for a representative to gain support for the position he/she regards as most important to him/her, he/she must be flexible enough to trade his/her support on issues he/she considers of lesser importance. The representative must also be willing to compromise on points that are not central to his/her position in order to attract support. This practice of coalition formation through compromise and flexibility should make presbyterian denominational structure both the most willing and most able to adopt conciliar positions. By its

very nature the presbyterian denominational structure should give members of a presbyterian denomination an increased understanding of the importance of working together and of the power that can be exercised by a large majority. Members of presbyterian denominations, in other words, will be able to see conciliarism as a means to achieving goals they support whereas episcopal and congregational denominations are more likely to view conciliarism with jealousy and suspicion.

Since both the governmental structure of denominations and conciliar positions were operationalized earlier it only remains to discuss how hypothesis four will be tested. By comparing the policy position of the conciliar organizations of which a denomination is a member with the denominational policy, controlling for governmental structure, it will be possible to determine the constraint on policy shifts exercised by denominational organizational structure. If this hypothesis is to be accepted then the structure of a denomination's government must be found to influence the denominations willingness to follow conciliar policy positions along the lines specified by the hypothesis. The hypothesis will be rejected if no relationship is found between a denomination's governmental structure and its willingness to follow conciliar policy positions.

The same format employed in Chapter IV will be used here, examining first the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism, followed by international denominational conciliarism, international interdenominational conciliarism and finally combined conciliar effects. Within these types of conciliarism the congregational, episcopal and presbyterian denominational structures will be examined, looking for patterns of behavior associated with each organizational type.

## **National Interdenominational Conciliarism**

### **Denominations with Congregational Structure**

There are insufficient cases remaining, once denominational structure is introduced as a constraining factor, to be used to conduct analysis of the effect of congregational structure on the members of the British Council of Churches. The Baptist Union of the United Kingdom was therefore omitted from the analysis. The denominations with congregational structure in the United States and Australia are not members or affiliates of their national councils of churches.

The Baptist Union of Australia failed to issue any relevant statements. In addition no data were obtained for the Australian Council of Churches of Christ. Thus, only two denominations, the Baptist Union of Canada and the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand are used in considering the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism on the policy making of congregationally structured denominations.

Table 33. Effects of National Interdenominational Conciliarism on Congregational Type Denominations

	Canada	New Zealand
Acknowledge Issue	.00152	.21811
Broader Context		.16667
General Disarmament		
Nuclear Disarmament		
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.18418</b> (.005)	
Encourage Negotiation		
Endorse/praise Action		.37500
Comprehensive Testing Ban		
Unspecified Testing Ban		
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone		.37127
Reduction Armaments	<b>.79199</b> (.0000)	
Objection Criticism		
Other	<b>.40702</b> (.0000)	.15929

While there were no statistically significant results for the relationship between the policies of the Baptist Union of New Zealand and the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ there were three variables for the Baptist Union of Canada that were statistically significant, Unspecified Disarmament, Reduction of Armaments, and Other. Of these three variables Reduction of Armaments and Other exhibit clear relationships between the policies of the Baptist Union of Canada and the Canadian Council of Churches. Reduction of Armaments is the stronger of these relationships. Indeed, knowing the presence on the agenda and salience of a Reduction in Armaments to the Canadian Council of Churches would be a reliable predictor of agenda presence and salience of arms reduction to the Baptist Union of Canada. This is contrary to the behavior predicted by the hypothesis.

The results for the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, while not statistically significant, serve to indicate that there is a discernible relationship between its policies and those of the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ on the issues of both Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone.

It is interesting to note that for each of these congregational denominations the issues that display a relationship between denominational and conciliar positions are issues that are important to the nations themselves. Canada has tended to consistently support the position that reducing armaments is a necessary step in securing a just and lasting peace. In the case of New Zealand, the quest for having the South Pacific declared a Nuclear Free Zone has long been of great importance. It might be the effects of these national preoccupations that are being seen rather than the effects of conciliar pressures. The findings observed are not sufficient alone to determine which pressures are the most meaningful.

### **Denominations with Episcopal Structure**

Of the episcopal type denominations only the Roman Catholic Churches in Canada and the United Kingdom are members or affiliates of the national conferences in these nations. The Roman Catholic Churches in the other nations in the study are not members or affiliates of the national councils of churches in their nations.

The small number of cases remaining in the United Kingdom data set when only the British Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church are examined leads to some very misleading results. None of these relationships is statistically significant. The appearance of complete agreement between Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom policies and those of the British Council of Churches is likely due entirely to the number of cases used in the analysis. These results cannot really be regarded as meaningful in any sense. It is interesting, however, to note that this apparent identity of interest appears for each of the variables for which results are obtained. Future research using a larger sample size and a data set that was known to be complete for the British Council of Churches is probably warranted.

The behavior of the Roman Catholic Church of Canada cannot be attributed to incomplete data and small sample size. The tightness of fit on all of the variables but two is the result of the agenda presence or absence of these variables for both the Roman Catholic Church in Canada and the Canadian Council of Churches. Knowing whether or not these variables are on the

agenda of the Canadian Council of Churches would be a very strong predictor of agenda presence for the Roman Catholic Church in Canada. The only variable where the national interdenominational conciliar position does not explain more than half the variance is Nuclear Disarmament. The R squared for this variable is still a healthy .47297, explaining nearly half the variance. These observed results cannot be explained simply by reference to national preoccupations. It seems clear that what is observed is the result of conciliar pressure. This responsiveness to conciliar pressure is greater than that which would be predicted by hypothesis four.

Table 34. Effects of National Interdenominational Conciliarism on Episcopal Type Denominations

	Canada	United Kingdom
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.79352</b> (.0000)	1.0
Broader Context	<b>.88403</b> (.0000)	1.0
General Disarmament		
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.47297</b> (.0000)	
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.93260</b> (.0000)	1.0
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.86397</b> (.0000)	1.0
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.99387</b> (.0000)	
Comprehensive Testing Ban	<b>.95993</b> (.0000)	
Unspecified Testing Ban		1.0
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.90612</b> (.0000).	1.0
Reduction Armaments	<b>.67796</b> (.0000)	1.0
Objection Criticism	<b>.81458</b> (.0000)	
Other	<b>.82852</b> (.0000)	1.0

## **Denominations with Presbyterian Structure**

All the presbyterian type denominations in this study are members of their national councils of churches; however, because no data are available in this study for the Australian Council of Churches, Australia is omitted.

Although no statistically significant results were found for the presbyterian type denominations in New Zealand or the United Kingdom these results may still serve to provide some insight into denominational reactions to conciliar pressure. The relationships found between the policies of the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ and the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand, while failing to meet the requirements of statistical significance, serve to strengthen the argument that national goals are conceivably of equal if not greater importance than conciliar pressure in determining denominational policies in this nation. Here, as with the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, the strongest demonstrated relationship between denominational and conciliar policies is on the issue of the Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone. The only other policy relationship of any note can be found on the question of Unspecified Disarmament. This differs from the complete absence of relationship found for the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand and the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ. In this case the evidence appears to point to a response to conciliar pressure rather than a response to general national goals.

The results for the United Kingdom, while not statistically significant, seem to imply a considerable degree of responsiveness to conciliar pressure. On four of the variables, Acknowledge the Issue, Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, more than half the variance is explained. Additionally, more than one quarter of the variance is explained on the variable Other. These substantial numbers, while probably the result of the small sample size that results from data set that may not be complete, nevertheless, serve as signs that there is likely some degree of responsiveness to conciliar pressures at work. More research is indicated in order to clarify the exact role of conciliar pressure to denominational policy making.

In the United States the denominations with a presbyterian structure did not show a marked relationship between denominational policies and those of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA. On the statistically significant variables there is not an R squared

of even .15. Clearly, for the United States, the hypothesis does not stand up to testing and must be rejected.

The same is not true for the presbyterian type denominations in Canada. Here, five variables, Broader Context, Unspecified Disarmament, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Other, show an R squared of greater than .3, indeed two of these variables, Unspecified Disarmament and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, show an R squared of greater than .4. While not overwhelming relationships, there is a distinct association between the denominational and conciliar policies in this case. Three other variables, Acknowledge the Issue, Nuclear Disarmament and Endorsement/Praise of a Particular Treaty or Action, have R squareds of greater than .2 demonstrating a clear relationship between denominational and conciliar policies on these variables. Unlike the United States, Canada unmistakably provides justification for the hypothesis.

Examining the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism on denominational policies when the constraints of denominational structure are included reveals that the nation in which the denomination resides has a greater impact on how much of an association there is between denominational and conciliar policies than does denominational structure. The denominations in Canada were much more likely to exhibit a marked relationship between denominational and Canadian Council of Churches policies than were denominations in any other nation. The relationship between Canadian Council of Churches positions and those of the episcopally structured Roman Catholic Church of Canada were especially strong. The strength of this relationship is directly contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis.

Overall these results lead to the conclusion that hypothesis four does not hold true for the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism. The fact that all the denominational types in Canada exhibited marked relationships between denominational and Canadian Council of Churches policies might be an indication that the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism is more the result of the spirit of cooperation among denominations of a particular nation than of pressures by the conciliar body. This explanation makes intuitive sense since the national interdenominational conciliar bodies are in fact associations of the denominations within the national borders that have banded together in order to cooperate on issues of mutual concern. It is noteworthy in this case that all the Canadian denominations in the study are members of the Canadian Council of Churches. This relationship between other denominations in the study and

their various national councils of churches is not present. Only in Canada does the entire sample of denominations belong to the national council of churches.

Table 35. Effects of National Interdenominational Conciliarism on Presbyterian Type Denominations

	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.23999</b> (.0000)	.03731	.78215	<b>.06198</b> (.02)
Broader Context	<b>.39113</b> (.0000)	.05488	.33333	<b>.06895</b> (.01)
General Disarmament	.00020		.22222	.00632
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.24009</b> (.0000)		.09166	<b>.11713</b> (.001)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.44468</b> (.0000)	.20940	.69547	.00173
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.07895</b> (.01)		.69444	.00010
Endorse/Praise Action	<b>.27917</b> (.0000)			.01078
Comprehensive Testing Ban	<b>.37685</b> (.0000)			.01330
Unspecified Testing Ban	.02315		.08397	<b>.07815</b> (.01)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.44962</b> (.0000)	.28158	.73837	<b>.13943</b> (.0006)
Reduction Armaments	<b>.04444</b> (.05)		.10359	.03842 (.07)
Objection Criticism	<b>.04803</b> (.04)		.05085	<b>.08078</b> (.009)
Other	<b>.30517</b> (.0000)	.05718	.33333	.01905

### International Denominational Conciliarism

Before proceeding with the analysis of the effects of international denominational conciliarism on denominational policies when taking into account the constraints applied by denominational structure it is helpful to say a few words about the relationship between denominations and the international denominational conciliar bodies to which they belong. The very nature of international denominational conciliar organizations precludes membership in more than one. This is true since denominations are seldom more than one form of

denomination. The exceptions to this rule can be found in denominations such as the United and Uniting denominations of Canada and Australia respectively. These two denominations were formed by a merger between the Presbyterian and Methodist denominations in these nations. As denominations formed by a merger between two distinct denominations they are able to hold membership in two international denominational conciliar organizations, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (Presbyterian and other Reformed Denominations) and the World Methodist Council (Methodist Denominations). Consequently, the analysis for these two denominations includes both conciliar bodies.

The analysis that follows will examine the Baptist World Alliance, Vatican, and World Alliance of Reformed Churches combined with the World Methodist Council in order to maintain the congregational, episcopal, and presbyterian order of denominational type that is used in the other sections.

### **Congregational Structure--Baptist World Alliance**

Baptist denominations in Canada, New Zealand and the United States are members of the Baptist World Alliance. The Baptist Union of Australia is also a member of the Baptist World Alliance but it has not issued any relevant policy statements. The fact that this denomination has not issued any relevant statements can be taken to indicate that it has behaved as the hypothesis would predict. It has failed to respond to any type of conciliar pressure. The following table lays out the policy relationships between the other Baptist denominations in the study and the Baptist World Alliance.

The weakest policy associations are between the Southern Baptist Church and the Baptist World Alliance while the Baptist Union of New Zealand exhibits the strongest policy associations. The Baptist Union of Canada falls in the middle.

The Southern Baptist Church in the United States has a statistically significant relationship between its policies and those of the Baptist World Alliance on only one variable, Nuclear Disarmament. At .15275, however, the R squared does not indicate a striking relationship. The identity of positions of the Southern Baptist Church and the Baptist World Alliance found for Unspecified Disarmament is the result of the corresponding upward trends in the number of references each body made regarding Unspecified Disarmament. Statistically, it is not significant due to the fact that the Baptist World Alliance issued only three statements relating to the nuclear

issue, thus allowing only three points of variance. Inherent in this study is the assumption that while failure of a conciliar body to address an issue places some pressure on a denomination not to address the issue, greater pressure is placed on a denomination by a conciliar body addressing the issue. It is worth noting, however, that both the Southern Baptist Church and Baptist World Alliance displayed increasing interest in the possibility of disarmament while being careful not to specify the type of disarmament that should be pursued

Table 36. Effects of International Denominational Conciliarism on Congregational Type Denominations-BWA

	Canada	New Zealand	United States
Acknowledge Issue	.00270	<b>.39148</b> (.0000)	.01320
Broader Context			
General Disarmament			
Nuclear Disarmament			<b>.15275</b> (.01)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.18418</b> (.005)		1.0
Encourage Negotiation		<b>.79605</b> (.0000)	.00235
Endorse/praise Action		.00128	.00115
Comprehensive Testing Ban		<b>.48750</b> (.0000)	
Unspecified Testing Ban			
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone		<b>.18418</b> (.005)	
Reduction Armaments	<b>.22502</b> (.001)	<b>.48750</b> (.0000)	.00128
Other	.01116	.01416	.00160

The silence on the issue throughout the bulk of the nuclear era changing to increasing calls for some unspecified type of disarmament suggest a certain amount of responsiveness to conciliar pressure on the part of the Southern Baptist Church. Unfortunately, the small number of relevant statements issued by the Baptist World Alliance means that denominational responsiveness in this case must remain a suggestion rather than a statistically significant conclusion. Therefore, hypothesis four cannot be rejected on the evidence supplied by the behavior of the Southern Baptist Church.

The Baptist Union of Canada exhibits a statistically significant relationship between its policies and those of the Baptist World Alliance on two variables, Unspecified Disarmament and Reduction of Armaments. Of these two variables the .22502 R squared for Reduction of Armaments is a clear though not overwhelming relationship. Conciliar pressure cannot be said to be a major contributing factor to the policy positions of the Baptist Union of Canada and the hypothesis appears to be an adequate, rather than strong, predictor of the behavior of this denomination.

In the relationship between the policies of the Baptist Union of New Zealand and those of the Baptist World Alliance there are five statistically significant variables, Acknowledge the Issue, Encourage Negotiation, Comprehensive Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Reduction of Armaments. Of these five variables only one, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, displays a weak relationship at an R squared of .18418. The other variables all show a marked relationship. Indeed, the relationship on the variable, Encourage Negotiation is a very respectable .79605. It appears from these results that the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand is quite responsive to the conciliar pressures of the Baptist World Alliance.

The results found for the relationship between Baptist Union of New Zealand and Baptist World Alliance policies are contrary to those that would be predicted by hypothesis four. The relationship between the policies of the Baptist Union of Canada, the Southern Baptist Church and those of the Baptist World Alliance are somewhat more in line with what the hypothesis would predict.

The loosely organized congregational structure of the various Baptist denominations in the study might lead some to suppose that the difference in the responsiveness to conciliar pressure exhibited is the result of differing theological imperatives. This would be an error. Theologically, Baptists all come from the same common stock. The differences between Baptist denominations are not those of theological belief but rather of emphasis. The core beliefs are common to all but each particular Baptist denomination might give more weight to one specific belief than does another. One denomination, for example, might emphasize the predestination of believers while another might place greater emphasis on free will. There is, however, one core belief that might provide some explanation for the difference in denominational responsiveness to conciliar pressure demonstrated above. That core belief is one of the main tenets of the Baptist approach. This main tenet is the belief that it is possible for individual groups of core believers to know the

will of God.<sup>1</sup> Thus, it is possible that the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand believes the will of God for their particular denomination to be different than do the other Baptist denominations in this study. It may be that the Baptist World Alliance shares with the Baptist Union of New Zealand a particular interpretation of God's will or it may be that the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand responds to the Baptist World Alliance's interpretation of God's will by adopting similar positions. The basis of the observed relationship is not clear from this analysis. The Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand consistently behaved differently on the issues in this study than have other Baptist denominations. A more detailed in-depth examination of this denomination would be required to explain the observed peculiarities.

### **Episcopal Structure--The Vatican**

In this work the Vatican is treated as a conciliar organization. This is done because the configuration of the Roman Catholic Church allows some national autonomy while providing for the cooperation and coordination of Catholic churches throughout the world. In effect all Roman Catholic Churches are required to be members of the Vatican. This structure means that Vatican policies are binding upon all Roman Catholic Churches. Such a relationship is unique among the denominations and conciliar bodies in this study. Consequently, it might be expected that the combinations of binding conciliar pronouncements and mandatory conciliar membership would invalidate the hypothesis. Examination of Table 36, however, demonstrates that while there is more responsiveness to conciliar pressure than might otherwise be the case it is by no means a determinate factor in the policies supported by the Roman Catholic denominations in this study.

In Australia there are only three variables, Acknowledge the Issue, Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of Armaments, show statistically significant relationships between denominational and conciliar policies. Of these three variables, Acknowledge the Issue exhibits a weak relationship, Nuclear Disarmament a clear but not overwhelming relationship and Reduction of Armaments a very respectable R squared of .62160. It is as if the Roman Catholic Church in Australia sought to pay lip service to the concerns of the Vatican regarding the nuclear question (Acknowledge the Issue), agreed slightly more strongly that Nuclear Disarmament

---

<sup>1</sup> For additional information about Baptist denominations see Mircea Eliade, (editor in chief), Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, New York and New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

would be a strategy worth examining further and took to heart the Vatican's desire for a Reduction of Armaments.

In Canada four variables, Broader Context, Nuclear Disarmament, Encourage Negotiation and Reduction of Armaments, demonstrate statistically significant relationships. Of these variables the relationship is weakest though still clear for Nuclear Disarmament. The other variables exhibit marked relationships. The Canadian Catholic Church is more responsive to Vatican pressures than any of the other Catholic denominations. It has been observed, however, that in general the Canadian denominations in the study tend to exhibit a greater tendency toward working closely with conciliar and other cooperative and/or international organizations than their counterparts in other nations.

Table 37. Effects of International Denominational Conciliarism on Episcopal Type Denominations--Vatican

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.18603</b> (.01)	.06200	.02949	.41736	.01221
Broader Context	.05365	<b>.48387</b> (.0000)	<b>.48077</b> (.0001)	.09091	.00425
General Disarmament	.01620			.09091	.00783
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.24739</b> (.004)	<b>.20055</b> (.01)		.00080	.00716
Unspecified Disarmament	.02248	.00240	<b>.19921</b> (.01)		.00979
Encourage Negotiation		<b>.39193</b> (.0001)		.43860	.00371
Endorse/Praise Action	.04007	.00740		.43860	.11360 (.06)
Comprehensive Testing Ban					
Unspecified Testing Ban					
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone					
Reduction of Armaments	<b>.62160</b> (.0000)	<b>.43548</b> (.0000)	<b>.46215</b> (.0000)	<b>.88889</b> (.05)	.00093
Objection/Criticism	.03960	.00411	.00148		.00230
Other	.00877	.00194			.00137

The Roman Catholic Church in New Zealand had statistically significant relationships with the policies of the Vatican on just three variables, Broader Context, Unspecified Disarmament and Reduction of Armaments. The R squared of .19921 for Unspecified Disarmament shows a weak relationship between denominational and conciliar policies. The relationships between denominational and conciliar policies on the remaining two variables exhibit a clear fit between the policies of the Roman Catholic Church of New Zealand and those of the Vatican.

In the United Kingdom there is only one statistically significant result. It is on the policy of Reduction of Armaments. The remarkable tightness of the fit between the Roman Catholic Church of the United Kingdom and the Vatican on the question of the Reduction of Armaments is probably due to the few number of cases that are used in the analysis. It is worth noting that with the exception of the Catholic Church in the United States, all the Roman Catholic Churches in this study exhibit a marked relationship between their policies and those of the Vatican on this variable. Given the relationship between conciliar and denominational policies regarding Reduction of Armaments displayed by the Roman Catholic denominations in Australia, Canada and New Zealand as well, however, it would be unwise to ascribe all of the policy relationship between the Vatican and Roman Catholic denomination in the United Kingdom to sample size. The small number of cases may have inflated the results but it does not detract from the obvious relationship exhibited.

In the United States the Catholic denomination is often something of a maverick. It tends, more than any other Roman Catholic denomination, to challenge the teachings and authority of the Vatican. It is especially interesting that there are no statistically significant results between the policies of the Vatican and those of the Roman Catholic Church of the United States. These maverick tendencies of the United States Roman Catholic denomination are apparently on full display here. Not only are there no statistically significant results but also a lack of any non-statistically significant results. Were it not for the unique nature of the Vatican as both a conciliar body and ultimate binding authority on Roman Catholic doctrine the relationship between the United States Catholic denomination and the Vatican would be exactly what hypothesis four predicts. It is arguable that the leadership of the United States Roman Catholic denomination is,

while unwilling to directly defy the Vatican, nonetheless jealous of its own authority, as the hypothesis predicts, and is therefore less likely to further advance Vatican positions.

Overall the fit between denominational policies and conciliar policies here is most likely attributable to the fact that Vatican policies are binding upon the Roman Catholic denominations. While it is possible that the failure of these denominations to respond strongly to conciliar pressure is due not to the predicted jealousies of the episcopal policy maker but rather to a perception that because Vatican policies are binding on Roman Catholic denominations there is no need on the part of national denominations to address the issue as well, the possibility of jealousy is an equally compelling explanation for the results obtained. Either explanation might account for the lack of overwhelming denominational adherence to binding conciliar policies. It is not possible to distinguish the motivations based on the research done here but it must be noted that, for the most part, these results are in line with what hypothesis four would expect. On most of the variables no relationship is found. Heavy reliance cannot be placed on this finding because they do not meet the criteria of statistical significance but it is enough to provide modest support for the hypothesis.

#### **Presbyterian Structure--Anglican Consultative Council**

The Anglican Consultative Council is similar to the Vatican in that all members of the Anglican Communion must be members of the Anglican Consultative Council. The Archbishop of Canterbury of the Church of England is the titular head of the Council but his statements do not have the same weight and binding authority as those of the Pope. Council positions are not binding upon the members. Unfortunately, not enough data were collected on the Anglican Consultative Council to be used in analysis.

#### **Presbyterian Structure--World Alliance of Reformed Churches and World Methodist Council**

All the Presbyterian denominations in the study are members of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches. This conciliar body, which was established in 1970, has issued only one statement on the nuclear issue during the period under consideration. Consequently there is insufficient variance to use in analysis of the effects of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches positions on the positions of the Presbyterian denominations.

The Uniting Church of Australia and the United Church of Canada, as mergers of the Presbyterian and Methodist denominations in those countries, belong to both the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the World Methodist Council. Using the conciliar positions of the World Methodist Council combined with those of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches these two denominations allow the examination of the effects of international denominational conciliarism on denominations with a presbyterian structure.

Table 38. Effects of International Denominational Conciliarism on Denominations with a Presbyterian Structure

	Australia	Canada
Acknowledge Issue	.00893	.12081 (.08)
Broader Context	.00937	<b>.19896</b> (.01)
General Disarmament		
Nuclear Disarmament	.00359	.00128
Unspecified Disarmament	.00656	.03117
Encourage Negotiation	.00373	<b>.41211</b> (.0000)
Endorse/praise Action	.00465	.00306
Comprehensive Testing Ban		
Unspecified Testing Ban		
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone		
Reduction Armaments	.00197	<b>.43912</b> (.0000)
Objection/Criticism		
Other	.01073	

There are no statistically significant relationships between the policies of the Uniting Church of Australia and those of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and World Methodist Council. In fact, there are no relationships at all on any variable. The Uniting Church of Australia provides absolutely no support for hypothesis four.

In the case of the United Church of Canada there are three variables that exhibit a statistically significant relationship, Broader Context, Encourage to Negotiate, and Reduction of Armaments. The relationship is weak for Broader Context. There is a clear though not exceptional fit between denominational and conciliar policies on the other two variables. Nor is there a clear non-statistically significant relationship found on any other variable. Overall, the fit

is not any better than that which was found for the Roman Catholic Church of Canada and the Vatican. This is contrary to what would be predicted by hypothesis four.

When examining international denominational conciliarism hypothesis four is not a good predictor of the behavior of denominations with a presbyterian structure. The results obtained here do not support the hypothesis. Denominations with a presbyterian structure do not appear to be any more flexible and willing to adopt conciliar policies than denominations organized along congregational or episcopal lines.

### **International Interdenominational Conciliarism--World Council of Churches**

It is difficult to draw conclusion with any certainty about the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism on denominational policies when taking into account the constraint imposed by denominational structure. This is due largely to the fact that denominational conciliar memberships do not fall neatly into convenient patterns for analysis. While the denominations with presbyterian structure in all the nations in the study are members of the World Council of Churches, of the episcopally structured denominations only the Roman Catholic Church of Australia is a member, and the only congregational type denomination that is a member of the World Council of Churches is the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand. Consequently, it is not possible to compare the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism and the constraint of denominational structure on denominational policies across nations except in the case of the presbyterian type denominations. This is a serious liability since it has been shown previously that the same denominations in different nations often behave quite differently.

### **Congregational Structure**

The Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand is the only congregational type denomination in this study that belongs to the World Council of Churches. Unfortunately, analysis of the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism on this denomination did not yield any statistically significant results. In fact, the largest relationship found was .078. Consequently, the table is omitted from this report.

Despite the lack of statistically significant relationships it is worth noting that the results obtained do tend to support the hypothesis. This congregationally structured denomination does not follow the conciliar positions of the World Council of Churches. It is interesting that the

Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand is not responsive to this type of conciliar pressure since it demonstrated some responsiveness to both national interdenominational and international denominational conciliar pressure.

### Episcopal Structure

The Roman Catholic Church of Australia fared better in terms of statistical significance. Six of the variables were significant at the .05 level or below. Of these six Nuclear Disarmament, Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action, and Objection/Criticism of a Particular Action, display a clear relationship between denominational and conciliar policies. None of the R squareds are especially high, although the .37972 for Endorsement/Praise of a Treaty or Action is worth noting. Those results that were obtained that were not statistically significant did not show any relationships. Again, the results obtained are not inconsistent with those predicted by the hypothesis.

Table 39. Effects of International Interdenominational Conciliarism on Policies of Episcopal Type Denominations

	Australia
Acknowledge Issue	.00555
Broader Context	<b>.10170</b> (.05)
General Disarmament	.01128
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.29521</b> (.0005)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.14958</b> (.01)
Encourage Negotiation	
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.37972</b> (.0000)
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.06931
Unspecified Testing Ban	.09238 (.06)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.00590
Reduction Armaments	.04216
Objection/Criticism	<b>.20957</b> (.004)
Other	<b>.16447</b> (.01)

### **Presbyterian Structure**

Of the presbyterian type denominations there were few statistically significant results and with the exception of Nuclear Disarmament in the United Kingdom those results that were statistically significant never reached an R squared of .2. Indeed, with the exception of the United Kingdom there are not any strong relationships found, even including those that do not meet the requirements of statistical significance.

The one significant variable for the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism on denominations with a presbyterian structure in the United Kingdom, Nuclear Disarmament, falls somewhat when the adjusted R squared is used. However, it remains a highly respectable .88019. The adjusted R squared is a more accurate measure due to the scarcity of documented cases in the United Kingdom. Still, this result should be regarded as somewhat questionable since only four documents are used. In addition, the four documents only represent two years of data as two documents were issued in both 1983 and 1985.

While the conclusion cannot be regarded as definitive without a larger sample of congregational and episcopal denominations that belong to the World Council of Churches the available evidence would lead to a rejection of hypothesis four. The tightest fit between World Council of Churches positions and denominational positions belongs not to a presbyterian type denomination but to the Roman Catholic Church of Australia, an episcopal type denomination. It appears that when considering the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism those denominations organized along presbyterian lines are not the most likely to follow conciliar positions.

Table 40. Effects of International Interdenominational Conciliarism on Presbyterian Type Denominations

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom	United States
Acknowledge Issue	.00050	.00005	.00358	.49764	<b>.07309</b> (.01)
Broader Context	.01013	<b>.11210</b> (.003)	<b>.09387</b> (.007)	.49945	<b>.18738</b> (.0001)
General Disarmament	.00415	.00384	.01587	.62500	.00152
Nuclear Disarmament	.00418	.01769		<b>.91014</b> (.01)	.00702
Unspecified Disarmament	.01602	.03184	<b>.15314</b> (.0005)	.31534	<b>.07957</b> (.01)
Encourage Negotiation	.00701	.00137		.34341	.02450
Endorse/praise Action	.03484	.00606	.00649	.04255	.00522
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.00091	.00068	.00003	.01042	.00006
Unspecified Testing Ban	.14798	.01813	.00337	.64286	.00229
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.00275	.00003	.00311	.73433 (.06)	<b>.13877</b> (.001)
Reduction Armaments	.00386	.01860		.56002	.00037
Objection/Criticism	.00210	.02632	.00168	.06148	<b>.08835</b> (.009)
Other	.00027	<b>.05574</b> (.04)	.02150	.67834 (.08)	<b>.05574</b> (.04)

### Combined Conciliar Effects

In examining the effects of combined conciliar pressures on denominational policies in Chapter IV it was apparent that the United Church of Canada and Presbyterian denomination in the United States were most responsive to the combined conciliar pressures. These two denominations are presbyterian in structure. This provides clear support for hypothesis four. It must be kept in mind however that there were only denominations with a presbyterian structure that could be used in the analysis of combined conciliarism. Due to the nature of the available data other denominations could not be used in this analysis. Until a study is conducted that

includes denominations of all structural types that belong to a number of conciliar organizations this support for hypothesis four cannot be regarded as conclusive.

## **Conclusion**

The results do not warrant an outright rejection of the hypothesis, however, the evidence supporting hypothesis four cannot be considered compelling. Of all the denominations in the study the Canadian denominations are the most responsive to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism. This is true regardless of the denominations' organizational structure. It is surprising to note that the episcopally structured Roman Catholic Church in Canada is the most responsive to this type of pressure. This is clearly not in line with hypothesis four. In the United States only the presbyterian type denominations in the study are members of the National Council of Churches of Christ USA. There are not any clear relationships between conciliar and denominational positions, a finding that is also contrary to hypothesis four. The presbyterian type denominations in New Zealand and the United Kingdom did not yield any statistically significant results when examined for the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism. The non-statistically significant results for New Zealand suggested a very small relationship between the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ and the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand. The non-statistically significant results in the United Kingdom indicated the possibility of a definite relationship between the policies of the Church of Scotland and the British Council of Churches. Statistically significant results were not found for the effect of national interdenominational conciliarism on the congregational type denomination in New Zealand or the episcopally structured denomination in the United Kingdom. For both nations the non-statistically significant results are the same as for their presbyterian type counterparts. The non-statistically significant results for New Zealand suggested a small relationship between the New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ and the Baptist Union and Missionary Society. The non-statistically significant results in the United Kingdom indicated the possibility of a definite relationship between the policies of the Roman Catholic Church of the United Kingdom and the British Council of Churches.

The fact that international denominational conciliar bodies are composed of members of denominations that have a great deal in common would make it reasonable to expect that this form of conciliarism would exert a strong influence on member denominations. After all, the

members are usually all of the same denomination or are denominations that grew out of the same tradition. Consequently, it is not surprising that all three of the congregational type denominations were found to have a statistically significant relationship to at least one of the policies of the Baptist World Alliance. The relationship between Baptist World Alliance positions and those of the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand is, however, substantially stronger than those of either the Baptist Union or Canada or the Southern Baptist Convention of the United States. Hypothesis four would not expect such a strong relationship. The weaker relationships of conciliar policies and denominational policies found for the Baptist Union of Canada and the Southern Baptist Convention of the United States are more in line with the hypothesis.

Looking at the effect of Vatican policies on those of the episcopally structured Roman Catholic Churches shows that the Catholic Church in Canada is the most responsive to the pressures of international denominational conciliarism. Both the Catholic Church in Australia and New Zealand are somewhat responsive to the Vatican. There were neither statistically significant results for the Roman Catholic Church in the United States nor non-statistically significant results. This is in keeping with what hypothesis four would predict. Only one variable was statistically significant for the Catholic Church in the United Kingdom. The binding nature of Vatican pronouncements does not exert the influence here that might be expected. Whether this is the result of Catholic Churches not feeling a need to repeat positions that are already enunciated is beyond the scope of this study. The fact that Catholic denominations do not exhibit greater response to Vatican pressures can be taken as support for hypothesis four.

Lack of variance prevented consideration of the effects of the Anglican Consultative Council and World Alliance of Reformed Churches on the policy making of their members. Indeed, only the Uniting Church of Australia and the United Church of Canada could be used in examining the effects of international denominational conciliarism on denominational policy making. Of these two denominations the Uniting Church of Australia yielded no statistically significant results. In fact there was no relationship even when non-statistically significant findings were examined as well. The United Church of Canada did demonstrate some relationship between conciliar and denominational policies but overall these relationships were no stronger than those between the Roman Catholic Church of Canada and the Vatican.

Hypothesis four fails to perform well in considering the effects of international denominational conciliarism.

Hypothesis four also fails to explain the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism on denominational policy making. The presbyterian type denominations do not demonstrate a greater willingness to follow the positions of the World Council of Churches than the only episcopally structured member, the Roman Catholic Church in Australia. This is not what the hypothesis would predict.

There does seem to be a relationship between the effects of all the types of conciliar pressures combined, denominational policy and the organizational structure of the denomination. Unfortunately, the absence from the analysis of any denominations other than those structured in the presbyterian fashion prevents full confidence in this finding. It is however, indicative a possible lines of further inquiry.

Conciliar pressure does appear to have some affect on denominational policy making. Knowing the denominational structure, however, is of only limited use in predicting how a denomination will respond to that pressure. Other factors such as conciliar type seem to exert greater influence.

## CHAPTER VI

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THEOLOGY

5) *Those denominations with liberal theological outlook are likely to adopt the conciliar position.*

Liberal and conservative are, unfortunately, two of the most overworked and least understood words in the political vocabulary. Everyone believes that they know what the words mean and yet no one has offered a definitive, widely accepted definition. Given the lack of a distinct definition anyone using these terms is obligated to provide the definition being used so that others can better evaluate their work.

In the previous chapter it was concluded that although denominational structure was, in many cases, related to the willingness of denominations to adopt conciliar positions it was by no means a strong and definitive relationship. This chapter examines the impact of theology, i.e. liberal v conservative, on the willingness of denominations to adopt conciliar positions. At the risk of making the hypothesis tautological, liberal is defined as reaching out and embracing other viewpoints, as a search for synthesis. Conservative, on the other hand, is considered to be holding to established and traditional positions, a desire to slow and limit change. In terms of theology these definitions would refer to willingness to interpret the Bible (liberal) and literal reading of the Word (conservative). Hypothesis five examines the importance of the institutional constraint, denominational theology, in the model.

Hypothesis five looks at denominational theology as an institutional structural constraint. Denominational theology was operationalized using expert judgment.<sup>1</sup> Experts were asked to rank the denominations' theology on a Likert scale from liberal to conservative, where liberal is a greater willingness to apply interpretation to biblical teachings and conservative is a strictly literal reading of the scriptures. It is expected that denominations that are willing to interpret scripture will be more willing to follow conciliarism than those who are literalists. This is expected to be the case because a willingness to interpret scripture is indicative of greater flexibility. Flexibility is indicated by approaching the Bible not as the literal, exact word of God but as the word of God<sup>2</sup> requiring interpretation in order to apply to modern life. This flexibility thus demonstrates a

---

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix C.

<sup>2</sup> All the denominations in the study accept the Bible as the word of God. However, they differ on how much interpretation that word requires.

willingness to recognize differing viewpoints. Such willingness would play an important role in allowing a denomination the ability to adopt conciliar positions.

It should be noted at this point that the theology of the conciliar bodies themselves could also be ranked on the conservative/liberal scale. Intuitively one would expect that international denominational conciliar bodies would reflect the theology of their members, i.e. Baptist denominations are generally regarded as theologically conservative thus the Baptist World Alliance would also be theologically conservative. This intuitive expectation results in the expectation that denominations would, thus, be more likely to follow the policies of the international denominational conciliar bodies of which they are members. There are two flaws in this logic. First, as the previous chapter demonstrated, denominations are not more likely to follow international denominational conciliar policies than the policies of other conciliar bodies. Second, and perhaps of greater importance here, the denominations of particular types, e.g. Anglican, Baptist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, etc., do not exhibit a consistent theological bent across national boundaries. The members of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, in this study alone, for example, range from somewhat liberal to somewhat conservative theologically. It is clear that denominational theology and conciliar memberships are not going to fall into neat patterns.

Denominations choose both which councils to join and which policies of those councils to endorse or accept. In addition, denominations are frequently confronted with competing policies brought about by membership in more than one conciliar organization. The hypothesis in this chapter argues that the more theologically liberal denominations will find it easier to endorse or accept the policies of the conciliar bodies to which they belong. In other words the more theologically liberal denominations should more often follow conciliar policies than their theologically conservative counterparts. Knowing the theological type--whether it tends to be more conservative or more liberal--of a denomination should make it possible to predict whether the denomination will or will not follow the conciliar path. If it does not, the hypothesis will be rejected.

### **Overview of the Data**

A brief overview of the data at this point will provide a useful background for the analysis that follows. The theological positions found among the denominations in the study

range from somewhat conservative to somewhat liberal. There were no very liberal or very conservative denominations. There were no data on theology collected for New Zealand; consequently it is not used in the analysis. It should also be pointed out that the data on theology are not complete for any nation.

The following denominations have been ranked using expert opinion<sup>3</sup> on a theological continuum from Conservative to Liberal; Church of England in Australia (Somewhat Conservative), Uniting Church of Australia (Somewhat Liberal) and Roman Catholic Church of Australia (Somewhat Conservative), Anglican Church of Canada (Somewhat Liberal), United Church of Canada (Moderate), Church of England (Somewhat Conservative), Church of Scotland (Somewhat Conservative), Southern Baptist Conference of the United States (Somewhat Conservative) and the Presbyterian denomination in the United States (Moderate).

The format for examining the effect of theology on a denomination's willingness to follow conciliar policies will be similar to that in the two preceding chapters. Those denominations whose theology is somewhat conservative will be presented first followed by the moderate theology and somewhat liberal theological denominations. Within each theological type the conciliar positions of national interdenominational, international denominational and international interdenominational will be presented.

The denomination that holds membership in more than one type of conciliar organization for which a somewhat liberal theological rating was obtained is Uniting Church of Australia and the Anglican Church of Canada. The absence of data for the Australian Council of Churches of Christ makes it impossible to adequately examine combined conciliar effects for the Uniting Church in Australia. Likewise, lacking a usable data set for the Anglican Consultative Council it is not possible to assess combined conciliar effects for the Anglican Church of Canada.

## **Somewhat Conservative Theology**

### **National Interdenominational Conciliarism**

Of the denominations that were ranked somewhat conservative--Anglican Church of Australia, Roman Catholic Church of Australia, Church of England, Church of Scotland and Southern Baptist Convention of the United States only two could be used in examining

---

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix C.

relationship between the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism and the constraint of denominational theology. These were the Church of England and the Church of Scotland. The Southern Baptist Convention in the United States was not used in the analysis of the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism because it does not belong to the National Council of Churches of Christ USA. The Anglican Church of Australia and Roman Catholic Church in Australia are omitted from the analysis because no data were obtained for the Australian Council of Churches of Christ. No results were obtained for any variable when the positions of the somewhat theologically conservative Church of England are examined in relation to those of the British Council of Churches. This is the result of the scarcity of documents collected for both of the denomination and the British Council of Churches. While no statistically significant results were obtained when examining the relationship between the policies of the Church of Scotland and the British Council of Churches it is still possible to find indications of possible relationships. These are presented in the following table.

Table 41. Theologically Somewhat Conservative Church of Scotland and the Conciliar Pressure of the British Council of Churches

	United Kingdom Church of Scotland BCC
Acknowledge Issue	.78215
Broader Context	.33333
General Disarmament	.22222
Nuclear Disarmament	.09166
Unspecified Disarmament	.69547
Encourage Negotiation	.69444
Endorse/praise Action	
Comprehensive Testing Ban	
Unspecified Testing Ban	.08397
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.73837
Reduction Armaments	.10359
Objection/Criticism	.05085
Other	.33333

There are four variables for which the R-squared is more than .6. These variables, Acknowledge the Issue, Unspecified Disarmament, Encouragement to Negotiate and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, all indicate a definite association between denominational and

conciliar positions on the nuclear issue. Three additional variables, Broader Context, General and Complete Disarmament and Other, also display a relationship although not as strong. Even though the limited number of data points may be largely responsible for the overall strength of these relationships they nevertheless reflect a clear pattern of association between the denominational and conciliar policies. Without a larger study it is not possible to make realistic conclusions but the initial indications are of a denomination that does not behave in the manner predicted by the hypothesis. Further study is warranted if a clear picture is to emerge.

### **International Denominational Conciliarism**

In examining the international denominational memberships of those denominations that are ranked as having a somewhat conservative theology only two, the Roman Catholic Church in Australia and the Southern Baptist Convention in the United States can be used in the analysis. The Anglican Church of Australia was not used in the consideration of the effects of International Denominational Conciliarism since the international denominational conciliar body to which it belongs, the Anglican Consultative Council, has only two statements in the data set. The Church of England is omitted from this analysis also because of the scarcity of data for the Anglican Consultative Council. The Church of Scotland is also omitted. Although complete data have been obtained for the World Alliance of Reformed Churches the fact that it issued only one statement relating to the nuclear issue does not allow enough variance for analysis.

The somewhat theologically conservative Roman Catholic Church of Australia exhibits a statistically significant relationship between its policies and those of the Vatican on three variables, Acknowledge the Issue, Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of Armaments. Acknowledging the Issue demonstrates the weakest fit. Nuclear Disarmament demonstrates a clear but not overwhelming relationship between denominational and conciliar policies. Reduction of Armaments at an R squared of .62160 is the tightest fit between the policies of the Catholic Church in Australia and the Holy See.

There are two possible explanations for the strong relationship on this variable. One explanation would hold that this is a clear indication of responsiveness to conciliar pressure. The other explanation would claim that this is coincidental. In this explanation the catholic Church in Australia is not responding to conciliar pressure but has independently reached the conclusion that a reduction in armaments would be desirable, a conclusion also reached by the Vatican.

While the analysis is not finely tuned enough to verify which explanation is the more persuasive it is evocative that a strong relationship is found for only one variable. This suggests more weight be given to the second explanation. If this is the case there is added support for the hypothesis.

Table 42. Denominations with Somewhat Conservative Theology and International Denominational Conciliarism

	Australia Roman Catholic The Vatican	United States Southern Baptist BWA
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.18603</b> (.01)	.01350
Broader Context	.05365	
General Disarmament	.01620	
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.24866</b> (.004)	<b>.15336</b> (.01)
Unspecified Disarmament	.01957	1.0
Encourage Negotiation		.00224
Endorse/praise Action	.04007	.00109
Comprehensive Testing Ban		
Unspecified Testing Ban		
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone		
Reduction Armaments	<b>.62160</b> (.0000)	.00122
Objection/Criticism	.03960	
Other	.00877	.00152

The Southern Baptist Convention in the United States has a statistically significant relationship between its policies and that of the Baptist World Alliance on the policy of Nuclear Disarmament only. It is not a particularly strong relationship. Neither the Southern Baptist Convention nor the Baptist World Alliance has issued very many statements on the nuclear question. While the small number of statements may account for the lack of statistical significance on more variables, as it stands this is clear support for the hypothesis. The apparent identity of positions on the variable Unspecified Disarmament, while not statistically significant, deserves explanation. Reference to the raw data reveals that both the Southern Baptist Conference and the Baptist World Alliance considered this variable in only three years. For the Baptist World Alliance these considerations came in 1980 (1 reference), 1981 (8 references) and

1982 (4 references). For the Southern Baptist Conference, the considerations were in 1981 (1 reference), 1982 (2 references) and 1984 (2 references).

The findings for the Catholic Church in Australia and the Baptist Church in the United States are in keeping with what would be expected by hypothesis five. Both of these somewhat theologically conservative denominations respond somewhat to the pressures of international denominational conciliarism but neither denomination demonstrates a strong tendency to follow the conciliar positions.

### **International Interdenominational Conciliarism**

Of the five somewhat theologically conservative denominations in the study only the Southern Baptist Convention of the United States is not a member of the World Council of Churches. The others all belong or are affiliated with this international interdenominational conciliar body.

