Partisan Cultural Stereotypes: The Effect of Everyday Partisan Associations on Social Life in the United States

By

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“I was early voting... and when I parked my car, I figured out something that it would take the rest of the country another week to figure out. I understood that Donald Trump was going to be our next president. Because in Ohio, unlike DC, you could see the results in the parking lot... all these ... pickup trucks and tractors...And then I walked up, and I saw a long, long line ... of dusty white people”
- Dave Chappelle, Equanimity

Partisan identity is a particularly salient cleavage in the American political environment. The psychological attachment individuals have to their party, whether the result of policy opinions or affect, has played a central role in the American public’s political attitudes and behavior (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. 1960; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Huddy, Mason and Aaroe 2015), and has recently bled into apolitical environments as well. Partisans have, in the past decade or so, begun to engage in partisan bias and discrimination in apolitical environments. They express positive attitudes towards and favor co-partisans and express negative attitudes and prejudice toward opposing partisans (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar et al. 2018).

Partisans discriminate based off others’ partisan identity in a variety of different hypothetical or real contexts largely in part because partisan discrimination is not only socially accepted but often encouraged (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Both politicians and partisan commentators frequently spend time denigrating the other party: calling them deplorable (Reilly 2016) or comparing opposing partisans to historically evil and unfavorable groups (Berry and Sobieraj 2014). This language from group elites creates an environment in which social norms against partisan discrimination are non-existent, unlike social norms against racial or gender
discrimination. Thus, it is perceived as acceptable for everyday Americans to engage in discrimination of an individual solely from their partisan group membership. It is perhaps fortunate, then, that partisan identity (and associated issue positions) is not easily attainable information in most contexts. Most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006), and few people wear a name tag that says “Democrat” or “Republican.”

However, as Dave Chappelle points out in his description of 2016 early voting in Ohio, even when you don’t know someone’s partisan identity you can still categorize and stereotype individuals by party. Through increased sorting between social groups and the two political parties (Mason 2018), the cultural symbols used to impute social group membership can now be used to impute partisan membership, provided the social group is uniquely associated with only one party.

Not only do people recognize that the two parties are distinctly comprised of different social groups but they actively extend in-group favoritism and out-group animosity towards co-partisan and opposing partisan social groups, respectively (Mason et al. 2018; Miller et al. 1992). Democrats express positive feelings towards social groups that fall under the Democratic partisan coalition absent partisan labels, and so do Republicans.

One problem with these studies though is that they measure group affect bluntly, through survey questions and feeling thermometer ratings of social groups. This is not necessarily a realistic way in which people learn about and evaluate others’ identities. People do not necessarily go around introducing themselves as their social groups. Instead, we pick up cues from how people look and act, what they like to talk about, and the things that they own (Gosling et al. 2002; Rentfrow and Gosling 2006). Instead of learning about people’s social identities via sterile social group proper nouns, we decode their lifestyle choices and preferences to decipher who they are and to which groups they belong (Gosling et al. 2002). Therefore, we use the cultural symbols
attached to these social groups to impute social group membership, and provided that that social
group is uniquely associated with only one political party, to also impute partisan membership. As
such, some everyday cultural preferences, like driving a pickup truck instead of a Volvo, wearing
camouflage instead of a basketball jersey, and listening to rap music not country music, are
partisan cultural stereotypes.

In this dissertation, I argue that partisan cultural stereotypes are omnipresent. Basic
information about individuals’ hobbies and preferences is easily available and obvious information
about people. This information can be communicated to others through many different processes.
Two of the primary ways in which an observer “learns” about a person are through visual or verbal
pieces of information (Lampel and Anderson 1968). Visual pieces of information are typically
communicated through physical appearance and can be observed simply by looking at someone,
whether in a photograph or in person (Ambady and Rosenthal 1992; Levy and Richter 1963). If
someone is wearing a cowboy hat, people might automatically impute that they are from a rural
area of the country and that they are a Republican. Thus, if a person’s clothing choices, hair style,
and general physical style are associated with a specific partisan social group then people can
impute partisan identity simply by looking at someone.

Besides visual pieces of information, people can signal aspects about themselves through
verbal or written communication (Lampel and Anderson 1968). Indeed, cultural preferences, like
music, movies, and hobbies, are often the first things people talk about when getting to know others
(Rentfrow and Gosling 2006), and if these cultural preferences are connected to partisan identity,
learning this information can activate partisan categorization of an individual in small talk
situations or casual “getting-to-know-you” environments.

Through either of these “learning” processes, people can use the cultural attributes and
preferences of others, in everyday social scenarios, to infer their partisan preferences and formulate a broader impression of strangers around this perception of partisanship. I argue that this initial impression can shape any number of social evaluations, such as where to sit on the bus, in which neighborhood to live, whom to recommend for a promotion, and which candidate to vote for in low-information elections. By just seeing or meeting someone, people might immediately engage in partisan categorization and prejudice without knowing anything else about them. If perceived partisan identity shapes these daily experiences and interactions with strangers around partisan bias, these minor interactions will continue to foster negative attitudes towards the opposing party and affective polarization, simply through increased physical distance between the two partisan groups in daily interactions.

My dissertation research involves four related articles that all focus on the concept of partisan cultural stereotypes. Through these four articles I answer three central questions: do partisan cultural stereotypes exists, how are they formed, and what are their social implications? Drawing on theories from political science and psychology, I use a variety of experimental and psychological methods to analyze how partisan identity plays a role in day-to-day social evaluations and interactions in the United States.

In the first paper of my dissertation, I conduct an initial test of the relationship between cultural preferences and partisan stereotypes. First, I conduct a categorization task using an undergraduate sample to demonstrate that certain cultural preferences are seen as highly typical of one of the two parties, and that some of these cultural preferences are seen as more typical of one of the two parties than issue positions and partisan news media sources. Building off the results of this categorization task, I conduct a nationally representative survey experiment to assess whether learning about a stranger’s cultural preferences is related to partisan social evaluations of that
individual. In this 2 by 3 experimental design, respondents read a vignette about either a hypothetical co-worker or non-partisan political candidate’s cultural preferences and daily lives. The results from this experimental study suggest that if the cultural preferences of either the co-worker or candidate are connected to one party, that respondents are more likely to categorize and stereotype that individual as the “correct” partisan. Furthermore, partisans are also more likely to express partisan discrimination towards an individual that is seen as stereotypical of their opposing party.

In the second paper of my dissertation, I test the breadth of the effect of cultural preferences on partisan discrimination through two experimental studies. In the first study, I conduct an Implicit Association Test (IAT) and find that both partisan categorization and partisan bias occur automatically and subconsciously when exposed to cultural preferences. These findings suggest that these social group cultural symbols and the party images are cognitively linked in long-term memory, and that partisan identity and associated affective tags can be activated when exposed to cultural preferences. In the second study, I test whether this implicit partisan bias extends to explicit partisan bias by replicating and expanding the second experimental study from the first paper. I find that regardless of which apolitical environment and what type of social evaluation, partisans express partisan discrimination against stereotypical opposing partisans.

In the third paper, I assess whether partisan identity can be visually communicated. As mentioned above, information about an individual or their identity can be communicated through multiple pathways. In the previous two papers, I evaluated whether partisan identity can be perceived through written communication about an individual. In this paper, I evaluate whether partisan identity, through partisan cultural stereotypes like clothing choice and physical style, can be perceived by just looking at someone. In the first part of this paper, I test whether one’s physical
appearance affects the partisan perception and initial impressions of an individual through a randomized and timed categorization task. The findings from this study suggest that clothing styles and appearance significantly alter the partisan perception of an individual and that partisan identity can be inferred from visual cues. In the second half of this paper, I show that these visual manifestations of partisan identity also affect social evaluations of complete strangers, as both Democrats and Republicans engage in partisan social evaluations of individuals who look stereotypical of their in-party and out-party. Furthermore, partisan discrimination is, to some extent, moderated by socio-economic status differences within the two parties.

The last paper of this dissertation evaluates one mechanism through which partisan cultural stereotypes form and come to be systematic: public knowledge. I argue that it is through the growing intersection of culture and politics, namely the endorsement of politicians by celebrities and politicians’ lifestyle preferences, that people learn to distinctly associate certain cultural preferences with one of the two political parties. I test this theory in two ways. First, I trace Taylor Swift’s evolution from a staunchly apolitical celebrity to a supporter of two Tennessee Democrats and use original survey data to assess how her behavior has affected partisan categorization of her and her fans. I find that while her behavior slightly shifted respondent’s partisan categorization of her towards more typical Democrat, her behavior did not shift respondents’ categorization of her fans. Second, I conduct an experiment to more directly test what happens when people are aware of either celebrity or partisan exemplar behavior. I find that when respondents learn about either a celebrity endorsing a partisan politician or a partisan exemplar endorsing a celebrity, they are more likely to categorize and stereotype a fan of the celebrity as a Republican or Democrat, depending on the partisan politician mentioned in the treatment. When people are aware of the cultural behavior of a politician or the partisan behavior of a celebrity, associative learning begins to take
place and partisan cultural stereotypes form.

This dissertation project is an in-depth study of how the concept and definition of partisan identity has evolved as the two partisan coalitions have become socially and culturally distinct. Advances in technology and production have drastically increased the availability of consumer’s options across a broad array of products and have thus made social group membership more visible through increased symbolic consumption. Industrialization and economic development coupled with globalization has drastically increased Americans consumption options from radio programs, to grocery stores, to hobbies, to potato chips – basically every choice one makes throughout the day. It is this choice that allows individuals to specifically tailor their consumption behavior to their self and social identity, creating a more cohesive concept of identity (Heffetz 2009, Elliot and Wattanasuwan 2015). If they wish to, social group members can use their consumption patterns to intentionally express who they are and what they stand for. Christians can now listen to Christian radio, environmentalists can now choose to drive more environmentally friendly cars, and individuals with predilections towards meditation and spirituality can practice yoga even if they live in the middle of rural Kansas. Thus, social group identity can be easily expressed through consumption choices as well as easily seen and inferred from consumption choices.

When coupled with the emergence of hyper polarization and the resulting salience of partisan identity, social group symbolic consumption and intentional expressions of social group identity can also be interpreted as symbolic consumption and the intentional expression of partisan identity. As a result, we now live in an era where people can easily infer social and partisan group identity from intentional consumption choices.
CHAPTER 2

THE CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES

**Abstract:** People routinely use their knowledge of others’ partisanship, when present, to make social evaluations in political and apolitical settings. Most social situations, however, do not focus on partisan identification nor issue positions. In this paper, I argue that, despite this informational shortfall, people may still engage in partisan prejudice by using information about others’ habits and hobbies, provided such cultural preferences are associated with one party or the other. Using two studies, I find, first, that respondents systematically recognize many cultural preferences as associated with a particular party; and, second, that they use these connections to categorize and stereotype others as partisans. Also, and most importantly, I demonstrate that people use cultural preferences to express prejudice against out-group partisans in both non-partisan political and apolitical settings. Thus, not only is politics relevant to citizens’ everyday lives, but citizens use information from everyday life to navigate the political and social world.

When an interviewer meets a job candidate wearing an expensive suit and belongs to a country club, does she assume the interviewee is a Republican? What about when a real estate agent meets a client who drives a Subaru and carries a bag from the local farmer’s market? Does she perceive this woman to be a Democrat? If so, do these seemingly apolitical but in fact political cues affect how the interviewer and real estate agent evaluate and interact with these individuals? Simply observing people’s personal lives can allow others to make assumptions about partisanship that bleed into otherwise apolitical situations. As a result, partisan bias can shape everyday apolitical judgements and interactions, as easily as it can political ones.

I use the term *partisan cultural stereotypes* to capture how cultural symbols of social, ethnic, and cultural groups have become fused with partisanship. Building on theories of partisan coalitions and reference groups (Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991), I argue that as certain social groups have become closely associated with the two parties, a broad range of group-associated symbols have also become part of the partisan stereotypes. For example, “rural whites” is one group in the Republican Party coalition. Rural whites are associated in the public’s mind with an
array of cultural symbols, one of which is the television show *Duck Dynasty*. Thus, learning that someone likes to watch *Duck Dynasty* may not only signal social group membership but also partisanship.

Images and rhetoric connecting cultural symbols and partisanship are popular. An ad attacked Howard Dean during the 2004 presidential primary by calling him a “latte-drinking, sushi-eating, Volvo-driving …left-wing freak show…” (Anderson and Hook 2004). In addition, newspaper articles frequently connect partisanship with food, drink, and television preferences (Nededog 2016; Wasserman 2014; Wilson 2013). Microtargeting campaigns know these cultural habits are important to politics, as they use them to predict Americans’ political leanings and voting habits (Brennan 2012). Although the association between certain cultural attributes and partisanship is recognized among political elites, it remains unclear how such connections operate among the mass public. Specifically, do citizens perceive these cultural attributes as *partisan* stereotypes and, if so, how do these seemingly innocuous, even mundane, pieces of information affect people’s everyday evaluations of and social interactions with others?

The answer to this question is normatively important. Partisanship is a critical societal cleavage in the United States (Green et al. 2002). Especially in these more polarized times, evidence suggests that people increasingly want to engage with co-partisans and avoid out-partisans (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). It is perhaps fortunate, then, that partisanship (and associated issue positions) is not easily attainable information in most contexts. Most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006), and few people wear a name tag that says “Democrat” or “Republican.” Partisan cultural stereotypes, however, are omnipresent. People can easily see cultural markers, such as wearing Birkenstocks, a crew cut, or a cross around one’s neck. Indeed, cultural preferences, like music, movies, sports, and hobbies,
are often among the first things people talk about when getting to know others (Gosling 2008; Renfrow and Gosling 2006). Because people can readily observe these cultural symbols, it is possible, even likely, that they can easily collect, process, and absorb this information to make inferences about partisanship. This initial impression can, in turn, shape any number of social evaluations, such as where to sit on the bus, in which neighborhood to live, whom to recommend for a promotion as well as which candidate to vote for in low-information elections. By just seeing or meeting someone, people might immediately engage in partisan categorization and stereotyping without knowing anything else about these individuals.

In this paper, I develop the concept of partisan cultural stereotypes and test it using two different studies. First, I establish that they exist in the minds of voters. Across 30 different cultural symbols, including food, music preferences, and hobbies, people agree that these cultural characteristics are stereotypical of the two parties. People even believe some cultural characteristics are more stereotypical than well-known partisan issue positions, namely abortion. Next, I demonstrate that these partisan cultural stereotypes lead to partisan categorization and stereotyping of hypothetical individuals, which, in turn, affect social evaluations in both a non-partisan political context and an apolitical context. Specifically, when respondents learn about a candidate (or co-worker) whose cultural preferences signal that they belong to a different party, respondents are less likely to vote for the candidate or recommend the co-worker. Overall, I find that individuals see everyday information about people’s habits and cultural preferences as signals of people’s partisanship, and they use these signals to make decisions about support in both non-partisan political and apolitical settings.
**Conceptualizing Partisan Cultural Stereotypes**

To simplify the social world, humans automatically and subconsciously categorize individuals into social groups by observing their exhibited group-associated characteristics, or group stereotypes (Brewer 1999; Dovidio et al. 1986). Whether real, exaggerated, or inaccurate, these stereotypes are widely held beliefs about a group’s defining characteristics (Hilton and von Hippel 1996). By comparing an individual to a group’s prototype, or the summary representation of stereotypes (Smith and Zarate 1990), people can not only engage in group categorization but also, through the application of other group stereotypes, infer a wealth of information about an otherwise unknown individual (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Furthermore, once categorization and stereotyping occurs, the resulting group-based impression is quite stable and can affect how subsequent information about an individual is processed (Fiske 1998; Lodge and Taber 2013). Thus, simply from meeting or seeing someone for the first time, people can form relatively complete and enduring impressions of others as group members, which they can use to simplify both social interactions and everyday decisions.¹

People develop social group prototypes for a wide array of different groups, including Democrats and Republicans. As the summary representation of exaggerated or even false characteristics associated with the two parties, these partisan prototypes encompass a variety of stereotypical partisan attributes. The most germane aspect of the partisan prototype to my work is the well-known relationship between parties and the social groups that “belong” to each party (Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991). Because parties are associated with social groups and

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¹ Ambady and Rosenthal (1992) find that impressions formed after observing someone for several minutes are equally as predictive and accurate as impressions formed after observing someone for less than a minute.
because social groups have certain identifying symbols, I argue that these group symbols have, themselves, become part of the partisan prototypes. However, unlike other partisan stereotypes, these cultural symbols enable partisan categorization akin to how skin color enables racial categorization. Since they are easily visible or introductory details, exposure to seemingly mundane, prima facie apolitical, information about someone’s hobbies or cultural preferences can lead to partisan categorization and stereotyping almost immediately. If partisan categorization occurs as I hypothesize, it can then potentially lead to partisan prejudice without any explicitly partisan information being expressed.

Partisan coalitions incorporate groups from seemingly all aspects of social life, from economic to racial to religious factions, dividing Americans at the level of basic core values (Hunter 1991). Republicans are increasingly white, male, religiously orthodox, and rural. Democrats, on the other hand, are increasingly ethnically diverse, female, morally progressive, and urban (Hunter 1991; Pew Research Center 2016). Especially with the sharp partisan divide, the public recognizes most social groups as belonging to only one of the two parties (Miller and Wlezien 1993; Miller et al. 1991), contributing to the images people have of prototypical partisans (Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991).

One way to identify group membership is through group symbols. Symbols have long been used by religious organizations and nations as group identifiers, simultaneously providing a statement about their beliefs as well as differentiating themselves from other groups. Beyond religion and national identity, group symbols can be used to identify members of a broad array of groups (Firth 1973; Geisler 2005). For example, wearing a cross might suggest that a person is religious, while belonging to a country club might suggest that a person is affluent. Likewise, activities such as watching foreign films or practicing yoga may identify someone as a member of
the “creative class” (Florida 2002; Infante 2015), a group that is defined more by personality traits and cultural predispositions. From any of these cultural symbols, people can easily categorize others into the appropriate social group and, if the group is distinctly associated with one political party, by party. Thus, belonging to a country club might suggest not only that someone is affluent but also that she is a Republican, and watching foreign films might suggest that someone is a member of the creative class and, thus, a Democrat.

This allows people to use the cultural symbols associated with a wide variety of groups not only to decide whether a person is culturally like him or her but also to presume whether that person is a political friend or foe. Of course, not every cultural symbol is a partisan cultural stereotype. Some cultural symbols are not clearly associated with specific groups. Hobbies like running and watching football, for example, cut across a wide range of group identities, and, as such, people would not be able to impute partisanship from them. Other cultural preferences are associated with one group, but these groups are not clearly connected to one political party. For example, because groups like white women and Catholics are not necessarily distinctly part of a single partisan coalition (Pew Research Center 2016), the cultural symbols associated with them ought not to convey enough partisan information for them to become partisan cultural stereotypes. In short, a cultural symbol must be distinctly associated with a group that is distinctly associated with one of the two parties for it to become a partisan cultural stereotype.

If I can demonstrate that they exist, what are the implications? Recent work on affective polarization has established that when people know the partisan identity of others, partisans tend to favor co-partisans and express animosity towards members of the opposite party, even sometimes encouraging outright discrimination (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016). As troubling as this may be, the fact that people do not come to know
people’s partisanship immediately mitigates these potential negative consequences. Indeed, people rarely share partisan information with each other unless they are already close personal friends or family (Mutz 2006). However, partisan cultural stereotypes do not even require people to express anything explicitly about politics to make political inferences. Hence, one does not even need to know another’s partisanship to treat them like an in-partisan or out-partisan. People can perceive partisanship through observing partisan cultural stereotypes and use this assumed information to select into pleasant interactions and avoid those who are perceived to be not politically like them. In addition, the familiarity of these cultural symbols makes them relatively easy to recognize, comprehend, and absorb compared to other more complex partisan stereotypes, like issue positions. As such, partisan categorization, through simply observing or meeting someone, can influence impression-formation almost immediately. Perceived partisanship, then, becomes a filter through which all subsequent interactions might be processed. As a result, these partisan cultural stereotypes could lead to expressions of partisan bias in a variety of both political and apolitical settings. However, since political contexts in America prime partisan identity, I expect that the strength of the expression of partisan bias will be greater in a political context than in an apolitical context.

The Content of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes

To test whether people associate cultural symbols with the two political parties, I conducted a laboratory study with 220 undergraduates in the fall of 2015. Participants were randomly assigned to complete one of two classification tasks, both of which asked participants to classify 30 characteristics by party. Fifteen of the characteristics were ex-ante posited to be typical of Democrats and 15 characteristics were ex-ante thought to be typical of Republicans.
The characteristics tested consisted mostly of the cultural symbols associated with social groups in the partisan coalitions. For instance, two characteristics are music preferences: hip-hop and country music. I chose these two genres because they are symbols commonly associated with African Americans and rural whites, social groups that are associated with the Democratic Party and Republican Party, respectively (Kotkin 2012; Miller et al. 1991). I included country clubs and golf because each is a cultural symbol of the upper-class, a key constituency of the GOP (Miller et al. 1991; Pew Research Center 2016). The symbols yoga and foreign films are included because they are symbols of the creative class, a social group associated with the Democratic Party (Carney et al. 2008). Like most stereotype content, it does not necessarily matter if these stereotypes are accurate of group or party members; simply believing these characteristics are associated with a group can facilitate the formation of a cognitive connection.

The other characteristics included are social groups and well-known partisan political characteristics. The social groups used are responses mentioned frequently in the American National Election Study (ANES) during the party likes and dislikes open-ended questions. The political characteristics are two issue positions on the polarized issue of abortion (pro-life and pro-choice) (Fingerhut 2017) and two cable news networks (MSNBC and Fox News). The political characteristics are included to provide a baseline against which the strength of the association between cultural characteristics and partisanship can be compared.²

Half the subjects completed a categorization task, in which they categorized, as quickly as possible, each of the 30 characteristics by party. In this task, respondents were randomly presented

² The characteristics are: hunting, big business, Fox News, southern, steakhouses, country clubs, golf, country music, Duck Dynasty, rural, action movies, Evangelicals, affluent, pro-life, SUVs, farmer's market, working class, Subarus, New England, rock climbing, low income, The Daily Show, pro-choice, urban, MSNBC, atheists, yoga, vegan restaurants, foreign films, and hip-hop.
with one characteristic at a time in the middle of the computer screen. The names of the two parties appeared in the top two corners, with one in each corner. To categorize the characteristic, participants had to press one of two keys on the keyboard.\(^3\) This was repeated until respondents categorized all 30 characteristics. The other half of the sample completed a typicality task that required subjects to rate the same 30 characteristics using a six-point scale of partisan typicality that ranged from very typical Democrat to very typical Republican.\(^4\)

I used two different classification tasks in order to capture two different aspects of social categorization. The categorization task is intended to mimic the automaticity of social categorization in daily interactions, and measures how people react to the simple exposure of a cultural attribute. The typicality task, on the other hand, is used to capture just how exemplary (or not) each attribute is of one of the partisan stereotypes, and, as such, can provide insight into which attributes are seen as more or less strongly associated with each party image.

\(^3\) Instructions for this task as well as a screen shot of this task are in the Appendix A.

