A SENSE OF PLACE AND THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE SELF

By

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TO MY BELOVED WIFE, YEON
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: GEOGRAPHY IS NOT WHAT YOU THINK IT IS; IT IS NOT WHERE YOU THINK THERE IS</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. ANNE FINCH’S STRATEGIC RETREAT INTO THE COUNTRY HOUSE.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ROBINSON CRUSOE AND COUNTER-SPACES OF IMAGINATION.</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. IN SEARCH OF FANTASTIC GEOGRAPHY IN THE SOUTH SEAS.</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. GEOGGIC POETRY AND THE TOPOLITICS OF EMPIRE.</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. SALISBURY PLAIN, SALISBURY PLACE.</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

GEOGRAPHY IS NOT WHAT YOU THINK IT IS; IT IS NOT WHERE YOU THINK THERE IS

My dissertation, “A Sense of Place and the Uncertainty of the Self” deals with the making of roads, maps, journeys, and voyages in the eighteenth century and their wider cultural impact of these developments. The combination of the enclosure of commons and the building of turnpike roads accelerated the dissemination of commodities and print and broadened opportunities for travel. Their effect on “The Sense of Place” as John Barrell has called it expanded, sometimes beyond the point of recognition, the worldview framed by a parish or an estate. Turnpikes and canals moved people as well as goods, and rearranged the figure of an author in the landscape as a wanderer along the major routes of Britain. There existed new opportunities for excitement, mobility, and resettlement, and they were cut through by nostalgia, displacement, and occasionally a sense of terror. A variety of these geographical experiences that I will discuss are dependent upon new practices and procedures in various discursive fields, including science, literature and politics, which are not immediately of a geographical nature. A much larger set of conditions of geographical experiences include three types: firstly, the development of geographical techniques as part of the “transport revolution”; secondly, the literary “movement” and its genres – the traveling poem, sentimental novel, the grand tour, georgic and pastoral poem, the lyrical ballad, and ballad poetry in general; and thirdly, contemporary geopolitics as part of the British imperialism. These three conditions are indissolubly linked with each other; it is impossible to think the one while ignoring the
others. My dissertation begins with a kind of revindiction of geography as a medium rearticulates a certain modes of geographical experience in a specifically formal way.

My discussion of the conditions of geography engages in an ongoing scholarly discussion of geography as a “medium” or a four-dimensional vehicle by means of which one acts, experiences, thinks, and writes. Geography, insofar as it has a natural or architectural design, makes itself articulated doubly: first by a set of spatial markers, such as place, body, and property, and second by a set of temporal markers, such as duration and memory. I begin my dissertation by making it as clear as possible that geographical thought does not exclude time and, by extension, history. Within my geographical framework, time does not simply flow in a linear way, but it moves at a distance which is always variable. Historically speaking, it was a commonplace in the eighteenth century that a geographical travel was also a time travel. Christopher Ridgway, for instance, suggests “rethinking the picturesque travel” along these lines:

The conjunction of geographical progress and historical awareness meant that whatever terrain one traveled through – principal highway, city street, rural lane, or uncharted wilderness – the process was not simply one of voyaging through space (whether known or unknown, empty or filled), for travel also encompassed a fourth dimension – time. But time does not mean simply the hours expended on a journey (the pedestrian or equestrian duration), for it also embraces exposure to the past, to a series of histories and narratives particular to specific places.¹

The “picturesque travel” is more than merely a metaphor, for it unfolds another historical illumination of the mutual appropriation of history and geography in the “Great Map of Mankind.” Edmund Burke, in his correspondence to William Robertson (1721–1793), the Scottish historian who sent him a copy of the History of America wrote as follows:
We need no longer go to History to trace it in all stages and periods. History from its comparative youth is but a poor instructor. When the Egyptians called the Greeks children in Antiquities, we may well call them Children; and so we may call all these nations, which were able to trace the progress of Society only within their own limits. But now Great Map of Mankind is unroll’d at once; and there is no state or Gradation of barbarism, and no mode of refinement, which we have not at the same instant under our View (9 June 1777).

It would be mistaken to imagine that Burke discards “History” in favor of “Geography” or opposes “History” to “Geography” or displaces “History” into “Geography.” But he, with his cartographic connection, shows that history and geography are neither completely independent activities nor separate domains but reciprocally interconnected. That is, the globe becomes now historicized, and history spatialized at the same time. This contemporaneous moment of reciprocity is not only a phase shift in the sense that the new civilization takes the place of the old civilization but also a paradigm shift in that the ancient, textual geography makes way for the modern, empirical geography. Burke’s “Great Map of Mankind” also illustrates the doubled articulations of near/ far, local/ global, chorographic/ geographic, regressive/ progressive, national/ imperial, gradual/ speedy, and ancient/ modern. And it suggests the need for a rigorous reconceptualization of the relation of geography to the picture (and its implied description); to the prospective eye; to the notion of neighborhood in a topological and topographical sense as well as in a Freudian sense of the term “Nebenmensch,” which is translated into the “next-man” or an “adjoining person”; and lastly but not the least, to cartography. My dissertation claims that geography is not the surrounding of the land, but rather the impossibility of its (en)closure. Geography is not simply a context either, for its architectural punctuation is never final.
As a kneading process of difference, geography anticipates a topographical and also topological frame to continually present outside forces and influences for the human experience of geographical difference. My dissertation calls into question a corporeal experience and its related positive notion of geography, for it assumes a stable notion of the thinking subject, which subsumes every experience within consciousness and its correlate, a conscious speaking subject. This positive geographical experience does not combine into an exclusively meaningful and unitary act of consciousness; their resulting articulation of experience, thinking, and rewriting does not emerge as linear and developmental, even though the effect of that resulting triptych may appear seamlessly sutured. Instead of constructing a developmental, positivist notion of geography, I offer to treat geographical experience as an unaccountable event of ambiguities that emerges in places as diverse as voyages of discovery as well as science and literature, whenever the matter of rewriting extraordinary, remarkable geographical experience is at stake. In “catastrophic” events, for instance, like the death of Captain James Cook in Hawaii, there is not a fixed point at which a catastrophe occurs but an ever-present inability to define precisely the ways in which the catastrophe happens.

My study of geography engages itself, first and foremost, in an experimental approach that reexamines the “essentialist” definition of geography. By asking accepted ideas of geography what undone theoretical work may be left for us to do, and to what extent it needs to be reconfigured, retrofitted, or displaced, I take a critical distance from the “essentialist” definition of geography whose problematically permanent notion of fixed “Time” and “Place.” Robert Mayhew and John Agnew criticize: “Most histories of
geography have been retrospective impositions of contemporary definitions, and most
asides about the politics of geography have been retrospective politics grafted unto
retrospective geography” (13). Mayhew argues that a majority of geographical writers
under his consideration establish a “timeless essence which defines geography,” with that
essence relating to the twentieth-century debates within geography. For instance, it may
involve an ecological approach for Stoddart or a regionalist one for Hartshorne, but the
history of political geography is also to the point for John Agnew:

The use of the term “political geography” dates approximately from 1750
when the French philosophe Turgot coined it to refer to his attempts to
show the relationship between geographical “facts,” from soils and
agriculture to settlement and ethnic distributions, to political organization.
Political geography, in other words, was conceived as a branch of
knowledge for government and administration – as state knowledge. As a
self-confessed sub-area of academic Geography, the term is even more
recent, dating from the 1890s. As reinvented at that time, the field was
particularly oriented to justifying and providing advice about the colonial
ventures in which the Great Powers were then engaged. The word
“geopolitics” was also invented in the 1890s, by the Swedish political
scientist Kjellen, to refer to the so-called geographic basis of world
politics.²

Agnew and Mayhew concur that a geo-political definition of geography has been almost
unchanged from the moment when it was recounted by Mary Shelley in her
Frankenstein: “Among the lessons that Felix had bestowed upon Safie geography had not
been omitted. I had learned from these the relative situations of the different countries of
the earth.”³ Geographer’s task, as represented in the education of the Monster was to
determine relative location upon the earth and to describe the political as well as physical
entities to be found in those locations.

Mayhew is very close to saying that this “functional” practice in geography
shaped and affected a traditional sense of geography well into the early nineteenth
century. In this regard he is similar to Edward Said, who scrutinizes the role of memory in relation to sites where tradition has a role to play. The memory “enterprise,” according to Said, is a “geographical” practice of reconstituting, preserving, and condensing a sense of place that underwrites the integrity and legitimacy of a specific cultural community in the present. With a different set of questions, however, Mayhew approaches the issue of what I call the “geographical authorship” in the eighteenth century print culture. In asking, “Who were the authors of geographical books, and who were the consumers of such books?” he pays particular attention to geographical authors, or writers of small histories, dictionaries, and ephemeral poems associated as with those figures Alexander Pope once dubbed the “Grub Street Dunces,” such as Thomas Salmon, Laurence Echard, Edward Wells, and John Ogilby. Not only does he discuss the significance of “grubstreet” geographers, no matter how modest it may be, in developing a modern “composition and grammar” of geography, but, more emphatically, he keeps the track of the political alignment of geography into the Royal and the Whig and the Tory geographers, who all in all contributed to institutionalizing geography as a “discipline,” or a form of the Enlightenment knowledge.

Mayhew’s “discursive” project describes a history of geography in which “the meaning of a political statement would be defined by the difference that articulates it upon the other real or possible statements.” If statements and discourses have meaning insofar as they are made to perform abridgements and permutations on other possible statements and discourses, one might be left with a “discursive composition” of “syntactical components” of geographical expression, such as the “subject” of the men of geography, the “agency” of recounting events, and the “object” of the origins and
evolution of political, geographical ideas. Mayhew’s discursive practice synthesizes a
topic of geography and a spatially informed social discourse into the intellectual “site”
where politics and history constitutes the British history of geography. It is not my
concern to question the validity of this description of politically inflected geography.
While it may, in any case, be sufficient to underlie its historically situated character, for
me, it is more a question of how, as Neil Smith points out, “specific societies produce
equally specific geographies,” and, conversely, “how one goes beyond the boundaries of
discourse and feels the tangible, historical, political, and cultural geographies one
discursively evokes.” Smith’s suggestion takes me to David Livingston’s pluralist
approach to geography. Mayhew and Livingston shares a similarity in making obsolete
the essentialist notion of geography, but Livingston’s “contextual” geography is restricted
to the particular meanings one has had in different times and places, and there have been
different sorts of geographical knowledge practiced and promoted at various times in
various settings. The signifying process of geographical meaning articulates itself upon a
variety of “media” of geographical units, such as times and places and settings. This
dialectical convergence of medium and message into a statement of “the Medium is the
Message” constitutes the core of Livingston’s notion of the Enlightenment geography.
Livingston states as follows:

We want to use geography to employ a comparative approach and search
for a broader vision of the Enlightenment, one that draws upon local
settings to enrich a Euro-American perspective, while at the same time,
considering how ideas of the Enlightenment and of geography, and
perhaps retaining -even reinforcing national identities- also transcend
national boundaries and the influence of local settings.  

xiii
Livingston’s claim may be paraphrased into a statement that he wants to use geography to determine a proper set of relations between the one (vision) and the many (places).

When Livingston tries to impart a proper and irreversible sense of order to a multiplicity of the constituents of contextual geography, he performs as similar a division of labor as Immanuel Kant did two centuries ago in putting an inner sense of geography in a temporal sequence (Kant’s nacheinander) and putting the constituents of the earth in a spatial sequence (Kant’s nebeneinander). Although Livingston plays out the paradigmatic opposition of one to many in space, the key issue to Kantian division of geography was to provide the preliminary Idea for knowledge of the physical world. “Physical geography is the first part of knowledge of the world. It belongs to an idea (Idee) which is called the propaedeutic to understanding our knowledge of the world.”

Beyond merely describing the physical world, Kant sought for an architectonic system of knowledge designed a priori for finding the inner unity and law to govern the manifold parts of the world: “By an architectonic I understand the art of constructing systems. As systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregates of knowledge” (99). Kant’s labor of division entails the conceptual priority of the inner and systematic “architectonics” of the knowledge of the world over the outer surface of the world. As Kant constituted the ideational geography where a priori representation of the world becomes a structuring authority of his cultural production of geography, Livingston maps out the relationships between one global vision and multiple local settings through the difference of positions in the coordinates of domination, oppression, marginalization, on one hand, and the Enlightenment, on the other hand. This idea of the Enlightenment geography that
Livingston suggests is, then, a privileged moment, in the discipline of geography, a kind of power that works to characterize, classify, and specialize and to distribute a labor of division across an uneven scale of the hierarchy of the metropolis centers of influence over the local settings. According as the Enlightenment Idea operates, then, by the determination of degrees of similarity and difference in relation to the “Euro-American perspective,” which endeavors to integrate the features of self-varying deformation into an increasingly homogeneous knowledge of the world, the geographer is bound to be left with an incomplete geography by default, even though not by definition, as the whole (one) geography is part of the parts of the multiple, inconsistent, open places.

Since geography as a discipline studies the spatial relations among things that coexist alongside one another and constitute the surface of the earth, Livingston as well as Kant confronts, like their precursors, a critical issue of determining the frame of reference of neighborhood. Where does neighborhood continue to extend, and where does it stop to constitute another neighborhood? Then, what constitutes a minimal unit of geography? How does geography reach an “indivisible” whole? Or is it infinitely divisible at a variable distance? The notion of neighborhood is linked, in effect, with the historical and philosophical notion of the continuum; that is, it presupposes a principle of the double articulation of continuity and contiguity, proximity and distance, community and its neighborhood. Within my frame of reference of the notion of neighborhood, it traces back to the seventeenth-century thinking of spatial trajectory represented by those figures, such Leibniz, Descartes, Galileo, and Newton. The question of the continuum was crucial, for instance, to Leibniz: “Only geometry can provide a thread for the Labyrinth of the Composition of the Continuum, of maximum and minimum, and the
unassignable and the infinite, and no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics who has not passed through that labyrinth." An eighteenth-century figure named Joseph Banks, a Lincolnshire landowner, serves, in the third chapter of my dissertation, as the example of a local “agent” who will reenact the historical contingency of the geometrical continuum, that is, the spatial coordinate, for his figure is situated between the British and the “local” islands and renegotiates his “in-between” positions in the Seas. My purpose of this chapter is not to solve the historically enduring question of the continuum but to see to it that the philosophical notion of the continuum was not unrelated to a practical cartographic problem of reconfiguring nautical rhumbs from the Mercator projection, for instance, for Thomas Hariot, an Elizabethan explorer and mathematician. In trying to solve the cartographic problem of how much the given latitude needs to be changed in order to produce a marine chart that preserves true directions, he also asked in a similar manner to his contemporary continental philosopher this question of “How can a line, a particularly coast line, [which is] composed of infinite parts and infinitely turning around the center, be finite?” A finite but ever-variable orbit around the center that Hariot grappled with approximately four centuries ago is now very close to the image of the “strange attractor,” like the Butterfly effect, which is continually deferred toward the infinitely large and infinitesimally small. My notion of neighborhood reveals another related terrain of singularity, for the continuous continuum is concerned with distributing a whole series of ordinaries and regularities all the way to the following continuum. That is, the continuous neighborhood, in connection with the continuum, organizes disparate elements within continuous spaces. Maximum and minimum are such (mathematical) cases of singularity; the bump on the road is another practical example of singularity.
When Foucault dreams of a “new age of curiosity,” he does not mean that singularity is a cognate of the eighteenth-century curiosity.

Curiosity is a vice that has been stigmatized in turn by Christianity, by philosophy, and even by a certain conception of science. The word, however, pleases me. To me it suggests something altogether different: it evokes “concern”; a readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds us. . . I dream of a new age of curiosity. We have the technical means for it; the desire is there; the things to be known are infinite; the people who can employ themselves at this task exist.

Let us associate the “technical means” for a brief moment with the “Freudian means” for finding the uncanny from what surrounds us. Freud’s “concern” to find the “virtual half” to bear witness to what the present continues to lack feeds into his concern for Nebenmensch,” the “next-man,” an “adjoining person,” or the next neighbor. As Kenneth Reinhard explains it, “insofar as the Nebenmensch is always this next person, always embodies in a particular person who fills the arbitrary place of the neighbor, it materializes an uncanniness within the social relationship.” The neighbor, for Freud, embodies the “fundamental antagonism both within and between the familial and the social,” the “strangeness” that the adjoining person may cause. When Wordsworth did not yet know to how to mediate the psychological and the social, he sought for the next person, to whom he could transfer his narration. My dissertation, in the final chapter, asks and further examines why the first encounter that William Wordsworth had after returning to the British isle from the Continent in the early 1790s was the Female Vagrant who had been displaced by force onto Salisbury Plain. Why does Wordsworth try to “subjectivize” such displaced figures as the Female Vagrant and the Sailor and later the leech-gatherer in his poetry? What is at stake is the question of why the poet “moves” them into a “trance” to repeat a narrative of their social predicament. My work on
Wordsworth’s *Salisbury Plain* poems engages the occasion of the transference and its working-through. I argue that Wordsworth’s revision of *Salisbury Plain* into *Adventures on Salisbury Plain* both anticipates and exceeds the libidinous economy of the Unconscious, as Freud represents it in his critical essay titled “The Uncanny.” While keeping the track of the transference of narration from the Female Vagrant to the Sailor, my reading of *Salisbury Plain* poems claims that Wordsworth, unlike Freud, does not have a strong stake in curing transference neurosis; he gives that job to the vagrant woman in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain* in order to practice his poetic technique of narrative intervention in *Salisbury Plain* poems. My dissertation bears witness to the fact that my notion of singularity suggests similar but “something altogether different” from those of Foucault’s curiosity and Freudian uncanniness alike. Put differently, my dissertation is framed by the history of mathematics and the science of trajectory in the “long eighteenth century” from a certain number of critical thinkers, among them some who belong to our era, such as Kevin Hetherington and Bruno Latour, or to the history of philosophy, such as Thomas Hariot, John Locke, David Hume, and Rene Decartes, who participated in a philosophical debate as to what part geography plays in the continuum of place as divisible or indivisible. A common trait to those who help me to think through the conceptual metamorphosis of geography and its implied singularity is the attempt to speak of the history of geography without putting the human subject defined by his or her intellectual categories at the center of their epistemological system.14

The geography-information link has too often been conceptualized in the form of an all-inclusive experiential and epistemological dyad, with the shifting back and forth between the two and the flickering effect that produces creating often deceptively illusory
knowledge that embodies and nourishes each other. Livingston suggests, “We want to consider the potential for thinking about geographies of enlightenment knowledge as information was produced in and about certain places, for example, as it traveled by word of mouth, in manuscript or in printed form, and as it was trusted and acted upon by others elsewhere” (13). In the wake of this circumscribed oscillation between geography and information, the materiality (and also method as the way as in *methodos*) of geography is silently eclipsed, pushed to the periphery of literary backdrop, to the margins of critical intellectual inquiry:

The historian as social critique and observer, history as a privileged interpretive practice, became familiar and accepted in academic and popular circles. In contrast, Geography and geographers were [then] left with little more than the detailed description of outcomes, what came to be called by the chroniclers of the discipline the ‘areal differentiation of phenomena’ – the accumulation, classification, and theoretically innocent representation of the earth’s surface.\textsuperscript{15}

With the Soja’s problematic of the disciplinary division of labor, therefore, my study goes backward, rediscovering forgotten empirical questions within an epistemologically shaped discursive ecology, undoing the socio-economic matrix that it established, and above all, going beyond an ever-tightening grid of the disciplinary compartmentalizing of geographical professions. In an essay titled “Postscript to the Societies of Control,” Gilles Deleuze characterizes disciplinary societies as follows:

They [disciplinary societies] initiate the organization of vast spaces of enclosure. The individual never ceases passing from one enclosed environment to another, each having its own laws: the first family; then the school (“you are no longer in your family); then the barracks (“you are no longer at school”); then the factory; from time to time the hospital; possibly the prison, the preeminent instance of the enclosed environment.\textsuperscript{16}
If in the disciplinary societies, as Deleuze argues, one is always starting again from school to the barracks, from the barracks to the factory, then, Moll Flanders, the eighteenth-century novel character epitomizes the very characteristic of continually starting over from marriage to marriage, from threshold to threshold, and from family to prison. Daniel Defoe’s *Moll Flanders* consists of a series of incidents, including five marriages, counterfeiting, theft, imprisonment at Newgate, eight-year transportation, and settlement in America. The distribution of these “singular” incidents envisions the distribution of real disciplinary space across the feminine body of Moll, in the sense that she keeps coming back at the road of “bifurcation” in the choice either of money and property or of the involuntary lack of moral propriety. As Moll’s governess instigates her, “My governess was something impatient of my leading such a useless unprofitable life.”17 Moll’s governess knows more than anyone else about Moll and serves as an ear for Moll, but the vector of Moll’s desire moves toward productivity as if it were a social imperative “to concentrate; to distribute in space; to order in time; to compose a productive force within the dimension of space-time whose effect will be greater than the sum of its component forces” (Deleuze 1). Furthermore, Defoe seems to endow his character Moll with the human capacity to think until she gets imprisoned with the very architecture of fabricating virtue, i.e., the Newgate prison: “In short, I began to think, and to think is one real advance from hell to heaven. All that hellish harden’d state and temper of soul, which I have said so much before, is but a deprivation of thought; he that is restored to his power of thinking is restored to himself” (358). Moll becomes an efficient part of the disciplinary society after her confinement in the penitentiary, or that the formal constancy of a self-contained set of incidents invests the author with a desire
of producing an aesthetic property, since Defoe may, as Ian Watt suggests, be a muster of incident, incapable of a cohesive whole.