There are statistically significant relationships between the policies of the somewhat theologically conservative Church of England in Australia and Roman Catholic Church in Australia and the World Council of Churches on six variables, placing the issue in a Broader Context, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Disarmament, Endorse/Praise a Particular Treaty or Action, Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy and Other. None of these relationships demonstrate a tight fit. Indeed at an R squared of .18298, Endorse/Praise an Action or Treaty is the largest relationship. It is apparent that the somewhat theologically conservative denominations in Australia do not adopt the policies of the World Council of Churches with any great frequency; knowing the position of the World Council of Churches would not be very useful in predicting Church of England in Australia or Roman Catholic Church of Australia positions on the aspects of the nuclear issue examined by these variables.

The Church of England and Church of Scotland have a statistically significant relationship with World Council of Churches policies on only one variable, Nuclear Disarmament. At an R squared of .91014, this seems to be a very tight fit. However, care should be exercised in regarding this fact due to the paucity of documents for these denominations.

Of non-significant results only three variables exhibit virtually no relationship. These are Endorsement/Praise of a Particular Action, Comprehensive Testing Ban and Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy, all the others exhibit an R squared of greater than .3. While some of this

is undoubtedly due to the small number of documents collected for these two denominations the results nevertheless suggest that these denominations in the United Kingdom are responsive to the pressures of the World Council of Churches. More research is required to assess the extent of this responsiveness.

Table 43. Somewhat Theologically Conservative Denominations and International Interdenominational Conciliarism

	Australia Anglican Roman Catholic	United Kingdom Church of England Church of Scotland
Acknowledge Issue	.00276	.49764
Broader Context	<b>.04893</b> (.05)	.49945
General Disarmament	.00561	.62500
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.14267</b> (.0008)	<b>.91014</b> (.01)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.08068</b> (.01)	.31534
Encourage Negotiation		.34341
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.18298</b> (.0001)	.04255
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.03434	.01042
Unspecified Testing Ban	.04691 (.06)	.64286
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.00295	.73433 (.06)
Reduction Armaments	.02053	.56002
Objection/Criticism	<b>.09932</b> (.005)	.06148
Other	<b>.07674</b> (.01)	.67834 (.08)

### Combined Conciliarism

Combined conciliar effects are impossible to determine for any of the denominations for which a somewhat conservative theological rankings are available. In the case of the Anglican type denominations, Church of England in Australia and Church of England few or no documents were collected for one or more of the conciliar bodies to which it belongs. There were no documents collected for the Australian Council of Churches of Christ and very few collected for the Anglican Consultative Council. The Roman Catholic Church in Australia is an observer

member of the Australian Council of Churches of Christ and thus has incomplete data available when considering the effects of combined conciliarism. The Southern Baptist Conference in the United States is a member of only one conciliar organization and thus not subject to the pressures of combined conciliarism. This leaves only the Church of Scotland. It is unfortunately the case that the small sample size for this denomination and the conciliar organizations to which it belongs make it impossible to obtain any results that can be used in examining the effects of combined conciliarism.

### **Conclusion**

Overall the behavior of denominations with somewhat conservative theology is mixed at best. The somewhat theologically conservative denominations in Australia behave as the hypothesis predicts. The denominations in the United Kingdom with a somewhat theologically conservative orientation appear to behave in a manner counter to what would be predicted by hypothesis five. Further research utilizing complete data sets and larger sample sizes would be required to clarify the value of this hypothesis.

### **Moderate Theology**

#### **National Interdenominational Conciliarism**

There are two theologically moderate denominations available for examination in relation to conciliar policies--the United Church of Canada and the Presbyterian denomination in the United States.

Expert opinion has defined the United Church of Canada as theologically moderate. Statistical analysis shows it to be extremely responsive to the positions of the Canadian Council of Churches. The relationship between the policies of these two organizations is statistically significant on all but two variables, General Disarmament and Unspecified Testing Ban. There is a clear relationship on all remaining variables, indeed, only three variables, Encourage Negotiation, Reduction of Armaments and Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy, have an R squared below .5. Of these Reduction of Armaments is a relatively small but still notable .24576. Overall, it is apparent that knowing the positions of the Canadian Council of Churches on aspects of the nuclear issue would be a good predictor of the positions of the United Church of Canada.

Hypothesis five would not predict relationships of such strength. Chapters IV and V, have shown, however, that Canadian denominations seem to be much more responsive to the positions of the Canadian Council of Churches than are other denominations to their national interdenominational conciliar bodies.

The Presbyterian denominations in the United States share a theological outlook with the United Church of Canada. As illustrated in the table below, however, they are less responsive to the policies of the National Council of Churches of Christ USA. There are statistically significant relationships on six variables Acknowledge the Issue, place the issue in a Broader Context, Nuclear Disarmament, Unspecified Testing Ban, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy. Of these variables only two, Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone exhibit a clear fit between denominational and conciliar policies. This finding is much more in keeping with the hypothesis. As a theologically moderate denomination it would be expected to be somewhat responsive to conciliar pressures but not overwhelmingly so.

The divergence in findings for the United Church of Canada and the Presbyterian denominations of the United States does not allow for definitive conclusions about the validity of hypothesis five. The findings for the Presbyterian denominations do offer enough support that further consideration of the hypothesis with a larger sample of theologically moderate denominations is probably warranted.

Table 44. Theologically Moderate Denominations and National Interdenominational Conciliarism

	Canada United Church	United States Presbyterian
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.64067</b> (.0000)	<b>.12804</b> (.02)
Broader Context	<b>.82453</b> (.0000)	<b>.14759</b> (.01)
General Disarmament	.00069	.01224
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.56629</b> (.0000)	<b>.24694</b> (.001)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.94816</b> (.0000)	.00390
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.43353</b> (.0000)	.00030
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.88293</b> (.0000)	.00733
Comprehensive Testing Ban	<b>.97278</b> (.0000)	.02755
Unspecified Testing Ban	.00210	<b>.17350</b> (.007)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.92521</b> (.0000)	<b>.29032</b> (.0003)
Reduction Armaments	<b>.24576</b> (.0007)	.07182 (.09)
Objection/Criticism	<b>.35066</b> (.0000)	<b>.17682</b> (.006)
Other	<b>.69388</b> (.0000)	.04560

### International Denominational Conciliarism

Only one of the theologically moderate denominations could be used in the analysis of the impact of international denominational conciliarism. The Presbyterian denomination in the United States is omitted for the same reason the theologically somewhat conservative Church of Scotland was above. There is insufficient variance in the positions of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches to make analysis possible. This leaves only the United Church of Canada for consideration.

The United Church of Canada appears to be quite responsive to the positions of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and World Methodist Council. There is a statistically significant relationship between its policies and those of the conciliar organizations on five

variables Acknowledge the Issue, place the issue in a Broader Context, Encourage Negotiation, Reduction of Armaments and Other. Of these only Acknowledge the Issue has an R squared of less than .2. Indeed, Encourage Negotiation with an R squared of .56681 explains more than 50% of the variance. There is a clear fit between the positions of these conciliar bodies and the United Church of Canada on all the variables except Acknowledge the Issue. This relationship seems to be greater than what hypothesis five would predict. However, without a larger sample of theologically moderate denominations to examine it is difficult to be certain that the United Church of Canada is representative of the typical relationship. The findings for this one denomination do not conform to the hypothesis.

Table 45. Theologically Moderate Denomination and International Denominational Conciliarism

	Canada United Church WARC WMC
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.14201</b> (.04)
Broader Context	<b>.20295</b> (.01)
General Disarmament	
Nuclear Disarmament	.00116
Unspecified Disarmament	.03444
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.56681</b> (.0000)
Endorse/praise Action	.00208
Comprehensive Testing Ban	
Unspecified Testing Ban	
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	
Reduction Armaments	<b>.43854</b> (.0000)
Objection/Criticism	
Other	<b>.37069</b> (.0001)

### International Interdenominational Conciliarism

Both of the theologically moderate denominations in the study are members of the World Council of Churches. This enables the use of both in the analysis and achievement of a slightly better picture of the validity of the hypothesis than was possible for the effects of international denominational conciliarism.

Three variables for the United Church of Canada, place the issue in a Broader Context, Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy and Other, demonstrate statistically significant relationships with the policies of the World Council of Churches on these variables. Only two of these variables, Broader Context and Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy, exhibit a clear though not overwhelming fit. The Presbyterian denominations in the United States show statistical significance between World Council of Churches positions and their own on six variables Acknowledge the Issue, place the issue in a Broader Context, Unspecified Disarmament, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone, Objection/Criticism of an Action or Policy and Other. Of these only Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and place the issue in a Broader Context demonstrate a clear fit. Place the issue in a Broader Context has the best fit with a very respectable R squared of .40497.

Table 46. Theologically Moderate Denominations and International Interdenominational Conciliarism

	Canada United Church	United States Presbyterian
Acknowledge Issue	.00118	<b>.15117</b> (.01)
Broader Context	<b>.25476</b> (.0014)	<b>.40497</b> (.0000)
General Disarmament	.00741	.00318
Nuclear Disarmament	.05118	.01631
Unspecified Disarmament	.07881 (.09)	<b>.16782</b> (.01)
Encourage Negotiation	.01877	.05007
Endorse/praise Action	.00635	.01516
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.00135	.00002
Unspecified Testing Ban	.01043	.00025
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.00005	<b>.28697</b> (.0008)
Reduction Armaments	.05329	.00151
Objection/Criticism	<b>.23056</b> (.002)	<b>.19081</b> (.007)
Other	<b>.11056</b> (.04)	<b>.10191</b> (.05)

Overall, however, while there is a clear impact of World Council of Churches positions on some variables on the policies of these two denominations knowing World Council of

Churches policies would not be an adequate predictor of denominational policies. This conforms to the expectations of hypothesis five, that theologically moderate denominations would be responsive to conciliar pressures but not overwhelmingly so.

### **Combined Conciliarism**

The two theologically moderate denominations in the study, United Church of Canada and the Presbyterian Church in the United States both appear to be highly responsive to the pressures of combined conciliarism. This can be seen in Table 46.

Of the two denominations the United Church of Canada is the most responsive. More than half the variance can be explained by the pressures of all the conciliar bodies to which it belongs on ten of the variables. For the Presbyterian denomination in the United States only six of the variables have more than half the variance explained by the pressures of combined conciliarism. Two other variables, Nuclear Freeze/Nuclear Free Zone and Objection/Criticism of a Particular Policy or Action exhibit very respectable R-squareds of more than .29. These findings are contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis. Both the theologically moderate denominations are very responsive to the pressures of combined conciliarism when the hypothesis would predict modest responsiveness.

Table 47. Theologically Moderate Denominations and Combined Conciliarism

	Canada United Church WARC, WMC, CCC, WCC	United States Presbyterian WARC, NCCCUSA, WCC
Acknowledge Issue	<b>.68928</b> (.0000)	<b>.88591</b> (.0000)
Broader Context	<b>.87770</b> (.0000)	<b>.84393</b> (.0000)
General Disarmament	.00883	.01351
Nuclear Disarmament	<b>.56564</b> (.0000)	<b>.97360</b> (.0000)
Unspecified Disarmament	<b>.96647</b> (.0000)	.01630
Encourage Negotiation	<b>.54547</b> (.0000)	<b>.89193</b> (.0000)
Endorse/praise Action	<b>.85026</b> (0.0)	.01870
Comprehensive Testing Ban	<b>.97453</b> (0.0)	.02603
Unspecified Testing Ban	.07073	<b>.17676</b> (.03)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	<b>.92497</b> (0.0)	<b>.29645</b> (.002)
Reduction Armaments	<b>.52093</b> (.0000)	<b>.82226</b> (.0000)
Objection/Criticism	.12177	<b>.29758</b> (.002)
Other	<b>.86173</b> (.0000)	<b>.72907</b> (.0000)

### Conclusion

The support for the hypothesis found here is mixed. While the United Church in Canada is consistently quite responsive to all forms of conciliar pressures the Presbyterian denomination in the United States is only modestly responsive to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism. It is, however, highly responsive to the pressures of combined conciliarism. Hypothesis five predicts that theologically moderate denominations would only be somewhat responsive to the pressures of conciliarism. The United Church of Canada is considerably more than somewhat responsive. The Presbyterian denomination in the United States, however, is somewhat responsive to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism and highly

responsive to the pressures of combined conciliarism. Overall these findings do not support the hypothesis.

### **Somewhat Liberal Theology**

There are two somewhat theologically liberal denominations in the sample, these are the Uniting Church of Australia and the Anglican Church of Canada.

#### **National Interdenominational Conciliarism**

Of the two theologically somewhat liberal denominations only one can be used to examine the effects of national interdenominational conciliarism, the Anglican Church of Canada. The absence of data for the Australian Council of Churches of Christ requires that the Uniting Church of Australia be omitted from the analysis.

There were not any statistically significant relationships between the policies of the Anglican Church of Canada and the Canadian Council of Churches. When the non-statistically significant results are examined they demonstrate virtually no relationship between the policies of the Anglican Church of Canada and those of the Canadian Council of Churches. It is not possible to draw any definitive conclusions about the usefulness of hypothesis five in predicting the relationship between national interdenominational conciliar pressures and denominational policies in a somewhat theologically liberal denomination. However, the initial indications are that hypothesis five would not be useful

Table 48. Somewhat Liberal Theology and National Interdenominational Conciliar Pressure

	Canada Anglican CCC
Acknowledge Issue	.00155
Broader Context	.00184
General Disarmament	
Nuclear Disarmament	.00105
Unspecified Disarmament	.00248
Encourage Negotiation	.00337
Endorse/praise Action	.00342
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.00088
Unspecified Testing Ban	.00430
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	
Reduction Armaments	.00796
Objection/Criticism	.00194
Other	.00004

### **International Denominational Conciliarism**

Due to the fact that the Anglican Consultative Council data are not documented as complete and only two documents were obtained there is insufficient variance to be able to use it to examine the effects of international denominational conciliar pressures on the somewhat theologically liberal Anglican Church of Canada. Analysis of the effects of this form of conciliarism on the other theologically somewhat liberal denomination in the sample, the Uniting Church of Australia, did not yield any statistically significant results. Consequently, it is not possible to draw any functional conclusions about the validity of hypothesis five.

As Table 48 indicates, however, the initial assessment of hypothesis five in predicting the policy positions of the Uniting Church of Australia using the pressures of international denominational conciliarism would be that hypothesis five has virtually no utility as a predictor.

Table 49. Somewhat Liberal Theology and International Denominational Conciliar Pressures

	Australia Uniting Church WARC WMC
Acknowledge Issue	.00893
Broader Context	.00937
General Disarmament	
Nuclear Disarmament	.00359
Unspecified Disarmament	.00656
Encourage Negotiation	.00373
Endorse/praise Action	.00465
Comprehensive Testing Ban	
Unspecified Testing Ban	
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	
Reduction Armaments	.00197
Objection/Criticism	
Other	.01073

### **International Interdenominational Conciliarism**

Both the Uniting Church in Australia and the Anglican Church in Canada are members of the World Council of Churches.

For both the Uniting Church in Australia and the Anglican Church in Canada the only statistically significant relationship between denominational policies and those of the World Council of Churches is on the variable Unspecified Testing Ban. For the Uniting Church in Australia more than 30 percent of the variance in the denominational position can be explained by the Unspecified Testing Ban policy of the World Council of Churches. For the Anglican Church of Canada the amount of explained variance is only slightly more than 10 percent. Because these denominations are somewhat liberal theologically, hypothesis five would expect that they would be the most responsive, of the denominations in the sample, to conciliar pressures. This is obviously not the case.

Table 50. Theologically Somewhat Liberal Denominations and International Interdenominational Conciliarism

	Australia Uniting Church	Canada Anglican
Acknowledge Issue	.00121	.00436
Broader Context	.02082	.00604
General Disarmament	.00831	.00624
Nuclear Disarmament	.00848	.00382
Unspecified Disarmament	.02263	.00390
Encourage Negotiation	.01426	.00000
Endorse/praise Action	.07518	.00350
Comprehensive Testing Ban	.00208	.00149
Unspecified Testing Ban	<b>.30154</b> (.0004)	<b>.10106</b> (.05)
Nuclear Freeze/Free Zone	.00549	
Reduction Armaments	.00807	.00086
Objection/Criticism	.00467	.00102
Other	.00083	.00188

### Conclusion

The evidence available does not permit drawing definitive conclusions about the validity of hypothesis five. The hypothesis performs reasonably well when denominations with somewhat conservative theologies are considered individually. It is of some use when denominations that have a moderate theology are examined. But, once the analysis for the somewhat liberal denominations is included the hypothesis does not perform at all well. This suggests that the hypothesis is in error since the theologically moderate denominations are, in fact, more responsive to conciliar positions than are the somewhat theologically liberal denominations.

It would appear that the initial assumptions about the factors that would influence a denomination's willingness to follow conciliar pressures were in error. The results obtained here would indicate that rather than flexibility of interpretation leading to an increased willingness to follow conciliar policies such flexibility leads to a reluctance to be tied down to anyone else's interpretations. Denominations that are somewhat liberal theologically are unwilling to commit to fixed conciliar positions. As the denomination's interpretations change, being committed to fixed positions would force it to expend its resources to change the policies of the conciliar bodies to which it belongs in order to bring them into line with the denomination's own new

interpretations. The alternative would be for the theologically somewhat liberal denomination to abandon its own new interpretations to remain in conformity with the conciliar positions. Either choice would have far reaching consequences to either the denomination's resources or self-image.

Theologically moderate denominations, on the other hand, demonstrate a willingness to interpret scripture but also to remain committed to those interpretations for long periods of time. This would make it easier for such denominations to commit to fixed positions. It is apparent that a revised hypothesis is needed in light of the reexamined assumptions and the findings obtained from the analysis above. This revised hypothesis would state:

*Denominations that are theologically moderate are more likely than either theologically conservative or theologically liberal denominations to adopt conciliar positions.*

The results of the analysis carried out in this chapter would indicate that such a revised hypothesis would have far greater predictive abilities than the original statement of hypothesis five. The analysis carried out above and the results obtained clearly demonstrate the need for a larger study using the revised hypothesis.

## CHAPTER VII

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICIES AND PERCEIVED NUCLEAR THREAT

*6) The level of nuclear threat to the nation in which a denomination is located will affect the willingness of the denomination to support the policies of the nation-state.*

Or, to put it another way when the threat to the nation is high the denomination will be more likely to support national policies. There is a tendency among citizens and non-governmental organizations to exhibit a willingness to go along with any national policy when it is expressed in terms of national security. National security is often expressed in terms of the need to possess overwhelming military power in order to deter aggression. This can be seen in part in one of the paradigms of "nuclearism" elucidated by G. Clarke Chapman, Jr., he describes this paradigm as a distinctive form of hopelessness that

resembles what military planners call "worst case analysis," that is, the prudence before battle to overestimate systematically an enemy's effective forces, while underestimating one's own. . . . This mindset guarantees an escalating arms race, since each side will seek the illusory safety margin.<sup>1</sup>

The tendency to support any national policy when it is expressed in terms of national security is even more apparent when it is realized that

with the exception only of the Quakers and other small historic "peace" churches, all congregations in America--Catholic, Protestant and Jewish--historically have supported the nation's readiness to engage in war.<sup>2</sup>

While churches, not just in America, but, throughout the world have sometimes opposed specific wars<sup>3</sup> they have not, as a rule, rejected war as an instrument of national policy. When the nation state has claimed war is necessary as a matter of national security the churches have by and large rallied around lending their support. It has not only been war that has benefit from the support generated by those "magic" words "national security."

---

<sup>1</sup> G. Clarke Chapman, Jr., "Approaching Nuclearism as a Heresy: Four Paradigms," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Volume 39, number 4, 1984, 255-268.

<sup>2</sup> L. Bruce van Voorst, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1983, Volume 61, no. 4, 827-852

<sup>3</sup> Most notably the objection by American denominations to the Vietnam war

When a nation's existence is at stake, the principles of humanity--as they are called--must be regretfully sacrificed to the very existence of a people.

. .<sup>4</sup>

Hypothesis six presupposes that, in the international system there is a strong belief by nations and denominations in the efficacy of deterrence. Nuclear deterrence has been a matter of national security for over fifty years now. The nations in this study have all relied on a national policy of nuclear deterrence either directly the United Kingdom and the United States, or through Alliances, Australia, Canada, New Zealand. It might be argued that by refusing to allow nuclear ships to dock at its ports New Zealand is rejecting the policy of reliance on deterrence. Even if this is the case New Zealand, through membership in the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty Organization, subscribed to a policy of deterrence throughout most of the period under examination. Also within the time frame under examination New Zealand did not explicitly reject the policy of deterrence.

Previously the importance of external environmental constraints on the policy making of denominations was established.<sup>5</sup> Since the dependent variable in this study has been defined as policy-making with regard to the issue of nuclear deterrence one of the most important constraints to be considered is, obviously, the level of threat by nuclear weapons to which the home nation of the denomination is subject from the nuclear powers.<sup>6</sup> Thus the first requirement in testing hypothesis six will be a definition of perceived nuclear threat.

In order to understand what is meant by perceived nuclear threat it is first necessary to describe perceived threat. In its simplest terms perceived threat can be explained as follows. Given two actors *A* and *B* the threat perceived by *A* would be based on the amount *A* believes *B* would benefit from forcing *A* to change/bring its policies into line with those of *B*. *A* considers 1) how much its policies diverge from those of *B*, 2) what *A* thinks *B* expects to gain from a change in the policies of *A*, 3) the cost *A* believes it can extract from *B* if *B* attempts to change *A*'s policies by force and 4) whether *A* believes *B* is willing to pay that cost. The greater the divergence between the policies of *A* and *B*, the more *A* believes *B* could expect to gain from

---

<sup>4</sup> H. Davis, SJ, Moral and Pastoral Theology, as quoted in War and the Lambeth Conference, by members of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, Oxford, England: Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, 1968, p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter I.

<sup>6</sup> Nuclear powers are those nations, China, France, United Kingdom, United Soviet Socialist Republic, and United States, which, during the time of the study were the only powers that had publicly admitted they possessed both nuclear weapons and the delivery vehicles necessary to deliver these weapons to a target outside their national boundaries.

forcing *A* to change its policies, the less the cost *B* would incur for forcing *A* to adopt the policies that *B* prefers the greater the threat that *A* will perceive.

It should be noted that the above description ignores the existence of risk factors by choosing to assume risk neutral policy makers. To include the effects of risk adverse and risk taker policy makers on perceived threat at this point is to needlessly complicate the analysis. The method used in creating the measure of perceived nuclear threat used below will also assume risk neutral policy makers. If that form of perceived nuclear threat appears to have an impact on denominational policy making it will provide a strong indication that further research utilizing more complex calculations of perceived nuclear threat are warranted.

Perceived nuclear threat explicitly focuses on the *nuclear* component. The measure used here does not deal with how likely a nuclear attack may be but whether there is a strong or weak possibility of conflict with a nuclear power and if there is a conflict with a nuclear power how much nuclear capability is arrayed against the study nation. The essence of the measure is presented at this point; the details of the measure will be covered below. Perceived nuclear threat is a measure of the nuclear capability that might be used against a nation times the gains a nuclear power might accrue should the policies of the nation shift in the nuclear nation's favor. Total perceived nuclear threat, given a risk neutral decision maker, is the sum of all perceived threat for all nuclear nations in the system at that time.

Returning to the two nations *A* and *B* example used above this could be expressed as follows. If nation *A* is non-nuclear and nation *B* is armed with nuclear weapons then *A* must include the nuclear as well as conventional weaponry that might be used against it in the event that *B* decides that it needs to employ force to change the policies of *A*. *A* must calculate what it believes *B* could expect to gain, that is the gains that *B* could realistically expect to accrue if the policies of *A* were to cease divergence from those of *B*. Perceived nuclear threat is measured as the expected gain by *B* multiplied by the amount of nuclear force that it can use against *A*. Of course in the real world *A* must consider not just the possible gains and nuclear force as they relate to *B* but also to *C*, *D*, *E*, etc.

The expressly nuclear dimension of the measure requires elaboration at this point. War is never pretty. The death, destruction and devastation wrought by conventional weapons can truly be appalling yet there is a qualitative difference between conventional and nuclear weapons. No matter the horrific effects of conventional weaponry it does not contain the possibility of the

destruction of man as a species. A nuclear war involving the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear nations encompasses this prospect. Edward Leroy Long, Jr. puts it this way:

The significance of the atomic bomb for man's attitude toward history lies in the fact that it changes the problem of death from an individual to a possible social problem. We all may die together, not only cutting off the allotted span of each man, but bringing to an end the society in which human life finds its worldly meaning.<sup>7</sup>

Even if the end of mankind is not regarded as likely in the event of a nuclear war it is widely believed that even a few successfully delivered strategic nuclear weapons would cause unacceptable damage to any country. Herman F. Reissig says it well when he says,

With the invention of thermonuclear weapons, war between nations possessing stockpiles of these weapons can no longer be described as a way of settling disputes when other means have failed. When one relatively small bomb can cause almost total destruction within a radius of nine miles and when the nuclear powers have many such bombs and the means to deliver them it seems an illustration of the worst kind of blindness to suppose that a national society can be defended by the use of a nuclear arsenal. No imagination is keen enough to describe the physical and moral horror of the kind of war the world's two strongest powers are now capable of waging.<sup>8</sup>

Clearly, nuclear weapons are fundamentally different from conventional arms. The World Council of Churches expressed it this way:

...such methods of modern warfare as the use of atomic and bacteriological weapons and obliteration bombing involve force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale as to imperil the very basis on which law and civilization exist.<sup>9</sup>

The general consensus that nuclear weapons are qualitatively different can also be seen in the fear of a rogue regime or terrorists gaining control of nuclear weapons. The fear that this might lead to nuclear blackmail clearly demonstrates the perception that nuclear weapons are different from conventional weapons. There have been many uses of conventional explosives in terrorist attacks and there is a very real fear that such attacks might happen again. The fear of

---

<sup>7</sup> Edward Leroy Long Jr., The Christian Response to the Atomic Crisis, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950, p. 88.

<sup>8</sup> Herman F. Reissig, "Change Without War: National Armaments are Obsolete", Social Action, Volume 29, October 1962, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> 1950 International/Non-Denominational World Council of Churches.

such conventional attacks, however, pales in comparison to the horrors conjured up by the thought of a nuclear device in the hands of a terrorist group or rogue regime. Indeed, the reactions of the United States to the possibility of Iraq or North Korea joining the nuclear club demonstrate the fear of nuclear weapons in the hands of those regarded as unpredictable and indifferent to international norms.

### **Denominational and Conciliar Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons**

Since the beginning of the nuclear era, denominations and conciliar bodies have been expressing their own views on the unique nature of nuclear weapons in a variety of statements. The quotes below indicate some of these views. These attitudes and beliefs have evolved over time. Through the years these views have ranged from nuclear weapons are a great evil to regarding nuclear weapons as a necessary evil that provides deterrence. They have included positions permitting possession of nuclear weapons as long as they aren't used and the argument that nuclear weapons can be retained as a way station on the road to disarmament. As this selection of denominational and conciliar positions demonstrate they have never been comfortable with nuclear weapons and the deterrence policy that has evolved since their creation. The following selection of quotes offers a sketchy overview of the evolution of denominational and conciliar policies on the issue.

We would begin with an act of contrition. As American Christians, we are deeply penitent for the irresponsible use already of the atomic bomb. We are agreed that, whatever be one's judgment of the ethics of war in principle, the surprise bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are morally indefensible...We have sinned grievously against the laws of God and the people of Japan. Without seeking to apportion blame among individuals, we are compelled to judge our chosen course inexcusable.<sup>10</sup>

Some of the Committee are convinced that in the present uncertain situation, and until international agreement is reached, individual nations are justified in retaining these (sc. thermonuclear) weapons as a lesser evil than surrendering them and increasing the possibility of an unscrupulous attack.<sup>11</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Federal Council of United States Churches 1946.

<sup>11</sup> As quoted from the Lambeth Council Report of 1958 in War and the Lambeth Conference, by members of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, Oxford, England: Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, 1968, p. 11.

A first requirement is for a discipline which is capable of possessing nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, but never using them in all out warfare.<sup>12</sup>

The discovery of nuclear power is in itself an act of obedience to the command of God that man is to subdue the earth and have dominion over it. This power of God was given to man for a constructive use. The power in itself is morally neutral. Whether it is regarded as good or evil will depend upon man's use or abuse of it. The unlocking of the secrets of nature and the employment of them for the good of man can be pleasing to God. The development of nuclear bombs, however, and their use for warlike and destructive power threatens man with a monster capable of preventing man finally from obeying all the commands of God.<sup>13</sup>

There have been suggestions to the effect that nuclear weapons are immoral in themselves because they can only be used immorally; but proof for this position has been lacking, and the actual possession of nuclear arms cannot be ruled out on such grounds. Thus, the Vatican Council was careful to avoid condemning as immoral the mere possession of nuclear systems.<sup>14</sup>

In current conditions "deterrence" based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum, which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion.<sup>15</sup>

Regretting that for nearly four decades we have watched in near silence the development of nuclear weapons and the escalation of the nuclear arms race, we now declare that such weapons are morally unacceptable, and covenant with God and with each other to work for peace through prayer, evangelism, education programmes and public witness.<sup>16</sup>

The positions quoted above have all grown out of the struggle to apply traditional Just-War conditions to the nuclear question. All the denominations in this study have traditionally accepted the doctrine of the Just War. This doctrine has been applied to conventional warfare since it was first formulated by St. Augustine. With the advent of nuclear weapons, however, these traditional calculations have changed.

---

<sup>12</sup> 1953 World Council of Churches.

<sup>13</sup> The Report on the Church in International Affairs, "Moral and Spiritual Considerations re the Use of the Hydrogen Bomb," The United Church of Canada Year Book, 1955, 116-117.

<sup>14</sup> Rev. W. Smith, SJ, "The Christian and the Morality of Nuclear Defence Through Deterrence," in Australia and Nuclear Deterrence, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1975, p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Roman Catholic Holy See Pope (June) 1982.

<sup>16</sup> New Zealand Baptist Assembly, "Statement approved by the New Zealand Baptist Assembly," November 9, 1982, p. 3.

The onset of nuclear weapons had a dual impact on the ethics of warfare: it created a new moral category and it posed a qualitatively new moral problem. The new category emerged as the professional and popular understanding of the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons increased. The empirical data pushed the debate on the morality of war beyond Bainton's distinction of pacifism and just-war ethics. Between these categories moralists posited a position of nuclear pacifism. The position is grounded in just-war premises (some uses of force are legitimate) but terminates in a pacifist conclusion (nuclear weapons cannot be used). Nuclear pacifists agree with the conclusion of Professor Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars:

Nuclear weapons explode the theory of just-war. They are the first of mankind's technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world.<sup>17</sup>

Looking again at the quotes above it is easy to see that despite a belief by the governments in deterrence the denominations and conciliar bodies have not always shared such a belief. Perhaps, therefore, a belief in the efficacy of deterrence is not the guiding principle behind denominational decision-making but such policy making is instead guided by a search for an alternative to the problem of deterrence. If this is the case then a subsidiary hypothesis presents itself.

6a) *As threat increases the denominations will devote more time to the nuclear issue.*

Both the main hypothesis and the subsidiary hypothesis will be tested in the remainder of this chapter. First, however, it is necessary to define the variables that will be used in testing these hypotheses.

We will begin by determining how much the nations in this study fear nuclear weapons. The amount of fear is defined as the total systemic perceived nuclear threat that a nation experiences due to the existence of nuclear arsenals in the international system and the nation's own position within the international system.

Construction of a measure of total systemic perceived nuclear threat will be based, in part, on the Expected Utility model established by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita.<sup>18</sup> This model has

---

<sup>17</sup> Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 282 as quoted in J. Bryan Hehir, "The Just-War Ethic and Catholic Theology Dynamics of Change and Continuity," in National Conference of Catholic Bishops United States Catholic Conference, In the Name of Peace: Collective Statements of the United States Catholic Bishops on War and Peace, 1919-1980, Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1983, p. 103.

been used successfully to predict wars and to project the type of conflict from total war to successful mutual deterrence. Including Expected Utility in the threat measure<sup>19</sup> will allow for some certainty about whether a nuclear power could rationally expect to benefit from an attack on one of the nations in the study. It should be noted at this juncture that the Expected Utility model does not specifically address whether a nuclear nation might expect to benefit from a *nuclear* attack on another nation.

Using Expected Utility in part to measure threat relies on the assumption that anytime a nuclear nation engages in conflict with another power the potential exists that nuclear weapons will be used. Despite the fact that there has been only one use of nuclear weapons in a war situation to date and that there is apparently a strong reluctance on the part of the nuclear powers to use nuclear weapons<sup>20</sup> the potential remains. In any given conflict between a nuclear nation and any other nation there is the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used.

Since 1945 the use of nuclear weapons has been seriously considered on at least 15 occasions, which have become public:

- In 1946 President Truman delivered a 48-hour ultimatum to the Soviet Union that the United States would use fission bombs if the Soviet troops did not evacuate Azerbaijan (in Iran).
- On at least five occasions the world came close to nuclear exchange between the superpowers because there was a misreading of radar.
- Seven times the US seriously considered limited nuclear engagement.
- Twice an all-out nuclear war was imminent (in the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis and again during the 1973 Yom Kippur War).

There is no way of knowing how often the Soviet Union has considered using nuclear weapons. These have been 40 dangerous years indeed.<sup>21</sup>

Logically, if victory or defeat is the guiding code the more a nuclear power expects to gain in defeating another nation the more potential that nuclear weapons might be used. Any

---

<sup>18</sup> See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1981 and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka, *Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong*, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1985 for excellent discussions of the Expected Utility Model.

<sup>19</sup> For a detailed description of the method used to calculate perceived threat see Appendix F.

<sup>20</sup> Whether this reluctance stems from effective nuclear deterrence, moral repugnance, or some other source the fact remains that there has been no use of nuclear weapons in conflict situations. In recent years several nuclear nations have taken part in armed conflict; the United State in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the United Kingdom in the Falklands; where nuclear weapons could potentially have been employed. Nevertheless nuclear weapons were not used in any of these conflicts.

<sup>21</sup> Catholic Bishops of Australia, "Years of Living Dangerously," in Work for a Just Peace: Reflections on Peacemaking in an Armed World, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1985, p. 20.

nation at war with a nuclear power cannot therefore be certain that nuclear weapons will not enter into the conflict.

There are a number of ways in which the final choice to employ nuclear weapons might occur. 1) Nuclear weapons might be employed as a last resort should a conventional war be going badly. If for example, one nuclear nation attacks another nuclear power based on conventional superiority and nuclear parity this might lead to a nuclear exchange. If the conventionally weaker nuclear power is losing a conventional war the temptation to launch a nuclear first-strike might be irresistible. 2) If the leader of a nuclear power is a madman he might be willing to risk the use of nuclear weapons. 3) The increased reliance on automatic response mechanisms for responding to a nuclear attack might result in the accidental launch of nuclear weapons. 4) In a war situation uncertainty is increased. Decision-makers are subject to pressures and stresses in a war situation, which are not present during peace. This increases the chances that nuclear weapons might be used. The possibility of using nuclear weapons always exists in any conflict involving a nuclear nation.

### **Measuring Perceived Nuclear Threat**

In order to create a measure of total perceived nuclear threat it is necessary to first understand what each nuclear power could expect to gain from a change in the policies of each of the nations in my study. This is done by calculating the Expected Utility for each of the nuclear powers against each nation in the study.<sup>22</sup> The Expected Utility of one nation for another can be described as how much one nation can expect to gain from a change in the policies of another, utility is the commonalty of interests between two nations and Expected Utility is benefits that might accrue through increasing the commonalty of interests. This work will build upon the work of Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita in measuring Expected Utility. Like Professor Bueno de Mesquita it will be using Alliance relationships to determine the commonalty of interests between nations.<sup>23</sup> Commonalty or simple utility can range from 1 perfect identity to -1 no commonalty. Expected Utility is the nuclear nation's utility for itself (1) minus its utility for the study nation (range of -1 to 1). Thus Expected Utility can range between zero and two. If the nations have a perfect identity of Alliance relationships the Expected Utility

---

<sup>22</sup> For the method of operationalizing and calculating utility and threat see Appendix F.

<sup>23</sup> See Appendix F for changes in Bueno de Mesquita's alliance criteria.

of a change in policies would be zero. If they have no Alliances in common the Expected Utility for change would be two. The greater the Expected Utility the more likely conflict is to result as well as an increased potential for employing nuclear weapons. The Expected Utility calculations will be made for the nuclear powers for the years following their entrance into the nuclear club.<sup>24</sup>

Expected Utility provides the basis for a measure of perceived nuclear threat since it indicates the expected gains to a nuclear power from changes in the policies of a study nation. However, Expected Utility does not incorporate nuclear weapons in its calculations. Therefore the next step in creation of a measure of perceived nuclear threat must be the establishment of a nuclear capability for each nation.

Nuclear capability is computed as the percentage<sup>25</sup> of the total number of strategic nuclear warheads and bombs<sup>26</sup> available in the nuclear system<sup>27</sup> that each nuclear capable nation has under its command. Nuclear capability is the percentage of total nuclear weapons of the attacking nation divided by the percentage of total nuclear weapons of the attacking nation plus the percentage of total nuclear weapons of the attacked nation. The formula is:

$$P_s = \% \text{ nuclear weapons}(i) / (\% \text{ nuclear weapons}(i) + \% \text{ nuclear weapons}(j))$$

where (i) represents a nuclear nation<sup>28</sup> and (j) represents one of the nations in this study. This measure of power reflects the nuclear strength that might be arrayed/used against each nation in the study or its interests. This provides an indication of what, potentially, it has to fear from nuclear weapons. It also adjusts for a study nation's own possession of nuclear weapons. A study nation that possesses, for example, 90 percent of all available nuclear weapons can at most be attacked by 10 percent of the total available nuclear weapons even if all of the other nuclear

---

<sup>24</sup> United States 1945, Soviet Union 1949, United Kingdom 1952, France 1960, and China 1964 thus calculations will be made for the United States from 1945-1985, the Soviet Union from 1949-1985, and so forth.

<sup>25</sup> The use of percentages as a measure of the systemic nuclear power or capability available to each of the self-declared nuclear nations is predicated on the pioneering national capability measure of Singer, Bremer and Stuckey in J. David Singer; Stuart Bremer; and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", Peace, War, and Numbers, Pages 19-48, Bruce Russett (editor), Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972, p. 26.

<sup>26</sup> The total number of strategic nuclear warheads and bombs is calculated by counting the total number of launchers of each type and multiplying launchers by warheads or bombs per that type launcher. Once this has been done for each type of launcher the number of warheads or bombs deliverable by each type of launcher are added together. In cases where the number of warheads or bombs per launcher are not available that class of launcher is assumed to deliver one warhead or bomb. When the launcher number is given as a number between two numbers the mean is used.

<sup>27</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>28</sup> The nuclear system is defined as the five nations, China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States, that admit possession of nuclear delivery capability.

nations in the system at that time were to attack it. Probability of success might be verbally expressed as the ability to inflict nuclear damage divided by the ability to inflict nuclear damage minus the nuclear damage that could be sustained as a result of the decision to engage in nuclear conflict.

The nuclear capability term in this formula also takes deterrence, indirectly into account. It does this through the distribution of total nuclear weapons. The larger the total percentage of nuclear weapons you have in your arsenal the less willing other nations should be to attack. Thus the threat perceived should be smaller since percentage wise fewer nuclear weapons could be employed against it due in part to the deterrence value of nuclear superiority.

It might be argued that while all the nuclear weapons of France, for example, would be targeted on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, in a conflict with France, would still have to retain some of its nuclear weapons targeted against the United States. Initially, this seems to invalidate the use of percentage of nuclear weapons aspect of the threat measure. This is not the case. Threat is based on the possibility of the nations in this study being subject to a nuclear attack that results in unacceptable damage if not complete elimination of the nation. Even a small nuclear bomb can cause tremendous damage.

The Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress studied the likely effects of a single 1 Mt air burst over a city of four million people like Detroit or Leningrad, and predicted for Detroit that 470,00 people would be killed at once and 630,00 injured; because of demographic differences the figures for Leningrad would be about twice as high.<sup>29</sup>

With this sort of devastation the result of a single megaton air burst it is easy to see why only a small portion of the nuclear arsenal of a superpower would be enough to devastate the smaller nuclear powers as well as the non-nuclear nations in this study.

France and the United Kingdom are geographically small nations with large populations. Even a few strategic nuclear weapons landing in these nations would result in tremendous death and destruction. The geographical size of the nations and their dense populations would mean lots of deaths from radioactive fallout as well as the initial blasts. The huge nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union would make it possible for them to retain enough nuclear weapons to deter the other while still destroying any other nation.

---

<sup>29</sup> As quoted in The Report of a Working Party under the Chairmanship of the Bishop of Salisbury, The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience, England: CIO Publishing, 1982, p. 13.

New Zealand with its small geographic area and small population would also suffer major devastation from a few strategic nuclear weapons. Australia and Canada on the other hand are geographically large nations with relatively small populations. These populations, however, tend to be clustered in a few major cities. Therefore, a few strategic nuclear weapons targeted on these cities should result in unacceptable damage.

It is important to remember that this is intended as a preliminary measure. The perceived threat measure does not deal with questions of "will we be able to prevent a nuclear attack through deterrence or other means" so much as the question of how much utility the nuclear nations have for changing another nation's policies, *possibly* through nuclear means, and *in the event* of a nuclear attack what is the *nuclear strength* arrayed against the nation.

At this point each study nation has a level of perceived nuclear threat from each nuclear nation individually. Each study nation would have  $x$  amount to fear from the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. These amounts will be different for each of the nuclear powers. Some amounts might be large causing great concern and other amounts so small as to be of virtually no concern. The smallness of the perceived threat does not detract from its reality however. It is important to remember that the measure of perceived nuclear threat being employed in testing hypothesis six is cumulative. It is the amount of nuclear threat that a nation perceives from the United States and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and France and China as long as there are nuclear weapons that might be used against a nation there is some threat even though many of the nations with nuclear weapons might be allies of the nation against which they might use nuclear weapons. Allies with nuclear weapons will have less reason to employ force against their ally but Alliance does not preclude the possibility. Allies are obviously less likely to employ nuclear weapons against one another than against enemies. This will have the effect of reducing the total systemic perceived threat since some of the perceived threat will be slight. Thus total systemic perceived threat is computed as perceived threat from the United States plus perceived threat from the Soviet Union plus perceived threat from the United Kingdom plus perceived threat from France plus perceived threat from China. In other words the more nuclear nations there are, that expect significant gains from a change in the policies of a study nation, the more threat the study nation should perceive. Likewise as more nations join the nuclear club the level of perceived threat should increase.

Once the level of total systemic perceived threat to which the nations in the study are exposed has been established it is expected that those nations where the level of total systemic perceived threat is high should have denominations which are more reluctant to oppose national policies which are based on the need for nuclear deterrence than will denominations in nations with a low or moderate level of threat. If a nation is highly threatened by a nuclear nation the fears of nuclear annihilation and the importance of national security should both be increased for the denominational constituency. Thus the environmental factor of threat will constrain the denomination in two ways. It will limit the denominations willingness to oppose national policies since to do so would be to potentially render the nation subject to nuclear destruction. As an important factor influencing the attitudes of a denomination's constituency it will be an additional constraint on denominations.

### **Overview of the Data**

Before turning to testing the hypotheses it is useful to have a picture of the data being used. In hypothesis six the first dependent variable under examination is deterrence. Three variables explicitly reflect deterrence, 1) acceptability of deterrence, 2) morality of nuclear weapons possession and 3) usability of nuclear weapons. Chapter Three provided a detailed overview of these variables. As shown in that chapter, in most years denominations have made no clear unequivocal statements about the acceptability of nuclear deterrence, the morality of possessing nuclear weapons or whether nuclear weapons can ever be used and if they can under what circumstances this would be acceptable. The actual position of the denomination for these variables was determined by examining the themes that dominate the variable, i.e. the theme most frequently found in the statements/documents. When there was no definitive statement by a denomination in a year it was coded as indeterminate. As a result indeterminate is the single largest category for each of these variables for all denominations in each of the nations in the study.

The other available categories for these variables 1) complete acceptance, 2) conditional acceptance and 3) rejection, (one could think of these choices as always, sometimes and never). Over time the denominations have been reluctant to give unconditional support to policies of nuclear deterrence, possession and use of nuclear weapons. This fact was reviewed in greater detail in Chapter III.

Three other variables can also serve as dependent variables in testing hypothesis six. These variables are 1) number of documents, 2) number of references to nuclear threat and 3) number of references to the likelihood of nuclear war. They are useful in exploring the impact of perceived nuclear threat on denominational policymaking as it relates to the nuclear question. These variables are measures of the general level of concern denominations have regarding the nuclear issue. Number of references to nuclear threat and number of documents are both included because sometimes denominations don't issue several statements in a year but instead issue one very long statement. In this case even if there is only one document there will be a high number of references to nuclear threat.