\(^4\) The question wording was: "Please rate whether you think this characteristic is typical of Republicans or typical of Democrats. If you think this characteristic is typical of both Republicans and Democrats please select the group you think it is MORE typical of. When thinking about these characteristics please think about the political parties' cultural stereotypes and try not to base your thoughts on personal beliefs." The response options were very typical Democrat, typical Democrat, somewhat typical Democrat, somewhat typical Republican, typical Republican, and very typical Republican. This language is taken from previous work on stereotype content (see Devine 1989). In addition, respondents produce similar answers when asked to make judgments based off personal beliefs and when asked to make judgments based off cultural stereotypes (Krueger 1996).
Figure 1a. Mean Categorization Rating with 95% Confidence Intervals

Figure 1b. Mean Typicality Rating with 95% Confidence Interval
Figures 1a and 1b show the average rating, with 95% confidence intervals around the mean, of each of the 30 characteristics in the categorization task and the typicality task, respectively. For both tasks, the responses are recoded to range from -1 to 1. Values closer to -1 indicate that participants, on average, associate this characteristic with “Democrat,” and values closer to 1 indicate that this characteristic is, on average, more associated with “Republican.”

Figures 1a and 1b show that in both tasks, all 30 characteristics were classified “correctly.” Respondents, on average, categorized characteristics that were ex-ante believed to be associated with Republicans and Democrats as “Republican” and “Democrat,” respectively. Thus, participants perceive these 30 characteristics as solidly part of at least one partisan stereotype. Within the 30 characteristics, however, there is variation in the extent to which certain cultural symbols are seen as typical of the two parties. This variation in associative strength is clearly seen in the typicality task results. Symbols like hip-hop and vegan restaurant are firmly thought to be Democratic attributes whereas driving a Subaru and going to the farmer’s market, while still perceived to be Democratic, are seen as comparatively less indicative of Democrats. Likewise, characteristics like hunting and country music are perceived as distinctly Republican while being affluent and driving an SUV are thought of as somewhat less typical. Thus, upon exposure, all of these 30 characteristics are seen as indicators of partisanship, yet, respondents perceive some attributes as more indicative of partisanship than others.

These results also suggest that learning certain cultural information may activate partisan categorization more crisply than learning some partisan political information. Indeed, respondents

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5 Boxplots of the distribution of responses in each task are in the Appendix A.  
6 These results do not change significantly when looking at the mean categorization or typicality ratings by respondent partisanship.
classified some cultural characteristics as more typical of a party than the four explicitly political attributes. Hip-hop, foreign films, and vegan restaurants are, on average, perceived as more indicative of Democrats than MSNBC and pro-choice in the categorization task. Even more striking, about half of the Republican cultural characteristics are perceived as more distinctly Republican than being pro-life across both tasks, while hunting and big business are seen as more Republican than watching Fox News in the categorization task. Extant work on partisan stereotypes emphasizes the strong link between issues and the two parties (Egan 2013), and the public perceives MSNBC and Fox News as bastions of partisanship (Pew Research Center 2009). Yet, these results suggest that people might see certain cultural characteristics as more indicative of party membership that either of these types of partisan political habits.

To further demonstrate the extent to which respondents see these cultural symbols as part of the two partisan stereotypes, I recorded how quickly respondents who completed the categorization task classified each of the 30 characteristics. Categorization in social interactions is an automatic process that happens due to linked cognitive associations in long-term memory (Allport 1954; Hilton and von Hippel 1996). As such, scholars often use response time in subconscious categorization tasks to measure the strength of cognitive associations between group characteristics and groups, with quicker response times indicative of stronger cognitive connections (Fazio and Olson 2003). Here, I use the response time in a conscious categorization task to approximate the association between cultural symbols and partisanship.

The mean categorization time for each characteristic was very quick, and respondents were able to categorize the cultural and political characteristics at similar speeds.\(^7\) Indeed, relative to

\(^7\) The mean categorization time for each of the 30 characteristics is in the Appendix A.
direct and easily identifiable partisan political symbols, cultural symbols are categorized by partisanship just as, if not more, quickly. Thus, it is not more cognitively taxing for respondents to categorize cultural characteristics than political characteristics by party, indicating that partisan cultural stereotypes may be just as closely associated with the partisan images people hold in their heads as partisan political stereotypes.

Overall, the results from this initial study validate the idea that people do associate these cultural symbols with the two parties and that such symbols are, across different tasks, clearly identified as belonging to one of the two parties. In addition, these results indicate that respondents have stronger partisan associations with some cultural symbols than some explicitly political characteristics, a finding that is suggestive of the salience and strength of these cultural symbols in people’s images of the two parties. The results of this study demonstrate that people actively and systematically perceive certain cultural symbols as central to partisan stereotypes, and that the association between these apolitical traits and partisanship exists beyond correlations mentioned in popular discourse. Given this, there is the potential that, even if people do not talk about politics (Mutz 2006) and politicians obfuscate their policy positions (Conover and Feldman 1984), people may use these partisan cultural stereotypes to make immediate social evaluations of otherwise unknown individuals through partisan categorization.

The Consequences of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes

To understand whether people use these apolitical attributes to make partisan based social evaluations, I designed a biography vignette experiment. This study was conducted online in the spring of 2016, with data collected by Survey Sampling International (SSI). The study, in which 1,200 SSI panel recruits participated, was described as a survey about political attitudes and
behaviors. In order to participate, respondents had to be U.S. citizens, to be 18 years of age or older, and to identify as partisans or partisan leaners.8

Respondents first completed a series of demographic questions. Next, they were randomly assigned to read one of six biographies about a hypothetical individual. Three of the biographies related to a non-partisan political context: a candidate in a local election for the office of county supervisor. The other three biographies related to an apolitical context: a co-worker up for promotion. Within each context, one biography was stereotypical of the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither. The partisan cultural stereotypes from Study 1 were used to create the two “partisan” biographies. The control biography consisted of cultural preferences that could be related to a variety of different social, racial, or cultural groups, and thus, are not distinctly associated with any social group distinctly associated with a party. The content of the three biographies did not vary across candidate and co-worker contexts.

The individual in each treatment was a man named “Michael Lange”; as such, the sex and the implied race of the target were held constant across all six treatments. Each of the biographies about Mr. Lange included five pieces of information and are modeled after candidate information from in a real non-partisan election (Littman 2015). The biographies included information about his occupation, his location of residence, and three of his hobbies. All information in the treatment was apolitical, no info about issue positions or partisan labels was included, to both isolate the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on partisan bias as well as resemble the type of information

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8 SSI invited participants to take the study by sending their panel subjects an email with a link attached. I asked SSI to only recruit partisans and partisan leaners because the study focuses on partisan intergroup dynamics and independents do not have a clear out-party. Besides a 50/50 sample split between Republicans and Democrats, the survey targeted census demographic distributions on race, age, gender, education levels, and census region.
one might learn upon initially meeting someone. The specific wording of the six treatments appears in the Appendix A.

Immediately following exposure to a treatment, respondents reported his or her likelihood of supporting Mr. Lange. Participants who received a candidate treatment were asked about their likelihood of voting for him, and respondents who received a co-worker treatment reported their likelihood of recommending him for a promotion. Responses to these two questions are combined into one variable, Support, which ranges from 0 (very unlikely) to 1 (very likely).9

Partisan Categorization

Before analyzing the effect of these partisan cultural stereotypes on support, I examine whether Mr. Lange’s cultural preferences did indeed trigger partisan categorization. In one of the last questions in the survey, after answering Support, respondents were asked to categorize Mr. Lange as a Democrat, Independent, or Republican.10 This variable, Perceived Partisanship, ranges from -1 (Democrat) to 1 (Republican), with Independent placed at 0.

Figure 2a and 2b display the distribution of Perceived Partisanship across the three treatments in the candidate context (Figure 2a) and the co-worker context (Figure 2b). Two results are of note. First, the majority of respondents perceived the “Democrat” and “Republican” Mr. Lange as a Democrat and Republican, respectively. 57% of respondents who received the “Democrat” candidate and 51% of respondents who received the “Democrat” co-worker

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9 The question wording is: “Based on the information you just read, how likely are you to [vote for Mr. Lange for county supervisor/recommend Mr. Lange as your project manager for a year-long work project]?”
10 The question wording is: “Which political party do you think Mr. Lange belongs to? Please make an educated guess if you are unsure.”
categorized Mr. Lange as a Democrat. Similarly, 64% of respondents who received the “Republican” candidate perceived him as a Republican, and 60% of respondents categorized the “Republican” co-worker as a Republican. In addition, for both control treatments there is no majority consensus on Mr. Lange’s perceived partisanship.

Figure 2a. Distribution of Perceived Partisanship by Candidate Treatment
Figure 2b. Distribution of Perceived Partisanship by Co-Worker Treatment

Second, partisan categorization is, essentially, the same across the two contexts. The distribution of Perceived Partisanship for the two “Democrat” biographies and the two “Republican” biographies are statistically identical.¹¹ In addition, the mean of Perceived Partisanship for the “Democrat” candidate ($M_{candidate} = -0.30$) is not statistically distinguishable from the mean of Perceived Partisanship for the “Democratic” co-worker ($M_{co-worker} = -0.28$). This is also the case for the two “Republican” biographies ($M_{candidate} = 0.40; M_{co-worker} = 0.31$) and the two control biographies ($M_{candidate} = 0.04; M_{co-worker} = 0.06$). Overall, the results from this analysis further substantiate the results of Study 1 by demonstrating, in another format and among a more representative sample, that people can and do use this connection between the apolitical and

¹¹ A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions produces a D-value of 0.0340 ($p = 0.901$), which suggests that the distribution of Perceived Partisanship is not significantly different across the candidate and co-worker contexts.
political to engage in partisan categorization when only given apolitical information.

Partisan Stereotyping

Categorization and stereotyping are two separate, but related, processes. While categorization does not always lead to the application and use of stereotypes (Devine 1989; Macrae et al. 1994), when it does, people are more likely to formulate an extreme and prototypical perception of group members (Devine 1989; Rahn 1993). As a result, people are remembered as just another group member and not a unique individual. I use this section to test whether the partisan categorization of Mr. Lange leads to the subsequent application of partisan stereotypes beyond the information presented in the vignettes.

I use two different measures of partisan stereotyping: cultural attribution and issue placement. The first measures whether respondents remember Mr. Lange enjoying other partisan consistent cultural stereotypes not mentioned in the biographies as well as reject partisan inconsistent cultural stereotypes. The second measure assesses whether respondents extend their stereotyping to make stereotypical political judgments about Mr. Lange’s issue positions. If stereotype application does occur, then, for example, I would expect that a respondent who reads about a “Democratic” Mr. Lange to falsely recall that he also prefers other “Democratic” partisan cultural stereotypes that were not mentioned in the treatments. In addition, I would also expect that respondents would also impute that this “Democratic” Mr. Lange holds liberal policy positions, even though no explicit political information was provided about him.

First, I test the extent to which respondents engage in partisan cultural stereotyping beyond the information in the treatments. The last survey question asked respondents to recall information
about Mr. Lange and identify which attributes described him.\textsuperscript{12} From the response to this question, I created two measures that captured the extent to which respondents applied stereotypes \textit{not} mentioned in the treatments to Mr. Lange. Both measures were created by adding the same two components together: assignment of three new Republican (Democratic) attributes not mentioned in the treatments and rejection of seven Democratic (Republican) attributes.\textsuperscript{13} I then subtracted the measure of Democratic typicality from the measure of Republican typicality to create the variable \textit{Cultural Stereotype Application}, which ranges from -1 to 1. More positive values of this variable indicate that the respondent holds a stronger representation in memory of Mr. Lange as a stereotypical Republican, whereas more negative values indicate that the participant holds a stronger representation of him as a stereotypical Democrat.

I regressed \textit{Cultural Stereotype Application} on two treatment dummy variables, “\textit{Democrat}” \textit{Treatment}, which is coded as 1 if the candidate or co-worker is stereotypical of the Democratic Party, 0 otherwise, and “\textit{Republican}” \textit{Treatment}, which is coded as 1 if the candidate or co-worker is stereotypical of the Republican Party, 0 otherwise. Both of these two treatment

\textsuperscript{12} The question wording for this question was: “Lastly, we would like to ask you some questions about Mr. Lange. Below is a list of attributes. If you think the attribute describes him select ‘Yes, that describes him.’ If you think the attribute does not describe him please select ‘No, that does not describe him.’ Please complete each item.”

\textsuperscript{13} This list of 20 attributes consisted of 8 attributes associated with each of the two parties (4 from the treatment and 4 not from the treatment) and the 4 attributes mentioned in the control. The four additional Democratic attributes were: “Is a Democrat,” “Eats at Vegan Restaurants,” “Drives a Subaru,” and “Spends time at a Farmer’s Market.” The four additional Republican attributes were: “Is a Republican,” “Eats at a Steakhouse,” “Drives an SUV,” and “Spends time at the country club.” In the final analysis, I only looked at the attributes not mentioned in a treatment and excluded “Is a Democrat” and “Is a Republican” since respondents had already categorized Mr. Lange by party in a previous question. The results of the analysis do not change if I include these two partisan attributes. In addition, I analyze the two components of \textit{Cultural Stereotype Application} as separate dependent variables in the Appendix A. The results of the analysis do not change when looking at these two components separately.
variables are interacted with the dummy variable *Co-Worker Scenario*, coded 1 for those who received a treatment about a co-worker, to account for possible differences in stereotyping by context. The OLS regression also controls for basic demographic characteristics such as partisan identification, age, race, gender, education, and level of income.

The results in Table 1, model 1 show that respondents engage in partisan stereotyping when they remember information about both the candidate and the co-worker. The coefficient for “*Democrat*” *Treatment* is negative and significant, suggesting that participants who received this treatment are significantly less likely to stereotype this individual as a Republican compared to the control by -0.36 (p < 0.01). In other words, those who received a treatment about a man who lives in the city and watches comedy movies are more likely to remember him as enjoying additional Democratic cultural stereotypes not mentioned in the treatment and disliking Republican cultural stereotypes. Partisan stereotyping similarly occurs when assessing the effect of “*Republican*” *Treatment* on *Cultural Stereotype Application*. Participants who received this treatment are significantly more likely to remember this individual as stereotypical of the Republican Party compared to those who received the control treatment by 0.32 (p < 0.01), or about three additional consistent Republican stereotypes. In addition, neither treatment effect on *Cultural Stereotype Application* differs significantly between the political and apolitical contexts, which suggests that partisan stereotype application occurs regardless of context.

Building from these results, I test the extent to which respondents move beyond partisan cultural stereotypes and engage in partisan stereotyping when it comes to issue positions. After respondents received the treatment and answered whether they would support Mr. Lange, respondents placed both the candidate or co-worker on a series of issues. Placement on abortion, government spending, and aid to minorities were averaged to create the variable *Political*
Stereotype Application. The variable ranges from -1 to 1, where more negative values indicate more liberal issue positions and more positive values indicate more conservative positions.

Table 1, model 2 shows that exposure to partisan-associated cultural attributes does indeed lead to partisan stereotyping on issue positions. Participants who received a “Democratic” treatment are significantly more likely to think that the target has more liberal policy views compared to the control by about -0.12 (p < 0.01). Similarly, participants who received a “Republican” treatment are significantly more likely to perceive that the target maintains, on average, more conservative policy positions compared to the control by 0.26 (p < 0.01). Like the application of partisan cultural stereotypes, the application of stereotypical partisan issue positions does not differ significantly between the non-partisan political and the apolitical contexts. Thus, respondents also engage in partisan stereotyping when it comes to both candidate placement and co-worker placement on issue positions.

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14 I included four issues total: abortion, government spending, aid to minorities, and gun control. I excluded responses to the gun control issue question in the final analysis since the Republican treatments feature a hunter who presumably uses guns. Therefore, all issue positions included in Issue Placement avoid information related to, but not mentioned, in the treatment. The results of the analysis do not change when I include responses to the gun control issue question. The three issue positions used scale together with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.49 for the “Republican” treatments, 0.36 for the “Democrat” treatments, and 0.38 for the control treatments.
Table 1. The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on Social Judgments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cultural Stereotype Application (1)</th>
<th>Political Stereotype Application (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Republican” Treatment</td>
<td>0.32*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.26*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democrat” Treatment</td>
<td>-0.36*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.12*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Republican” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>0.01 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democrat” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-29</td>
<td>-0.10 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 30-39</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 40-49</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.10 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 50 - 64</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.22** (0.09)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1124</td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both dependent variables are coded from -1 (Democrat) to +1 (Republican). OLS coefficients with standard errors below. *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
The results from these two models suggest that respondents do engage in partisan stereotyping in addition to partisan categorization. When asked to describe either the candidate or co-worker, respondents draw from prior, stored knowledge about party members rather than remember specific details about Mr. Lange. Not only does this occur when respondents are asked about other cultural attributes, but also when they are asked about political attributes. Thus, exposure to only partisan cultural stereotypes can lead to stereotyping even among non-cultural partisan attributes, albeit to a lesser degree. Overall, the results from these two tests suggest that respondents’ impressions of the candidates and co-workers revolve around a broad view of them as partisan caricatures. As such, these stereotypical views should subsequently guide respondents’ social evaluations of these hypothetical individuals.

Cultural Stereotypes and Partisan Bias

I next examine the implications of partisan cultural stereotypes on social evaluations. In particular, I look at whether exposure to certain cultural attributes triggers bias in favor of suspected co-partisans and against suspected opposing partisans.

I regress the dependent variable Support on two partisan treatment variables, “In-Party” Treatment and “Out-Party” Treatment. Each treatment variable is also interacted with the dummy variable Co-Worker Scenario to account for heterogeneous effects by context. Lastly, in order to control for any possible differences in expressed support between Democrats and Republicans, I also subset the sample by respondent partisanship. I include controls for demographics such as age, race, gender, education, and level of income as well.

Table 2 shows that among both Democrats and Republicans, exposure to the “Out-Party” Treatment significantly decreases the likelihood that a respondent will express support in the non-
partisan election context. In addition, the interaction term, “Out-Party” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario, suggests that both Democrats and Republicans differentiate between political and apolitical contexts when it comes to expressions of partisan prejudice. Figure 3a and Figure 3b plot the predicted level of support for the out-party treatments, by context, among Democrats and Republicans, respectively.

In both the non-partisan political and apolitical contexts, Democrats are significantly less likely to support an individual who is perceived, through only apolitical information, to be a member of the opposing party compared to the respective control conditions. However, as Figure 3a shows, the magnitude of animus is significantly larger in the political (albeit non-partisan) context by about 11 percentage points. Democratic respondents are significantly less likely to support a candidate who likes to hunt and is an investment banker by -0.20 (p < 0.01), compared to the control candidate. Democrats are also less likely to support a co-worker who likes to hunt and was an investment banker by -0.09 (p < 0.01), compared to the co-worker treatment.
Table 2. The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Among Democrats (1)</th>
<th>Among Republicans (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>“In-Party” Treatment</strong></td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Out-Party” Treatment</strong></td>
<td>-0.20*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.11*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“In-Party” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario</strong></td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Out-Party” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario</strong></td>
<td>0.11** (0.05)</td>
<td>0.10* (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.04* (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.10** (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-29</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 30-39</td>
<td>0.03 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.09 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 40-49</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.08)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 50-64</td>
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<td>0.04 (0.08)</td>
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<td>Adjusted R²</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support is coded from 0 (very unlikely) to 1 (very likely). OLS coefficients with standard errors below.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In both the non-partisan political and apolitical contexts, Democrats are significantly less
likely to support an individual who is perceived, through only apolitical information, to be a member of the opposing party compared to the respective control conditions. However, as Figure 3a shows, the magnitude of animus is significantly larger in the political (albeit non-partisan) context by about 11 percentage points. Democratic respondents are significantly less likely to support a candidate who likes to hunt and is an investment banker by -0.20 (p < 0.01), compared to the control candidate. Democrats are also less likely to support a co-worker who likes to hunt and was an investment banker by -0.09 (p < 0.01), compared to the co-worker treatment.

Figure 3a: Predicted Support of “Out-Party” Treatment Conditional on Context Among Democrats

Republican respondents are also significantly less likely to support Mr. Lange if they perceive him to be a member of the out-party, but only in the non-partisan electoral environment. When faced with voting for a yoga-practicing professor, Republicans are significantly less likely
to vote for this candidate by -0.11 (p < 0.01), compared to the control. Yet, as Figure 3b shows, when faced with recommending a yoga-practicing ex-professor for a promotion, there is no significant nor substantive difference in the likelihood of expressed support for this co-worker compared to the control co-worker. The marginal effect of receiving “Out-Party” Treatment conditional on Co-Worker Scenario is -0.018 (p-value = 0.621).15

Despite this relatively consistent out-party effect on support, there is not a significant in-

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15 For all three of the significant “Out-Party” Treatment effects on Support, I conducted a test for mediation by Perceived Partisanship. In the candidate context, the results of a Sobel test report that Perceived Partisanship mediates 20% of the effect of “Out-Party” Treatment on Support among Democrats (Z = -3.101, p-value < 0.01). Among Republicans in the candidate context, Perceived Partisanship significantly mediates about 43% of the treatment effect (Z = -3.21, p <0.00). For Democrats in the co-worker condition, Perceived Partisanship mediates about 23% (Z = -2.313, p < 0.05) of the effect of “Out-Party” Treatment on Support.
party effect among either Democratic or Republican respondents. Neither group of partisans is significantly more likely to support the “In-Party” Treatment compared to the control in either context. Generally speaking, these results point to the relative motivational power of negative information compared to positive information (Baumeister et al. 2001). Respondents significantly alter their support only upon receiving information about a person perceived to be a member of the disliked, opposing party. Specifically regarding partisanship, these results provide further evidence of the relative strength of out-party effects compared to in-party effects (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson 2012) as well as highlight the strength of out-party animosity as a source of motivation in the current American political environment (Bump 2016). Overall, these results suggest that apolitical information can trigger expressions of partisan bias in both political and apolitical scenarios, when minimal information is present and partisan information is absent.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

I have demonstrated here that aspects of everyday life are themselves inherently political. Individuals use non-political information – apolitical, cultural, and social preferences – to routinely categorize others into partisan camps and, then, make partisan based social judgments in a variety of settings. As such, cultural attributes, like taste in movies and music, are more than just exciting preference correlates of partisanship. People view specific cultural symbols as typical attributes of the party stereotypes, and, in this role, these apolitical traits are cognitive attached to a wealth of political information that may be inferred upon immediately seeing or meeting someone. As such, party becomes a salient and influential identity in everyday situations, through which people can make social evaluations as well as avoid perceived unpleasant and uncomfortable interactions. Thus, not only is politics relevant in citizens’ everyday lives, but citizens use mundane information
from their daily lives to navigate the political and social world.

Study 1 validates the concept of partisan cultural stereotypes with evidence that people view specific cultural symbols as typical of Democrats or Republicans. These results suggest, through multiple measures of partisan typicality, that people have a robust cognitive association between these cultural symbols and partisanship. These apolitical attributes are perceived to be part of at least one of the two partisan stereotypes. In fact, these apolitical characteristics are seen as just as stereotypical as overtly and polarized political attributes, such as issue positions and partisan cable news. Thus, it is entirely possible that cultural symbols are just as central to the mass public’s images of the two parties as political attributes.