My example of Moll is not, however, concerned with how fittingly Foucault’s analysis permits one to speak of the “author function” she partakes of, but rather with how much difference the invention of Moll effects in treating a historical specificity of literary property. *Moll Flanders* is the book made into a commodity by the author, but, then, the question remain as to why Moll gives an “abridgement of this [the Wickedness of her Life] whole History, the Picture of her conduct for 50 years in miniature” (366). If she wants to market herself by selling a discourse on moral propriety, then, why is it that she pays obsessive attention to her own value, detail, and to whom it belongs? Foucault raised the question of the “author function” in his article titled “What is an Author?” in relation to the historical “coming into being of the notion of ‘author’ – that is, of the emergence and evolution of the author function within the social formation of discourse. In discussing the material conditions of the emergence of the “author” in the disciplinary society, Foucault argues that it derives from the socio-economic matrix of ownership:

> Once a system of ownership for texts came into being, once strict rules concerning author’s rights, author-publisher relations, rights for reproduction, and related matters were enacted – at the end of eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century- the possibility of transgression attached to the act of writing took on, more and more, the form of an imperative peculiar to literature. It is as if the author, beginning with the moment at which he was placed in the system of property that characterizes our society, compensated for the status that he thus acquired by rediscovering the old bipolar field of discourse, systematically practicing transgression and thereby restoring danger to a writing which was now guaranteed the benefits of ownership.¹⁸

Foucault emphasizes that the exceptional figure and function of the author emerges itself as an effect of the extension of ownership that constitutes the economic-legal nexus of
disciplinary power within which the author is embedded. “The ‘author-function’ is tied to the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe, determine, and articulate the realm of discourses; it does not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual” (Foucault 113). As scholars from McLuhan and Eisenstein to Lunsford have long argued, book technology and the attributes it supports are the institutions most responsible for maintaining the notions of authorial individuality, uniqueness, and ownership that often drastically affect the conception of the “singular (univocal) relationship that holds between an author and a text [as] the manner in which a text apparently points to this figure who is outside and precedes it.” This point of view suggests that Moll is not necessarily posited as the human subject as an originator or shaper of a work but functions as an operation in a “milieu, or else a “site” wherein there converge, and are recorded, the cultural constructs, discursive formations, and configurations of the author function in relation to property and moral propriety. As Moll instantiates a social position as a form of property in this discursively interlaced matrix that precedes the author and from which he or she is not easily extricated, so the author performs a disciplinary function by “providing the basis for explaining not only the presence of certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and diverse modifications through his biography, the determination of his individual perspective, the analysis of his social position, and the revelation of his basic design” (111). The author that Foucault describes becomes almost indistinguishable from its ideological function as he explains the author as a “certain functional principle by which, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, and the free composition, decomposition, recomposition of fiction” (119). The discursive analysis that Foucault
establishes by “depriving the subject, i.e., Defoe and its surrogate Moll of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable function of discourse” (119) suggests that the character Moll, as an “ideological product,” plays a role quite characteristic of the emerging capitalist economy - industrial and bourgeois society, individualism and private property.

It is true that Moll does not idealize capital but she situates herself in the very condition of circulation. To this extent, she seems to have the compulsive desire to sell her story of moral propriety, but she writes her own value in a book, I argue, mainly because she does come through all singular states in her life to be the owner of her self:

When a woman is thus left desolate and void of Council, she is just like a Bag of Money, or a jewel dropt on the Highway, which is a Prey to the next Comer; if a Man of Virtue and upright Principles happens to find it, he will have it cried, and the Owner may come to hear of it again; but how many times shall such a thing fall into Hands that will make no scruple of seizing it for their own, to once that it shall come into good Hands (182).

Moll’s imaginary recognition of her body as a commodity or a lost thing enlivens her narration, giving life, blood, and flesh to it. She creates her market by making her state of being stripped away from humanity self-advertised and, conversely, by allowing the reader to take the godly position. The reader must judge this being empowered by judging their own moral judgment, which is the singular gaze of novel character Moll; that is, “commodity” is telling its owner’s tale, which exemplifies Moll’s slippery sprawl across the early eighteenth-century British society.

Moll is a geographical traveler, and her unsettling experience feeds into geographical attributes as a character who proposes herself as singular, exemplar, and unique in her life-experience of the times. The character of Moll offers the reader the
shape of the outside in the sense that the reader finds not only outside buildings and institutions but also a writing of the singular event that they form part of. The singularity of Moll’s character, as Deidre Lynch suggests, designates “the legible, graphic elements of writing,” “a typographical object,” or “a unit of information,” which “moves and makes all their way all over the social map” (361). When Moll serves as an index to the multiplicity of locations and circumstances, her story constitutes a new type of history, a new mode for the discussion of a social phenomenon of “destabilization on the move,” or unsettling social experience for anybody who speaks in her name.

The asymptotic relationship that I am describing between cognitive mapping and the singularity of experience rearticulates the issue of “who speaks, where and why” at the moment of Foucault’s conclusion in his critical article: “All discourses, whatever their status, form, value, and whatever the treatment to which they will be subjected, would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur. We would no longer hear the questions that have been raised for so long: Who really spoke?” (119) There is a point in invoking the metaphor of a spider-web strung among tree branches (as the emblem of a discourse among discourses) in order to mention that by achieving a certain density of saturation discourses reveal each of its correspondences and nodes as a network of discourses in the “anonymity of a murmur.” With this possibility one can go in the direction of the self as a point or a node of points connecting it to all other points in the network. This postmodern thinking of inter-textuality ensures that nobody can ever be simply inside or outside who (and what) is everywhere among us, i.e., Moll. This idea becomes even stronger if Jean-Francois Lyotard’s analogy is involved: “Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at ‘nodal points’ of specific
communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or better: one is always located at a
*post* through which various kinds of message pass.”19 By “post” Lyotard most likely
means the modern European “post office,” which serves as a nodal point in a network of
telecommunications, and, to be elaborated a little later, the British turnpike roads played a
similar role in the middle eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The postmodern
sensibility in treating the self as de-centered or displaced is not inconsequential in
moving the character of Moll perpetually in transit at a crossover of geographical roads,
ruins, and empty places. She is the singular, exemplar character that is being insulated
from her regular neighborhood.

The singularized character of Moll along the road allows one to speak of a
different mode of authorship grounded on the interrelated matter of owning and of
(re)writing her singular experience. If the book of Moll Flanders takes on the character of
autobiography, it is because Moll rewrites how the “I” of her singular self comes to
acquire a legal standing of her own narrative as in Olaudah Equiano’s conversion
narrative of *The Interesting Narrative*. Take a brief example of the “I” in Equiano’s own
narrative: “It is, therefore, I *confess*, not a little hazardous, in a private and obscure
individual, and a stranger too, thus to solicit the indulgent attention of the public;
especially when I *own* I offer here the history of neither of a saint, a hero, nor a tyrant”
(italics added 31). Like the “I” of Moll, the “I” character of Equiano hinges upon the
“punct” of “owning” in the one sense of “acknowledging and also confessing (a thing)
to be true and valid as well as in the other sense of “making (a thing) one’s own,” as the
Oxford English Dictionary informs it. Bearing the weight and value of £ 15 in person,
Equiano introduces himself as Gustavus Vasa, the name of a slave. The economy of his
singular, interesting narrative makes a surplus value out of his non-person as a lost slave or “thing,” just as the singularity of Moll’s social predicament makes a commodity in transaction out of her body as a “lost woman.” As Miguel Tamen explains this strategy of personification, “my literal autobiography of a former nonperson would be a story whose initial chapter would be about my own story is permeated by the possibility, to which I am now quite foreign, of not being able to tell it at all.” Equiano concludes, “My life and fortune have been extremely chequered, and my adventures various. Even those I have related are considerably abridged. . . I early accustomed myself to look at the hand of God in the minute occurrence. . . To those who are possessed of this spirit, there is scarcely any book or incident so trifling that does not offer some profit” (236). It is hard to say whether Equiano is more interested in God’s secret hand of Providence than his instrumental walk of life. And it is no less uncertain whether he is fundamentally interested in religious conversion or the expressive possibility of being free to narrate the unaccountable things he encounters.

What I pay attention to is this common de-nomination of singular experience as a point of excess, a surplus, or a supplement by means of which a multiplicity of interests are tapped into the quantum of his or her personal history. From the point of the situation of social experience, it is a caesura, a zone of undecidability, in which the past memory is dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past. Rather than a calculus of the possibilities to become real, geographical memory serves, then, as a potential field of singularities in the present situation, which will be unfolded into otherness or difference. This movement of difference is what Jacques Derrida calls the movement of differance: “We shall designate by the term differance the movement by
which language, or any code, any system of reference in general, become ‘historically,’ constituted as a fabric of differences.” My point of contention is that the character of Moll and Equiano is woven out of the fabric of writing and what makes this clothed repetition extraordinary is the condensation of social incidents as in William Wordsworth’s clothed transformation into the Female Vagrant and back into the Sailor - this point of view is one of the consistent themes of my dissertation. The relation of Moll and Equiano to their memoirs lies between a trace and the self when the trace subsists in the world when the event disappears. It's something of the event, but not the event as such; it is the trace, a mark, a symptom, a renegotiation of one’s sense of the event. Equiano confesses, “If any incident in this little work should appear uninteresting and trifling to most readers, I can only say, as my excuse for mentioning it, that almost every event of my life made an impression on my mind, and influenced my conduct” (236). While a “perpetual surging of invention” of the character of Equiano includes his invested story of the middle passage, there is a rupture in the subjective relation of his singular event to the world. “Constituting itself, dynamically dividing itself,” this interval of invention is what Derrida also calls spacing; time’s becoming-spatial or space’s becoming-temporal – writing his memoirs becomes the milieu of the Middle Passage, in which Equiano’s time does not simply flow, indexing itself from past to present, but varies, traversing his reflection-record and anticipating his virtual encounter of the reader-subscriber.

The alignment of writing a text with “scaping” the land convokes a different mode of ownership in Mark Rose’s study of authorship and ownership. Rose suggests another way of investing the links between property and land in order to create a different
mode of analysis by which authorship become inextricably linked with the notions of property, originality, and personality. He states, “I am not concerned with the production of the author as a consciousness so much as a representation of authorship based on notions of property, originality, and personality.”22 It is Rose’s specific focus to argue that “all forms of property are socially constructed and, like copyright, bear in their lineaments the traces of the struggles in which they were fabricated” (8). And it is not a coincidence that Defoe was highly interested in experimenting with what could be called “copy-left” matter of editorial abridgment in his writings, including Moll Flanders and Robinson Crusoe. It was debatable whether an abridgement of an existing book could be a new work, and an abridger could be entitled into an author. Defoe’s intervention in appropriating the undetermined agenda in abridgement is a process of realizing the possibility of owning his own character by means of the power of fiction. Combining the real and the imagined, abridgement and authorial property on equal terms or at least privileging one over the other, Defoe’s writings represent thus a land or place for the generation of “counter-spaces” of imagination, alternative spaces of authorial intervention in the dominant order of things:

To conclude, what we observe in both Defoe’s writings in the period just before the passage of the Statue of Anne is an early moment in the formation of the discourse of proprietary authorship. How would one think about an author’s relationship with writings? The most familiar metaphor was paternity, but to invoke the representation of a text as a child in order to bolster the author’s right to sell his works in the marketplace presented rhetorical difficulties. An alternative metaphor, literary property as a landed estate . . . it contributed to a new way of thinking about literature.23

By recalling the history of copyright, the Statue of Anne did not settle the theoretical questions behind the notion of literary property, but it rather represented a significant
moment in the process of re-establishing copyright under the rubric of literary property and not the “right to copy.” And the new way of understanding literary property is by way of geography as a surface of plane on which to set forth and describe the world. Robinson exclaims in his journal, “Let the Naturalists explain Things, and the Reason and Manner of them; all I can say to them is, to describe the Fact, which was even surprising to me when I found it; though I knew not from what it should proceed; it was doubtless the effect of ardent wishes, and of strong Ideas form’d in my Mind.”24

Robinson’s notion of property is a process of realizing his own character on his own island. As Majorie Swann suggests, we need to understand that a historical development of authorship bore no inevitable relationship to printed books: “We should not privilege the cultural code of print to the extent that we fail to consider how other material practices might also have affected writer’s new models or resources for authorial self-fashioning.”25 Among many “other material practices” of authorship, Rose argues, “The imprinting of the author’s personality on the common stock of the world is a work of original authorship. The basis of literary property is not just labor but personality and this reveals itself in ‘originality.’” The imprinting the author’s personality in the land is, for Swann, linked with expressing the author’s distinctive relation to the land: the construction of landed identity was intertwined with modes of representation by which the English estate came to be portrayed as a cultural space in which a collection of physical objects takes place in allegiance to the estate. Unlike the authorial figure as the product of an extension of the technique of constituting the author’s individuality as an operation in the shifting terrain of discourses, I argue that the upheaval of spatial
character in space is part of a generic procedure of reinventing an operator by means of which the character describes singular and personal experiences in writing.

The “fidelity operator” is the concept of Alain Badiou that I borrow in order to account for a particular role that the character performs in a place where he or she is situated. Badiou explains, “The process of a truth is fidelity (to the event), i.e., the evaluation, using a specific operator (that of fidelity), of the degree of connection between the terms of situation and the supernumerary name of the event.”26 For instance, the character of the young Wordsworth in the letter of Llandaff is the very instance of a fidelity operator, who evaluates the political situation surrounding France and Britain and tries to put into practice a Revolutionary possibility of thinking the Other in his early Salisbury Plain poems. Robinson Crusoe is the interventional naming of a prototypical character from the point of view of the “anomie” situation, not knowing whether his cast island is paradise or prison and struggling to build himself a secure place. The emergence of this operator is thus “locatable by the emergence of a language inside the situation, whose multiple referents are conditioned by an as yet uncompleted generic part of” writing (Badiou 96). Badiou’s point of view of the supernumerary operator is highly germane to a critical reading of writings whose temporal distance between experience and writing one’s experience is accompanied by spatial disjunction, for the character traces in situ random and indiscernible materials of the event, “starting from the non-existent point at which the event has convoked the void and interpolated itself between the void and itself” (95). The void of Robinson’s island represents the void space of writing on which to take account of the deconstruction of reality whereby the reality “out there” surrounding Robinson’s castaway once again melts back into the conditions of
fictional writing. To this extent, the narration of the character sounds like a record of the factual history, but it is a re-articulation and re-enactment of the situation of the event. The common trope of a “true story” or “history of facts” is therefore the result of the pure event of contracting the mutual interest in rediscovering personal accounts of the singular experience of geography. In those writings with the particular temporal gap of a decade between original accounts of experience and the author’s publication of it, such as Aphra Behn’s *Oroonoko*, Oliver Goldsmith’s *The Traveler*, and John Galt’s *Annals of the Parish*, for instance, each author’s reflection-record bears witness to an interventional method of using a spatial operator in order to re-evaluate a totality of his or her total experience in the geography of the event, that is, to account for the singular void of past experience that the event has convoked in the present situation.

Balwhidder, a novel character in *The Annals of the Parish* (1821) is such a fidelity operator who describes how the construction and development of the turnpike road reconfigures the social life of the minister Balwhidder’s parish, Dalmailing, near the west coast of Scotland. Balwhidder’s characterization of the features of the parish reenacts the development of the turnpike road in Scotland: “The King’s road, which then ran through the Vennel, was mended; but it was not till some years after, I shall record by and by, that the trust-road, as it was called, was made, the which had the effect of turning the town inside out” (34). Note the temporal modality of the future anterior in the account of Balwhidder. The mutual appropriation of the past and the future tense indicates that he is in the process of going back to the moment when the turnpike was constructed. While he is looking back on his memory of the parish, his account takes a “natural” course of historical development. Initially, Balwhidder’s parish holds it responsible to repair and
maintain the King’s road. The poor condition of the King’s road is, as the narrator describes, “a narrow and a crooked street, with many big stones here and there.” When the Lord Eglesham from London is stymied in the quagmire of the road, he petitions “an act of parliament to put down the nuisance” and “undertakes the trust road” (42). The result is that “the town gradually, in the course of years, grew up into that orderliness which makes it now a pattern to the countryside (43)”; that is, that the turnpike trust road generates a serial replication of homogeneity across the nation. The turnpike road system contributes to a “visible increase of worldly circumstances” (Galt 65), a concurrent series of events that will take place across the scale of geography in the same year of 1789: the construction of another new road from the mainline of Glasgow, the set-up of the stage coach, easy accessibility to the Glasgow market, and, most of all, a book shop in Cayenneville, a two-to-three mile distance from Dalmailing. The event of the turnpike road, the taking place of an interregional circuit or an extensive communications network of the turnpike roads brings together, distributes, and circulates the real time information across the nation. The speed and motion of the turnpike road enables people “not simply to judge the rest of the world by what one sees going on around oneself, but to walk abroad into other parts and thereby enlarge one’s sphere of observation, as well as ripen one’s judgment of things” (Galt 136). Balwhidder serves for the author as a fidelity operator to allow one to ask the postmodern questions regarding the possibility of reading turnpikes as what McLuhan called a “break boundary?” Does the idea of the human body survive the “extension or self-amputation of one’s physical bodies” in the speeding up made possible by turnpike roads, especially the “explosion of the eye?” How much “instantly” and also how have authors reacted to new media? Galt’s reevaluation of the
change of the parish of Dalmailing is a gradual adaptation of thinking to the change of 
place in its material conditions.

While Franco Moretti has noticed how the system of central places works within 
the “changing geography of village narratives,” I read that the turnpike road shapes and 
affects a continuous process of societal restructuring of the parish across the scale of 
geography. Moretti enumerates the “system of central places at work,” including “school 
in Irville, university in Glasgow, lawyers and doctors in Edinburgh,” which thus form the 
radius of the central-peripheral zone based on the dichotomy of the city and the country. 
For Moretti, cotton-mill manufacture in Glasgow is a determining social event to “re-
center social life”: “the building of the cotton-mill, a new genius, as it were, had 
descended upon the earth, and there was an erect and out-looking spirit abroad that was 
not to be satisfied with the taciturn regularity of ancient affairs” (Galt 128). Moretti reads 
that the sense of the region is gone and replaced by a “web of commercial reciprocities” 
ranging from Cayenneville via Glasgow and Edinburgh to London. Similarly, Galt 
notices how city economy invents things that are to become city imports from the rural 
world, and then reinvents the rural work, as well as how the new work is added to the 
older work and then the new divisions of labor are added to other appropriate varieties of 
older work, as is the case of “tambouring, in such a manner as to supersede by precept 
and example that old-time honored functionary, the spinning-wheel” (Galt 128). Moretti 
focus on the “Symbolic” central places play at the heart of Dalmailing, but I call attention 
to how the “Semiotic” communications network cuts cross the almost real-time 
information transmission.
To put it in terms of Julia Kristeva, the figure in the landscape is not the function of the transcendental ego, for expanded geography puts *sujet en proces*, the subject on trial, *in process* in its never-ending rapprochment between the symbolic act of consciousness and a multiplicity of indeterminable referents in the world.