It is important to remember that there is not a statement issued every year. Frequently the number of documents issued is zero. The largest number of documents is the United Church of Canada's 15 in 1982. Thus number of documents ranges from zero to 15.

References to nuclear threat, is the variables that is most general in nature since it includes *any* reference to the nuclear question.<sup>30</sup> It ranges from zero in those cases where there were no references or documents<sup>31</sup> to the 559 of the United Kingdom Church of England *Church and the Bomb* debates. Clearly during the Church of England debates about the Church and the bomb that denomination found the nuclear issue worth considerable attention despite the fact that only one document was issued as a result of these debates.

Likelihood of nuclear war is a good indicator of concern about nuclear weapons since it indicates a degree of fear that such weapons might be used in war fighting. In every nation in the sample denominations have expressed the belief that unless something changes a nuclear war is likely. Despite this in no nation were there, over time, enough references to the likelihood of nuclear war to yield statistically significant results in regression analysis.

It is also important to look at the effect of time on both references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence and number of documents. This will provide some indication of whether the passage of time has also affected the frequencies with which denominations include the nuclear question on their agendas. Examining, first, the number of documents over time reveals the following relationships (Table 51).

---

<sup>30</sup> See Chapter I and Appendix B.

<sup>31</sup> When there are no documents number of references is coded as zero.

Table 51: Number of Documents and Time  
R Squared

Australia	.06523
Canada	.04554
New Zealand	.04164
United Kingdom	.02369
United States	.05054

It is revealing to note that over time the number of documents issued by the denominations in each nation has not regularly increased despite the fact that total systemic perceived nuclear threat has regularly increased. In fact there is virtually no relationship between the passage of time and the number of documents issued by the various denominations. It is important to remember that many of the denominations in the study do not meet on a yearly basis. The Episcopal Church in the United States for example has its General Convention every three years. This fact may slightly skew the findings since in this work all denominations and conciliar organizations are treated as if they meet every year. This is done for two reasons. First, doing so assures that all denominations and conciliar bodies are comparable when examined using the statistical tools available. Second, all the denominations and conciliar organizations that do not meet annually have in place mechanisms for dealing with important questions that arise in the interim. These mechanisms range from calling a special meeting to allowing the executive body of the denomination or conciliar body to issue statements. Such executive statements are treated here as if they came through the regular policy making process.

Since denominations sometimes issue long documents or statements in lieu of many shorter ones it is necessary to consider number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence over time as well. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 52.

Table 52. Number of References to the Nuclear Issue and Time  
R Squared

Australia	.04531
Canada	.03918
New Zealand	.10395
United States	.12385

The results for the United Kingdom were not statistically significant probably due to the small size of the samples for the denominations in that nation. Examining the results for the other nations demonstrates that the relationship is slightly stronger between number of documents and time for Australia and Canada than between number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence. For New Zealand and the United States these results are reversed with number of references and time exhibiting a greater relationship than number of documents and time. There is a small relationship for these two nations between the passage of time and attention paid by the study denominations in these nations. However, these relationships are still not very strong. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the duration of the nuclear age has not substantially impacted either the number of documents about the nuclear issue that denominations in these five nations have issued or the number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence that have been made by denominations in their statements. Some other factor has presumably been at work.

It was intuitively assumed that as the number of documents increased so would the number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence. Checking the validity of this assumption resulted in the relationships shown in Table 53.

Table 53. Number of Documents and Number of References to the Nuclear Issue  
R Squared

Australia	.26019
Canada	.60602
New Zealand	.39814
United Kingdom	.04939
United States	.21005

While Canada and New Zealand show clear relationships between the number of documents and the number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence Australia and the United States show a much smaller degree of relationship. The United Kingdom demonstrates virtually no relationship. By examining the relationship between these two dependent variables it is possible to get a sense of how much the two tests of the sub-hypothesis are actually testing the same thing. While this may be the case to some extent in Canada it is much less so in the other nations being studied. Some relationship between the variables is to be expected since they are both measures of denominational concern about the nuclear issue.

An overview of total systemic perceived nuclear threat reveals that it was always less than one in the United States. It was less than one in all other nations in the study until 1960 when the total systemic perceived threat of Australia, Canada and New Zealand passed one. The United Kingdom did not pass the one mark until 1967. Total systemic perceived threat remained greater than one and less than two for Australia and New Zealand until 1975 when these two nations perceived the nuclear threat in the system as 2.23. Canada and the United Kingdom never experienced threat levels of greater than 1.845 (Canada) and 1.557 (United Kingdom). Total systemic perceived threat varies from a low of zero in the United States when it was the sole nuclear power to a high of 2.79 in New Zealand. There are ten years for which nuclear data for one or more of the nuclear powers was unavailable 1952-1959 and 1961-1962.

Looking at the independent variable, total systemic perceived threat was recoded into low, medium and high based on threat levels for all nations combined. The implications of this is that the denominations in the United States should be less supportive of deterrence because it has the lowest level of threat while those in Australia and New Zealand with the highest levels of threat should be most supportive of deterrence. The recoding was done because the deterrence variables used to test this hypothesis are nominal level making regression a very poor tool. By recoding it is possible to use crosstabs, a much more effective tool when the dependent variables are nominal level. Recoding is done as follows; less than one is low, greater than or equal to one but less than two is medium and greater than or equal to two is high.

Finally, it is important to consider the effect of time and interrelationship on the variables total perceived systemic threat, number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence and number of documents. Examining the effect of time on total perceived systemic threat reveals that the intuitive assumption that as time passes more nuclear weapons are added to the various arsenals and total perceived nuclear threat increases. The R Squared for these relationships is shown in Table 54.

Table 54. Total Systemic Perceived Threat and Time  
R Squared

Australia	.89915
Canada	.71884
New Zealand	.91037
United Kingdom	.84312
United States	.86505

Clearly total perceived nuclear threat has increased over time. It is possible to say with confidence that as the years have gone by total systemic perceived nuclear threat has increased. Of course this result is only to be expected both because more nuclear weapons have been acquired by members of the nuclear club and more nations have joined the club in the 41 years of this study. These increases imply that support for deterrence has also increased throughout the period under study. Since nuclear weapons have only been used once in war fighting, the addition of more weapons to existing arsenals and other nations to the nuclear club must be for deterrence purposes. Clearly the passage of time has had a significant impact on perceived nuclear threat.

### Testing the Hypothesis

Two tests of the hypothesis six will be conducted using the number of documents and the number of references to the nuclear issue as the dependent variables. First, the number of documents will be regressed against total systemic perceived threat and second number of references will be regressed against total systemic perceived threat. The results obtained from an examination of the effects of total systemic perceived nuclear threat on number of documents are displayed in Table 55.

Only Australia and the United States display a statistically significant relationship, although with a significance of .08 the United Kingdom nearly meets the requirements of a significance of at least .05. Of Australia and the United States the relationship in the United States is the larger. In Australia there is virtually no relationship. In the United States the relationship is not very large explaining only slightly more than ten percent of the variance. Clearly there is no real support for the hypothesis here.

Table 55. Number of Documents and Total Systemic Perceived Nuclear Threat  
R Squared

Australia	.05717
United Kingdom	.03408 (.08)
United States	.15228

Nor does the hypothesis fare much better when Number of References to the Nuclear Issue is used. As Table 56 shows only in the United States is there a statistically significant relationship. This is a very weak relationship and provides no support for the hypothesis.

Table 56. Number of References to the Nuclear Issue and Total Systemic Nuclear Threat R Squared

Australia	.02387 (.08)
United States	.05955

Clearly, knowing the level of systemic perceived nuclear threat does not aid in predicting how often the denominations in the study will address the nuclear question as measured by the number of documents or the number of references to the nuclear issue. These tests of hypothesis six did not support it. Perhaps the simple, if threat increases the number of documents and references should decrease concept is not sensitive enough since it does not visibly consider national security concerns. The next test of hypothesis six deal more directly with these concerns by focusing specifically on nuclear deterrence.

### **Policies Regarding Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat**

The denominational positions regarding the acceptability of deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession and usability of nuclear weapons as determined by specific statements by the denominations turn out not to be very numerous. This makes drawing rigorous conclusions a risky proposition but the statements made may allow for some general ideas about the relationship between total systemic perceived threat and denominational positions regarding these specific aspects of nuclear deterrence. The absence of any policy statements specifically regarding deterrence, weapons possession and use of nuclear weapons, coded as indeterminate, is as important as the specific statements. It is predicted, by hypothesis six, that those statements placing conditions on or rejecting nuclear deterrence as well as setting limits on the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons and declaring them immoral should be more likely to occur at low levels of threat. Rejection of the use of nuclear weapons should also occur more often at low levels of perceived threat.

## Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence

Each aspect of nuclear deterrence will be examined in turn for each of the nations in the study beginning with the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence.

### Australia

Table 57. Australia--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>			Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	High Threat	
Conditionally Accept			2 4.5%	2 1.6%
Indeterminate	28 100%	52 100%	31 93.9%	122 98.4%
Column Totals	28 22.6%	52 41.9%	44 35.5%	124 100%

The sample denominations in Australia, Table 56, behave completely contrary to what hypothesis six would predict. The only two occasions when nuclear deterrence was declared conditionally acceptable occurred during the period of high perceived threat.

### Canada

Canada did not experience high levels of threat at any time in the period under study. Denominations in Canada have at times endorsed every possible position on the question of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence. While it is in keeping with the hypothesis that the support for nuclear deterrence as always acceptable occurred during a period of moderate threat so did all the statements of conditional acceptance and rejection. The degree of threat does not seem to influence Canadian denominations to be more accepting of the policy of nuclear deterrence.

Table 58. Canada--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>		Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	
Always Acceptable		1 1.1%	1 .8%
Conditionally Accept		4 4.3%	4 3.2%
Never Acceptable		2 2.2%	2 1.6%
Indeterminate	32 100%	85 92.4%	117 94.4%
Column Totals	32 25.8%	92 74.2%	124 100%

**New Zealand**

Table 59. New Zealand--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>			Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	High Threat	
Never Acceptable			2 4.5%	2 1.6%
Indeterminate	28 cases 100%	52 cases 100%	42 cases 95.5%	122 98.4%
Column Totals	28 22.6%	52 41.9%	44 35.5%	124 100%

In New Zealand, like Australia, the only definite policy statements that were taken on the issue occurred during periods of high perceived nuclear threat. These positions are more extreme than in Australia since they are complete rejections of deterrence as unacceptable. This does not agree with the predictions of hypothesis six.

### United Kingdom

The United Kingdom exhibits the now familiar pattern of policy positions placing conditions on and rejecting nuclear deterrence occurring in the period of greatest perceived threat. The evidence so far points to a rejection of hypothesis six as invalid.

Table 60. United Kingdom--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>		Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	
Conditionally Accept		2 3.6%	2 2.3%
Never Acceptable		1 1.8%	1 1.1%
Indeterminate	32 100%	53 94.6%	85 96.6%
Column Totals	32 36.4%	56 63.6%	88 100%

### United States

Table 61. United States--Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>	
	Low Threat	Row Totals
Conditionally Accept	2 1.6%	2 1.6%
Indeterminate	122 98.4%	122 98.4%
Column Totals	124 100%	124 100%

As one of the two nuclear superpowers the United States never experienced a period of even moderate threat. Consequently, it is not possible to determine how its denominations would react in periods of greater threat. It is interesting to note, however, that despite the low levels of perceived nuclear threat experienced by the United States the only denominational positions on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence are conditional. There are no statements that nuclear deterrence is always acceptable nor are there statements that it is unacceptable.

## Summary

In no nation does the predicted behavior occur. Denominations in all five nations in the study behave in a fashion contrary to the assumption that national security concerns will hold the denominations silent on the nuclear question. These findings suggest that far from viewing themselves as somehow obliged to support their nation's national security when based on nuclear deterrence, denominations regard themselves as a sort of moral voice of conscience that must speak out against the madness of relying on nuclear weapons for security.

The scarcity of specific references to the acceptability of nuclear deterrence prevents drawing definitive conclusions. The results obtained, however, definitely suggest that something more is at work in the behavior of denominations than the traditional "rally 'round the flag" impulse. It would be invaluable to verify these results with a larger study.

## Morality of the Possession of Nuclear Weapons

The second aspect of nuclear deterrence to be examined is the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. Possessing nuclear weapons is at the heart of the question of nuclear deterrence. Here also the hypothesis would expect that statements placing conditions on the possession of nuclear weapons or declaring such possession immoral would be most likely to occur in periods of low threat.

## Australia

Table 62. Australia--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>			Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	High Threat	
Sometimes Moral			1 case 2.3%	1 .8%
Never Moral		2 case 3.8%	2 cases 4.5%	4 3.2%
Indeterminate	28 cases 100%	50 cases 96.2%	41 cases 93.2%	119 96%
Column Totals	28 22.6%	50 41.9%	44 35.5%	124 100%

The hypothesis finds no support here either. No positions on the issue are taken in periods of low perceived threat. While on two occasions during the period of moderate threat possession of nuclear weapons is condemned as immoral on two other occasions the same position is taken during the period of high threat. There is also one time during the period of high threat when a denomination adopted the position that possession of nuclear weapons can only sometimes be moral.

### Canada

Table 63. Canada--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>		Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	
Never Moral		2 cases 2.2%	2 1.6%
Indeterminate	32 cases 100%	90 cases 97.8%	122 98.4%
Column Totals	32 25.8%	92 74.2%	124 100%

Table 63 shows that denominations in Canada adopted the most extreme position, declaring possession of nuclear weapons immoral, during the period of greatest threat. This is completely contrary to hypothesis six.

### New Zealand

Table 64. New Zealand--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapon</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>			Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	High Threat	
Never Moral			1 2.3%	1 .8%
Indeterminate	28 cases 100%	52 cases 100%	43 cases 97.7%	123 99.2%
Column Totals	28 22.6%	52 41.9%	44 35.5%	124 100%

Only one denomination ever took a definite position on the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. This position was the declaration of such possession to be immoral. It is interesting that this one declaration occurred during the period of high threat. The hypothesis would have predicted that it should have been made during a period of low or at least moderate threat.

### United Kingdom

Table 65. United Kingdom--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>		Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	
Sometimes Moral		1 1.8%	1 1.1%
Never Moral		1 1.8%	1 1.1%
Indeterminate	32 100%	54 96.4%	86 97.7%
Column Totals	32 36.4%	56 63.6%	88 100%

Hypothesis six also fails to predict any positions taken by the sample denominations in the United Kingdom. The two definite policy positions expressed in this nation by the denominations in the sample occur during the period of greatest threat.

### United States

Despite the fact that the United States did not experience any periods of moderate or high threat the positions taken on the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons does not really conform to what hypothesis six would expect. The hypothesis would expect that because threat was low there would be a greater freedom to reject the possessions of nuclear weapons as immoral. While on two occasions such a rejection took place the greater number of policy positions were the less extreme conditional acceptance of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons.

Table 66. United States--Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>	
	Low Threat	Row Totals
Sometimes Moral	3 2.4%	3 2.4%
Never Moral	2 1.6%	2 1.6%
Indeterminate	119 96.8%	119 96.8%
Column Totals	124 100%	124 100%

### Summary

Just as with the question of the acceptability of nuclear weapons the denominations in the study failed to address the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons in the manner hypothesis six would predict. Denominations did not raise the issue of whether it was moral to possess nuclear weapons in times of low levels of perceived nuclear threat when it would presumably be less damaging to national security to object to the possession of nuclear weapons on moral grounds. Instead, they raised the moral question more often as threat increased. Again they seem to see themselves as somehow outside the concerns of national security and to find it necessary to raise these moral questions at a time when the concerns about preserving national security should be the strongest.

### Usability of Nuclear Weapons

The final aspect of nuclear deterrence to be considered is the Usability of Nuclear Weapons. No denomination in the study ever issued a statement that nuclear weapons could ever be used. Hypothesis six would expect the statements that nuclear weapons may not ever be used to occur mostly during periods of low perceived nuclear threat.

### Australia

The denominations in Australia issued statements rejecting the use of nuclear weapons in both periods of moderate and high perceived nuclear threat. The majority of these statements

however, came during the period of high perceived nuclear threat. Hypothesis six fails to predict this outcome.

Table 67. Australia--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Usability of Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>			Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	High Threat	
Never Use		1 case 1.9%	3 cases 6.8%	4 3.2%
Indeterminate	28 cases 100%	51 cases 98.1%	41 cases 93.2%	120 96.8%
Column Totals	28 22.6%	52 41.9%	44 35.5%	124 100%

### Canada

Table 68. Canada--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Usability of Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>		Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	
Never Use		5 cases 5.4%	5 4.0%
Indeterminate	32 cases 100%	87 cases 94.6%	119 96.0%
Column Totals	32 25.8%	92 74.2%	124 100%

All of the Canadian denominations rejections of the use of nuclear weapons came during the period of greatest perceived nuclear threat. Again the hypothesis fails to predict this outcome.

### New Zealand

On all three occasions when New Zealand denominations rejected the use of nuclear weapons perceived nuclear threat was at its highest level. This is clearly contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis

Table 69. New Zealand--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Usability of Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>			Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	High Threat	
Never Use			3 cases 6.8%	3 2.4%
Indeterminate	28 cases 100%	52 cases 100%	41 cases 93.2%	121 97.6%
Column Totals	28 22.6%	52 41.9%	44 35.5%	124 100%

### United Kingdom

Table 70. United Kingdom--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Usability of Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>		Row Totals
	Low Threat	Moderate Threat	
Never Use		5 cases 8.9%	5 5.7%
Indeterminate	31 cases 100%	51 cases 91.1%	83 94.3%
Column Totals	32 36.4%	56 63.6%	88 100%

Like the denominations in New Zealand, the sample denominations in the United Kingdom issued all their rejections of the use of nuclear weapons during the period when the United Kingdom was experiencing its greatest level of perceived threat. The hypothesis fails to demonstrate any validity.

### United States

Due to the fact that the United States has only experienced low levels of perceived threat it is not possible to draw conclusions about how its denominations would behave during periods of moderate or high threat. It is interesting to note that there were only four occasions when it was stated that nuclear weapons could never be used. Due to the low level of perceived nuclear threat experienced by the United States the denominations in this nation should, according to the

predictions of hypothesis six, be the most willing to publicly state that these weapons could never be used.

Table 71. United States--Usability of Nuclear Weapons and Degree of Perceived Threat

<i>Usability of Nuclear Weapons</i> Count/Percent	<i>Degree of Perceived Nuclear Threat</i>	
	Low Threat	Row totals
Never Use	4 cases 2.4%	4 2.4%
Indeterminate	120 cases 96.8%	120 96.8%
Column Totals	124 100%	124 100%

### Summary

The pattern here is identical with that seen previously. In no case do the denominations behave as the hypothesis would predict. In no case do the denominations waver from their positions that nuclear weapons may never be used and in each case direct pronouncements of this position were as likely to be made during the period of highest level of perceived nuclear threat.

### Conclusions

Hypothesis six must be judged invalid. It fails to predict either the presence of expressions of concern about the nuclear issue as measured by number of documents and number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence or the behavior of denominations in taking policy positions on the three specific aspects of nuclear deterrence considered here. Indeed, the opposite of what hypothesis six predicts seems to be the case. As the level of perceived nuclear threat increases the denominations are much more likely to adopt positions in opposition to nuclear deterrence.

As the only nation in which the level of perceived nuclear threat never exceeds low levels the United States is the only nation in which the hypothesis may have any validity. It is that because the United States has an enormous nuclear arsenal that it is able to maintain the low level of perceived nuclear threat. It is therefore in the national security interest to maintain a huge deterrence force in order to insure continuation of the low levels of perceived nuclear

threat. If this is the case then the failure of denominations in the United States to speak out more forcefully against the acceptance of nuclear deterrence, possession of nuclear weapons and the possibility of using nuclear weapons may be the result of national security concerns.

Unfortunately, this is an unverifiable suggestion. The behavior of the denominations in all other nations in the study, both those that do and do not possess their own nuclear weapons is clear, however. When the level of perceived nuclear threat is high denominations, in general, are more likely to question the policies of nuclear deterrence. Evidently, denominations do not feel the need to subjugate their own moral perceptions to the issues of national security as measured here. A larger study using more refined content analysis would be valuable. It would need to look at exactly what the denominations were saying about the policies of nuclear deterrence and the strength of those statements in order to determine whether denominations indeed regard themselves as voice of morality or of sanity or something else as yet unrecognized.

## CHAPTER VIII

### DENOMINATIONAL POLICY AND CHURCH/STATE RELATIONS

*7) The more closely associated a denomination is with the state the more unlikely it will be to shift its policy to one of opposition to the state. In other words, the greater the stake of the denomination in the existing order, the less likely it is to challenge that order.*

The focus of the teachings of Jesus was on how an individual's relationship with God should impact on his relations with other individuals. As a result there is very little explicit direction about the relationship between disciples of Jesus and the state to be found in the Bible. The kingdom Jesus came to establish was not an earthly one and thus his teachings were about the relationship between an individual and his God rather than about the relationship between a person and his nation. Throughout history Christians have thus been faced with the task of defining their relationship to the state.

Aristotle may claim that man is by nature political but Jesus, in his teachings, does not concern himself with the political nature of man. Jesus called upon his followers to be in the world but not of it<sup>1</sup>. The implications of this position for political man is never carefully explored in the Bible leaving later commentators, teachers, preachers and Christians to struggle with this question.

The Bible contains only one episode in which Jesus is asked to render a verdict on an expressly political question, i.e. payment of taxes. The question was whether the Jews, the chosen people of Yahweh and now subject to the Roman Empire should pay taxes to Rome (Luke 20:25). Jesus responded by advising that it is right to "give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's" (Luke 20:25 NIV). Jesus based this advice on the fact that the coins used to pay the tax bore Caesar's picture. No other guidance was provided in this instance. This makes it difficult to build a clear picture of what belongs to God and what to the state.

At first glance the subject of taxes is not one in which the Christian conscience and the state are obviously at odds. As citizens, Christians should pay their taxes, thus, bearing their share of the expenses of maintaining the common good. The question becomes a little more complex when the purposes for which the taxes are spent are considered and found to be purposes contrary to the teachings of God. Are the circumstances different then? Would Jesus

---

<sup>1</sup> See for example John 17:14 and 17:16.

have said the same thing if the question had been "is it right to pay taxes when these taxes are being spent on the executions of believers?" Do Christians still owe taxes? Do taxes still belong to Caesar? An example of this kind of question can be found in the activities of the war tax resisters. These people withheld that portion of their federal income taxes that would be used to fund the nuclear portion of the defense budget. The teachings of Jesus do not provide an easy method whereby one can make the determination of what belongs to Caesar, the state--and what to God. The method that must be used relies upon the Christian conscience and the obedience to the will of God that this conscience inspires.

To the Apostle Paul was left the task of relating the teachings of Jesus to "living the Christian life." He struggled with the problem of the relationship between Christians and the state and in Romans 13:1-7 are his conclusions. Everyone must submit himself/herself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently,

he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only because of possible punishment but also because of conscience. This is also why you pay taxes, for the authorities are God's servants, who give their full time to governing. Give everyone what you owe him: If you owe taxes, pay taxes; if revenue, then revenue; if respect, then respect; if honor then honor (Romans 13:1-7 NIV).

In this passage the dominance of the state appears to be clearly established, at least in secular matters. The authorities are established and maintained by the will of God and thus it is right that Christians along with everyone else should submit themselves to these authorities. But what happens if the commands of the state run counter to the commands of God? What must a Christian do then? It is apparently assumed by Paul that this dilemma could not arise since the authorities established by God could not go counter to his will.

Romans 13:1-7 is the one most often used to justify Christian obedience to the state and is frequently regarded as the definitive word on the relationship between the Christian and the

state.<sup>2</sup> The interpretation of God's will given in this part of Romans is of little use in determining what is owed by the Christian to the state in those instances where there seems to be conflict between obedience to the state and obedience to God. In fact, however, the focus on obedience to authority ignores the remainder of the passage. Romans 13:8-14 speaks of loving one another, of the Christians calling to love their neighbors as themselves. Roland Bainton has argued that it is this portion of the passage where the true relation of the Christian and the state is demonstrated. Christians are called to bring the dynamic love of the Christ into a sinful world and to follow the way of the Lord not the way of the world.<sup>3</sup> This establishes a need for Christians to be obedient to God rather than the state in case of conflict between the two and sets the standard for determining what is owed to the state and what is owed to God. The dynamic love of Jesus, the Christ, is to be the determining factor. No matter what the demands of the state they should be viewed in light of this love. In purely secular matters such as paying taxes for the administration of the state obedience to the state is clearly indicated but in those matters where the demands of the state are contrary or in conflict with the dynamic love of the Christ, Christians have a higher responsibility and owe obedience to God.

Knowing that obedience is owed first to a higher authority is not the end of the difficulty though. It still leaves the question of how this obedience to a higher authority is to be implemented. This question applies to both individual Christians and to the corporate Christian community--the Church.

Questions of individual Christian conscience have been around since the beginning. There are no answers that have been universally accepted but,

All Christians agree that their religion is not just a personal matter. The Gospel makes moral demands, which have implications for social activities and public life as well as for personal morality. The Christian Churches therefore have a number of reasons for wanting to be involved in moral and social matters. . . . Before the time of Jesus the prophets declared that God required people to show justice and compassion. Since the time of Jesus the Church, through its saints, leaders and councils, has provided guidance on how the demands of the Christian Gospel are to be applied to all the opportunities and problems which human beings and human societies face.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> See Roland H. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation, New York: Abingdon Press, 1960.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> What the Churches Say on Moral and Social Issues, Christian Education Movement, *Why the Churches Speak on Moral and Social Issues*, p. 1.

Since this work is concerned with the policy making of the corporate community attention will be focused on the Church. In his book *No Rusty Swords*, Dietrich Bonhoeffer describes the different ways in which the Church can act toward the state.

There are three possible ways in which the church can act toward the state: in the first place . . . it can ask the state whether its actions are legitimate and in accordance with its character as state, i.e. it can throw the state back on its responsibilities. Secondly, it can aid the victims of state action. The church has the unconditional obligation to the victims of any . . . society, whether they belong to the Christian community or not. The command goes, "Do good to all people." In both these courses of action, the church serves the free state in its own free way, and at times when laws are changed (i.e. by the Nazis) the church may in no way withdraw itself from these two tasks.

The third possibility is not just to bandage the victims under the wheel, but to put a spoke in the wheel itself. Such action would be direct political action, and is only possible and desirable when the church sees the state fail in its function of creating law and order, i.e. when it sees the state unrestrainedly bring about too much or too little law and order . . . There would be too little law if any group of subjects were deprived of their rights, too much law where the state intervened in the character of the church and its proclamation.<sup>5</sup>

In other words it is the task of the Church to question the policies of the state, to care for those who fall through the cracks and when necessary to directly seek to influence and/or change state policies. It would seem that it is this concept of the Church that was found in the previous chapter. The Church, as represented by the denominations in this study, was questioning the policies of the state despite the national security concerns that were predicted to restrain such behavior.

The Christian Church possesses a dual nature as both a societal organization like many others and as expounder of a particular system of morality. It is the belief of the Church that their moral system is universally applicable. It is this belief in the universality of their ethic that compels the Church to consider more than the internal affairs within narrow national boundaries making it both a domestic and international actor. As the members of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship have put it:

---

<sup>5</sup> As quoted in Robert McAfee Brown, "Christian Responses to the National Security State," in Dieter T. Hessel, *Moving Toward Shalom: Essays in Memory of John T. Connor*, Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1987, 5-18.

If Jesus is really the Saviour of the world (and not just of the Church) then Christianity has something constructive to say about international conflicts.<sup>6</sup>

There are a variety of ways in which the church can relate to the state. Church/state relationships, through the centuries, have run the gamut from the Church as an illegal entity to the Church as virtually synonymous with the state. Each type of relationship has different implications for Christian policy making. For example there are those that would argue that

The history of the church itself . . . would suggest that the change from pacifism to militarism was directly correlated with the change in the relations between the church and state. When the church became a part of the state, it moved from a pacifist position toward the justification of war; when it became virtually identified with the state it moved toward a crusading attitude toward war. In short it would seem that the more the church chose to conform to the state, or to identify with the aggressor, the more militaristic became the attitudes of its clergy and laity.<sup>7</sup>

This change in attitude can be seen in the reactions of the churches to the nuclear issue. Addressing the question of nuclear deterrence, perhaps more than any other church policy, is a direct entrance of the churches onto the stage of global politics. As such it presents unique interest for students of international relations. Over time a policy shift has taken place in the churches. At the risk of over generalizing these policy shifts have been from one of shame and regret at the first use of nuclear weapons to one of tacit acceptance and even support of nuclear deterrence once the Soviet Union developed nuclear capability to opposition as the nuclear era has worn on. This type of shift has taken place among many of the denominations in the nations included in this study.

Hypothesis seven assumes that this type of shift in policies will be influenced by the relationship that the denomination has with the state. There are essentially five patterns of Church/state association. These are 1) the Church as state, this would be a theocracy, 2) the Church as a branch of government, such as occurs when there is an established state religion in which the church hierarchy is appointed or at least confirmed by the government and/or the church budget is provided by the government, 3) the Church dominates in supplying bureaucrats

---

<sup>6</sup> War and the Lambeth Conference, by members of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, Oxford, England: Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, 1968, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> William Eckhardt, "Religious Beliefs and Practices in Relation to Peace and Justice", Social Compass, 1974, Volume XXI, no. 4, 467.

and policy makers; in this pattern the majority of elected and appointed officials come from the ranks of a specific church or denomination, even though there is not a formal association between the Church and state the church exercises strong influence over policy by virtue of its relationship with those making policy, 4) state indifference to the Church, this is a secular society in which the Church is allowed to exist free from hindrance and interference by the state but the state in no way assists the Church and 5) state hostility to the Church, in this pattern the state actively persecutes the Church and tries to obliterate its existence. The hypothesis assumes that those denominations that are most closely associated with the state should be the denominations that are least likely to reject the policy of nuclear deterrence.

### **Overview of the Data**

In this study the closeness of association between a denomination and the state was determined by whether the denomination is a state religion or a denomination that is subsidized by the state. This determination was made based on the categories employed by the World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900-2000.<sup>8</sup> This work divides church/state relationships into three basic categories. The state may be religious, secular or atheistic. A religious state actively seeks to promote religion either by the establishment of an official state religion or heavily subsidizing a particular religion. Religious states are further broken into the type of religion that is promoted e.g. Anglican in the United Kingdom. A secular state seeks to promote neither religion nor irreligion. Atheistic states actively seek to promote irreligion. After dividing states into these categories each nation is assigned a religious liberty standing. These scores are shown in Table 72.

The secular/religious label and the religious liberty score for each of the nations in this study are combined to establish a degree of church association with the state. A religious state that promotes the Anglican denomination and provides limited state subsidies, for example, exhibits a closer church state association than a secular state that provides some state subsidies to religious schools only. The hypothesis expects that those denominations, which are state religions or are subsidized by the state, will have a greater stake in the existing order and should be unwilling to challenge it by opposing state policies. Those denominations that are not official

---

<sup>8</sup> David B. Barrett (ed.), World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900-2000, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

state religions but receive limited subsidies will not be as willing to challenge the state policy of reliance on nuclear deterrence as those denominations in a secular state that only subsidize schools, etc. If denominations with close ties to the state are found to oppose state policies then this hypothesis will be rejected.

Table 72. Religious Liberty Index

1	State propagates Christianity
2	Massive state subsidies to churches
3	Limited state subsidies to churches
4	State subsidizes schools only
5	Complete state non-interference
6	Limited political restrictions
7	Minorities discriminated against
8	State interference and obstruction
9	State hostile and prohibition
10	State suppression and eradication

In this study two of the five nations employed are defined as religious and three are secular states. The two religious states are Australia and the United Kingdom. In Australia there is not an official state religion while the United Kingdom has two official state religions, the Anglican Church of England in England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The Church of England has a closer relationship with the state than the Church of Scotland. The Church of England is part of the national government.<sup>9</sup> The Church of Scotland is the established church but it is not a part of the government.

The church/state relationship and religious liberty ratings for the nations are found in Table 73. In this table it can be seen that the United Kingdom with its two official state religions has the closest relationship with the state. The Church of England and Church of Scotland are the official state religions but churches in the United Kingdom all receive limited state subsidies. In Australia the state actively promotes Christianity and is thus defined as religious but it does not endorse any particular denomination as the official state religion. Instead, it subsidizes all Christian denominations. While in Canada and New Zealand the state is secular but there are limited subsidies to churches. The denominations in the United States have the loosest association with the state. The state is secular and only education receives state subsidies.

---

<sup>9</sup> See discussion in Appendix D.

Table 73. National Church/State and Religious Liberty Standings

<i>Country</i>	<i>Church/State Relationship</i>	<i>Religious Liberty</i>
Australia	Religious	3
Canada	Secular	3
New Zealand	Secular	3
United Kingdom	Religious--Anglican/Presbyterian	3
United States	Secular	4

The descriptions above would lead to the expectation that the Church of England and the Church of Scotland would be the most unlikely to oppose state policies. Churches in Australia would also be unlikely to depart from government policy since they receive significant encouragement from a religious state as well as subsidies. Denominations in Canada, New Zealand and the other denominations in the United Kingdom would be more likely than the official state churches to question state policies but this questioning should be limited. Denominations in the United States should be the most likely to take positions opposed to nuclear deterrence. The hypothesis expects that the predicted reluctance of the Church of England and Church of Scotland to challenge state support for nuclear deterrence will appear when these denominations are compared both with other denominations in those nations or the Catholic, Anglican and Presbyterian denominations in other nations.

There are essentially three options available to denominations that are allied with the state either by accepting subsidies or as the official state religion. When confronting the official state policy of deterrence these options are 1) don't do anything or at least very little about the issue, 2) support deterrence policies in statements, or 3) depart only slightly from the policy of deterrence, for example issuing statements of conditional acceptance. In essence these options boil down to 1) avoid the issue as much as possible, 2) support the policies of the state to which the denomination is allied, and 3) make only small incremental moves away from state policies. These options form the premises behind the tests of hypothesis seven that follow. It is possible that support for state policies may take the form not of unconditional support but of spelling out the conditions under which such a policy is a moral option. This possibility has much in common with option three. In order to distinguish them it will be necessary to consider the exact policy statement in the context in which it was made.

## Testing Hypothesis Seven

The initial test of hypothesis seven is simply the number of documents issued by the denominations in question. This test is predicated on the position that one method of not challenging the policy of nuclear deterrence is not placing the question on the denominational agenda. There are a couple of data related caveats to keep in mind at this point. First, data collected for most denominations in the United Kingdom are not documented as complete and second, the number of documents does not always reflect the weight of consideration given the issue by the denomination.<sup>10</sup> The single document collected for the Church of England for example is a major book that examines all aspects of the issue intently.

Table 74. Number of Statements Issued by Each Denomination

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United Kingdom <sup>11</sup>	United States
Anglican/Episcopal	1 document	20 documents	2 documents	1 document	14 documents
Baptist	No relevant documents	3 documents	3 documents	4 documents	5 documents
Uniting/United/Presbyterian	44 documents	49 documents	14 documents	4 documents	41 documents
Roman Catholic	16 documents	9 documents	1 document	12 documents	16 documents <sup>12</sup>

The expected pattern of not including the issue on the denominational agenda does not present itself here. Indeed, the data reveal that the Baptist denominations are in general most reluctant to place the issue on the denominational agenda while the Uniting/United/Presbyterian denominations are most often the ones that have had the issue on the agenda. This is not true of the Church of Scotland but this may be due to an incomplete data set.

The Church of England may offer tentative support for the hypothesis since there is only one document counted. It is not possible to tell whether this is due to an incomplete data set,

<sup>10</sup> It should also be noted that a denomination's size in terms of membership has no relationship with the number of documents it issues.

<sup>11</sup> Data is not documented complete for denominations in the United Kingdom except in the case of the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom.

<sup>12</sup> The data for the Roman Catholic Church in the United States has not been documented complete. The number of sources employed in gathering this data and the wide time range covered by the collected data tends to the conclusion that this number is probably very close to accurate.

however. The fact that both the Anglican Church in Australia and New Zealand failed to issue many statements on the question is interesting. It indicates that, unlike the Church of Scotland, the Church of England may not be acting in a markedly different fashion from other denominations of the same type. The few documents issued by New Zealand are also in keeping with the expectation that a denomination receiving even limited subsidies is less likely to oppose state policies. This finding is reinforced by the fact that all New Zealand denominations in the study tend to issue fewer statements than the same denominations in other nations. This is true for every denomination except the Anglican Church of New Zealand, which has issued one more statement than both the Anglican Church of Australia and the Church of England.

It is possible that the reason this analysis has failed is that denominations, the Churches of England and Scotland especially, have placed the issue on the denominational agenda in order to defend the policy of deterrence. This possibility is considered below.

In Chapters III and VII it was shown that the most clear policy options available to the denominations were on the variables, Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence, Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession and Usability of Nuclear Weapons. That discussion was concerned with the number of times all the denominations in the nation in the study expressed a definite policy on one of these three variables. The analysis here will center on which specific denominations expressed those policies.

### **United Kingdom**

The relationship between the Church of England and the British government is different than that between the Roman Catholic Church in Australia and the Australian government. The Church of England is not merely the official state religion, it is actually a part of that government. The head of state for the United Kingdom is also the titular head of the Church of England. The other official state religion in the United Kingdom, the Church of Scotland does not have such close ties to the government. It is governed by a general assembly in the same fashion as other Presbyterian denominations. The monarch is not the titular head of the Church of Scotland although while in Scotland the monarch switches to membership in the Church of Scotland. As an official state religion, though, hypothesis seven applies equally to the Church of Scotland as to the Church of England. Hypothesis seven would predict that both would be

extremely reluctant to challenge government policies that favor deterrence. As Table 74 illustrates, however, this is not the case.

Table 75. United Kingdom--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence.

	Always Acceptable	Sometimes Acceptable	Never Acceptable
Church of England	0 times	0 times	1 time
Baptist Union	0 times	0 times	0 times
Church of Scotland	0 times	0 times	0 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	2 times	1 time

Of the policy statements gathered for the Church of England on at least one occasion it renounced the policy of nuclear deterrence as unacceptable. In The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience, 1982, the Working Party under the direction of the Bishop of Salisbury actually advanced both the proposition that nuclear deterrence was acceptable under some conditions and that it was unacceptable. Under the content analysis rules the official policy when two or more policies are advanced in the same document is defined as that position that receives the largest number of references; in this case, a policy that nuclear deterrence is unacceptable. The language of the statements rejects nuclear deterrence. This is the most extreme policy position that could be taken. As an official state religion in a nation with an independent nuclear deterrent this action is completely contrary to what the hypothesis would predict. Only the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom takes this position as well. The language used in their 1982 Statement, while mild, is nevertheless clear. The Bishops state, "We are convinced, . . .that if it is immoral to use these weapons it is also immoral to threaten their use."<sup>13</sup>

In this initial test of the hypothesis, both the official state religion and a subsidized religion behave contrary to the predictions of hypothesis seven. Although the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom tried in two previous years to accept nuclear deterrence on a conditional basis in the end it took the more extreme position of rejecting such a policy on moral grounds.

---

<sup>13</sup> Roman Catholic Bishops, "Statement by the Roman Catholic Bishops Conference of Scotland," 1982, p. 3.

Hypothesis seven fares better when applied to the Church of Scotland. In none of the statements gathered for this denomination was an definite policy on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence set. This is clearly in keeping with the choice of a denomination closely allied with the state to avoid conflict by not addressing the issue.

The Baptist Union of Great Britain, which also receives subsidies, likewise behaved in the manner predicted by the hypothesis. It did not make any pronouncements on the issue of the acceptability of the policy of nuclear deterrence.

This analysis leads to a lack of clear support for the hypothesis. Two of the denominations behaved in the manner predicted and two did not. On balance, however, the uncertainty about the completeness of the United Kingdom data set and the fact that the most closely allied denomination did not behave as predicted would lead to the conclusion that hypothesis seven did not perform well in this test. Turning to the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons provides the results seen in Table 76.

Table 76. United Kingdom--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession

	Always Moral	Sometimes Moral	Never Moral
Church of England	0 times	1 time	0 times
Baptist Union	0 times	0 times	0 times
Church of Scotland	0 times	0 times	1 time
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	0 times

Also in The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience, 1982, the Working Party makes the statement that possession of nuclear weapons may sometimes be moral. It likewise states that possession can never be moral but again the coding rules find that the greater number of references to possession sometimes being moral makes that the official policy. In fact the Working Party in its report The Church and the Bomb actually advocated unilateral disarmament as part of its statements that nuclear weapons possession cannot be moral. This is a very great departure from governmental policy. This aspect of the report was, however, defeated. The provision was opposed by Archbishop Robert Runcie among others. The vote

defeating the Working Party's proposal was 338 to 100. In the end the Church of England refused to call for unilateral disarmament but it did advocate no first use.<sup>14</sup>

Here the policy divergence is not as extreme as it was for acceptability of nuclear deterrence. In rejecting the extreme call for unilateral disarmament and stating conditions under which possession of nuclear weapons could be moral, the Church of England is exercising option two--support the policies of the state by spelling out the conditions under which such a policy is a moral option. This provides some support for hypothesis seven.

When the actions of the other denominations in the United Kingdom sample are examined it can be seen that the Church of Scotland is the only other denomination to have taken a position on the morality of nuclear weapons possession. This position was the rejection of possessing nuclear weapons as immoral. It is interesting that the Church of Scotland, which is the official state religion of Scotland, should take this position. As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland partakes of the independent nuclear deterrent. As a semi-separate entity however, it is perhaps freer to criticize governmental policies.

This same pattern holds true for the other United Kingdom denominations in the sample. Neither the Baptist Union of Great Britain nor the Roman Catholic Church of the United Kingdom expressed policies regarding the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. As denominations that receive state subsidies this result is expected.

Examining the question of the usability of nuclear weapons yields the results in Table 77. While no denomination has ever said that nuclear weapons can be used, only the Baptist Union has chosen to ignore the issue entirely.

As seen in Table 77, the Church of England advocates no first use of nuclear weapons. It has also made statements that these weapons are so terrible that their use can never be acceptable. This is a position that it shares with all other denominations that have addressed the issue. Here too, there is no support for hypothesis seven. The denomination had the option of not addressing the issue at all. It opted instead to explicitly reject the implied governmental policy of using nuclear weapons. The hypothesis failed to predict the behavior of the Church of England on this issue.

---

<sup>14</sup> Kenneth Slack, "Anglican Bishops Confront the Bomb", Christian Century, April 13, 1983, 335-336.

Table 77. United Kingdom--Expresses Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons

	Always Useable	Sometimes Useable	Never Useable
Church of England	0 times	0 times	1 time
Baptist Union	0 times	0 times	0 times
Church of Scotland	0 times	0 times	1 time
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	4 times

It also failed to predict the behavior of the Church of Scotland. Like its English counterpart the Scottish Church did not exercise its option to ignore the issue. Instead, it made it clear that it believes nuclear arms are such dreadful weapons that they must not be used. This position was expressed in 1983 when it stated: "The General Assembly affirms its convictions that nuclear arms, including readiness to use them, are by their nature morally and theologically wrong."<sup>15</sup>

### Australia

It is very interesting to note that of the denominations in the Australian sample, only the Roman Catholic denomination in Australia has expressed specific policies regarding the acceptability of nuclear deterrence.

Table 78. Australia--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence

	Always Acceptable	Sometimes Acceptable	Never Acceptable
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
Uniting	0 times	0 times	0 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	2 times	0 times

These statements have taken the form of conditional acceptance for such a policy. This seems to provide support for the argument advanced above that denominations that receive state subsidies and thus government encouragement are likely to support state policies or depart only slightly from state policies. The fact that no other denomination in the Australian sample advanced any position on the acceptability of deterrence might indicate that there was some other factor instrumental in pressuring the Roman Catholic Church in Australia to act while the other

<sup>15</sup> As quoted in, The Peace Forum, The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Pack for Churches, "What have Churches said about the Freeze", The British Council of Churches, London, 1985, p. 2.

denominations simply exercised the option of avoidance. Examination of the actual policy statement adopted by the Australian Catholic Church on this issue clearly shows minimal divergence from Australian government policy.

The Catholic Church in Australia found it necessary to address the question of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence in two separate years. First in 1975 in "The Christian and the Morality of Nuclear Defence Through Deterrence" by the Rev. W. Smith SJ and again in 1985 in "Work for a Just Peace." On the latter occasion there were seven separate statements, as determined by coding rules, within the work advancing the position that there are conditions under which nuclear deterrence is acceptable.

It remains to be determined whether these statements were incremental steps away from government policies or attempts to justify those policies by elucidating the conditions under which they are moral. In 1975 the specific statement reads;

It seems to us, therefore, that it is possible to find a morally legitimate means of nuclear deterrence, even more than one. We would certainly rule out as totally immoral the use of nuclear weapons indiscriminately against cities: and counter-force warfare that damages civilians and their possessions disproportionately is also wrong.<sup>16</sup>

This statement is clearly an effort to legitimize governmental policies by providing a context within which deterrence is morally acceptable. It takes the position that clearly it is wrong to harm innocent civilians by intending them as the target of nuclear retaliation or by selecting targets that would disproportionately damage them. However, it does not seek to sway government policies away from deterrence.