Next, I show that when introduced to a hypothetical candidate or co-worker and provided with only apolitical information about them, respondents form mental images of these individuals as partisans. Not only do they engage in partisan categorization but they also apply other partisan stereotypes, like unmentioned cultural attributes and issue positions, when making judgments about these individuals. Even when given only apolitical information, people perceive others as partisans and use this categorization to formulate a broader understanding of this individual.

Lastly, these partisan cultural stereotypes influence social evaluations in both non-partisan political and apolitical contexts. When a Democrat is introduced to a hypothetical candidate or co-worker who possesses cultural preferences typical of her out-party, she is less likely to support the candidate or co-worker. When a Republican learns that a hypothetical candidate possesses cultural preferences typical of her out-party, she is less likely to support the candidate. Overall, these results demonstrate that when given only apolitical information about an individual, an experience similar to meeting someone for the first time, people engage in partisan categorization and express partisan bias against perceived out-partisans.
Democrats, however, are more consistent in their partisan bias across different environments. One potential explanation for this difference could be that Republicans believe that politics do not belong in social and apolitical settings. Recently, Republican politicians and media personalities have admonished the politicization of events like the Super Bowl (Nolte 2017), the Oscars (FOX News Insider 2017), and even television shows (Domenech 2017). Texas Governor Greg Abbott went so far as to tell the NFL to “get the heck out of politics” after they suggested that the Texas “Bathroom Bill” might affect the likelihood of the NFL holding future events in the state (Boren 2017). Republicans feel that this politicization not only brings politics into an environment in which it does not belong but also ruins the respite from political and social conflict that these events provide (Domenech 2017). Perhaps it is this desire for a clean separation between the political and apolitical that drives the null effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on Republicans’ expression of co-worker support.

Overall, people perceive specific cultural attributes as central parts of both the Democratic and Republican stereotypes. Due to these connections, people can use perceived partisanship to make evaluations in a plethora of scenarios without observing or acquiring anything more than introductory information about others; like what they are wearing or what type of music they prefer. Thus, through merely seeing or meeting someone, people can engage in partisan categorization and stereotyping, which can not only shape initial person perception but also influence the subsequent interactions and social evaluations that may follow.

As demonstrated, these partisan cultural stereotypes can be useful in making quick, albeit potentially more inaccurate, decisions in both political and apolitical situations. In political scenarios, the majority of American elections are low-information elections (Kam and Zechmeister 2013), where partisan information is limited, and issue positions reflect local concerns rather than
national party platforms. In these elections, the cultural symbols of candidates can be readily available and easily interpreted information that can guide voters toward decisions based on inferences of partisanship. Compared to spending time deciphering candidates’ opinions on local traffic concerns or cost of living, learning that a candidate used to be a hedge fund CEO or is married to a local university professor can make vote choice in these elections less cumbersome. These cultural attributes may also be quite useful in apolitical scenarios as well. When making time-consuming decisions, like choosing which neighborhood to live in, or simple everyday decisions, such as where to sit on the bus, these partisan cultural stereotypes could potentially lead people towards outcomes that are, at least on the surface, seen as more culturally and politically pleasant. Overall, these partisan cultural stereotypes can be beneficial by helping people make quick decisions in a variety of scenarios. These decisions, however, may not be as accurate as actually learning a candidate’s positions or detailed information about a neighborhood.

Even though people can use these cultural preferences to make decisions quickly, this perpetual categorization can further entrench the perception of the other side as exaggerated and extreme partisans. When people use stereotypes as a cognitive shortcut, they rely on this perceived prototypicality to make social decisions, ignoring or even avoiding unique information about an individual (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Despite the fact that both parties encompass a diverse coalition of individuals, categorization and stereotyping perpetuates the idea that group members are essentially partisan caricatures. Furthermore, since social norms do not discourage partisan discrimination, people are not pressured into moderating their partisan based prejudice. Without this motivation to control bias, people will continue to use partisan cultural stereotypes to make expeditious but potentially discriminatory decisions on a daily basis - not eating lunch with a perceived out-partisan co-worker, not tipping a perceived out-party waiter, or, even, not holding
an elevator for a complete stranger who exhibits out-partisan symbols. These daily discriminatory occurrences could not only affect our perception and understanding of people as members of a political party but also could ultimately have broader implications for the general erosion of cooperation and respect across party lines.
CHAPTER 2

POLITICS ALL AROUND US: PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES AND DISCRIMINATION

ABSTRACT: Partisan groups are charged with affective components, and when partisanship is known, partisan affect can shape attitudes and behaviors toward co-partisans and members of the opposite party. Yet explicit mentions of partisanship are a rare event in everyday interactions, as people tend to shy away from talking politics. In this paper, I look to build on work about partisan stereotypes and partisan prejudice by looking at how partisan cultural stereotypes, or everyday habits and hobbies associated with the parties, can influence both the spontaneous and deliberative expressions of partisan bias. First, using an implicit measure of partisan affect, I show that these cultural symbols can facilitate the automatic activation of polarized partisan affect just like explicit partisan symbols. Second, in a separate study I find that spontaneous partisan affect can translate to deliberate expressions of partisan bias in a variety of contexts as well. These results are suggestive of a broader finding that partisan identity, and politics in general, plays a larger, subtler role in information processing by automatically eliciting partisan affect as well as directing conscious social judgements without ever being mentioned.

Imagine you are in an elevator and right before the door is about to close, someone wearing a NASCAR hat and golf shoes, and carrying take out from a local steakhouse comes running to catch the elevator. What would you do? How would you immediately react, would you help this individual or “fail” to press the open-door button in time? How would you behave if they made it into the elevator? Would you start up a conversation with them or just keep your eyes glued to the floor? What about if this individual was wearing an indie band t-shirt, carrying rock-climbing gear, and a yoga mat instead?

While these clothing styles, sports preferences, and exercise gear might seem like mundane objects, these apolitical attributes are actually associated with the mental images people have of Republicans and Democrats, respectively. They are partisan cultural stereotypes, and reflect how certain cultural symbols of social, ethnic, and cultural groups have become fused with partisanship. Hints of the association between the political and apolitical are common in marketing reports regarding drinking habits, restaurant preferences, and television viewership (Wasserman 2014;
Wilson 2013), not to mention micro-targeting campaigns that focus on people’s cultural habits to predict their partisanship, social group membership, and likelihood of voting (Brennan 2012).

The association between these cultural stereotypes and partisanship is important because, even though partisanship is a critical societal cleavage in the United States (Green et al. 2002) that shapes both political (Bartels 2000; Mason 2015; Nicholson 2012) and apolitical outcomes (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016) along partisan group lines, explicitly partisan labels (and associated issue positions) often are not readily available information about anyone, outside of a partisan election. Exacerbating this void, moreover, is the fact that most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006). Partisan cultural stereotypes, however, can fill this void, and can function as more accessible attributes of the partisan stereotype since they tend to be easily-visible symbols, such as clothing choice or hair style, and come up naturally in conversation, such as when people talk about what they did over the weekend, what television shows they watch, or even what they ate for lunch.

Building on theories about partisan coalitions and reference groups, I argue that these cultural symbols associated with social, ideological, and cultural groups, have become key aspects of partisan stereotypes. As such, cultural preferences like listening to hip-hop, playing golf, and watching foreign films are now cognitively linked to partisanship in long term memory, and can cause people to automatically engage in partisan categorization. As a result of this partisan categorization, these partisan cultural stereotypes might then cause both spontaneous and deliberative expressions of partisan prejudice. First, these partisan cultural stereotypes can potentially lead to the automatic facilitation of polarized partisan affect as the network of partisan related cognitive associations is activated in long term memory. Second, since there is a general lack of motivation to curtail overt partisan bias among the American public (Iyengar and
Westwood 2015) exposure to these partisan cultural stereotypes can also potentially shape deliberative expressions of partisan prejudice through daily social evaluations, such as where to sit on the bus, which neighborhood to live in, and whom to recommend for a promotion.

In this paper, I look to broaden the discussion of partisan prejudice through assessing the impact of partisan cultural stereotypes on both spontaneous and deliberative expressions of partisan bias. I build this argument first by showing that partisan affect is strongly associated with and automatically activated by these partisan cultural stereotypes. I show through implicit measures of partisan affect, that both partisan cultural stereotypes and overt partisan symbols facilitate similar, if not identical, levels of automatic and uncontrolled expressions of polarized partisan affect. In a second study, I demonstrate that these partisan cultural stereotypes affect deliberate social judgments in both a non-partisan political context and apolitical contexts. When presented with an individual whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the opposing party, partisans use partisan categorization to express partisan discrimination in a variety of different types of social evaluations and social contexts.

**Stereotypes and Partisanship**

To simplify the social world, humans automatically categorize individuals into social groups based on group associated characteristics (Brewer 1999; Dovidio et al. 1986; Rosch 1975). Because these group characteristics and category labels are a cognitive network of linked attributes in long term memory (Lepore and Brown 1997), that are consistently associated with each other in society, they become a “well-learned set of associations” (Devine 1989, p. 6). As a result, exposure to group related characteristics can facilitate the automatic activation of group labels, which in turn can facilitate the activation of other group related cognitive links, such as group
stereotypes, feelings towards the group, or opinions about the group (Devine 1989; Kam 2007; Lodge and Taber 2013; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Because of this process of categorization and subsequent stereotyping, individuals can infer a veritable wealth of information from the mere presence of a social group member.

This process of social categorization is largely a reflection of the social group prototype, because this prototype provides a template of comparison for the categorization process. The prototype is a summary representation of group characteristics and associations, which becomes emblematic of what a group member should be like. If a target individual exhibits any of these characteristics seen as prototypical, she is more likely to be categorized and stereotyped as a member of that group (Smith and Zarate 1990).

People have images of what prototypical Democrats and Republicans look like, which they can use to categorize candidates and peers into neat partisan categories. Of the many aspects of the partisan prototype, the most germane to my work is the well-known relationship between parties and their coalitions, specifically which social groups “belong” in which political party (Mason 2018; Miller et al. 1991). The public distinctly recognizes many varied types of social groups as belonging to at least one of the two parties (Miller et al. 1991; Miller and Wlezien 1993), and this distinct partisan association in turn informs people’s mental images of the prototypical partisan. Because Democrats are more urban, less affluent, more ethnically diverse, more female and hold more progressive values, a prototypical Democrat is perceived to be more urban, less affluent, more ethnically diverse, more female and hold more progressive moral orientations. By comparison, a prototypical Republican is seen as more rural, more affluent, whiter, more male, and more traditionally religious (Green et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1991). Since these social groups
are part of the partisan prototype, learning that someone is a member of a social group can automatically lead to the partisan categorization of that individual.

One way to identify social, cultural, or ideological group membership is through group symbols. Symbols have long been used by religious organizations and nations as group identifiers, simultaneously providing a statement about an individual’s beliefs as well as differentiating her from other groups (Firth 1973; Geisler 2005). For example, wearing a cross might suggest that a person is religious, while living in a big house might suggest that a person is affluent. From these symbols, people can easily categorize others by the appropriate social groups and, if the social group is closely associated with a political party, by appropriate political party, if the context warrants it. Thus, living in a big house might not only suggest that someone is affluent, but also that she is a Republican. Whereas having more “artsy” or “cultured” tastes like watching independent films, drinking artisan coffee, or going to book readings might not only result in the categorization of an individual as a member of the “creative class” (Carney et al. 2008; Infante 2015), but also as a member of the Democratic Party. In general, these symbols may not only be used to distinguish whether people are culturally like you or not, but also whether people are politically like you or not.

Taking everything into account, because parties are identified with social groups and social groups are associated with certain cultural symbols, parties become connected with these cultural symbols. As a result, exposure to cultural and apolitical symbols associated with these social groups can automatically lead to partisan categorization.
Partisan Cultural Stereotypes and Spontaneous versus Deliberative Partisan Affect

Through the process of partisan categorization, due to exposure to these partisan cultural stereotypes, partisanship becomes a central factor in guiding attitude expression and behavior. Specifically, because of partisanship’s role in today’s polarized political environment, partisan identity can elicit intergroup bias as a social identity (Huddy et al. 2015; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). As a social identity, the salience of partisanship can bring out strong in-group favoritism towards co-partisans as well as animosity towards the opposite party. Thus, exposure to partisan cultural stereotypes can potentially elicit expressions of partisan prejudice. However, the extent to which these cultural stereotypes shape both automatic (or subconscious) and controlled (or conscious) expressions of partisan prejudice depends on individual level motivations (Devine 1989).

When partisanship is salient, cognitive and affective components that are strongly associated with partisanship can be automatically and uncontrollably activated in long term memory (Burdein et al. 2006). The association between affect and partisanship are particularly linked in long term memory and deeply ingrained in people’s minds (Burdein et al. 2006; Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Implicit measures of partisan affect suggest that not only do individuals have strong cognitive associations between positive affect and their party and negative affect and the opposite party (Iyengar and Westwood 2015), but also that these cognitive associations are frequently automatically and subconsciously activated when people are exposed to explicitly partisan stimuli (Burdein et al. 2006). The emergence of this affective response is often an uncontrollable and spontaneous reaction, which can then affect how people react towards the stimuli either without awareness of their attitudes or without awareness of what is causing their attitudes (Lodge and Taber 2013). Put simply, due to the strong associations between affect and
partisanship in long term memory, when people see or hear about someone’s partisanship they automatically experience a positive or negative emotional response, depending on whether the individual is a co-partisan or opposing partisans. Once this partisan affect is activated, people can engage in subconscious or conscious partisan prejudice.

I argue here that this spontaneous activation of polarized partisan affect could also occur when exposed to partisan cultural stereotypes, and as such automatically activate polarized partisan affect even when explicit partisan signals are not present. Exposure to these cultural attributes, because they are cognitively linked to partisanship, can cause the automatic and uncontrollable activation of other concepts cognitively linked to partisanship, namely polarized partisan affect. Thus, a Republican being introduced to someone who likes yoga and vegan restaurants might potentially experience an automatic, uncontrollable response of negative partisan affect in this initial meeting. Because yoga and vegan food primes Democrat which then primes negative affect, these partisan cultural stereotypes can elicit automatic reactions of polarized partisan affect even when partisanship is not mentioned. As such, exposure partisan cultural stereotypes should cause the spontaneous activation of polarized artisan affect.

Whether or not these spontaneous group attitudes lead to more controlled and deliberative expressions of partisan prejudice depends on two things: an individual’s motivation to engage in a more effortful and conscious judgement and their opportunity to do so (Fazio 1990). The motivation to engage in more thorough cognitive processing could be the result of a variety of forces that may cause people “…to gauge the appropriateness, or even counter the influence, of an automatically-activated attitude” (Fazio and Olsen 2014). Whether this motivation is a desire to abide by social norms and control prejudices (Devine 1989; Dunton and Fazio 1997) or a concern about having a more accurate opinion (Schuette and Fazio 1995), if individuals have the motivation
to stop and think about their automatic reactions to stimuli deliberative expressions of prejudice might be different from these automatically activated attitudes. As such, people can, if they desire to, control their automatic partisan prejudice.

Regarding partisanship, however, there might not be a motivation to “override” these automatic reactions. When exposed to overt partisan labels, partisans have engaged in partisan bias in political outcomes (Druckman et al. 2013; Mason 2015; Nicholson 2012) as well as in apolitical outcomes (Bishop 2009; Huber and Malhotra 2017; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016). This consistent and frequent expression of in-party favoritism and out-party derogation seems to be result of a lack of social norms against partisan bias (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Partisan bias is theorized to be acceptable, even encouraged sometimes, which can minimize people’s motivation to control against their automatic reactions of partisan bias. As such, I then expect that exposure to partisan cultural stereotypes will not only lead people to the spontaneous activation of partisan bias but also to the deliberative expression of partisan bias.

To test these two different hypotheses, I conduct two separate studies. First, I look at the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on the automatic activation of partisan bias using an implicit measure of partisan affect. Then, I look at how these partisan cultural stereotypes affect more deliberative expressions of partisan bias and prejudice using a social evaluation experiment.

**Partisan Cultural Stereotypes and Spontaneous Partisan Prejudice**

One way to assess the strength of the association between attitudes and groups is through the use of an Implicit Attitude Test (IAT). This task is designed to capture cognitive links between groups and an evaluative dimension as well as the ease at which facilitation occurs between the two concepts. By measuring the time it takes to categorize both the group and evaluation using
two response keys that have both been assigned dual meanings, this measure can measure both of these aspect of cognitive association (Greenwald et al. 1998). The faster the response time for a key assigned to one of the target groups and one of the evaluative dimensions indicates that this category/evaluation pairing is more strongly associated in the respondent’s long term memory.

In the spring of 2017, I conducted a study among 175 undergraduates where participants were randomly assigned to complete one of three brief IATs (BIAT), which is a condensed version of the IAT. In this paper, I focus on the results from only two of the BIATs which paired partisan symbols with positive and negative words. One-third of the subjects took a BIAT where these affect words were paired with eight explicitly partisan stimuli, things like a picture of a donkey labeled “The Democratic Party” or the logo of the Republican National Committee. Another third of the subjects took a BIAT where these positive and negative words were paired with eight implicitly partisan cultural stereotype stimuli. The four Democratic cultural stereotypes used were hip-hop, foreign films, urban, and vegans, and the four Republican cultural stereotypes used were big business, country music, golf, and rural. In both BIATs, I used a standard set of positive (Wonderful, Best, Superb, and Excellent) and negative words (Terrible, Awful, Worst, and Horrible). The explicitly partisan BIAT acts as a baseline level of comparison for the association of partisan affect and partisan cultural stereotype stimuli.

In each BIAT, participants completed six rounds of 20 timed categorizations. The first two rounds were treated as training in order for participants to become accommodated with the structure of the task. The last four rounds were used for scoring the strength of the association.

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16 These stimuli are in the Appendix B.
17 The cultural attributes used in the cultural symbol IAT are traits that were rated as distinctly typical of only one of the two parties by undergraduates in a separate study conducted in the fall of 2015.
between partisan affect and the partisan stimuli. Within each round, participants were asked to categorize one partisan group’s stimuli and positive words by pressing the “i” key on the keyboard, and to categorize everything else by pressing the “e” key on the keyboard. Each respondent, completed two rounds where they categorized Democratic stimuli with positive words and two rounds where Republican stimuli were paired with positive words. The order of these four rounds was randomized, and within each round the order in which stimuli was presented was randomized.

To calculate *Implicit Partisan Affect*, I subtracted the mean response times for the two rounds that paired co-partisan targets with positive terms from the mean response times for the two rounds that paired opposing partisan targets with positive terms. Positive values of this variable indicate a stronger cognitive association between positive words and co-partisans, and negative values indicate a stronger cognitive association between positive words and opposing partisans.

Figure 1 plots the distribution and mean value of *Implicit Partisan Affect* for both the cultural symbol BIAT and the explicit partisan symbol BIAT among all partisans. The results from both BIAT measures demonstrate that values of *Implicit Partisan Affect* correspond closely with respondents’ party identification. The majority of partisans in the sample have positive values of *Implicit Partisan Affect*, suggesting that they have a stronger association between their own party and positive words than the other party and positive words. This occurs regardless of the type of BIAT the partisan completed. The median of *Implicit Partisan Affect* for the explicit partisan symbols is 53.11 milliseconds (mean = 82.57, se = 26.44, N = 53), and the median of *Implicit

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18 To calculate the average mean value, I followed the process of Greenwald et al. 2003 except I did not calculate a D-Score and instead kept the BIAT results in terms of milliseconds.
Partisan Affect for the partisan cultural symbols BIAT is 74.78 milliseconds (mean = 91.77, se = 21.06, N = 50).

Furthermore, the distribution of Implicit Partisan Affect for respondents who completed the cultural symbols BIAT is statistically indistinguishable from the distribution of Implicit Partisan Affect for respondents who completed the explicit partisan BIAT. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distributions is insignificant with a p-value of 0.918. This similarity is further substantiated by the fact that the means of Implicit Partisan Affect across the two tasks are statistically indistinguishable from each other as well, with a difference in means of -9.20 milliseconds (p = 0.73). While Implicit Partisan Affect for the cultural stereotype BIAT is slightly stronger, this difference is imprecisely estimated.

Figure 1. Distribution of Implicit Partisan Affect
Overall, the results from this study suggest two main findings. First, that these cultural stereotypes are cognitively linked to partisanship as well as the affective nodes that are themselves linked to partisanship. Respondents have a stronger cognitive association between in-party cultural symbols and positive affect than opposing party cultural symbols and positive affect, indicated by the positive mean of Implicit Partisan Affect. These cultural aspects of the party are cognitively “linked nodes” to both partisanship and partisan affect. Second, this association is statistically just as strong as the association between explicit partisan symbols and partisan affect. The almost complete overlap of Implicit Partisan Affect across the cultural symbol stimuli and partisan symbol stimuli suggests that these partisan cultural stereotypes are as cognitively associated with partisan affect and partisanship as explicit partisan symbols. Thus, exposure to someone saying they play golf or practice yoga can potentially activate as much partisan affect as exposure to someone saying they are a Democrat or a Republican. As such, exposure to these partisan cultural stereotypes on an everyday basis can potentially lead to deliberate expressions of favoritism and admiration towards people whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the in-party and deliberate expressions of animosity towards people who prefer cultural and lifestyle choices of the opposite party. If so, then there might be evidence for a lack of motivation to control these automatic expressions of polarized partisan affect.

**Partisan Cultural Stereotypes and Deliberative Partisan Prejudice**

To test the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes on deliberative social evaluations, I conducted a laboratory experiment in the fall of 2016. 334 undergraduate students participated in this omnibus study. Participants were first asked a series of questions about their demographics, political attitudes, and consumer behavior, then they completed the social evaluation experiment.
In the social evaluation experiment portion of the study, all participants were asked to evaluate three different hypothetical individuals: a candidate in a hypothetical non-partisan county level election, a fellow intern at a hypothetical internship, and a hypothetical local doctor recommended to them by a friend.\(^{19}\) Within each context, participants were randomly assigned to one of three potential biography types: a “Democrat” individual, a “Republican” individual, or a control individual. All nine of these treatment biographies included only apolitical information about the hypothetical individual, and did not mention any explicitly political information either through partisan labels or policy positions.\(^{20}\) In addition, all three of the biography types featured different information across the three treatment contexts so that individuals who randomly received all three of the same type of biography, i.e. three “Democrat” biographies, did not receive the same biography three times. The specific wording for each of the nine biographies is in Appendix B.

**Partisan Categorization**

After receiving each of the biographies, participants were immediately asked to evaluate the hypothetical individual on several dimensions, which varied by context. After respondents answered the pertinent social evaluation questions, participants were then asked to rate the partisan typicality of the candidate, doctor, and intern on a seven-point scale that ranged from Very Typical

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\(^{19}\) All participants received the candidate biography first. Then half of the participants received the doctor biography first and the intern biography second, and the other half received the intern biography first and the doctor biography second.