Sense as a trial and the speaking subject on trial articulate themselves on the impetus of the interaction between the two modes of signification: the symbolic and the semiotic. The emergence of the semiotic in the symbolic is subservient to the transformational conditions in the relation between subject and receiver: anguish, frustration, identification or projection all break down the unity of the transcendental ego and its system of homogeneous sense and give free rein to what is heterogeneous in sense.27

This heterogeneous links, connections, or networks to the subjective relation to something indeterminable of an event is what Kristeva calls the semiotic; and I call the semiotic cut-cross the transcendental ego’s precipitous engagement in giving meaning an event of geography. When Balwhidder sets forth a continual process of changing social life of Dalmailing, seeing the turnpike through the eyes of an immanent stranger makes his vision opaque because of a dense degree of change vying for attention and designation. “Beyond a certain threshold, this quantitative pressure produces a catastrophe in the coherence of the symbolic.” This means that the status of an absolute observer is weakened and that geography cannot be described “from the exterior” as if one were an ideal, god-like observer. That is to say, the priority of horizontal directionality over vertical dimensionality (fixity) is a precondition of geography where one finds him or herself defined by a meaningful “observational” relation. Geography is, then, the practice of reorganizing all theoretical and practical experiences, one which cuts a vertical figure horizontally and promotes new values of the flow of displacement in the case of the geographical retreat of Anne Finch into the country house, Robinson’s
singular camouflaging in the “anomie” state, Banks’s “sidelined movement” into the infinitely expanded receptacle of the South Seas, and Wordsworth’s uncanny movement of Salisbury Plain by means of the ancient transport system. These heteroclite places existing in different modes emerges themselves into an “outside” that is in fact immanent to each artistic world, a name of the multiple connections to one’s sense of place. Therefore, there is no geography outside of plural and heterogeneous worlds.

Each chapter in my dissertation is a variable evocation of the same central theme: geography and the uncertainty of the self. The rediscovery of geography in and out of the eighteenth-century and the Romantic writing provides the most revealing literary and theoretical world; this is the insistent premise and promise of my dissertation. The first chapter on Anne Finch describes the early eighteenth-century use of landscape to portray identity against the backdrops of household, estate, and state. When Anne Finch retreated to the country house in Eastwell Park after her husband’s political disgrace, her country house provides for her a loophole, or an aperture through which she could view new possibilities for her own poetical and political expression. If architecture wishes to dissent from the management and organization of space, how would it go about doing this? Finch’s country house plays a pronounced role in con-vert-ing (noting the etymology of “vert” as change and transformation) her political predicament into poetry; that is, the country house becomes the medium and the material infrastructure of her poetry alike. This chapter suggests that the means of feminine communication becomes the means of feminine production in the sense that the metropolitan, male Republic of Letters is different from a loosely dispersed spatial network of provincial, feminine community. While Finch is transporting herself beyond her country seat to make new
allies with female matrons, I argue that Finch’s “metis” practice also takes account of a counter-history of the structure of feminine abject feeling in the eighteenth century.

Chapter 2 engages in the eighteenth and the early nineteenth-century development of turnpikes and its wider cultural impact. The turnpike road system made geography fragmented, but it simultaneously reshaped fragmented geography into a more organized network of improved roads, which in turn formed a network of routes for compiling and distributing information, i.e., routes of copyrights and commodities. The turnpike “trusts system” also contributed to the transformation of space itself into a commodity. Initially, turnpike roads were controlled by the Justice of the Peace, but from the 1750s on, a turnpike “trusts system” constituted a network of investments, in which place became an object of speculative investment. The result is that place ended up as a marketable entity, thereby generating a serial replication of homogeneity. Drawing upon critical spatial theorists, such as Edward Soja, David Harvey, and Nicholas Poulantzas, I discuss that the turnpike road makes possible the double articulation of the macro-level analysis of the economic infrastructures of transport and also the micro-level of diffusion, piecemeal character, and dissipation of social development across the national scale of British geography. Geographical configurations of places are now shaped around new transport and communications systems and physical infrastructures, new centers of production and consumption, new agglomerations of labor power, and modified social infrastructures. The turnpike road system makes it possible that the real time information – especially news and print – circulates almost simultaneously across the nation. A network of turnpikes underpins information at a distance, but it, more crucially, reinforces the power to act and move instantaneously, from afar. In questioning how Daniel Defoe envisions
this restructuring of the world, I discuss further the issue of copyright as a property in conjunction with the geographical development of road-making. As far as the South Seas are concerned, the issue of landscape presents disturbance to the voyaging self. Robinson is a foundational and prototypical “anomie” as Christopher Herbert calls it. The practical character shown by Robinson in an unknown island is a disguised form of fortification that Anne Finch reinforced in her retreat to the countryside. Robinson’s camouflage in the landscape is a provisional, ad hoc practice that improvises to contingences that exist within the unknown island. Rather than reproducing the dominant order of the British society, Robinson’s camouflage amplifies fortified or minor organizations of place that also operate as prison, thereby reconfiguring the island into a sort of affective geography.

When I discuss Robinson Crusoe in my second chapter, not only do I study the issue of copyright in conjunction with geographical development, but I also make the island of Robinson Crusoe a “way station” to the island of Tahiti in order to de-nominate the very spacing of utopian and fantastic imagination of geography. In my subsequent chapter 3 on Joseph Banks will be introduced as a singularized traveler, voyaging into the unknown in the South Seas. In analyzing Banks’s journals that he brings back from his circumnavigation around the world, I see Banks as a strange attractor of romance in the island of Tahiti; that is, that romance shapes and enables both fantastic and empirically organized accounts of the world encountered by Banks. My broader concern is to demonstrate that the history and geography of geography is a complex process in which events determined by local interactions coexist with projects informed by global conceptions about the task of geography and the aim of knowledge. And it is also a dramatic history of ruined ambitions, failed ideas, and accomplishments that do not
achieve the significance that they should have attained, which is the case of Banks back in the metropolitan city of London.

My study of Banks’s circumnavigation takes as its starting point the historical contingency of the spatial coordinate in mapping out the transit of Venus in order to settle down the national issue of cartographic longitude. In the second half of the eighteenth century, new state intervention in science, colonies, and the economy emerged out of the Britain. Riding this new tide into the ocean, an expedition left Plymouth harbor in August 1768 bound for the South Seas. Banks, together with James Cook, was following in the wake of Dampier and Byron. James Cook’s expedition traced the conjuncture of an old South Seas myth, the Terra Incognita and a modern investigation. Alexander Dalrymple had hoped that he might have secured the power, dominion, and sovereignty of Britain by locating the rumored southern continent. While this thirst for commercial advantages was not new, it was joined now to new kind of cultural curiosities. The Admiralty had agreed to carry the Royal Society to Tahiti, where a scientific observation of the transit of Venus would allow a calculation of the distance of the earth from the sun. Urbane voyagers, such as Joseph Banks, aimed to bring the riches of scientific measurement back with the scope of European knowledge, but the opportunities for “anomic” were manifold. Banks’s fellow voyager, James Cook, one of the finest hydrographers and cartographers the Royal Navy had employed, was widely assumed by the loss of his mind as he died in 1779.

The transition from the island of Tahiti back to the island of Britain could be described in a psychoanalytically inflected point of view. A certain psychological symptom of Crusoe’s compulsiveness is caused arguably by his refusal to listen to the
interdiction of his father in the name of *nom du perre.* It takes approximately twenty-eight years for Crusoe to work through such a psychoanalytical problem, and his island becomes a site where healing takes place. And Banks’s infatuation and transmigration in the South Seas reveals a state called “psychasthenia.” Defined as a disturbance in the relation between self and surrounding territory, *psychasthenia* is, as Celeste Olalquiaga explains it, a state in which the space defined by the coordinates of the organism’s own body is confused with represented space. Incapable of demarcating the limits of its own body, lost in the immense area that circumscribes it, the psychasthenic organism proceeds to abandon its own identity to embrace the space beyond. It does so by camouflaging itself into the milieu. To Banks, Tahiti is not what he thinks it is or where he thinks it is; that is, it is always already elsewhere in the sea of fantasy. This psychoanalytically inflected direction does not mean to say that the rest of my dissertation would be governed by the method of psychoanalytical reading, because chapter 4 aims to anticipate and exceed a psychoanalytically inflected spatial metaphor. Chapter 4 puts into operation a cultural poetics of the georgic and topographical and locodescriptive expression.

Chapter 4 deals with the issue of the elevated prospective view in the literary genres of the georgic and locodescriptive poetry. With regard to georgic and the whole question of genre, I raise it in the context of pastoral, the idealized literary representation of the countryside, and the sort of landscape painting that supported such an idealization. The invention of landscape painting coincides with the elaboration of the “view” as a space contained within a picture, but which opened up the setting to the world beyond. The discovery of an adequate technique for framing and defining depth signals the invention of landscape as a cultural space. My critical reading of the eighteenth-century
georgic and topographical poetry deconstructs and provincializes the delocalized cartographic eye in their poetic projects to give universalizing place to a specific locale. Rather than standing and surveying from on high, this new mapping eye is imagined as moving through the world, describing a prospect of society from a multiplicity of stations, stakes, and places. Arguing that the unfolding of events in a literary genre inevitably suggests (though not necessarily conjunctive) parallels to the unfolding of imperial events in the world, my reading of the British georgic and topographical poetry pays attention to the fact that the British topographical poems organizes the field of perception of an actual landscape to take into account the urban, architectural, agricultural, and political consequence of what has happened to the land. Geography serves, in this chapter, as a surface or plane of inflection between mapping and drawing, by which a drawing pen or the eye traces back what takes place on the surface of the earth. When the rapidity of movement and speed expands the prospect eye beyond a certain point of recognition, the traversing eye, like a mapping impulse, reemerges within the very world it pictures, displacing a human subject into an anonymous, liminal figure being destabilized on the move in the world.

Chapter 5 traces William Wordsworth as a traveler in the Salisbury Plain poems. When Wordsworth took to the road in 1793, looking for the enigmatic figures, such as the Female Vagrant and the leech gatherer, he sought for a poetical and political framework for these displaced people. In writing Salisbury Plain in his early work, Wordsworth’s sense of homelessness transformed the place of Salisbury into the sea, and he sailed on a gypsy caravan into the sea. The aim of this chapter is to develop further Michael Wiley’s Romantic Geography in terms of geographical imagination. With its
imagining of the possible utopia, Wordsworth becomes political, since he takes the
criticism of his own time to its highest point; that is, *Salisbury Plain* keeps the track of
the social accidents of the disintegration of the community.

The most important contribution of this chapter in my dissertation is to
demonstrate that Wordsworth induces the narrative technique of making what Freud calls
“an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to rational intervention” as the
practice of authorial intervention. Freud’s notion of “an artificial illness which is at every
point accessible to our [rationalized] intervention” provides the best example of the
master puppeteer motif that Wordsworth experiments with the transference of narration
in the revision of his early *Salisbury Plain* into *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. One
particular way to read Wordsworth’s knots of revision is to track the transference of
narration, the transference of speech from one interlocutor in *Salisbury Plain* to the other
in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. A traveler’s speech is replaced by the “artless” story of
the Female Vagrant, which is given to the Sailor in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. By
bringing home the vagrant woman’s story as a deliberate art and connecting it to his life,
the Sailor suggests the theme that he is representing the inability of escaping
“transference neurosis” when, under the stress of war, revolution, and social dislocation,
transference neurosis has become ordinary neurosis. My discussion of Wordsworth’s
*Salisbury Plain* poems show that Wordsworth argues, like Freud, that artificial illness is
as dangerous as real ones, and no less dangerous for the analyst as for the analysand. In
this chapter, I claim that *Salisbury Plain* poems represent all illnesses as artificial- that is,
in the vocabulary of the poem, as the result of a political cause which has the social
consequence of making an illness transferable from person to person, poem to reader. By
ultimately holding the Sailor responsible for what has happened to him, Wordsworth testifies to the fact that the Sailor accepts the social consequence of the crime that he has himself given rise to, without escaping into the artificial and unpredictable pre-texts that the vagrant woman’s narrative suggest in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. While valorizing Karen Swann’s thesis that the Spenserian repetition is uncanny, I suggest the theme of forgery in Salisbury Plain poems, not only because Wordsworth resembles all the vagrants, travelers, gypsies, who are opaque figures and inhabitants of another world, but also because it is almost impossible whether Wordsworth reiterates or represents the Female Vagrant in *Salisbury Plain* poems. What defines the extraordinary power of Wordsworth’s disguised repetition is a rehearsal of social accidents, the condensation of them one into another, with an echo which makes each the double the other.
Notes


3. Mary Shelley, Frankenstein (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). Frankenstein’s monster also possesses a map of the world and travels the newly developed turnpike road, the Holyhead Road that Thomas Telford, one of the finest civil engineers, built during the 1810s. Having “God-like” geographical information, he says, “It [Ruins of Empire] gave me an insight into the manners, governments, and religions of the different nations of the earth. I heard of the slothful Asiatics; of the stupendous genius and mental activity of the Grecians; of the wars and wonderful virtue of the early Romans – of their subsequent degeneration – of the decline of that might empire; of chivalry, Christianity, and kings” (115). While the monster’s political alignment is not as clear as Elizabeth who maintains that “the republican institutions of our country have produced simpler and happier manners than those which prevail in the great monarchies that surround it” (60), it looks certain that the monster inherits a certain “imperialistic” perspective into the so-called “static” Asia. In addition to the monster’s political alignment, it is more crucial to ask where relativity stops for the monster’s understanding of geography, for the monster imagines the issue of transhumanance from the margin of European society.

4. Robert Mayhew, Enlightenment Geography: the Political Languages of British Geography, 1650-1850 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). For more approachable information on John Ogilby’s “imaginary scrolls,” see Peter Truchi’s Maps of the Imagination: the Writer as Cartographer (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 2004). Truchi provides Ogilby’s intriguing biography to connect his map-making project with Daniel Defoe’s writing the topography of London: “In 1666, having lost virtually everything he owned in the Great fire of London, he began his last and most successful career . . . He began by helping to create a plan of London, the purpose of which was to establish property boundaries as they existed before the fire” (103).


10. For general understanding of the Mercator projection, refer to Turchi’s explanation: “In 1569, Gerhardus Mercator created map using ‘a new proportion and a new arrangement of the meridians with reference to the parallels.’ Mercator’s projection dominated popular cartography to the end of the twentieth century – to the extent that most of us grew up seeing a German globe-maker’s view of the world. . . His projection was tremendously important because it was so practical, so useful – for a particular purpose. It allowed sailors to lay a ruler on the map and plan a straight-line for their destination. On Mercator’s map, distortion increases as one moves farther from the equator (and the most important sailing routes for the sixteenth century) so that Greenland appears to be the size of South America – though in fact South America is nine times larger” (74-75). While Turchi writes “maps of the imagination” for the general reader, Alexander’s work charts out how Thomas Hariot is in transit from the ancient, citational geography into the modern, experimental geography. Given that re-citation, or quotation is, according to etymology, equivalent to setting in motion to transfer, deport, and export from one place to another, it follows that neither is the reassertion of empirical space simply a metaphorical re-composition of places, a superficial linguistic spatialization that makes space appear to matter theoretically as much as narrative. For the criticism of “narrative Euclideanism,” see John Law and Ruth Renschop’s essay titled “Resisting pictures: Representation, Distribution, and Ontological Politics” in Kevin Hetherington’s *Ideas of Difference* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997). They argue, “It is often suggested that the geometrical art of narrating the Euclidean world of the Italian Renaissance became, in one guise or another, the hegemonic set of framing assumptions for much depiction in the West through to the nineteenth century” (161). They further claim that contemporary Westerners have, to a large extent, been constituted as Euclidean subjects at least when they think about representation.


13. The word “subjectivize” is Alain Badiou’s term to describe “the emergence of an operator, consecutive to an interventional nomination. . . Subjectivation is interventional nomination from the standpoint of the situation, that is, the rule of the intra-situational effects of the supernumerary name’s entrance into circulation. . . Subjectivation, aporetic knot of a name in excess and an un-known operation, is what traces, in the situation, the becoming multiple of the true, starting from the non-existent point in which the event convokes the void and interposes itself between the void and itself” (393-394). See Badiou in his recent translated and published masterpiece titled *Being and Event* (New York: Continuum, 2005).

14. For the postmodern notion of singularity, see also Marcus Doel’s essay titled “Deconstruction on the Move: from the libidinal economy to liminal materialism,” *Environment and Planning A* (1994: vol. 26): 1041-1059: “Although the terms ‘difference,’ ‘otherness,’ ‘alterity,’ and ‘singularity’ may circulate as free sign-values, or free quotations, they are nevertheless appropriated specific theoretical-practices as exchange-values, use-values and referents. For, although the terms ‘difference,’ ‘otherness,’ ‘alterity,’ and ‘singularity’ appear to function as general equivalents which could serve as a store of value and a medium of exchange between a plethora of heterogeneous theoretical-practices, it has become increasingly apparent that each theoretical-practice considers the Other to be its Other. Hence the fact that the economies of the Same invest in difference in an attempt to appropriate it for themselves. Hence also the predestination of a quotation market to a succession of proprietary disputes and conflicts around its exploitation. Moreover, in the struggle of an economy of the Same to appropriate an-Other for itself through the forging of property rights (whether of use or reproduction), it necessarily misses the very otherness of the Other. For example, the current attempts to accommodate, assimilate, and appropriate the striae of class, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality within a generalized quotation market is a case in point. Such a capitalization of difference and otherness will not enable one to articulate the multiple dimensions of identity and domination insofar as each striation represents a particular investment in the quotation market” (1045).


23. Ibid., 41.

24. Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe* (New York: Norton & Company, 1994), 136. Robinson also calls his story a “whole collection of Wonders” (186). It is notable that Robinson’s sense of wonder is often times associated with “secret Hints, or pressings of my Mind” (127). Robinson construes his finding and description of fact as a “factish” process of realizing what his mind desires: for instance, self-realization of physical deliverance from the island to Britain by means of the knowledge and agency of Friday.


26. Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” in *Topoi* 7(1988): 93-98, 94. The example of such a fidelity operator for Badiou is St. Paul, who traced forward the truth of the Christ event after he “met” on the way to Damascus. For the further discussion of Badiou, refer to *St. Paul: the Foundation of Universalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). For the critique of Badiou’s understanding of Paul, see Giorgio Agamben’s *The Time that Remains* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2005). For a better balanced reading of Badiou, I suggest that one also read Badiou’s article titled “What is Love?” in *Sexuation*, ed. Renata Salecl
Reinhard also reinterprets Badiou’s schemes of love:

“H(umans) according to Woman and H according to Man” in his article titled “Toward a Political Theory of the Neighbor” in *The Neighbor*.

CHAPTER I

ANNE FINCH’S STRATEGIC RETREAT INTO THE COUNTRY HOUSE

Political retirement to a garden becomes standard practice in the eighteenth century with the Temples at Stowe, Bolingbroke and Dawley and Pitt at his garden in Burton Pynsent. Any patriot politician worth “his salt” speaks from the countryside, boasting of how his claim to power is based on his entire removal from the circuit of power. When Anne Finch (1661-1720), Countess of Winchilsea writes, “My hand delights to trace the unusual things, and it deviates from the common and known way,” she retraces the trajectory of her remarkable political retreat into the country house in Eastwell Park. Most importantly, Finch’s catastrophic “spatial retreat” reveals the socio-geographical restructuring of the times and its new nexus to Finch’s poetry. In this chapter, I explore the material conditions of Finch’s poetic writing in terms of geography.

There are contemporary currents in literary or aesthetic criticism of literature that intersect to some extent with my geographical approach, e.g., the so-called “Green” criticism. That is, my work on Finch engages critically in an on-going scholarly discussion of the recent study of the relationship between literature and environment in Green literary criticism propounded by Jonathan Bate and his acolytes, such as Karl Kroeber in eco-criticism, Laurence Coupe in Green studies, James McKusick in Green writing, and Richard Groves in Green imperialism. For instance, Nicolle Jordan’s approach to “environmental thought” in Finch’s “nature poetry” endorses Groves’s point of the “emergent conservationist sensibilities” of earl modern England,” thereby showing
how Finch mourns the loss of the old oaks to make the terras. Within the framework of Finch’s “environmental thinking,” according to Nicolle’s argument, it was in the final analysis an “ethos of stewardship” and “ecological well-being” that maintains an “estate’s and nation’s legitimacy and stability” in a post-Revolutionary era (255-260).

Pushing a little further the issue of how she envisions and experiences the country house in a situation where the manor itself did not devolve into her husband’s hands until the death of Charles Heneage, fourth Earl of Winchilsea, in the year of 1712, I want to suggest that this dispossessed situation provides for Finch an alternative way of imagining the conditions of the new poetic dispensation that allows her to reclaim the old country seat poetically. The objective of my critical engagement is, then, to suggest another way of investigating the links between poetry and geography, to create a different mode of analysis by which geography become inextricably linked with a plane of inflection between the private experience and the public writing. In so doing, my work on Finch aims to reveal a fresh, critical perspective on my proposed geography and its mediated experience.