The statements in support of conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence in 1985 are almost entirely reiteration of the statement issued by the Pope that

In current conditions, deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step toward progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Rev. W. Smith S.J., "The Christian and the Morality of Nuclear Defence Through Deterrence," in Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, Australia and Nuclear Deterrence, 1975.

<sup>17</sup> John Paul II in a message to the United Nations General Assembly's Second Special Session on Disarmament, as quoted in Catholic Bishops of Australia, "No More War," in Work for a Just Peace: Reflections on Peacemaking in an Armed World, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1985, p. 26.

These reiterations are coupled with statements included in "The Challenge of Peace" pastoral letter issued by the US Catholic Bishops. In their letter the Bishops defined specific conditions for the acceptance of nuclear deterrence. Among these, the Australian Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, quote the following

- If nuclear deterrence exists only to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others, then proposals to go beyond this to planning for prolonged strikes and counterstrikes, or "prevailing" in nuclear war, are not acceptable. . .
- If nuclear deterrence is our goal, 'sufficiency' to deter is an adequate strategy; the quest for nuclear superiority must be rejected.
- Nuclear deterrence should be used as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament. Each proposed addition to our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine must be assessed on whether it will render steps toward 'progressive disarmament' more or less likely.<sup>18</sup>

These quotes serve to illustrate that the Australian Catholic Church in this instance while seeking to move the policy away from a fixed reliance on nuclear deterrence toward one focused more on the need for disarmament had not entirely rejected the policy of deterrence.

It is worth note that while the earlier statement of conditional support for nuclear deterrence took the form of establishing a framework in which the policy was acceptable the later statement sought to shift state policy incrementally toward a greater emphasis on disarmament. The earlier statement was made during a period of moderate perceived threat and the later one during a period of high threat.

The findings in Chapter VII are reinforced by this discovery. As perceived threat has increased in Australia the support for the acceptability of nuclear deterrence appears to have decreased. This appears to be the case since in years of low or moderate perceived nuclear threat Australian denominations did not choose to address the question of acceptability of nuclear deterrence and in the years of high perceived nuclear threat there were two occasions on which conditions were placed on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence.

Two Australian denominations, the Uniting and the Roman Catholic, considered the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. The results obtained by examining this question are presented in Table 79.

---

<sup>18</sup> US Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and our Response, as quoted in Catholic Bishops of Australia, "No More War," in Work for a Just Peace: Reflections on Peacemaking in an Armed World, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1985, p. 27.

Table 79. Australia--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession

	Always Moral	Sometimes Moral	Never Moral
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
Uniting	0 times	0 times	3 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	1 time	1 time

On three occasions the Uniting Church of Australia made statements that it was never moral to possess nuclear weapons. This is the most extreme position on the issue that it could have taken. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, at one time said it was sometimes moral and at another that it was never moral. The position that possessing nuclear weapons is sometimes moral was adopted in 1975 in "The Christian and the Morality of Nuclear Defense Through Deterrence" by the Rev. W. Smith SJ. The statements here take the form that it is sometimes moral to possess nuclear weapons in order to mount a credible nuclear deterrent, which as shown above was deemed acceptable under certain circumstances.

The rejection of possession of nuclear weapons came in 1981 when the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace issued "World Disarmament: A Statement of Policy." This statement reads in part

The ever-present possibility of nuclear war calls for reflection on the consequences of such an event and the realisation (sic) that the kind of nuclear war for which countries possessing nuclear weapons have prepared themselves is immoral. . . . It is therefore an urgent moral necessity for world leaders to divest their countries of nuclear weapons and to work to contain their spread.<sup>19</sup>

In effect the Catholic Church, in this statement, is directly rejecting the policy of deterrence since it relies upon the possession of nuclear weapons. It is questioning the policy the government has elected to follow. It doesn't avoid the issue, provide justification for governmental policies or seek to depart slightly from the governmental position as a way of influencing government policy. It is not only Australian reliance on deterrence that is questioned but also, in addressing world leaders, the policies of the nuclear powers.

Because the policy position of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia has changed over time, placing the "World Disarmament" statement in historical context might be helpful at this

---

<sup>19</sup> Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (Australia), World Disarmament: A Statement of Policy, 1981, p. 1.

point. With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as United States President in 1980 a possibility that had previously been ignored or deemed unthinkable began to be openly discussed. This was the possibility of a winnable limited nuclear war. Such open consideration of a previously unthinkable proposition was very frightening to many both within the United States and among its allies.

The psychological motivations of denominational policy makers are outside the scope of this analysis. There is no way of determining how much the fear that resulted from open discussions of the possibility of a winnable limited nuclear war might have influenced the decision of the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church in Australia to adopt a policy in such direct opposition to the reliance on nuclear deterrence. This reliance, in Australia came through Alliance with a nation that possessed nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes. Both the possibility that fear may have played a motivating factor and that Australia has no nuclear weapons of its own are worth keeping in mind.

As a state sanctioned religion of a non-nuclear state the Roman Catholic Church in Australia in the "World Disarmament" statement was condemning something that did not directly impact the Australian government. Australia itself was not being directly criticized; the criticism was leveled at those nations possessing nuclear weapons. It was their targeting strategies and war fighting plans that were rejected. Objecting to the manner in which those holding the nuclear umbrella were carrying it is an easier option than criticizing one's own handling of that umbrella.

The policy pronouncements of the Uniting Church in Australia came in 1963, 1972 and 1985. All three of the documents issued by the Church in 1963 include a rejection of the possession of nuclear weapons. The Deliverance of the Presbyterian Church Victorian Assembly of 1963 is representative. It reads

That the Assembly  
1. Declare that nuclear war would be so indiscriminate in its effects and so terrible in its consequences that participation in nuclear war or possession of nuclear weapons cannot be justified by the Christian Church.<sup>20</sup>

This is an unmistakable rejection of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. There is no support for the hypothesis in such a clear rejection. It should be noted, however, that Australia

---

<sup>20</sup> Victorian Assembly, Presbyterian Church of Australia, Deliverances, 1963, p. 68.

is not a nuclear weapons state and the statement does not expressly reject nuclear deterrence. It may be splitting hairs but in stating merely that the Christian Church cannot justify participation in a nuclear war or possession of nuclear weapons, the Uniting Church is not rejecting deterrence *per se*. It does not expressly reject deterrence nor does it address the nuclear powers. The Uniting Church in this statement refuses justification to two aspects of the deterrence equation that Australian governmental policies cannot substantially affect. Australia does not possess nuclear weapons and could not of its own choice participate in a nuclear war.

The 1972 statement was simply a reaffirmation of the 1963 declaration.<sup>21</sup> The 1985 statement was even stronger. As Rev. Wes Campbell of the Uniting Church put it

In 1985 the Uniting Church Assembly issued a Statement on Peace and Disarmament for discussion in parishes. In it there is a clear rejection of nuclear weapons as *sinful*: "As a matter of faith, therefore, we declare the production, possession, deployment or use of nuclear weapons a sin".<sup>22</sup>

By declaring the possession of nuclear weapons a sin, the Uniting Church is taking the strongest possible line against the policy. Sin is an offense against God. Christians must strive to avoid sin and to keep themselves in harmony with God. The Uniting Church has been remarkably consistent in its opposition to the possession of nuclear weapons.

The results of this test of hypothesis seven are mixed. In one case the Catholic denomination issued a statement that provided support and justification for governmental policy and in the other it rejected that policy. Consequently, there is neither clear support for the hypothesis nor clear rejection in the actions of the Catholic Church. Whatever the underlying causes, the Catholic Church in Australia does not behave entirely as the hypothesis would expect. The Uniting Church in Australia on the other hand provides no support for the hypothesis. Hypothesis seven fails entirely to predict the behavior of this denomination. Thus on balance the hypothesis does not fare well on the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons.

When the question of using nuclear weapons is examined the results in Table 80 are obtained.

---

<sup>21</sup> Victorian Assembly, Presbyterian Church of Australia, Deliverances, 1972, p. 51.

<sup>22</sup> Rev. Wes Campbell, "The Church's Approach to War and Peace," Division of Social Justice, Synod of Victoria, Uniting Church in Australia, p. 42.

Table 80. Australia--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons

	Always Useable	Sometimes Useable	Never Useable
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
Uniting	0 times	0 times	2 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	2 times

The policy of nuclear deterrence relies on the threat to use these weapons in order that they will never need to be used. As demonstrated in Chapter VII no denomination in the study ever issued a statement that nuclear weapons could be used. There seems to be a general belief on the part of denominations that the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable; that to employ these terrible weapons would be a rejection of God's sovereignty. Because of this belief it would be a violation of a denomination's purpose and identity to say that nuclear weapons could be used. Consequently, if a denomination did not want to address the conflict inherent in the deterrence dilemma; a nation must believably threaten to do something that is so evil and wrong that it must never be done; it should not issue a policy statement on the use aspect of nuclear weapons at all. It would be logical to expect that this would be what state supported churches would do. However, this is not the case. While neither the Baptist Union of Australia nor the Church of England in Australia have addressed the question at all, both the Uniting Church and the Catholic Church have on two occasions each clearly rejected any use of nuclear weapons. The Catholic Church did this in a 1975 work by Rev. J. Lanigan, "A Case Against the Retention of American Nuclear Facilities in Australia" and again in 1981 when it issued "World Disarmament: A Statement of Policy."

From the title alone of the 1975 work it is clear that this was not merely a restating of the deterrence dilemma with a slant toward the idea that everyone knows that nuclear weapons should never be used even though it is necessary to threaten their use in order to preserve the peace through deterrence. Such a slant could be seen as an effort to justify governmental reliance on deterrence policy without betraying religious ideals. Instead of such an effort "A Case Against the Retention of American Nuclear Facilities in Australia" is a fundamental questioning of Australia's role in the American nuclear deterrent strategy, i.e. a questioning of governmental policy.

The same is true of the 1981 statement "World Disarmament: A Statement of Policy."  
Here the Church says

. . .the church (sic) cannot condone as a legitimate means of national defence the use of nuclear weapons in the manner in which the superpowers have prepared for their use. Recent thinking in the Church is toward the rejection of any use.<sup>23</sup>

This is a rejection of government policies which rely on the credible threat of massive retaliation by its nuclear armed ally the United States to maintain the security of Australia. The Uniting Church rejected the use of nuclear weapons in both 1963 and 1985. This rejection came as part of the statements quoted above. In neither year does the denomination exercise any of the options available to support government policies. It does not ignore the issue, clarify the question or endeavor to incrementally change government policies. On both occasions the statements were outright rejections.

Here again there is no support for hypothesis seven. The policies of the state are not supported by the denomination is most closely allied with the state. Two of the Australian denominations in this study chose not to address the issue of using nuclear weapons at all. This certainly was an option for the Catholic Church and Uniting Church as well; an option they chose not to take in favor of an outright rejection of use of nuclear weapons. In regarding the actions of the Catholic Church it should be remembered, however, that the Vatican, whose policies are binding upon all Roman Catholic denominations has also rejected the use of nuclear weapons. This fact may help to explain the actions of the Catholic Church in Australia. This possibility is given additional strength by the behavior of other Catholic Churches in the study. With the exception of the Catholic Church in New Zealand, which has not addressed the issue, all the others have rejected any use of nuclear weapons. The policies of the Vatican, however, do not in any way explain the behavior of the Uniting Church of Australia.

So far the actions of official state religions and denominations in a religious state have been examined in light of hypothesis seven. It is time to turn our attention now to the behavior of those denominations, in secular nations that have lesser ties to the state. Specifically, those denominations in states that are not religious and do not possess a specific official religion but do subsidize the churches will be examined.

---

<sup>23</sup> Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (Australia), World Disarmament: A Statement of Policy, 1981, p. 1.

## Canada

Canadian denominations receive state subsidies but the state itself is defined as secular. As a result the hypothesis would expect to see the denominations unwilling to challenge state policies although this tendency should be less pronounced than the hypothesis would expect for official state religions or subsidized denominations in a religious state.

Table 81 reveals the positions the Canadian denominations in the sample have taken regarding the question of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence.

Table 81. Canada--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence

	Always Acceptable	Sometimes Acceptable	Never Acceptable
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
United Church	1 time	2 times	2 time
Roman Catholic	0 times	1 time	1 time

Both the Anglican and Baptist Churches in Canada have avoided taking clearly defined positions on this issue. This is in line with what the hypothesis would expect since avoiding the issue is clearly the easiest option available for a denomination that does not want to challenge state policies. As discussed above, a denomination that is receiving subsidies from the state should be less willing to challenge state policies. Clearly, the hypothesis finds support in the actions of these two denominations.

The same is not necessarily the case when the actions of the other two denominations are examined. The United Church of Canada first took, in 1960, the policy option of expressing conditional support for the policy of nuclear deterrence. This expression came in "The Winds of Change," in the context of a discussion of the moral dilemma inherent in the problem of "violence versus legal force." It was determined that no nation could permit itself to be a victim of a surprise nuclear first-strike. The discussion went on to reject the idea of a preemptive war, which goes well beyond the intent of deterrence.<sup>24</sup>

Four years later, in 1964, the United Church of Canada continued its conditional support of nuclear deterrence. As part of its report "Between Two Worlds" the Committee on the Church

---

<sup>24</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "The Winds of Change," 1960, 37-38.

and International Affairs (CCIA) it quoted from the July 1963 issue of Foreign Affairs, "Canada and World Relations,"

The question of nuclear weapons is subordinate to that of Canada's political responsibility as a member of a nuclear-armed Alliance. NATO is a nuclear-armed defensive Alliance, which dare not be otherwise as long as it is confronted by a nuclear-armed potential opponent. NATO may become less dependent upon nuclear weapons, but the Alliance must continue to possess nuclear weapons in the absence of controlled disarmament and as long as hostile forces have them.<sup>25</sup>

In both the 1960 and 1964 statements the argument in favor of conditionally accepting nuclear deterrence can essentially be reduced to the contention that as long as there is a nuclear armed potential opponent it is acceptable to mount a credible nuclear deterrent. The implication of this is that should the conspicuous potential for conflict with the Soviet Union disappear the reliance on nuclear deterrence should fade away. In other words, it is permissible to deter, with nuclear weapons, an opponent armed with comparable armaments but to seek to employ a nuclear deterrent against a non-nuclear state would be wrong.

These two statements are in line with what the hypothesis would expect since it is an effort to provide justification for governmental policy.

The expression of clear support for the state policy of reliance on nuclear deterrence came in 1968, it simply stated ". . . Canadians favour a policy of credible deterrence."<sup>26</sup> In making this statement the United Church of Canada did not express a staggering degree of support for the state policy of reliance on nuclear deterrence but in making this unqualified statement it was obeying the imperatives of hypothesis seven as well as demonstrating a certain amount of responsiveness to constituent pressure.

After this statement of support, however, the United Church again qualified its support for the policy of nuclear deterrence. The statement of qualified support made in 1982 as part of "A Statement of Canadian Church Leaders on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies" takes the form of support for the policy of nuclear deterrence "as it obtains today" as an interim measure. By accepting this policy in the interim it allows the government of Canada to work to bring into

---

<sup>25</sup> "Canada and World Relations," Foreign Affairs, July 1963, As excerpted in CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "Between Two Worlds," 1964, p. 76.

<sup>26</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "Guidelines for Peace," 1968, p. 31.

effect the strategy of suffocation based on a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, followed by a

complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, a ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and a complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.<sup>27</sup>

The document goes on to urge the Canadian government to "refuse to test the cruise missile or any other nuclear weapon vehicles within Canadian territory" and "refuse to produce components for nuclear weapons systems" as well as declare "Canada a nuclear weapons free zone." These are all substantial departures from government policy. This is not what the hypothesis would expect. Significant departures of this kind go well beyond the sort of gentle pushing or encouragement to alter government policies that hypothesis seven encompasses.

By 1984 the United Church of Canada had completely broken with governmental reliance on nuclear deterrence. "Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age" unequivocally rejects every aspect of nuclear deterrence. First, it quotes from the World Council of Churches "Statement on Peace and Justice":

We believe that the time has come when the churches must unequivocally declare that the production and deployment, as well as the use of nuclear weapons are a crime against humanity and that such activities must be condemned on ethical and theological grounds.

Then, in quoting from a 1982 lecture by Dr. William Sloan Coffin, of the Riverside Church in New York City, the United Church in Canada states

. . . it is right, . . . to say that it is a sin not merely to use, or merely to threaten to use, but merely to build and merely to possess nuclear weapons. . . If we want to think seriously about living in sin, we should say that that's exactly what the United States is doing; exactly what the Soviet Union is doing; that's what England, France, China are doing. We are living in sin right now simply because we possess weapons of this kind of terrifying power.

---

<sup>27</sup> Canadian Church Leaders, Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Canadian Council of Churches, Lutheran Church, Anglican Church of Canada, United Church of Canada, Presbyterian Church of Canada, "A Statement of Canadian Church Leaders on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies," December 1982, 2-3. It should be noted that while the Anglican Church of Canada was party to this statement it does not regard it as an official policy statement of the Anglican Church of Canada; consequently, it was not coded as one of this denomination's statements.

The United Church goes on to say:

Canada is by no means innocent. Our country has participated in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, back to their very beginning in 1945. Ever since we have contributed to the manufacture of components for nuclear weapons systems of the United States. We have made federal tax money and government services available to companies that wanted to compete for American contracts to supply parts for these weapons. By working on the periphery of the nuclear club, we have been living in sin.<sup>28</sup>

In "Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age" the United Church of Canada goes well beyond anything predicted by hypothesis seven. This is an outright rejection and condemnation of government policy.

The Roman Catholic Church in Canada has made two statements regarding the acceptability of nuclear deterrence. Of the three statements issued in 1982 that addressed the nuclear issue two of them, "Submission to the Standing Committee on International Affairs and National Defence" and "Statement of Canadian Church Leaders on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policy" gave conditional acceptance to nuclear deterrence. The "Statement of Canadian Church Leaders" was discussed above. In this document, the Roman Catholic Church of Canada, like its United Church counterpart goes well beyond what would be predicted by hypothesis seven.

The "Submission to the Standing Committee on International Affairs and National Defence" is not so extreme. It states that

The possession of nuclear weapons for deterrence can only be tolerated as long as progress is being made in the reduction of nuclear stockpiles through continuing negotiations among the nuclear weapons states. Our goal must be the eventual and complete elimination of nuclear weapon systems.<sup>29</sup>

The attempt to shift government policies to a greater emphasis on disarmament seen here is in line with the expectations of the hypothesis.

It is interesting to note the difference in policies found in these two statements issued ten months apart. The "Submission to the Standing Committee" was made in February while the "Statement of Canadian Church Leaders" came out in December. Obviously, there was a

---

<sup>28</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, Report of the Disarmament sub-committee, Resolution Numbers 23, 24, "Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age," 1984, p. 444.

<sup>29</sup> Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCCB), Roman Catholic Church of Canada, "Submission to the Standing Committee on International Affairs and National Defence: concerning Canada's Preparations for the Second Special Session of the United Nations on Disarmament," February 16, 1982, p. 5.

fundamental change in something that took place during this time period. While noting this feature, it is beyond the scope of this work to explain it.

The 1983 statement "On Peace and Disarmament" rejected nuclear deterrence as unacceptable.

. . . We must say without reservation that nuclear weapons are ultimately unacceptable as agents of national security. We can conceive of no circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons could be justified and consistent with the will of God, and we must therefore conclude that nuclear weapons must also be rejected as a means of threat and deterrence.<sup>30</sup>

This statement is particularly astonishing since it goes beyond the position taken by the Vatican. As a Roman Catholic denomination the Catholic Church in Canada owes obedience to Rome. In taking a position that goes beyond that of the Vatican the Catholic Church in Canada is not only rejecting government policies but also breaking with Vatican positions. This is counter to both hypothesis seven and hypothesis three.

Overall, the support for hypothesis seven in the case of Canada is mixed. While several of the statements sought to shift incrementally or to establish an acceptable context for government policies which are in keeping with the expectation of the hypothesis there are several others statements that are direct rejections of governmental reliance on nuclear deterrence. The absence of statements by two of the denominations, however, adds weight to the validity of the hypothesis leading to the overall conclusion that the hypothesis performs fairly well here.

An examination of the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons provides the results shown in Table 82.

Table 82. Canada--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession

	Always Moral	Sometimes Moral	Never Moral
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
United Church	0 times	1 time	3 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	0 times

<sup>30</sup> Canadian Church Leaders, Lutheran Church in America (Canada Section); Canadian Council of Churches; United Church of Canada, Presbyterian Church in Canada, Anglican Church of Canada; Baptist Convention of Ontario and Quebec; Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops; Project Ploughshares, "On Peace and Disarmament: Brief Submitted to the Prime Minister," December 14, 1983, p. 436. Surprisingly, only the Roman Catholic Church acknowledges this statement as denominational policy.

Here every denomination except the United Church is seen to have exercised the option of avoidance of the issue. The United Church of Canada, though, has been particularly independent on the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. It has dealt with the question in four separate years. In 1959 and 1960 it declared the policy of possessing nuclear weapons immoral. This was done in "Canada's Defence and Foreign Policies" (1959) and "The Winds of Change" (1960).

In "Canada's Defence and Foreign Policies" the rejection of possessing nuclear weapons turns out to be an endorsement of government policy. Here the statement is in praise of the government's unilateral decision to forgo possession of an independent nuclear deterrent and "a Canadian policy of unilateral renunciation of nuclear warfare."<sup>31</sup> In choosing to justify government positions the United Church is behaving here as the hypothesis would predict.

"The Winds of Change" included a rejection of nuclear weapons on moral grounds that described the newest generation of nuclear arms as "an unholy affront to the conscience of mankind."<sup>32</sup> Here the Church was not praising the decision of the Canadian government to forgo a nuclear force of its own but instead condemning nuclear weapons possession and any reliance on nuclear weapons. This is not what hypothesis seven would expect.

In 1962 the United Church in Canada moderated its position to recognize that possessing nuclear weapons might sometimes be moral. The document, "Lord of the World," a CCIA report, also expressed the belief that possessing nuclear weapons could never be moral but there were more expressions that it might sometimes be moral so, according to the established coding rules, that represented the official policy. In "Lord of the World," the United Church has sought to move the government policy of reliance on nuclear deterrence, based on the possession of nuclear weapons by Canada's ally the United States, to a greater emphasis on the need for disarmament. It is not a rejection of government policies but an effort to place these policies in a real world situation and shift the focus to greater emphasis on an alternative. The policy expressed here takes the form of the need for nuclear weapons in order to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent coupled with a strong emphasis on the need for disarmament.<sup>33</sup> This is in line with the expectations of the hypothesis.

---

<sup>31</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "Canada's Defence and Foreign Policies," 1959, p. 198

<sup>32</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "The Winds of Change," 1960, p. 42

<sup>33</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "Lord of the World," 1962, 74-77

1984 saw a return to the position that possessing nuclear weapons could never be moral. All four of the statements issued that year; "Confessing our Faith in a Nuclear Age," "Nuclear Freeze," "Ethical and Theological Implications of the Arms Race" and "The Common Good of All," contained a rejection of nuclear weapons possession. This was clearly a strongly held position to be included in all the statements issued. It was not simply a reiteration of previous positions but rather an expression of deeply held opinion. The argument from "Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age" that

One of the signs of hope for the church (sic) in our age is the growing consensus within the Christian community that nuclear weaponry is sinful. Its mere possession raises the distinct possibility of total human extinction, which would be the ultimate sin because it would be an act of mutual and total suicide<sup>34</sup>

is representative of the tone taken in all four documents. This total rejection of nuclear weapons possession as sinful is contrary to the expectation of the hypothesis.

The context of the 1984 statements might help to explain this departure from predicted denominational behavior. These statements were made during the Reagan era in the United States. As discussed above, it was during this time that there was increased speculation about the possibility of a winnable limited nuclear war. The fear engendered by such speculation might have provided the motivating force behind the positions adopted by the United Church of Canada. It is worth remembering, however, that not all denominations responded to this fear by issuing statements rejecting the possession of nuclear weapons. Still, for the most part, the hypothesis has fared reasonably well in predicting Canadian denominational behavior on the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons.

It is time to examine the usability aspect of the nuclear issue. Regarding this question it is seen that three of the four denominations in the Canadian sample are prepared to state that use of nuclear weapons is immoral under any conditions.

Only the Baptist denomination has employed the option of avoiding the issue. All of the others in the sample chose to formally express their opposition to any use of nuclear weapons.

On two occasions the Anglican Church in Canada rejected the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. These occasions came in 1958 and 1962, relatively early in the nuclear age. "International Affairs" was issued in 1958 rejecting the use of nuclear arms and

---

<sup>34</sup> CCIA Report, United Church of Canada, "Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age," 1984, p. 444

"International Relations" in 1962 contained the same rejection. It's interesting to note that the Anglican Church adopted this position earlier than the other denominations in the Canadian sample. It did this by endorsing the resolutions of the Lambeth Conference of 1958, which stated that the use of nuclear weapons was "repugnant to the Christian conscience."<sup>35</sup> This was fairly mild as rejections go. It did not declare it a sin or evil instead choosing to brand it repugnant. The 1962 rejection was a bit stronger declaring the conviction "that the only sane course open to humanity is never to use nuclear weapons."<sup>36</sup>

Table 83. Canada--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons

	Always Useable	Sometimes Useable	Never Useable
Anglican	0 times	0 times	2 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
United Church	0 times	0 times	4 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	2 times

The United Church in Canada formally rejected any use of nuclear arms in four separate statements, "Lord of the World" (1962), "Manifesto on Nuclear Disarmament" (1982), "On Peace and Disarmament: Brief to the Prime Minister" (1983) and "Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age," "Nuclear Freeze," "Ethical and Theological Implications of the Arms Race" and "The Common Good of All" (1984). The United Church of Canada is markedly more activist on the nuclear issue than are the other denominations in the Canadian sample. This greater activism is especially clear in 1984 when there were four separate documents containing the rejection of the use of these weapons. Quoting from a 1983 World Council of Churches Assembly in Vancouver, the United Church in Canada states,

we believe that the time has come when the churches must unequivocally declare that the production and deployment as well as the use of nuclear weapons are a crime against humanity and must be condemned on ethical and theological grounds.<sup>37</sup>

This statement is representative of the rejections of the use of nuclear weapons issued by the United Church. These statements are stronger rejections than the hypothesis would predict.

<sup>35</sup> General Synods and Annual Meetings, Anglican Church of Canada, "International Relations," Department of Christian Social Relations: Resolutions Passed at General Synods and Annual Meetings, 1947-1963, 1958, p. 23.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 1962, p. 27.

<sup>37</sup> United Church of Canada, "Ethical and Theological Implications of the Arms Race," 1984, p. 2.

Twice the Roman Catholic Church in Canada expressed its opposition in 1982 and 1983 to any use of nuclear weapons. The 1982 statements were "Statement of Canadian Church Leaders on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies," "Submission to the Standing Committee on International Affairs and National Defence" and "Disarmament and Security." The 1983 statement was "On Peace and Disarmament: Brief to the Prime Minister." Like its United Church counterparts the Roman Catholic Church in Canada has issued very strong rejections of the use of nuclear weapons. "The Brief to the Prime Minister" is illustrative, it states,

we can conceive of no circumstances under which the use of nuclear weapons could be justified and consistent with the will of God, and we must therefore conclude that nuclear weapons must also be rejected as a means of threat or deterrence.<sup>38</sup>

Examining all the statements against any use of nuclear weapons issued by the denominations in the Canadian sample shows that hypothesis seven does not perform particularly well when applied to the question of use. A rejection of any use of nuclear weapons in the strongest terms is the norm for Canadian denominations in the sample.

### **New Zealand**

There is one additional nation, in this sample, that subsidizes its Christian churches; New Zealand. The activities of its denominations in relation to governmental policies regarding nuclear deterrence are revealed in Table 84.

Table 84. New Zealand--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence

	Always Acceptable	Sometimes Acceptable	Never Acceptable
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	2 times
Presbyterian	0 times	0 times	0 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	0 times

---

<sup>38</sup> Bishop John Sherlock, President of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, Archbishop Ted Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada, The Rt. Rev. W. Clarke MacDonald, Moderator of the United Church of Canada, The Rev. Donald MacDonald, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, The Rev. Robert Binhammer, President of the Lutheran Church in America, Canada Section, The Rev. Dr. Russel D. Legge, President of the Canadian Council of Churches, "Canadian Church Leaders Statement to the Prime Minister on Peace and Disarmament," Roman Catholic Church in Canada, December 14, 1983, p. 1.

Of the four denominations in the New Zealand sample three chose to avoid the question of whether nuclear deterrence could be judged acceptable. Only the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand chose to address the issue. On two occasions it rejected the policy as unacceptable. These statements came in 1982 and 1984. The behavior of the Baptist Union is even more remarkable when it is noted that these are the only two years that it has issued statements on the nuclear issue. The 1984 statement in "Public Questions Presentation" is particularly clear in its rejection of all aspects of the nuclear question.

We believe that:

(a) Nuclear war would inflict unparalleled human suffering and death and environmental disaster

(b) The notion of nuclear deterrence, and the willingness to use nuclear weapons which it implies, is contrary to the teachings of Jesus Christ and an unacceptable and abhorrent way of resolving conflict between nations

(c) Nuclear weapons, because they have the capacity to completely destroy God's creation, exceed the authority, which God has given to humankind

(d) The nuclear arms race results in widespread injustice by using invaluable and limited resources in the production of sophisticated weaponry to kill and wound people.<sup>39</sup>

It is important to remember the events taking place in New Zealand in the 1980s. As discussed previously, the Reagan Administration in the United States was publicly considering the unthinkable, a winnable, limited nuclear war. At this time in New Zealand there was strong anti-nuclear sentiment that culminated in the election of a Labour government that, in September 1984, introduced a bill to ban nuclear armed ships from New Zealand ports. While the positions of the Baptist Union go further than those of the New Zealand government these positions are not as opposed to government policies as they would be were the government still firmly committed to unquestioning reliance on nuclear deterrence. This represents an effort to shift government policies incrementally.

Hypothesis seven performs well in predicting the behavior of the denominations in the New Zealand sample when applied to the issue of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence. When applied to the morality of possessing nuclear weapons it also performs well. As the table below demonstrates it was again only the Baptist denomination that expressed the position that it was

---

<sup>39</sup> Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, "Public Questions Presentation," November 6, 1984, p. 5.

immoral to possess nuclear weapons. The other denominations in the sample did not address the question.

The Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand rejected as immoral possession of nuclear weapons in the 1982 "Public Questions Presentation" the Baptist Union declaring them "morally unacceptable."<sup>40</sup> The explanation of shifting political winds, provided above, is useful here as well.

Table 85. New Zealand--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Possessing Nuclear Weapons

	Always Moral	Sometimes Moral	Never Moral
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	1 time
Presbyterian	0 times	0 times	0 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	0 times

When hypothesis seven is applied to the question of usability of nuclear weapons two of the New Zealand denominations in the sample are shown not to have adopted the option of avoiding the issue. Here, both the Baptist and Presbyterian denominations rejected any use of nuclear weapons. The Baptist Union rejected any use of nuclear weapons in both its 1982 and 1984 statements.

While the Baptist denomination followed the same pattern as on the other two aspects of the issue, the Presbyterian Church in New Zealand departed from its habit of avoiding the issue to make clear its opposition to any use of nuclear weapons. This departure came in 1978 when it issued "Christian Perspectives on Disarmament: A Contemporary Comment." In this document the Presbyterian Church advocated making New Zealand a nuclear free zone and prohibiting the docking of nuclear armed ships as well as stating that "Because of the Gospel of Jesus Christ the Church must oppose violence and bloody revolution, and the use of either nuclear or conventional weapons, for as long as it is humanly possible."<sup>41</sup> It is interesting that the prohibition on the docking of nuclear armed ships became official governmental policy six years after the Presbyterian denomination advocated it. Thus, while this position goes beyond the

<sup>40</sup> Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, "Public Questions Presentation," November 9, 1982, p. 3.

<sup>41</sup> General Assembly, Presbyterian Church of New Zealand, "Christian Perspectives on Disarmament: A Contemporary Comment," 1978, p. 168.

governmental policy at the time it presages policies that the government would adopt in later years. This is largely what the hypothesis would expect.

Table 86. New Zealand--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons

	Always Useable	Sometimes Useable	Never Useable
Anglican	0 times	0 times	0 times
Baptist	0 times	0 times	2 times
Presbyterian	0 times	0 times	1 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	0 times

In this nation the denominations that receive government subsidies within a secular state behaved generally in accordance with the hypothesis. With a few notable exceptions denominations primarily chose to avoid the issue or sought only to incrementally change governmental policy. The analysis now turns to those denominations in the sample that are least associated with the state, those in the United States. The hypothesis would expect that these denominations would be the most active in expressing opposition to state policies related to nuclear deterrence.

### United States

Even a cursory glance at Tables 86, 87 and 88 reveals that the denominations in the United States sample do not behave as the hypothesis predicts. They are no more likely than denominations with closer associations to the state to oppose state policies.

When examining expressed policies of United States denominations regarding the acceptability of nuclear deterrence none of the denominations in the sample are seen to adopt the most extreme position of rejecting the policy of nuclear deterrence as unacceptable. Only the Presbyterian and Catholic denominations have chosen to address the question at all. Both have chosen on one occasion to place conditions on the acceptance of nuclear deterrence.

Table 87. United States--Expressed Policies Regarding the Acceptability of Nuclear Deterrence

	Always Acceptable	Sometimes Acceptable	Never Acceptable
Episcopal	0 times	0 times	0 times
Southern Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
Presbyterian	0 times	1 time	0 times
Roman Catholic	0 times	1 time	0 times

The Presbyterian denomination placed conditions on nuclear deterrence at the 183rd General Assembly in 1971. This conditional acceptance is granted in the following:

The Christian who, under current conditions, accepts a policy of nuclear deterrence as the best of several undesirable options must be careful not to fall into the too-easy acceptance of current conditions as inevitable and static. He must be honest enough to admit that he supports such a policy even though there is a possibility that nuclear weapons will be used. To those Christians, Norman Gottwald offers a direct challenge:

Anyone who endorses nuclear deterrence in the light of Christian conscience had better throw off the official smugness of Western and Eastern propaganda on the subject. He had better throw much more of his weight than presently toward controlled disarmament and toward strengthening international procedures for solving political disputes. . . .Is nuclear deterrence morally defensible? In Christian terms, the answer to that question must be an emphatic no unless the one who says yes qualifies by saying that the sole purpose of nuclear deterrence is to buy a little time to work for peaceful alternatives. He who says that nuclear deterrence is credible and morally defensible without working relevantly for other ways to peace has betrayed his conscience and is neither a credible Christian nor a credible citizen of the twentieth century.<sup>42</sup>

The Catholic Church in the United States expressed the position that nuclear deterrence was only acceptable as an interim measure on the road to disarmament. This position was adopted in the Pastoral letter "The Challenge of Peace," in 1983. The relevant sections have been quoted previously.

Table 88. United States--Expressed Policies Regarding the Morality of Nuclear Weapons Possession

	Always Moral	Sometimes Moral	Never Moral
Episcopal	0 times	0 times	0 times
Southern Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
Presbyterian	0 times	0 times	1 time
Roman Catholic	0 times	3 times	1 time

The Presbyterian denomination in the one year it addressed the issue of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons adopted the most extreme position that possessing nuclear weapons

---

<sup>42</sup> Norman Gottwald, "A Sleep of Prisoners," *Worldview*, November 1964, as quoted in the minutes of the 183rd General Assembly Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1971, p. 637f.

was never moral. This rejection came in 1982. In this year there were five separate documents issued that dealt with the nuclear question. Of these five documents only one, the minutes from the 194th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), addressed the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. The 194th General Assembly couched its rejection of possessing nuclear weapons in terms of the effect a reliance on nuclear weapons would have on the souls of believers. "...The inherent dignity and worth of persons can be destroyed in our preoccupation with massive weapons and the false security they provide. What profit we if, in our quest for security, our souls are lost?"<sup>43</sup>

The Roman Catholic denomination also adopted the position that possession of nuclear weapons could never be moral on one occasion. This was in the 1984 statement "Violence Ends Where Love Begins." In addition, however, it adopted the position, on three occasions, that it could be moral under some circumstances to possess nuclear weapons. This position was advanced in "To Live in Christ Jesus: The Community of Nations" 1976, "SALT II a Statement of Support" 1979 and "The Challenge of Peace" 1983. All three documents allow the possession of nuclear weapons as an interim measure only while efforts are made to achieve a lasting peace and disarmament. The 1984 document "Violence Ends Where Love Begins" was issued by Pax Christi USA and reads in part: "[Pax Christi] believes that the construction and possession of nuclear weapons represents a profound immorality in the contemporary world."<sup>44</sup>

Ultimately, the denominations in the United States sample have not behaved as the hypothesis would expect. They have not taken more frequent stands on the issue of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons than their counterparts in other nations in the study nor have they consistently adopted the position in greatest opposition to those of the United States government.

Table 89 represents the policies expressed by the denominations in the United States sample regarding the use of nuclear weapons.

---

<sup>43</sup> 194th General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1982, p. 298.

<sup>44</sup> Pax Christi USA, "Violence Ends Where Love Begins," pamphlet, 1984. In general Pax Christi statements do not constitute official pronouncements of the Roman Catholic Church but this one was recommended to my attention as embodying Catholic beliefs on the nuclear issue.

Table 89. United States--Expressed Policies Regarding the Usability of Nuclear Weapons

	Always Useable	Sometimes Useable	Never Useable
Episcopal	0 times	0 times	0 times
Southern Baptist	0 times	0 times	0 times
Presbyterian	0 times	0 times	1 time
Roman Catholic	0 times	0 times	3 times

It is surprising to find that on the aspect of nuclear deterrence that was previously defined as the least controversial (See Chapter III) only the Presbyterian and Catholic denominations have chosen to formally declare the use of nuclear weapons unacceptable under any circumstances.

The Presbyterian denomination made this declaration on one occasion in its 1983 document "A Study and Action Guide on the Nuclear Arms Race and the 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race': Proposal for a Mutual US - Soviet Nuclear Weapons Freeze." Here the rejection of any use of nuclear weapons comes in the context of encouraging the United States and Soviet Union to implement a freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and new delivery vehicles. It is argued that implementing such a freeze would reduce the chances of nuclear weapons ever being used again as well as being the first step on the road to disarmament and peace.

The Roman Catholic Church adopted positions opposing the use of nuclear weapons on three separate occasions "To Live in Christ Jesus: The Community of Nations" 1976, "SALT II a Statement of Support" 1979 and "The Challenge of Peace" 1983, the same documents that declared possession of nuclear weapons to be moral only under certain conditions. One of the conditions placed on nuclear weapons is that they could never be used or their use threatened against civilian populations.

Hypothesis seven has failed to adequately predict the behavior of the denominations in the United States sample. These denominations have not been more willing to challenge state policies than those with closer ties to the state. Indeed, in many cases denominations with closer ties to the state have been more willing to challenge state policies.

## **Official State Religions and Their Sister Denominations**

It remains to examine the subsidiary expectation of hypothesis seven. This is the expectation that an official state religion will keep its policies in line with those of the government thus behaving differently, not only than the other denominations in its nation, but also from its sister churches in other nations.

Only the Church of England takes any position on the acceptability of nuclear deterrence no other Anglican/Episcopal denomination in the study takes any position on this issue. The Church of England is unique in this respect, not only does it take a position when none of its sister denominations do but also takes the position most contrary to governmental policies. It rejects governmental policies and behaves in a fashion contrary to that of sister denominations in the other nations in this study. There is no support for hypothesis seven here.

In comparison with other Anglican/Episcopal denominations regarding the question of whether it can be moral to possess nuclear weapons it is again seen that the Church of England has been unique. It is the only one to have taken a stand on the morality of nuclear weapons possession. The position that it adopted was again contrary to that of the government of the United Kingdom.

The Church of England also clearly rejected any use of nuclear weapons. When this is compared with the policies of other Anglican/Episcopal denominations it is seen that only the Anglican Church of Canada has also expressly rejected the use of nuclear weapons. All other Anglican/Episcopal denominations in the study have chosen not to address the question. This was clearly an option for the Church of England, one it chose not to exercise.

Overall the Church of England is far more activist on the issue than are its sister denominations in the other nations in the sample. The fact that data for the United Kingdom have not been documented complete except in the case of the Roman Catholic Church does not change the fact that the Church of England is more activist on nuclear questions than its counterparts in other nations. This greater activism is contrary to what the hypothesis would predict. Perhaps it is its privileged position as the official state religion that allows the Church of England the freedom to oppose governmental policies. If this is true then rather than constraining policy making behavior it offers a secure platform from which to criticize. This same freedom to criticize, however, is not exhibited by the Church of Scotland.

The Church of Scotland does not exhibit the unusual activism of the Church of England. In general Uniting/United/Presbyterian denominations tend to be more activist than Anglican/Episcopal denominations on the nuclear question. Although it must be remembered that this might be due to an incomplete data set, the Church of Scotland does not adopt clear positions on the aspects of the nuclear question under examination more frequently than do other similar denominations. Only the Presbyterian Church in New Zealand addresses the question less frequently.

While only the United Church of Canada and the Presbyterian denominations in the United States specifically address the question of the acceptability of nuclear weapons only the Presbyterian Church in New Zealand does not take a stand on the issue of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons. On the issue of the morality of possession of nuclear weapons the Presbyterian Church in the United States and the Church of Scotland each declared on one occasion that it was never moral. Both the Uniting Church of Australia and the United Church of Canada took three opportunities to declare it immoral. The United Church of Canada also declared that it could sometimes be moral on one occasion.

Examining the stances taken on the possibility of using nuclear weapons shows that all the Uniting/United/Presbyterian denominations have, on at least one occasion, declared them unusable. The Uniting Church of Australia and the United Church of Canada have each adopted that position on more than one occasion.

Taken all together the actions of the Church of Scotland do not fit neatly into the pattern predicted by the hypothesis but the behavior observed may provide some tentative support for the hypothesis. There is enough support provided to indicate that a more detailed test with more official state religions and additional policies is needed to fully resolve the question. Such a test would also need to take into account the relative sizes of the official state religions in the United Kingdom. The relative sizes of the denominations that are associated with the state may have relevance in determining the extent to which a denomination believes it has sufficient power to confront governmental policies with which it disagrees. The larger Church of England has taken positions on nuclear issues contrary to those of the government more frequently than has the smaller Church of Scotland.

It must be kept in mind that while both the Church of England and the Church of Scotland are official state religions the Church of England is a part of the government while the

Church of Scotland is not. Relative size, official role, etc. would all need to be examined in greater detail to determine which factor would provide the greatest predictive power.

## **Conclusion**

The lack of specific directions from Jesus to Christians regarding their political life is clearly reflected in the findings in this chapter. Denominations have been found supporting governmental policy, opposing governmental policy and trying to incrementally influence or shift the governmental policies that rely on nuclear deterrence. To use Bonhoeffer's terms, denominations in this sample can be found throwing the state back on its responsibilities, bandaging the victim under the wheel and putting a spoke in the wheel.

It is interesting to note that there is not unequivocal support for the hypothesis. Political behavior would recommend that the denominations that are the most closely associated with the state not, in effect, "bite the hand that feeds them." This behavior is not clearly exhibited in the sample. This indicates that the proposed model fails to identify key factors in the policy making motivations of Christian denominations.

The hypothesis cannot be wholly discounted but it falls far short as a definitive explanation of the motivations behind denominational policy making. It should serve as a basis for further study and in future research receive a more complete exploration than the preliminary work done here.

## CHAPTER IX

### ARE CHRISTIAN DENOMINATIONS MERELY ONE MORE TYPE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION? CONCLUSIONS

There is an enduring tension between Church and State that makes for fascinating study. It is particularly interesting to examine the areas where they meet and clash. Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is one such area. This study was prompted by the question of how the Church addresses an issue that is clearly dominated by the purview of the State prompted.

In an effort to answer this question, this work has taken the prevailing knowledge about policy making in non-governmental organizations and applied it as an integrated universal model to selected Christian denominations, a seriously neglected area of research. The major premise of the model was predicated on the argument that denominations respond to pressures when establishing policies. The pressures a denomination experiences were identified as organizational dictates; those factors that form a basis for the continued existence of the denomination, such as meeting the expectations of members and obedience to the biblical and theological underpinnings of Christianity, in this case the attitudes toward war and peace; and the force of conciliarism.

However, denominations are not free to respond to these pressures due to the constraints under which denominational policy must be made. These constraints restrict a denomination's ability to establish policies based entirely on the pressures to which it is subject. Constraints act as a braking force that ensures that denominations do not shift policies without observing proper forms. Without these braking forces denominational policies would be a hodge podge of shifting decisions bowing to any pressure. These constraints provide a certain amount of continuity in a denomination's policies. The principle constraints examined in the study are organizational structure and external environment. Both how a denomination makes its policies and the circumstances in which it functions and/or exists have a profound impact on denominational policy making. These were the factors believed to inhibit, to a greater or lesser degree, a denomination's abilities to shift policies in response to pressures.