\(^{20}\) The information includes: the first name of the individual (except for in the candidate treatment), their hometown, and three sets of hobbies and activities. The cultural attributes used in the partisan treatments are traits that were rated as distinctly typical of only one of the two parties by undergraduates in a separate study conducted in the fall of 2015.
Democrat to Very Typical Republican. From these questions, I created *Perceived Partisanship* and rescaled the variable to range from -1 (Very Typical Democrat) to 1 (Very Typical Republican). To assess whether partisan categorization of these candidates, doctors, and interns did indeed occur from exposure to partisan cultural stereotypes, I then conducted a difference in means test across all three biographies in each context.

Figures 2a-2c show the mean levels of *Perceived Partisanship* for the candidate context, the doctor context, and the intern context, respectively. Within each context, participants categorized the “Republican” and “Democratic” treatments “correctly.” All three of the “Republicans” are seen as highly typical of the Republican Party ($M_{candidate} = 0.65; M_{doctor} = 0.56; M_{intern} = 0.47$), and all three “Democrats” are seen as highly typical of the Democratic Party ($M_{candidate} = -0.56; M_{doctor} = -0.60; M_{intern} = -0.48$). In addition, within each context each of the three different biographies are seen as conceptually and significantly different in terms of their partisan typicality. The “Republican” treatment and the “Democratic” treatment are perceived to be the treatment most typical of the Republican and Democratic Party, respectively, in each of the three contexts. Overall, the results from this difference in means test suggest that a target individual’s cultural preferences can and do trigger partisan categorization regardless of the context in which this exposure occurs. As such, I next examine whether these partisan cultural stereotypes lead to expressions of intergroup bias in all three of these contexts across a broad range of social evaluations.
Figure 2a: Mean Partisan Categorization of Candidate Treatments +/- 1 Standard Deviation

Figure 2b: Mean Partisan Categorization of Doctor Treatments +/- 1 Standard Deviation
Partisan Social Evaluations

Since I am not only interested in testing whether these partisan cultural stereotypes affect social evaluations, but also in assessing the scope of partisan prejudice, respondents were asked to judge each of the three different individuals on different types of evaluations.

After receiving the candidate biography, participants were asked about their likelihood of voting for this candidate to capture the extent to which people used these partisan cultural stereotypes as cues for vote choice in a non-partisan election. After receiving the doctor biography, participants were asked to evaluate the doctor on two dimensions. They were first asked about their likelihood of visiting him if they were sick, which was followed by a question about how comfortable they would feel talking to the doctor about all potential medical conditions and treatments. Both of these questions aimed to measure whether partisan stereotyping plays a role in
everyday decisions about service selection as well as indirect measures of how likely people are to trust and feel comfortable with a co-partisan versus an opposing partisan in charge of their health.

Lastly, after receiving the intern biography, participants were also asked to evaluate the intern on two dimensions. First, participants were asked about their likelihood of recommending the fellow intern for a promotion. This question was selected in order to assess the extent to which partisan stereotypes affect rewarding someone in a situation when the outcome does not directly affect the respondent or the status of the respondent’s political party. Despite this lack of a direct implication, however, group success is uniquely tied to group members’ self-esteem, and some group members might look to bolster the standing of their group and fellow group members to produce positive self-esteem (Ellemers et al. 2002). Following this promotion question, participants were then asked a battery of social distance questions. These four questions were used to capture the level of desired interaction a participant would want to have with a hypothetical intern, and how partisan stereotyping from apolitical attributes can play a role in whom participants decide to spend their time with (Bogardus 1933).

In general, I hypothesize that participants will be more likely to positively evaluate members of their own party as well as negatively evaluate members of the opposing party. As such, I recode the treatment variables into In-Party Treatment and Out-Party Treatment to more appropriately capture the effect of the in-group versus the out-group. In-Party Treatment is coded as 1 if a respondent received a treatment stereotypical of their own party and 0 otherwise. Out-Party Treatment is coded 1 if the respondent received a treatment stereotypical of the opposing party, 0 otherwise. Since I am interested in partisan group effects, I exclude only pure independents.
from this analysis because they do not have a clear out-party. Table 1 shows the results from regressing the treatment dummy variables on each of the five social evaluations.

Table 1. The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on Social Evaluations

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<th>Doctor Comfort</th>
<th>Intern Recommend</th>
<th>Intern Social Proximity</th>
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<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.85***</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>0.73***</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below.

†p<.15; *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

First and foremost, across every context and form of social evaluation respondents who received an Out-Party Treatment are significantly less likely to positively and favorably evaluate this individual, whomever it is. Respondents are less likely to vote for a candidate whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the opposite party by -0.13 (p < 0.00) compared to the control candidate. They are less likely to visit (β= -0.19, p <0.00) and feel comfortable talking to a doctor (β= -0.11, p < 0.00) whose cultural preferences suggest that he politically disagrees with the respondent. And again, in the intern context, respondents are significantly less likely to recommend, as well as want to hang out with, a fellow intern who could be a member of the opposite party by -0.14 (p < 0.00) and -0.13 (p < 0.00), respectively, compared to the control. In
each aspect of evaluation, respondents express a significant and substantively large negative evaluation of people whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of their out party.

In comparison, receiving an in-party treatment only significantly affects respondents’ likelihood of vote choice in the non-partisan election scenario. Respondents who received a treatment describing a candidate whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the respondent’s party are significantly more likely to vote for this candidate by 0.07 (p <0.00) compared to the control candidate. Thus, it seems that the only context in which respondents not only do not prefer a member of the opposite party but also actively prefer a member of their own party is the most political environment.

Overall, these results suggest that respondents primarily want to consistently avoid or express dislike towards members of the opposite party, and only prefer a member of the in-party when it comes to explicit contexts of governance. As such, interacting with a “non-partisan” or control is seen as just as fine as interacting with a co-partisan.

**But is it Partisan Categorization?**

To test whether the effects of these treatments operate through the theorized mechanism of partisan categorization of partisan cultural stereotypes, I use this section to conduct a mediation analysis with *Perceived In-Party* as the mediating variable. *Perceived In-Party* is a recoded version of *Perceived Partisanship*, which ranges from -1 to 1 with higher values of *Perceived In-Party* indicating that the respondent perceived the treatment as being typical of the respondents’ in-party and negative values indicating that the respondent perceived the treatment as being typical of their out-party.
For each of the six significant direct treatment effects, I conduct a test of mediation using a Sobel-Goodman test. However, since I have five different dependent variables and six tests of mediation, I just present the Sobel test statistics and percentage of the total effect mediated for each test of mediation in Table 2. If the Sobel test statistic is significant then all four conditions of proper mediation are met. First, the treatment variable, here *In-Party Treatment or Out-Party Treatment*, significantly affects the outcome variable, any of the social evaluation dependent variables. Second, the treatment variable significantly affects the mediator variable, *Perceived In-Party*. Third, the mediator variable, *Perceived In-Party*, significantly affects the outcome variable, any of the social evaluation variables, when controlling for the effect of the treatment. And lastly, the size of the treatment effect is smaller when controlling for the mediator compared to the size of the treatment effect when not controlling for the mediator variable (Baron and Kenny 1986; Judd and Kenny 1981).

Table 2 shows the results of this mediation analysis among all participants for each of the six direct treatment effects in Table 2. Column 1 describes the test of mediation being conducted, with the treatment variable listed first, followed by the mediator, and then the outcome variable. In every test of mediation, the Sobel test is statistically significant, seen in Column 2, which suggests that in every case where a treatment significantly affects respondents’ social evaluations, this effect is mediated by partisan categorization from only apolitical information. People are exposed to partisan cultural stereotypes. They categorize these individuals by partisanship. They then use this partisan categorization to make evaluations of the individual.

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21 I also conducted a causal steps approach (Baron and Kenny 1986) for each of these six tests for mediation. They confirm the results of the Sobel test, and are in the appendix.
Not only does Perceived In-Party significantly mediate the relationship between the treatment and the outcome variable, it mediates a substantial portion of the relationship between the treatment and the outcome variable in every instance. The results from the Sobel tests suggest that in every test for mediation, Perceived In-Party mediates more than 50% of the total effect of the treatment when not controlling for the mediator. As a result, the evidence from these tests of mediation suggest that people do in fact engage in partisan categorization when learning about an individual’s cultural proclivities, hobbies, and everyday likes and dislikes. This process of partisan categorization then leads to deliberate and controlled expressions of partisan bias and prejudice, mainly of people who are categorized into the out-party, in a variety of contexts and types of evaluations.

Table 2: The Mediating Effects of Perceived In-Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediation Model</th>
<th>Sobel Test Statistic</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Effect Mediated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Party → Perceived In-Party → Vote Choice</td>
<td>Z = 4.375 (p &lt; 0.00)</td>
<td>165%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Vote Choice</td>
<td>Z= -4.201 (p &lt; 0.00)</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Doctor Visit</td>
<td>Z= -5.198 (p &lt; 0.00)</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Doctor Comfort</td>
<td>Z= -4.329 (p &lt; 0.00)</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Intern Recommend</td>
<td>Z= -4.794 (p &lt; 0.00)</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Party → Perceived In-Party → Social Proximity</td>
<td>Z= -6.332 (p &lt; 0.00)</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, I demonstrate that through its cognitive and affective associations in long term memory, partisanship may have a broader impact than previously thought. People associate
seemingly mundane, everyday information with the partisan stereotypes. Because of this cognitive association with partisanship, these partisan cultural stereotypes elicit automatic partisan affect as well as shape the way people make deliberative decisions in social situations.

First, my results suggest that people clearly associate these cultural attributes with the two political parties. Exposure to these cultural attributes facilitates the automatic and subconscious activation of partisan affect at nearly similar levels as exposure to partisan labels. Not only do these results suggest that these cultural symbols are just as cognitively hard wired into people’s conceptualization of partisan categories, but also that mere exposure to these cultural stereotype attributes can lead to the automatic and uncontrollable activation of polarized partisan affect. Thus, explicitly partisan symbols do not need to be present for individuals to subconsciously feel and react as if they had been exposed to partisan stimuli.

Furthermore, these cultural stereotypes can also influence more deliberative expressions of partisan bias, specifically regarding social evaluations in both a non-partisan political context and apolitical contexts. Across a variety of different social contexts and types of evaluations, partisans express partisan bias and seem to be unmotivated to control their automatic activation of polarized partisan affect regarding negativity towards the opposite party and, in one case, positivity towards co-partisans.

Partisans consistently express a dislike of candidates, interns, and doctors whose cultural preferences are stereotypical of the opposing party. Not only are partisans less likely to vote for a perceived out-partisan, they also express negative evaluations of stereotypical opposing partisans in apolitical scenarios. In both social evaluations of the doctor, partisan respondents are significantly less likely to visit and feel comfortable around a doctor whose partisan cultural stereotypes are suggestive of the opposing party. Despite the fact that the doctor was highly
qualified, with decades of experience, and recommended by a friend, all of which are considered to be more important aspects than personal characteristics when selecting a doctor (Bornstein et al. 2000; Wolinsky and Steiber 1982), partisans still decline to use a doctor whose personal characteristics suggest that they are politically different.

Similarly, in both social evaluations of the fellow intern, partisans who read that a fellow intern held preferences stereotypical of the opposing party are significantly less likely to recommend this intern for a job promotion and less willing to interact with them outside of the work environment. Without any other information besides cultural preferences, respondents here are significantly more likely to punish an intern perceived to be a member of the opposite party even though this outcome has little to no impact on the respondent or the respondent’s party. And when faced with the potential of interacting with this individual, respondents are less willing and happy to form a personal relationship with someone perceived to be a member of the opposite party.

Looking at their evaluations of co-partisans, only partisans’ vote choice significantly increased when evaluating someone stereotypical of their party. Unsurprisingly, it seems that partisans gain additional peace of mind by selecting someone from their own party compared to a more politically ambiguous candidate. Partisans can trust someone from their own party to act in their own political interests compared to a neutral individual. Surprisingly, though, these results conflict with the results from some of my previous work which finds an insignificant effect of In-Party Treatment on Vote Choice. One reason for a significant finding in this paper could be the timing of the study. The study in this paper was conducted during the 2016 presidential primary races, whereas the study in the other paper was conducted in the Spring of 2015. Partisan identity and partisan voting may have been more salient in the study conducted in this paper due to the
environmental context at the time. As a result, partisan voting for an in-party candidate may have been a greater concern for the respondents in this survey.

Finally, using several mediation analyses to isolate the effect of Perceived In-Partisanship, I find that the effect of these partisan cultural stereotype biographies on various different forms of social evaluation partially operates through the mechanism of partisan categorization. This significant mediation occurs in every case where these cultural biographies significantly shape how respondents evaluate these three types of hypothetical individuals. These results suggest that one of the primary mechanisms through which people evaluate other’s cultural preferences is partisan identity, and, more generally, through a political lens. This in turn affects how they feel about complete strangers in a variety of social situations and types of evaluations.

Overall, the results from these two studies suggest that exposure to these partisan cultural stereotypes can affect automatic, uncontrollable polarized partisan affect as well as more conscious expressions of partisan bias. Both studies demonstrate that partisan cultural stereotypes are potent pieces of political information and exposure to these seemingly apolitical lifestyle choices can shape conscious and potentially subconscious expressions of attitudes and behavior towards others. In particular, the results from study 1, that partisan cultural stereotypes can elicit spontaneous partisan affect, suggest that subtler forms of partisan bias can occur as a result of exposure to seemingly mundane lifestyle choices. Evidence that subliminal group primes affect people’s behavior without their awareness (Bargh, Chen, and Burrows 1996) suggests that partisan cultural stereotype primes could potentially cause individuals to engage in expressions of partisan bias without them being aware of their actions and/or the processes influencing their actions. People might be expressing favoritism for in-partisans and/or animosity towards out-partisans on
a daily basis through more unintentional actions – avoiding eye contact, unconscious imitation, and particular facial gestures.

Concerning these more controllable and aware decisions to express partisan prejudice, respondents seem particularly inclined to negatively evaluate members of the opposite party rather than favor members of their own party. In general, these results point to the relative motivational power of negative information compared to positive information (Baumeister et al. 2001), as respondents are more likely to significantly alter their social evaluations when the partisan cultural stereotypes facilitate the activation of negative affect. Thinking specifically about partisanship, these results both provide further evidence for the relative strength of out-party effects when compared to in-party effects demonstrated in the previous literature on partisan group dynamics (Nicholson 2012), as well as highlight the strength of out-party animosity as a source of motivation in the current American political environment (Bump 2016; Iyengar et al. 2012).

As social groups become politicized and connected with the two partisan coalitions, these associated cultural symbols transform into key signals of partisanship. As a result, political preferences are now easily discernible, and in some cases immediately visible, when you see someone. For instance, if someone on the street is wearing tie dye and Birkenstocks most people will probably categorize that individual as a Democrat without even interacting with them. From this categorization, one can then decide whether they want to even interact with that individual at all. In other words, people could potentially be subconsciously aware of other’s partisanship through just observing them and learning about their basic everyday activities. This constant subconscious awareness of partisanship can lead to partisan categorization and discrimination from an even earlier point of interaction.
CHAPTER 3

LOOKS LIKE A DEMOCRAT: PARTISAN VISUAL CATEGORIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON IMPRESSION FORMATION AND DAILY INTERACTIONS

ABSTRACT: The past decade powerfully reminds us that partisan identity is a pivotal social identity that people use to navigate political and apolitical environments. In this paper, I argue that partisan identity and a range of social identities are now so intertwined that people associate visual markers of cultural preferences, such as wearing flannel or camouflage for example, with the two parties. As a result, people can form partisan impressions of others without them even uttering a word, much less sharing an issue position. In an original study, I show that, first, respondents do indeed engage in spontaneous partisan categorization upon simply seeing people. Second, I show that this partisan categorization, along with social group categorization, affects respondents’ initial impressions, evaluations of, and willingness to interact with these individuals. Overall, these results suggest that partisan identity is a visually observable identity and that people use these visual partisan stereotypes to guide social evaluations with others by their physical appearance before even getting to know them.

Partisans discriminate based off others’ partisan identity in a variety of different hypothetical or real contexts largely in part because partisan discrimination is not only socially accepted but often encouraged (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). It is perhaps fortunate, then, that partisan identity (and associated issue positions) is not easily attainable information in most contexts. Most people tend to avoid political discussion on a daily basis (Mutz 2006), and few people wear a name tag that says “Democrat” or “Republican.”

However, not knowing someone’s partisan identity does not restrict someone’s ability to categorize and stereotype individuals by party. Through increased sorting between social groups and the two political parties (Mason 2016), the cultural symbols used to impute social group membership can now be used to impute partisan membership, provided the social group is uniquely associated with only one party. As such, some everyday cultural preferences, like driving a pickup or wearing camouflage, are partisan cultural stereotypes. Since these everyday cultural preferences are typically basic information about individuals’ hobbies and preferences, they are
relatively available pieces of information about people and can even be observed through visible stimuli, such as clothing choice, hair style, or the stuff people own and carry with them. Since people have an innate, automatic tendency to categorize individuals into groups simply when observing someone, mere exposure to someone’s physical appearance may lead to the partisan categorization and partisan discrimination of complete strangers.

In this paper, I work to broaden the discussion of partyism by assessing the extent to which people spontaneously engage in partisan categorization and express partisan bias towards others simply from observing their physical appearance. I test this first by showing that people engage in partisan categorization when briefly exposed to pictures of an individual wearing visual partisan cultural stereotypes. For example, a picture of a white male with long hair, a scraggly beard, in a tie-dye shirt, and wearing sandals is systematically categorized as a Democrat while a photograph of the same man wearing a NASCAR shirt and a camouflage American flag hat is considered a Republican. I build on these initial results by assessing whether respondents perceive these individuals as friendly and competent and find that perceived partisan identity, along with perceived social group identity, affects partisans’ ratings of friendliness and competence.

In a second study, I use the pictures from Study 1 to show that people express partisan bias in certain types of social evaluations simply by looking at someone. When it comes to assessing whether these stereotypical “partisans” care about, respect, and understand people like them, both Republicans and Democrats believe that stereotypical opposing partisans do not care, respect, or understand people like them. These feelings of partisan bias do not necessarily translate to expressions of behavioral social evaluations. Democrats and Republicans engage in behavioral expressions of partisan bias when asked to evaluate explicit partisans, but this bias is limited when it comes to evaluating stereotypical partisans in both long-term, obligatory social situations and
short-term, voluntary situations.

Overall, the results from these studies suggest that people categorize, stereotype, and formulate some biased social evaluations of others as partisans depending on what clothes they are wearing and how they are styled. As a result, partisan identity can be a visually observable identity that people can automatically categorize others by and that these automatic categorizations can have lasting effects on person perception and social evaluations.

**Partisan Stereotypes and Visual Categorization**

Partisan identity has recently emerged as a salient and influential group identity in apolitical environments (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Iyengar et al. 2018). The two parties are perceived to be comprised of different types of people and social groups (Ahler and Sood 2018; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991) and partisans, now, perceive opposing partisans as extreme and increasingly dissimilar (Ahler 2014; Hetherington, Long, and Rudolph 2016). As a result, partisanship is a critical societal cleavage that is a clear division within political and social life. Partisans express positive attitudes towards co-partisans and negative attitudes toward opposing partisans. This partisan bias has affected both interparty attitudes (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) as well as interparty behavior in both online surveys and the real world (Huber and Malhotra 2017; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Levendusky 2018; McConnell et al. 2018). In none of these studies is the context directly relevant to political outcomes or expressly political, yet, partisans use partisan identity to formulate decisions on how to feel toward and interact with individuals. In order to be able to discriminate along partisan lines, however, people need to be able to categorize individuals as a member of a political party.

Vision and visual information are central to the process of group categorization and person
perception. Indeed, within milliseconds of viewing someone, humans can detect whether that person is male or female, young or old, Latino or black (Thorpe, Fize, and Marlot 1996). A person’s visual attributes - their face, hair style, and clothing choices, for instance – are central to this process of visual group categorization (Macrae et al. 2005; Quinn, Mason, and Macrae 2009; Rentfrow and Gosling 2006). Through these aspects of intentional visual and physical appearance, people unwittingly communicate a plethora of information about themselves, which enables observers to categorize complete strangers into groups immediately upon seeing them (Quinn, Mason, and Macrae 2009). For instance, if an individual has long hair they are more likely to be categorized as a female and assigned stereotypical feminine traits (Manning 2010). From this spontaneous group categorization, people can begin to decode who this individual is, what values she holds, and how she would act in a given situation (Hall 2009; Uleman and Saribay 2012).

While partisan identity is not typically thought of as a visible identity, through the well-known relationship between parties and the social groups that “belong” to each party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991), people can use the visible cultural symbols of social groups to impute partisan identity. Cultural symbols, like a national flag or a cross necklace, have long been used by group members to provide a statement about their beliefs as well as signal to the outside world that they are members of these groups and distinct from people in other groups (Firth 1973; Geisler 2005). For example, wearing a suit and a nice watch might suggest that someone is affluent, while wearing a cowboy hat might suggest that someone is from a rural area and a farmer. From these visible social group attributes, people can easily and automatically categorize strangers and non-acquaintances as members of a specific social group. If that social group is cognitively associated with a specific party, then these aspects of physical appearance can lead people to categorize these individuals as partisans as well. A man
wearing a suit and a nice watch might not only lead someone to see him as affluent but also as a Republican. Through the cognitive association between social groups and party, these visible social group cultural symbols become cognitively linked to partisan identity and transform into aspects of the partisan stereotype. As such, I hypothesize that upon viewing someone, and observing their visual partisan cultural stereotypes, people can spontaneously categorize someone as a member of a political party.

Through partisan categorization, these visual stimuli may have broad effects on the initial impressions formed of others which in turn can affect social evaluations of them. Thus, partisan categorization is not the only outcome of the visual manifestations of partisan cultural stereotypes. There are also “downstream” implications of categorization. In this paper, I look at two different types of attitudinal outcomes that may result from categorization: impression formation and social evaluation.

Impression Formation

When forming impressions of others, people are primarily interested in deciphering an individual’s warmth and competence (Uleman and Kressel 2013). Warmth typically accounts for the perceived intentions of an individual and whether these intentions are positive or negative. Perceptions of competence are a reflection of whether an individual is seen as capable of carrying out this intent (Fiske 1992; Fiske et al. 2002). Impressions of others along these “separate dimensions of (dis)like and (dis)respect” are largely reflections of an individual’s group membership (Fiske et al. 2002, pg. 879).

An individual is seen as warm (cold), if their group is viewed as not competitive and not in conflict with (competitive and in conflict) with the perceiver’s in-group. Since intergroup
relations play a large role in directing the perception of an individual’s warmth, I expect that this dimension of impression formation will be largely affected by the perception of an individual’s partisanship. The effect of a respondent’s partisan identity on perceived warmth is bolstered by both the close cognitive association between partisan identity and affect (Iyengar and Westwood 2012; Taber and Lodge 2013) and the unique environment of direct and overt political competition in which the two groups exist.