To the extent that Finch’s poetry relies on an intersection of geography and its experience, Finch’s poetic career anticipates the Romantic poet, William Wordsworth’s poetic career. It is not simply that Wordsworth praises Finch as a “nature poet” in noting “some delightful pictures” in her poems, but it is rather that the political context of the time when Wordsworth as a “very angry young man” was working on his first version of Salisbury Plain was very similar to the political context of the time when Finch worked on “The Hurricance,” “The Spleen,” and “Absolute Petition for Retreat.” In these poems, Finch is acutely conscious of the geographical medium, for instance, the hurricane, by
means of which she is communicating her poetic thinking. As a result, it is hard to distinguish whether the hurricane’s movement is equivalent to a potential pro-Stuart upheaval or an actual manifestation of her mental turbulence. Finch’s undecidable poetic voice is then connected with the voice of the Female Vagrant in my last chapter. When Wordsworth took to the roads in the 1790s as a reluctant traveler, looking for the enigmatic figures, such as the Female Vagrant and the leech gatherer, Wordsworth sought for a poetical and political framework for these displaced people. To anticipate what will come a little later, the Female Vagrant has a geographical station, that is, the Stonehenge through which she has wrought certain motifs of a political tradition on hollow ground, such as the American war, the death of husband and children, the dispossession of home, family, income, and grievances of the poor. It is arguable whether the voice of the Female Vagrant reiterates or represents the voice of the male poet or, if not, the vernacular. Although there is an indelible mark of difference between the Female Vagrant and aristocratic Finch, the Female Vagrant and Finch come close by virtue of their social predicament in the common loss of their familiar places.

With the efficacy of the voice of the femme forte, Finch shows how vulnerable her political situation is when she retreats into the country house, and there she finds a loophole, or an aperture through which she can view new possibilities for her life and poetry. Why does a particularly architectural figure, such as a loophole or an aperture, appear in accounting for a political situation affecting Finch’s retreat into the Eastwell manor? “Is space political?” one can ask, echoing Fredric Jameson, who raised the same question elsewhere. The problematic of his questioning is germane to the discussion of Finch and the Female Vagrant alike, first of all, because their social position is altogether
incommensurable with the status quo of their situated society. That is, Jameson proposes an “allegorical” relationship between a work of art and its situated society:

The political rewriting or appropriation, then, the political use, must be also allegorical. . . I want to suggest that the political relationship of works of art to the societies they reside in can be determined according to the difference between replication (reproduction of the logic of that society) and opposition (the attempt to establish the elements of a Utopian space radically different from the [previous or existing] one. At their extremes, both these stances raise some questions: for instance, can even the most undistinguished work still altogether replicate or reproduce the hegemonic spatial logic?

The issue of whether the Female Vagrant’s voice reiterates (that is, replicates) or represents the poet’s voice is related to Wordsworth’s allegorical sense of his own society. The poet’s incommensurability with his or her own political ground leads, then, to Finch’s allegorical relation to the country house in that she refuses to “underscore and reinforce whatever division of labor is active in the social order in question” (Jameson). Interiority and inferiority was a social construct marked on the newly constituted body of the feminine in the eighteenth-century Britain. The idea of supposedly ideal woman emerged within the institutions of domesticity established by the construction of the patriarchal household. The house simultaneously expresses the individuals, locking them into spatial practices that define and reproduce the body. The exterior of the house serves as a male mask displaying the man’s status to the world. As the unified self, protected by a seamless façade, the exterior is masculine. A man’s house and estate stands in his place as an extension of his propriety. On the other hand, the interior of the house is the scene of reproduction and femininity. The wife merely maintains this very hegemonic spatial order she is placed in. The division of gender topography defines two disparate but interrelated positions represented in the spatial order that Jameson explains.
Finch’s maintenance and management of the country house anticipates and exceeds the so-called “functionalistic” division of architecture into a set of feminine/private/interior and masculine/public/exterior. With reference to Nancy Armstrong, Finch’s life and her poetic writing in “the country house that is not the country house” could make it possible for “competing interest groups to ignore their economic origins and coalesce into a single domestic ideal.” Although life at Eastwell is a kind of retirement, Finch, nevertheless, maintains links to a wider literary and social world in many channels such as through poetic writing, through correspondence and visits with her former friends at court, through friendship with the three generations of Thynnes of Longleat and her Kent neighbor, Catherine Cavendish, countess of Thanet as well as Thanet’s daughters and through literary exchanges with Pope, Swift, John Gay, and Nicholas Rowe. In this sense, the country house provides for Finch the poetic site of an alternative of oppositional (gender) politics, one at odds politically and poetically with the dominant division of both the country life and role of woman in early Augustan period.

When gender relations play a subtle but pronounced role in Finch’s poetry, I argue that Finch’s “metis architectural practice” serves as a critical mode of converting her political disgrace into new possibilities for her poetical and political expression. This point will be pursued further in accounting for Defoe’s novel character Robinson’s “metis” practice in the colonial landscape in my chapter 2. Six years after Finch published her poetry collection of Miscellany Poems, Defoe published a male version of the isolated rural society in a novel form of writing Robinson Crusoe. While Finch retreats “allegorically” into the countryside on a chorographic scale, Robinson enters into
geographical digression into the South Seas as a development often identified with the
coterminous rise of romance. With the metis practice Robinson converts an unmanned
island into a surrogate home. In so doing, however, he builds his own habitat, the country
manor most defensively with spikes and other sharp obstructions. As Defoe noted in The
Complete Gentlemen, “We find the Moderns begin to gain upon the Ancients extremely,
not least because of improvements in mathematics, fortification, encampments,
entrenchings, military discipline, besieging and defensing town, in all of which the
knowledge and experience of the present age is infinitely beyond what ever went before
them” (The Spectator 25 June 1712). The two modern figures, Finch and Defoe, take
advantage of immediate circumstances in order to seize the initiative in articulating their
own spatial experience of the early eighteenth-century British society.

My work on Finch, then, charts a new territory to reveal the militarized
infrastructure of feminine literary production. In the first half of the eighteenth century, a
garden was converted into a fort. The impending anxiety of civil war that loomed over
England, Scotland, and Ireland as well as the continuing wars that Britain waged in
Europe and its colonies contributed to militarizing the landscape and fortifying gardens.
As Robert Williams points out, gardens were occasionally constructed in or afterwards
embellished with, a defensible format; that is, the British garden was transformed by the
science of fortification of the times into a war machine represented by seize architecture.
Seize architecture was equipped with its particular loopholes and traces designed to
inflect and survey all the other sites of the landscape. And the restructuring of ruins
designed in constructing seize architecture defends potential ruins caused by massive
attacks and artilleries. Finch camouflages herself in this fortified landscape and converts
her “ruined” political life into a poetic engagement in the high politics of the late Stuart era.

After the “bloodless revolution” of 1688, the Catholic Finches, with other so-called “non-jurors,” refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Protestant King William III, and Anne Finch lost her position as one of Mary Modena’s maids of Honor at the Stuart court. While the burden of her political loyalties forced Finch to retreat spatially from the court to the provincial Eastwell Manor, a country house in Kent, her retreat does not follow the model of political banishment into shade. Her retreat into the country house is not simply a personal issue but profoundly affected by the high politics of the late Stuart era. As a strategically political and poetical activity, her retreat is, I argue, indissolubly related to her poetic predicament and, by extension, the feminine means of literary production. Finch makes of her private and individual retreat a political and poetic artifact with a considerable degree of influence and power over the very public world from which it appears to be withdrawn. Sarah Churchill, Duchess of Marlborough was widely considered to at most powerful woman in the early eighteenth-century England, and yet the focus of my argument is that the spatial retreat provides the conditions of dehiscence as spacing and swerving, dispersal and digression. When Finch retreats as a political figure to the country house, her country house in Eastwell Park provides for her a loophole, or an aperture to inflect and survey the political and literary terrains of the British history, thus transforming her backward glance into a fortified vision of the absent Stuart politics and also a forward vision of the print culture in the eighteenth century.
Recently, critics have called attention to Finch as a significant participant in the political debates as regards the Glorious Revolution and its aftermath. Arboreal imagery in Finch’s representations of retreat, shade, and darkness carries pronounced political and poetical implication. To understand the occasion of shade, we need consider that being in shade has a specific reference to being out of favor at court. In retrospect, Finch offers an autobiographical reference to Mary’s and the court’s favor in an elegy following Mary’s death in 1718, “On the Death of the Queen:”

The Sovereign Mistress of my vanquish’d mind  
Who now survive but to attend her hearse  
With dutious tribute of recording verse  
In which may truth with energy be found  
And soft as her compassion be the sound  
Bles’t were the hours when thro’ attendance due  
Her numerous charms were present to my view  
When lowly to her radiant eyes I bowed  
Suns to my sight but Suns without a cloud  
Towards me their beneficial aspect turn’d  
Impressed my duty (57).

She compares, metaphorically, the court to “suns without a cloud” as if to reenact Hamlet’s line “I am too much in the sun.” Another point to make of these lines is that, like such near contemporary royal women writers as Aphra Behn, Margaret Cavendish, and Mary Astell, Finch identifies herself with the Queen as an exemplum of sovereignty, who “speaks with conscious sense / Of Real Worth and matchless excellence” (99-100). In this regard, the heliotrope of the Queen as another Sun and not the Moon reinforces the commonality, particularly, with Astell – she claims that women are inferior to men not by nature but by default, that is, due to the lack of education. As John Mallinson points out, Finch also attributes the predicament of women not by nature – “a weak or wounded brain” but to faulty education (39). In terms of education, however, the court provided
Finch with a favorable atmosphere that must have sharpened her intellectual and artistic sensibilities. Her “duty” as a maid of Honor was, McGovern remarks, thrust into an exciting environment that included many of the most prominent literary figures called “the Courtly Wits” (22). The “heliotropic” court “nurtured” Finch with classical and canonical education; her literary reputation, together with her loyalty, was bound to blossom as time unfolds. Until her marriage to Heneage Finch in 1648, she lived at court with Mary of Modena and her English and Italian waiting women. The maids of Honor performed reading, singing, and painting in court masques. Importance for Finch’s education at court, they were, Carol Barash remarks, schooled both in French and Italian translations of the classical texts, and they were urged to make their own English translations of these works (262).

The “bloodless revolution” of 1688 drastically affected the Finches’ lives. As Gentleman of the Bedchamber to the Duke of York, Finch’s husband refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Protestant King William III. He was arrested while trying to follow the fallen James II but released eventually. Thereafter the Finches retired from London and the Court. They were deprived of their royal privileges at Court. As Finch remarks, she finds herself thrown away, “Blasted by a storm of Fate, / Felt thro’ all British state.” Her “feeling” of personal and political deprivation is a sensitive register of an uncertain and unstable British history. Finch’s “felt thought” – by which Raymond Williams means unpleasurable sensations of “disturbance, blockage, tension, emotional trouble” (Politics and Letters 167) affects and redefines Finch’s sense of the present, that is, “this, here, and now” of the present British state. By drawing on Williams’ notion of
“feeling,” what I would like to argue is that Finch’s personal mode of feeling and, by extension, affect engages poetically in the historically unstable present.

As a poetic site of engagement with her present situation, a Pindaric mode of writing explores a “perplexing Form” that can “crowd with boding dreams the melancholy Head” (13) and wreaks havoc with the senses.

In the course of the poem, Finch exploits the spleen’s capacity for distortion, its “fond Delusions” and “fantastic” visions. Writing in the irregular Pindaric mode, her self-consciousness is implicated and enveloped in the social field; that is, Finch explores the possibility that certain modes of affect pre/conditions any individual’s subject’s sense of history. Charles Hinnant elaborates the significance of a splenetic mode of poetic enunciation as follows:

> It is significant that the I does not appear in “The Spleen” until halfway. For a poet as self-conscious as Finch, this delay is a deliberate decision, expressive not only of a particular sense of self but of the particular conditions under the speaking subject should be established. The I of Finch’s poems often defines itself in opposition to an implicit they – just as the self it constructs is defined by its opposition to the world (222).

Before I discuss the significance of the line “My hand delights to trace unusual Things” in terms of a “particular condition” out of which Finch emerges, that is, differential gender articulation, it is worth amplifying the fact that Finch is acutely
conscious of the genre in which she is working. For I contend that the hallmark of Finch’s poetry is a critical mode of converting address, while noting the Latin etymology of the word “vert” as change and transformation. Finch converts the hurricane of 1703 into another Pindaric mode of address “Upon the Hurricane in November 1703, referring to this Text in Psalm 148 ver. 8 Winds and Storms fulfilling his Word.” As the title shows, this poem stages an encounter between divine will and human institutional system.

Throughout the Land, unlimited you flew,
Not sought, as heretofore, with Friendly Aid
Only, new motion to bestow
Upon sluggish Vapors, bred below
Condensing into Mists, and melancholy Shade
No more such gentle Methods you pursue,
But marching now in terrible Array (3-9)

Finch surveys a public world where nothing remains in place from the heaven-revealing storm of 1703. “The Earth agen one general Scene appears; / No regular distinction now,
/ Betwixt the Grounds for Pasture, or the Plough, / The Face of Nature wears” (194-7).

The figure of the hurricane through the poem indicates the motions of sliding, bending, varying, twisting, undermining, loosening, yielding, and resigning; the figure works, Hinnant argues, to establish a continuity of reference to the winds and to divine power that moves- yet is distinguished from – them. In other words, the author figure takes a third agency by which her critical stance bears witness to the fact that she does not belong to the party agendas represented by Tory and Whig. “Nor WHIG, nor TORY now the rash Contender calls” (172). And she is also located at an equal distance both from the deists’ rational system that embodies divine purposes and from Hobbesian “tertium super partes,” primarily concentrated in the hands of the brutish military. “Free as the Men, who wild Confusion love, / And lawless Liberty approve, / Their Fellow-Brutes pursue
their way, / To their own Loss, and disadvantage stray” (198-201). I suggest that the author’s position is supplementary, since Finch does not belong to either party or two competing philosophies of nature; rather she never ceases to circulate throughout, problematize, and intervene in the nation’s dilemma.

When now, too soon the dark Event
Shews what that faded planet meant;
Whilst more the liquid Empire undergoes,
More she resigns of her entrusted Shores,
The Wealth, the Strength, the Pride of diff’rent Shores
In one Devoted, one Recorded Night,
Than Years had known destroy’d by generous Fight
Or Privateering Foes (259-266).

It becomes clear that the hurricane brings forth a challenge to the state of things in the Britain of 1703, questioning the very basis on which the nation’s structures - “wealth,” “strength,” and “pride” - stand.

From a political perspective, Hinnant argues, what is significant about “Upon the Hurricane” is that Finch resists the temptation to use the hurricane of 1703 as a pretext for framing a judgment upon the events of the previous years. What confirms this poem as a poem of public significance is rather its critical insight into the political implications of this precipitous encounter between divine power and British institutional system.

O Wells! Thy Bishop’s Mansion we lament,
So tragical the Fall, so dire th’Event!
But let no daring Thought presume
To point a Cause for that oppressive Doom.
Yet strictly pious Ken! Had’st Thou been there,
This Fate, we think, had not become thy Share (91-6).

Finch identifies herself with Bishop Thomas Ken, another non-juror who did not adapt to the new dispensation. The fact that his replacement Bishop Kidder was crushed to death
with his lady in his palace allows Finch to trace the political changes of Church and Court that affected her life directly. Though Finch is cautious in attributing the dismantling of Bishop’s mansion to any simple cause, she is, nevertheless, addressing a force that not only refuses to identify itself with party agendas but also, in fact, produces her mental crisis from political banishment. This does not mean to say that the hurricane’s action is equivalent to a political upheaval. Rather, Finch’s Pindaric poem “Upon the Hurricane” exceeds the gendered usage of “the loose and unequal lines of the Pindaric ode so fashionable with women” (Perry 127) of the early eighteenth century. Her poetic activity engages itself in the relationship between the public and private political spheres, emphasizing the complicated place of the female subject in the modern construction of politics and gender (Barash 261).

Unlike the roots of many “trees … Master’d soon and soon o’erthrown” in the hurricane which prevails across the British Isles in 1703, her “root” remains firm. “A helpless vine is found, / Unsupported on the Ground, / Careless all the Branches spread, / Subject to each haughty Tread, / Bearing neither leaves, nor Fruit, / Living only in the Root” (153-158). The figure of a helpless vine is an arboreal image for a “weaker sex,” an image of a feminine parasite. The under-presence of her root, however, cuts across a variety of verse genres; her retreat is not an act of passive resignation into shade, darkness, death, or oblivion, but the process of transforming her political predicament into an active poetic activity. “Whilst for my self, like Solitary Men, / Devoted only to the Pen / I but a Safe Retreat admist thee crave / Below the Ambitious World, and just above my Grave” (177-80). She asks for a “Safe Retreat,” Barash reads, a place where she will have the same access to poetic language as politically oppositional male poets
(267). She goes further than this by inverting the masculine identification of light, clearing, and, by extension, Enlightenment. As Ruth Salvaggio points out, she opens man’s systems of light into the space of “the other” (106). While adding the Latin word *umbra* to Salvaggio’s discussion of “the other,” I would like to suggest that Finch’s representation of shade is a “spectral,” “haunted,” “other,” or “nether” world of the feminine. The representation of shade, where shade is always already understood as pastoral, is used to produce an other feminine subject and Finch as representative of a new femininity. “Peace and Rest” are, Finch claims, “under Ground” (234). To the extent to which Finch retreats into a “subterranean Place,” shade “transports” her into a poetic vantage point where “all Heaven shall be survey’d / From those windings and that Shade” (293-4). We might say that Finch invents the poetic shade, like a resource of “spiritual” inscription to provide a release for the poetic psyche. Calling attention to “the positive energies” of shade, Salvaggio argues that she seek them in the feminist potential for a writing that exceeds the dualistic oppositions fundamental to systematic thought” (106) on gender.

Finch articulates radically differential gender relations. They are radical, because her address of gender relations has the possibility of modifying and transforming the line of political debates. I endorse Rachel Weil’s claim that views of gender do not exist as a codified, coherent entity in the Stuart England. If, as Weil suggests, politics is an arena in which ideas about gender, or relevant to the social construction of gender, are shaped and transformed (4), poetical activity is by default a political practice to subvert and destabilize gender relations. When Finch says, “Man of Place and Power;” and yet
“Woman of Abjection,” her interest in gender relations intersects with Astell, another “radical” Anglican woman writer.

Men are possessed of all places of power, trust and profit, they make laws and exercise the Magistry, not only the sharpest Sword, but even all the Swords and Blunderbusses are theirs, which by the Strongest Logic in the world, give them the best title to everything they please to claim as their Prerogative. … Our fathers have all along both Taught and Practised Superiority over the weaker sex, and consequently Women are by nature inferior to Men (Astell 29).

While it is uncertain whether Astell and Finch knew each other, they share the same structure of feeling, when Finch says, “the dull manage of a servile house / is held by some our outmost art and use” (“The Introduction” 19–21). As Perry points out, if Mary Astell and the countess of Winchilsea knew each other, no clue of the acquaintance remains; but they were both borne along on the same historical current (118). Their politics were very similar; that is, both were high-church Tories and non-jurors living in similar social milieu.

Finch calls further into gendered question the matter of writing:

Did I, my lines intend for public view,
How many censures, would their faults pursue,
Some would, because such words they do affect,
Cry they’re insipid, empty, incorrect,
… Alas, a woman that attempts the pen
Such an intruder on the rights of men (Introduction 1-10)

She testifies to the fact that a woman who writes and especially a poet who writes as a woman would perform an act of “transgression,” insofar as writing is invoked as a kind of public property. If she speaks from a position of authority, the act would be stigmatized as a form of crime. At this juncture, Finch’s poetical lines exemplify an act of political struggle for the new social ties among women; her poems not only “represent”
and record the lived experience as a woman, but they also serve, more crucially, as practices to redefine and renegotiate the political line of public and private distinction.

Finch’s withdrawal grounds her poetic turn from the public to private world as authoritatively female. Finch continues to say in her Introduction, “She fights, she wins, she triumphs with a song, / Devout, majestic, for the subject fit, / And far above her arms, exalts her wit; / Then, to the peaceful, shady palm withdraws, / And rules the rescued nation, with her laws” (46-50). Finch’s predicament does not simply address “the constraint of being a woman” as a surviving stratagem as an eccentric and/ or versifying poet. Her strategy of working from an abject predicament takes a supplementary turn of the screw with regard to private and public dichotomy; that is, her writing as a “private” woman or her writing of women’s privacy disrupts and subverts the “standard” hierarchy between private interiority and public exteriority.

Finch’s writing inscribes her retreat as the possibility of rupture, the divergence from the natural division between private and public. Finch’s writing, she claims, “delights to trace unusual things, / And deviates from the known and common way.” One way to appreciate Finch’s claim is to see a pitfall of the conceptual predicament of “male discourse and systems” (Salvaggio 106). The term predicament has also been synonymous with category, particularly as it denotes the basic system of classifications that all knowledge can be compartmentalized. Insofar as male discourse and systems dreams of dominion over the physical organization of space, especially the ordering of the political distinction of interiority and exteriority, femininity and masculinity, they cannot but perpetrate the violence of categorical concepts. In its concretization of inclusion and exclusion, architecture, at this conjunction, establishes the groundwork for
society’s so-called policing practices of the reductive (re) production of stable distinction between femininity and masculinity. Finch’s act of retreat can’t be considered as a passive allocation and distribution to the naturalized conceptual predicament of differentiation. If her writing “traces the unusual things and it deviates the known and common way,” it is an activity to testify to the management and organization of space in the early eighteenth century. The failure to consider the management of space means, both for Finch and for feminists, to remain still in the conceptual predicament (category) of female abjection.