## Review Summary

The effort to form a comprehensive model of denominational policy making has not been entirely successful. One difficulty encountered was the impossibility of testing all of the hypotheses posited in the model. The first hypothesis,

*denominational policy positions will not differ substantially from those of their constituents*

for example could not be tested as the necessary data do not exist. The hypothesis may in fact be true; there is clearly a marked similarity between the private positions of a denomination's membership and the positions stated by the denominational leadership. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine the direction of the flow of pressure. Denominational statements exhibit a belief that denominations are opinion setters rather than opinion followers. In fact, it is unlikely that the flow of opinion is unidirectional at all; it is more likely that constituent and denominational positions reinforce one another. Anecdotal evidence suggests a strong connection between constituent opinion and denominational policy, however, existing data do not allow for a rigorous test of the hypothesis.

Several of the hypotheses generated by the model yielded results that suggest the model is on the right track although insufficiently refined. Some tentative support for the model comes from hypothesis two,

*those denominations with a hierarchical government will be less constrained in making policy or introducing new aspects of an issue onto the agenda than those that are governed on either a pluralistic representative model or by the entire membership.*

This hypothesis adequately predicted the behavior of the congregational type denomination but failed to predict the degree of activism displayed by denominations with a presbyterian form of governmental structure.

Three different approaches were used in testing Hypothesis two. The definite policies of acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of possession of nuclear weapons, and usability of nuclear weapons were used in the initial approach. The second approach considered the policies that were emphasized in each nation. Those policies that received lesser emphasis were used in

the final approach. Overall the results were mixed. None of the approaches demonstrated consistency across the board. In general the hypothesis performed well for predicting the behavior of the congregational type denominations. The exception was the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, which was markedly more activist than its counterparts in other nations and frequently exhibited substantially greater willingness to address aspects of the nuclear issue than was the episcopally structured Roman Catholic Church in New Zealand. The behavior of both these denominations are directly contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis. All other congregational type denominations behaved as predicted. The episcopal denominations are more activist than the congregational denominations except in Canada and New Zealand. The denominations used in the study in New Zealand are silent on the issue of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons except for the Baptist Union and Missionary Society. The episcopal denominations are silent on this issue except in Australia and the United Kingdom but even in these nations the presbyterian denominations adopted the more stringent position that possessing nuclear weapons could never be moral both earlier and more frequently than their episcopal counterparts.

The results obtained are an indication that the organizational structure does impact policy decision making although not precisely as initially predicted and should be pursued in further research. The hypothesis was a less accurate predictor of denominational policy making behavior as it applied to the episcopally structured denominations. While these denominations were frequently more willing to make policy decisions that challenged governmental positions than were the Congregationally structured Baptist and presbyterian type Anglican/Episcopal denominations, they were often less willing to adopt such policies than were the Presbyterian, United and Uniting denominations. Clearly, organizational structure as it was operationalized does not capture the whole picture. It would seem that either the freedom of a single dominant policy maker to make policy is more limited than the hypothesis expected or those who have been Pontiff of the Roman Catholic Church during the era under study have for personal reasons been reluctant to address the nuclear issue. The Roman Catholic Church is the only major denomination in this study that has the single dominant policy maker described in the operationalization of hierarchical structure. There are other denominations that are hierarchical in the sense that decision making flows from the top down, but none of these denominations are dominated by a single policy maker. It also appears that the Presbyterian, United and Uniting

denominations are more flexible in their policy making abilities than the hypothesis predicted. The test of hypothesis two conducted in this work yields results indicating that the hypothesis would be more accurately stated to say:

*Denominations with a presbyterian structure will exhibit a greater willingness to take definite stands and to question governmental policies about the acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of possessing nuclear weapons and the use of nuclear weapons, as well as take these positions earlier than will episcopal or congregational type denominations.*

The original formulation of Hypothesis two did not hold up to examination but the consistency of the results led to a reformulation that appears to be closer to a rule. Clearly, the organizational structure of a denomination plays a role in its policy making. The exact nature of that role, however, remains ambiguous.

Hypothesis three,

*denominations follow the policies of the conciliar organizations of which they are members,*

expected to find that denominations are more likely to place aspects of the nuclear debate on their denominational agendas when those aspects have appeared on the agendas of the conciliar bodies to which the denomination belongs. Those aspects of the nuclear debate that do not receive attention from the councils to which the denomination belongs were expected to receive little or no attention from the denominations.

This hypothesis predicts well for some forms of conciliar pressures, most notably international denominational conciliarism. Unfortunately, the results are not consistent across nations. Conciliar pressures do appear to be a factor but different denominations and denominations in different nations respond to different types of conciliar pressure. International denomination conciliarism seems generally to exert the most pressure but in Canada denominations are most responsive to national interdenominational conciliar pressure.

The most noteworthy finding regarding the relationship between national interdenominational conciliarism and denominational policy, revealed by regression analysis, was the relative consistency within nations. There is a clear fit, for example, between the policies of the Canadian Council of Churches and its member denominations. The fit between policies of the National Council of Churches of Christ USA and its member denominations, on the other

hand, is substantially poorer. Conciliar pressure is a piece of the puzzle but it is not clear exactly how it fits.

One possibility that presents itself as an explanation for the relationship between conciliarism and denominational policies is that the predicted flow of pressure from councils to denominations is backwards. With the exception of the Vatican, all the conciliar organizations are voluntary associations. It may be that the voluntary nature of these associations results in member denominations being able to pressure the councils to place issues on their agendas. The validity of this speculation could only be confirmed by an examination of all member policy positions on a subject together with those of the conciliar body.

A factor that was expected to influence responsiveness to conciliar pressure was the organizational structure of the denominations. Organizational structure was seen previously to play a role in denominational policy decision making. Despite the role of organizational structure found in testing Hypothesis two. Study of Hypothesis four,

*denominations with a presbyterian structure of government will be more likely to follow conciliar policies than those that are either episcopal or congregational in structure,*

demonstrated that it does not substantially impact responsiveness to conciliar pressure.

It is interesting to note that for the Baptist Union of Canada and the Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand, both congregational denominations, there is a certain amount of responsiveness to the pressures of the national councils of churches in their respective nations. It is worth remembering, however, that the issues that display a relationship between denominational and conciliar positions are issues that are important to the nations themselves. The position that reducing armaments is a necessary step in securing a just and lasting peace has consistently received support in Canada. In New Zealand, having the South Pacific declared a Nuclear Free Zone has long been of great importance. It may be that these congregationally structured denominations are responding to the effects of these national preoccupations rather than to conciliar pressures. The findings observed are not sufficient alone to determine which pressures are the most meaningful.

When examining denominations with an episcopal structure in regard to the pressures of national councils of churches, hypothesis four fails to predict the observed results. Hypothesis four expects a lesser degree of responsiveness than would be exhibited by a presbyterian type of

denominational structures as well as expecting that the episcopal type of denominational structures should be more responsive than congregational.

The Canada Roman Catholic denomination is strongly responsive to the pressures of the Canadian Council of Churches. While in the United Kingdom the Roman Catholic denomination's positions are identical with those of the British Council of Churches. In the case of the Roman Catholic denomination in the United Kingdom this is most likely the result of small sample. In neither case, however, does the observed behavior correspond to that which was predicted.

Of denominations with a presbyterian structure Canada is the most responsive followed by United Kingdom then New Zealand, while denominations in the United States with a presbyterian structure are unresponsive to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism. The hypothesis works in Canada, fails in United States and provides limited help in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. There are definite but unconfirmed indications that hypothesis four is useful in United Kingdom. In short, this hypothesis was useful in describing the policy making of denominations with a presbyterian structure in three of four nations. This is a strong indication that this is a valid explanation but it is not universally applicable. Something else is at work too. The nation in which a denomination is located plainly has an impact on the success of the hypothesis.

When international denominational conciliarism is considered, the relationship between the policies of the Baptist Union of Canada, the Southern Baptist Church and those of the Baptist World Alliance are largely those that the hypothesis would predict. The results found for the relationship between Baptist Union of New Zealand and Baptist World Alliance policies, however, are contrary to those predicted by Hypothesis four.

The closeness of the fit between Roman Catholic denominational policies in Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom and Vatican conciliar policies is contrary to what the hypothesis predicts. However, this is likely due to the fact that Vatican policies are binding upon all Roman Catholic denominations. It is possible that the failure of Roman Catholic denominations to respond strongly to conciliar pressure is due not to jealousies of the episcopal policy maker but rather to the perception that since Vatican policies are binding on Roman Catholic denominations the national denominations do not need to address the issue as well. However, the possibility of jealousy is an equally compelling explanation for the results

obtained. Both explanations provide a believable accounting for the lack of overwhelming denominational adherence to binding conciliar policies. The research done here lacks the sharpness of calibration necessary to distinguish the motivations but it must be noted that, for the most part, these results are in line with what was predicted by hypothesis four.

Hypothesis four is not a good predictor of the behavior of denominations with a presbyterian structure when examining international denominational conciliarism. The results obtained do not support the hypothesis. Denominations with a presbyterian structure appear no more flexible and willing to adopt conciliar policies than denominations organized along congregational or episcopal lines.

When considering the effects of international interdenominational conciliarism, it appears that, those denominations organized along presbyterian lines are not the most likely to follow conciliar positions. While a larger sample of congregational and episcopal denominations that belong to the World Council of Churches would be necessary to regard the conclusion as definitive the available evidence would lead to a rejection of hypothesis four. The tightest fit between World Council of Churches positions and denominational positions belongs not to a presbyterian type denomination but to the Roman Catholic Church of Australia, an episcopal type denomination.

In examining the effects of combined conciliar pressures on denominational policies it was apparent that the United Church of Canada and Presbyterian denomination in the United States, both of which are presbyterian in structure, were clearly responsive to combined conciliar pressures. This provides definite support for hypothesis four. It must be kept in mind however that the only denominations that could be used in the analysis of combined conciliarism had a presbyterian structure. Thus the support for hypothesis four cannot be regarded as conclusive.

The results of the examinations of hypothesis four do not warrant an outright rejection of the hypothesis. However, the evidence supporting it cannot be considered compelling. There does seem to be a relationship between the effects of all the types of conciliar pressures combined, denominational policy and the organizational structure of the denomination. Unfortunately, the absence from the analysis of any denominations other than those structured in the presbyterian fashion prevents full confidence in this finding. It is however, indicative of possible lines of further inquiry.

Overall, knowledge of a denomination's organizational structure was shown to be of limited use in predicting its response to the pressures of the conciliar bodies of which it is a member. Knowledge of a denomination's location was of much greater use.

Theology was expected to act as another constraint. This was tested in Hypothesis five,

*those denominations with liberal theological outlook are likely to adopt the conciliar position.*

This hypothesis shows some utility when applied to the available data but the paucity of data makes it difficult to place full confidence in this hypothesis.

Taken all in all, the behavior of somewhat theologically conservative denominations is mixed at best. The behavior of these denominations in Australia lends support to the hypothesis. The behavior of these denominations in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, is counter to what the hypothesis would predict. Research utilizing data sets known to be complete and larger sample sizes would be necessary to clarify the value of this hypothesis in predicting the behavior of denominations that are theologically somewhat conservative.

The support for hypothesis five as it applies to theologically moderate denominations is diverse. The United Church in Canada is consistently quite responsive to all forms of conciliar pressures. The Presbyterian denomination in the United States, in contrast, is only modestly responsive to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism but highly responsive to the pressures of combined conciliarism. The hypothesis predicted that theologically moderate denominations would be only somewhat responsive to the pressures of conciliarism. The United Church of Canada is considerably more than somewhat responsive. The Presbyterian denomination in the United States, however, is somewhat responsive to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism and highly responsive to the pressures of combined conciliarism. Overall these findings do not support the hypothesis.

The somewhat theologically liberal denominations in the study are the Uniting Church in Australia and the Anglican Church in Canada. The fact that no policy statements were obtained from the Australian Council of Churches made it unusable in the analysis. When the policies of the Anglican Church of Canada were examined in relation to the pressures of national interdenominational conciliarism virtually no relationship between the policies of the Anglican Church of Canada and those of the Canadian Council of Churches were found. As a theologically

somewhat liberal denomination hypothesis five would predict a marked degree of responsive to conciliar pressures. This is obviously not the case.

The evidence available does not permit drawing definitive conclusions about the validity of hypothesis five. The hypothesis predicts reasonably well when denominations with a somewhat conservative theology are considered individually. It is of some use when denominations that have a moderate theology are examined. But, once the analysis for the somewhat liberal denominations is included the hypothesis fails to predict. This suggests that the hypothesis is in error since the theologically moderate denominations are, in fact, more responsive to conciliar positions than are the somewhat theologically liberal denominations. Particular denominations are more responsive than the hypothesis predicts. Type of organizational structure and theological leanings do not adequately explain constraints in action.

It should be noted that the analysis suffers from a certain amount of overlap as the congregationally structured denominations are often theologically conservative and those with a presbyterian structure are frequently theologically moderate. A larger and more diverse sample size would be necessary for a truly meaningful test of the hypothesis. The test results here can only be considered suggestive.

The initial assumptions about the factors that would influence a denomination's willingness to follow conciliar pressures were apparently inadequate. The results obtained indicate that rather than flexibility of interpretation leading to an increased willingness to follow conciliar policies such flexibility leads to reluctance to be tied down to any interpretations. Denominations that are somewhat liberal theologically are, thus, unwilling to commit to fixed conciliar positions. As the denomination's interpretations change, being committed to fixed positions would force it to expend its resources to change the policies of the conciliar bodies to which it belongs in order to bring them into line with the denomination's own new interpretations. The alternative would be for the theologically somewhat liberal denomination to abandon its own new interpretations to remain in conformity with the conciliar positions. Either choice would have far reaching consequences to either the denomination's resources or self-image.

Theologically moderate denominations, on the other hand, demonstrate a willingness to interpret scripture but also to remain committed to those interpretations for long periods of time. This would apparently make it easier for such denominations to commit to fixed positions. It is

apparent that a revised hypothesis is needed in light of the reexamined assumptions and the findings obtained from the analysis above. This revised hypothesis would state:

*denominations that are theologically moderate are more likely than either theologically conservative or theologically liberal denominations to adopt conciliar positions.*

The results of the analysis that were carried out would indicate that such a revised hypothesis would have far greater predictive abilities than the original statement of hypothesis five. The results obtained clearly demonstrate the need for a larger study using the revised hypothesis. The constraining factor of denominational theology and the pressure of conciliarism do appear to function, in some cases, as predicted but without additional research it is not possible to determine the importance of these factors overall.

It was argued in the initial analysis that one of the pressures to which denominations are subject is level of nuclear threat. This was expressed in Hypothesis six:

*the level of nuclear threat to the nation in which a denomination is located will affect the willingness of the denomination to support the policies of the nation-state.*

Surprisingly over time the number of documents issued by the denominations in each nation has not regularly increased despite the fact that total systemic perceived nuclear threat<sup>1</sup> was increasing. Contrary to expectation there was virtually no relationship between the passage of time and the number of documents issued by the various denominations.

The duration of the nuclear age has not substantially impacted either the number of documents issued, about the nuclear issue, by the study denominations in these five nations or the number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence that have been made by these denominations in their statements. Some other factor has presumably been at work.

Total perceived nuclear threat is a likely candidate for this role. It can be stated with confidence that total perceived nuclear threat has increased over time. Plainly this is the result of both more nuclear weapons being acquired by members of the nuclear club and more nations joining the club in the 41 years covered by this study. These increases in both size of nuclear arsenals and membership in the nuclear club imply that governmental support for deterrence has

---

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix F.

also increased throughout the period under study. Since nuclear weapons have only been used once in war, the addition of more weapons to existing arsenals and of other nations to the nuclear club must, arguably, be for deterrence purposes.

Two tests of hypothesis six were conducted using the number of documents and the number of references to the nuclear issue as the dependent variables. First, the number of documents was regressed against total systemic perceived threat and second number of references was regressed against total systemic perceived threat.

These tests of hypothesis six did not provide any support for it. Knowing the degree of systemic perceived nuclear threat does not aid in predicting how often the denominations in the study will address the nuclear question as measured by the number of documents or the number of references to the nuclear issue. The simple concept that, if threat increases the number of documents and references should decrease, lacks sensitivity. This may be due to the fact that it does not visibly consider national security concerns.

Hypothesis six predicted that those statements placing conditions or rejecting nuclear deterrence or the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons would be more likely to occur at low levels of threat. The same should hold true for rejection of the use of nuclear weapons. Interestingly, this is not what the analysis found; there appears to be a lack of trust of the State by the Church.

In no nation does hypothesis six accurately predict denominational behavior. In all five nations in the study denominations behave in a fashion contrary to the assumption that national security concerns will hold the denominations silent on the question of nuclear deterrence. These findings suggest that instead of viewing themselves as obligated to support their nation's national security when based on nuclear deterrence, denominations regard themselves as a sort of moral voice of conscience that must speak out against the madness of relying on nuclear weapons for security. This suggestion is borne out by the language used in denominational statements. Morality is frequently employed as the important part of the question.

The scarcity of specific references to the acceptability of nuclear deterrence prevents drawing definitive conclusions. The results obtained, however, definitely suggest that something more is at work in the behavior of denominations than the traditional "rally 'round the flag" impulse. It would be valuable to verify these results with a larger study.

When the question is the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons the hypothesis also finds no support. No positions on the issue were taken during periods of low perceived threat.

As with the question of the acceptability of nuclear weapons the denominations in the study failed to address the question of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons in the manner hypothesis six would predict. Denominations did not raise the issue of whether it was moral to possess nuclear weapons in times of low levels of perceived nuclear threat when it would presumably be less damaging to national security to object to the possession of nuclear weapons on moral grounds. Instead, they raised the moral question more often as threat increased. Again they seem to see themselves as somehow outside the concerns of national security and to find it necessary to raise these moral questions at a time when the concerns about preserving national security should be the strongest.

The United States, as one of the two nuclear superpowers, never experienced a period of even moderate threat during the period under examination. Consequently, determination of how its denominations would react in periods of greater threat is not possible. It is interesting to note that there were only four occasions when it was stated that nuclear weapons could never be used. Due to the low level of perceived nuclear threat experienced by the United States the denominations in this nation should, according to the predictions of hypothesis six, be the most willing to publicly state that these weapons could never be used. Despite the fact that the United States did not experience any periods of moderate or high threat the positions taken by United States denominations do not conform to what hypothesis six would expect. The hypothesis would expect that because threat was low there would be an increased likelihood of rejection of the possession of nuclear weapons as immoral. While such a rejection took place on two occasions the greater number of policy positions adopted took the form of conditional acceptance of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons rather than the more extreme total rejection.

The pattern here is identical with that seen previously. In no case do the denominations behave as the hypothesis would predict. In no case do the denominations waver from their positions that nuclear weapons may never be used. The level of perceived threat does not have any restraining effect on denominational policy making.

Apparently governmental belief in the efficacy of deterrence is not shared by the denominations since the results of the analysis do not show denominational support for the

policy. The greater the threat experienced by the nation the more likely the denominations are to adopt positions rejecting policies that rely on deterrence. There is another possibility that must be considered, however. The fact that denominations adopt positions most often during periods of high threat may be due not to a lack of faith in deterrence but to the possibility that when threat was high is when the issue was important.

It is perhaps possible that in adopting positions opposing reliance on nuclear deterrence denominations are reminding governments of the high cost should deterrence fail and thus encouraging caution on the part of the government. However, the fact that both rejection of deterrence and of possession of nuclear weapons also occurred during periods of high perceived threat makes it unlikely that positions rejecting any use of nuclear weapons were simply a means of reminding governments that deterrence alone was the goal.

The other possibility that presents itself as an explanation for these findings is that deterrence was not viewed by the citizenry of the nations in this study as a means of preserving national security. Thus, as perceived nuclear threat increased there was an increasing expectation that deterrence would fail and nuclear annihilation would result. In this case the denominations were responding to constituent pressures in issuing statements opposing nuclear deterrence and its attendant components. Distinguishing these two possibilities would require a more sensitive analysis than this rough cut into the data.

It is when the level of perceived nuclear threat is high that denominations, in general, are more likely to question the policies of nuclear deterrence. Evidently, denominations do not feel the need to subject their own moral perceptions to the issues of national security as measured here. A larger study using more refined content analysis would be valuable. It would need to look at exactly what the denominations were saying about the policies of nuclear deterrence and the strength of those statements in order to determine whether denominations indeed regard themselves as voice of morality or of sanity or something else as yet unrecognized.

Hypothesis six failed entirely as a predictor of denominational policies on the nuclear issue. The level of perceived nuclear threat as measured here did not have the predicted impact on denominational policy making. Clearly, a rising degree of nuclear threat did not encourage the denominations to remain silent. On the contrary, it seems to have emboldened them to speak out against nuclear deterrence. It would appear that denominations in this study do not have much faith in the doctrine of deterrence. They seem to feel that the greater the perceived nuclear threat

the greater the likelihood that deterrence would fail and result in the nuclear holocaust it is supposed to prevent. In addition they appear to feel the obligation to present the moral arguments against the policy of deterrence.

The final constraint that was employed in this analysis was degree of association with the state. Thus, Hypothesis seven,

*the more closely associated a denomination is with the state the more unlikely it will be to shift its policy to one of opposition to the state. In other words, the greater the stake of the denomination in the existing order, the less likely it is to challenge that order.*

This hypothesis also did not perform entirely as predicted. There were some possible indications of a role for the importance of church/state relationships in denominational policy making. However, this role remains only a possibility rather than clear and definite as anticipated by the hypothesis.

The policy of nuclear deterrence relies on the threat to use nuclear weapons in order that they will never need to be used. As Chapter VII demonstrated no denomination in the study ever issued a statement that nuclear weapons could be used. Denominations appear to believe that the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unusable; that to employ these terrible weapons would be a rejection of God's sovereignty. Due to this belief it would be a violation of a denomination's purpose and identity to say that nuclear weapons could be used. The conflict inherent in the deterrence dilemma; that a nation must believably threaten to do something that is so evil and wrong that it must never be done; is a tricky one for denominations to handle. The simplest way for denominations to handle this contradiction would be avoidance; denominations wishing to take this route would not issue a policy statement on the use aspect of nuclear weapons at all. It would be logical to expect to find this behavior on the part of state supported churches.

The options available to denominations with regard to governmental policies can be summarized as silence, support and stated opposition. Silence on the question of acceptability of nuclear deterrence would be the most logical choice for denominations with close ties to the state. Astonishingly, the Church of England and the Church of Scotland, the denominations most closely allied with government, did not exhibit the predicted behavior. The behavior of the other two denominations in the United Kingdom is more consistent with what the hypothesis predicts.

In Canada, the support for hypothesis seven, when used to predict the behavior of Canadian denominations, is mixed. Although the behavior of the Anglican and Baptist denominations supports the hypothesis, that of the Roman Catholic and United denominations does not provide consistent support for the hypothesis. While several of the statements sought to shift incrementally or to establish an acceptable context for governmental policies, behaviors that are in keeping with the expectations of the hypothesis, there are several other statements that are direct rejections of governmental reliance on nuclear deterrence. Rejection of any use of nuclear weapons in the strongest terms, for example, is the norm for Canadian denominations in the sample. The absence of statements by the Anglican and Baptist denominations, however, adds weight to the validity of the hypothesis leading to the overall conclusion that the hypothesis performs fairly well here.

Despite some positive results, for the most part, hypothesis seven fails to provide adequate predictive power when used on Australian denominations. The policies of the state are not supported by the denominations most closely allied with the state. Two of the Australian denominations, the Anglican and Baptist, chose not to address the nuclear issue at all. This was certainly an option for the Catholic Church and Uniting Church as well; an option they chose not to take.

After examining the actions of official state religions and denominations in a religious state in light of hypothesis seven, attention was turned to the behavior of denominations in secular nations, those that have lesser ties to the state. Specifically those denominations in states that are not religious and do not possess a specific official religion but do subsidize the churches were examined.

In Canada denominations receive state subsidies but the state itself is defined as secular. Consequently, the hypothesis would predict that the denominations would be unwilling to challenge state policies although this tendency should be less pronounced than it would be for either official state religious or subsidized denominations in a religious state.

Overall, the support for hypothesis seven in the case of Canada can only be described as mixed. While many of the statement sought to shift incrementally or to establish an acceptable context for government policies, behavior that is in keeping with the expectation of the hypothesis, there are other statements that are direct rejections of governmental reliance on the policy of nuclear deterrence. Rejection of any use of nuclear weapons in the strongest terms, for

example, is the norm for Canadian denominations in the sample. The choice of two of the denominations not to address the question, however, adds weight to the validity of the hypothesis leading to the overall conclusion that the hypothesis demonstrates some utility.

Hypothesis seven performs well in predicting the behavior of the denominations in the New Zealand sample when applied to the issue of the acceptability of nuclear deterrence since three of the four denominations chose the option of avoiding the issue. Only the Baptist denomination behaved in a manner contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis. This denomination twice adopted the position that nuclear deterrence was never acceptable.

When applied to the morality of possessing nuclear weapons the hypothesis also performs well. Only the Baptist denomination did not choose the option of avoiding the issue. Again, this denomination adopted the most extreme position in violation of the behavior predicted by the hypothesis.

When hypothesis seven is applied to the question of usability of nuclear weapons both the Baptist and Presbyterian denominations in the sample are shown not to have adopted the option of avoiding the issue. Both adopted the position that nuclear weapons must never be used.

In New Zealand denominations receiving government subsidies within a secular state behaved generally in accordance with the hypothesis. With the exceptions as noted, denominations chose to avoid the issue.

The denominations in the United States sample do not behave as the hypothesis predicts. Denominations with the weakest ties to the state are not more likely to adopt the most extreme position. In fact, none of the denominations in the United States sample adopted the position that nuclear deterrence is never acceptable. In the period under examination none of these denominations adopted the most extreme position on this issue although denominations that are more closely allied with the state did so. Denominations in the United States are not, as the hypothesis would predict, more likely than denominations with closer associations to the state to oppose state policies. The behavior of these denominations is entirely contrary to that predicted by hypothesis seven.

The subsidiary expectation of hypothesis seven was that an official state religion would keep its policies in line with those of the government thus behaving differently, not only than the other denominations in its nation, but also from its sister churches in other nations.

The Church of England is the only Anglican/Episcopal denomination in the study that is both an official state religion and a part of the government. It is unique in this respect. The position it adopts, however, is the most contrary to governmental policies. It rejects governmental policies and behaves in a manner contrary what the hypothesis would predict. There is no support for hypothesis seven here.

Regarding the question of whether it can be moral to possess nuclear weapons it is again seen that the Church of England has been unique when compared to other Anglican/Episcopal denominations. It is the only one to have taken a stand on the morality of nuclear weapons possession. As before the position that it adopted was contrary to that of the government of the United Kingdom.

The Anglican/Episcopal denominations in the study, except that in Canada, chose not to address the question of the usability of nuclear weapons. This was clearly an option for the Church of England, one it chose not to exercise. Instead it clearly rejected any use of nuclear weapons.

Overall, the Church of England is far more activist on the issue than are its sister denominations in the other nations in the sample. The fact that data for the Church of England has not been documented as complete does not change the fact that the Church of England is more activist on nuclear questions than its counterparts in other nations. This greater activism is in direct contradiction to what the hypothesis would predict.

The unusual activism of the Church of England is not seen on the part of the Church of Scotland. In general Uniting/United/Presbyterian denominations have demonstrated greater activism on the nuclear question than Anglican/Episcopal denominations. While it must be remembered that this result may be due to an incomplete data set, the Church of Scotland does not adopt clear positions on the aspects of the nuclear question under examination more frequently than do other similar denominations. Only the Presbyterian Church in New Zealand has addresses the question with less frequency.

On the issue of the morality of possession of nuclear weapons the Presbyterian Church in the United States and the Church of Scotland each declared on one occasion that it was never moral. Both the Uniting Church of Australia and the United Church of Canada took three opportunities to declare it immoral. The United Church of Canada also declared, on one

occasion, that it could sometimes be moral. Only the Presbyterian Church in New Zealand does not take a stand on the issue of the morality of possessing nuclear weapons.

Examining the stances taken on the possibility of using nuclear weapons, shows that all the Uniting/United/Presbyterian denominations have, on at least one occasion, declared nuclear weapons unusable. All of these denominations have taken a clear stance, at least once, in opposition to the use of nuclear weapons.

While the actions of the Church of Scotland do not fit neatly into the pattern predicted by the hypothesis, the behavior observed may provide some tentative support for the hypothesis. There is enough support for the hypothesis to indicate that a more detailed test with a larger number of official state religions and additional policies is needed to fully resolve the question. Such a test would need to take into account the relative sizes of the official state religions. The contrasting behavior between the official state religions in the United Kingdom may be due to the relative sizes of the denominations. The Church of England, at least nominally, represents the largest number of believers in the United Kingdom. A larger state denomination might believe it possessed sufficient power to confront governmental policies with which it disagrees. In the United Kingdom, the larger Church of England has taken positions on nuclear issues, contrary to those of the government more frequently than has the smaller Church of Scotland.

Examination of hypothesis seven has found denominations supporting governmental policy, opposing governmental policy and trying to incrementally influence or shift the governmental policies that rely on nuclear deterrence. It is interesting to note that there is not unequivocal support for the hypothesis. It was expected that political behavior would recommend that the denominations most closely associated with the state not, in effect, "bite the hand that feeds them." This behavior was not clearly exhibited in the sample.

On at least one of the variables that were identified as representing clear policies; the two denominations in this study that are most closely allied with the state do show some possible support for hypothesis seven. Unfortunately, this support is not consistent across all the variables. As a result the hypothesis is of severely limited use in predicting denominational behavior. The hypothesis cannot be wholly discounted but it falls far short as a definitive explanation. This indicates that the proposed model has failed to identify key factors in the policy making motivations of Christian denominations.

Whatever role might be held by the relationships between church and state, the tests of the hypothesis conducted here indicate that it is unlikely to be a substantial factor. The extent of the role will need to be determined by further research; research that includes both a larger sample of denominations and a greater number of policies.

## **Conclusions**

This work has taken what is known about policy making in non-governmental organizations and applied it as an integrated universal model to a sampling of Christian denominations, a seriously neglected area of research. It has been an initial look at the behavior of a non-governmental organization, in an unparalleled tension with their government. It has examined a possible coherent universal model describing how non-governmental organizations, in tension with their governments, address an issue with a substantial political dimension. The research was to begin with the proposed model and examine each hypothesis. The results of this examination were expected to weigh the utility of the model and marked avenues for future research.

There are undoubtedly factors that press denominations to address issues while other factors hold denominations back from addressing issues. This work has taken the bold step of proposing a model based on clearly identified pressures and constraints. While the model has not proven to have universal applicability it has served as a starting place, the first footing in a sound foundation upon which future research can be built.

The model has not performed well as a serious predictive tool but enough clues have emerged to suggest that the concept of pressures and constraints affecting denominational policy making is sound. What the model has failed to do is to adequately identify the spectrum of pressures and constraints at work.

There are a number of possible explanations for the failure of the hypotheses tested here to yield a comprehensive model that accurately predicts the policy making behavior of denominations. The lack of greater support for the hypotheses examined may be due, in part, to the manner in which they were tested. It could be that there is a lag time between the experience of pressure by the denomination and the production of policy. Another possibility is that there is something fundamentally different about the nuclear question and that these hypotheses would fare better if a different, less politically charged, issue were examined. Cultural differences

between nations are another possible factor; each nation possesses its own concerns and attitudes that undoubtedly influence the policy making of its denominations.

The influence of culture is one that deserves serious consideration in light of the overall findings. The most accurate predictor of denominational policy on the nuclear question is the nation in which the denomination resides. Canadian denominations, for example, showed themselves to be consistently more activist on the issue than denominations in other nations. Denominations in New Zealand, on the other hand, showed themselves least likely to behave in the manner predicted by the hypotheses. The Baptist Union of New Zealand is the most activist of Baptist denominations and the most activist of New Zealand denominations in the study.

Location is also important to the effects of conciliarism. The effects of national interdenominational conciliarism on denominational policies when the constraints of denominational structure are included are that the nation in which the denomination resides is of greater importance in determining how much of an association there is between denominational and conciliar policies than is denominational structure. For example, Canadian denominations were markedly more likely to exhibit a definite relationship between the policies of the study denominations and those of their national interdenominational conciliar body (Canadian Council of Churches) than were denominations in any other nation. The relationship between Canadian Council of Churches positions and those of the Roman Catholic Church of Canada were especially strong, a relationship that is directly contrary to that predicted by the hypothesis.

The model used in examining the policy making of Christian denominations in this work was premised on the assumption that all non-governmental organizations respond to certain identifiable pressures and constraints could explain how they arrived at their policies. Before the logic of this assumption can be thoroughly invalidated it would need to be tested on a set of comparable non-governmental organizations. Unfortunately, there are, in fact, no secular organizations that are truly comparable to The Church and the other great religions. The Church predates all modern governments by centuries. It has experienced a multitude of incarnations and relationships with the state; it has been persecuted and it has ruled and all these experiences have left a mark. An essential step in assessing the findings in this study would be to test them in relation to the behaviors of the world's other great religions. This would offer conclusive evidence about whether some "religious" aspect is the truly significant factor in determining how a religious body sets policy regarding political issues. If the model of pressures and constraints

proved accurate for these non-governmental organizations then it would be necessary to conclude that Christian denominations are somehow fundamentally different. The first step in answering this question would be determining whether other non-governmental organizations feel it necessary to issue policy pronouncements about issues that have a clearly political dimension, specifically the question of nuclear deterrence. Another step would be to explore whether Christian denominational behavior would conform to the model regarding other politically charged issues. It is conceivable that the nuclear issue with its potential for world destruction is thereby significantly different from other politically relevant issues.

In addition to the caveats identified above, it must be remembered that in this work Christian denominations have been examined as if they are *no* different than any other non-governmental organization. The failure of the model to fully account for the factors that underpin denominational policy making may ultimately be due to the failure to include a variable representative of the self-perceived role of denominations as expounders of God's will. Christian churches are more than simply non-governmental organizations. They have freighted themselves with tremendous moral and ethical baggage. This makes the study of the policy shifts of the Christian denominations particularly interesting for student of politics. This is true because such study allows for the examination of the role an articulate ethical system plays in policy formation in a political environment. Rather than being just another study of organizational politics; the task becomes, in addition, the study of the effect of an articulate system of morality and ethics.

None of the denominations in the nations in this study consistently exhibit the predicted behavior. Denominations in all five nations do not behave in a fashion consistent with the assumption that national security concerns will hold the denominations silent on the nuclear question. These findings suggest that instead of viewing themselves as somehow obliged to support their nation's reliance on nuclear deterrence for national security; denominations regard themselves as a sort of moral voice of conscience that must speak out against the madness of relying on nuclear weapons for security.

The scarcity of specific references to the acceptability of nuclear deterrence prevents the drawing of definitive conclusions. The results obtained, however, certainly suggest that something more is at work in the behavior of denominations than the traditional "rally 'round the flag" impulse. It would be invaluable to verify these results with a larger study.

Hans Morgenthau in his classic work *Politics Among Nations* advances six principles of

political realism. Principle number five is that the moral aspirations of a particular nation cannot be equated with the moral laws that govern the universe.<sup>2</sup> He goes on to say that "to know that nations are subject to the moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another."<sup>3</sup> This argument has intriguing implications for the study of policy making in the Christian churches--especially when those policies have a global focus. The Christian churches believe that they are the custodians of the moral laws governing the universe to which Morgenthau refers. For this reason they see it as their duty, one of their organizational dictates, to pursue policies which they regard as being in accord with the universal moral laws.

Historically the churches in the western world have perceived themselves as being responsible for defining right and wrong and obeying a higher law. The language used in their statements bears witness to this perception. The state on the other hand has seen its primary functions as the security of the nation and furthering of the national interest.

If we consider the realm of the churches as the realm of ethics and that of the state as the realm of politics then it should be clear from the difference in role perception that there exists a strong potential for conflict between Christian churches and the State. The goals and preferences of these two actors are by their very natures certain to be in conflict from time to time. This can be seen in the clear failure of the assumption that fear would make denominations keep quiet. It appears the opposite is true that fear motivates them to speak up, that there is no faith in the policy of nuclear deterrence.

The role of denominations as self-perceived voices of God expounding the moral and ethical ideals has not been explicitly addressed in this work. The research conducted here has revealed a far greater willingness to oppose state policies and to adopt the most extreme positions of opposition than was expected by the model. The premise that Christian denominations do perceive themselves as seekers after God's will, after a higher truth, must be considered as an explanation for the willingness, found in this work, of denominations to disregard the conduct that the dictates of the pursuit of political power would seem to advise. Whether their perception of a higher power is correct or incorrect, it nevertheless appears to have a substantial impact on denominational policy making behavior. Certain pressures and

---

<sup>2</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 1978, p.11

<sup>3</sup> *ibid.*

constraints that would be expected to impact the policy making of a non-governmental organization that has an interest in certain governmental policies do seem to influence denominational policy making but that is by no means the entire picture that has emerged.

To arrive at a clear picture of the efficacy of the model proposed here it would need to be tested on a non-governmental organization that does not carry the moral and ethical baggage of Christian denominations. It would be necessary for the model to perform well in such a test in order to conclude that the fault in predicting denominational policy making behavior does not lie simply with the model. Examination of the policy making of Christian denominations expressly taking into account their self-perceived role would also be required. The research conducted here and the very language denominations use in their statements lends credence to the supposition that the pressure to which denominations are most responsive is their perceptions of the higher moral law. If this is indeed the case, then denominations cannot be considered in the same fashion as other non-governmental organizations. It must then be accepted that something in these organizations is able to transcend the pressures of politics.

## APPENDIX A Overview of the Data

The data in this study are divided into five individual nation sets. These are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. In each nation there are four denominations that are employed in the study. These are Anglican/Episcopal, Baptist, Presbyterian and Roman Catholic.

The major conciliar bodies were identified as those whose membership was consistent throughout the sample, i.e. national and international. Regional conciliar bodies, e.g., Conference of European Churches, are omitted because the work deals with a question with global implications and because regional conciliar organizations were likely to influence very few of the denominations in the study. (See Appendix E for conciliar memberships. These conciliar bodies served as the source of the independent variables regarding conciliar pressures. These conciliar bodies were Anglican Consultative Council, Baptist World Alliance (established 1945), Sacred Congregation for Bishops (the Vatican), World Alliance of Reformed Churches (established 1970), World Methodist Council (established 1881), World Council of Churches (established 1948), and the various nation councils of churches. Respectively, these are Australian Council of Churches, Canadian Council of Churches, New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ, British Council of Churches and National Council of Churches of Christ USA (established 1950, the successor to the Federal Council of Churches).

Data were collected largely through mail solicitations. The denominations and conciliar bodies were written requesting copies of all policy statements that dealt with the issue of nuclear weapons/nuclear deterrence.

The statements were content analyzed for the variables detailed in Appendix B. Every effort was made to collect complete data. Each denomination and conciliar body in the study was sent a list of the statements collected and asked to provide written assurance that the list included all relevant statements. The following provides a breakdown of data collected for each nation and for the conciliar organizations. Those listed in **boldface** are the denominations and conciliar bodies that have affirmed that the documents used are a complete representation of relevant policy statements. Denominations not in boldface have not been so affirmed. This does not indicate incomplete sets but rather sets that are not certain they are complete.

Table 90. Conciliar Organizations, Denominations and National Councils

Anglican Consultative Council

**Baptist World Alliance**

**World Alliance of Reformed Churches**

**World Methodist Council**

**World Council of Churches**

The Vatican

*Australia*

**Anglican Church of Australia**

**Baptist Union of Australia**

**Uniting Church of Australia**

**Roman Catholic Church in Australia**

Australian Council of Churches

**Canada**

**Anglican Church of Canada**

**Baptist Union**

**United Church of Canada**

**Roman Catholic Church in Canada**

**Canadian Council of Churches**

New Zealand

**Anglican Church of New Zealand**

**Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand**

**Presbyterian Church of New Zealand**

**Roman Catholic Church in New Zealand**

New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ

United Kingdom

Church of England

Baptist Union of Great Britain

Church of Scotland

**Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom**

British Council of Churches

United States

**Episcopal Church of the United States**

**Southern Baptist Conference**

**United Presbyterian Church of the USA**

Roman Catholic Church in the United States

National Council of Churches of Christ USA

In the United States there were two Presbyterian churches, the United Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Church USA. These churches were cooperating with one another on

policy positions throughout the time period of the study. In 1983 they merged to form the United Presbyterian Church in the USA. They are merged in the data set as the Presbyterian denomination. This was done because many of their policy statements overlap and there was cooperation in policy formation before the merger into one church.

In Australia the Presbyterian Church joined with the Methodist Church in 1977 to form the Uniting Church of Australia. The statements of the Presbyterian Church prior to 1977 are used and those of the Uniting from 1977 on. The denomination is referred to as the Uniting Church of Australia throughout.

The United Church of Canada represents a merger of the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational denominations. The merger occurred in 1925 with the Canadian Conference of Evangelical Brethren joining in 1968.