An individual is perceived as competent (incompetent) if their group is considered to be a group of high (low) status in the social hierarchy (Fiske et al. 2002; Uleman and Kressel 2013). Since the partisan coalitions incorporate groups from all aspects of social life, with economic, racial, and religious differences, I do not think that perceptions of competence will be as highly correlated with perceived partisan identity. Republicans can be white, male, religious, rural, or affluent. Democrats, on the other hand, can be ethnically diverse, female, morally progressive, urban, or poor (Hunter 1991). While all these different types social groups can be categorized and stereotyped as either Republicans or Democrats (Ahler and Sood 2018; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991), the social status of these distinct social groups within the two party coalitions vary widely. Two social groups that are considered to be part of the Republican partisan coalition are the elderly and the rich (Fiske et al. 2002). These two groups, however, are stereotypically perceived as low social status and high relative social status, respectively. This divergence in social status exists among different social groups in the Democrat partisan coalition as well. Highly educated individuals are thought to have higher social status than those who are working class or low income (Fiske et al. 2002). Therefore, I expect that regardless of whether an individual is categorized as a partisan, their perceived social group can lead to differentiations in initial impressions of competence.
Beyond the effect of visual partisan cultural stereotypes on impression formation, it is also possible that this automatic partisan categorization can affect social evaluations and treatment of strangers. Once categorization of an individual occurs, the resulting group-based impression of the individual is thought to be stable and enduring (Fiske 1998). Thus, once an individual automatically categorizes a stranger as a partisan, that individual is evaluated as a member of that particular political group. Recent work on affective polarization has established that when people know the partisan identity of others, partisans tend to favor co-partisans and express animosity towards members of the opposite party, even sometimes encouraging outright discrimination (Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Nicholson et al. 2016). Furthermore, partisans also express a desire for increased (or decreased) physical and social distance from a known member of the out-party (or in-party) (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Deichert, Goggin, and Theodoridis 2018). As a result, if simply seeing an individual dressed in stereotypical partisan clothing affects how that individual is categorized, then particular clothing styles or physical appearance could lead to expressions of partisan bias towards a complete stranger in a variety of different social evaluations and social scenarios. Thus, before even getting to know an individual or talking to them, people might start to engage in partisan bias by applying stereotypical partisan attitudes to them, negatively (or positively) evaluating them, and interacting with less (or more) due to perceptions of partisan identity.

**Partisan Visual Categorization and Impression Formation**

To test whether people systematically categorize others by partisan identity automatically upon seeing them, I designed a survey where individuals were asked to complete three speeded categorization tasks. In each task, respondents were asked to categorize twelve photos of an
individual on each of three attributes: partisan identity, friendliness, and competence. The study was conducted in January 2018 through the web-based survey and crowdsourcing platform, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 370 U.S. citizens over the age of 18 participated in exchange for $1.00 payment. 206 respondents identified as Democrats, 103 respondents identified as Republican, and 61 respondents identified as pure Independents. The study took around 7 minutes.

The study was described as a survey about political opinions and behaviors. Respondents answered a few demographic questions, completed all three of the speeded categorization tasks, and then completed two other unrelated tasks. Respondents categorized all twelve photographs by partisan identity, competence, and friendliness one attribute at a time. The order of the three sets was randomized and the order of the pictures within each set was also randomized.\(^{22}\) The twelve photographs featured the same individual, a thirty-year-old white male in eleven different visual manifestations of partisan cultural stereotypes and a neutral control. Five of the photos were *ex-ante* posited to be typical of Democrats, five of the photos were *ex-ante* posited to be typical of Republicans, one photo (of the individual dressed as a Union member) was not posited to be *ex-ante* Republican or Democrat, and one photo did not include any partisan cultural stereotypes and was included as the control.\(^{23}\)

The partisan cultural stereotypes exhibited in each of the photographs are visible characteristics of social groups associated with the two partisan coalitions and feature social groups of varying status and competitiveness within the social hierarchy. For instance, one picture features the model wearing a plaid shirt over an indie rock t-shirt and holding a vintage bike. These symbols are

\(^{22}\) The question wording for all three of the speeded categorization tasks is in the Appendix.  
\(^{23}\) The photo that is *ex-ante* posited to be neither Republican or Democrat is a man dressed up as a union member. Given the current shift in the voting behavior of this group, I had no expectations as how individuals would categorize him by partisan identity.
commonly associated with the creative class, a social group that is associated with the Democratic Party (Florida 2012; Infante 2015). Another photograph, features an individual wearing a cowboy hat and boots, two cultural symbols associated with rural people, a distinct part of the Republican Party’s coalition. All visual manifestations of these partisan cultural stereotypes were validated as uniquely belonging to one of the two parties in previous studies in which respondents were asked to categorize written stimuli or biographies of individuals by party.

In addition to using pictures of the model dressed in various partisan cultural stereotypes, two of the photographs featured the model dressed in explicit partisan wear. In one picture the model is wearing a Clinton campaign shirt and in another the model is wearing a Trump campaign shirt. These explicit partisan visuals are included to provide a baseline comparison of the strength of partisan categorization given exposure to an individual exhibiting more implicit signals of partisan identity.24

Respondents were only given 3 seconds to look at and categorize each photograph by the attribute.25 Restricting the time allotted only provides respondents with a thin-slice of information about the individual, mirroring the sensation of initial exposure to a stranger (Ambady and Rosenthal 1992; Tskhay et al. 2017). In addition, when a time constraint is imposed on direct measures of attitudes, the attitudes formed are more automatic attitudes than controlled attitudes (Ranganath, Smith, and Nosek 2008). It is only enough time for a respondent to formulate a gut reaction about this individual rather than an impression formed from deliberation. As such, these speeded categorization task should capture what type of impression automatically forms when given thin slices of information about an individual.

24 Pictures of all 12 of the treatments are in the Appendix.
25 This information was provided to them in the task introduction.
Perceived Partisanship

I first test whether respondents engage in partisan categorization when exposed to an individual’s physical appearance. Figure 1 shows the mean level of Perceived Partisanship, with 95% confidence intervals around the mean, for each of the 12 treatments across the entire study sample. Perceived Partisanship is coded 0 for Republican categorization and 1 for Democrat categorization and the treatments, coded as dummy variables, are ordered from most Republican to most Democrat.

![Average Perceived Partisanship with 95% Confidence Interval](image)

Figure 1. Average Perceived Partisanship of Picture Treatments with 95% Confidence Intervals

26 The mean values of Perceived Partisanship for each photograph are in the Appendix.
From Figure 1, two things are of note. First, the majority of “Republican” partisan cultural stereotype treatments are considered significantly more Republican than the control and the majority of “Democrat” partisan cultural stereotype treatments are considered to be significantly more Democrat than the control. For example, 84% of respondents view Camo, the model wearing a camouflage outer shirt, a NASCAR shirt, and a camouflage American flag hat, as Republican. 87% of respondents perceive Hipster, the model wearing a plaid shirt over an indie rock t-shirt and holding a vintage bike, as a Democrat. The only two treatments perceived as indistinguishable from the control are Preppy, a treatment ex-ante believed to be a Republican treatment ($M_{Prep} = .61; M_{Control} = .62; \text{diff} = -.01, p = 1.00$) and Basketball, which was ex-ante stereotypical of the Democratic party ($M_{Basketball} = .67; M_{Control} = .62; \text{diff} = .06, p = 1.00$). The majority of respondents (67%), however, categorized Basketball “correctly”, it is simply that Control was also perceived by a majority of respondents (62%) as a Democrat. Preppy was the only treatment where the majority of respondents categorized the model “incorrectly” according to ex-ante expectations, as 61% of the sample perceived him as a Democrat.

Second, some partisan cultural stereotype treatments were perceived to be just as partisan as the explicit partisan treatments, Trump Supporter and Hillary Supporter. A difference in means test of Perceived Partisanship between Trump Supporter and Cowboy suggests that Perceived Partisanship is statistically indistinguishable between these two treatments ($M_{Trump} = .08; M_{Cowboy} = .13; \text{diff} = .05, p = 1.00$). Perceived Partisanship is also indistinguishable between the two treatments Trump Supporter and Camo ($M_{Trump} = .08; M_{Camo} = .16; \text{diff} = .08, p = .48$). Similarly, the difference in means between Hillary Supporter and Hippie ($M_{Hillary} = .92; M_{Hippie} = .87; \text{diff} = -.04, p = 1.00$) is statistically insignificant as is the difference in means between Hillary Supporter and Hipster ($M_{Hillary} = .92; M_{Hipster} = .87; \text{diff} = -.05, p = 1.00$). Thus, when respondents see the
model wearing some cultural symbols of partisan coalition groups they are, on average, just as likely to elicit the same level of spontaneous partisan categorization as when the model is wearing explicit partisan clothing. People are just as likely to spontaneously think “Democrat” when they see an individual in tie-dye as when they see an individual in a Clinton t-shirt.

Lastly, I included Union as a treatment to test whether a union worker (or working class individual, more generally) was thought of as Democrat or Republican. Due to the recent swing in working class voters, particularly in union heavy rust belt states, from Democrat to Republican in the 2016 presidential election, I had no theoretical expectations for how this individual would be categorized (Coontz 2016). The individual is wearing a union jacket, union hat, and carrying a union lunch bag (see the picture of the treatment in Appendix C). As Figure 1 shows Union is categorized as a highly typical Republican with a mean partisan categorization of 0.23. This could either be the result of actual partisan perception of Union switching from Democrat to Republican, or an effect of people not being able to recognize that this individual is wearing union related clothing.

To test whether partisan categorization is affected by respondent partisan identity, Figure 2 shows the mean levels of Perceived Partisanship, with 95% confidence intervals around the mean, for each treatment among Democrats and Republicans separately. The Figure suggests that the mean values of Perceived Partisanship for each of the eleven treatment photographs are essentially the same across Democrats and Republicans. However, Democrats and Republicans perceive the control’s partisanship as statistically and substantively quite different.Democrats perceive the control to be more typical of the Democrat Party ($M_{Control} = .71$) compared to

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27 Difference in means results for each of the treatments by respondent party are in the Appendix.
Republicans, who perceive the control as the more neutral, non-partisan individual it was intended to be ($M_{\text{Control}} = .44$). For Democrats, then, these results suggest that the control is not necessarily a true control and instead they infer that this “control” individual, who exhibits no overt negative qualities, is a member of their own party (Theodoridis and Goggin 2017).

**Figure 2. Average Perceived Partisanship of Picture Treatments with 95% Confidence Intervals by Respondent Partisanship**

Overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that people do engage in spontaneous partisan categorization when briefly observing the physical appearance and features of an individual. People can impute partisan identity from visual cultural symbols because of the cognitive association between party, partisan coalition groups, and these social group cultural
symbols. Furthermore, an individual’s willingness to categorize someone by party is not significantly affected by their own partisanship, and thus partisan categorization is not a reflection of the partisan identity of the perceiver.

Impression Formation

The results from above suggest that both Republicans and Democrats can use these visual manifestations of cultural symbols to engage in partisan categorization of individuals, and thus these visual features are recognized as partisan stereotypes. However, this does not necessarily suggest that all of these different partisan stereotypes will affect impressions of warmth and competence in the same way. As theorized above, these individuals are not only typical of a political party but also of social groups that vary in status and skill. As such, in order to gain a more complete picture of how these various partisan cultural stereotypes might affect one’s impression formation of someone, it is essential to understand the effect of each type of visual manifestation of partisan cultural stereotypes on perceived intent (friendliness) and capability (competence).

To analyze whether respondents use friendliness and competence to differentiate between various stereotypical co-partisan and opposing partisan subtypes, I subset the data by respondent partisan identity in order to isolate in-groups and out-groups. Perceived Friendliness and Perceived Competence are both coded as dummy variables where 1 indicates friendly and competent (0 indicates unfriendly and incompetent), respectively.

To get an initial assessment of how Democrats and Republicans differentiate various types of partisan cultural stereotypes along these two dimensions, I plot Perceived Friendliness against
Perceived Competence for all twelve treatments among Democrats, in Figure 3a, and Republicans, in Figure 3b.

The results from Figure 3a suggest that Democrats rate stereotypical co-partisans more favorably along these two dimensions than stereotypical opposing partisans. In addition, for the majority of treatments, Democrats do not necessarily differentiate between friendliness and competent when forming impressions of stereotypical partisans. In general, the majority of treatments are seen as equally warm and competent, falling along the diagonal line that is bookended at the bottom left hand corner by Trump Supporter and in the top right hand corner by Hipster.

Figure 3a. Stereotype Content Model Among Democrats
This general positive or negative perception, however, primarily applies to stereotypical “Republicans” (treatments that are bolded and italicized). *Trump Supporter, Camo, Cowboy,* and *Union* are all viewed as equally friendly and competent, in addition to being viewed as less warm and capable than the majority of stereotypical co-partisans. *Suit* is rated as significantly more competent than warm (*diff:*.57, *p* < .00), a result consistent with perceptions of affluent or high-income groups in other assessments of warmth and competence (Fiske et al. 2002). *Preppy,* on the other hand, is seen by Democrats as relatively high in friendliness (*M* _friendly_ = .81) and competence (*M* _competent_ = .79) compared to other “Republicans,” however, this is probably largely a result of Democrats, on average, categorizing *Preppy* as a co-partisan.\(^{28}\)

When formulating initial stereotype impressions of individuals stereotypical of their own party, Democrats seem to differentiate slightly more along these two dimensions. Only *Hipster* and *Hillary Supporter* are perceived as true in-group members, equally high on friendliness and competence (Fiske et al. 2002). For the other three “Democrats,” there is some variance in the impressions of them. *Professor* is thought of as significantly more competent than warm (*diff = - .19, *p* < .00), although high on both (*M* _friendly_ = .72, *M* _competent_ = .92). This suggests that Democrats in the sample find *Professor* slightly more threatening than other stereotypical Democrats, which makes sense given the authority often attributed to professors. Conversely, Democrats think of both *Hippie* (*M* _friendly_ = .95, *M* _competent_ = .51, *diff = .44, *p* < .00) and *Basketball* (*M* _friendly_ = .65, *M* _competent_ = .48, *diff = .17, *p* < .00) as more warm than competent which suggests that Democrats take pity on both of these particular in-group subtypes. Compared to *Hippie,* though, *Basketball* is seen as about 30 percentage points less friendly. Overall, all stereotypical co-partisans are rated as

\(^{28}\) The mean paired difference between the two dimensions of friendliness and competence is in the Appendix.
friendly and only Basketball is rated as (slightly) less friendly than Cowboy, a stereotypical opposing partisan.

Figure 3b depicts the perceived friendliness and competence among Republicans. From these findings, three main results emerge. Like Democrats, Republicans seem to form more positive impressions of individuals who are stereotypical of their own party compared to the impressions formed of individuals who are stereotypical of the opposing party. Cowboy and Preppy are seen as high-status individuals, rated equally high on friendliness and competence, whereas Hillary Supporter is seen as the lowest status individual, equally low on friendly and competent.

Figure 3b. Stereotype Content Model Among Republicans
However, the similarities between Democrats and Republicans end there. Republicans are unique from Democrats, in this sample at least, in two ways. First, Republicans, on average, formulate more positive initial impressions of ex-ante stereotypical opposing partisans compared to Democrats, particularly along the dimension of perceived friendliness. While Democrats, on average, ascribe negative intention to several stereotypical Republicans – *Trump Supporter, Camo,* and *Suit* – Republicans, on average, see stereotypical Democrats as having positive, or at worst neutral, intentions. These results suggest that Republicans, compared to Democrats, perceive stereotypical opposing partisans as less cold, regardless of which social group their cultural symbols are associated with. This difference in perceived friendliness might be able to explain why Republicans are less likely than Democrats to discriminate against stereotypical opposing partisans in apolitical contexts. Republicans might simply view them as not competitive.

Second, Republicans seem to distinguish more between friendliness and competence when forming impressions of various stereotypical co-partisans or opposing partisan, although slightly more for stereotypical opposing partisans. Indeed, Republicans’ mean ratings of friendliness and competence are more consistently significantly different across the 12 treatment photographs compared to Democrats (see Appendix C Table 3). Both *Professor* (M<sub>friendly</sub> = .58, M<sub>competent</sub> = .8, \( \text{diff} = -.22, p < 0.00 \)) and *Suit* (M<sub>friendly</sub> = .54, M<sub>competent</sub> = .94, \( \text{diff} = -.4, p < 0.00 \)) are viewed as significantly more competent than friendly, befitting of both of these stereotypical partisans’ social groups. They also view *Camo, Preppy, Hippie,* and *Basketball* as more friendly than competent, suggesting that for Republicans all four of these types of individuals are viewed as helpless and non-threatening stereotypical partisans, which may reflect attributes related to their social group. Particularly interesting, I think, is that *Camo* is included in this group given that this outfit was selected to represent “rednecks.” This group has been particularly central in the recent political
environment, as the subject of derogatory remarks from Democrats but the subject of empathy and pity at least in Republican elite rhetoric (Barabak and Duara 2016). Thus, perhaps, Republicans are less likely than Democrats to rely on their partisan perceptions when formulating initial impressions of friendliness and competence, but instead also incorporate aspects of these individuals’ social groups when formulating impressions of them.

Partisan Visual Categorization and Social Evaluations

The previous study finds clear evidence connecting specific clothing choices and visual appearances to the stereotypical images people have of Democrats and Republicans. Study 1, however, does not explore how these visual partisan cultural stereotypes affect social evaluations of strangers. To assess whether and how these initial partisan perceptions shape attitudes and expressed behaviors, I contracted with YouGov to recruit a nationally representative sample of 1,200 respondents. 510 respondents identified as Democrats (including leaners), 417 respondents identified as Republicans (including leaners), 225 respondents identified as pure Independents, and 48 individuals were not sure about their partisan identification. After completing an unrelated survey, respondents were randomly assigned to evaluate one of seven partisan pictures from Study 1 on a variety of social judgment dimensions.

To examine the breadth of the effect of partisan discrimination, respondents were asked two attitudinal questions and two behavioral expression questions. Overall, this study assesses a) whether partisan discrimination occurs when evaluating complete strangers and b) the extent to which it occurs in various different types of social evaluations. Across all four types of social evaluations, I expect that respondents will express positivity towards someone dressed as a stereotypical co-partisan and negativity towards someone dressed as a stereotypical opposing
partisan, regardless of the respondent’s partisanship. It is simply mechanisms of in-group/out-group prejudice that drive these expectations, but that in-group and out-group status are signaled by clothing styles and physical appearance.

**Attitudinal Social Evaluations**

The two attitudinal dependent variables are *Affect* and *Empathy*. To measure *Affect* respondents were asked to rate their feelings towards the treatment individual using a traditional feeling thermometer. This variable was then recoded to scale from 0 (very cold) to 1 (very warm).

The second attitudinal variable, *Empathy*, measures the extent to which respondents think that the individual in the photograph cares, respects, and understands her. In Kramer (2016), rural residents of Wisconsin frequently express these feelings when talking about Wisconsin urbanites, state level elites, and the liberal news media. These qualitative interviews suggest that a potential aspect of the urban/rural cultural divide is a lack of understanding, respect, and empathy. Partisan identity now seems to mirror this strong cultural divide, in that the daily concerns and interests of Republicans and Democrats are so vastly different that the two sides just do not understand or empathize with each other’s lifestyles or daily needs. I look here to test whether these feelings to misunderstanding and lack of empathy and respect also fall along a partisan divide.

The question wording for each of the three intergroup resentment questions is “Thinking about the individual in the picture, in your opinion, do you think the following statements describe him extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all? [Cares/Understands/Respects] people like me.” The answers to each of these three questions scale quite well together with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .94. Therefore, I created an additive index of the three measures, *Empathy*, which ranges from 0 (does not care/understand/respect people like me) to 1 (does
care/understand/respect people like me).

Empathy and Affect scale relatively well together with a Cronbach’s Alpha of .77, however, I choose to analyze them separately. While they both might be measuring general positive or negative feelings towards co-partisans and opposing partisans, theoretically I think they are measuring slightly different concepts of positive and negative feelings. One is personal feelings towards an individual, Affect, and one is group level feelings of disrespect and empathy, Empathy, both of which I argue could be influenced by partisan identity of the respondent.

I begin by looking at the difference in means of Affect across all seven treatments among Democrats, in Figure 4a, and among Republicans, in Figure 4b. Democrats feel significantly more positive towards co-partisans than the control and feel significantly more negative towards opposing partisans when rating an individual wearing an explicit signal of partisanship. Democrats rate Hillary 18 percentage points (p < 0.00) more favorably than the control and rate Trump 22 percentage points (p < 0.00) less favorably than the control. Thus, explicit symbols of partisanship do influence how respondents feel about these complete strangers. Moving to the implicit symbols of partisanship, there is some evidence that these visual partisan cultural stereotypes affect basic feelings about a stranger, but this effect is not consistent across all partisan cultural stereotype treatments.
Among Democrats, only Hipster exerts a significant effect on their feelings towards these strangers. Democrats rate the Hipster 9 percentage points higher than the control (p < .05). In connection with Study 1, which found that respondents see the Hipster as highly typical of the Democratic party, these results suggest that Democrats do in engage in some level of in-group favoritism based on perceived partisan affiliation. However, this is the only visual manifestation of partisan cultural stereotypes that significantly affects Democrats’ feelings towards strangers. For the three other treatments, the average feeling thermometers are suggestive of partisan bias in that the two “Republican” treatments are rated more negatively than the control and the one “Democrat” treatment is rated more positively than the Control but these three treatment effects are not significantly different from the control picture.

Looking at Figure 4b, Republicans feel 17 percentage points (p < 0.00) more positively
about Trump compared to the control and 19 percentage points (p < 0.00) more negatively about Hillary than the control. Furthermore, there is slightly more evidence among Republicans that visual partisan cultural stereotypes affect social evaluations of strangers. Republicans express both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation when evaluating stereotypical Republicans and Democrats, respectively. When exposed to an individual dressed in camouflage, Republicans rate this individual more positively than the control by 10 percentage points (p < 0.05), engaging in perceived co-partisan favoritism. Conversely, when exposed to an individual dressed like a Professor, Republicans express out-group derogation and rate him 13 percentage points more negatively than the control (p < 0.00). Furthermore, the average feeling thermometer rating for Professor is statistically insignificant from the average feeling thermometer rating of Hillary (diff: -.06, p = .141). This suggests that for Republicans this implicit signal of Democratic partisanship stirs up statistically equivalent levels of disdain as explicit signals of Democratic partisanship.

Overall, there is some support that perceptions of partisanship via clothing style alter basic affect towards strangers along partisan dimensions. However, the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes varies depending on which partisan cultural stereotype is visually represented. Not all partisan cultural stereotypes exert an influence on basic affect.

Turning next to the difference in means analysis of Empathy across all seven treatments and control pictures, the results of these two models are in Figures 5a and 5b, respectively.

Among Democrats, in similar fashion to the analysis of the affect measure results, the two explicit partisan treatments Hillary and Trump produce significant feelings of partisan bias. Democrats who received the Hillary treatment are, on average, more likely to think that this individual empathizes with people like them compared to the control by 0.16 (p < 0.00).
Conversely, Democrats who received the *Trump* treatment think that this individual is, on average, less accepting of and empathetic towards them by -0.21 (p < 0.00) compared to the control.