It is illuminating that Finch redefines private abjection in a critical mode. In her “To the Nightingale,” she says:

Poets as thou were born,
   Pleasing best when unconfined,
   When to please is least designed,
   Soothing but their cares to rest.
Cares do still their thoughts molest,
   And still th’ unhappy poet’s breast,
Like thine, when best he sings, is placed against a thorn (7-13).

It is arguable whether Finch records the lived experience of abjection or whether her poetic language evokes as the eighteenth-century “common way” of abject feeling. But the point that I would hope to make is that she redefines the division between natural and abject, open and confined, natural authority and labored molestation. In so doing, she rethinks and re-forms her abject retreat as a poetic and political practice to intervene in a naturalized labor of division and a stabilized division of labor, i.e., the political line of gender relations. “Thus we poets that have speech, / Unlike what thy forests teach, / If a fluent vein be shown / That’s transcendent to our own, / Criticise, reform, or preach, / Or censure what we cannot reach” (30-35). Finch reconfigures the relationship between the
public and private spheres in reinventing the structure of feminine feeling. And Finch’s
efficacy lies, as Carol Barash claims, in the fact that Finch generates a web of metaphors – solitude, inwardness, what Julia Kristeva calls abjection – that would become, over the
course of the eighteenth century, figures both of women’s emotions and the power of
masculine poetic language (261). She makes of her private retreat a poetical and poetical
artifact with a considerable degree of influence and power over the public world from
which she appears to be withdrawn.

Where the public sphere is defined as a space of institutions and practices, Finch’s
retreat into her provincial country house, Eastwell Manor, is, one could argue, a private
and individual withdrawal from the public sphere. For the principles of the public sphere
involves an open discussion of some issues and concerns of the public good. Furthermore,
the public sphere consists of the organs of information and political debate such as
newspapers and journals, as well as institutions of political discussion such as political
clubs, literary salons, public assemblies, and coffee houses. What I argue is not whether
Finch was regarded as a powerful and influential woman. I attempt, rather, to elucidate,
first, how she converts her predicament of political defeat into poetry; second, how the
feminine means of communication becomes the means of feminine literary production;
and, last but not the least, how feminine literary production engages itself in destabilizing
the private and public division.

While endorsing Barash’s claim that Finch follows the tradition of the *femme
forte*, I understand that her retreat serves as a loophole as in fortification. I pay attention
to Robert Williams’s research that the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century
was “a time when the science of fortification at its zenith” (50). Just as a loophole in
fortification functions as an aperture to inflect and survey all other sites of the field, Finch’s retreat into Eastwell Manor serves as a channel to which everything goes and through which the entire real historical process of the outside world- for instance, the reconstruction of the country house and the massive militarization of landscape- envelops. In her poem “The House of Socrates,” for instance, Finch dubs this period as an “over-building age:” that is, the period of the country house boom and the massive mock militarization of landscape.

The country house in the eighteenth century was an architectural practice to portray identity against the backdrops of household, estate, and state. As John Summerson points out, the building of the country house in England was assuming a new significance in the minds of those who were able to build them – a national, even a patriotic significance (81). The architecture of the country house was a vehicle of expressing political and social allegiance to the state as well as in the family estate. The Eastwell Manor “performs” its architectural character in Jacobite fashion. Finch’s settling in Eastwell Park is, in this regard, a process of converting her political failure into poetry, which has political ramifications. Eastwell Park is sublimated into what she calls “Poetry’s native of the Place,” that is, a navel of her poetry:

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Whilst Eastwell Park does each soft gale invite,
There let them meet and revel in delight,
Amidst the silver beeches spread their wings
Where ev’ry birds as in Arcadia sings
........................................