A complete list of the policy statements obtained for each denomination in the study follows:

Table 91 Lists of all the Documents Collected from all the Denominations and Conciliar Bodies

## **AUSTRALIA**

### ANGLICAN CHURCH OF AUSTRALIA

1981 Resolution on disarmament General Synod

*Documented complete*

### BAPTIST CHURCH OF AUSTRALIA

No Relevant Documents

*Documented complete*

### ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF AUSTRALIA

1967 Peace

1970 United Nations

1974 Nuclear Weapons

1975 Comments on Father Smith's Paper Michael Tate

1975 The Disciple and Killing Michael Tate

- 1975 A Case against the Retention of American Nuclear Facilities in Australia Rev. J. Lanigan
- 1975 The Christian and the Morality of Nuclear Defence through Deterrence Rev. W. Smith S.J.
- 1975 The Morality of Involvement in Nuclear Deterrence Systems
- 1977 What is the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
- 1978 Disarmament
- 1980 A Policy for Nuclear Disarmament Pax Christi Australia
- 1981 World Disarmament: A Statement of Policy Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
- 1982 To Remember the Past is to Commit Oneself to the Future the Path of Peace Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace
- 1982 Disarmament
- 1985 Work for a Just Peace
- 1985 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Annual Report

**Documented complete**

**UNITING CHURCH OF AUSTRALIA**

- 1957 Victoria Assembly Deliverance
- 1957 Report of the Assembly
- 1957 Minutes
- 1957 Deliverances
- 1957 Report Ecumenical Affairs
- 1958 Victoria Assembly Deliverance
- 1958 Deliverances
- 1958 Reports
- 1959 Minutes
- 1962 Victoria Assembly Deliverance

1962 Minute Number 119: 2 & 3

1963 Victoria Assembly Deliverance

1963 Deliverances

1963 Report the Church's Attitude to War in a Nuclear Age

1964 Victoria Assembly Deliverance

1964 Deliverances

1964 Report Church and Nation

1972 U.S. Bases in Australia Report

1972 Victoria Assembly Deliverance

1972 Deliverances

1973 Minute Number 86

1975 The Export of Uranium Report of Assembly

1975 Victoria Assembly Deliverance

1975 Deliverances

1976 Nuclear Arms Race and Foreign Bases Report

1976 Victoria Assembly Deliverance

1976 Report Foreign Policy Neutrality

1978 Energy Resources--A Nuclear or a Non-Nuclear Future Report to Synod

1982 Foreign Bases

1982 Assembly Resolution on Militarism and Disarmament

1982 Victorian Synod Militarism and Peace Resolution

1982 Militarism and Disarmament

1982 Peace and Disarmament Report to Synod

- 1983 Militarism and Peace Resolution
- 1984 Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
- 1984 Report to Synod
- 1984 Peace Issues
- 1985 The Church's Approach to War and Peace Rev. Wes Campbell
- 1985 Victoria Synod Division of Social Justice Resolution
- 1985 Militarism and Peace Resolution Division of Social Justice
- 1985 Assembly Resolution on Peace and Disarmament
- 1985 Peace, Disarmament, and Common Security
- 1985 Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
- 1985 Division of Social Justice Report to Synod

**Documented complete**

**AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES**

No Documents Collected

**CANADA (All Country Specific Data Complete)**

**ANGLICAN CHURCH OF CANADA**

- 1947 International Affairs: Atomic Bomb and War Resources Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1950 International Affairs the Council for Social Services, 35th Annual Report
- 1951 A Positive Programme for Peace
- 1954 International Affiliations Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1955 International Affairs Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1956 International Relations Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1956 The Council for Social Services the Church in the International Scene

- 1957 In His Name--Disarmament
- 1958 His Family International Affairs
- 1958 Lambeth and World Conflicts
- 1958 International Affairs Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1960 By Love, Serve One Another
- 1960 International Affairs Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1961 The International Scene
- 1962 Walk through the Land Resolutions on Social Matters
- 1962 International Relations Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1963 What Is Man? Resolutions Passed at the Joint Meeting of the Executive Council of the General Synod and CCS
- 1963 International Affairs Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1965 (title unclear) Declaring the immorality of the policy...Resolution Passed at General Synod
- 1983 General Synod Resolution Act 86 30th General Synod

**Documented complete**

**BAPTIST CHURCH IN CANADA**

- 1976 Resolution
- 1982 On World Peace and Disarmament
- 1983 Report from the Third Baptist Peace Conference Paul R. Dekar

**Documented complete**

**ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF CANADA**

- 1981 The Neutron Bomb--Enough is Enough
- 1982 Statement of Canadian Church Leaders on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies
- 1982 Submission to the Standing Committee on International Affairs and National Defence

- 1982 Disarmament and Security Conference of Catholic Bishops
- 1983 Militarization: Obstacle to Development
- 1983 Ethical Choices and Political Challenges
- 1983 On Peace and Disarmament to the Prime Minister
- 1984 The Church and World Peace
- 1985 Press Conference Statement by Bishop of Gatineau Hull

**Documented complete**

**UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA**

- 1948 The Church and the Era of Atomic Power Record of Proceedings
- 1948 International Affairs Atomic Energy UCC Yearbook
- 1949 International Affairs Miscellaneous UCC Yearbook
- 1950 The Hydrogen Bomb UCC Record of Proceedings
- 1955 Moral and Spiritual Consideration Re: the Use of the Hydrogen Bomb UCC Yearbook
- 1958 Deliverance Or Doom UCC CCIA Report
- 1959 Canada's Defence and Foreign Policies
- 1960 The Winds of Change UCC CCIA Report
- 1962 Lord of the World UCC CCIA Report
- 1964 Between Two Worlds UCC CCIA Report
- 1966 The Church and World Society UCC CCIA Report
- 1968 CCIA Report Guidelines for Peace
- 1967 Major Emphasis 1967-68 for consideration by UCC CCIA
- 1971 Some Considerations about the Preparation of the CCIA Report
- 1972 Peace Disarmament and Nuclear Arms Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1975 Resolution Re: NORAD UCC CCIA

- 1977 Oppression Takes No Holiday 16th Report of CCIA UCC
- 1978 International Peace Measures Policy booklet on militarism
- 1978 Peace Education Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1980 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1980 UCC CCIA Report
- 1981 International Peace Measures Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1981 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1982 Peace Action Within Canada Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1982 Canada AS A Nuclear/Chemical/Biological Weapons Free Zone Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1982 International Problems Invade Our Living Rooms UCC CCIA Report
- 1982 Statement of Canadian Church Leaders on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies
- 1982 Manifesto on Nuclear Disarmament UCC General Council
- 1982 The Search for Peace in the Eighties: A Statement on Disarmament and Militarization
- 1982 Disarmament and Development Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1982 Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1982 Conscientious Objection to War and Tax Redirection Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1982 Nuclear Free Zone Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1982 Disarmament and World Peace Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1982 Global Referendum on Disarmament Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1982 Manifesto on Nuclear Disarmament Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1982 International Peace Measures
- 1982 Peace Education Policy Booklet on Militarism

- 1983 Canada as a Nuclear/Chemical/Biological Weapons Free Zone Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1983 Peace Education Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1983 Canadian Church Leaders Statement to the Prime Minister on Peace and Disarmament
- 1983 Peace Action Within Canada Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1983 Cruise Testing and Umbrella Agreement Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1983 Disarmament and Development Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1983 International Peace Measures Policy Booklet on Militarism
- 1984 Confessing Our Faith in a Nuclear Age UCC CCIA Report
- 1984 Nuclear Freeze Foreign Policy and International Affairs
- 1984 Ethical and Theological Implications of the Arms Race UCC CCIA
- 1984 The Common Good of All Resolution of CCIA passed by General Council

**Personal knowledge complete**

**CANADIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES**

- 1945 Address to the Canadian Council of Churches 26 September Record of Proceedings
- 1947 The Church and International Affairs the Problem of World Order CCC 4th Meeting Record of Proceedings
- 1956 CCC 11th Meeting Record of Proceedings
- 1958 CCC 12th Meeting Statement of International Affairs Record of Proceedings
- 1960 CCC Thirteenth Meeting Record of Proceedings
- 1964 CCC 15th Meeting International Affairs
- 1976 CCC Third Triennial Assembly "Jesus Christ Frees and Unites--Canadians? Record of Proceedings
- 1979 Sharing the Ecumenical Task Triennial Assembly
- 1982 A Statement on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies Presented to the Prime Minister

- 1982 Concern for Peace Expressed by Canadian Churches
- 1982 The Earth is the Lord's Triennial Assembly
- 1983 Therefore Choose Life...Statement on Peace and Disarmament Project Ploughshares
- 1985 Empowered to Participate Triennial Assembly
- 1985 Canada's International Relations: An Alternative View Brief by CCC to Special Committee

**Personal knowledge complete**

**NEW ZEALAND**

**ANGLICAN CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND**

- 1974 Nuclear Weapons and Testing Proceedings of the 41st General Synod 18-22 March
- 1984 South Pacific Proceedings of the 46th General Synod 6-11 May

**Documented complete**

**NEW ZEALAND BAPTIST**

- 1982 Statement Approved by the New Zealand Baptist Assembly
- 1982 Public Questions Presentation
- 1984 Proposed Resolution from Public Questions Committee on Nuclear Weapons

**Documented complete**

**PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND**

- 1962 Committee Comments on Nuclear War and Disarmament
- 1963 International Relations Committee
- 1964 On French Nuclear Tests
- 1972 International Relations Committee
- 1975 Nuclear Weapons and Energy
- 1976 International Relations Committee Report to Assembly

- 1977 The Neutron Weapon
- 1978 Committee Activities
- 1978 Appendix Christian Perspectives on Disarmament Contemporary Comment
- 1982 International Relations Joint Committee Report
- 1982 Appendix B Study Document Peacemaking: A Christian Calling
- 1983 Suggested Deliverances
- 1983 Appendix a Peacemaking: A Christian Calling
- 1984 Joint International Relations Committee

**Documented complete**

**ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF NEW ZEALAND**

- 1982 New Zealand Catholic Bishops Speak Out for Peace, Oppose Nuclear Weapons  
24 April 1982

**Documented complete**

**NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF NEW ZEALAND**

- 1981 Church and Society Commission Executive Meeting August 5/6, 1981
- 1981 Church and Society Commission: Nuclear Free Pacific Issues
- 1981 Nuclear Free Pacific Issues
- 1981 General Business National Council of Churches Executive Meeting, February 8, 1981
- 1981 Commission and Committee Reports Christian World Service National Council of Churches Executive Meeting August 5/6, 1981
- 1982 Working Committee Report Executive Meeting March 5/6, 1982 Letter From the Salvation Army
- 1982 Committee and Commission Reports Executive Minutes March 5/6, 1982
- 1982 Church and Society
- 1982 International Affairs

- 1983 International Affairs: Peacemaking Executive Minutes February 23/24, 1983
- 1983 Executive Minutes July 8-10, 1983 Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific
- 1984 Peace Sunday
- 1984 Church and Society Executive Minutes April 27/28, 1984
- 1984 Triad Exercises Executive Minutes OCTOBER 12/13, 1984
- 1985 Peace Initiatives, International Affairs Executive Minutes April 12/13, 1985
- 1985 Urgent Request for Support of New Zealand's Anti-Nuclear Stand
- 1985 General Meeting Resolution

## **UNITED KINGDOM**

### CHURCH OF ENGLAND

- 1983 Resolution Passed at End of Church and Bomb Debates

### BAPTIST CHURCH OF UNITED KINGDOM (Baptist Union of Great Britain)

- 1963 SPECIAL Resolution on Nuclear Weapons Baptist Union Assembly
- 1977 Endorsement of a European Baptist Federation Resolution on the Neutron Bomb Baptist Union Council
- 1984 Peace and Disarmament Resolution Baptist Assembly
- 1984 As Quoted in "The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Pack for Churches" British Council of Churches Peace Forum

### PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED KINGDON (Church of Scotland)

- 1983 Resolutions on Peace and Disarmament United Reformed Church Assembly May 1983
- 1983 As Quoted in "The Nuclear Freeze: A Study Pack for Churches" British Council of Churches Peace Forum
- 1985 You and Your Peace making Peace Advisory Group
- 1985 Nuclear Freeze General Assembly Resolution

## ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

- 1970 Violence-War
- 1978 Justice and Peace: Disarmament
- 1980 Nuclear Deterrent: Moral Issues
- 1980 The Easter People
- 1982 Bishops Express Peace Anxieties to Foreign Secretary
- 1982 Statement on Peace
- 1982 Statement by Roman Catholic Bishops Conference of Scotland
- 1983 The Church and Disarmament-Cardinal Hume-Statement on Peace
- 1983 Peace Defence Disarmament Correspondence with Governments Letter to the Prime Minister, US Ambassador
- 1984 Bishop's Pastoral on Peace
- 1984 Peace Defence Disarmament Introduction
- 1984 The Bishops' Message

### Documented complete

## BRITISH COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

- 1983 Quoted in "What Have Churches Said About the Freeze?" The Nuclear Freeze A Study Pack for Churches
- 1983 On making Peace in A Nuclear World
- 1984 Nuclear Naivety? Rev. Canon Kenyon E. Wright
- 1984 Christian Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons Sydney D. Bailey
- 1985 The Nuclear Freeze --A Study Pack for Churches The Peace Forum

## **UNITED STATES**

### EPISCOPAL CHURCH UNITED STATES

- 1946 Atomic Bombing General Convention of 1946
- 1955 Atomic Energy and World Peace General Convention 1955
- 1958 the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy General Convention 1958
- 1961 Resolution Number 106 General Convention 1961
- 1962(?) War and Peace General Convention
- 1967 Vietnam General Convention of 1967
- 1976 Commend Efforts to Control Nuclear Weapons General Convention of 1976
- 1982 Request Presiding Bishops to Establish Inter-Faith Conference on Armaments Policy  
67th General Convention
- 1982 Endorse a Bilateral Freeze on the Testing and production of Nuclear Weapons 67th  
General Convention
- 1982 Urge a Governmental Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons 67th General  
Convention
- 1985 Refer Statements on Peace and Nuclear Deterrence to Local Churches for Study 68th  
General Convention
- 1985 Encourage the Lambeth Conference to Address the Issues of War, Violence and Nuclear  
Arms 68th General Convention
- 1985 Request the Church and Individual Members to Work for Peace 68th General Convention
- 1985 Oppose the Strategic Defense Initiative Known as "Star Wars" 68th General Convention

**Documented complete**

**SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION**

- 1978 Resolution Number 5 on Multilateral Arms Control p. 54
- 1979 Resolution Number 11 on Peacemaking p. 51
- 1981 Resolution Number 14 on Peace and National Security p. 54
- 1982 Resolution Number 12 on Peace With Justice p. 59
- 1983 Resolution Number 4 on Peace With Justice pp. 63-64

**Documented complete**

UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH USA

- 1946 158th General Assembly Minutes Part I p. 196 (UPC)
- 1946 88th General Assembly Minutes Part I p. 160 (PCUS)
- 1947 159th General Assembly p. 204
- 1949 161st General Assembly pp. 246-247
- 1954 PCUSA p. 185
- 1955 167th General Assembly p. 219
- 1956 168th General Assembly p. 225
- 1957 PCUS p. 196
- 1958 170th General Assembly p. 538
- 1960 PCUS p. 182
- 1960 172nd General Assembly Minutes Part I p. 353
- 1963 175th General Assembly p. 334
- 1964 106th General Assembly and 176th General Assembly p. 152 and p. 318
- 1967 179th General Assembly Minutes pp. 321-322
- 1969 Disarmament and Arms Control Minutes p. 102
- 1971 183rd General Assembly Minutes pp. 636-638, 640-641
- 1972 (best guess) The Corporate Witness of the General Assembly Presbyterian Church in the United States
- 1972 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Minutes pp. 65, 182 (PCUS)
- 1977 117th General Assembly Minutes Part I p. 186 (PCUS)
- 1978 Disarmament and Arms Control Minutes p. 206 (PCUS)
- 1978 190th General Assembly Minutes p. 278
- 1979 191st General Assembly Minutes Part I p. 413 "Choose Life" Statement (UPC)

- 1979 SALT II Minutes pp. 237-238 (PCUS)
- 1980 PCUSA p.60
- 1980 192nd General Assembly Minutes Part I p. 202 (UPC)
- 1981 121st General Assembly Minutes p. 26 Peacemaking the Believers Calling also the Nature and Value of Human Life (PCUS)
- 1981 121st General Assembly Minutes p.138 (PCUS)
- 1981 The Corporate Witness of the General Assembly Presbyterian Church in the United States Public Policy Statements of the 121st General Assembly (PCUS)
- 1981 Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race Proposal for a Mutual U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Weapons Freeze (UPC)
- 1982 Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race Proposal for a Mutual U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Weapons Freeze (PCUS)
- 1982 Confronting Idolatry 194th General Assembly (UPC)
- 1982 Statement in Support of the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations (PCUS)
- 1982 194th General Assembly pp. 297-298
- 1982 Peacemaking Skills The Peacemaking Project (UPC & PCUS)
- 1983 A Study and Action Guide on the Arms Race and the "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race " Proposal for a Mutual U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Weapons Freeze (UPC & PCUS)
- 1983 195th General Assembly Minutes pp. 353, 355
- 1983 The Arms Race: Continuing Dynamics Resolution passed by the 195th General Assembly Presbyterian Church USA
- 1983 Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter/A Consultation on Peacemaking 195th General Assembly pp. 72-73
- 1983 Commitment to Peacemaking Presbyterian Church (USA) 195th General Assembly
- 1984 PC (USA) p.345
- 1985 PC (USA) p.77

**Documented complete**

## ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH USA

- 1959 Freedom and Peace November 19, 1959
- 1966 Peace and Vietnam November 18, 1966
- 1968 Human Life in Our Day, Chapter II, "The Family of Nations" November 15, 1968
- 1969 Statement on the Catholic Conscientious Objector Division of World Justice and Peace U.S. Catholic Conference
- 1970 Human Solidarity April
- 1971 Resolution on Southeast Asia November
- 1973 Resolution towards Peace in the Middle East
- 1974 Amnesty: A Work of Reconciliation
- 1976 Reflections on an Election Year
- 1976 To Live in Christ Jesus: A Pastoral Reflection on the Moral Life
- 1976 To Live in Christ Jesus, "The Community of Nations" November 11, 1976
- 1978 The Gospel of Peace and the Danger of War
- 1979 SALT II A Statement of Support September 16, 1979
- 1979 Political Responsibility: Choices for the 1980s
- 1980 Statement on Registration and Conscription for Military Service February 14, 1980
- 1983 The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace the Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response Origins May 19, 1983 vol. 13 no. 1
- 1984 Pax Christi Violence Ends Where Love Begins

## NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST USA

- 1950 Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction Report of a Commission appointed by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America
- 1951 The National Council of Churches Views its Task in Christian Life and Work General Board May 16, 1951

- 1957 Some Hopes and Concerns of the Church in the Nuclear Space Age General Board 5  
December 1957
- 1958 The Churches' Concern in Policies Related to the Control of Armaments and the Use of  
Space General Board June 4, 1958
- 1960 Toward a Family of Nations Under God: Agendas for Action for Peace General Board  
June 2, 1960
- 1968 Defense and Disarmament: New Requirements for Security General Board September  
12, 1968
- 1968 Imperatives of Peace and Responsibilities of Power February 21, 1968
- 1972 Resolution on Military Force and Foreign Policy General Assembly December 6, 1972
- 1976 Resolution on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Resulting From Nuclear Fuel  
Reprocessing Technology Governing Board October 8, 1976
- 1977 Resolution on the Complete Cessation of All Explosive Nuclear Testing Governing  
Board May 4, 1977
- 1977 Resolution on Nuclear Weapons Governing Board November 10, 1977
- 1977 To Preserve and Not to Destroy: Statements Disarmament General Board updated  
November 1977
- 1978 Swords into Plowshares: The Churches' Witness for Disarmament Governing Board  
May 10, 1978
- 1979 Choose Life Governing Board May 10, 1979
- 1981 Resolution on a Nuclear Weapons Freeze Governing Board May 14, 1981
- 1981 Call to Halt the Nuclear arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon  
Freeze
- 1982 An Old Vision Peace With Justice for All: A Renewed Pledge Governing Board May 12-  
14, 1982
- 1983 Peacemaking and Ecumenism: A Celebration of the Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter  
Governing Board
- 1983 A Message of Concern to Member Communion Regarding the United States Response  
to International Problems Governing Board

1983 The Churches and War Tax Resistance Governing Board November 11, 1983

ANGLICAN CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

1958 The Reconciling of Conflicts Between and Within Nations Lambeth Committee Report

1981 Christian Attitudes to War in a Nuclear age Statement of the Anglican Primates as quoted in To Make Peace part two The report of the second joint commission on peace 1985

BAPTIST WORLD ALLIANCE

1980 World Peace and Disarmament

1981 Baptist World Alliance General Council Meeting at San Juan, Puerto Rico

1982 Resolution on Disarmament

**Documented complete**

WORLD ALLIANCE OF REFORMED CHURCHES

1983 A Covenant for Peace and Justice a Statement of the Executive Committee

**Documented complete**

WORLD METHODIST COUNCIL

1947 A Message to the Methodists of the World

1956 Message to the Methodists Proceedings WMC

1956 Christians and the Modern State Proceedings WMC

1956 Nuclear Knowledge and Christian Responsibility Proceedings WMC

1971 Peace and Justice Proceedings WMC

1981 A Call to End the Arms Race

1981 Report of the Social and International Affairs Committee

**Documented complete**

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

1954 International affairs-Christians in the Struggle for World Community; Evanston Speaks, Reports of the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches

1978/1 WCC Statements on Disarmament (A Selection)

1978/4 Report of the Conference on Disarmament

1970/3 The Churches in International affairs: Reports From 1970-1973

1983 Before It's Too Late

1983 The Churches in International affairs Reports 1979-1982

1982 Peace and Disarmament Documents of the World Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Church

1982 The Security Trap, Arms Race, Militarism and Disarmament: A Concern for Christians

1983/6 The Churches in International Affairs: Reports From 1983-1986

**Documented complete**

**THE HOLY SEE/VATICAN**

1946 Address to the Sacred College of Cardinals Pius XII

1951 Christmas Radio Message

1953 Address to the International Office of Documentation for Military Medicine

1954 Easter Radio Message

1954 Address to the 8th Congress of the World Medical Association

1955 Christmas Radio Message

1956 Christmas Radio Message

1957 Christmas Radio Message

1959 Christmas Radio Message

1962 The Avoidance of War the Documents of Vatican II

1963 Encyclical Letter "Pacem in Terris"

1963 Telegramme to the Signatories of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Experiments

1964 Christmas Radio Message

- 1965 Address to the General Assembly of the UNO
- 1965 Pastoral Constitution "Gaudium et Spes"
- 1966 Address to the Sacred College of Cardinals
- 1966 Message to the General Secretary of the UNO
- 1967 Angelus Message
- 1968 Address to the Pontifical Academy of Science
- 1968 Address to the Sacred College of Cardinals
- 1969 Address to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See
- 1970 Homily on the World Day of Peace
- 1970 Message to the General Secretary of the UN for the 25th Anniversary
- 1971 Instrument of the Accession of the Holy See to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- 1972 Address to the Sacred College of Cardinals
- 1972 Address to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See
- 1974 Homily on the World Day of Peace
- 1975 The Build Up of a Lasting Peace
- 1975 Address to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See
- 1975 Message on the World Day of Peace 1976
- 1975 Address to the Sacred College of Cardinals
- 1977 Address to the First Secretary of the Poland Unified Workers Party
- 1978 Message to the UN's General Assembly at a Special Session on Disarmament
- 1978 Letter to His Holiness Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and the Whole of Russia
- 1979 Address to the General Assembly of the UNO
- 1979 Address to the President of the US

- 1979 Dignity of the Human Person Founded on Justice and Peace
- 1980 Homily on the World Day of Peace
- 1980 Address to UNESCO
- 1981 Message for the World Day of Peace, 1982
- 1981 Address to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See
- 1981 Address to the Representatives of UN's University in Hiroshima
- 1981 Angelus Message
- 1981 Angelus Message
- 1981 Angelus Message and Statement on the Consequences of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
- 1981 Appeal for Peace at the Memorial in Hiroshima
- 1982 Address to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See
- 1982 Homily on the World Day of Peace
- 1982 Negotiation: The Realistic Solution to the Threat of War John Paul II Second Special Session on Disarmament

It is also useful, in this overview of the data, to have a tabular breakdown of denominational policy statements by year for the study denominations in each nation. This information is coupled with a figure representing the number of policy statements that would be issued by a hypothetical average denomination. This number is the average of all the study denominations' policy statements.

Table 92. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations in Australia

	Anglican	Baptist	Uniting	Roman Catholic	Average
1945	0	0	0	0	0
1946	0	0	0	0	0
1947	0	0	0	0	0
1948	0	0	0	0	0
1949	0	0	0	0	0
1950	0	0	0	0	0
1951	0	0	0	0	0
1952	0	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0	0
1954	0	0	0	0	0
1955	0	0	0	0	0
1956	0	0	0	0	0
1957	0	0	5	0	1.25
1958	0	0	3	0	.75
1959	0	0	1	0	.25
1960	0	0	0	0	0
1961	0	0	0	0	0
1962	0	0	2	0	.5
1963	0	0	3	0	.75
1964	0	0	3	0	.75
1965	0	0	0	0	0
1966	0	0	0	0	0
1967	0	0	0	1	.25
1968	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	1	.25
1971	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	3	0	.75
1973	0	0	1	0	.25
1974	0	0	0	1	.25
1975	0	0	3	5	2
1976	0	0	3	0	.75
1977	0	0	0	1	.25
1978	0	0	1	1	.5
1979	0	0	1	0	.25
1980	0	0	0	1	.25
1981	1	0	0	1	.5
1982	0	0	5	2	1.75
1983	0	0	1	0	.25
1984	0	0	3	0	.75
1985	0	0	7	2	2.25
Totals	1	0	44	16	
Averages	.024	0	1.07	.39	15.25

Table 93. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations In Canada

	Anglican	Baptist	United	Roman Catholic	Average
1945	0	0	0	0	0
1946	0	0	0	0	0
1947	1	0	0	0	.25
1948	0	0	2	0	.5
1949	0	0	1	0	.25
1950	1	0	1	0	.5
1951	1	0	0	0	.25
1952	0	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0	0
1954	1	0	0	0	.25
1955	1	0	0	0	.25
1956	2	0	1	0	.75
1957	1	0	0	0	.25
1958	3	0	1	0	1
1959	0	0	1	0	.25
1960	2	0	1	0	.75
1961	1	0	0	0	.25
1962	2	0	1	0	.75
1963	2	0	0	0	.5
1964	0	0	1	0	.25
1965	1	0	0	0	.25
1966	0	0	1	0	.25
1967	0	0	1	0	.25
1968	0	0	1	0	.25
1969	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	1	0	.25
1972	0	0	1	0	.25
1973	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0	1	0	.25
1976	0	1	0	0	.25
1977	0	0	1	0	.25
1978	0	0	2	0	.5
1979	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	2	0	.5
1981	0	0	2	1	.75
1982	0	1	15	3	4.75
1983	1	1	7	3	3
1984	0	0	4	1	1.25
1985	0	0	0	1	.25
Totals	20	3	49	9	
Averages	.49	.07	1.19	.22	20.25

Table 94. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations in New Zealand

	Anglican	Baptist	Presbyterian	Roman Catholic	Average
1945	0	0	0	0	0
1946	0	0	0	0	0
1947	0	0	0	0	0
1948	0	0	0	0	0
1949	0	0	0	0	0
1950	0	0	0	0	0
1951	0	0	0	0	0
1952	0	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0	0
1954	0	0	0	0	0
1955	0	0	0	0	0
1956	0	0	0	0	0
1957	0	0	0	0	0
1958	0	0	0	0	0
1959	0	0	0	0	0
1960	0	0	0	0	0
1961	0	0	0	0	0
1962	0	0	1	0	.25
1963	0	0	1	0	.25
1964	0	0	1	0	.25
1965	0	0	0	0	0
1966	0	0	0	0	0
1967	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	0	0
1971	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	1	0	.25
1973	0	0	0	0	0
1974	1	0	0	0	.25
1975	0	0	1	0	.25
1976	0	0	1	0	.25
1977	0	0	1	0	.25
1978	0	0	2	0	.5
1979	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	2	2	1	1.25
1983	0	0	2	0	.5
1984	1	1	1	0	.75
1985	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	2	3	14	1	
Averages	.05	.07	.34	.02	5

Table 95. Number of Statements Issued Each Year By the Denominations in the UK

	Church of England	Baptist	Church of Scotland	Roman Catholic	Average
1945	0	0	0	0	0
1946	0	0	0	0	0
1947	0	0	0	0	0
1948	0	0	0	0	0
1949	0	0	0	0	0
1950	0	0	0	0	0
1951	0	0	0	0	0
1952	0	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0	0
1954	0	0	0	0	0
1955	0	0	0	0	0
1956	0	0	0	0	0
1957	0	0	0	0	0
1958	0	0	0	0	0
1959	0	0	0	0	0
1960	0	0	0	0	0
1961	0	0	0	0	0
1962	0	0	0	0	0
1963	0	1	0	0	.25
1964	0	0	0	0	0
1965	0	0	0	0	0
1966	0	0	0	0	0
1967	0	0	0	0	0
1968	0	0	0	0	0
1969	0	0	0	0	0
1970	0	0	0	1	.25
1971	0	0	0	0	0
1972	0	0	0	0	0
1973	0	0	0	0	0
1974	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	1	0	0	.25
1978	0	0	0	1	.25
1979	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	2	.5
1981	0	0	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0	3	.75
1983	1	0	2	2	1.25
1984	0	2	0	3	1.25
1985	0	0	2	0	.5
Totals	1	4	4	12	
Averages	.02	.1	.1	.29	5.25

Table 96. Number of Statements Issued Each Year by the Denominations in the United States

	Episcopal	Southern Baptist	Presbyterian	Roman Catholic	Average
1945	0	0	0	0	0
1946	1	0	2	0	.75
1947	0	0	1	0	.25
1948	0	0	0	0	0
1949	0	0	1	0	.25
1950	0	0	0	0	0
1951	0	0	0	0	0
1952	0	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0	0
1954	0	0	1	0	.25
1955	1	0	1	0	.5
1956	0	0	1	0	.25
1957	0	0	1	0	.25
1958	1	0	1	0	.5
1959	0	0	0	1	.25
1960	0	0	2	0	.5
1961	1	0	0	0	.25
1962	1	0	0	0	.25
1963	0	0	1	0	.25
1964	0	0	1	0	.25
1965	0	0	0	0	0
1966	0	0	0	1	.25
1967	1	0	1	0	.5
1968	0	0	0	1	.25
1969	0	0	1	1	.5
1970	0	0	0	1	.25
1971	0	0	1	1	.5
1972	0	0	2	0	.5
1973	0	0	0	1	.25
1974	0	0	0	1	.25
1975	0	0	0	0	0
1976	1	0	0	3	1
1977	0	0	1	0	.25
1978	0	1	2	1	1
1979	0	1	2	2	1.25
1980	0	0	2	1	.75
1981	0	1	4	0	1.25
1982	3	1	5	0	2.25
1983	0	1	5	1	1.75
1984	0	0	1	1	.5
1985	4	0	1	0	1.25
Totals	14	5	41	17	
averages	.34	.12	1	.41	19.25

Table 97. Number of Statements Issued by Year by the average Denomination in Each Nation

	Australia	Canada	New Zealand	United States	United Kingdom
1945	0	0	0	0	0
1946	0	0	0	.75	0
1947	0	.25	0	.25	0
1948	0	.5	0	0	0
1949	0	.25	0	.25	0
1950	0	.5	0	0	0
1951	0	.25	0	0	0
1952	0	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0	0
1954	0	.25	0	.25	0
1955	0	.25	0	.5	0
1956	0	.75	0	.25	0
1957	1.25	.25	0	.25	0
1958	.75	1	0	.5	0
1959	.25	.25	0	.25	0
1960	0	.75	0	.5	0
1961	0	.25	0	.25	0
1962	.5	.75	.25	.25	0
1963	.75	.5	.25	.25	.25
1964	.75	.25	.25	.25	0
1965	0	.25	0	0	0
1966	0	.25	0	.25	0
1967	.25	.25	0	.5	0
1968	0	.25	0	.25	0
1969	0	0	0	.5	0
1970	.25	0	0	.25	.25
1971	0	.25	0	.5	0
1972	.75	.25	.25	.5	0
1973	.25	0	0	.25	0
1974	.25	0	.25	.25	0
1975	2	.25	.25	0	0
1976	.75	.25	.25	1	0
1977	.25	.25	.25	.25	.25
1978	.5	.5	.5	1	.25
1979	.25	0	0	1.25	0
1980	.25	.5	0	.75	.5
1981	.25	.75	0	1.25	0
1982	1.75	4.75	1.25	2.25	.75
1983	.25	3	.5	1.75	1.25
1984	.75	1.25	.75	.5	1.25
1985	2.25	.25	0	1.25	.5

The final aspect of the data to be presented is the rank ordering from most to least active of the nations based on total number of documents issued by the study denominations. This allows for an "at a glance" assessment of how active a nation's denominations are on the issue of nuclear weapons and deterrence.

Table 98. Activist Ranking

Canada  
United States  
Australia  
United Kingdom  
New Zealand

This ranking is achieved by totaling the statements issued by each of the study denominations in each nation. It should be kept in mind that this is a somewhat simplistic measure as not all statements are created equal. This measure regards the book length statement of the Church of England as equal to the paragraph length statements of the Roman Catholic Church in the United Kingdom.

## APPENDIX B

### DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The specific policy I have selected for analysis is the position taken by Christian denominations regarding the nuclear threat, i.e., nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence. This policy can be analyzed most effectively through the use of eight areas of interest: 1) the nuclear threat as a problem, 2) the nuclear threat as part of a broader issue, 3) deterrence, 4) possession of nuclear weapons, 5) use of nuclear weapons, 6) disarmament, 7) the likelihood of nuclear war, and 8) recommendations, commendations, and strategies. These eight areas are arrived at by considering the options available to the denomination once an issue has reached the denominational agenda. These options are 1) acknowledge the issue, 2) fit the issue into a broader context--usually one already being addressed, or 3) advocate particular solutions/strategies. It must be noted that these options are not mutually exclusive; a single document might contain statements indicative of all three actions.

Acknowledging the issue and placing the issue into a broader context are options that recognize the existence of the issue and that it is one with which the denomination may properly concern itself. These two options are also a means of avoiding the conflicts that could arise if the issue were addressed in a more specific manner or entirely on its own merits. By merely acknowledging the issue and thus not advocating a particular policy or approach or by treating the issue as part of a larger issue--placing it into a broader context that is already being addressed--conflict can be kept to a minimum. In this case it might be argued that not enough is being done to address the issue, but not that the issue does not exist. The variables the nuclear threat as a problem and the nuclear threat as part of a larger problem are representative of the options acknowledging the issue and placing the issue into a broader context. In my analysis these two variables serve merely to indicate the presence of the issue on the agenda.

Advocacy of particular solutions/strategies is a more complex option. This option requires that the denomination identify the various facets of the issue before considering and recommending particular solutions or strategies for dealing with these facets. In my analysis this option is represented specifically in the following variables: deterrence, possession of nuclear weapons, use of nuclear weapons, disarmament, the likelihood of nuclear war, encouragement to negotiation, endorsement/praise of a specific treaty, conference, talks or other governmental

action, comprehensive testing ban (includes underground testing), ban (unspecified), nuclear freeze/nuclear free zone, reduction of armaments, objection/criticism of particular governmental actions, and other. Examining these variables will enable me to determine which aspect of the nuclear issue the denominations in my study consider most important and most amenable of solution.

The denominational position for each of these variables is determined by applying the techniques of content analysis to statements, reports, and resolutions made by the denominations in my study. In the case of the Roman Catholic denomination this includes papal speeches, addresses, homilies, etc. The first step in coding my data is to determine which variables are present in each of the denominational statements that have been collected. The second step is to determine how frequently each variable occurs in the denominational statement. I assume that the more important the denomination considers a variable, the more frequently it will be referenced. In addition, if my model is correct and there is a relationship between denominational policy and public opinion; there should be a strong correlation between the number of references to the particular variable and the attitude of the constituent public toward that variable.

The next to last step in coding is to count the number of documents relating to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence issued for each denomination for each year. This is done to provide a measure of importance of the issue to the denomination. The final step in the coding is to calculate whether denominational positions have changed in a meaningful manner from year to year. Comparing each variable from year to year using both frequency of reference and actual policy position as guidelines accomplishes this. If different variables or positions on the variable dominate from one year to the next, the denomination's policy will be said to have changed.

Coding the variables is done using content analysis based on the themes that are present in each statement. Themes are the concepts conveyed in the individual sentences that make up the statements that compose the document. In denominational policy statements there is often more than one theme, thus a statement can contain more than one variable. Themes in denominational policy statements are frequently separated from one another by semicolons or commas. Every effort is made to be as exact as possible; except for obvious synonyms negotiate, hold talks for example, statements must contain the exact policy terms, for example nuclear disarmament, in order to be coded as the particular variable.

The actual coding of the variables is discussed below. These variables are all interval level variables since they rely on the number of references to the specific variable. The exception will be the variables acceptability of nuclear deterrence, morality of nuclear weapons possession and usability of nuclear weapons, which are nominal level. Detailed descriptions of the variables are provided as follows. 1) The nuclear threat as a problem: this variable involves simple acknowledgment of the issue, including the use of facts about the nuclear threat insofar as these facts are not advocating particular actions but are aimed mostly at providing information. It is important here to note that concern is expressed but no clear statement of policy emerges. In effect the denomination is merely acknowledging that the issue is one with which it may rightly concern itself. 2) The nuclear threat as part of a broader issue: here an effort is made to fit the issue into a broader context, which is usually part of an issue that the denomination is already addressing, for example, examining the nuclear issue in terms of questions of social justice which includes such issues as racism, poverty, economic exploitation, etc.; an example would be a statement that the nuclear threat can only be understood in terms of the larger North/South conflict. These two variables are coded simply as the total number of references in the document(s) for that year. 3) Acceptability of the policy of nuclear deterrence includes statements regarding nuclear deterrence upon which national and/or international security is based. Denominations may accept completely, accept conditionally or reject the policy of nuclear deterrence on moral grounds. 4) Attitudes toward the morality of the possession of nuclear weapons: this variable encompasses the perspective held by the denomination about the question of whether possessing nuclear weapons can ever be moral. Denominations can regard it as always, sometimes, or never moral. 5) Usability of nuclear weapons: here the question of use of nuclear weapons is examined. Questions considered here include: can nuclear weapons ever be used in a just, moral manner; and can there ever be a situation in which use of nuclear weapons is justified. Variables three, four and five either occur or do not; either the denomination makes a clear statement of a position on the issue or it does not. They are coded based on whether the denomination accepts, accepts conditionally, or rejects the policies of nuclear deterrence, nuclear possession, and use of nuclear weapons. 6) Disarmament: this variable emphasizes the importance of disarmament as a policy goal for which denominations want to see nations strive. It is coded as to which type of disarmament is advocated: general and complete disarmament, nuclear disarmament, or unspecified disarmament. 7) The likelihood of nuclear war reflects the

fears that the nuclear threat could cease to be a threat and lead to a nuclear exchange with the attendant massive death and destruction that would ensue. An example would be a statement that unless nations can be persuaded to destroy their nuclear stockpiles, a nuclear confrontation is inevitable. The coding is based on the number of references. 8) Recommendations, commendations, and strategies are the most complex of the variables because it addresses specific treaties, policies, solutions, etc. Examples are praise of a particular treaty, encouragement to negotiate, endorsement of a nuclear freeze, etc. This variable will be coded based on the number of references to the most commonly advocated recommendations, commendations, and strategies. A coding outline is presented below.

**Nuclear threat as a problem**

number of references to nuclear weapons and/or nuclear deterrence

**Nuclear threat as part of a broader issue**

number of references placing the nuclear issue in a broader context

**Acceptability of nuclear deterrence**

Unqualified acceptance

Conditioned/limited acceptance

Complete rejection

**Morality of nuclear weapons possession**

always moral

Sometimes moral

Never moral

**Usability of nuclear weapons**

Unconditionally

Conditionally (no first use, counter-force targeting only)

Nuclear weapons can never be used

**Disarmament/prohibition of weapons**

Number of references to General and Complete disarmament

Number of references to Nuclear disarmament

Number of references in which the type of disarmament is unspecified

**Likelihood of nuclear war**

Number of references to nuclear war being likely to occur in the future

**Recommendations, commendations and strategies**

Number of references that encourage negotiation

Number of references that endorse or praise specific treaties conferences, talks or other governmental actions

Number of references to a comprehensive testing ban (includes underground testing)

Number of references a testing ban that does not specifically include underground testing

Number of references supporting a nuclear freeze or nuclear free zone

Number of references encouraging the reduction of armaments

Number of references objecting or criticizing particular governmental actions

Number of references all other aspects of the nuclear issue

These same variables and techniques are employed to code the statements of conciliar organizations with the addition that the number of times the conciliar organization issues an appeal for the churches or Christians to do something is also calculated. This will measure the extent to which conciliar organizations actually apply pressure to their members directions to Christians can be assumed to be directed toward the members as all members of these conciliar bodies can be expected to be Christians. The more times a conciliar body issues an appeal or call to action the more they are pressuring their members to adopt the conciliar position.

Once these variables have been coded, it will be necessary to turn to the actual analysis of the data. The pressures and constraints experienced by denominations in their policy-making efforts will be correlated using cross tabulation or regression analysis to determine whether the model I am advancing is a valid means of analyzing the policy-making of Christian denominations. The constraints will be employed as control variables while the pressures: public opinion, perceived threat, and conciliar interest in the issue will be the independent variables. These independent variables will be compared with the presence of the issue on the denominational agenda to determine whether the pressures have encouraged the denominations to take an interest in this issue.

## APPENDIX C

### EXPERT OPINION ABOUT DENOMINATIONAL CONSTITUENCIES

Below are the questions posed to academic experts about the constituent characteristics of the denominations in my study. Academic experts should, in theory, be more objective and less likely to wish to present the denomination in the best possible light. Denominational leadership on the other hand has a vested interest in presenting their denomination in the best possible light. The questions posed are as follows:

#### Denominational Characteristics Survey

In your opinion which of the following most closely describes the income level of the majority of members of the (Anglican/Episcopal, Baptist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic) denomination

- Upper
- Upper-middle
- Middle
- Lower-Middle
- Lower

In your opinion is the theology of the (Anglican/Episcopal, Baptist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic) denomination

- Very Conservative
- Somewhat Conservative
- Moderate
- Somewhat Liberal
- Liberal

In your opinion the attitude the majority of members of the (Anglican/Episcopal, Baptist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic) denomination regarding political issues is

- Very Conservative
- Somewhat Conservative
- Moderate
- Somewhat Liberal
- Liberal

In your opinion the average education level of members of the (Anglican/Episcopal, Baptist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic) denomination is

Grade School Only  
High School Graduate  
Some College  
College Graduate  
Graduate School

I am defining conservative as a desire to maintain tradition and liberal as willingness to seek new solutions. In theological terms these two concepts refer to a willingness to interpret the Bible (liberal) and a literal reading of the scriptures (conservative).

## APPENDIX D

### ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF DENOMINATIONS

The organizational structure of denominations refers simply to the method of government employed by the denomination. This method of government can range from a powerful central unitary body controlling all aspects of the denomination to a coordinating body concerned mainly with administrative details to no central coordination whatsoever. There are three basic forms of denominational government; episcopal, congregational, and presbyterian.<sup>1</sup> The table below summarizes the organizational structure of the denominations in my study.

Anglican/Episcopal	Episcopal
Baptist	Congregational
Presbyterian	Presbyterian
Roman Catholic	Episcopal

Episcopal denominational structure is a method of ecclesiastical rule or authority in which the clergy are organized into successive grades or ranks. Those with the highest rank are the dominant policy-makers--the leaders--of the denomination. The denominational leadership makes all decisions, which affect the life of both the denomination as a whole and the individual congregations. This includes decisions about such diverse subjects as the denominational position on deterrence and the appointments of the pastors of the individual congregations. The flow of decisions and policy is from the top down. It is the task of the individual congregations and members to simply obey the leadership. The best example of a denomination with an episcopal structure is the Roman Catholic Church. Roman Catholics recognize the pope as the supreme head of their denomination. They revere him as the Vicar of Christ and accept, as a tenet of their religion, that he is infallible on matters of doctrine. It should be noted that the Roman Catholic Church operates on two levels. It functions both as a denomination and as an

---

<sup>1</sup> For the descriptions of the forms of denominational government or structure, I am heavily indebted to the following sources; J.D. Douglas (General Editor), *The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church*, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1974, 1978, Revised Edition; Paul Kevin Meagher, Tomas C. O'Brien, & Sister Consuelo Maria Aherne (editors), *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion*, Washington, D.C.: Corpus Publications, Three Volumes, 1979; and David B. Barrett, (ed.), *World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900-2000* New York: Oxford University Press, 1982; Eliade Mircea, (Editor in Chief), *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, Fifteen Volumes, 1987.

international denominational conciliar body. The various National Councils of Bishops within each nation have the authority to issue statements about issues important within that nation. These statements, however, must not advocate positions that depart from those advocated by the pope. The pope is the head of the denomination. Although Vatican Council II recognized that authority in the church was collegial in character it expressly limited that authority as subject to its head--the Roman pontiff. The pontiff must consent to the exercise of the college and without this consent the college has no authority.<sup>2</sup> The Anglican/Episcopal denomination is also episcopal in structure. The archbishop of Canterbury is recognized as the international head of the denomination although this recognition is titular only; his authority does not extend outside the United Kingdom. Each national denomination has its own leadership. The episcopal structure of this denomination is different from the Roman Catholic in that there is not a single dominant policy-maker. Perhaps the Anglican/Episcopal denominational structure can best be described as based on a division of labor. Policy and doctrine are set by a General Convention composed of both clergy and laity while pulpit appointments are made by the Bishops. The role of the General Convention can be examined in detail by looking at the United States Episcopal denomination. The General Convention of the Episcopal denomination, composed of two houses, the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies, meets every three years for about ten days. The House of Bishops is made up of all living Bishops. The House of Deputies is composed of four clergy and four lay from each diocese. These houses are the source of policy and doctrine; both houses must approve a resolution before it can become policy. Between meetings of the General convention the denomination is administered by the Executive Council. In terms of policy the most the Executive Council can do is to flesh out the administrative detail of policy set by the General Convention. The House of Bishops also meets between meetings of the General Convention. The Bishops can issue pastoral letters but these are not binding but merely advisory. The structural form of the Anglican denominations in my study is generally consistent with that of the Episcopal denomination described above. The exception is the Church of England, the Anglican denomination in the United Kingdom. The fact that it is a national church means that there are certain structural differences. As the national church, the Church of England is subject to the state; thus policy and doctrine are officially set by parliament. The British monarch is the official

---

<sup>2</sup> Paul Kevin Meagher, Tomas C. O'Brien, & Sister Consuelo Maria Aherne (editors), *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion*, Washington, D.C.: Corpus Publications, Three Volumes, 1979, p. 2883.

head of the Church of England and appoints the archbishops of Canterbury and York as her representatives. The archbishop of Canterbury together with the archbishop of York act on behalf of the monarch in administering the activities of the denomination. The General Convention functions as it does in the U.S. except that changes in policy or doctrine that it approves must also be approved by parliament in order to take effect.

Congregationalism is the opposite of episcopal in that decisions are made by each congregation for itself alone. The local congregations are self-governing. Thus, the important policymaking unit is the congregation rather than a national governing body. In denominations organized on the congregational model the individual congregations are completely autonomous. They do not need the approval of any higher governing body to make policy or establish positions. In congregationally organized denominations local congregations even have authority to ordain ministers. This is the only type of organization that allows congregations at the local level this power. While congregationalism allows individual congregations to act without reference to a central body or other congregations; the congregationally governed denomination in my study--the Baptist denomination--has found it beneficial to establish voluntary associations. An example of one of these voluntary associations is the Southern Baptist Convention. These associations have only limited authority to speak for the denomination such statements do not carry the force of law but instead represent only the majority opinion. The primary purpose of these associations is to act as a forum and a coordinating body in order to facilitate the smooth allocation of resources. The political clout of the denomination is also enhanced by the presence of a recognizable central body since this body is perceived as representative of a very large membership.