Unlike the results of the feeling thermometer analysis, all of the stereotypical “Democrats” and “Republicans” also produce expressions of partisan bias on *Empathy* among Democrats. Democratic respondents who received the two stereotypical “Democratic” treatments, *Hipster* and *Professor*, think these individuals care, respect, and understand people like them by 0.11 (p < 0.00) and 0.07 (p < .10) more than the control. The in-group favoritism that occurs as a result of exposure to *Hipster* is statistically equivalent to that of *Hillary* (diff: .05, p = .176) as well. Furthermore, Democrats who saw the two “Republican” treatments, *Camo* and *Suit*, see these two individuals as significantly less empathetic towards and understanding of people like them by -0.08 (p < 0.05) and -0.10 (p < 0.05) compared to the control, respectively.

![Graph of Empathy by Treatment](image)

*Figure 5a and 5b. Average Level of Empathy by Treatment with 95% CI*
Figure 5b shows that Republicans also feel some partisan bias when evaluating treatments on *Empathy*. Republicans think that, on average, *Trump* is more empathetic and understanding of them than the control by 0.17 (p < 0.00), and that *Hillary* is less empathetic of them than the control by -0.18 (p < 0.00). Republicans also express feelings of partisan bias when exposed to pictures of individuals who are stereotypical of the two parties. Republicans, on average, think that both *Hipster* and *Professor* are less likely to care, respect, and understand people like them by -0.09 (p < 0.10) and -0.14 (p < 0.00), respectively. However, only Republicans who saw *Camo* think that this stereotypical Republican empathizes with people like them (diff: 0.13, p <0.00) more than the control individual. Republicans actually think that *Suit* is less accepting of people like them. However, this effect is imprecisely estimated and insignificant. The negative magnitude of this effect might be due to Study 1’s results that suggest that both Democrats and Republicans perceive *Suit* to be relatively low in warmth and high in competence when compared to other individuals. Even though *Suit* is intended to be a Republican co-partisan, Republicans might weight the social group associations of *Suit* more heavily when evaluating this individual’s empathy and understanding of fellow Republicans.

Overall, the analysis of both of these attitudinal variables suggest that while explicit partisan cues consistently affect both *Affect* and *Empathy*, the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes seems to be more pronounced when evaluating *Empathy* and feelings of group level acceptance rather than the basic measures of personal affect.

**Behavioral Expression Social Evaluations**

The two dependent variables that measure behavioral expressions are *Seat Distance* and *Family Marriage*. Here, I test the extent to which this preference for interacting with a co-partisan
and distancing oneself from an opposing partisan (Deichert, Goggin, and Theodoridis 2018; Iyengar and Westwood 2012) translates into a preference for distancing (interacting) with an individual stereotypical of the opposing party (own party).

*Seat Distance* measures the extent to which partisans would be willing to sit close to or far away from the treatment individual. Respondents were told to imagine that they were in a doctor’s office waiting room where there were seven seats in a row. They were also told that the treatment individual was seated in the seat furthest to the left. Respondents were then asked to choose a seat from the remaining six seats available from a stylized likert scale where the furthest left answer option, 0, indicated that the man was sitting there. This computerized technique of measuring seat distance is taken from McKinnon et al. (2011). From these responses, I calculated the number of seats between the seat the respondent chose and the seat where the treatment individual was seated. This variable, *Seat Distance*, ranges from 0 (sat close by) to 1 (sat far away).

Theoretically, *Seat Distance* is intended to capture how partisan bias might occur in day to day social situations with others. How people behave in these daily, minor interactions can have lasting impacts on intergroup relations as sheer proximity increases the likelihood of interacting with someone. If people choose to sit further away from out-group members, they are not only creating a physical distance between them and the other, but also decreasing the likelihood that interaction, by happenstance, occurs across group lines (McKinnon et al. 2011). However, since the scenario depicted is a minor social situation that does not require actual interaction or conversation, people might not care if they are sitting next to someone stereotypical of the other party, especially when compared to a more long-term and interactive social situation.

To measure how willingness to engage in a more intimate social interaction would be affected by partisan cultural stereotypes, respondents also answered a question about whether they
would be happy if this individual married into their family. *Family Marriage* ranges from 0 (very unhappy) to 1 (very happy). According to the Borgardus (1933) social distance scale, this measure of social distance, i.e. having someone as part of your close family, is the greatest amount of desired social proximity that one can express about another. Close family members interact frequently and these interactions tend to be more intimate, especially when compared to sitting next to someone in a sterile environment. Therefore, these two variables, *Seat Distance* and *Marriage*, measure how stereotypical partisan appearance can affect both day to day, voluntary interactions (i.e. *Seat Distance*) as well as more long-term, obligatory interactions (i.e. *Family Marriage*).

To analyze the effect of visual partisan cultural stereotypes on *Seat Distance* and *Family Marriage*, I conducted a difference in means test on each of the dependent variables among Democrats and Republicans. The results of the difference in means test on *Seat Distance* is in Figures 6a, among Democrats, and 6b, among Republicans.
Democrats, Figure 6a, express a desire to engage in partisan bias towards explicit partisan signals when selecting a seat. On average, Democrats sit closer to Hillary compared to the control by about -0.07 (p<0.10) and they, on average, choose to sit further away from Trump by 0.17 (p<0.00). While these results suggest that partisans approach and avoid co-partisans and opposing partisans wearing explicit partisan symbols, there does not seem to be evidence supporting the hypothesis that partisans also approach and avoid perceived co-partisans and opposing partisans, respectively. Democrats only seem to avoid Suit and express an on average preference to sit further away from this individual compared to the control by 0.09 (p < 0.10).

This general pattern also occurs among Republicans. On average, Republicans choose to sit further away from Hillary by 0.21 (p < 0.00) and choose to sit closer to Trump by -0.10 (p < 0.05) when compared to the control. Republicans, also, seem to desire more distance between them...
and Suit and on average sit further away from Suit than the control by about 0.17 (p < .01). Republicans’ treatment of this individual might revolve around other perceived social group memberships, like his class and wealth. As a result, Republicans’ avoidance of this individual might be a reflection of their attitudes towards him as a member of the wealthy, business class rather than him as a perceived co-partisan.

Looking next to how partisan cultural stereotypes affect a willingness to interact with someone in a more socially proximate scenario, Figures 7a and 7b show the difference in means analysis, among Democrats and Republicans, for Family Marriage. In the analysis of this dependent variable, I restrict the population of respondents to whites only. By limiting the respondents to white only, I reduce the potential bias of minority respondents who might prefer intra-race marriage.

Both white Democrats and white Republicans are significantly less happy if their close relative marries an explicit opposing partisan. White Democrats, on average, feel less happy if their close relative marries Trump by -0.34 (p <0.00). White Republicans, on average, feel less happy if their close relative marries Hillary by -0.22 (p < 0.01). Both white Republicans and Democrats feel happier if a close relative marries a perceived co-partisan as well. On average, white Republicans feel about 0.13 (p < 0.05) happier if their close relative marries Trump than the control. White Democrats feel on average happier if their close relative marries Hillary (diff: .011, p < .05).

Moving from explicit to implicit signals of partisan identity, white Republicans and Democrats’ preferences towards marriage do reflect partisan bias. These expressions of partisan bias, for the most part however, are not significantly different from their levels of happiness expressed about the control. White Democrats feel happier when faced with evaluating Hipster
(0.71, p = 1.00) and Professor (0.64, p = 1.00) and less happy with Camo (0.55, p = 1.00) and Suit (0.58, p = 1.00) compared to the control (0.63), but none of these mean differences are significant. Likewise, white Republicans feel happier or equally as happy when faced with the prospect of a close relative marrying a stereotypical co-partisan, Camo is 0.64 (p = 1.00) and Suit is 0.58 (p = 1.00) and less happy with a potential Hipster (0.56, p = 1.00) or Professor (0.48, p < .05) family member. However, only the negative effect of Professor is significantly different from the mean value of Family Marriage when evaluating the control.

![Figure 7a and 7b. Average Level of Family Marriage by Treatment with 95% CI](image)

Overall, for measures of expressed behavior it seems that explicit signals of partisanship affect both potential short-term, voluntary interactions, Seat Distance, and long-term, obligatory interactions, Family Marriage. Visual partisan cultural stereotypes and perceptions of partisanship, however, have minimal effects on respondent’s behavioral expression in either of these types of interaction.
Discussion and Conclusion

Through the associations between partisan identity and the social groups in the partisan coalitions, people use the visual attributes and physical appearance of strangers to categorize them by political party, formulate partisan based impressions of them, and assess how to interact with and treat them. Thus, person perception and subsequent social evaluations are potentially imbued with partisan animosity before even interacting with someone simply because partisan identity is now a visible identity.

The first portion of this study validates the idea that aspects of one’s physical appearance, like clothing preference and their possessions, are now recognized as partisan stereotypes. From observing these visual partisan stereotypes, people can and do engage in partisan categorization of strangers. Across the entire sample, the majority of treatments that were ex-ante considered to be Democrat or Republican are categorized as such in a speeded categorization task. These results suggest that partisan identity may now be a visible identity, somewhat similar to race or gender, that individuals “see” when they simply look at someone.

While the probability that people spontaneously engage in partisan categorization may be more tied to contextual factors, like electoral cycle (Michelitch 2015), than race or gender, these results show that people do recognize visual attributes to be part of the partisan stereotype. When tasked with imputing partisan categorization, forcing the salience and importance of partisan identity, people see aspects of an individual’s physical appearance – what clothes they wear, their hair, or what items that they have with them – as easily available and highly informative in achieving this goal of quick partisan categorization. On top of relying on an individual’s obvious social group memberships – here white, male, and young – respondents perceive these mundane stylistic preferences as more informative of an individual’s potential partisan identity. In fact,
respondents seem to think that some of these stylistic preferences and physical features are just as informative of an individual’s partisan identity as actual partisan gear, i.e. wearing a Clinton or Trump campaign shirt.

Next, I assess how Democrats and Republicans form initial impressions of these stereotypical individuals through perceived warmth and competence. The results here suggest that in addition to generally positive perceptions of co-partisans and generally negative perceptions of opposing partisans, impressions of stereotypical partisans vary along these two dimensions. This suggests that partisan identity is not the only identity that plays a role in person perception. The specific social groups associated with the various types of each stereotypical partisan also play an influential role. For example, Democrats’ perception of Suit seems to incorporate both aspects of perceived partisan identity and perceived social group membership. Democrats rate Suit more negatively than Republicans ($diff = .16, p < 0.00$), which reflects the partisan association of affluent individuals. On the other hand, both Democrats and Republicans perceive Suit as highly competent ($diff = -.00, p = .64$), which seems to reflect the social status of affluent individuals not partisan group members. This differentiation within types of co-partisans and opposing partisans suggest that not all stereotypical partisans will be treated equally, some will be pitied or extended compassion while others will be avoided or derided.

This differentiation not only has implications for how people feel and behave around actual various stereotypical partisans, but may also provide insight into what types of Republicans and Democrats people picture in their heads when they engage in partisan discrimination. It seems, from these results, that Democrats and Republicans might be thinking of only one or two types of stereotypical partisans, those that are perceived as low in warmth and competence, when expressing prejudice against explicit partisans. For Democrats, this might be someone like Camo
and for Republicans this might be someone like Hipster. Both treatments are seen by the vast majority of respondents as Republican (84%) and Democrat (87%), respectively, and are perceived as the least warm and competent stereotypical opposing partisans (though Republicans still perceive Hipster to be friendly and competent). As such, it might be fruitful to assess how people react when other information beyond only a partisan label is provided. Providing more information about an explicit partisan - their social group membership, hobbies and interests, or maybe even showing a picture of them, might alter people’s mental images of who this stereotypical partisan is and produce more nuanced behavior beyond basic in-group and out-group prejudice that has come to define interparty political and apolitical attitudes and behavior.

Beyond personal perceptions of who people are, these visual partisan cultural stereotypes can also affect how people feel towards and interact with others. Study 2 tests how these visual representations of partisan cultural stereotypes affect both interpersonal attitudes and expressions of behavior. I find that while explicit partisan symbols produce significant partisan effects on various forms of social evaluations, the effect of partisan cultural stereotypes is more focused. Specifically, when people see stereotypical partisans they consistently experience significantly greater perceptions of antipathy and lower levels of happiness if an individual stereotypical of the opposing party marries into their family.

Specifically, the relative import that partisan cultural stereotypes has on attitudes concerning respect, understanding, and empathy for people like me compared to affect potentially highlights some of the microfoundations driving partisan polarization today. These significant feelings of partisan resentment towards individuals stereotypical of the opposing party signal that Americans today not only live in two different cultural/political worlds but that they also perceive little to no respect or understanding across this cultural divide. Democrats view stereotypical Republicans as
people who neither understand nor care to understand them and what is important to them, and Republicans express this same resentment towards stereotypical Democrats. Furthermore, these differences in lifestyle, culture, and daily priorities can be clearly seen from simply looking at the visual, cultural partisan cues a stranger sends with their clothing. This perceived mutual disrespect across partisan lines further affects the extent to which people wish to interact with individuals who are stereotypical of the opposing party.

Across the results of Study 2, there are also two general patterns when it comes to the relative effect of explicit partisan signals and visual partisan stereotypes. First, partisans more consistently express animosity towards perceived members of the opposing party than favoritism and preference for perceived members of their own party. This difference also applies, in some cases, to the relative magnitude of bias against explicit opposing partisans and bias towards co-partisans. These results are not unique to this study. Throughout this dissertation, I find consistently stronger negative effects for stereotypical opposing partisan treatments than positive effects for stereotypical co-partisans. These results are also not unique to this dissertation. It seems that these results further bolster the claim that affective polarization is driven more by negative feelings towards the opposing party rather than positive feelings towards the in-party (Iyengar and Westwood 2014), and that people recognize more what they are not compared to what they are and act on this recognition.

Another general pattern of results across Study 2’s treatment effects, is the difference in the consistency of the effect of explicit partisan clothing and stereotypical partisan clothing. Explicit partisan clothing produces significant in-party and opposing party effects for both Republicans and Democrats in every type of social evaluation. The effect of stereotypical partisan clothing is not that pervasive. While one explanation for this difference could be that people do not perceive
partisanship when looking at someone dressed as a hipster or wearing camouflage, the results from Study 1 suggest otherwise. Not only are Hipster and Camo perceived as highly typical Democrats and Republicans, respectively, but they are also categorized as such in a statistically indistinguishable rate as the explicit Democrat and explicit Republican. Perhaps, instead of a difference in perception of partisan identity affecting the difference in social evaluations, the difference is caused by a perception of centrality of identity. Individuals who wear explicit campaign gear, in addition to signaling their partisan identity, might also signal that they care about politics a lot and that their partisanship and involvement in these respective campaigns means a lot to them. Thus, these explicit partisan symbols are cueing both partisanship and partisan intensity and potentially exacerbating the extent to which partisan discrimination naturally occurs in apolitical situations.
CHAPTER 4
THE FORMATION OF PARTISAN STEREOTYPES

ABSTRACT: This chapter explores the process of partisan cultural stereotype formation. Drawing on theories of exemplar behavior and associative learning, I argue that partisan elites’ cultural preferences and cultural elites’ political preferences can play a role in the development of the cognitive connection between political parties and lifestyle choices. One recent example of this argument is Taylor Swift’s recent foray into politics. The first part of this chapter outlines these recent events and how Swift’s activities have shaped partisan perceptions of her and her fans. In the second part of this chapter, I present results from an experiment that tests this theoretical argument more rigorously. I find that the behavior of both cultural and political elites can transform previously apolitical cultural preferences into partisan cultural stereotypes.

Every day, people make mundane personal choices – ranging from which car to drive to what to eat. As inconsequential as these activities may seem, individuals seize on them to draw out information about other people’s lifestyles, values, and priorities (Rentfrow and Gosling 2006). Indeed, in today’s politically polarized environment, people use others’ cultural preferences—such as listening to country music or driving a Prius—to make inferences about their partisan identity.

In previous work, for example, I find that individuals systematically associate cultural preferences with specific political parties and, as such, are partisan stereotypes. Thus, despite the fact that partisanship is not a visible physical trait and people rarely discuss politics (Mutz 2006), individuals can use partisan stereotypes to make assumptions about people’s political character from their appearance or preferences and, thus, engage in partisan prejudice on a daily basis. Yet in order for citizens to use these cultural preferences as political signals, these cultural preferences must first become partisan. That is, citizens must develop a cognitive association between a cultural object and a party.

One mechanism through which mental representations, or stereotypes, of groups are formed is through the behavior of group elites, either a single leader or collective of leaders (Smith
As such, their behavior affects the perception of the group by those both inside and outside of it. For group members, the behavior of group leaders establishes group norms, clarifies group values and boundaries, and conveys their obligations as group members. For individuals outside of the group, the behavior of group leaders communicates the group’s values and shapes the perception of the entire group (Feldman 1984). For instance, Americans’ view of Russians shifted from “rugged, brave, and patriotic” to “fierce, aggressive, and fanatic” as Stalin’s authority expanded and Soviet-U.S. relations became hostile (Allport 1979, Buchanan and Cantril 1953). Through the behavior of the group leader, a general association between these aggressive characteristics and the social group “Russians” was established. The group leader’s behavior not only shaped the image of the leader but also the entire group (Conover and Feldman 1984; Fiske and Linville 1980).

I argue that these same mechanisms can transform cultural preferences into partisan stereotypes. When a political leader expresses a specific cultural preference, Obama inviting the cast of Hamilton to the White House and performing with them, for example, a cognitive association between the preference and the party, as a social group, can take shape. Through classical conditioning, people can implicitly learn that perhaps Hamilton Fans are Democrats or that the Democrats, more than Republicans, like Hamilton. In a similar vein, when a cultural group leader endorses a politician, say Kid Rock endorsing Donald Trump, it may also facilitate a cognitive connection between the musician, his fans, and the Republican Party. Thus, through the behavior of either political or cultural group leaders, a cultural preference can become uniquely associated with one party, transforming the preference into a partisan stereotype.

Celebrities can play a large and influential role in the behavior of their fans. Indeed, people
do tend to trust their favorite celebrities. Fans typically view their favorite celebrities as credible, trustworthy, and, in general, associate positive feelings with them (Hoffman and Tan 2013). These attitudes towards their favorite celebrities often have real effects on fans’ behavior ranging from increased consumption of celebrity endorsed products (Spence 1973; Till et al. 2008) to following celebrity health advice, sometimes even when it contradicts the advice of medical experts (Hoffman and Tan 2013).

Due to the rise of social media and public relations, the intersection between celebrity culture and politics has expanded (Lawrence and Boydstun 2017). Certain celebrities have begun to use their access to a larger audience to wade into political territory, hoping to be a political influence for their fans (Street 2004). The extent to which celebrities engage in politics can vary widely from comedians Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert hosting political talk shows to celebrities like Kendall Jenner and Kate Hudson urging their fans to be politically active (Gonzales 2016). Other celebrities endorse candidates or parties and use their platform and popularity to specifically voice their own political opinion. For instance, LeBron James actively supports the Democratic Party. He has spoken at rallies for Hillary Clinton in the past, and most recently wore a Beto O’Rourke hat to a basketball game in San Antonio (Folley 2018). It is this type of celebrity behavior, I argue, that can lead to the formulation of partisan cultural stereotypes. LeBron expresses his support for the Democratic Party and people begin to associate this political preference with him and his followers. Through repeated pairings of these two objects, LeBron and Democrats, people will begin to stereotype LeBron fans and potentially NBA fans, more generally, as Democrats.

But celebrities are not the only ones reaching out to the “other side” in this emerging relationship. Politicians frequently make their cultural preferences known simply by living their
life in the public eye or intentionally posting about their habits and preferences. In a speech in Michigan, Mitt Romney casually referred to the cars that he and his wife drive stating “I drive a Mustang and a Chevy pickup truck. Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs, actually” (Keith 2012). In the remark, through simply mentioning the cars that his family prefers he effectively communicated to the public that he was wealthy. He further established the connection between him, his supporters, and a certain level of wealth (Keith 2012). In another more famous example, Gerald Ford ate a tamale improperly, with the husk on, at a media event in San Antonio (Marshall 2016, Popkin 1993). While this is not necessarily an example of a politician expressing a cultural preference, this specific event demonstrated that he had never experienced this type of food and implicitly signaled ignorance of the food, the culture, and Texans. This incident became a focal point of media coverage in Texas, and through repeated coverage could have potentially signaled to the public that the Republicans, President Ford, and Mexican food and culture are incompatible.

Through the behavior of both celebrities and politicians, the public begins to form associations in their heads about what it means to be a fan of a celebrity or a supporter of a politician. They form cognitive associations between culture and partisan politics. This type of associative learning, through observing direct exemplar behavior or reading about it through media sources, can be bolstered through classical conditioning. The more frequently objects and evaluative criteria are paired, the stronger the cognitive association becomes between this object and evaluative criteria in long term memory (Olson and Fazio 2001). Exposure to these associative patterns can lead to formulations of certain attitudes about objects without individuals being consciously aware of how they were formed and lead to the development of strong associative networks that are activated automatically when exposed to the object. Repeated exposure to a group exemplar’s behavior can, thus, reinforce the association between a group and the evaluative
characteristic and further establish this characteristic as a facet of the group. The behavior of a group exemplar comes first, but through repeated patterns of associations strong group stereotypes can emerge.

To build on the example of Stalin above, from repeated exposure to pairings of Russians, or Stalin in particular, and aggressive characteristics people can implicitly “learn” that Russians are aggressive without full awareness of how these attitudes are formed. As a result, Russians can be stereotyped as aggressive, hostile, and mean.

Overall, I expect that when a politician publicly endorses (or rejects) a cultural preference or a cultural group leader publicly endorses a party, an association between the politician’s party and the cultural preference will begin to form in people’s minds. As a result, when confronted with an individual who likes the relevant cultural preference, people will rely on this cognitive association to make partisan based judgments about the individual (H1).

To test this hypothesis, I first draw on a case study of Taylor Swift’s recent public endorsement of two Tennessee Democrats running for public office after she avoided politics for the previous portion of her career. Through this case study, I find that perceptions of Taylor Swift have shifted over time. When Swift was largely apolitical and silent about political issues in the United States, the plurality of the public perceived her as neither Democrat or Republican. Her endorsements have led to the development of an association between her and the Democratic Party.

Second, I conduct an experiment to explicitly test for this causal process. In the experiment, I show that people rely on both the behavior of a cultural exemplar and politicians to engage in partisan categorization and stereotyping of a fan of the cultural exemplar. Overall, the behaviors of group exemplars can have significant effects on perceptions of the exemplar and the cultural group, resulting in the transformation of apolitical cultural preferences to partisan cultural stereotypes.
Taylor Swift’s Long Awaited Foray into Politics

On October 7, 2018, political news shocked the entertainment world and entertainment news shocked the political world. Taylor Swift, the famously apolitical pop star, finally expressed her political voice when she posted on Instagram that she would be voting for two Democratic candidates running in Tennessee, Senate candidate Phil Bredesen and Representative Jim Cooper (Mervosh 2018). While she had previously encouraged people to vote in the 2016 presidential election (Mervosh 2018) and courageously faced her sexual assaulter in court (Yahr 2017), this was the first time the pop star explicitly discussed where her partisan allegiance lies. Her endorsement prompted support from Democrats, a backlash from Republicans, and it potentially contributed to an unprecedented spike in voter registration. Swift established herself as an active, voting Democrat.