And Poetry’s a native of the place.
Those Eastwell hills let ev’ry breeze renew,
Which from adjoining seats kind neighbours view;
Please’d in the artfull gardens which they boast (88-104).
```
As the title of another poem, “Upon Lord Winchelsea *Converting* the Mount into a Terras,” illuminates, Finch converts her retreat into a poetical artifact much in the same way that Lord Winchelsea, her husband’s nephew, converts the mount into an architectural artifact, i.e., a terras. Finch starts her poem by arguing that Eastwell Manor conceals all the beauties of the park, and that it is an error of the old to remove the pivotal point of the beauty of the landscape. However, just as the Roman Caesar came, saw, and won the battle, the old ancestor refined a bare mount into a civilized lineament. Rugged, striated lines of the natural mount are changed now into a smooth view-sight, just as the mount makes way for a human design to build up architecture. Rather than eulogizing the old ancestor, Finch asks why there could be no vision without the division of labor. While man’s labor produces the glory of the seat from the same natural ground, woman is alienated from the landscape. At this conjuncture, Finch laments the loss of the oak tree: “When untimely fate / Sadly prescribed it a too early date, / The heavy tidings cause a general grief, / And all combine to bring a swift relief. / Some plead, some pray, some counsel, some dispute; / Alas in vain, where power is absolute” (29-34). Serving as a counterpoint, this passage evokes the violence of absolute paternal power in order to mention a catastrophic event of cutting down the oak tree. She goes further in saying that absolute power displaces communal speech acts into whispers and unspeakable groans. While it is very hard impossible to say that she recalls the traumatic memory of the loss of her favor, trees are sentenced to death as if they were the faithful ones in their unwavering pledge of loyalty to the King. It is certain, however, that the old ancestor performs his absolute power and authority over her imagined affiliations with laborers. She is reenacting what the “bloodless” Revolution has caused to her life, and in so doing,
she exceeds the cultural function that she is made to internalize, which is, household management. Instead of merely using a discourse on the moral stewardship, Finch’s poetic description creates the conditions of imagining stewardship and proprietorship for the future reader. She declares a higher aim to forge the new landscape in the poetic space of authorial regulation and management:

The new wrought gardens give a new delight  
Where every fault that in the old was found  
Is mended, in the well disposed ground.  
Such are th’effects, when wine, nor loose delighs  
Devour the day, nor waste the thoughtless nights,  
But generous arts, the studious hours engage,  
To bless the present, and succeeding age.  
Oh, may Eastwell still with their aid increase,  
Plenty surround her, and within be peace.  
Still may her temperate air his health maintain,  
From whom she does such strength and beauty gain.  
Flourish her trees, and may the verdant grass  
Again prevail, where late the plough did pass:  
Still may she boast a kind and fruitful soil,  
And may someone with admiration filled  
In just applauses and in numbers skilled,  
Not with more zeal but more poetic heat,  
Throughly adorn bravely what we relate (89-96).

The signification of the “wrought garden” has a double aspect, first of all, in relation to language, which creates the poetic conditions of cultural engagement in the discourse of moral stewardship, and also in relation to its referents, i.e., the loss of the old oak trees and the new terras. That is, Finch’s poetic intervention in forging the landscape is deconstructing the old while establishing the new. On the one hand, Finch anticipates and exceeds the country-house poem convention in that she eulogizes an owner of the estate while correcting the folly and violence of the old ancestor. When Finch identifies herself with the new owner, on the other hand, she, as Nicolle argues, traverses an ongoing
discourse on the management of an estate. Finch looks to engage ideologically in the prevailing discourse of moral proprietorship, but I argue that her poetic writing does more than an ideological engagement, for she is layering up the strata for enacting power in poetry; that is, her ancestor’s visibly enacted power in cutting down the oak trees provides for Finch an invisibly enacted power in educating a “futuristic” cultural logic of how to “read” the newly wrought garden. She aims to elevate the Jamesonian sense of political allegory to the higher cultural logic of poetic regulation. Even though she looks like a slip, or a displaced object for grafting onto the country house, her poetry enables her to be the poet of dehiscence as the instance of spacing and swerving, dispersal and digression.

The country house also supplies Finch with a medium of poetry; and it serves, more significantly, as the material infrastructure of new social and political ties among her female friends. Finch enjoyed recognition and friendship from other female friends through what McGovern describes as “an informal, loosely structured type of network” (120). “To a Friend,” Finch writes, “in Praise of the Invention of Writing Letters.” “The Wings of Love were …/ … shaped into a Pen, / To send in Paper-sheets, From Town to Town, / Words smooth were they, and softer than his Down. / … And hopt, from Bough to Bough, supported by the Wind” (11-16). The image of the letter as anima, the Latin word meaning breath, breeze, and spirit (as in the Latin word pneuma), shows that the author figure becomes a mode of address like her breath moving everywhere with the breeze. “That the dark Pow’rs of distance cou’d subdue, / And make me See, as well as Talk to you; / That tedious Miles, nor Tracks of Air might prove / Bars to my sight, and shadows to my love” (33-36). Like what Kristeva calls the semiotic mode of
signification, her mode of correspondence functions to cut cross the symbolic and
masculine “bars” of communication, that is, the public postal services to censure the
letter. As “the Charms / That under secret Seals in Ambush lie,” her letter
correspondences extends in the rhezomatic conjunction, “and … and … and …,” thereby
securing her “the fond Engagements and the Ties” (An Epistle to Madam Deshouliers 29)
among her female friends. The similarly invested structure of feminine feeling goes even
further, anticipating the future control of an emerging British printing culture.

Till time, which hastily advances,
And gives to all new turns and chances,

New Augustean days revive,
When wit shall please, and poets thrive.
Till when, let those converse in private,
Who taste what others don’t arrive at;
Yielding that Mammonists surpass us,
And let the Bank our-swell Parnassus (A Tale of the Miser and the Poet, 93-103)

The private means of communication becomes the feminine means of literary production.

I think that the poem titled “A Description of One of the Pieces of Tapestry at
Longleat” is a nice place to consummate my discussion of Anne Finch, since Finch’s
poetic “voice” comes from a particular “shuttle” of writing poetry. As Geoffrey Hartman
suggests, the shuttle represents the weaver’s instrument by which the synectoche
substituting part for the whole, but it also contains a metonymy which names the
productive cause instead of the product (338). Finch’s address to Raphael’s tapestry
cartoon has been transferred along a continuous series of adjacent metonymical parts
from Sergius Paulus (the proconsul of Asia), through St. Paul, Elymas (the sorcerer who
was struck blind by St. Paul), Lictors, Barnabas, to Henry Theanor. The productive cause
could be attributed to Finch’s practice of representation. I argue that Finch’s practice of representation is an occasion of what Anne Bergren calls the metis practice. She elaborates as follows:

Metis works by continual shape-shifting, turning the morpe of defeat into victory’s tool. Its method includes the trick or trap (dolos) … and the ability to seize the opportunity (kairos). Each of these exploits the essential forms of metis, the “turning” (tropos) that binds opposites, manifest in the reversal and the circle, in weaving, twisting, and knotting, and in every joint (italics added 8).

Bergren’s metis practice intersects with Finch’s mode of converting her predicament into a strategically poetic and political activity. Her mode of address is conversing with her female friends; that is, she not only establishes the scene of collaborative feminine writing, but also establishes her female friends as the surrogate writers and readers.

Thus Tapestry of old, the Walls adorn’d
Ere noblest Dames the artful Shuttle scorn’d:
Arachne, then, with Pallas did contest,

But all the Fame, that from the Field was brought,
Employ’d the Loom, where the kind Consort wrought:
Whilst sharing in the Toil, she shar’d the Fame,
And with the Heroes mixt her interwoven Name (1-9).

Finch identifies herself with Ovid’s Arachne who equips herself with a transformative force of tapestry; and she also envisions tapestry as feminine. “All Arts are by the Men engross’d / And Our few talents unimprov’d or cross’d” (12-13) But Finch attempts to shatter and subvert the very opposition of gender relations between feminine inferiority and masculine superiority. For this, she engages herself as if in rhetorical competition. “My burden’d Thoughts, which labour for a Vent, / Urge me t’ explain in Verse, what by each Face is meant” (22-23). Finch seeks for the (productive) cause “why Nature acts not
still by Natures Laws” or “why all Illumination quench’d or veil’d” in Raphael’s tapestry cartoon. In other words, Finch is searching for the cause that gains its materiality in the effects, i.e., “an absent cause” immanent in the structure of effects – “Deprivation,” “the Negatives of life,” “One important Want,” uneven gender topography, or her political predicament.

But to thy Portrait, Elymas we come
Whose Blindness almost strikes the Poet dumb;
And whilst She vainly to Describe thee seeks,
The Pen but traces, where the Pencil speaks.
Of Darkness to be felt, our Scriptures write
Thro’ all thy Frame such Stupefaction reigns,
As Night it self were sunk into thy Veins:
Not by the Eyes alone thy Loss we find,
Each Lineament helps to proclaim thee Blind.
An artful dimness far diffus’d we grant,
And failing seem all Parts through One important want (66-79)

Insofar as Elymas’s blindness deprives her of her speech and voice, Elymas is, paradoxically, accountable for the poet’s agency. Finch chooses, Salvaggio argues, to write poetic lines figured through weaving to take her into that space of displacement and absence (115-116), even though she retains a stigmatized mark of as “illegitimate” a poet as Elymas is a false prophet called Bar-Jesus (a pseudo-Christ). She does this in order to engage in the metis practice of turning her predicament into strategically political verse. Furthermore, Finch’s productive cause is overdetermined, because the poet’s being dumb is, metonymically speaking, caused by the “traumatic” event of the bloodless revolution of 1688. Finch’s poetic consciousness traces its cause retrospectively and casts it forward in her poems; the result is the future anticipation of control and its converting force of address. The future anticipation of control implies a critical stance from which Finch continues to engage politically and poetically with the displaced Stuarts in their absence.
The “metis” practice reconfigures the feminine means of communication as the means of feminine literary production. In this conjunction, the country house supplies Finch with an infrastructure of the new social ties and alliances. Anne Finch exerts much more influence and power over the public sphere from which she appears to be withdrawn than those who simply occupy that world. Finch transports, as the semiotic vessel, beyond the private sphere.

Political retirement to a garden becomes standard practice in the eighteenth century with the Temples at Stowe, Bolingbroke and Dawley and Pitt at his garden in Burton Pynsent. Any patriot politician worth his salt speaks from the countryside, boasting of how his claim to power is based on his entire removal from the circuit of power. Anne Finch’s retreat into the country house in Eastwell Park says the opposite. While showing how gender relations play a subtle but pronounced role in architecture, this chapter aims to re-conceptualize the infrastructure of the feminine literary production and to argue that the country house is the medium and at the same time the material condition of her poetical writing. If architecture wishes to dissent from the political status quo, how would it go about practicing this opposition? This chapter suggests Anne Finch’s architecture practice of *metis* as a critical mode of converting her political disgrace into new possibilities for her poetical and political expression. Anne Finch’s position is very close to the position that William Wordsworth takes in regard to the Female Vagrant’s social predicament.
CHAPTER II

ROBINSON CRUSOE AND COUNTER-SPACES OF IMAGINATION

In this chapter, I consider both the development and the discourse of the “turnpike,” to see the turnpike system as the case of the modern production of space in Britain and to suggest the need for a formative interpretation of its occurrences within the British literature. By suggesting a theoretical convergence of three possible readings of the turnpike, this chapter investigates the era of Daniel Defoe’s life and experience in order to analyze Robinson Crusoe as a champion of the author cast away in a foreign locale and his alternative imagination of claiming the ownership of property. As Jonathan Lamb suggests, Crusoe’s voyaging represents human activity in the Lockean state nature, that is, the condition where rational self-preservation is played out. A series of concatenated events recurs throughout Crusoe’s voyage: Crusoe’s identity is unsettled; he is cast away in an unmanned island; the land is not occupied; and Crusoe makes the island his own by means of his uncomfortable and almost obsessive activities of occupying, cultivating, using, and appropriating every part of the island. I argue that Crusoe’s recursive activity testifies, paradoxically, to the imperfection of the Lockean paradigm of the State of Nature in a remote and foreign land, and impels Crusoe’s fanatical imagination of property and its related copyright. In a luxurious gesture, Crusoe, in an island deprived of familiar things and objects, promises that he shall give the reader the Copy, and he implicitly suggests that it shall be “free of charge”: “All as handsome about me as I could, I began to keep my Journal, of which I shall here give you the Copy
(tho’ in it will be told all these Particulars over again) as long as it lasted” (64). I explore into the rich “passage” of what Crusoe aptly describes as the “great thoroughfare of the Brain” (181) to find out links between geography and literature.

The significance of the turnpike system has been overshadowed by scholarly attention to other measures of enclosure, such as houses, libraries, schools, hospitals, factories, and prisons. Building on Michel Foucault’s spatial view of things, which analyses discontinuous but actual spaces, territories, domains, and sites, the first reading of the turnpike engages in how relations of power and discipline were inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of the British social life, how human geography became filled with power relations. This point of view recuperates that power relations stand in for a range of disciplinary techniques that will be enacted concurrently and over the next half-century in England by such measures as systematic numbering of houses, establishment of a police force, decennial censuses, and other expanding information gathering and surveillance networks, especially such as restrictions on casual labor and poor laws.1 In this framework, the turnpike circulates as a form of currency which flows between social and political languages that constitutes the truth-effect of despotic British governance. Thomas Paine, for instance, evoked the despotic rhetorical trope of the British turnpikes to be compared with Edmund Burke’s demonized troping of the French Revolution: “It is not among the least of the evils of the present existing governments in all parts of Europe, that man, considered as man, is thrown back to a vast distance from his Maker, and the artificial chasm filled up by a succession of barriers, or a sort of turnpike gates, through which he has to pass” (305). In the next paragraph, Paine establishes his truth claim to natural rights by saying, “the duty of man is not a wilderness
of turnpike gates, through which he is to pass by tickets from one to the other” (305).

While in a different social context, William Cobbett expresses his concern about turnpike tolls by asserting that owners and gate-keepers are changing the nature of the public more than they are legally entitled to charge.

Another point of view sees the turnpike as the watershed of an economic take-off. This economic perspective concerns the wider economic effects of the “transport revolution” on the economy of Britain, and the key effect is the transformation of the land into a national circuit of market accessibility with direct benefits of the “modernization of transport services,” “travel times,” and “forward linkages” to agriculture as well as industry. In this view, the turnpike road system yields a spatially structuring force of uneven development via fragmentation and redistribution of geography. The turnpike road system made geography fragmented, but it simultaneously reshaped fragmented geography into a more organized network of improved roads, which in turn formed a network of routes for compiling and distributing information, that is, routes of copyrights and commodities. This economic point of view concerns “the sense of place” as John Barrell has called it; its effect of the turnpike expanded, sometimes beyond the point of recognition, the worldview framed by a parish or an estate. While I will discuss further this effect on the sense of place in my fourth chapter, it is worthwhile to register another bifurcating point with regard to the turnpike: How much crucial role did the transport system play in an industrial take-off compared with inland trade and traffic enabled by canals? Reinterpreting Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Lee’s macro-level analysis of the “central place” and the “network system,” I take a viewpoint that the turnpike performs the double articulation of consolidating social, political, and economic power – it was
developed by means of bills in Parliament in the same way as enclosure- and diffusing a piecemeal character of development in a “patchwork” of improved and unimproved highways (Philip Bagwell 41).

By asking what kind of language the turnpike gives us, the last but not least point of view of the turnpike finds its geographical expression in the framework that Neil Smith, Nicos Poulantzas, and Edward Soja maintains in light of the organization of a continuous, homogeneous, and fragmented space-time such as it lies at the real substratum of the spatiality of Britain. The turnpike serves as the medium and outcome, the precondition and embodiment, of the modern production of space in the eighteenth and the next centuries. Jacques Derrida and Paul Virilio add another theoretical depth to those contemporary spatial theorists by suggesting that the turnpike and, by extension, canals underpin information at a distance and reinforce the power of instantaneous action and mobilization to “make domination at a distance feasible” as Bruno Latour has also called it.

*The Gentleman’s Magazine* described the historical condition and future direction of English roads:

> England, all things duly considered, may be justly called the finest country in the world; for tho’ nature may have been unkind to her in point of sunshine, and certainty of weather, yet industry in general, and the advantage of a maritime situation in particular, have raised her to so high a pre-eminence over other nations, that all foreigners both envy and admire her. . . . The only solid objection I can make to this amiable recess, secreted, as it were by the hand of nature, from the gross of the European continent, is the wretched state of many public roads. I allow it would be an endless work to attempt to reform all the little branching ones; to aim at this, might to give up the whole. But the great arteries, the more considerable veins of every country, the ducts that lead from vital parts to the more eminent extremes, these should be kept open and permeable (301).
Nothing would better express the poor quality of the parish road before the turnpike road than the saying that if a drop of sweat should happen to fall from any of them it would produce a quagmire on the road. A parish held it responsible to repair and maintained the little branching roads within its boundary. An Act of Parliament authorized village authorities to claim six days of labor from every male villager per year, which was known as unpaid statutory labor to provide a source of public finance for road improvement. Any parish whose roads were “bad” was answerable to the Justice of the Peace at Quarter Sessions, when the parish was subject to fines.

Beginning in the 1640s, the parish had the right to finance road improvement by levying property taxes, known as “highway rates.” Invented in 1693 and beginning in 1696, the “village system of road provision,” which turned to the law enforcement of the magistrate for collective cooperation, was replaced by an alternative institutional arrangement, that is, the “town-centered” turnpike system. Initially, turnpike systems were controlled by the Justice of the Peace, but from the 1750s on, a turnpike “trusts system” constituted a network of investments, in which place became an object of speculative investment. Beginning in 1707, the turnpike trusts proper began to emerge as semi-autonomous bodies largely independent of the Justice of the Peace. A trust was managed by a group of “trustees” named in its charter. The division and separation of trusts from the Justice of the Peace meant that a relatively autonomous group of people could assemble principally for the purpose of road improvement. From the 1740s, the turnpike trusts gained much more authority independent of the Justice of the Peace. Turnpike trusts, enacted by individual Acts of Parliament, designated a local group to set up tollgates at various locations on a certain stretch of the road. Each Turnpike Act
defined a maximum schedule of tolls that could be levied on different types of traffic, including coaches, wagons, packhorses, and livestock. Besides defining the schedule of tolls, Turnpike Acts also authorized the trustees of the local group the benefit and the right of compulsory land purchase. By 1780 the greater part of the main road system had been subjected to turnpike control. Turnpike trustees were empowered to make charges fixed in Acts of Parliament for use of their roads and to erect toll-gates where money could be collected. They also had an obligation to set up mileposts along their routes and were able to borrow money for improvements on the security of future toll income. The result was that place ended up as a marketable entity, thereby generating a serial reinvestment, redistribution, and restructuring of the parish-centered village into the trusts-controlled place. A turnpike “trusts system” exercised a spatial practice of improving the road while turning it into a marketable commodity.

My recharting of the development of the turnpike system calls attention to its two elements of both the Central Place and the Network system, or fixed and open circuit. While Paul Hohenberg and Lynn Lees use the concepts to read the processes of the making of urbanization, I use them to describe the turnpike road both as the medium and the outcome, the precondition and embodiment, of the modern production of space in Britain. Drawing on the notion of the central place and also reinterpreting Eric Pawson’s “schema of relations between the parish repair system, Justice trusts, and turnpike trusts,” I argue that the turnpike “trusts system” functions as the central place of control and inspection. The organizational framework of turnpike “trusts system” redraws and reproduces the social division of labor within its own body. This process takes place in a range stretching from hierarchical and centralized relations to those concentrated in
various layers and nodal-points of control and administration; that is, from the echelons within which authority is delegated through the allocation of power and authority to the modes of recruiting laborers and resources\(^5\). Down to the last detail, the framework of the system incarnates the “capitalist” division of labor in the processes of articulating and distributing the executive power and knowledge of the Parliamentary Acts. That is, the knowledge-power relations linked to turnpike “trusts system” find geographical expression in particular techniques of the exercise of power – turnpike tolls and taxes as devices inscribed in the texture of the land whereby populous flow and mobility are enforceable through control and inspection. The turnpike “trusts system” wields a straightforward and linear transformation of the “view of the world” placed on a par with the coordination of the parish. The parish would become less and less the center of the area within its boundaries, and more and more a part of an extended network of long-distance trading roads to allow commodities and traded goods to reach a nationwide market and another growing agricultural regions.

The economic significance of turnpike roads is linked with the turnpike road system as a network. A greater frequency of exchange between villages and market towns could encourage, for instance, a greater diversity of agriculture; for as long as roads were bad and villages thus isolated, every village had to grow corn for its own consumption. A good road system would encourage every village to think of itself no longer as primarily concerned to grow its own food for its own needs, but as putting its agricultural produce into circulation, and thus as being more dependent on national prices and more part of the national economy.\(^6\) The improved road transport system provides the basis of intensifying and accelerating market accessibility on a sufficiently large scale for the domestic
markets to absorb agricultural produce as well as manufactured products. The turnpike road system contributes to agricultural development and industrial take-off by “extending gradually the advantages of market accessibility to most areas within the central zone”; by “initiating the erosion of the subsistence farming and wastelands of the peripheral zone”; and finally by “encouraging development in the peripheral zone” (Eric Pawson 313-322). The turnpike road system generates a kinetic geography that makes things and people stop, pass, and move. As figure 1 illustrates, the turnpike road system forms an open, dissipative circuit, or a communications network capable of bringing together and accelerating the flows of information, commodities, and copyrights.

In surveying the shifting domain of England into “islands of improvement in a sea of open-field,” Defoe observes the turnpike as follows:

Upon this great Road there are wonderful improvements made and making, which no Traveller can miss the Observation of, especially if he knew the Condition these ways were formerly in; nor can my Account of these Counties be perfect, without taking notice of it; for certainly no public Edifice, Almshouse, Hospital, or Nobleman’s Palace, can be of equal Value to the country with this, no nor more an Honor and Ornament to it (524).

The turnpike that Defoe observes in traveling throughout the islands of Britain manifests itself as the medium and the outcome, the presupposition and embodiment, of a whole collection of wonders of remarkable development. Turnpikes move people as well as goods, and rearrange the figure in the landscape as a wanderer along the major routes of Britain. Like an artist who takes up his brushes and proceeds to paint what he sees in the landscape, nothing worth notating escapes the traveler’s picturing eye. This “impulse to record and describe the land” sees geography as a “surface on which to set forth or inscribe the world” (Svetlana Alpers 147). This geography turns into a fold or an
epidermis encrusted with the “arteries and veins” of turnpikes - a line that passes through the next field door, the neighboring parish, topographical views, and city views. It becomes “that great thoroughfare of the Brain,” that is, a circuit of collecting, communicating, and distributing artificial intelligence and information. For the turnpike system forms a self-organizing, dissipative (i.e., patchwork) structure of development across the scale of the geography of England, “it is impossible, as needless, to set down the innumerable Crowd of Thought that whirl’d through that great thoroughfare of the Brain” (181).

Infrastructural expansion represented by the construction of turnpikes provides the possibility of personal alienation for Crusoe as a missing person from his comfortable neighborhood. From the start, Crusoe couldn’t curb his indomitable desire to “see the world.” And his recursive desire gives rise to almost always the same effect on him: to be plunged into abysmal conditions, such as being a slave for two years and being cast off into an uninhabited island. Seen this way, Crusoe seems to have only two extremes in his life: “He cast his self down again into the deepest Gulph of human Misery that ever Man fell into, or perhaps could be consistent with Life and a State of Health in the World” (35). Even though there is danger in his voyage that the comfort of his identity is engulfed, that is, mutilated and alienated by a certain “cannibalistic” world, why couldn’t he contract his father’s new aesthetic value of “the middle station of life,” the “upper station of low life” as the “just standard of true Felicity?” (4) As if entrusted by the chance events of displacement from port to port and from place to place, that is, from Hull via the Yarmouth road and Guinea to All-Saints Bay in the Brazils, Crusoe ultimately repeats the opportunities of voyage for excitement, mobility, and resettlement.
Crusoe’s recursive voyage braid together three different strands of psychological, ethical (and religious), and geographical (and also economic) speculation. Although he feels in the Brazil plantations that he has “lived like a Man cast away upon some desolate Island, that no body there but himself (33),” it is a matter of fact that Crusoe accumulates his personal effects. What kind of neighborhood does Crusoe live so that he mimics the order of things there? What is then the status of the Lockean notion of society for Crusoe? Locke’s state of nature kneads the three major cords of bonds, obligation, and alliance into a social contract that men are said to have signed among them in order to enter into a collectivity that makes them the men they are. From the time the pact was signed, it is as if the group had signed it, were no longer rooted in anything but its own history of the social contract. Individuals outside of community are not men, but “wild savage beasts” (2. 11), for “it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community” (2. 13). The contract affects men as individuals by making them immediate participants in their specific community:

And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has established (2. 7. 87).

Locke’s law follows from natural law, which is reason, insomuch as reason governs all men. “Reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for all men becoming all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely
wise maker” (2. 2. 6). Locke’s natural law breaks open a theological code by which he legalizes a rule-based society as the state of nature: “Man is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, by the like reason, to preserve the rest of mankind” (2. 2. 6). Being in his station with a sense of obligation is a good mode of preserving himself without being master of other human beings. As James Tully comments, that which is an end for man, being preserved, is turned into a normative proposition that he ought to be preserved (45). The norm of preservation informs every individual of a good sense of observance. “Man living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge between them, is properly the state of nature” (2. 3. 19). Locke reduces nature to human nature, which is reduced to either reason or the social contract.

When the state of nature is reduced to human nature, one of the specific challenges to which Locke must respond is that the state of nature is a “fiction,” lacking in reality. Even though the state of nature asserts its materiality, its materiality is nothing other than the state of nature in its formative or constituting effects. Insofar as the state of nature operates successfully by constituting an object domain as a taken-for-granted ontology, the material effects of the state of nature are taken as primary givens. Richard Ashcraft remarks as follows:

What is absolutely crucial to Locke’s description of the state of nature is his characterization of human nature in terms of God’s workmanship and purposes which require that human beings be endowed with free will and reason. It is from this standpoint, Locke argues, that an individual can be “supposed capable of knowing the law [of nature], and so living within the rules of it (104).
When this material effect is taken as a departure of Locke’s political argumentation, the state of nature comes very close to myth in the Roland Barthean sense of the term. To understand political power, and derive it from its original, Locke suggests that one needs to consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature (2.2.4). This presumption is not always fully in practice, but, as Ashcraft argues, there is no reason to suppose that Locke does not incorporate this same principle into the conceptualization of the natural human condition of man in The Second Treatise (104). Such assumption is necessary in order to defend the proposition that it is possible to make and keep contracts in the state of nature, which presupposes trust among individuals. Locke refers to the individual’s existence in the state of nature as its formative effects under natural law.

When the state of nature is coterminous with the boundary of a society, it leaves the world on its sidelines as supplementary with an enormous collection of things reduced to the status of objects to be appropriated by human labor. Crusoe goes beyond with the Lockean notion of a pre-contractual state of nature toward the world in which the Other is imagined to inhabit. Crusoe’s repeated voyage drives him beyond the cultural boundary of society. And in this process, the boundary is displaced and dislocated into a problematizing place where one can call into question the Lockean premises of the state of nature and its closely related human nature. Crusoe indicates that his miseries may follow from his action “like a meer Brute from the Principles of Nature and by the Dictates of Common Sense only” (83). The principles of nature and the dictates of
common sense are fundamentally undermined outside of their cultural premises, especially, in other spaces.

Crusoe’s narration exposes the ways in which he turns an unoccupied island into his private property. Crusoe starts writing the journal while talking in the past: “September 30, 1659, I poor miserable Robinson Crusoe, in the offing, came on Shore on this dismal unfortunate Island, which I call’d the Island of Despair, all of the rest of the Ship’s Company being drown’d, and my self almost dead” (52). Crusoe’s use of the past tense measures an origin of the event of his coming at the island like the two critical methods of “recension and emendation” to identify the origin of history. This almost obsessive claim to history repeats and renders almost inoperable the generic procedure which Locke expounds in his Second Treatise that one obtains property by mixing labor. The general strategy of Defoe’s authorial experimentation with the Lockean paradigm of property is to ask one to imagine a circumstance in which ordinary human life comes to stand still and to re-imagine the terms by which one bonds to survive. As one can see, in the shipwreck that casts him into a desert island, Crusoe is thrown so filled with anxiety that “he runs about for a while like a Mad-man” (43). Fearful of unknown space, he spends his first night inhabiting the island not in its own terms but above the land in a tree. “All the Remedy that offer’d to my Thoughts at that Time, was, to get up into a thick bushy Tree like a Firr” (44). What his shipwreck unfolds is, as Lamb claims, that consciousness of a rational being is almost indistinguishable from “instinctual self-preservation which humans share with irrational animals” (27), an encounter of the real beneath the Lockean notion of the state of nature:

I began to look around me to see what kind of Place I was in, and what was next to be done, and I soon found my comforts abate, and that in a word I had
a dreadful Deliverance: For I was wet, had no Clothes to shift me, nor any thing either to eat or drink to comfort me, neither did I see any Prospect before me, but that of perishing with Hunger, or being devour’d by wild beasts; and that which was particularly afflicting to me, was, that I had no Weapon either hunt and kill any Creature for my Sustenance, or to defend my self against any other Creature that might desire to kill me for theirs. In a word. . . this threw me into terrible Agonies of Mind, that for a while I run about like a Mad-man (43).

Confronted with the desired state of his own person, Crusoe feels that his identity is insecure and perpetually contingent. Crusoe’s narrative would record, in a large measure, a “frailty” or emptiness of the echoes of Locke’s identity and consciousness outside of their stable field of application. Crusoe’s incessant activity to thickly layer and fortify the pale of barricades and stakes demonstrates the very precarious nature of human consciousness on the unmanned island. “My thoughts were now wholly employ’d about securing myself against either Savages, if any should appear, or wild Beasts, if any were in the Island; and I had many Thoughts of the Method how to do this, and what kind of dwelling to make, whether I should make a Cave in the Earth, or a Tent upon the Earth” (53). Crusoe is obsessively defensive of himself and apprehensive of strangers, visible or invisible, to himself. This is preserving his self which, when preserved, owns the means of its presentation both as a property and as narrative.

Defoe dramatizes or experiments with the notion of the mixing metaphor of Lockean property by situating Crusoe in a remote, foreign locale without the common rule or law of property. Locke argues that a man has property rights in his own body, in his labor as his activity, therefore in those material things that he had “mixed his labor with” (2.5.27). His rights are subject to cultural provisos that he should not appropriate more than he could make use of, and that there should be “enough and as good left in common for others” (2.5.33). The mixed labor implies that whatever has been
deliberately transformed by labor becomes the property of the laborer, and this opens up the question of to what extent to which the material should be considered to have been transformed by a particular activity of labor. Insofar as he mixes his labor with the island, the island would be a property in reward for his labor. Crusoe would be born with his new gained and constantly experienced authority over his domain, for the laborer should have a property right in the material on which he labored. As if to consummate the Providential premise of property, Crusoe exclaims, “the island has come to radiate with the “Dispositions of Providence [which] “quiet his mind and order every Thing for the best” (131).

Locke claims that God gave the world to the “industrious and rational” and refers to the “pains” which characteristically accompany labor. The justification of appropriation is that a person deserves to have those items which his toil and industry have produced, the products being a fitting reward for the expended effort. As Ashcraft elaborates, labor as an activity, and its end product, private property, have become through this (theological) shift in Locke’s argument a fulfillment of man’s natural law obligations, expressed as the will of God.

The general point I am making is that, instead of focusing upon the declarative, naturalistic language of rights, we view Locke’s discussion of property in terms of the intentional language of divinely instituted obligation. . . Lockean natural rights are always the active fulfillment of duties owed to God (Ashcraft 135).

By performing useful labor, one deserves a reward that accurately reflects the value of that labor. This interpretation entails a particular difficulty in interpreting the Lockean premise of the divine contract of property, because, as Ashcraft argues, Locke’s main intention is to justify the fundamental principle of the Law of Nature by defending the
enclosure and productive use of land in civilized countries which have contributed much more to the preservation of mankind (140). Locke says, “Land that is left wholly to nature that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed as it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing” (2.5.42). The Locke’s argument of landed property lies in the notion of enacting power in order to produce the divine purposefulness of the human obligation.

To qualify the enactment of power in Locke’s argument of landed property, one needs to understand a variety of the geographic techniques that Crusoe keeps performing and distributing on the island, including enclosure and its related cadastral survey. I will argue that Crusoe’s cadastral survey again exposes the problematic nature of the Lockean paradigm of appropriating the “vacant” land. An increasing amount of enclosures of the domain of the island shows that Crusoe is mixing his labor by an interrelated multiplicity of activities of traveling, touching, using, cultivating, keeping, appropriating, and mapping as well as “registering” the island into a text. Enclosure is, Roger Kain and Elizabeth Baigent explain it, the “process whereby land that was exploited collectively, or over which there existed common rights, was divided into parcels owned in severalty, with each proprietor exchanging his share of common rights over the wider area for exclusive rights in part of it” (237). It involves the meticulous measurement of a piece of land, followed by the surrounding of the land with barriers designed to close off the common passage of people and animals. Enclosure also requires a survey by enclosure commissioners, usually three in number, and enclosure maps are attested by their surveyors on oath as true and accurate. As Kain and Baigent cite it, “Acts of Inclosure commonly require a Survey to be made, either by the Commissioners, or by some person
employed by them, and a Map to be prepared from it; both of which is generally done by
a Surveyor, especially appointed for the purpose” (239). Land turns into a “movable”
form of property by means of the cadastral survey:

A Plan and Survey of the Number of Acres in each division . . . is called the General Survey: Afterwards the known property of every owner in
each Division is separately to be measured, and this when finished, is
called the Particular Survey. By means of the latter every Proprietor’s
Estates is reduced first into its Measure and Number of Acres, and then by
a Comparison of Measure of the several parts with the Value of each by
the Acre, as before fix’d, it is reduced into Money, or its whole annual
value, unconnected with the Common Ground (Cited in Kain and Baigent,
243).

Land is turned into the cadastral map and it circulates across a “discursive state archive”
consisting of the enclosure commissioners, the public records office, various country
record offices, and parish registries (Marzec 138).

Crusoe’s exploration into the inlands of the island anticipates the cadastral
method of survey. After he circuits around the island, Crusoe exclaims, “I was King and
Lord of all this country indefeasibly, and had a Right of Possession; and if I could convey
it, I might have it in Inheritance, as completely as any Lord of Mannor in England” (93).
Confirming that there is no one else but himself and also surveying and planning
innumerable tracts of land, Crusoe represents the interests of the lord of the manor in
enclosing his “country habitation.” Crusoe’s act of enclosure, however, exceeds the
cadastral survey in that it requires roads; that is, Crusoe’s perception of the cadastral
survey is an opportunity to rationalize the transport system. The method of survey
presupposes a rectilinear sense of the land:

The most approved Method of surveying and planning any Tracts of Land
is to measure the Outside thereof from station to station with a chain,
taking offsets from the straight line at convenient Distances, where there is
any Irregularity in the Figure; and at each Station also to mark the Angles or Bearings between the Lines; which is done either by means of a graduated Instrument, as a Theodolite, Circumferentor, or Semicircle; or otherwise it is done by means of a Telescope and Plain table (Recited in Kain and Baigent 243)

For enclosure is not only a process that parcels out heath and commons, but also a nexus that charts roads and houses; and valorizes the value of space, linking enclosure with the turnpike could be considered as reciprocally complementary in favor of the interests of trade. As Defoe speculates it, “Trade will be encouraged by [road improvements] in every way; for carriage of all kinds of heavy goods will be much easier, the wagons will either perform in less time, . . . all of which will tend to lessen the rate of carriage, and so bring goods cheaper to market” (A Tour 1726 439). A political regulation, grounded on an Act of Parliament passed in 1691, for instance, authorized municipal counties to set the maximum per-ton freight charge on goods being shipped into their jurisdiction. The turnpike road would increase significant productivity growth during the middle eighteenth century. However, a political factor couldn’t be ruled out in considering the passing of the turnpike act, a formal counter-petition.8 At any rate, Crusoe, with a quite reap of mind, imagines that it is impossible, as needless, to set down the innumerable crowd of Thought [and things] that whirl’d through that great thoroughfare of the Brain [of his island].

The geographical techniques that Crusoe is reenacting on his island are crucially associated with Kevin Hetherington’s process of place-formation. The argument of Hetherington is that place is not necessarily a complete product as a commodity but a process of giving place to place. Hetherington says, “place is a contingent effect of the
processes of placing, ordering and naming that emerge from the actions of heterogeneous materials within a given network and the system of differences that are generated to give stability to such mobile process” (192). A sense of place derives, according to him, from the “spatial ordering of materials and the system of differences that they perform” (184). As Steve Pile and Heidi Nast elaborates, a sense of place “involves accounts of places-bodies in changeable relationships to others, where those relationships are still mapped through positions in two dimensional grids of domination, oppression, and marginalization, but through the people’s n-dimensional capacities to produce directions and organization, to negotiate their connections and disconnections” (Places through the Body 413). Rather than a calculus of the possibilities to become real in the future, place is a potential field of virtualities in the present configuration, which will be unfolded into otherness or difference. Hetherington explains:

Places are materially constituted through an ordering process that involves an ongoing and recursive process that has three parts: i) the placing of materials within a network, ii) arranging those placings so that they can be known and represented through immutable mobiles and iii) naming those arrangements and through that naming trying to allow their mobility and deferral to settle down (192).

Place is generated by the placing, arranging and naming, that is, the spatial ordering of materials in an over-determined project. A place is of a mobile, open, and divisible (variable) process of constant change and transformation.

Crusoe’s decision not to use the most bountiful part of the island as a ground for making a surrogate home shows the very shifting ground in the Lockean premise of landed property.

I was surpriz’d to see that I had taken up my Lot on the worst Side of the Island. . . I confess this Side of the Country was much pleasanter than
mine, but yet I had not the least Inclination to remove; for as I was fix’d in my Habitation, it became natural to me, and I seem’d all the while I was there, to be as it were upon a Journey, and from Home (102).

Crusoe makes the “natural contract” to be distinguished from the social contract propounded by Locke. Crusoe’s geographical techniques of producing the “Country Habitation,” “Enclosures,” or “Fortification” are part of the mock processes of reconfiguring the British sense of place.

Although Crusoe reifies and encloses the lapses of hours and days in the objects he uses a labor force in making, Crusoe has “wasted” most of his times in a non-functional way. For instance, he feels joy at making himself a modest pot: “No Joy at a Thing of so mean a Nature was ever equal to mine, when I found I had made an Earthen Pot that would bear the Fire” (89). Not only does Crusoe find an aesthetic value in his labor, but he also finds that scarcity is a natural relation of himself to the environment. Furthermore, Crusoe destabilizes the Lockean notion of property, complicating it with a distinction between movable (writing) and immovable (landed) property. As Wolfram Schmidgen suggests, Defoe’s novel thematizes the question of landed property by “making immovable property resists fully becoming his mobile” (34). Crusoe’s incessant activities of making the island enclosed and thus owned are symptomatic of his obsession with the land, which carries over the “compulsion to repeat” his narrative of how close he is to appropriating the island into his own. And yet geography resists being crossed over by Crusoe’s narration. Crusoe gestures toward turning his island into a “General Magazine,” or a mobile storehouse: “So that had my been to be seen, it look’d like a general Magazine of all Necessary things, and I had every thing so ready at my Hand, that it was a great Pleasure to me to see all my Goods in such Order, and especially to
find my Stock of all Necessaries so great (63).” The order and also implied grid of the general- magazine-like narration, however, does not cover and represent the whole island discursively and continues to be infiltrated by all the more empirical experiences. This is why Crusoe tries to construct a literary fact as part of a whole process of making the island his own. Assuming that fact is taken to refer to some objectively independent entity that was out there and owned, how does Crusoe produce a matter of fact that he has discovered and owned the island out there as a property? Crusoe’s construction of fact is a process of historicizing each part of his story. Crusoe tries to company and suture the journal with the actual narrative whereby all the traces of textual production are made extremely difficult to detect. If I mix metaphor a little, when a skilled practitioner tries to explain the grounds of a performance, a juggling if you want, to a curious observer, he can show the observer how he does it all without a particular knowledge of his own principles and still mystifies the observer because the art itself comprises (or black-boxes) the fact. This yields the most sophisticated fine line between Crusoe’s writing as fact and his writing as artifact, not in the sense that fact and artifact are respectively natural and artificial, but in the sense that the reality that the reader believes to out there circles back into Crusoe’s journal writing, the real conditions of narration of which are again made explicit. The reader comes at Crusoe’s island by means of his own retrospective account of it, but once Crusoe’s description begins to stabilize, it takes place as a reality which takes on a life of its own after the circularity of materiality. Crusoe states in the Preface, “The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; neither is there any Appearance of Fiction in it: And whoever thinks, because of all such things are dispatched, that the Improvement of it, as well as to the Diversion, as to the
Instruction of the Reader, will be the same” (3). This particular deconstruction of reality into fact and artifact is characteristic of the Oceanic journal writing that a variety of the Oceanic writers, naturalists, and voyagers brought back from their voyage. Joseph Banks’s Tahiti journal reveals this split of reality, and yet Crusoe goes further by implying that his form of writing is “faction,” the combination of fact and fiction.

Crusoe’s slippery position toward the Lockean notion of property, that is, his inconsistent rendition of theological matrix makes Charles Gildon, Defoe’s contemporary, lambaste him. According to Gildon, Christian religion and the doctrines of providence are too sacred to be delivered in fictional plot-making. It is therefore a sinister and diabolical move to mix secular lies with holy truths of religion. And as if to defend himself in front of his opponent’s indictment, Crusoe emphasizes once again, “The Editor believes the thing to be a just History of Fact; neither is there any appearance of Fiction in it” (3). To look back on a dispute between fiction and fact from the vantage point of the history of copyright, one needs to be situated historically back in the legal discussions of copyright, to see how the distinction between fact and fiction permeated into the Act of Anne.

The Copyright Act of 1710 was the basis for legislation, which finally recognized copyright as a type of property. The Copyright Act of 1709 defined the proprietary rights of writers and booksellers, allowing 21 years of copyright protection for existing books and 14 years for new books (plus another 14 years if the writers still lived after the first term) (Meynell 14). And along with the lapsing of the Licensing Act roughly in 1695, the geographical restrictions on printers were removed, thus making it legal to set up presses in the provinces (64 – 97). The lapsing of the Licensing Act in 1695 informed the
author of the end of censorship in England, but the most stringent common laws against libel and seditious libel were still in effect. In order to establish such a category, distinct categories of indictable and nonindictable (that is, news and fiction) would have to be defined and established. When *Robinson Crusoe* was written in 1719, there was no clear distinction between news and fiction, and Defoe’s work rested uneasily in that world of a discourse which was inclining to separate into two sub-discourses (Davis 85-101). It was during the first quarter of the eighteenth century that there was concrete and rapid movement toward defining, for legal purposes, factual and fictional narratives. Crusoe’s infidel rendition of the Lockean notions of society and property runs the risk of making his rather “untrue or a lie, hence damnable” under the copyright acts in the 1710s, since copyright tended both to depend on and assist in William Blackstone’s pro-argument of Locke’s notion of identity of the author.

Locke’s notion of identity grounds itself on the extension of the identity of consciousness. For Locke, soul is the same thing as consciousness, just as matter is the same extension; that is, body is one site of convergence while soul is the other site of convergence. What I mean by convergence is the combination of the parts and ideas in a unified form, which constitutes body. I understand that body and soul are constructed in the same manner in Locke’s philosophical argument of the soul: “As a body is a thing that is extended, figured, capable of motion; a spirit, a thing capable of thinking; and so hardness, friability, and to draw iron, are qualities to be found in a loadstone” (246). As an extended substance, soul changes place:

For my soul, being a real being as well as my body, is certainly capable of changing distance with any other body or being, as body itself, and so is capable of motion. And if a mathematician can consider a certain distance, or a change of that distance between two points, one may certainly
conceive a distance and a change of distance between two spirits, and so conceive their motion, their approach or removal, one from another (Book II, C. 23, 19)

Locke is saying that soul and matter are both capable of extension; this is their common property. In this paradigm, the self manifests itself as “that conscious thinking being which is sensible or conscious of pleasure or pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends” (2. 27. 17). The Lockean notion of self concerns the change of place and entails the theoretical and empirical possibilities for personal and cultural alienation. In the case of separation of his little finger, insofar as consciousness goes along with it, it would constitute the same self. In Blackstone’s words, “the identity of a literary composition consists in the sentiment and the language; the same conceptions, clothed in the same words, must necessarily be the same composition; and whatever method takes of conveying that composition to the ear or eye of another, by recital, by writing, or by printing, in any number of copies or at any period time, it is always the identical work of the author which is so conveyed” (2: 406, cited in Ross, 6). Blackstone solidifies the Locke’s notion of identity starting from one and the same thought into its multiple changes of place between the originality of the author’s idea and all its bodily manifestations. In the case of translations and abridgements, the identity of the author’s idea couldn’t be seen to be extended. The abridgement of a map would be, then, free of charge, because its identicalness is taken-for-granted as a public entity, and it is capable of being reproduced as similar but different copies. In this context, Crusoe exclaims:

It is impossible, as needless, to set down the innumerable Crowd of Thought that whirl’d through that great thorow-fare of the Brain, the Memory, in this Night’s Time: I run over the whole History of my Life in Miniature, or by
Abridgement, as I may call it, to my coming to this Island, and also of the Part of my life, since I came to this Island (my emphasis 181).

When Crusoe says that he shall give his reader the “Copy,” he means that the particulars will be told over again (64). Crusoe is exploiting on the fact that his novel writing is both factual and historical; that the “format” of the journal is diagramic like a faithful map; and thus that his journal writing escapes damnation that he is counterfeiting fact out of his fictional writing. It is certain that Crusoe is exploring the lacunae of copyright acts in the 1710s, but at the same time, Defoe looks as very eager as Crusoe on the island to touch the public world. Encountering the second shipwreck, Crusoe ejaculates thus: “In all Time of my solitary life, I never felt so earnest, so strong a Desire after the Society of my fellow Creatures, or so deep a Regret at the want of it” (173). When a human becomes a human, as Walter Benjamin says, insofar as he endows his or her surrounding objects with the ability to look back, Defoe the author hankers after imparting the parts of his original and novel creation of Crusoe to the metropolitan London.

Robinson, on his island, could reconstruct an analogue of society only by giving himself all the rules and laws, which are reciprocally implicated with his person, even when there still have no objects. The theme of Robinson’s work would be not only a story, but “an instrument of research” – a research which starts out from the desert island and aspires to reconstitute the origins and the rigorous order of works and conquests which happens with time (Macherey 241). But this research is, I argue, concerned with how to preserve him and how to keep everything under the contract with Crusoe himself. Seen from the example of the mutilated finger from one whole body, Crusoe goes through various unsettling experiences to shatter his sense of identity. An experience of
being buried alive with the dying goat gives him unsustainable pain of the singular gaze from the animal:

I fancy’d myself now like one of the ancient Giants, which are said to live in Caves, and Holes, in Rocks, where none could come at them. . . The old Goat who I found expiring, dy’d in the Mouth of the Cave; and I found it much easier to dig a great Hole there, and throw him in, and cover him with Earth, than to drag him out. . . I have enjoy’d the Certainty that no Savages would come to the Place to disturb me, [and] I could have been content to have capitulated for spending the rest of my Time there, even to the last Moment, till I had laid me down and dy’d, like the old Goat in the cave (130).

This uncanny feeling is disturbing to Crusoe while he is gazing and sympathizing with the dead animal. The animal is there before Crusoe, there close to him, there in front of him – the animal which enters Crusoe’s dwelling place and sees him suddenly alienated from his human neighborhood. As Derrida remarks this “unsubstitutable singularity” (378), “being after, being alongside, being near would appear as different mode of being,” indeed of Crusoe’s being-with the animal subjects in his initial dining on the island. Derrida’s encounter of the gaze of a cat is very apt for marking the singularity of Crusoe’s geographical experience:

In any case, they [different modes of being with the animal] express a certain order of the being-huddled-together [etre-serre] (which is what the etymological root, pressu, indicates, whence are derived the words pres, aupres, après), the being-pressed, the being-with as being strictly attached, bound, enchained, being-under-pressure, compressed, impressed, repressed, pressed-against according to the stronger or weaker stricture of what always remains pressing. . . It [the animal] can look at me. It has its point of view regarding me. The point of view of the absolute other, and nothing will have ever done more to make me think through this absolute alterity of the neighbor than these moments when I see myself seen naked under the gaze of a cat.9
The gaze of the absolute other, the annihilation of his person, forces him to think and follow after what Pierre Bourdieu calls “practice,” a term for the specific and situational activities within a society that cannot be adequately theorized about within that society. What Bourdieu describes “a quasi-theoretical reflection” on practice reveals the nature of Crusoe’s sovereign mastery of his situation, that is “a mode of practical knowledge not comprising knowledge of its own principles” (19). Crusoe’s will to survive exemplifies his instinctive practical imperative of self-preservation, which operates as different from Locke’s rational and theological demand of self-preservation. Crusoe’s encounter of a footprint on the shore amplifies to the extreme Crusoe’s sense of being pressed by the possibility of annihilation: “It is not possible to describe how many various Shapes affrighted Imagination represented Things to me in, how many wild Ideas were found every Moment in my Fancy, and what strange unaccountable Whimsies came into my Thoughts by the Way” (142). It may be that Crusoe’s reaction to the footprint on the shore reveals another hidden agenda of property, since he couldn’t prove that he arrives at the vacant island first in order, but his reaction exposes a paradoxical aspect of the so-called sovereign European self caused by contingent human conditions. As Lamb suggests it, “supported by nothing more substantial than custom or iteration, the self-evidence of favorite British notions [of identity] is subject to sudden collapses or contradictions which shatter the illusion of ideological consistency that habit has given them” (7). In this plight, Lamb continues to elaborate, the “British recognizes anxiety endured whenever the familiar pulse of custom is interrupted by an unpredictable event, or by a phenomenon that corresponds to no model or purpose” (7). Crusoe’s singular and
personal experiences of a foreign world represent the paradoxical nature of a practical culture.

This “practical” Crusoe acts in defense of the particularity of his personal experience and of the rhetorical flair of the voice that alone is fit to speak of it. Michel de Certeau has expanded Bourdieu’s notion of practice by applying the Greek word *metis* to it and associating the *metis* practice with a “vigilant serendipity that exploits the occasionality of events to proclaim the injuries it has suffered.” As Lamb expands the significance of the *metis* practice, “*metis* finds a home for the singular detail in the network of conventional doctrine, just as a cuckoo finds a place for its egg in an alien nest. It is a restoration of practical pertinence.” It may be paraphrased that Crusoe finds a surrogate home in a foreign island and hankers after “any possible Energy of Words” (173), a “recovery of the voice that has been cleverly substituted for” his written journal. Just as Finch’s voice of Bas-Jesus is the voice of counter-memory, and the country house of Longleat turns into a copy of her own artifact in writing poetry, the sound of Crusoe’s retrospective accounts of his experience becomes an “imitation of this part of itself that is produced and reproduced by the media of” writing geography.10

Crusoe’s subsequent career shows his instinctual grasp of the situations that might happen on the island. While Crusoe becomes, as John Richetti says, “more and more an unhesitating tactician, openly manipulating for practical advantage the moral and social structures that had been theoretical impediments to action” (70), I argue that Crusoe is experimenting with a pure sense of the Lockean possibility for handling, extending, and transforming the island as part of himself that no one else can claim or usurp. Crusoe’s initial reception of the island is characterized by the double negative: Crusoe has no