Presbyterianism is rule by elders. These elders are elected clergy and laymen who are charged with the task of governing the denomination. At the level of individual congregations the elders form a session that makes the decisions for their congregation. The sessions in turn send representatives to the presbytery that make decisions for a stipulated geographic area and have the authority to ordain ministers. Presbyteries send representative to the synod--the level of government once removed from the general assembly. The general assembly is the highest level of government and acts as both a sort of Supreme Court to which appeals from the rulings of lower levels of the organization may be made and the central policy-making and coordinating body. The general assembly, however, is not all powerful since any major change in policy or

doctrine must be approved by the presbyteries. Presbyterianism is thus organization along the same federal principals that were used in establishing the United States government. It is based on elected representation, checks and balances, and the right to appeal to a higher court. Under this design certain powers are the prerogative of the local congregation while other powers, for example establishing seminaries and doctrine, are reserved to the General assembly. This method of denominational organization is similar to the pluralistic representative model of government. This model relies on the belief that various divergent interests being represented at the central government will reach compromises acceptable to the majority. The presbyterian organizational structure described for the United States Presbyterian denomination is true in its basic forms for all other Presbyterian denominations in my study.

## APPENDIX E

### THE DENOMINATIONS AND THEIR CONCILIAR MEMBERSHIPS

Conciliarism takes two forms: national conciliarism and international conciliarism. Within these two forms are the subdivisions denominational and interdenominational. Denominational conciliarism is confined to members of specific denominations. Interdenominational conciliarism does not have such restrictions; it accepts members from a variety of denominations. In the listing below the denominations are listed by nation followed by their conciliar membership. The type of conciliar body is indicated in parens following each listing. Types of conciliar bodies are as follows;

- National Denominational (ND)
- National Interdenominational (NI)
- National Interdenominational Limited (NIL)
- International Denominational (ID)
- International Interdenominational (II)

National Interdenominational Limited refers to those conciliar bodies that are composed of only certain denominations that have specific qualities in common. An example would be an evangelical Alliance. National Denominational is also a type of conciliar body but this type is synonymous with denominational organization and was treated as such in Appendix D.

#### **Australia**

- Church of England in Australia (Anglican)
  - Anglican Consultative Council (ID)
  - World Council of Churches (II)
  - Australian Evangelical Alliance (NIL)
  - Council of Churches in East Asia (II)
  - Australian Council of Churches (NI)
- Baptist Union of Australia
  - Baptist World Alliance (ID)
- Presbyterian Church of Australia Continuing
  - World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)
  - World Council of Churches (II)
  - Australian Evangelical Alliance (NIL)

Australian Council of Churches (NI)

Uniting Church in Australia (Presbyterian and Methodist)

World Methodist Council (ID)

World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)

World Council of Churches (II)

Australian Evangelical Alliance (NIL)

Australian Council of Churches (NI)

Catholic Church in Australia

Sacred Congregation for Bishops (ID)

Observer or associate Member Australian Council of Churches (NI)

Related to World Council of Churches (II)

## Canada

Anglican Church of Canada

Anglican Consultative Council (ID)

World Council of Churches (II)

Anglican Council of North America and the Caribbean (ID)

Canadian Council of Churches (NI)

Baptist Federation of Canada

Baptist World Alliance (ID)

Applied for membership in World Council of Churches <sup>1</sup> (II)

Associated member of Canadian Council of Churches (NI)

Presbyterian Church in Canada

World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)

World Council of Churches (II)

Canadian Council of Churches (NI)

Uniting Church of Canada (Methodist and Presbyterian)

World Methodist Council (ID)

World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)

World Council of Churches (II)

Canadian Council of Churches (NI)

Catholic Church of Canada

Sacred Congregation for Bishops (ID)

National Priests' Organization Bishops in the Americas (SCOBA) (ID)

Canadian Catholic Conference (ND)

Canadian Council of Churches (affiliate) (NI)

---

<sup>1</sup> Application withdrawn or not granted by 1980 current status unknown.

## **New Zealand**

Church of the Province of New Zealand (Anglican)  
Anglican Consultative Council (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
Australian Evangelical Alliance (NIL)  
National Council of Churches in New Zealand (NI)

Baptist Union and Missionary Society of New Zealand  
Baptist World Alliance (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
Australian Evangelical Alliance (NIL)  
National Council of Churches in New Zealand (NI)

Presbyterian Church of New Zealand  
World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
Australian Evangelical Alliance (NIL)  
National Council of Churches of New Zealand (NI)

Catholic Church in New Zealand  
Sacred Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (ID)  
New Zealand Episcopal Conference (NIL)

## **United Kingdom**

Church of England (Anglican)  
Anglican Consultative Council (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
British Evangelical Council (NIL)  
British Council of Churches (NI)

Baptist Union of Great Britain and Ireland  
Baptist World Alliance (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
British Evangelical Council (NIL)  
British Council of Churches (NI)

Church of Scotland (Presbyterian)  
World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
British Evangelical Council (NIL)  
British Council of Churches (NI)

Catholic Church in England and Wales  
Sacred Congregation for Bishops (ID)

Consultant Member British Council of Churches (NI)  
Consultant Member Bishops Conference of England and Wales (ND)

## **United States**

Episcopal Church in the USA  
Anglican Consultative Council (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
Anglican Council of North America and the Caribbean (NIL)  
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA (NI)

Southern Baptist Convention  
Baptist World Alliance (ID)

Presbyterian Church US  
World Alliance of Reformed Churches (ID)  
World Council of Churches (II)  
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA (NI)

Catholic Church in the USA  
Sacred Congregation for Bishops (ID)  
National Conference of Catholic Bishops (ND)

The above list includes all the conciliar memberships for the denominations in this study.<sup>2</sup> Not all the conciliar organizations are used in the analysis, however. The analysis uses only those conciliar bodies that have denominational members in several of the study nations. This requirement results in the use of the following conciliar bodies in the analysis.

Anglican Consultative Council  
Baptist World Alliance (established 1905)  
Sacred Congregation for Bishops (the Vatican)  
World Alliance of Reformed Churches (established 1970)  
World Methodist Council (established 1881)  
World Council of Churches (established 1948)  
National Councils of Churches  
    Australian Council of Churches  
    Canadian Council of Churches  
    New Zealand Council of Churches of Christ  
    British Council of Churches  
    National Council of Churches of Christ USA (established 1950 successor to the Federal Council of Churches)

---

<sup>2</sup> Source is David B. Barrett (ed.), World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900-2000, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Restricting the conciliar bodies to these allows for more rigorous comparison of the effects of conciliar pressures on the denominations in the different nations.

## APPENDIX F

### PERCEIVED THREAT

The degree of perceived threat within each nation is calculated using the formula:

$$\text{Threat} = \text{Probability of Success (Expected Utility)} / 2$$

The probability of success is calculated based on power measured in terms of nuclear capability. Power is computed as the percentage<sup>1</sup> of the total number of strategic nuclear warheads and bombs<sup>2</sup> available in the nuclear system<sup>3</sup> that each nuclear capable nation has under its command. Power is the percentage of total nuclear weapons of the attacking nation divided by the percentage of total nuclear weapons of the attacking nation plus the percentage of total nuclear weapons of the attacked nation. The formula is:

$$P_s = \% \text{ nuclear weapons}(i) / \% \text{ nuclear weapons}(i) + \% \text{ nuclear weapons}(j)$$

where (i) represents a nuclear nation<sup>4</sup> and (j) represents one of the nations in this study. This measure of power reflects the nuclear strength that might be arrayed/used against each nation in the study or its interests. This provides an indication of what, potentially, it has to fear from nuclear weapons. It also adjusts for a study nation's own possession of nuclear weapons. A study nation that possesses, for example, 90 percent of all available nuclear weapons can at most be attacked by 10 percent of the total available nuclear weapons even if all of the other nuclear nations in the system at that time were to attack it. Probability of success might be verbally expressed as the ability to inflict nuclear damage divided by the ability to inflict nuclear damage

---

<sup>1</sup> The use of percentages as a measure of the systemic nuclear power or capability available to each of the self-declared nuclear nations is predicated on the pioneering national capability measure of Singer, Bremer and Stuckey in J. David Singer; Stuart Bremer; and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", Peace, War, and Numbers, Pages 19-48, Bruce Russett (editor), Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972, p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> The total number of strategic nuclear warheads and bombs is calculated by counting the total number of launchers of each type and multiplying launchers by warheads or bombs per that type launcher. Once this has been done for each type of launcher the number of warheads or bombs deliverable by each type of launcher are added together. In cases where the number of warheads or bombs per launcher are not available that class of launcher is assumed to deliver one warhead or bomb. When the launcher number is given as a number between two numbers the mean is used.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> The nuclear system is defined as the five nations, China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States, that admitted, during the period under study, to the possession of nuclear delivery capability.

minus the nuclear damage that could be sustained as a result of the decision to engage in nuclear conflict.

This measure pertains to nuclear capability only. A nation is not considered nuclear capable until it can deliver a nuclear warhead intercontinentally. Tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons are ignored in this measure. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long range strategic bombers enable a nation to threaten any other nation in the international system. Tactical nuclear weapons must be delivered to the battlefield to be of any use. The distance factors and logistical concerns this raises are beyond the scope of the present study.

The probability of inflicting nuclear damage without sustaining nuclear damage in return ranges from 0 (impossible) to 1 (certainty). This measure has the benefit of depicting bilateral deterrence. Unfortunately, simple bilateral deterrence does not adequately reflect the realities of the international system. There are ties among nations that must be taken into account. This is done using Expected Utility.

Expected Utility in simple terms might be expressed as the amount of change in a nation's policies that *could* be gained through conflict with that nation. It is measured using the Alliance scale of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. Bueno de Mesquita offers cogent and well reasoned arguments for why military alliances are a useful measure of utility. At this point it would be valuable to quote his reasoning at length.

Ideally, the dimension used to indicate national utilities should (a) be sensitive to subtle changes in foreign policies; (b) be responsive to more than one-on-one interactions between pairs of nations; and (c) be closely related to the array of foreign policy interests likely to influence a nation's decisions pertaining to initiating a war or serious dispute or to maintaining peace. Furthermore, the dimension used to indicate national utilities should (d) be comparable across nations and across time; (e) be based on data that are readily available for the full period from 1816 through 1974 (and beyond); and (f) be readily applied to the full set of nations that comprise my spatial domain. . . .

Using military Alliances as an indicator of national utilities has several merits beyond the potential sensitivity to foreign policy changes. Such Alliances are explicit statements about the contingent behavior of one nation toward another in the event of war. As such, they should be particularly reflective of those factors that influence a nation's war-related utility for another nation. Furthermore, with the application of suitable distinctions between types of Alliances, formal military

agreements are both available and fairly comparable for virtually all pairs of nations for the entire span under investigation.<sup>5</sup>

While I agree with Professor Bueno de Mesquita that the Alliances of nations serve as useful indicators of their national interests and international relations I was not entirely convinced by his method of operationalizing Alliances.<sup>6</sup> Using only formal treaties to determine Alliances does not adequately reflect reality. For example when using only formal Alliances the utility of England for Australia is identical to that of China for Australia. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and England share a *de jure* head of state, Queen Elizabeth II. Such a relationship while not a formal military Alliance argues that these nations have strong ties which Bueno de Mesquita's method of operationalizing Alliances fails to take into account. As a result of such discrepancies I felt it necessary to make some adjustments in the Alliance definition criteria. Rather than base Alliances entirely on formal written treaties, as Professor Bueno de Mesquita does, I have included informal treaties, such as the British Commonwealth and official statements of commitment and support. The adjusted criteria are presented below.

1=defense pacts in which signatories agree to come to each other's mutual defense in case any one signatory is attacked, and joint command structures in cases of war or occupations of conquered territory.<sup>7</sup>

2=non-aggression pact in which signatories agree not to declare war against each other in the event that a third nation declares war against one of them, and informal official statements, such as existed between the U.S. and Canada prior to the signing of NATO, of intended mutual defense.<sup>8</sup>

3=entente in which the signatories agree to consult each other about possible coordinated action in the event that one of them is attacked by a third party, membership in the British Commonwealth, and observer status or political membership only in a treaty organization.<sup>9</sup>

4=no treaty or informal agreement between nations.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap*, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981, 109-112.

<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Bueno de Mesquita, himself recognizes the limitation of this measure since it ignores important "informal links between nations links forged through common histories, common culture, and so forth." (p. 113).

<sup>7</sup> As the Soviet Union began to find itself at odds with the other allies in 1946 and 1947 its alliance score shifts from 1 (1945) to 2 (1946) to 3 (1947) and by 1948 beginning with the Cold War, the alliance score is 4. These same shifts can be found when other allies find themselves at odds over questions of policy, for example French partial withdrawal from SEATO and NATO and the U.S.-New Zealand confrontation over nuclear armed ships in New Zealand ports. I have used my own judgment as to the degree of change these conflicts engender in the alliance scores of the Nations involved.

<sup>8</sup> Since informal official statements, statements made in speeches or interviews, do not have the binding force of treaties they are not considered true mutual defense pacts.

<sup>9</sup> As members of a loose alliance structure a conservative estimate is that Commonwealth members can be expected at a minimum to consult with one another in the event that one is attacked. Also lacking a binding treaty or official statements there is no guarantee that Commonwealth members will do any more than consult.

<sup>10</sup> Without at least an informal official statement or informal agreement there can be no reliance on the actions of other nations should a nation suffer attack.

Once the Alliance relationships are established their utility is calculated based on a correlation between their respective Alliance portfolios.  $U_{ij}$ , or the utility of a nuclear power for the study nation, is then computed, based on these Alliance correlations,<sup>11</sup> as a Tau-B matrix.<sup>12</sup> Expected Utility is calculated as

$$U_{ii} - U_{ij}$$

$U_{ii} - U_{ij}$  is the difference between the ideal preferences (1) of the nuclear nation (i), as measured by Alliances, and the preferences of the study nation (j) measured the same way. The utility of a nuclear nation for itself ( $U_{ii}$ ) is always 1. Thus the formula for utility can be rewritten as

$$(1 - U_{ij})$$

$U_{ij}$  can vary between -1, no Alliances in common, to 1, complete Alliance agreement. This provides an indication of how much the preferences of the nations diverge. When the preferences are totally divergent the two nations are in complete disagreement and ( $U_{ii} - U_{ij}$ ) is two [1 - (-1)]. Under these conditions conflict can be expected to result. When the two nations Alliances are in complete agreement ( $U_{ii} - U_{ij}$ ) = 0 since 1 - 1 = 0. There is nothing to be gained by initiating conflict in this case and thus none will occur.

By multiplying Expected Utility times probability of success a measure is created that reflects both the potential gains to a nuclear nation should it employ nuclear weapons against the study nation and the amount of nuclear force that might be employed by both sides in such a conflict. This is the perceived threat that the study nations experience. The greater the disparity between two nations' Alliances the larger the expected gain should conflict be initiated and the greater the amount of nuclear force to which it might be subject the larger the perceived threat.

The expected gains of engaging in conflict are not the entire picture. If it were, then anytime a nation wished another to change its policies war would ensue; a condition that does not hold. Another factor that enters into the calculations is the propensity of a nation's decision makers to take risks. However, for simplicity this measure assumes risk neutrality on the part of the national decision makers. Dividing  $P_s(U_{ii} - U_{ij})$  by two assures risk neutrality since a risk neutral actor will only gamble if the probability of success is .5 or better. A 1.0 probability divided by two is .5--the baseline for risk neutrality. Risk is not taken into account in this study

---

<sup>11</sup> The alliance strengths for each pairing given the total alliances of each nation. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita The War Trap, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981 114-122 for a complete explanation.

<sup>12</sup> For a complete explanation of a Tau-B matrix see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981 115-122.

1) in order to keep the perceived threat measure as simple as possible and 2) because the overarching goal of this work is not to provide a definitive answer but rather to explore the usefulness of the model presented, in an effort to indicate potentially valuable avenues of further research.

Thus the formula:

$$\text{Threat} = \sum (U_{ii} - U_{ij}) / 2$$

Threat is a measure of the potential that a study nation could be subjected to a nuclear attack. Here threat to the study nation is measured for each nuclear nation individually. It is not yet a measure of how much the study nation is threatened by all nuclear weapons in the nuclear system. Threat is based on the probability of the attack succeeding and the extent to which the study nation's policy preferences diverge from those of each individual nuclear nation. To arrive at a measure of total systemic perceived threat the utilities each individual nuclear nation has for the study nation is summed. Total perceived threat is a measure of the likelihood of a study nation being the focus of a nuclear attack by any nuclear nation. It is a measure of systemic or accumulated threat. Perceived threat reflects the extent to which nations in the study fear nuclear weapons based on the different utilities that the nuclear nations have for it.

The use of an Alliance based Expected Utility incorporates the effect of the study nations having friendly relations with some of the nuclear nations. The expected utility the nuclear nations have for the study nations and the various Alliances they have with them reflects the presence of multilateral deterrence. As a nuclear nation's utility for a study nation increases the less it will want that nation to change and the more likely it will be to intervene with a nuclear strike if the study nation is engaged in a conflict in which it is being attacked by nuclear weapons. Indeed, many collective security Alliances require exactly that sort of nuclear support.

This measure of threat is a good preliminary measure since it has the benefits of simplicity while incorporating many fundamental aspects of the international system. It does, however, possess two important flaws. 1) It does not take into account proximity to nuclear nations. In the event of a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, Canada would likely be subject to a great deal of radioactive fallout. Intuitively, this should make Canada more concerned about nuclear weapons than say Australia which does not share a border with a nuclear nation. 2) It doesn't include the additional risk of nuclear conflict inherent in possession of nuclear weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons and/or allowing

nuclear weapons to be based on its territory is likely to place a nation at greater risk of a nuclear attack due to the possible launch of a preemptive first strike. These flaws should be kept in mind when examining the analytical results.

A word should be said here about the nations used in computing the Alliance portfolios and the results obtained in the Tau-B matrix. Even though not all the nations currently possessing nuclear capability have been nuclear capable throughout the period under study, all five of the nuclear nations have been used for each year of the study in order to provide consistency.<sup>13</sup> The exception is 1945 when Germany, Italy, and Japan are included in the Alliance portfolios. This was done because 1945 was a war year and Germany, Italy and Japan were the enemies of France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United States.

This method of analysis leads to some slightly counter-intuitive results. For example prior to the 1950's Australia and the United Kingdom have a slightly negative relationship. This is due to the adverse effect of the tighter Alliance structure between the United Kingdom and France and the United States than is present in the Commonwealth ties of Australia and the United Kingdom. Since Australia has no reason--based on Alliance analysis--to feel secure about either France or the United States it cannot fully rely on the United Kingdom which has the tightest possible Alliance with these two nations. The Commonwealth Alliance between Australia and the United Kingdom is not enough to counterbalance the stronger formal treaty Alliance the United Kingdom has with France and the United States.

---

<sup>13</sup> This is done as the Tau-B matrix is influenced by the number of nations used to compute the matrix.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

When I began this work there was little literature on the subject of religion and politics much less the relationship between conciliarism and denominational policymaking. While the subject of religion and politics has seen a lot of growth in recent years there is still very little on denominational policymaking especially with regard to issues with a decided political aspect. These factors influenced the decision to omit the traditional review of the literature chapter in favor of an annotated bibliography.

The style of this annotation is admittedly rather idiosyncratic. All the works employed are listed alphabetically by author. Classics in the discipline of Political Science that were used for general background, e.g. Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action, have very brief entries; articles and books of more direct use have longer entries. The content of the entries is intended to give a brief overview of the subject matter of the work, its overall strengths and weaknesses and an indication of its usefulness to the work at hand. Had I tried to give full annotations to all the works cited here the bibliography would have been book length on its own.

Abbott, Walter M. (general editor), The Documents of Vatican II, New York: Gull Press, 1966. This is an excellent presentation of the documents produced by Vatican II. Each document is preceded by an introduction written by a notable expert and followed by a response from another expert. For those interested in Vatican II this is a must read.

Addison, James Thayer, War, Peace, and the Christian Mind: A Review of Recent Thought, Greenwich, Connecticut: The Seabury Press, 1953. While providing, on the whole, an excellent presentation of both pacifist and non-pacifist positions Addison is occasionally guilty of overstating the "glories" of war in an effort to refute the pacifist argument that *all* war is evil. While claiming, probably with justification, that pacifist solutions would have been unsuccessful against Hitler, Addison does not stay with means-ends justification but tries to argue that in such cases war is less evil rather than a necessary evil. This approach hurts his over-all presentation. His distinction between non-resistance and passive resistance is excellent and over-all the book is very worthwhile.

Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971. A classic in the field of decision making. Describes the Rational actor, Bureaucratic Politics, and Organizational Process Models.

Almond, Gabriel A., The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Fredrick Praeger Publisher, 1960. In this work Almond provides a good historical analysis of the trends in American public opinion about foreign policy up to the date of publication. Almond also provides a clear analysis of the various means for the formation of public opinion.

Anderson, Gordon L., "The Evolution of the Concept of Peace in the Work of the National Council of Churches", Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Fall 1984, Volume 21, no. 4, pp. 730-754. An excellent review tracing the evolution of the concept of peace from optimism to disillusionment with government and a turn toward idealistic pacifism to "realism" to a sense of inadequacy to interest group activism. Anderson argues that without a theology of peace the churches will remain ineffective.

Anglican Pacifist Fellowship Members, War and the Lambeth Conference, Oxford, England: Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, 1968. This pamphlet is an indictment of the Anglican Consultative Council for not taking their Lambeth Council Report of 1958 seriously. The members of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship reject the idea of the lesser of evils in favor of an absolute obedience to the Gospel message. In their view the Church has been co-opted by the state and thus led astray from the true path. They argue that the Lambeth Council Report of 1958, "The Reconciling of Conflicts Between and Within Nations", called on Christian people to subject their attitudes on modern warfare to intense prayer and study and that the members of the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship have done so. They believe that the "Church today is ineffective in its witness" because it is not facing the vital theological issues of fundamental importance raised in the 1958 report. They urge all Christians to "recognize that if the pacifist witness is valid at all, it is witness to an imperative which stems from the heart of the Gospel." It is their assertion that "the Church need never subscribe to the doctrine of the Lesser Evil. She may be called upon to make sacrifices which are an evil from the worldly point of view, but the meaning of the Cross is precisely that evil is turned into good by the transforming power of love."

"The Atomic Bomb and the Future", Christianity and Crisis, Volume IX, number 17, October 17, 1949, pp. 129-130. This article deals with the announcement that Russia now has the bomb. Two courses for dealing with this fact are examined. The preferred course is international control of atomic power. If it is not possible to reach international agreements including right of inspection and enforceable sanctions against violators than a balance of power will be required. The fact that no definitely Christian answer to the problem exists is lamented. A few things that Christians can and should do are presented. These include pursuing for a no first use policy, a stronger emphasis on social justice, efforts toward reconciliation and emphasis on the comfort of faith in a world that can never be the same again.

Badie, Bertrand and Pierre Birnbaum, The Sociology of the State, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. To a large extent this book is Sociologists discovering what Political Scientists have known for years. Still it provides a good critique. The last few chapters are clear and informative and the references are excellent, however, 'state' is not operationalized well.

Bainton, Roland H., Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-evaluation, New York: Abingdon Press, 1960. An excellent, well-researched, and well-written survey of the historical roots and 'contemporary' attitudes of Christians toward war and peace.

Bakkevig, Trond, "The Doctrine on Just War--Relevance and Applicability," Studia Theologica, Volume 37, number 2, 1983, pp. 125-145. Bakkevig traces the evolution of the concepts of Just War and peace through the thinking of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther. He

argues that while many have declared the Just War doctrine dead it still has validity. The two main reasons why the Just War doctrine has been declared dead are historicism and the existence of nuclear arms. Historicism has led to a belief that in history good and evil are so intertwined that it is impossible to completely distinguish between good and evil. Bakkevig points out that while it is true that good and evil are intertwined throughout history this has "never stopped God from giving his commandments, the Scriptures from transmitting ethical norms or the Church from confessing the implications of Christian commandments in concrete situations." Those who declare nuclear armaments mean the end of the Just War doctrine argue that nuclear weapons have qualitatively change warfare, placing nuclear war beyond ethical reflection. There are two positions taken by the "nuclear arms mean the death of the Just War doctrine" adherents in the event that deterrence fails. The first could be summed up as "better dead than red." This position holds that physical destruction is not as bad as the moral ruin of communism. The second position believes that communist tyranny is better than the extinction of human life but that there's nothing that can be done because of the current political situation. Bakkevig argues that we still need the Just War doctrine to set some rules about when and how we can engage in war. The fact that nuclear weapons cannot be used under the Just War doctrine means that nuclear arms must be abandoned. The international situation requires that we may have to rely temporarily on deterrence while we work toward nuclear disarmament but by no means should it be regarded as a permanent solution.

Barrett, David B. (ed.), World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Study of Churches and Religions in the Modern World AD 1900-2000, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. A truly excellent reference work containing incredible detail.

Batchelder, Robert C., The Irreversible Decision 1939-1950, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961. An excellent book though lacking in scientific rigor. Batchelder does an excellent job on churches and the atom bomb. He quotes from church councils rather than denominations except in the case of Roman Catholicism.

Bellany, Ian, Australia in the Nuclear Age: National Defence and National Development, Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972. Although dated this book provides an excellent discussion of the nuclear weapons debate in Australia. The focus of Australian concern is on the Chinese nuclear weapons.

Bennett, John C., "The Atomic Bomb and the Future", Christianity and Crisis, Volume IX, number 17, October 17, 1949, pp. 129-130. Deals with the explosion of the first Russian nuclear device. Consists largely of a plea for American Christians to seek reconciliation between the American people and people of other lands.

Bennett, John C. (editor), Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. In general the contributors to this volume do no more than declare that nuclear weapons are an issue that must be addressed. They do this by focusing on particular aspects of the question while, unfortunately, failing to offer any real answers or solutions.

van der Bent, Ans J. (ed.), Handbook of Member Churches World Council of Churches, revised edition, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1985. This book contains a listing of churches which are members of the World Council of Churches as well as information about each church and about the World Council of Churches.

van der Bent, Ans J., Six Hundred Ecumenical Consultations 1948-1982, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1983. A reference work which lists conferences and consultations. Each entry includes title, location, date, participant and other sources to be consulted for more detail.

Berzins, Otto, Nuclear Weapons, New York: Hart Publishing Company, Inc., 1966, 1967. Though somewhat dated in relation to the long term effects of nuclear explosions this is over-all a good primer describing what nuclear weapons are, how they work and what happens when they explode.

Bock, Paul, In Search of a Responsible World Society: The Social Teachings of the World Council of Churches, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974. An excellent overview of World Council of Churches pronouncements. Contains a good explanation of the workings of the World Council of Churches and its relationship to Christianity and society.

Bottome, Edgar M., The Missile Gap: A Study in the Formulation of Military and Public Policy, Cranbury, New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970. This book is a predecessor to Bottome's later work *Balance of Terror* and deals more with the internal mechanisms used in formulating a "missile gap" crisis. Bottom demonstrates that there never was a missile gap. He also shows how crises of a missile gap led to the nuclear, military and political policies that they did. Especially valuable is Appendix A: Comparative Weapons Systems of the United States and the Soviet Union 1949-1966. As Bottome describes it "This appendix is an attempt to present the reported comparative strategic military power of the United States and the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1966, with special emphasis on the "missile gap" period of 1958-1961."

Bottome, Edgar M., The Balance of Terror: A Guide to the Arms Race, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Bottome provides an interesting and useful history and analysis of both the arms race and U.S. strategic doctrine. He demonstrates that the U.S. has been consistently far ahead of the Soviet Union in nuclear weaponry. He proves that the bomber gap and the missile gap were both exercises in myth creation largely by the military industrial complex.

Brash, Alan A., The World Council of Churches, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981 second printing. an excellent primer about the World Council of Churches, its history, purpose, structure, and goals.

Briggs, Kenneth A., "The Bishops' Consensus," Christian Century, May 25, 1983, Volume 100, no. 17, pp. 519-520. Discusses the U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on nuclear weapons in a journalistic manner. Briggs emphasizes the strength of consensus reached by the Bishops.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, The War Trap, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1981. A seminal work in the use of the Expected Utility model for Political Science.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; David Newman; and Alvin Rabuska, Forecasting Political Events: The Future of Hong Kong, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985. The authors apply Expected Utility theory to the Sino-British negotiations over the fate of Hong Kong. The model accurately predicted the outcome of those negotiations and was used to predict the fate of Hong Kong once China resumes administration of the enclave in 1997. This work contains, especially in Chapter II, probably the best description of Expected Utility available.

Camp, Richard L., The Papal Ideology of Social Reform: A Study in Historical Development 1878-1967, Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1969. This work provides a good overview of the history of papal actions but is rather weak on providing the content of what the popes actually said.

Carter, Ashton B. & David N. Schwartz (editors), Ballistic Missile Defense, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984. Carter and Schwartz have put together a good review of the current state of Ballistic Missile Defense. This book covers the technological, political and policy state of this area through a series of essays by experts.

Casaroli, Cardinal Agostino, "The Vatican's Position on Issues of War and Peace," *Origins*, December 8, 1983, Vol. 13, No. 26, pp. 433-440. Cardinal Casaroli, at a November 18 Address at the University of San Francisco, examined the issues of war and peace in the age of nuclear weapons. His Address, printed in *Origins* provides a clear and insightful overview of the development of the Holy See's positions on the issue as well as what the current positions are and how these positions touch the lives of Catholics throughout the world.

"Catholic Bishops Say "No" to Nuclear Arms," Christianity Today, June 17, 1983, Volume 27, no. 10, p. 39. This is a news article regarding the Pastoral Letter "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response" issued by the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Conference. The report highlights certain aspects of the pastoral. Notable among these aspects are the exhortation to Catholics to help rid the world of nuclear weapons, the Just War approach and the inevitable conclusion that nuclear weapons do not meet the Just War criteria of discrimination and proportionality. This Pastoral letter was approved by a vote of 238 to 9.

"The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, The U.S. Catholic Bishops, U.S. Catholic Conference, Inc., Origins, volume 13, number 1, May 19, 1983. This is the complete text of the famous Pastoral letter issued by U.S. Catholic Bishops about the issues of war and peace. "In their pastoral letter, the bishops examine scriptural and theological perspectives on war and peace; they take up issues of public policy and strategy; and they discuss pastoral approaches for developing the role of Christians as peacemakers in the modern world."

Chandran, J.R., "The Authority of the Bible for Christian Social Action", Religion and Society, 1974, Volume 21, no. 1, pp. 18-35, Though the focus of this article is on India's struggle for social justice it makes points applicable to all areas. Of particular interest is the section dealing with the authority of the Bible focusing on various methods of interpreting scripture. These methods can be summarized as follows 1) Biblical literalism, in this view the simple equation of

the Bible with the Word of God comes to be regarded as the Bible says and God says being virtually synonymous. 2) Proof text approach in which passages of the Bible are regarded as authoritative utterances meant to be applicable for all places and generations. Scripture is quoted in the proof text approach in order to support "doctrinal points of view or ethical decisions. 3) Biblical theology approach, here "whatever precisely is meant by that term, it clearly refers to a view which holds that when all allowances have been made for the historical and theological limitations of the Biblical writers, their accounts, even as they stand, enshrine a hard core of truth, both historical and theological." Chandran argues that there are examples throughout the Church's history of the "challenge to relate the proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ to the struggle against social evils and injustice." The Church has not always been at the forefront of movements for social justice and the prevailing method of interpreting scripture has sometimes caused the Church to lag behind other movements. When this has happened it has often been because "vested interest [has] found it convenient to encourage those interpretations which emphasized the purely spiritual, inward, other-worldly and individualistic meaning of salvation and work of Christ, interpretations which had little to say to the prevalent unjust and oppressive social structures."

Chapman, G. Clarke, Jr., "Approaching Nuclearism As a Heresy: Four Paradigms," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Volume 39, number 4, 1984, pp. 255-268. Although his case could be more strongly presented, Chapman nevertheless makes an interesting presentation of "nuclearism" as a covert religion. He provides four paradigms of "nuclearism" 1) power as violence, 2) life as a zero-sum game, 3) reliance on worst case analysis and 4) official optimism a sort of faith in faith. He sees the biblical paradigm of the life of Christ to demonstrate that nuclearism as defined by the four paradigms is heresy. Nuclearism is defined as "the passionate embrace of nuclear weapons as a solution to death anxiety and a way of restoring a lost sense of immortality." Nuclearism is a heresy to the extent it has "penetrated the common sense or even fervent loyalties of millions who count themselves Christians." The Biblical paradigm demonstrates "a vision of power as relational and non-violent, life together as expansive love upheld by the Spirit's fullness, the future as a shared fulfillment that has already begun in forgiveness, and faith as a trustful and cruciform embrace of the unknown and through God." Nuclearism has no place in this paradigm.

Christenson, Reo M., "Christians and Nuclear Aggression", The Christian Century, May 25, 1983, 522-526, The author, an Evangelical, begins with a discussion of how the idea of a Just War has opened the way for violence as a means of settling international disputes and Christian participation in this violence. Christenson describes how this stand--essentially identical to that of non-Christians--has helped to discredit Christianity. He concludes that Augustine's theory of Just War has perverted the faith and that since Jesus would not fight in war we cannot do so and remain true to him.

Clotfelter, James, "Disarmament Movements in the United States", Journal of Peace Research, Volume 23, no. 2, 1986, pp. 97-101, Clotfelter explores six reasons why disarmament movements fail. 1) they are not seen as reflecting the basic values of society, 2) they identify with such widely approved symbols and themes as to deny themselves a clear identity, 3) they become identified with threatening symbols unrelated to disarmament, 4) they focus on the past, the present, or the distant future, 5) they are unable, or unwilling, to convince people that wars

hurt national economies, and 6) they fail to bridge class and ideological divisions. He concludes that the best hope for success that disarmament movements have is to present themselves as single-issue oriented and with strong ties to the churches.

Cochran, Thomas B., William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume I, U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984, Quite a useful source for data regarding the nuclear forces and capabilities of the United States and worth keeping available.

Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, Peace and Disarmament Documents of the World Council of Churches presented by Commission of the Churches on International Affairs; Roman Catholic Church presented by The Pontifical Commission <Justitia et Pax>, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982, This is an excellent reference work. A few pages of general comments precede each collection of documents. The reader is left to draw his/her own conclusions about what the documents mean and how they relate to one another.

Conference of European Churches, Confidence--Détente Disarmament: Report of the IVth Post Helsinki Consultation of the Conference of European Churches 29th May-3rd June 1980, El Escorial, Spain--Confidence Building in the Area of the Helsinki Signatory States--Tasks for the Churches, Geneva: Conference of European Churches, 1980. An interesting look at the policies and goals of the Conference of European Churches. The actual reports and recommendations of the working groups are included.

Conference of European Churches, Dynamic of Hope: Report of the Study Consultation of the Conference of European Churches 26-31 May 1983, Moscow, USSR, Occasional Paper No. 16, 1984. This report contains the speeches of the principal guest speakers as well as the recommendations of the working groups.

Cullmann, Oscar, The State in the New Testament, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. Cullmann argues that there is a dualism in the New Testament perception of the state. The state as an institution is to be accepted and obeyed since it is ordained by God. States, however, that become totalitarian and set themselves up as God are to be resisted. The state as an institution is good the state as an end in itself is bad. Christians are charged with obeying the state as institution but remaining watchful and critical lest the state transgress its legitimate limits.

Davis, Lynn E. & Warner R. Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted to Know About MIRV and ICBM Calculations but Were not Cleared to Ask", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Volume 17, no. 2, June 1973, pp. 207-242. Part I provides a clear, concise, understandable discussion of the techniques employed in nuclear analysis. These include such things as Lethal Radius, Overall Reliability, Single Shot Kill Probability, Circular Error Probable and Reprogrammable Reliability. Part II uses these to reexamine some 1969 claims regarding the percent of minutemen missiles that would be destroyed in a first strike. This is done to present real life examples as well as highlight the impact different assumptions can have on the analysis. Part III describes how these computational techniques can be used to determine the effects of the SALT Interim agreement limitations on the number of modern ICBMs on the character of the threat to US forces by the Soviet ICBMs and the threat of the US forces to Soviet ICBMs. The SALT

agreement is determined to enhance the survivability of both the US and Soviet landbased ICBMs. All in all an excellent article and very useful source.

Dennis, Jack (editor), The Nuclear Almanac: Confronting the Atom in War and Peace, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1984, an excellent work containing both thoughtful essays and comprehensive statistics. A reference work worth having.

Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, NATO, 1983-1986. This publication is almost entirely speculation about the military power of the Soviet Union and contains very little real fact or conclusive evidence. It is also extremely short on actual numbers.

Dodd, C.H., G.R. Cragg, and Jacques Ellul, Social and Cultural Factors in Church Divisions, Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1952, This work is composed of three essays discussing the factors that keep churches from uniting. The 'Disunities' essay especially considers the social and class differences. The 'Cultural and Social' essay looks at the role of nationalism in keeping churches apart.

Donaghy, John (editor), To Proclaim Peace: Religious Communities Speak Out on the Arms Race, Nyack, New York: Fellowship Publications, Second Revised Edition, 1983, This is a collection of statements about nuclear weapons and disarmament by 30 denominations and other religious organizations.

Douglas, J.D. (General Editor), The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1974, 1978, Revised Edition. an excellent reference covering people, places, terms, and concepts of interest to students of the Christian religion.

Douglas, J.D., "as Tension Grows, World Church Council Debates Nuclear Arms", Christianity Today, January 22, 1982, Volume 26, no. 2, p. 32. This is largely a news story about the World Council of Churches Public Hearings being conducted in Amsterdam.

Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1957, a classic in the field. This book describes the rational choices made by political parties in order to increase their share of the vote.

Driver, Tom F. "The Nuclear Dilemma and the Mind of Tragedy", Christianity and Crisis, November 27, 1961, Volume 21, no. 20, pp. 211-213. Driver discusses the potential for a nuclear war and argues that unless we recognize this potential we can never achieve even partial control of our fate. He fails to offer any concrete suggestions.

Duke, David N., "Christians, Enemies and Nuclear Weapons", The Christian Century, November 2, 1983, pp. 986-989, The focus is on questions such as "how ought we, as followers of Christ, love our enemies?" Five basic patterns of treating the enemy are identified in Christian history. 1) Reciprocal even-handed love of the enemy--in this pattern we try to treat others fairly but expect the same from them. This approach "requires nuclear weapons to ensure that enemies can do no more to us than we can do to them." While Jesus specifically rejected this pattern for his

followers when he said "for if you love those who love you, what reward have you?" this pattern forms the basis of international law. 2) Tolerant, practical love of the enemy. Even if the enemy does not love us we will love him, up to a point. There is a limit to this kind of love; the enemy is expected to change. "Nuclear weapons are a necessity just in case friendly overtures do not succeed. 3) Responsible righteous love of the enemy. In this pattern there is no limit to our love of the enemy, but because we are responsible for others we are obligated to defend those for whom we are responsible. "for a just cause one must take up the fight against the enemy." Nuclear weapons might be necessary to use against the enemy in order to defend the survival of loved ones. 4) Responsible, critical love of the enemy. "Like responsible, righteous love of the enemy, responsible, critical love is concerned not for personal survival but for the survival of those for whom one is responsible. Yet that responsibility never allows one to go so far as to claim a just cause in the destruction of the enemy. Violence may be necessary to protect loved ones, but never as a righteous defense." 5) absolute, excessive love of the enemy. This love does not calculate the consequences. This pattern of love believes that since Christ died for his enemies Christians have the responsibility of preserving all life, especially the enemy's. This pattern cannot allow nuclear weapons. Duke concludes that when it comes to the nuclear question only the last two patterns have any hope and that while it is difficult, true Christianity requires absolute excessive love.

Eckhardt, William, "Religious Beliefs and Practices in Relation to Peace and Justice", Social Compass, 1974, Volume XXI, no. 4, pp. 463-472. Eckhardt presents evidence (statistical correlation) demonstrating a connection between religiosity, conformity and militarism. He charges the Christian religion with identifying itself with the status quo and thus contributing strongly to both structural (injustice) and behavioral (war) violence. He recommends fundamental changes in the attitudes of the churches.

Eckstein, Harry, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", Strategies of Inquiry, Volume 7, Handbook of Political Science, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, (editors), Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, This work describes the usefulness of case studies, especially crucial case studies, in theory building. Case studies serve three purposes 1) serving as plausibility tests, 2) providing clues and insights, and 3) intensiveness of research.

Epstein, William, "Canada and Nuclear Weapons," Project Ploughshares Working Paper 85-2, Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares, July 1985. This is an excellent work that traces the evolution of Canadian nuclear policy from Canadian participation in the creation of the first atomic bomb through the choice not to build nuclear weapons to the decision to return US nuclear weapons under joint US-Canadian control. While the Canadian decision not to "go nuclear" was arrived at through tacit consensus the decisions first to accept warheads under joint control and later to return these warheads were more controversial.

Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America Report, "The Christian Conscience and Weapons of Mass Destruction", Christianity and Crisis, Volume 10, number 21, December 11, 1950, pp. 162-168. The basic conclusion of this report is that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil.

Feshbach, Seymour & Michael J. White, "Individual Differences in Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms Policies: Some Psychological and Social Policy Considerations", Journal of Peace Research, Volume 23, no. 2, pp. 129-139, 1986. A fascinating article that explores the findings of survey research on the issue of nuclear armament/disarmament using three studies. These studies show that support for nuclear war fighting has decreased overtime, and that the wording of the question can influence the opinion expressed. These studies also show that "when public opinion is poorly defined it follows the expert knowledge assumed to be possessed by the government and that the amount of nuclear armament information showed a strong negative correlation with pro-nuclear armaments attitudes and one's belief about whether a person can influence the likelihood of nuclear war is an important determinant of activism. The ultimate goal of this article was to give policy pursuit implications to peace activists. analysis revealed that peace activists would benefit most by targeting women under 34 with some college education. This is the group most supportive of peace issues.

Flowers, Ronald B., "The 1960's: A Decisive Decade in American Church/State Relationships," Encounter, Volume 40, number 3, Summer 1979, pp. 287-304. Flowers argues that the 1960's were an important decade in the evolution of church/state relationships in the United States. He highlights a number of precedents setting Supreme Court cases dealing with the separation and establishment clauses in the Constitution. Flowers also notes some important laws that were passed, the election of a Catholic President and the *Dignitates Humanae Personae* decree of the Second Vatican Council. This decree declared that a person's response to God must be free and that neither civil nor ecclesiastical authorities had any right to coerce or hinder a person's expression of faith.

Frame, Randy, "Is the Road to Peace Paved With Might or With Meekness", Christianity Today, July 15, 1983, Volume 27, no. 11, pp. 39-42, This is a news article about a conference of evangelicals titled "The Church and Peacemaking in the Nuclear Age". Evangelicals are divided on this issue between pacifism and peace-through-strength. The article includes a rehashing of the fundamentals of these positions.

Gains, David P., The World Council of Churches: A Study of Its Background and History, Peterborough, New Hampshire: Richard R. Smith, Co., Inc., 1966. While the writing style is rather dry, this book is a good reference providing many details, dates, and facts about the World Council of Churches.

Geyer, Alan, "The arms Race is Serious. Theology, to Date, Isn't.", Christianity and Crisis, November 1, 1982, Volume 42, no. 17, pp. 336-341. Geyer argues that nuclear deterrence and counter force strategy has become a sort of secular theology of national security which theologians and churches are reluctant to challenge. He goes on to discuss 10 morally-loaded issue areas. 1) The problematical role of nuclear doctrine, as each new administration "dismantles the conceptual architecture of its predecessors" the nuclear doctrines fluctuate

between deterrence and nuclear war-fighting resulting in great confusion and ambiguity. Geyer insists that the churches must maintain a clear understanding of what each strategy actually means. 2) The trivialization of nuclear issues; Geyer describes a number of the techniques for undercutting nuclear concern among ordinary citizens. among these are emphasizing the millions of casualties in non-nuclear wars since the beginning of the nuclear period, focusing on the greater proportion of the defense budget that is spent on conventional weapons, and stressing the post-nuclear age forecast of laser and space warfare which "make nuclear weapons obsolete." The churches, in Geyer's opinion, must "constantly stress the transcendent importance of the nuclear question and refuse to subordinate nuclear disarmament to any and all other foreign policy problems in the name of 'linkage.'" 3) Issues of demonology, Geyer deplors the tendency to make demons of enemies and argues that despite the belief of many Americans that the Soviets never make any meaningful disarmament concessions the "truth is that the Soviets made the major concessions in SALT II and that their record of compliance with arms control treaties is generally satisfactory. 4) Issues of nuclear equity, here, Geyer explores the fact that should the nuclear nations choose to annihilate each other through fallout, etc. they would take a number of other nations with them. Among these nations would be signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a treaty which binds the nuclear nations to a commitment to nuclear disarmament. That other nations might suffer greatly for the failure of the nuclear nations to meet this treaty obligation is a clear case of nuclear inequity. 5) Issues of constitutional polity, the very speed and destructiveness of nuclear weapons delivery systems have had profound impact on the nation state and its government. Nations can no longer protect their citizens and the decision making capacity of democratic institutions has been annulled. There is no longer time for deliberative decision making in a security crisis. 6) Issues of political integrity, because the nuclear arms race is promoted with "false words, deceptive jargon, pretentious dogmatics, hateful propaganda and arbitrary bars on access to truth. Demythologizing has become the indispensable theological tool of peacemaking: it is the empowerment of people to understand the stratagems by which inhuman and violent weapons violate the Word of God." 7) Issues of political initiative, each superpower takes unilateral action that escalates the arms race. They each have the responsibility to take "independent non-negotiated actions" that unwind the spiral. The actions "invite a corresponding response, . . . which do not have to depend on the uncertainties of protracted negotiation." 8) issues of security definition, "national security is inseparable from the security of other nations" in other words we are all citizens of the world and working together rather than fighting is going to enhance the security of all. 9) Issues of social justice, "one half of one percent of one year's world military expenditures would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production to the level of self-sufficiency in the world's food-deficient countries." Geyer asks whether ours isn't a "faith which requires the beating of at least some bombers into plowshares and some missiles into pruning hooks?" 10) Issues of mental and spiritual health, Geyer highlights the absurd contradiction of relying on both absolute terror and absolute reason in nuclear strategy. He argues that this fundamental contradiction relying on the cool headed reasoning of the enemy in the face of terror results in mental health problems both for decision makers and for youth who wonder if they will have a world in which to grow-up.