Before this emergence into the political world, Swift had been famously apolitical. Up until October 7, 2018, there was nothing but speculation about Swift’s political beliefs as she painstakingly avoided any sort of association with a political party. Neither her behavior nor media reports of her behavior connected her with the Republican or Democrat Party. She did not explicitly endorse President Obama or either of his opponents in 2008 or 2012. She did not speak or do anything related to the 2016 presidential election during either the primaries or the general election until election day when she urged her social media followers and fans to “…Go out and VOTE” (Framke 2016). She completely controlled her political image and did not explicitly align herself with either party in any election, and if she did speak about politics it was in relatively neutral language.

Her lack of political expression even prompted a consternation, as individuals in the media and activist communities claimed that she was intentionally not expressing her views and using
her platform because she did not want to alienate any of her fan base, seeing as how she has both Democrat and Republican fans (Framke 2016). Her absence of behavior or political expression created an atmosphere where no partisan association with her and her fans existed. There was no association to learn. This resulted in a relatively apolitical and non-partisan view of her and her fans.

In the Spring of 2018, prior to her foray into politics, I conducted a brief survey using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to measure how Taylor Swift’s minimal and neutral political behavior shaped perceptions of her and her fans’ partisanship. In the survey, respondents were asked to categorize a variety of celebrities and their fan bases by partisan identity. This list included Taylor Swift and her fan base. Respondents were asked to rate “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift’s Fans” on a 7-point scale of partisan typicality, which was then recoded to range from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).

The mean level of partisan categorization for “Taylor Swift” was 0.40 and the plurality (24.5%) of respondents categorized Taylor Swift as “Neither Democrat nor Republican.” Comparatively, Oprah Winfrey, a more politically outspoken celebrity, was given the mean categorization of 0.20 and the plurality (35%) of respondents categorized her as very typical Democrat. Respondents rated “Taylor Swift Fans” slightly more neutral than the popstar with a mean level of partisan categorization of 0.42. 27% of respondents rated Taylor Swift Fans as somewhat Democrat and 26% of respondents rated Taylor Swift Fans as neither Democrat or Republican. Comparatively, Oprah Fans were given a mean rating of 0.26 on the 0 to 1 partisan categorization scale and the plurality (31%) of respondents rated Oprah Fans as typical Democrat while only 14%
rated Oprah Fans as neither Democrat or Republican.29

These descriptive statistics suggest that her previously neutral political behavior did indeed lead to a relatively neutral perception of her politics among the public. Furthermore, her behavior and repeated absence of partisan pairings spread to the public’s perceptions of her fans’ partisan identity as well. Both she and her fans were previously thought of as absent any political affiliations. That was until Swift became political.

As expected, the responses following her declaration of support for the two Tennessee Democrats reflected partisan polarization. Democrats praised her decision to voice her opinions in favor of their party. Republicans were incensed. The National Republican Senatorial Committee disparaged the singer posting, “If you haven’t heard, multimillionaire pop star Taylor Swift came down from her ivory tower to tell hardworking Tennesseans to vote for Phil Bredesen” (Durkin 2018). Republicans in the mass public posted things like “Taylor swift just ended her entire career…,” insinuating that her Republican fan base would stop listening to her music (Durkin 2018). President Donald Trump even said he likes her music “about 25% less.” Repeated pairings of the pop star’s name with the Democratic Party are everywhere now. Not only are news media outlets reporting about her political attitudes, but people are actively searching for this information. Swift endorsed Bredesen and Representative Cooper on October 7th. According to Google Trends, searches for “Taylor Swift” in the United States tripled overnight and increased fivefold by October 10th.

To test whether this event and subsequent media coverage affected the partisan perception of Swift and her fans, I reran the celebrity stereotyping survey from the Spring of 2018 among

29 The distributions of the partisan categorization of “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift Fan” are in the Appendix.
different respondents in November 2018. Again, 300 U.S. citizens over the age of 18 completed a battery of questions where they categorized celebrities and their fans on a 7-point scale of partisan categorization. The scale was recoded to range from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).

In this second iteration of the survey, the mean level of partisan categorization of “Taylor Swift” was 0.35 and the plurality of respondents (28.7%) categorized “Taylor Swift” as a somewhat typical Democrat. Overall, Taylor Swift is perceived to be slightly more typical of the Democratic Party after she endorsed the two Tennessee Democratic candidates for office. Associative learning, either implicitly or explicitly, seems to be occurring as the partisan association with Taylor Swift have slightly shifted in accordance to her behavior.

This associative learning, however, has not yet extended to perceptions of her fans. The mean level of partisan categorization for “Taylor Swift Fan” in this survey, 0.42, was the same exact mean level of partisan categorization for “Taylor Swift Fan” in the previous survey that took place before she decided to become political. Furthermore, a plurality of respondents (30%) in this survey categorized “Taylor Swift Fan” as “Neither Democrat or Republican.”

The minor shift in partisan perception of Swift and the lack of a shift in partisan perception of her fans might be due to the specific content of her endorsements. Her support was not overtly partisan. In both of her Instagram posts, she expresses support for specific candidates and not necessarily the Democratic Party in general. Furthermore, she primarily rationalizes her support for the Democratic candidate for Senate by talking negatively about the Republican candidate’s policies. These minimal results might also be the result of respondents’ lack of awareness. At the time of this second survey, Taylor Swift had only been politically active for slightly over a month and the extent of her political action was only two Instagram posts. She has not been politically
active for long and while the initial post did receive a lot of media coverage, her overall level of activity was minimal. It might simply take time for news to travel and for people to learn about her political opinions. Respondents simply might not know about her political involvement and support of the Democratic Party just yet.

**The Emergence of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes**

To ensure that people do know about the political behavior of celebrities and partisan politicians, I contracted with YouGov in July of 2018 to conduct a survey testing whether partisan stereotypes can form through the behavior of either cultural group leaders or party leaders. First, respondents read a hypothetical article about either a politician endorsing a celebrity or a celebrity endorsing a politician and answered a series of distractor questions about the article. Next, respondents read a description of a hypothetical fan of the celebrity and evaluated him on several political dimensions. Around 1,200 respondents completed this experiment, and all were 18 years or older, U. S. citizens.

The study started with respondents randomly assigned to one of five vignettes where they read a hypothetical article about a) a politician (Democrat or Republican) who likes Mark Wahlberg, b) Mark Wahlberg endorsing a politician (Democrat or Republican), or c) an apolitical description of Mark Wahlberg.\(^{30,31}\) After receiving a vignette, respondents answered a series of

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\(^{30}\) I chose Hillary Clinton as the Democrat group leader because she was the most recent presidential nominee for the party. I did not choose President Trump as the Republican group leader because he and other Republican Party leaders have engaged in publicly contentious battles which has created the public image of Republican Party in-fighting (Bolton 2017). I chose Mitt Romney instead, as he was the most recent presidential nominee for the party before President Trump. The wording for each of these five treatments are in the appendix.

\(^{31}\) The actual treatments are in the appendix.
distractor questions about the article – how it compared to other news articles they typically read, the article’s length, and if they thought it was interesting – in an attempt to remove the explicit association of Mark Wahlberg and either the Democratic or Republican Party from the respondent’s short term memory (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989).

I use Mark Wahlberg and his movies as the cultural preference in these treatments because he is publicly non-partisan and, thus, it would not be unrealistic for him to be connected to either party. Furthermore, people do not view him as distinctly associated with one party. In the celebrity stereotyping survey conducted in the Spring of 2018, I also asked respondents to categorize Mark Wahlberg and Mark Wahlberg fans by partisanship. Table 1a shows that Mturk respondents, on average, perceive him and his fans to be non-partisan, and Table 1b shows that the distribution of perceived partisan identity of him and his fans is relatively equal across Democrat, Neither, and Republican.

Table 1a. Average Perceived Partisanship of Mark Wahlberg and His Fans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Perceived Partisanship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mark Wahlberg</td>
<td>.495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Wahlberg Fans</td>
<td>.484</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Perceived Partisanship* is a 7-point scale that ranges from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).
Table 1b. Distribution of *Perceived Partisanship* of Mark Wahlberg and His Fans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Somewhat Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Somewhat Typical Republican</th>
<th>Typical Republican</th>
<th>Very Typical Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mark Wahlberg</td>
<td>5.37%</td>
<td>9.06%</td>
<td>18.46%</td>
<td>34.56%</td>
<td>18.46%</td>
<td>11.07%</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mark Wahlberg Fans</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
<td>9.40%</td>
<td>16.78%</td>
<td>38.26%</td>
<td>18.46%</td>
<td>9.73%</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Perceived Partisanship* is a 7-point scale that ranges from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).

After completing this set of distractor questions, respondents then read a short biography about a hypothetical individual, Mr. Lange, who is a fan of Mark Wahlberg.\(^32\) Every respondent received the same biography of the hypothetical individual. Following this biography, respondents evaluated Mr. Lange on a variety of political dimensions. In the first battery of questions, respondents placed Mr. Lange on two policy positions: one economic issue, government spending, and one cultural issue, abortion. The order of these two questions was randomized in the survey. Next, respondents categorized Mr. Lange by partisanship and selected whom they thought Mr. Lange voted for in the 2016 election. The order of these two questions was also randomized in the survey. These four questions are the primary dependent variables and are used to measure the extent to which cultural preferences of individuals shape partisan categorization and stereotyping of said individuals.

\(^{32}\) This biography is in the appendix.
Partisan Categorization

I first assess how learning about the behavior and preferences of cultural elites and political party leaders affect how people perceive the partisanship of fans of the cultural elites. To test this, I conduct a simple difference in means test on the dependent variable *Partisan Categorization*. This dependent variable is a seven-point variable that was recoded to range from 0 (very typical Democrat) to 1 (very typical Republican).\(^3^3\) Each of the five vignettes (four treatments and one control) are represented by dummy variables. *Dem. Endorse* and *Rep. Endorse* are the two treatments in which a Democrat or Republican politician, respectively, talks about how much they like Mark Wahlberg. *Wahlberg Endorse Dem.* and *Wahlberg Endorse Rep.* are the two treatments where Mark Wahlberg endorses the Democrat or Republican Party, respectively. *Control* is the control treatment that simply talks about Mark Wahlberg. The average levels of *Partisan Categorization* per treatment are below in Figure 1.

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\(^3^3\) The exact question wording for this measure is “On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is very typical Democrat and 7 is very typical Republican, which party do you think Mr. Lange is most typical of?” with answer options of 1 - Very Typical Democrat, 2 - Typical Democrat, 3 - Somewhat Typical Democrat, 4 - Neither, 5 - Somewhat Typical Republican, 6 - Typical Republican, 7 - Very Typical Republican.
Figure 1 shows that all four treatments significantly affect the partisan perception of Mr. Lange, Mark Wahlberg fan. The two treatments that feature a Republican politician, either Mitt Romney or the Republican Party, both significantly increase the average level of Partisan Categorization and the two treatments that feature Democrat politicians, either the party exemplar or the party itself, significantly decrease the average level of Partisan Categorization when compared to the control vignette. Thus, the actions of both party exemplars and cultural elites affect how a fan of a cultural elite is perceived politically.

While both types of group leaders can influence perceptions of cultural group followers, the actions of the cultural group leader produce a larger effect size on the perception of cultural
group followers. The mean level of Partisan Categorization for Wahlberg Endorse Dem is 0.36 while the mean level of Partisan Categorization for Dem. Endorse is 0.45, this difference in means of Partisan Categorization is 0.09 and statistically significant (p < 0.00). Similarly, Mr. Lange is categorized as significantly more Republican (diff: 0.06, p < 0.00) among respondents who received the Wahlberg Endorse Rep. treatment than respondents who received the Rep. Endorse treatment. In both instances, it is the actions of the group leader that more directly affect perceptions of the fan. When it comes to partisan categorization, it is not the political leaders that create the largest difference in partisan perception but instead the celebrities connected to the preferences.

Voting Behavior

In addition to the partisan categorization dependent variable, respondents were also asked to select whom they thought Mr. Lange voted for in the 2016 election. Respondents were given all six presidential candidates from the 2016 election to select from when making this decision, but since I am specifically interested in perceptions of partisanship I created two dummy variables that measure whether they think Mr. Lange voted for the Democratic presidential candidate or the Republican presidential candidate. Vote Hillary and Vote Trump are coded as 1 if respondents indicated that Mr. Lange voted for that candidate, 0 otherwise. The difference in means test for these two dependent variables are below in Figure 2a and 2b.

34 The actual question wording was “Who do you think Mr. Lange voted for in 2016 Presidential Election?” with answer options Darrell Castle, Hillary Clinton, Gary Johnson, Evan McMullin, Donald Trump, and Jill Stein.
Here partisan categorization extends to perceived vote choice. Compared to the control both Democrat treatments have a significantly higher percentage of *Hillary Vote*. Respondents who received *Wahlberg Endorse Dem.* and *Dem. Endorse* think that Mr. Lange voted for Hillary, the Democratic candidate, by 0.27 (p < 0.01) and 0.23 (p < .01) more than the control vignette, respectively. Conversely, those who received *Wahlberg Endorse Rep.* and *Rep. Endorse* think that Mr. Lange voted for Hillary by 0.19 (p < 0.01) and 0.10 (p < 0.01) less than those who received the control.

The results from the difference in means of *Trump Vote* by treatment group inversely mirror these results. The two Republican treatments, *Wahlberg Endorse Rep.* and *Rep. Endorse*, increase the percentage of respondents who believe that Mr. Lange voted for the Republican candidate in 2016 by 0.24 (p < 0.01) and 0.10 (p < 0.01), respectively. While the two Democrat
treatments, *Wahlberg Endorse Dem* and *Dem. Endorse*, significantly decrease the percentage of respondents who thought Mr. Lange voted for Trump by -0.21 (p < 0.01) and -0.17 (p < 0.01).

Here partisan association extends beyond partisan categorization to perceived vote choice. While party and vote choice are indeed highly related in the polarized environment of today’s political climate (Bartels 2002), this question requires respondents to take perceived partisanship a step beyond categorization and make assumptions about how partisan identity might affect one’s political behavior – applying person perception to actual behavior. Furthermore, while Hillary Clinton was the Democrat that endorsed Mark Wahlberg in the *Dem. Endorse* treatment, Trump was not the Republican that endorsed Mark Wahlberg in the *Rep. Endorse* treatment. Thus, the fact that the results for *Trump Vote* and *Hillary Vote* are similar suggest that it is not necessarily candidate specific associations that respondents are cognitively “developing” as a result of these vignettes, and rather it is a connection between the party, including all of its members and exemplars, and the movie star.

**Issue Stereotyping**

To further assess the extent to which a cognitive association is developing between Mark Wahlberg fans and a political party cognitive network, respondents also evaluated Mr. Lange on two issue positions. These two issue positions, *Government Spending* and *Abortion*, measure the extent to which partisan stereotypes are applied to Mr. Lange in both the economic policy realm and the realm of social policy. I chose one issue from each of the two dimensions of policy space in order to capture a broad picture of partisan stereotyping across types of issues. I also chose issues from both dimensions to assess, more generally, whether one policy space is more or less
cognitively associated with partisan stereotypes and the development of cognitive partisan associations.

To assess Mr. Lange’s position on the issue of government spending, respondents were asked whether they thought Mr. Lange wanted the government to provide more or less services on a scale from 1 to 7. This dependent variable, Government Spending, was recoded to range from 0 (government should provide many fewer services) to 1 (government should provide many more services). To measure respondents’ perception of Mr. Lange’s abortion attitudes, respondents were asked to place Mr. Lange on the typical four-point abortion question which was recoded to range from 0 (most conservative position) to 1 (most liberal position) variable Abortion. The Cronbach’s alpha for these two issue positions is quite low at .28, so I analyze them as two separate dependent variables. This low measure of scale reliability preliminary suggests that respondents did not engage in similar levels of partisan stereotyping across these two issue dimensions.

As mentioned above, respondents answered both of these issue position questions immediately after reading about Mr. Lange and before perceived party and vote choice. Furthermore, the order of this two question battery was randomized. The results for both of these

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35 The specific wording for this question was: “Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Where would you place Mr. Lange on this scale?”

36 The specific wording for this question was: “There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions below do you think best agrees with Mr. Lange’s view?” The answer options were: “By law, abortion should never be permitted”, “The law should permit abortion only in the case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger”, “The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established”, and “By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.”
difference in means tests are below in Figure 3, for *Government Spending*, and Figure 4, for *Abortion*.

**Figure 3. Average Perception of Government Spending by Treatment**

From looking at Figure 3, it is evident that there is not much partisan stereotyping on the issue of government spending. Only *Wahlberg Endorse Rep.* produces a significant difference from the control treatment in the expected direction. Respondents who received this treatment think of Mr. Lange as 4 percentage points (p < .10) more conservative on this issue than the control. The effects of all other treatments produce insignificant effects on the perception of Mr. Lange’s position on government spending.
Conversely, respondents seem to engage in much more partisan stereotyping when it comes to placing Mr. Lange on the issue of abortion. Compared to receiving the control vignette, respondents who received either of the Republican vignettes think Mr. Lange holds more of a conservative view on this issue. Respondents who received the Wahlberg Endorse Rep. and respondents who received Rep. Endorse both think that Mr. Lange holds a 0.07 (p < .05) more conservative position on Abortion than respondents who received the control vignette. Respondents who received the Wahlberg Endorse Dem. treatment rate Mr. Lange’s position on Abortion as significantly more liberal by 7 percentage points (p < 0.05) compared to respondents who received the control treatment. Respondents who received the Dem. Endorse treatment think that Mr. Lange holds a more liberal position on Abortion than those who received the control.
condition, however, this difference is not significant. Those in the control condition already perceive Mr. Lange to have a relatively liberal position on Abortion, so the insignificant effect here could be a result of this relatively liberal baseline.

Overall, both the actions of cultural exemplars, here a movie star, and politicians can influence how fans of the cultural exemplars are politically perceived. However, the cultural exemplars seem to have a slightly stronger impact on the political perception of their fans than do partisan politicians. One explanation for this difference in effect is the group that is being evaluated. Since respondents are asked to evaluate people based on their cultural preferences, people are being evaluated as members of a cultural preference group. Perhaps the effect of partisan politicians would be larger if the partisan categorization and stereotyping questions were framed around the cultural stereotypes of partisans rather than the partisan stereotypes of cultural group members. These results suggest that one way in which cultural preferences can transform into partisan cultural stereotypes is through the behavior of cultural and political elites, and that the political behavior of celebrities plays an important role in how the public creates the mental images that are associated with the two parties.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Overall, this paper attempts to explain how cultural preferences transform into partisan stereotypes and how prima facie apolitical lifestyle choices become signals of partisan identity. Specifically, I argue that one of the mechanisms through which partisan cultural stereotypes develop is the behavior of group exemplars. When cultural exemplars endorse politicians or politicians express a cultural preference, cognitive associations between these two concepts start to form. Once these cognitive associations are developed, exposure to one of these connected
objects can result in the activation of the other. Thus, the behavior of group exemplars can explain why learning someone’s cultural preferences can potentially lead to partisan categorization, stereotyping, and, possibly, discrimination. People might not connect these cultural preferences to politics on our own, instead the exemplars of either parties or cultural groups have to explicitly do this for the mass public.

Through one illustrative example and an original survey experiment, I demonstrate that both cultural figures, celebrities in both cases here, and political figures can facilitate the development of this cognitive connection. Taylor Swift’s comments took a previously apolitical pop star and transformed her into the perceived champion of the Democrat youth vote (Leighley and Nagler 2018). In the experiment, both Mark Wahlberg’s endorsement of a party and a partisan exemplar’s “endorsement” of Mark Wahlberg affected respondents’ partisan perception of a Mark Wahlberg fan on a variety of partisan dimensions. When respondents read a newspaper article about Wahlberg endorsing the Democratic Party or the Democratic Party endorsing him, they were more likely to think of the Wahlberg fan as a typical Democrat and vice versa with the Republican party treatments.

The effect of the behavior of either cultural exemplars or partisan exemplars on partisan categorization is fairly pervasive across multiple indicators of partisan categorization. The effect on partisan stereotyping, however, is more selective. The results from the analysis of issue stereotyping preliminary suggest that partisan stereotyping might be stronger and easier when tasked with placing perceived partisans along social issues rather than economic ones. The cognitive connection between political parties and social issues simply might be more frequently activated, and, thus, more accessible than the connection between the two parties and economic issues.
This could partially be a result of the recent extension of partisan conflict into social and cultural policy. Since partisan conflict over cultural and social issues has emerged more recently, this specific policy divide is more salient than the partisan divisions in economic policy (Ellis and Stimson 2012). Furthermore, media coverage of cultural issues has recently surpassed media coverage of economic issues as measured through the Comparative Agendas project (The Policy Agendas Project at the University of Texas at Austin, 2017). Thus, cultural issues, due to their relatively greater news coverage, might simply be more associated with the two parties in our current context. Through this process of associative learning, the strength of the cognitive association between the parties and cultural issues might make stereotyping partisans by cultural issues easier and more accessible.

There was a lot of media coverage of Taylor Swift’s public endorsement of the two Tennessee Democrats. Media outlets reported on her endorsement, the language, and how the public and politicians responded. However, some media outlets and commentators argued that her endorsement, by and large, would have little to no effect on the outcome of the election (Conte 2018; Brice-Saddler 2018). This does not mean that Taylor Swift’s political expression was inconsequential though. On the contrary, the results of this paper suggest that her political expression, and more generally the intersection of culture and politics, are very consequential in the development of the mental images of the two parties. How celebrities, and more broadly lifestyle brands, express themselves politically and how politicians express themselves culturally can shape what cultural preferences the public associates with the two parties. We can see this more generally, through the emergence of political consumption and partisan consumption habits.

Recently, we have seen celebrities and politicians’ behavior politicize consumption decisions. When Nordstrom dropped Ivanka Trump’s clothing line, effectively expressing their
dislike of her and her family, female Trump supporters closed their accounts and decided to boycott the retailer (Wolf 2017). When Taylor Swift declared her support for Democrats Bredesen and Cooper, some Republican fans stated they would stop listening to her music (Durkin 2018) and President Trump stated he likes her music “about 25% less” now. In both instances, the political actions of cultural figures and politicians are shaping the mental images we have of the two parties and what it means to be a good partisan member. Good Republicans, who support Republican politicians, do not shop at Nordstrom or listen to Taylor Swift because of their political views. To do so would be seen as hypocritical to their partisan group membership.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this research project, I argue that because a variety of different social groups have distinctly sorted into the two partisan coalitions (Mason 2018), apolitical preferences and cultural symbols of these social groups have the potential to be partisan cultural stereotypes. As a result, people can use these apolitical preferences to categorize individuals by partisan identity without knowing any political information about them. Furthermore, this categorization has downstream consequences. People form broad impressions of others as partisans rather than unique individuals, and use this perceived partisan identity to guide how they interact with and treat others in everyday scenarios. Overall, these apolitical preferences can be used to navigate the social world through a perceived partisan lens, avoiding those who are perceived as politically dissimilar and only interacting with people who are perceived to be similar and understanding.

The results throughout this research project suggest that these everyday cultural preferences are cognitively linked to partisan identity. Across various different types of initial impressions of strangers, whether it is a “getting-to-know-you” scenario or simply looking at someone, individual across all of these studies used the cultural preferences, hobbies, music preferences, and clothing styles to infer partisanship. This cognitive association in long term memory is activated regardless of whether this association is measured implicitly or explicitly and regardless of whether people are asked to categorize single or clusters of cultural preferences.

One way in which these cognitive associations are formed is through the behavior of group exemplars which can lead to associative learning just through observing these correlations in everyday life. People pay attention to the habits of celebrities and cultural figures, and as such their
political behavior can lead to the development of an association between their products and a particular party. Politicians’ lifestyle choices can also result in the development of associations between cultural preferences and the political parties. The supposedly innocuous and arguably inconsequential behavior of these two types of exemplars are ultimately important in the formation of the mental images of what Democrats and Republicans are like.

But why exactly do people focus on these cultural preferences in order to formulate opinions and impressions of others? These cultural preferences are easily attainable and highly visible pieces of information, but people also strategically select and use these objects to express who they are and what they believe. This strategic selection can be motivated by internal gratification and satisfaction, but also as a way to project a certain image to others (Gosling et al. 2002). For instance, someone might wear a rapper’s shirt because they like the rapper, but they may also wear the shirt in order to communicate to other people that they like this specific rapper, enjoy rap in general, or support black culture, history, and rights. We innately recognize that how a person chooses to dress, how they describe themselves, and their preferred activities are parts of a puzzle that can help us create a broader picture of them. Thus, we are always looking for clues about what a certain person is like. It is just now these clues are cognitively associated with partisan identity and beliefs.

Furthermore, because the current political divisions between the two parties seem to revolve around their cultural differences, these cultural preferences and symbols might be particularly salient cues about partisan identity. The cultural divide between the two parties seems to be at the forefront of partisan polarization and general political divisions these days. In one recent New York Times article, a Republican voter was quoted as saying “I’m troubled by how things are going culturally, I’m troubled by crime and the lack of moral fiber,” and he is not alone
in expressing this opinion (Badger 2018). Because of this primacy of cultural policies and divisions, these cultural preferences, unavoidable reminders of the specific and distinct cultural habits and beliefs of social groups in the two parties, might be particularly salient for people, currently. So, people might be more attuned to identifiers of cultural/political differences. In addition, cultural and social issues are considered to be relatively “easy” issues in that people have gut reactions to them and more stable, stalwart opinions (Ellis and Stimson 2012). Perhaps, by extension, these cultural preferences might also be “easy” partisan cues to decipher, and thus, people pick up on these easier pieces of information about others.

Constant avoidance of and negative expressions towards perceived opposing partisans on a daily basis can facilitate the creation of two separate worlds, one of Democrats and one of Republicans, where there is no interaction and no contact between the two parties. To be a good political citizen, that is to be active and a fair member of the body politic, one must take part in a rational contemplation of the issues at hand and be a participant in the deliberative democratic process. This deliberative democratic process involves not only the discussion of issues with like-minded citizens, but also dialogue with individuals that hold a broad array of political attitudes and positions (Cohen 1989). This deliberation requires that individuals treat others with equality and respect, which is facilitated by a certain level of open-mindedness among citizens (Mendelberg 2002). If, however, partisanship continues to divide the public in these basic, everyday interactions then equality and respect for others and their ideas might never occur and the chances for deliberation deteriorate. These normative implications of partisan cultural stereotypes and the extent to which prejudice results from the categorization process can affect how the country moves forward from this era of polarization, as well as whether gridlock and conflict remains.
REFERENCES


THE CONTENT AND CONSEQUENCES OF PARTISAN CULTURAL STEREOTYPES
APPENDIX

Instructions for and Screenshot of the Categorization Task

In this next task, you will be presented with a set of words to classify into two groups. The task requires you to classify these items as quickly as possible; going too slow may result in an uninterpretable score. This part of the study will take about 3 minutes.

The word we would like you to categorize will be in the center of the screen, and the two categories available will be in the top two corners. One in the top right corner, and the other in the top left corner.

To select the group in the top left corner, press the key 'f' and to select the group in the top right corner press the key 'j'. Keep your index fingers on the 'f' and 'j' keys to enable rapid response.

When categorizing objects, please rate whether you think this characteristic is typical of Republicans or typical of Democrats. If you think this characteristic is typical of both Republicans and Democrats please select the group you think it is MORE typical of.

When thinking about these characteristics please think about the political parties' cultural stereotypes and try not to base your thoughts on personal beliefs.

37 This language is taken from previous work on deciphering stereotype content (see Devine 1989). In addition, work on stereotype content suggests there is minimal difference in the typicality of attributes when respondents are asked to make judgments based off personal beliefs compared to when respondents are asked to make judgments based off cultural stereotypes (Krueger 1996).
| “Republican” Treatment | Michael Lange  
**Day Job/Previous Job:** Investment Banker  
**Home base:** The country |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes to go hunting. He has been a hunter since he was in high school and he still enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the woods and spend time hunting deer, duck or birds depending on the season. Outside of hunting, Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his wife. His favorite show is Duck Dynasty, which he tries to watch as often as possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching an action film. “We love to just relax and go to an action movie when we have down time. We love the fight scenes and the car chases, and we always feel satisfied when the hero beats the bad guys,” Lange said.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Democrat** Treatment | Michael Lange  
**Day Job/Previous Job:** Professor at a local university  
**Home base:** The city |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes to teach yoga. He has practiced yoga since he was in high school, and he still enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the yoga studio and spend his time engaging in mindful, spiritual and centering meditation. Outside of yoga, Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his wife. His favorite show is The Daily Show, which he tries to watch as often as possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching a funny movie. “We love to just relax and go to a comedy movie when we have down time. We love to laugh and enjoy both physical and satirical humor, and we always feel amused watching the mischief,” Lange said.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Control** Treatment | Michael Lange  
**Day Job/Previous Job:** Mechanical Engineer  
**Home base:** The county |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When not working or campaigning for county supervisor, Michael Lange likes to go swimming. He has been a swimmer since he was in high school, and he still enjoys it today. On weekends, he likes to go to the lake or the pool and spend time either practicing or exercising in the water. Outside of swimming, Lange likes to unwind by watching television and going on dates with his wife. His favorite show is SportsCenter, which he tries to watch as often as possible. And when he and his wife go out, they typically end up catching the latest movie. “We love to just relax and go to the movie theater when we have down time. We love to get out of the house and go to the movies, and we always feel excited about seeing the latest picture,” Lange said.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Figure 1a: Boxplot of Categorization Ratings

Appendix Figure 1b: Boxplot of Typicality Ratings
In calculating the mean categorization time for each attribute, the data was cleaned by eliminating all responses where categorization time < 300 ms or where categorization time > 2 standard deviations from the mean. The results do not change when the categorization data is not recoded, and respondents still categorize the cultural characteristics just as quickly as the political characteristics.
Appendix Table 1. The Effect of Partisan Cultural Stereotypes on the Components of Cultural Stereotype Application

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attribution of Partisan Consistent Stereotypes</th>
<th>Rejection of Partisan Inconsistent Stereotypes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Republican” Treatment</td>
<td>0.21*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.37*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democrat” Treatment</td>
<td>-0.28*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.40*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Republican” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democrat” Treatment * Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>-0.09 (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Worker Scenario</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 18-29</td>
<td>-0.17* (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.07 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 30-39</td>
<td>-0.18* (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.08 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 40-49</td>
<td>-0.18* (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 50 - 64</td>
<td>-0.17* (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.37*** (0.11)</td>
<td>0.16* (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R^2</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1124</td>
<td>1124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both dependent variables are coded from -1 (Democrat) to +1 (Republican). OLS coefficients with standard errors below.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
### Stimulus for Partisan and Cultural Symbols BIATs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisan Symbols BIAT</th>
<th>Cultural Symbols BIAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrat Symbols</strong></td>
<td>HIP-HOP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Democrat Symbols" /></td>
<td>FOREIGN FILMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>URBAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VEGANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican Symbols</strong></td>
<td>BIG BUSINESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Republican Symbols" /></td>
<td>COUNTRY MUSIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOLF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RURAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Experimental Treatments for Candidate Biographies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Republican” Treatment</th>
<th>Michael Lange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day Job/Previous Job: Investment Banker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home base: The country</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day Job/Previous Job: Professor at a local university</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home base: The city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Treatment</th>
<th>Michael Lange</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day Job/Previous Job: Mechanical Engineer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home base: The county</td>
<td></td>
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### Experimental Treatments for Doctor Biographies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Doctor</th>
<th>Home base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Republican”</td>
<td>Brock Jones</td>
<td>Charleston, SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When not practicing medicine, Brock Jones likes to go golfing and get out to his ranch as much as possible. He has been a golfer since he was in high school and he still enjoys it today. &quot;I just love to drive the truck out to the country club and play golf with my friends&quot;, Jones said. It is peaceful, yet challenging, and he likes to hang out in the card room playing poker afterwards. When he has a long weekend, Jones and his wife like to take advantage of the break and go out to their ranch for a brief vacation. They love to take the family to the country, take care of their animals and enjoy the open space. Jones also likes to unwind by going on dates with his wife. When he and his wife go out, they typically end up going to a country music concert, &quot;I am a big fan of country music because I grew up on artists like Garth Brooks and Dwight Yoakum.&quot; They also often stop by their favorite local restaurant, &quot;We are both big fans of steak, and there is this little place in town that we both love because of the great quality of meat.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Democrat”</td>
<td>Liam Jones</td>
<td>Boston, MA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When not practicing medicine, Liam Jones likes to go rock climbing and travel as much as possible. He has been a rock climber since he was in high school and he still enjoys it today. &quot;I just love to drive the Subaru out to the local national parks and go rock climbing with my friends&quot;, Jones said. It is peaceful, yet challenging, and he likes being out in nature afterwards. When he has a long weekend, Jones and his wife like to take advantage of the break and travel to a foreign country for a brief vacation. They love to travel with the family, learn about different cultures and experience other ways of life. Jones also likes to unwind by going on dates with his wife. When he and his wife go out, they typically end up going to a hip-hop concert, &quot;I am a big fan of rap and R &amp; B because I grew up on artists like Nas and De La Soul.&quot; They also often stop by their favorite local restaurant, &quot;We are both vegans and there is this little place in town that we both love because of the great quality of veggie burgers.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Robert Jones</td>
<td>Harrisburg, PA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|               | When not practicing medicine, Robert Jones likes to go running and catch up on errands and repairs as much as possible. He has been a runner since he was in high school and he still enjoys it today. "I just love to drive the car out to the local running trail and go running with my friends", Jones said. It is peaceful, yet challenging, and he likes to exercise to relieve stress and stay in shape. When he has a long weekend, Jones and his wife like to take advantage of the
break and get errands done and do house repairs. They like to work as a family, running errands and repairing the house. Jones also likes to unwind by going on dates with his wife. When he and his wife go out, they typically end up going to a music concern, "I am a big fan of music because I grew up on all different types of music!" They also typically stop by a local Italian restaurant, "We are both bad cooks and there are a lot great restaurants in town that we both love because of their great quality of Italian food."
### Experimental Treatments for Intern Biographies

| “Republican” Treatment | Kyle Williams  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home base: Alabama</td>
<td>When not interning, Kyle Williams likes to relax by watching sports. His favorite sport to watch is NASCAR. He likes to watch the Indy 500 and races at the Texas Motor Speedway, but tries to catch as many races as possible. His favorite drivers are Kyle Busch and Jimmie Johnson. Outside of watching NASCAR, Williams likes to unwind by doing fraternity events, listening to music and hanging out with his girlfriend. He has been a member of his fraternity since he was a freshman, and enjoys the opportunity to form life long bonds with friends and do charity work for the community. On a typical night, his girlfriend will come over and they will just end up hanging out at his house: listening to class rock (i.e. Lynyrd Skynyrd or Van Halen), ordering food from either the local barbecue restaurant and watching Netflix or cable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| “Democrat” Treatment | Julian Williams  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home base: California</td>
<td>When not interning, Julian Williams likes to relax by watching sports. His favorite sport to watch is soccer. He likes to watch the European and Latin American leagues, but tries to catch as many games as possible. His favorite teams are a Mexican team named Chivas and the England National Team. Outside of watching soccer, Williams likes to unwind by working at his universities indie radio station, listening to music and hanging out with his girlfriend. He has been a member of his universities independent radio station since he was a freshman, and he enjoys the opportunity to meet local bands and see touring bands to play live in the studio. On a typical night, he and his girlfriend typically end up hanging out at home: listening to new indie or alternative music (i.e. Sufjan Stevens and DIIV), ordering food from either the local Indian or Vietnamese restaurant, and watching Netflix or cable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Control Treatment | James Williams  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home base: Ohio</td>
<td>When not interning, James Williams likes to relax by watching sports. His favorite sport to watch is basketball. He likes to watch both NBA and college basketball, and tries to catch as many games as possible. His favorite teams are the Cleveland Cavaliers and Ohio State's basketball team. Outside of watching basketball, Williams likes to unwind by playing intramural football, listening to music, and hanging out with his girlfriend. He has been playing intramural sports since he was a freshman, and enjoys the opportunity to play even though he isn't very good. On a typical night after interning, he and his girlfriend will typically end up hanging out at home: listening to new rock music, ordering food from a local restaurant and watching Netflix or cable.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table 1: The Mediating Effect of Perceived In-Party in the Non-Partisan Electoral Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vote Choice</th>
<th>Perceived In-Party</th>
<th>Vote Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-Party Treatment</strong></td>
<td>0.07***</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Out-Party Treatment</strong></td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>-0.49***</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived In-Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.17***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td>0.09***</td>
<td>0.29***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-White</strong></td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>-0.23**</td>
<td>0.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
### Appendix Table 2. The Mediating Effect of Perceived In-Party in the Doctor Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Doctor Visit</th>
<th>Perceived In-Party</th>
<th>Doctor Visit</th>
<th>Doctor Comfort</th>
<th>Perceived In-Party</th>
<th>Doctor Comfort</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-Party Treatment</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Party Treatment</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.50***</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Out-Party Treatment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-Party Treatment</td>
<td>-0.19***</td>
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<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td><strong>Perceived In-Party</strong></td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>-0.05**</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-White</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-White</td>
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<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
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<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>334</td>
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<td>316</td>
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</table>

All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Appendix Table 3. The Mediating Effect of Perceived In-Party in the Intern Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intern Recommend</th>
<th>Perceived In-Party</th>
<th>Intern Recommend</th>
<th>Social Proximity</th>
<th>Perceived In-Party</th>
<th>Social Proximity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-Party Treatment</strong></td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.41*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.09** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.41*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.07*** (0.03)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Out-Party Treatment</strong></td>
<td>-0.14*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.58*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.58*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived In-Party</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.21*** (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.23*** (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republicans</strong></td>
<td>0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.09** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.09** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
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<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-White</strong></td>
<td>-0.07** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.05* (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.06*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.05** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>0.73*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.09** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.73*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.71*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.09** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.71*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R²</strong></td>
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<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>334</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Dependent variables are coded from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate more positive social evaluation. OLS coefficients with standard errors below.

*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
LOOKS LIKE A DEMOCRAT: PARTISAN VISUAL CATEGORIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON IMPRESSION FORMATION AND DAILY INTERACTIONS APPENDIX

Task Instructions and Categorization Question Wording

Task Instructions.

You will be presented with three sets of 12 pictures and be asked to classify each set by a specific attribute.

You will have 3 seconds to view and classify each picture so please pay attention. The survey page will automatically advance to the next page after 3 seconds. This process will occur for each picture until you have completed the three sets of 12 pictures.

Categorization Question Wording

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Question Wording</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>Do you think he is friendly or unfriendly?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent</td>
<td>Do you think he is competent or incompetent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>Do you think he is a Republican or a Democrat?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Hillary Supporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Control" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Hillary Supporter" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Hippie" /></td>
<td><img src="image5" alt="Hipster" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table 1. Average *Perceived Partisanship* for each Photograph

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Condition</th>
<th>Perceived Partisanship</th>
<th>Lower 95% Confidence Interval</th>
<th>Upper 95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trump Supporter</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowboy</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camo</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suit</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preppy</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<td>0.66</td>
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<td>Control</td>
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<td>Basketball</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hipster</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hippie</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Supporter</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table 2. Perceived Partisanship by Respondent Partisan Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowboy</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camo</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suit</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preppy</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hipster</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hippie</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Supporter</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>-.02</td>
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</table>

Difference in means test. The significance level for every treatment is a one tailed t-test, since I had theoretical expectation that partisans would be more likely to categorize stereotypical opposing partisans. The significance level for the control is a two-tailed test since there was no theoretical expectation for the direction. *Perceived Partisanship* is coded as 0 (Republican) and 1 (Democrat).
Appendix Table 3. Perceived Friendliness and Perceived Competence by Respondent Partisanship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Friendliness</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Diff</td>
<td>Friendliness</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Diff</td>
</tr>
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<td>.27</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowboy</td>
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<td>.58</td>
<td>.10***</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camo</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.54</td>
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<td>.72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.01</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.11***</td>
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<td>.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.1**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.17***</td>
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<td>.21***</td>
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<td>-.347</td>
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<td>.8</td>
<td>-.22***</td>
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<td>Hipster</td>
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<td>.04</td>
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<td>.63</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>Hippie</td>
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<td>.51</td>
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<td>.47***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hillary Supporter</td>
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<td>.82</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.05</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

These are two-tailed difference in means tests. *Perceived Friendliness* and *Perceived Competences* are both coded as 0 (Unfriendly/Incompetent) and 1 (Friendly/Competent).
THE FORMATION OF PARTISAN STEREOTYPES APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1a. Distribution of Partisan Categorization for “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift Fan”, Spring 2018 Celebrity Stereotyping Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Somewhat Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Somewhat Typical Republican</th>
<th>Typical Republican</th>
<th>Very Typical Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Swift</td>
<td>9.60%</td>
<td>19.54%</td>
<td>23.84%</td>
<td>24.50%</td>
<td>13.91%</td>
<td>5.96%</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Swift Fan</td>
<td>7.28%</td>
<td>16.23%</td>
<td>27.48%</td>
<td>25.50%</td>
<td>14.24%</td>
<td>7.95%</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Table 1b. Distribution of Partisan Categorization for “Taylor Swift” and “Taylor Swift Fan”, Fall 2018 Celebrity Stereotyping Survey

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Very Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Somewhat Typical Democrat</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Somewhat Typical Republican</th>
<th>Typical Republican</th>
<th>Very Typical Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Swift</td>
<td>11.95%</td>
<td>26.28%</td>
<td>28.67%</td>
<td>16.38%</td>
<td>9.22%</td>
<td>5.46%</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Swift Fan</td>
<td>6.48%</td>
<td>19.45%</td>
<td>22.53%</td>
<td>29.69%</td>
<td>12.29%</td>
<td>8.53%</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahlberg Endorses Democrat</td>
<td>Mark Wahlberg Supported the Democratic Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that Mark Wahlberg, the 46-year-old movie mega-star, donated $5,000 to the Democratic National Committee in 2016.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is the first public report about the star’s political preferences. According to one fan, however, his supporters have known about his politics for a while. He will sometimes post information about the Democratic Party on his website or send out information about the Party through his emails to fans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The movie star, primarily known for his popular movies, is also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan base. Not only have his fans consistently seen and bought his films, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. When he posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get a golden Labrador retriever for his family because the movie star owned one.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wahlberg Endorses Republican</th>
<th>Mark Wahlberg Supported the Republican Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that Mark Wahlberg, the 46-year-old movie mega-star, donated $5,000 to the Republican National Committee in 2016.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is the first public report about the star’s political preferences. According to one fan, however, his supporters have known about his politics for a while. He will sometimes post information about the Republican Party on his website or send out information about the Party through his subscription email service.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The movie star, primarily known for his popular movies, is also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan base. Not only have his fans consistently seen and bought his films, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. When he posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get a golden Labrador retriever for his family because the movie star owned one.</td>
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A couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get a golden Labrador retriever for his family because the movie star owned one.

**Democrat Endorses Wahlberg**

**Democrat Hillary Clinton Loves Mark Wahlberg Movies**

The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that one of Hillary Clinton’s favorite actors is Mark Wahlberg. Clinton frequently watches Wahlberg’s films with her family.

This is the first public report about the Democratic politician’s interest in Wahlberg’s films. According to one fan, however, her supporters have known about her movie tastes for a while. She will sometimes post information about Mark Wahlberg movies on her website or send out information about his movies through her subscription email service.

The Democratic politician, primarily known for her political service, is also known for her ability to set trends among her loyal fan base. Not only have her Democratic supporters consistently bought her books and attended her events, but they have also fully embraced her lifestyle brand. When she posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term spike in attendance after she was seen there a couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get a chocolate Labrador retriever for his family because the Democratic politician owned one.

**Republican Endorses Wahlberg**

**Republican Mitt Romney Loves Mark Wahlberg Movies**

The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that one of Mitt Romney’s favorite actors is Mark Wahlberg. Romney frequently watches Wahlberg’s films with his family.

This is the first public report about the Republican politician’s interest in Wahlberg’s films. According to one fan, however, his supporters have known about his movie tastes for a while. He will sometimes post information about Mark Wahlberg movies on his website or send out information about his movies through his subscription email service.
The Republican politician, primarily known for his political service, is also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan base. Not only have his Republican supporters consistently bought his books and attended his events, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. When he posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get an Irish setter for his family because the Republican politician owned one.

**Wahlberg Control**

**Mark Wahlberg Supported National Charities**

The Tennessean, a Nashville newspaper, discovered that Mark Wahlberg, the 46-year-old movie mega-star, donated $5,000 to national charities in 2016.

This is the first public report about the star’s charity donations. According to one fan, however, his supporters have known about his contributions for a while. He will sometimes post information about charities on his website or send out information through his subscription email service.

The movie star, primarily known for his popular movies, is also known for his ability to set trends among his loyal fan base. Not only have his fans consistently seen and bought his films, but they have also fully embraced his lifestyle brand. When he posts links on social media, they are regularly copied and reposted, and a workout studio in New York saw a long-term spike in attendance after he was seen there a couple of times. One supporter even mentioned that he chose to get a Labrador Retriever for his family because the movie star owned one.
# Biography of Mr. Lange for YouGov Stereotype Formation Survey, Summer 2018

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark Wahlberg Fan</th>
<th>Michael Lange</th>
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<td>During the weekend, Michael Lange likes to go running and catch up on errands and repairs. He has been a runner since he was in high school and he still enjoys running on trails with friends and family today. Jones and his wife also like to relax on the weekends, run errands, and go see movies. “Our weeks are so busy, that my wife and I like to unwind during the weekends. We relax, run errands, and try to see the latest movie. We are big Mark Wahlberg fans and have been for a long time. We really enjoy his movies. From The Perfect Storm to The Departed, we think they are all super entertaining.”</td>
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