Geyer, Alan, "Unity vs. Prophecy at Uppsala", The Christian Century, June 1, 1983, Volume 100, no. 18, pp. 543-544. While primarily a news article about the Life and Peace conference held in April this piece highlights the central role discussions of nuclear issues have come to play in ecumenical conferences.

Gilkey, Langdon, "The Political Dimensions of Theology", Journal of Religion, Volume 59, April 1979, 154-168.

Greenwald, Carol S., Group Power: Lobbying and Public Policy, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977. A plainly written analysis of the nature of groups and their power. The emphasis in this book is on how group power can most effectively be used in lobbying.

Gremillion, Joseph B., Continuing Christ in the Modern World: Teaching Christian Social Concepts in the Light of Vatican Council II, Dayton, Ohio: Geo. A. Pflaum, Publisher, Inc., 1967.

Gremillion, Joseph & William Ryan, World Faiths and the New World Order: A Muslim-Jewish-Christian Search Begins, Washington, D.C: The Interreligious Peace Colloquium, 1978.

Halperin, Morton H., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974, A useful exploration of the workings of bureaucratic politics, and bureaucratic policy-making.

Hennessy, Bernard C., Public Opinion, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Second Edition, 1970. This is A very good textbook presentation of the attributes, use, and measurement of public opinion. It is very clearly and simply stated and covers the subject in A thorough manner.

Hessel, Dieter T., *Moving Toward Shalom: Essays in Memory of John T. Connor*, Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1987, pp. 5-18. This collection of five essays was commissioned as lectures by the Shalom Education Fund. The essays explore the Christian call to be in the world and not of it and the implications this call has for the relationship between the Christian and the state. Specifically, the essays examine when and in what fashion the Christian should resist the state. The conclusion is that this should never be undertaken lightly but there are certain circumstances when "bandaging the victim of the wheel of state is no longer sufficient and it becomes necessary to put A spoke in that wheel."

Hoekema, David A., "Morality, Just War, and Nuclear Weapons: An analysis of 'The Challenge of Peace'", Soundings, Winter 1984, Volume 67, no. 4, pp. 359-378, Hoekema analyses the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter as philosophy and ethics. He finds that in stopping short of A total condemnation of nuclear deterrence the Bishops failed to carry out the full logic of their arguments underpinning the rest of their letter.

Holmes, Jack E., The Mood/Interest Theory of American Foreign Policy, Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985, This book advances an interesting theory. It argues that the American public swings between introversion--isolationist mood--and extroversion--internationalist mood. The theoretical propositions and framework of the theory can all be found in the introduction.

Holsti, Ole R., Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969. This book provides a good description of content analysis, what it is and how to do it. It provides the foundation for the content analysis done in this dissertation.

Hudson, Darril, The World Council of Churches in International Affairs, Great Britain: The Faith Press, 1977. Hudson examines the role of the World Council of Churches as an international non-governmental organization. Using a skillful blend of analysis and quotations he makes a strong case for the effectiveness of the World Council of Churches in this role. The introduction gives an excellent description of non-governmental organizations and how the World Council of Churches fits this description.

Hudson, Winthrop Still, Nationalism and Religion in America: Concepts of American Identity and Mission, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970.

Information Please Almanac, New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co. (publisher has varied), annual, A useful source for finding fact and figures.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, (previously Institute for Strategic Studies), The Military Balance, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, annual since 1959, an excellent source of information and statistics about the world military balance. Data cover both individual states and the important Alliances.

Jacquet, Constant H., Jr., (editor), Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches 1985, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1985. This is an excellent source of addresses and some good statistics. It is published annually.

Jendrzeczyk, Mike (editor), The Deterrence Debate, Nyack, New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1984. This is the result of a panel discussion at the World Council of Churches General Assembly in Vancouver, B.C. 1983. While all the participants agreed that nuclear weapons are morally unacceptable and must never be used there was no consensus about what should be done to prevent their use. The suggestions ranged from unilateral disarmament to an acceptance of deterrence. This work also contains excerpts from statements made by the World Council of Churches (1981 and 1983) and the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter.

Johnson, David & Gene LaRocque, "The Mythology of National Defense", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 30, no. 7, pp. 21-26, September 1974. This work examines the way in which new weaponry is justified and the changes that these justifications have made in U.S. strategic doctrine. Johnson and LaRocque deplore the shift in nuclear strategy from the traditional "mutual assured destruction" to a counter-force posture in which there is a perceived lessening in the unwillingness to use nuclear weapons except as a massive retaliatory strike. Counter-force weaponry can be viewed as indicating the intent to launch a first strike against an opponents nuclear weapons. The authors believe the pursuit of a counter-force capability as destabilizing due to the potential for opponent perceptions of a possible first strike intent and because such capability leads to a tendency to imply the threat of nuclear war for "some ill-

defined transgression" rather than "for fairly specific contingencies, for example, an attack on the United States or its NATO allies."

Johnson, Kermit D., "Will the Bishops spar with Shadows", Christianity and Crisis, March 19, 1984, Volume 44, no. 4, pp. 81-82. Johnson examines the claim that possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is morally justifiable as long as there is no intention that these weapons would EVER be used. He points out that this claim is preposterous since deterrence rests on a willingness to use these weapons in retaliation. Johnson laments the failure of the U.S. Catholic Bishops to carry the logic of their Pastoral Letter to its conclusion and reject, totally, nuclear weapons. He expresses the hope that as "round two of the debate" gets underway the Bishops will remedy this failure.

Jones, Rufus M. (editor), The Church, the Gospel and War, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948. A two part collection. Part one deals with pacifism mostly from personal viewpoints. Part two deals with church/state relations as they relate to war. The Bainton, Latourette, and Iglehart pieces are excellent.

Joynt, Carey B., "The Agony of Choice in a Nuclear Age", Journal of Bible and Religion, Volume 30, July 1962, pp. 237-241. This is a review of Roland Bainton's Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace and Paul Ramsey's War and the Christian Conscience. Joynt finds Bainton's Christian nuclear pacifism more persuasive than Ramsey's effort to make a Just War case for nuclear weapons.

Kelly, Amy S., "The Spiritual Imperative for Peace", Mobius, Volume 4, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 112-124. The content of this article is summed up very well in the title. The basic argument is that peace is a spiritual imperative.

Kelly, James R., "Catholicism and Modern Memory: Some Sociological Reflections on the Symbolic Foundations of the Rhetorical Force of the Pastoral Letter, 'The Challenge of Peace'", Sociological Analysis, Volume 45, no. 2, pp. 131-144, 1984. Kelly examines the relevance, symbolism, and importance of the Pastoral Letter. While there is a great deal of sociological jargon there is also detailed and informative analysis. Kelly notes that the US Catholic bishops have on a regular basis issued statements on a vast array of social issues. These statements have tended to be mildly progressive by the standards of American politics but have been largely ignored by the media, public and even most Catholics. This makes the attention given the Pastoral Letter "The Challenge of Peace" all the more surprising. Kelly explains this attention in part by pointing out that it is regarded as a departure for the Catholic bishops to criticize American policy and not "show a readiness to endorse it simply because government attaches it to the need to combat communism." Catholics have historically been staunch foes of communism. "Catholicism and Modern Memory" points out the inherent tensions between the Bishops efforts to "place beyond the permissible realm of morality most uses of nuclear weapons which the American government, and indeed all nations with nuclear weapons, find inexpedient to renounce." Altogether, Kelly, provides a detailed and fascinating analysis.

de Knijff, Henry D., "The Churches Growing 'No' to Nuclear Weapons", The Modern Churchman, Volume 25, number 4, 1983, pp. 42-47, Basically this is a review of the Church of

England report The Church and the Bomb. The introduction, however, mentions actions taken by many other churches and councils. These actions include the Dutch Reform Church's 1979 declaration that both the use and possession of nuclear weapons have to be considered contrary to the will of God and the declaration of the Reformed Council in Germany which has declared the renunciation of nuclear weapons a matter of *status confessionis*.

Lawler, Justus George, "Moral Confusion in the Nuclear Age", The Christian Century, April 4, 1984, Volume 101, no. 11, pp. 331-335. Lawler writes against the position of Michael Novak. Novak is in favor of massive deterrence and the elimination of Just War requirements of non-combatant immunity. Lawler is appalled by this position and the lack of Christian moral love it demonstrates.

Lawler's polemical tone and rhetorical flourishes do not add much to the debate tending as they do to make the reader heartily sick of Lawler and Novak.

Lenski, Gerhard, The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economic, and Family Life, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963, Revised Edition. In this pioneering work, Lenski, examined the influence of religion on secular institutions. His study revolved around a sample survey. Examining two religious orientations, orthodoxy and devotionism, in four religious groups, Jewish, White Catholic, White Protestant, and Negro Protestant, Lenski found that the influence of religion on the secular areas of economics, politics, and family life was substantially higher than had been believed. This is an excellent study that deserves to be replicated.

Listhaug, Ola, "War and Defence Attitudes: A First Look at Survey Data from 14 Countries", Journal of Peace Research, Volume 23, no. 1, pp. 69-76, 1986, Survey data from 1981-82, regarding attitudes toward war were studied for 14 countries. The focus was on four issues 1) fear of war, 2) willingness to defend the country, 3) for which goals respondents were willing to sacrifice everything, and 4) trust in the armed forces. Most nations that have a high fear of war also have greater reluctance to defend the country with the exceptions of the US, which ranks high on fear and willingness and Italy, which ranks low on both fear and willingness. Listhaug concludes that three main factors may be argued to explain the levels of fear of war and willingness to defend the country found in the data, experiences of defeat, suffering in war and a vulnerable geopolitical location. The US differences are explained away by pointing out that the US is most likely to be fighting at a geographical distance from itself and the war is likely to be limited. The article provides an interesting first cut but limitations on the data mean that it fails to provide more than a preliminary assessment.

Littell, Franklin Hamlin, From State Church to Pluralism: A Protestant Interpretation of Religion in American History, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962, Littell traces the role of religion in America from colonial times to 1960. He argues that Protestantism dominated until fairly recently when a dialogue began between Protestant, Catholic and Jew. It is his claim that a massive influx of new members resulted in a loss of true religion, church discipline and theology. It's an interesting book despite its polemical tone against what Littell calls Protestant Nativism.

Litterer, Joseph A. (editor), Organizations: Structure and Behavior, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Third Edition 1980. In this work, Litterer, provides one of the best readers available on the subject. Sections by Max Weber and Talcott Parsons are included as well as contributions by more recent experts. The work has a uniformity and cohesion too often lacking in readers.

Long, Edward Leroy, Jr., The Christian Response to the Atomic Crisis, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950. The basis of this book is the shared guilt, felt by scientist and theologians, over the use of the atomic bomb. The book details how this shared feeling compliments and affirms the perspectives of each. The ultimate thrust of the book, however, is how the perspectives of the scientists ultimately fall short in light of Christian ethics. The calculative morality, trying to do the best we can given the situation, may work for many problems but when the problem may result in the end of history itself through the cessation of human life "the best we can" falls far short of the mark in Long's estimation. He argues instead that the only hope lies in the power of Christian redemption and Christian obedience. Without Christian obedience and redemption based on an ultimate standard mankind is in grave danger of miscalculating and destroying everything. This book provides a very interesting look at the way the atomic crisis was perceived in the early years. It is striking to note how similar the perceptions were to the beliefs about the nuclear threat evident in the 1980s. Chapter V provides a good discussion of the original United Nations negotiations about the bomb and international control.

Luttbeg, Norman R. (editor), Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage, Itasca, Illinois: Peacock Publishers, Inc., Third Edition, 1981. This reader provides 30 articles addressing various models of political linkage. These models serve to divide the work into five parts. Political linkage, defined as "any means by which political leaders act in accordance with the wants, needs and demands of the public in making government policy" (p. 3) rather than public opinion is the focus of this work.

MacCarthy, Ester Josephine, "The Catholic Periodical Press and Issues of War and Peace: 1914-1946", Ph.D. Dissertation: Stanford University, 1977, MacCarthy deals partly with the response of the Catholic Church to World War I and its aftermath and with the operation of the National Catholic War Council. She demonstrates that most Catholic periodicals eventually supported Woodrow Wilson's policies.

MacGregor, G.H.C., The New Testament Basis of Pacifism, New York: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1936, a very convincing argument for Christian pacifism by the foremost apologist for same. Heavy reliance on biblical statements leads to clear, logical, well-reasoned and convincing conclusions that the ethic of Jesus is pacifism based on redeeming love.

MacIver, Martha Abele, "Integrating Faith and Politics in Western Europe: The Influence of Religious Convictions on Political Attitudes", American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 1986, Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 1986, MacIver studies 'religious politicization' or the extent to which an individual consciously links religious belief and political attitudes. Using Eurobarometer data the study finds that on some issue there is a significant difference between the religious and the non-religious.

Mahood, H.R. (editor), Pressure Groups in American Politics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. The best part of this book is Chapter I, which provides an excellent historical review of Group Theory. Unfortunately, the other chapters in the book are sadly dated and of very little use.

Martin, David and Peter Mullen (editors), Unholy Warfare: The Church and the Bomb, England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, 1983, Martin and Mullen have provided an intriguing discussion of British nuclear deterrence policies and options. The collection of essays is by a large number of authors and experts. The book is largely in reaction to The Church and the Bomb, a Church of England position paper. David Martin provides probably the best essay in the collection.

Marwah, Onker and Jonathan D. Pollack (editors), Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. This is a series of essays written by some of the foremost experts on Asian security issues.

Mayer, Carl, "Moral Issues in the Nuclear Dilemma," Christianity and Crisis, March 19, 1962, Volume 22, Number 4, pp. 36-38. This article is a response to a debate that had been taking place in the pages of Christianity and Crisis regarding nuclear deterrence. Mayer is pro-deterrence arguing that it has kept the peace and that the proposals of the previous authors would have the effect of undermining deterrence and thus lead to war.

McSorley, Richard, New Testament Basis of Peacemaking, Washington, D.C: Center for Peace Studies, 1979, 1985. An interesting and thought provoking book. McSorley supports total pacifism. His critique of the Just-Unjust War Theory is telling but he fails to answer some of the most persuasive arguments against total pacifism--Nazi death camps and the right of Christians to decide for non-believers. Definitely worth reading.

Mead, Frank S., Handbook of Denominations in the United States, seventh edition, Nashville: Abingdon, 1980.

Meagher, Paul Kevin; Thomas C. O'Brien & Sister Consuelo Maria Aherne (editors), Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion, Washington, D.C.: Corpus Publications, Three Volumes, 1979. An excellent reference work dealing with the important aspects, concepts, people, etc., of the major religions of the world. The Roman Catholic religion receives the most detailed examination.

Melton, J. Gordon, Religious Bodies in the United States: A Directory, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992. This is a very useful reference work that provides a brief overview of the organization including its date of formation, Address, denominational affiliations, and purpose.

Merkel, Peter H. and Ninian Smart (editors), Religion and Politics in the Modern World, New York: New York University Press, 1983, a book full of interesting ideas. In general it focuses on nationalism, ethnicity and the similarity between these concepts and religion.

Miller, John H. (editor), Vatican II: An Interfaith Appraisal: International Theological

Conference, University of Notre Dame: March 20-26, 1966, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966. A fascinating look into the views of other religions regarding Vatican II. Various aspects of Vatican II are explored by prominent members of other religions.

Moellering, Ralph Luther, Modern War and the American Churches: A Factual Study of the Christian Conscience on Trial from 1939 to the Cold War Crisis of Today, New York: The American Press, 1956, a useful source for information and anecdotes about the attitudes of American churches concerning warfare and nuclear weaponry. Unfortunately it is not a very current source.

Molnar, Thomas, "Jacques Ellul on Christianity and Politics", *The Political Science Reviewer*, Volume XIV, Fall 1984.

Monroe, Anne, "Radical Evangelicals Are Gaining Influence Protesting U.S. Policy", The Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1985, This is a news article about evangelicals such as the Sojourners community who are theologically conservative but socially radical. These evangelicals "translate the Bible's calls for justice and peace into demands for disarmament, ending the death penalty and changing society to help the people they believe God favors--the poor."

Morgan, Patrick M., Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, second edition, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1983, Morgan argues that there are two types of deterrence--general and immediate. The need for immediate deterrence indicates a failure of general deterrence. He also argues that different types of decision-making have different effects on deterrence and believes that sensible incrementalist reversible decision-making is best. He concludes that the policy of deterrence is not really that good. It is an excellent book.

Murphy, Matthew F., "Nuclear Weapons and the Criterion of Proportionality", Center Journal, Winter 1982, Volume 2, no. 1, pp. 25-36. Murphy takes issue with the criticism leveled at nuclear weapons by Catholic opponents that nuclear weapons do not meet the Just War criterion of proportionality. He points out the small megatonage of U.S. nuclear weapons relative to their Soviet counterparts and criticizes opponents for not being explicit about which weapons would meet the proportionality criterion. On the whole Murphy's arguments fail to convince.

National Conference of Catholic Bishops United States Catholic Conference, In the Name of Peace: Collective Statements of the United States Catholic Bishops on War and Peace, 1919-1980, Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1983. This collection of statements by the United States Catholic Bishops on the subject of war and peace is an invaluable resource. Each statement is prefaced by a summary placing it in historical context and relating it to previous statements. The appendix "The Just-War Ethic and Catholic Theology Dynamics of Change and Continuity," by J. Bryan Hehir is the best summary of the just-war ethic and the shift to the inclusion of a pacifist position in Catholic thought that I have seen. Hehir draws upon the work of the best scholars in the field to provide a clear presentation of the development of the just-war ethic and the factors that led to the inclusion of pacifism as a Catholic position.

Nimmo, Dan D. & Charles M. Bonjean (editors), Political Attitudes and Public Opinion, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1972. This is an excellent reader for a basic course in

public opinion. It is somewhat dated but has actually held up quite well to the passage of time. The focus of the work is political attitudes, public opinion and how these two factors interact.

Nystrom, Paul C. & William H. Starbuck (editors), Handbook of Organizational Design, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981. While the primary focus of the works in these volumes is corporate management many of the articles are still useful to a political scientist.

Olson, Mancur, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971, Olson explores the characteristics of groups and organizations and the free rider problem. This is a classic work arguing that the larger the group the more incentive there is not to pay the cost of participating since the loss of individual payment will not be readily perceptible.

"Pacific Nuclear Free?" One World, number 104, April 1985. This is a news report about the New Zealand Council of Churches approval of the New Zealand government's decision to refuse to allow nuclear ships to stop in its ports. The council described the US's reactions to this decision as punitive and part of a "general tightening of control by the USA in response to an even more significant refusal on the part of the Pacific to bow to the 'nuclear imperialism' from any quarter."

Pollack, Jonathan D., "China as a Nuclear Power", in Asia's Nuclear Future, William H. Overholt (editor), pp. 35-65, 1977. Written by the foremost authority on the Chinese nuclear program this work traces the development of Chinese nuclear weapons as well as the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and policy.

Pollard, William G., "The Christian and Atomic Crisis", Christianity Today, October 13, 1958, Volume III, no. 1, pp. 6-9, Pollard, an Episcopal priest, is trying to defend himself from charges leveled by C. Wright Mills that Christianity is morally bankrupt unless it actively opposes nuclear weapons and the potential for total nuclear war. Pollard, An Executive Director of the Oak Ridge Institute for Nuclear Studies, argues that Christianity is not a religion based on ethics but on the Grace of God. He makes several interesting points about Christianity including what he perceives as the greatest opposition between Christian faith and modern life, the "modern quest for complete autonomy of man." Pollard ultimately fails to effectively refute Mills' claims that Christianity should actively oppose nuclear weapons.

Potter, Ralph, "Silence or Babel: The Churches and Peace," Social Action, Volume 32, January/February 1966, pp. 34-45. Potter Addresses the claim of many that the churches have been silent on the nuclear issue. He argues that this claim is unfounded. The churches have not been silent they have instead spoken poorly on the issue. The churches have not been willing to develop the specialized competence needed to deal with this highly complex subject. Until they develop such competence, Potter insists, the churches will not be able to address the issue thoroughly nor will they be able to play a significant role in policy formation. He laments the babel of Christian voices in this area advocating positions ranging along a continuum nearly from far left to far right. He cites the attempts by the World Council of Churches to address this issue in 1948 as an example of the difficulty the churches have in speaking with one voice. The report of the WCC indicates that "an irreducible plurality of conscientious convictions persisted

after fraternal confrontation." This same inability to reach a consensus is cited in other conciliar gatherings. Unless the churches develop the specialized knowledge and expertise to address the issue adequately there will continue to be a lack of consensus warns Potter. Without their own experts the churches will be pushed into "either reflexive protest or abdication by abstraction." If they want to play a role in shaping public policy they must be willing to pay the price of acquiring expertise.

Preston, Ronald H. (editor), Technology and Social Justice: An International Symposium on the Social and Economic Teaching of the World Council of Churches from Geneva 1966 to Uppsala 1968, London: SCM Press, LTD., 1971, The focus of this work is on economic development.

"Public Hearing on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament", The Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, No. 2, pp. 74-75, 1982. This is a news article on the public hearings sponsored by the World Council of Churches about nuclear weapons and disarmament. The hearings considered the questions of "1) a global view of the political aspects of nuclear escalation. 2) Present theological and ethical concerns in relation to the use of nuclear weapons. 3) Driving forces in the development and introduction of new nuclear weapons systems. 4) Strategy of limited nuclear war and the theory of nuclear deterrence. 5) Prospects of the negotiations for arms control. 6) Multilateral and unilateral disarmament. 7) Problems of the developing countries in connection with the arms race and nuclear proliferation." at the conclusion "The Hearing Group signed a statement in which military strategies oriented at nuclear warfare were condemned. It urged the continuation of the talks on nuclear disarmament and the resumption of the SALT process. The document called upon the Churches to pray for the success of the talks on the reduction of nuclear armaments."

Quinn, John R., "The Vision of Peace in a Nuclear Age", Mobius, January 1984, Volume 4, no. 1, pp. 109-111. Written by the Archbishop of San Francisco this work considers the factors that contribute to the likelihood of nuclear war: rhetoric, belief that war is inevitable, failure to recognize the qualitative difference between nuclear and conventional weapons. Quinn argues that if these factors are changed by the creation of a new international order there will be a better chance for peace. He is, unfortunately, vague about how to create this new order.

Raitt, Jill (editor), Religious Conscience and Nuclear Warfare: 1982 Paine Lectures in Religion, Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1983, Essay I discusses Pacifism, Just-War, Survivalism, and Sovereign-States Deterrence in terms of the nuclear threat taking basically a pacifist stance. Essay II while concerned about the tremendous number of nuclear warheads takes a position in favor of deterrence, an interesting essay.

Ramsey, Paul, War and the Christian: How Shall Modern War Be Conducted, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1961, Ramsey makes an argument not for Just Warfare--since warfare can never be just--but for Justified Warfare. "Out of neighbor-regarding love for all one's fellow men, PREFERENTIAL decision among one's neighbors may and can and must be made." (emphasis in original) In this sense can warfare be justified, the evils of my Nazi neighbors may be ended by violence in order to save my Jewish neighbors. ONLY counter-force warfare can be justified. Weapons must be confined to those which are usable and rational and limits must be placed on them by each government based on a moral-political decision. By Ramsey's logic

strategic nuclear weapons could never be used but tactical nuclear weapon use could in some circumstances be justified.

Rathjens, G.W. and G.B. Kistiakowsky, "Limitation of Strategic Arms", Scientific American, Volume 222, number 1, January 1970, pp. 19-29. The authors examine the potential impact of MIRV and ABM on the strategic balance. They recognize that what seems rational to objective observers may not seem rational to decision-makers caught up in the strange logic of international relations. This logic seems to demand a response to any change in the strategic posture by the opponent. This is true even when the change is directed toward a third party. For example, Soviet deployment of an ABM system in response to the growing Chinese nuclear arsenal will result in the US increasing qualitatively or quantitatively its nuclear weaponry so as to be capable of overwhelming the Soviet ABM. The authors argue that "because the assured-destruction, or damage-inflicting, capabilities of the two superpowers are so large and so varied, the present strategic balance is remarkably insensitive to either qualitative or quantitative changes in strategic forces." They further argue that improvements in defensive capability can always be offset by improvements in offensive capabilities. They find the development of MIRV troubling because of the concern that this technology might be used in a preemptive strike against the other side's nuclear forces and the possibility that in the event of a nuclear exchange MIRV technology might lead to an escalation to an all out nuclear war. They urge constraints be placed on the development of MIRV's. Since SALT is unlikely to lead to reductions in the assured-destruction capabilities of the superpowers Rathjens and Kistiakowsky believe that the most important goal of SALT is the reduction of the likelihood of nuclear exchanges ever taking place. They argue that the most that can reasonably be expected is "a move toward a strategic balance where (1) uncertainties about the adversary are reduced and with them the tensions; (2) each side can inflict a level of damage on the other sufficient to destroy its society but neither feels a need to maintain a great overkill capability as a hedge against possible damage-limiting efforts by the other; (3) there will be an improved chance that a thermonuclear exchange, should one begin, would be terminated short of running its course and (4) the levels of expenditure on strategic armaments are lower, so that larger fractions of the resources available to each society can be used for more constructive endeavors."

Ray, James Lee, "Threats to Protracted Peace: World Politics According to Murphy," In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., (editor) The Long Postwar Peace, New York, New York, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1991, pp.329-344.

Ray, James Lee, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition, Columbia, South Carolina, The University of South Carolina Press, 1995. The subtitle says it all. The democratic peace proposition is demonstrated to have a great deal of strength. Democracies do not typically war with other democracies. The definition of democracy, in my opinion, needs strengthening. And the question of whether the age of a democracy has any impact could be more fully explored. All in all a good resource.

Reichley, A. James, "Religion and the Future of American Politics", Political Science Quarterly, Volume 101, Number 1, 1986, pp. 23-48.

Reissig, Herman F., "Change Without War: National Armaments Are Obsolete", Social Action, Volume 29, October 1962, pp. 4-12. This article discusses ways of resolving differences between nations and presiding over peaceful change. The analysis is based on ten propositions--from nation-states are the basic international political actors to "the tasks set forth in this article are immensely complex". Reissig argues that the churches must work to awake the spiritual consciences to the outrage of nuclear war. To do this they need to challenge the system of beliefs that puts the nation above humanity. They will also have to support new ideas and now policies while making clear the basic facts of the world situation. altogether Reissig presents an interesting if utopian vision.

Reports from the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches, Evanston Speaks: Reports from the Second Assembly of the World Council of Churches, World Council of Churches August 15-31, 1954, Geneva, This work includes the actual reports and resolutions in their entirety.

The Report of a Working Party under the Chairmanship of the Bishop of Salisbury, The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience, England: CIO Publishing, 1982. The first few chapters provide a nice primer on nuclear weapons and nuclear strategies. The recommendation finally made is that Britain unilaterally disarm without withdrawing from Nato thus allowing it to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It attempts, unsuccessfully, to demonstrate how this would still be moral and how Britain would not be a free-rider. An interesting book.

Rochon, Thomas R., "The Churches and the Peace Movements in Western Europe", August 28-31, Washington, D.C., American Political Science Association, 1986, Rochon argues that it is the lay organizations that are taking strong stands, that the churches themselves stop short of outright rejection of nuclear weapons.

Rosenau, James N., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1961. Rosenau describes the basic theory of public opinion and how this theory relates to making foreign policy. While his examples are dated the basic analysis has held up well over time.

Rosenau, James N., The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence, Research Monograph #31, Princeton University: Center of International Studies, 1968. Rosenau demonstrates the existence of a minority of the public that is attentive to foreign policy. This "attentive public" actively seeks to influence foreign policy and is demonstrated to be growing.

Rosenberg, David Alan, "U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945-1950", The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May 1982, Volume 38, no. 5, pp. 25-30. Rosenberg, after finally receiving access to the U.S. nuclear stockpile figures presents them along with an analysis of how the secrecy and misperceptions about the size of this stockpile affected Cold War policy-making. He argues that the effects of these misperceptions are still evident in attitudes and policies today.

Ruoss, G. Martin, A World Directory of Theological Libraries, Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968. Although somewhat outdated this work contains a very good listing of theological libraries around the world.

Russett, Bruce and Miles Lackey, "In the Shadow of the Cloud: If There's No Tomorrow, Why Save Today?" American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28-31, 1986, This paper tests the proposition that people who regard nuclear war as eminent are less likely to save than those with greater confidence in the future.

Salomon, Kim, "The Peace Movement--an Anti-Establishment Movement," Journal of Peace Research, Volume 23, number 2, 1986, 115-127. Salomon looks at two views of the peace movement, 1) reaction to NATO's double-track decision of 1979 which reinforced man's fear of nuclear war and 2) Soviet manipulation of popular opinion and/or the peace movement in the West. He does not find either of these explanations entirely persuasive. Salomon argues that the peace movement must be placed in a broader social perspective. It is necessary first to examine the peace movement in light of other social movements. Salomon notes that there often exists a conflict "between the movement and the established society which the authorities represent. The movements believe that traditional policies have failed and can no longer present satisfactory solutions to serious political problems." This can be seen as true of the peace movement. "The peace movement's criticism of the nuclear arsenals also implies criticism of the logic of established security policies." Salomon also notes that the members of the peace movements tend to be younger, well-educated citizens with ties to the Green political parties and ecological movements. This group tends to have more anti-establishment attitudes.

Sanders, Thomas G., Protestant Concepts of Church and State: Historical Backgrounds and Approaches for the Future, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964.

Shannon, Thomas A. (editor), War or Peace? The Search for New Answers, Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1980. This volume is dedicated to noted pacifist and sociologist Gordon C. Zahn. Zahn provides an afterword and the editor an introduction. The book is divided into three parts. Part One Addresses *The Just War*, Part Two, *Pacifism* and Part Three *The Church and Pacifism*. The thrust of the book is strongly pacifist. The Just-War section acknowledges that in the age of modern (nuclear) war pacifism is a legitimate position that has a great deal to offer the Just-War tradition in terms of moral and ethical evaluation of how war may be waged. The other sections trace the development and roots of pacifism in the Catholic tradition. While the Just-War tradition has tended to dominate Catholic thought pacifism has not been absent. It has grown in stature since World War II and especially Vietnam.

Schonfield, Hugh J., The Politics of God, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970, Schonfield argues that both Judaism and Christianity have failed to realize the Mesianism intended by God. He argues that God intended the establishment of a servant-nation originally the Jews but latter the Christians. In the second part of the book he details his own formation of the Commonwealth of the World or Modcivitan Republic. Schonfield's arguments are well-reasoned and convincing though he flouts many traditional beliefs and dabbles in psychic phenomenon. For this reason it is difficult to decide whether he is "genuinely doing God's will or merely an interesting crackpot".

Sibley, Jack R., "The World and the Church: Revolution, Reformation, and Revelation," Encounter, Volume 40, Number 3, Summer 1979, pp. 305-311. Sibley argues that the Church has tended to overlook the fact that God so loved the *World* (emphasis in original). He claims that the Church likes to view itself as separate from the world and as a result has failed to recognize the extent to which Church reformations have been connected to economic and social revolution. He argues that reliance on God's revelation can enhance the connection between reformation and revolution. This will help the Church to fulfill its purpose in the world that God so loved.

Sider, Ronald J. & Richard K. Taylor, Nuclear Holocaust and Christian Hope: A Book for Christian Peacemakers, New York: IntersVarsity Press, 1982, Written by two evangelicals this book has 'raised some eyebrows' advocating as it does Civilian Based Defense (CBD) which is a sort of passive resistance. While much of it is simplistic and it fails to Address the question of the right of Christians to decide for others it is over-all an interesting book.

Singer, J. David (editor), The Correlates of War: I Research Origins and Rationale, New York: Free Press, Volume One, 1979. The subtitle "Research Origins and Rationale" gives a very good idea of the approach in this book. The Correlates of War project is described as follows: "In the spring of 1963 the University of Michigan's Center for Research on Conflict Resolution received a modest grant from the Carnegie Corporation, of which some \$15,000 was earmarked for a preliminary investigation into the conditions that have been historically correlated with international war in the past, or might be expected to be so in the future." (p. xi) This preliminary investigation grew into a program of unsurpassed scope. The Correlates of War project has had tremendous impact on the discipline of Political Science setting standards of scientific rigor and precision that have become benchmarks in the field. This first volume of The Correlates of War contains the essays that form the background for all subsequent work. In them the questions, hypotheses, models, and definitions that form the basis of the project are spelled out clearly. It is an excellent work that has become a classic in the field.

Singer, J. David (editor), The Correlates of War, New York: Free Press, Volume Two, 1979. This is the second volume of the Correlates of War project undertaken to explore the fundamental questions about war. Which nations engage in war, why do nations engage in war, etc. This classic in the field is divided into five parts, I. Methodological Perspectives, II. Accounting for the Onset of War, III. Accounting for the Expansion of War, IV. Accounting for the Outcomes of War and V. The Findings and Their Implications. The scientific rigor and clarity of the Correlates of War project is one of the benchmarks of Political Science at its best. The various contributors to this volume each advance knowledge in their own way. While it does not yet provide an encompassing theory this work adds to the overall knowledge of the subject and indicates further avenues of research.

Singer, J. David; Stuart Bremer; and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965", Peace, War, and Numbers, Pages 19-48, Bruce Russett (editor), Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972. This pioneering work helped to establish conditions of scientific rigor in the study of international relations. Specifically, Singer *et al*, sought to determine whether the preponderance and stability model which holds that war "will

increase as the system moves away from a high and stable concentration of capabilities" or the parity and fluidity model which holds that war "will decrease as the system moves away from such a high and stable concentration and toward a more ambiguous state of approximate parity" was a more accurate depiction of the conditions that lead to war. In order to test these models they created a measure of national capabilities based on six initial indicators, the nation's total population, the number of people living in cities of 20,000 or larger, energy consumption, iron or steel production, military expenditures and armed forces size, excluding reserves. These six initial indicators are reduced to three groupings, demographic, industrial, and military. In order to create a measure of war potential they "first compute the total score (in people, tons, dollars, etc.) for the system, and then ascertain each nation's percentage share. This has the virtue of normalizing all of [their] data, reduces the computational problems associated with fluctuating currency conversion rates, avoids that of changes in purchasing power, and puts the figures into ideal form for the computation of [their] concentration-distribution scores." Looking at capabilities, change in capabilities and movement of relative rank among nations, Singer *et al* discover that the parity and fluidity model closely fits the 19th century while the preponderance and stability model better describes the 20th century.

Sivard, Ruth Leger, World Military and Social Expenditures 1985, Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1985.

Slack, Kenneth, "Anglican Bishops Confront the Bomb", Christian Century, April 13, 1983, pp. 335-336, The Church of England refused to call for unilateral disarmament but it did advocate no first use. This was in reaction to the working party report *The Church and the Bomb*, which advocated unilateral disarmament. The article quotes Archbishop Robert Runcie opposing unilateral disarmament. Vote defeated working party's proposals 338 to 100. Vote to Amend resolution by Adding statement on no first use passed 275 to 222. Final vote on Amended resolution was 387 to 49.

Slack, Kenneth, "Conscience Case Gets 'Exemplary Sentence'", The Christian Century, April 25, 1984, Volume 101, no. 14, pp. 422-423. This is a series of brief news stories about various issues. The headline refers to the startlingly harsh sentence given a clerk in the British Foreign Office who informed a newspaper of the arrival of cruise missiles in England. Of note is mention of Shalom's formation as a group of "Christian multilateralists".

Smith, Bernard, The Fraudulent Gospel: Politics and the World Council of Churches, Wheaton, Illinois: Church League of America, 1977, Smith uses this book to launch a polemic against a too liberal World Council of Churches that is at one with the Anti-Christ. The introduction, however, does provide a good brief history of the World Council of Churches.

Smith, Elwyn A. (editor), Church-State Relations in Ecumenical Perspective, Louvain: Duquesne University Press, 1966.

Spring, Beth, "Reagan Courts Evangelical Clout Against Nuclear Freeze", Christianity Today, April 8, 1983, Volume 27, no. 7, pp. 44-45, 48, This is a news article about the National Association of Evangelicals, Reagan's appeal to them to oppose the nuclear freeze, the debate

between Ronald Sider (anti-nuclear) and Harold O. Brown ( pro-deterrence) and the neutral stance of the NAE.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, New York: Humanities Press, annual, This is an excellent collection of data on military expenditures, disarmament, weapons stockpiles etc.

Stroup, Herbert H., Church and State in Confrontation, New York: The Seabury Press, 1967. In this work, Stroup, provides a fascinating overview of the relations between church and state throughout history. Although he never gets into much detail he provides an excellent starting point for further study.

Tausky, Curt, Work Organizations: Major Theoretical Perspectives, Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1970. Even though the work organizations referred to in the title is industrial organization the theories examined can apply equally to other types of organization. The theories are classical, human relations, and structuralism. These are presented in a clear and concise fashion. Tausky gives the reader a good overview.

Tillich, Paul, A History of Christian Thought, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968, Tillich provides an excellent and detailed discussion of the evolution of Christian thought. He emphasizes the major trends and sacramental controversies.

Troeltsch, Ernst, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, volume 1, 1931, 1981, Translated from the German *Die Soziallehren der Christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen* by Olive Wyon, German Edition 1911, a classic work in the sociology of religion.

Truman, David B., The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, second edition, New York, Knopf, 1971, This is the classic work in the field of group politics.

United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, New York: United Nations Statistical Office, monthly, an excellent source of production, consumption, etc., figures.

United States Defense Atomic Support Agency, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, D.C.: United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1962, although dated this is still a good scientific source.

van Voorst, L. Bruce, "The Churches and Nuclear Deterrence", Foreign Affairs, Spring 1983, Volume 61, no. 4, pp. 827-852 This work provides an interesting and valuable review of the positions taken by the various denominations in recent years in regards the nuclear issue. The Pastoral Letter of the U.S. Catholic Bishops is given the most attention while Protestant positions are merely touched upon. While extremely normative in his approach van Voorst provides an excellent review coupled with sound analysis.

Vasquez, John A., James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, and Linda Stamato (editors), Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era, Ann Arbor, Michigan,

The University of Michigan Press, 1995. A valuable overview of Conflict Resolution theory and practice. Of particular interest was Chapter VII, "Why Global Conflict Resolution is Possible: Meeting the Challenges of the New World Order" by John Vasquez. The discussion of the rule norms play in the move toward or away from war was especially interesting. It would be interesting to study what role religions play in the establishment of norms.

Vasquez, John A., (editor), Classics of International Relations, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1996, third edition. An excellent reader in the subject of international relations. It provides a very useful overview of the field; including selections on Just War, Christianity and International Relations and Bureaucratic Politics.

Vasquez, John A., "The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War," In Charles W. Kegley, Jr., (editor) The Long Postwar Peace, New York, New York, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1991, pp. 203-223. A clear summation of the flaws inherent in the belief that nuclear deterrence has been the primary factor preventing total and especially nuclear war.

Vasquez, John A., The Power of Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1998. A well reasoned and thought out critique of the realist paradigm and it's failures. Useful to this work as a method of looking at conceptual frameworks. Fascinating reading.

Wald, Kenneth D., Religion and Politics in the United States, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1977.

Wasserstrom, Richard A. (editor), War and Morality, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1970, While there are some very good essays contained in this book as a whole it is only very loosely tied together through the title.

Wehr, Paul, "Nuclear Pacifism As Collective Action", Journal of Peace Research, Volume 23, no. 2, pp. 103-113, 1986, a fascinating work applying the paradigms of social disorganization and resource mobilization to the rise of nuclear pacifist movements. Wehr concludes that the nuclear pacifist movement could be an effective movement if it were better able to mobilize its resources through stronger and more centralized leadership as well as greater institutionalization.

Welch, Sharon D., "The Nuclear Arms Race As a Test of Faith," Union Seminary Quarterly, Volume 40, numbers 1 and 2, 1985, pp. 37-46. Using the language of feminism and theology Welch decries the episteme that allows for a reduction of mass murder in nuclear war to a calculation of mere numerical losses. She calls for a rejection of this episteme in favor of one based on the models of sisterhood, liberation faith and redemption. She argues that the episteme that permits nations to engage in acts that in an individual would be immoral is wrong. She calls for a rejection of the assumption that politics is the continuation of war by other means and that war is inevitable for settling certain international disputes. Welch insists that we must

acknowledge that people are not basically good, that the episteme under which we live has damaged us all. She argues that we must strive to participate in a different reality by challenging the dominant episteme and being a part of a redeemed community.

Whiting, David N., "The Bishops and the Bomb", Worldview, Volume 25, number 4, April 1982, pp. 12. Whiting discusses the role of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the newly resurgent peace (ban-the-bomb) movement. Involvement that began with a few Bishops has spread rapidly. The Bishops' involvement has served to popularize the issue. Catholics are taking a stand against the nuclear arms race.

Williams, Frederick W., "Regional Attitudes on International Cooperation", Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1945, Volume 9, no. 1, pp. 38-50, Williams examines poll data looking at regional opinion patterns and finds that "The country stands united in support of international cooperation." This was true of a solid majority in each region as well as the nation as a whole.

Wood, James E. Jr., "Editorial: The Nuclear Arms Race and the Churches", Journal of Church and State, Spring 1983, Volume 25, no. 2, pp. 219-229. Wood begins by arguing that the nuclear arms race is the number one issue in domestic and foreign affairs. He points out how the escalation and proliferation of the nuclear arms race has caused even those churches not considered among the traditional peace churches have experienced a new awareness of the urgency for peace and the "imperative need for a peace witness on behalf of the churches. Following a discussion of nuclear deterrence he touches on some of the actions of mainline denominations including such things as the formation of a coalition giving firm support to ratification of the SALT II treaty because failure to ratify it was viewed as a greater evil than any deficiencies in the treaty itself. Wood goes on to note that the actions of the mainline denominations differ markedly from those of the new Religious Right, which, among other things, took out full page ads in major American newspapers featuring an open letter from Jerry Falwell opposing a nuclear freeze and supporting increases in military spending. Wood ends by saying the nuclear issue is important quoting the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, "Because the nuclear issue is not simply political but also a profoundly moral and religious question, the church must be a participant in the process of protecting the world and its people from the specter of nuclear destruction.

World Council of Churches Directory of Christian Councils, Geneva: World Council of Churches, Third Edition, 1980. This is a directory containing addresses and descriptions of Christian Councils of Churches around the world.

World Council of Churches Report, "The Nuclear Threat: Basic Theological and Ethical Issues", The Ecumenical Review, October 1983, Volume 34, no. 4, pp. 419-420. Excerpted from *Before Its Too Late* a WCC report resulting from Public Hearings organized by the WCC in Amsterdam November 1981. The exception contains the basic arguments favoring the position that nuclear weapons are crucially, ethically, and fundamentally different than conventional weapons. The first crucial ethical difference is the sheer scale of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The second difference is the indiscriminate character of the nuclear arsenals. These differences lead to the conclusion that while there "is no Christian consensus on the subject of war as such, *we wish to state unequivocally that nuclear war-fighting is morally wrong whatever the*

*circumstances.*" (italics added) The arguments in favor of deterrence are examined and the conclusion is reached that "the readiness to do something wrong shares in the wrongness of the action itself." If nuclear war-fighting is wrong then the deterrent threat to fight a nuclear war is also wrong.

Wuthnow, Robert (editor), The religious Dimension: New Directions in Quantitative Research, New York: Academic Press, 1979. A fascinating book that should be required reading for anyone interested in systematic study of religion. Unfortunately not very useful for my purposes except for the Bergesen and Warr piece on "a Crisis in the Moral Order" (Chapter 13) which examines "religious" reactions to threats to corporate identity whether these threats are external (war), contextual (new demands being placed on corporate actions), or internal (need to establish national identity).

Yoder, John Howard, The Politics of Jesus, Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972, This book addresses two questions 1) are there social ethics exhibited in the life and teachings of Jesus and 2) what are the implications of these ethics. A good, well done resource.

Zahn, Gordon C., "War And Religion in a Sociological Perspective", Social Compass, Volume XXI, number 4, 1974, pp. 421-431, The title pretty much says it all.