clothes, nor anything either to eat or drink, nor weapon either to hunt or kill any creature for his sustenance, and no prospect of Life (36). Crusoe, however, turns this island into a utopic place with a chance to make miraculous things open for his touch. He entertains different notions of things: “I was removed from all the Wickedness of the world . . . [with] no Society, no ravenous Beast, no furious Wolves or Tygers, no venomous Creatures, [and] no Pain, no Distemper, no Uneasiness of Body; no, nor Uneasiness of Mind” (97-142). What is attachable to the body, what is near, and what is adjacent becomes now a property for Crusoe; that is, property is a way to extend his body into the island as a surrogate part of himself. Crusoe ultimately ends up realizing his “ardent wishes” of anticipation and “strong ideas” of incorporation. Crusoe contracts a new habit on the island thus:

Like many reflections, I afterward made it a certain Rule with me, That whenever I found those secret Hints [of some invisible direction], or pressings of my Mind, to doing, or not doing any Thing that presented; or to going this way, or that way, I never fail’d to obey the secret Dictate; though I knew no other Reason for it, than that such a Pressure, or such a Hint hung upon my mind (127).

Although the novel is studded with many religious references and symbols that arguably form part of a larger pattern, Crusoe is more concerned with the “secular” and “material” conditions of deliverance. A telling example of this is Crusoe’s speculative manipulation of the English mutineers. Rather than arming himself with a rationalized system of weapons, he deploys varied camouflage that forms part of the landscape. Crusoe transforms himself in the disguise of a shamanistic and European priest-hybrid with his “formidable Goat-Skin Coat on,” and “with the great cap, a naked Sword, two Pistols and a Gun” upon his Shoulder into a “Spectre-like figure” (original italics 233-4). Crusoe
becomes a mastermind to orchestrate everything under his conduct. He manages to be both stage-manager and actor, appearing in the guise of a governor’s man in order to surround the figure of the “governor” with the powerful aura of absence (Peter Hulme 217). Crusoe persuades the Captain with the abridgement of his whole story, for his story or history is a “whole collection of Wonders” (186). Crusoe’s sovereign deputyship derives from the curious singularity of his improvisational and circumstantial practices.

The later phase of Crusoe’s life defines more than utopic nostalgia. Let us recall that Richard Steele interviewed with Alexander Selkirk on his arrival after an approximately three-year period of voluntary castaway on the island of Juan Ferdinand. Selkirk’s account of his life on the island almost recapitulates Crusoe’s entire life on his island with one sensible difference. Steele casts Selkirk’s castaway in a utopian setting: “He grew dejected, languid, and melancholy, scarce able to refrain from doing himself Violence, till by Degrees, by the Force of Reason, and frequent reading of the Scriptures, and turning his Thoughts upon the Study of Navigation, after the Space of eighteen months, he grew thoroughly reconciled to his Condition” (236). “When he had made this Conquest,” Steele adds, “the Vigor of his Health, Disengagement from the World, a constant, cheerful, serene Sky, and a temperate Air, made his Life one continual Feast, and his Being much more joyful than it had before been irksome” (237). Crusoe does return with a different notion of the Lockean human nature, since he knows that “Gratitude was no inherent Virtue in the Nature of Man; nor did Men always square their Dealings by the Obligations they had receiv’d, so much as they did by the Advantages they expected” (225). After Crusoe returns to his society, he manages to perform his
expected social life, but he does not settle down. As Selkirk confesses, “I am now worth 800 pounds, but shall never so happy, as when I was not a worth a Farthing” (238).

Crusoe embarks on another voyage to visit his Island. His voyage “beyond” is not simply the return of the repressed, but rather an activity which ultimately implies return and repetition to testify to something which is excluded from the frame of the reigning historical present of his contemporary British society. Being in the “beyond” is, then, to inhabit an intervening space, as Homi Babba suggests it. Crusoe’s “transmigration” is therefore a return to the present Britain to reconfigure his cultural contemporaneity, to re-inscribe his novel and singular rendition of the Lockean propositions on the State of Nature, human nature, and property. Crusoe’s interventional (writing) space on the island becomes a counter-space of intervention in the here and now of the early eighteenth-century Britain.
CHAPTER III

IN SEARCH OF FANTASTIC GEOGRAPHY IN THE SOUTH SEAS

Wo es war, soll ich werden, Sigmund Freud/ Jacques Lacan

As soon as physical factors, such as the need to overcome the infertility of the soil, have brought man’s ingenuity into play, the momentum drives him well beyond his immediate objective; so that when his need has elapsed he comes to be swept into the great ocean of fantasy from which he cannot pull out. May the happy Tahitian stop where he is!

Denis Diderot, The Supplement au Voyage de Bougainville

As far as Europeans were concerned, the South Seas, the last undiscovered portion of the globe, were a locus of terrestrial paradise, utopian drive, intense feelings of pleasure; not only these, but they were also the scene of disease, pain, and disillusionment. It is with these concerns in mind that I seek to find some theoretical orientations for the more empirical readings related to Louis-Antoine de Bougainville’s and Joseph Banks’s voyage into the Pacific Ocean. For both of them, Tahiti has been a privileged arcadia and, by the same token, an ambiguous place, the border of hospitality as well as violence and theft. A naturally fertile environment, such as Tahiti with its rich volcanic soil, constant humidity, and tropical warmth, is presented as a body open, offered, given over to everything that, on its banks and edges, can happen. Recalling that
Tahiti is also surrounded by abysses, gulfs, and reefs, the island encloses the practice of eighteenth-century scientific mapping within the floating indeterminacy and contingency of romance. Banks’s occasional Arcadian imagery, initial use of classical Greek names for the locals, such as Lycurgus and Hercules, and his erotic negotiation with the Tahitian women provide the occasion of a recognizable paradise for him. In this respect he can be compared with Bougainville and the naturalist Philibert Commerson who accompanied Bougainville when they visited Tahiti the year before Banks arrived. Like Banks, Bougainville used Arcadian imagery in his published account to describe what appealed to him about Tahitian society. Although Bougainville reaches for terrestrial paradise with classical examples, Tahiti figured as a place of utopia for Commerson. Banks, on the other hand, understands Tahiti as a curious place of the singular as well as the site of geographical and astronomical observation. My focus on the similar but different response of Banks, Bougainville, and Commerson to Tahiti aims to bring to light how Europeans fantasized and/or idealized the world in encountering and “discovering” the “new” world.

Recent studies of Banks have been bifurcated into “static” or “dynamic” readings of his circumnavigation. On the one hand, Banks has been depicted as a virtuoso-traveler, who pursues his curiosity for the sake of curiosity. This view argues that Banks is nothing but an aristocratic gentleman with fortune. That is, Banks is particularly a curio and his “scientific passion” for Linnaean botany does not contribute to the scientific progress of Natural History in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, Banks fulfills the criterion of “the center of influence” as Bruno Latour has called it. The specimens, their accounts, illustrations, and figures that Banks brings back from his voyage are being “dispatched,
mobilized, and combined” in European museums, libraries, and universities, which form, in turn, a “dynamic network” of domestic and international influence and therefore the “centers of calculation.”\textsuperscript{11} Banks makes “domination at a distance feasible” as Latour puts it.

Banks always gets caught in this current ecology of criticism either as a maximally licentious curio-hunter or as a minimally licensed botanist. In this context, I suggest another possibility that Banks is a singular traveler voyaging into the unknown in the South Seas, or that Banks’s self is paradoxical in the sense that he is the Dilettante botanist. Furthermore, I’ll try to push Latour’s idea of being embedded as “black-boxing” further in order, firstly, to call into question some “uncritical” assumption of writers, such as Tim Fulford, who has turned to Latour for understanding Banks and secondly, to think what role of Tahiti plays spatially in Bougainville’s and Banks’s journal writing. No commentator seems to have noticed that Latour’s notion of “the centers of influence” has extended his earlier view of how the active role of scientific theory in shaping and constructing fact is effaced, all too often, by being embedded in a laboratory setting.\textsuperscript{12}

The concept of “black-boxing” refers, according to Isabelle Stengers, to a way of remaining under the “established setting” of a scientific project. Scientific theory has been so succeeded in constituting a black boxed setting that humanists are told from time to time to learn how to engage with the high ground of “objectivity” and “truth” on the scientist’s terms.\textsuperscript{13} The converse is also germane: black-boxed relations have been integrated into so many scientific research programs that are themselves accepted that only a few humanists practically interest the scientist in calling into question and scrutinizing the already-taken-for-granted assumptions. Black boxing, then, establishes a
relation between who enters it and who leaves it so much so that no one has, practically, the means to contest it. Black-boxing allows an inertial operating assumption to remain unexamined.

The opening of a black box is not an impossible event, but one that should be highly improbable. If the scientific prestige of Banks as a “purveyor of truth” is problematic, it is attributed ironically to the number of “boxes” that he fails to close, that is, to the number of “facts” that the other naturalists would accept actively in, for instance, controlling their reasoning, making their hypothesis legitimate, and establishing assent.

While Banks comes back with splendid specimens of hitherto unknown plants and animals, MS notes, drawings executed during the passage across the Atlantic, along the coast of South America, across the Pacific via the Society Island, and the east coast of Australia, his three-month stay at Tahiti, like a detour, does additional work to make him the case of hybrid identity, which he himself calls “half mongrel” and “half British.” In other words, Banks’s Tahitian journal indeed opens a variety of “boxes,” ranging from Linnaen botany, ethnography, and anthropology to romance narrative. Banks brings data and specimens back and fits them to the categories of the metropolitan knowledge, but the European audience understands that romance shapes and enables both fantastic and empirically organized accounts of the world encountered by Banks.

To read the significance of Banks’s “digressive” voyaging in the Pacific is paradoxically to investigate the ways in which Latour’s concept of the “centers of calculation” becomes “black-boxed” or translated into a folkloric handbook on the Oceanic exploration. When Tim Fulford says, “the centers of calculation produced writings that he [e.g., Latour] has taught us to see as handbooks or manuals for accessing
the remote,” his understanding of Latour’s concept is eclipsed by aligning Latour’s “centers of influence” with Michel Foucault’s “disciplines” as a portable substrate of the power relations of knowledge: “Bruno Latour, like Michel Foucault, showed that the eighteenth-century Enlightenment produced a series of interlocking intellectual disciplines that empowered those who mastered them to reduce the world to order.”16

Pushing this point a little further, it may be possible to suggest that the “centers of influence” forces a particular discursive, representational exercise upon multiple maps and establish the homogeneity of one dominant cartographic image over foreign locales. Latour is, however, far from single-mindedly lauding the power of cartography to dispatch, mobilize, abstract, and map out the world in mentioning the role of the “centers of influence”:

Most of the difficulties we have in understanding science and technology proceeds from our belief that space and time exist independently as an unshakable frame of reference inside which events and place would occur. This belief makes it impossible to understand how different spaces and different times may be produced inside the networks built to mobilize, cumulate, and recombine the world.17

He stresses the fact that the “centers of influence” delimit and sort out the vastly collected expanses of specimens, space, and time within their embedded setting of connection. As a particularly immanent condition of connectivity, the map, for instance, becomes one of provincial, local knowledges: “We do not have to oppose the local knowledge to the universal knowledge of the European, but only two local knowledges, one of them having the shape of a network transporting back and forth immutable mobiles to act at a distance.”18 To the extent to which the European map-making process is demystified as a local knowledge on the move, cartography is, to put it in the terms of Latour, “not a
general framework but a provisional result of connection among entities.” It may be said, with equal truth, that the gathering institutions like Kew Gardens sort out elements belonging to different times and spaces, and not the “universal” times that make the sorting. Latour elaborates: “Nothing is unfamiliar, infinite, gigantic, or far away in these centers that cumulate traces: quite the contrary, they accumulated so many traces so that everything can become familiar, finite, nearby and handy.” Rather than taking the view that things hold because they are universally true, Latour argues the quite reverse that things are true because they hold. Botany is, Latour claims provocatively, the “local knowledge generated inside gathering institutions like Kew gardens.”

Alongside with Kew Gardens, Linnaeus’s Swedish garden illustrates the local status of botany. Lisbet Koerner intersects nicely with Latour in terms of local Linnaeus:

> He [Linnaeus] believed that his science reflected nature’s harmony, which in turn was analogous to the order of his own study. He cast himself, then, as a political economist and an acclimatization experimenter. He took little interest in the exact science, however, or in technological progress (e.g., ferrous metallurgy and hydrodynamics). Nor did he interest himself in such instruments as diving-bells, steam engines, air pumps, telescopes, or even though he used them – microscopes. Linnaeus’s work-spaces more recalled a renaissance studioli or a curiosity cabinet.

Latour’s assertion, together with Koerner’s description, prompts me to ask whether Banks functions as a fidelity operator of botany like Dr. Solander, a Swedish student of Carl Linnaeus. To ask if Banks becomes the “first global agent of Linnaeus” is, then, to examine if Banks expands what Mary Louis Pratt calls the “planetary consciousness.”

The significance of Linnaeus’s “System of Nature” is, according to Pratt, that it alone launched a European knowledge-building enterprise of unprecedented scale and appeal. The Linnaeus’s system of classification helps the Europeans in the second half
of eighteenth century describes all the plants on the earth, known and unknown, according to the characteristics of their reproductive parts. That is, Linnaeus’s systematic classification consists of “twenty-four basic configurations of stamens, pistils, and such four added visual parameters as number, form, position, and relative size.”

Though she argues that the Linnaean system asserts a “harmless hegemonic vision that installs no apparatus of domination,” Linnaeus’s systematic classification conceals a certain imperial agenda of increased knowledge and possession, for the Linnaean systemizing of nature is “trans-cultural” and at the same time transactional. It is transcultural in the sense that Linnaean exploration relies on the natives in a similar way that James Douglas suggested to Captain Cook, Banks, and Dr. Solander when they are about to leave for Tahiti: “To exercise the utmost patience and forbearance with respect to the Natives of the several lands where the ship may touch . . . equally under his [God’s] care with the most polished Europeans, perhaps less offensive, more entitled to his favor.” Not only this, but it is transactional as well, as Pratt explains: “The systematic surface mapping of the globe correlates with an expanding search for commercially exploitable resources, markets, and lands to colonize, just as navigational mapping is linked with the search for trade routes.”

The “surface mapping” represents in its clearest grids the “contents” of the surface of the earth, and it turns what was unknown into something familiar in the map: “These vast contents would be known not through slender lines on blank paper, but through which labeled grids which entities would be placed.”

The coordinate of the map, then, imparts, superimposes, and, most of all, determines the degrees of clearness and distinctness, i.e., the maximum and the minimum of “singular” points by representing them on the surface of the map. As a result, no matter how immense they are, the vast
expanses of space summed up in Linnaean nomenclatures become never bigger than that of the coordinate of the map. This means that the surface of the globe is reduced in the scaled-down map that would subsequently enable the metropolitan centers of knowledge to dominate the newly discovered parts of the world from afar. While it may be true that Banks searches for a range of the way stations of commercialized Britain to Australia, the South Seas rearranges the self of Banks as a singularized traveler encountering a myriad of islands and negotiating those exotic locales.

It should be useful to reexamine situations surrounding Banks’s launching into his expedition for the study of nature. Gilbert White noted in his letter to Thomas Pennant, “on the sixth day of August [1768] Joseph Banks, who is accompanied by Daniel Solander, [and] Mr. Green the [Admiralty] Astronomer set[s] out for Deal in order to embark aboard the Endeavor Captain Cook bound for the South-Seas.” John Ellis also emphasizes the scientific aspects of Banks and Cook’s circumnavigation in his letter to Alexander Garden:

No more people ever went to seem better fitted out for the purpose of Natural History, nor more elegantly. They have got a fine library of Natural History; they have all sorts of machines for catching and preserving insects; they have even a curious contrivance of a telescope, by which, put into water, you can see the bottom to a great depth, where it is clear. They have the several sorts of salts to surround the seeds; and wax, both beeswax and that of the Myrica; . . . They have two painters and draughtsmen, several volunteers who have a tolerable notion of Natural History; in short Solander assured me this expedition could cost Mr. Banks ten thousand pounds.²⁹

The Endeavor is indeed a “floating laboratory” in the South Seas.³⁰ Banks’s “love in excelling in his favorite studies” entails a “scientific becoming” of his passion for empiricism. Banks’s eyewitness testifies to and/ or calls into question the credibility of
the narratives of other Oceanic writers. Banks criticizes, for instance, Alexander Dalrymple (1737-1808) in terms of *Terra Australis Incognita*: “It is some pleasure to be able to disprove that which does not exist but in the opinions of Theoretical writers, of which sort most are who have wrote any thing about these seas without having themselves in them.” Banks’s “scientific” passion is close to corroborating of the non-existence of the Southern Continent:

To strengthen these weak argument another Theory has been started which says that it is Necessary that so much of the South Sea as the authors of it call land should be so, otherwise this world would not be properly bal[a]nc’d as the quantity of Earth known to be situated in the Northern hemisphere would not counterpoise in this. The number of square degrees of their land which we have already chang’d into water sufficiently disapproves this.31

The purpose of Banks’s and Cook’s expedition is twofold: unofficially, to check on Samuel Wallis’s supposed sighting of the Great South land for the Royal Navy and, officially, to measure the transit of Venus across the sun for the Royal society.32

While the scientific observation of the transit of the planet Venus was crucial for determining cartographic longitude in the South Pacific, the value of the actual observations of Venus was next to nil. Cook writes: “We had every advantage we could desire in observing the whole of the passage of the Planet Venus over the Sun’s disk: we very distinctly saw an Atmosphere or dusky shade round the body of the Planet which very much disturbed the times of Contacts particularly the two internal ones. Dr. Solander observed as well as Mr. Green and myself, and we differed from one another in observing the times of the contacts much more than could be expected.”33 Problematic is, then, a scientific assertion that the island of Tahiti becomes the standard center to determine longitude in the South Seas. The standard center of astronomical observation is
rather “decentered” and “epicentric.” Herman Sporing, who works as a watchmaker in London, undertook to repair the stolen and dismantled quadrant with a set of watch-making tools barely before the scheduled observation. In this light, Banks marks a remarkably minimal point in terms of scientific punctuality, but the double sense of “singularity” as inflection calls attention to the self of Banks as “in-between” or paradoxical in the sense of affirming the reciprocal directions of sense-making.

To understand better the significance of Banks’s “singular” traveling, I feel it necessary to indicate as precisely as possible what I mean by “singular” and “singularity” and in the process to suggest that my notion of singularity is differentiated from the eighteenth-century notion of curiosity and its related wonder. While Nigel Leask’s study of eighteenth-century curiosity is intended to rethink the “temporal exchange” in a local encounter between the old European society and the new world, my notion of singularity considers the spatial trajectory of contingent encounter in any unknown locale. Since there is always an interval, or a zone of indeterminacy between two points of encounter, contiguous as they may be, the spatial trajectory of encounter and, by extension, geographical digression comprise an aleatory moment whereby any interval becomes the site of another complication and entanglement. Rather than a pre-given point, a matter of point of view, or distance in any metric sense, what is said to be singular is a set of points on a given trajectory, especially, in the neighborhood relation of topology. This means that being “singular” is not in relation to “universal” but in relation to “ordinary” or “regular.” What is crucial is not what one perceives but how one negotiates one’s bodily encounter in the immediate vicinity; that is, what counts in thinking singularity is, then, a method of prolonging or extending a remarkable point into the “normal points” of
understanding in relation to the metropolitan audience. Banks remains doubly
singularized as remarkable, insofar as he is not absorbed totally into the calculable
anticipation of the reader in the metropolis, and also insofar as his identity retains some
traits of multiple locales with a different set of flora, fauna, animal habitat, and local
customs and manners.

The public satire of Banks’s infatuation is very symptomatic of an unbridgeable
impasse that Banks can’t cross over between his interest in voyaging in the South Seas as
the Grand Tour and the public interests in him. Linnaeus the Younger, for instance,
complains:

I know that Banks doesn’t want to tell me anything before he has
completed his work; but if only we could speak face to face, we could
soon agree, since our purposes are different: mine is only to continue the
system, only to determine the plants’ genera and species and thereby
preserve the already started central book [Systema Naturae] in the science
[of Natural History]; but Banks, who has money, wants to illustrate these
[plants] with descriptions and figures.35

Banks is more interested in finding new species over the course of his voyage than
extending the system of nature that Linnaeus proposes. He certainly offers himself a
public persona of the Dilettante and at the same time extends a crucial influence by
means of journalizing his singular encounters of the world.36

To say that Banks draws a singular trajectory is to say that Banks manages to
negotiate the (differential) edges of the encounter with a myriad of islands in the South
Seas. Banks’s journal records multifarious instances of edge-negotiation. When he was
drawing nearer to Tahiti, he passes some people “on the shore” [who] “made many
signals.” Not knowing exactly “whether they meant to frighten away or invite them,”
Banks exclaims, “Had we therefore out of mere curiosity hoisted out a boat and the
natives by attacking us oblige us to destroy some of them the only reason we could give for it would be the desire of satisfying a useless curiosity.” In this case, Banks is not unaware that his curiosity, “self-defense, and preservation in come in opposition to the laws of hospitality, duties to which mankind usually give the preference in all cases.”

When Banks lay anchor at Matavai Bay in 13 April 1769, he encounters “some of the hundreds of inhabitants whose faces at least gave evident signs that we were not unwelcome guests” much in the same way that Bougainville received: “A crowd of Indians welcomed us on the shore with the most emphatic demonstrations of happiness.”

We then walked into the woods followed by the whole train to who we gave beads and small presents. In this manner we walked for 4 or 5 miles under groves of Cocoa nut and bread fruit trees loaded with a profusion of fruit and giving the most grateful shade I have ever experienced: in short the scene we saw was the truest picture of an arcadia of which we were going to be kings that the imagination can form.

Banks approaches the island of Tahiti in terms of arcadia and particularly the natural garden of paradise, whereas the particular arrangement of the natural setting prefigures utopia for Bougainville: “We stood in for the land. The whole coast rises in an amphitheatre with deep gullies and high mountains . . . As a whole this island presents a charming aspect.” Geographical arrangement prompts Banks and Bougainville to optimize a useful inscription device for their respective encounters; furthermore, none of the negotiations which Banks and Bougainville describe could exist without the particular geographical arrangement of the island.

In negotiating an ethnic position, Banks mutates between the two extreme roles of total newcomer and complete participant, who, in going native, is unable successfully to communicate such a singular position to the public. “The chief made us signs that if we
chose to eat he had victuals already; we accepted the offer . . . dressed after their way.

The adventures of this entertainment I must wish to record particularly, but am so much hurried by attending the Indians ashore almost all day long that I fear I shall scarce understand my own language when I read it again."40 No matter how absurd or confused the circumstances and activities of his “tribe” might appear, Banks, like the ideal observer, retains his faith that some kind of a discernible account is attainable. Banks adapts himself to the habitus of Tahitian people, which means that Banks has a local appellation:

As for our own names the Indians find so much difficulty in pronouncing them that we are forced to indulge them in calling us what they please, or what they say when they attempt to pronounce them. I give here a list: Ca;tn Cooke Toote, Dr. Solander Torano, Mr. Hicks Hete, Mr. Gore Torro, Mr. Molineux Boba from his Christian name Robert, Mr. Monkhouse Mato, and myself Tapne.41

As a translator, Banks provided a particularly important service to the expedition by facilitating barter for fresh food as Banks puts it: “Dr. Solander and myself . . . all along acted in the capacity of market men.” Banks even participates as a character in the funeral ceremony of mourning: “My curiosity was raised by his most singular dress. I was desirous of knowing what he did during his walk . . . Tomorrow I am going to be smutted from head to toe to do whatever they desire to do.”42 Banks is steering a mutable path by going native and further hybridizing, though he does not yet understand initially the nature of religion: “We have not yet seen the least traces of religion among these people, maybe they are entirely without it.”43

While Banks tries to expend his time and energy without reserve, Bougainville feels responsible for protecting Tahiti as a utopia. For both of them, Tahitian people are
remarkably handsome. For Bougainville, the race is superb, with men 5 feet 10 inches tall, many reaching six foot, a few exceeding this. Their features are very handsome. They have a fine head of hair which they wear in various ways. For Banks, the features of women are particularly remarkable: “I espied among the common crowd a very pretty girl with a fire in her eyes that I had not before seen in the country.” The mildness of the climate, the beauty of scenery, and the fertility of the soil where there is no need to labor for sustenance cause Banks to imagine the island of Tahiti as a palpable paradise especially when there is in a certain degree a lack of sexual inhibitions among Tahitian women. Banks is certainly not an unqualified admirer of the beauty of Oberea, or Purea known as the Dolphin’s queen and the wife of Oamo: “Our attention was now entirely diverted to the examination of a personage we had heard so much spoken in Europe: she appeared to be about 40, tall and very lusty, her skin white and her eyes full of meaning, she might have been handsome when young but now few or no traces of it were left.” Banks romanticizes the Tahitian women by adopting an indifferent stance on the political structure of the Tahitian islands. When Oberea takes care to provide Banks with cloth to replace the lost jacket, Banks becomes “motley” with his dress being half English and half Indian. Banks is not a little taken aback by the unabashed forwardness of the Tahitian women. He writes in the journal: “We walked freely about several large houses attended by ladies who showed us all kind of civilities our situation could admit of, but as there were no places of retirement, the house being entirely without walls, we had not an opportunity of putting their politeness to every test.” The same women of Tahiti, however, present scenes of peace, contentment, and sensual pleasure for Bougainville. A large population, made up of handsome men and pretty women, living together in abundance and good health, with every indication of the
The Tahitian women are consecrated by Commerson as the idols of love, for which “the whole island is its temple, all the women are its idols, and all the men worshippers.” The island of Tahiti is, for Commerson, the only ideal place on earth, in which “people live without vices, without prejudices, without needs, and even without dissension.”

The geniality of the Tahitians provides a utopian venue for Bougainville; he names the island of Tahiti New Cythera: “And so I have named it New Cythera and the protection of Minerva is as necessary as in the ancient Cythera to defend one against the influence of both the climate and of the people’s morals.” While it seems that Bougainville promotes Rousseau’s notion of the Noble Savage in a state of nature, he pre-idealizes the island of Tahiti as utopia. Commerson also exclaims in his letter on “The Discovery of the New Isle Cythera or Tahiti”: “This island seemed to me such that I had already applied to the name of Utopia or Fortune, given by Thomas More to his ideal republic, even before I knew that M. de Bougainville had named it New Cythera.”

When Bougainville leaves eventually, he exclaims thus:

I cannot leave this fortunate island without praising it once more. Nature has ceded it in the finest climate in the world, embellished it with the most attractive scenery, enriched it with all her gifts, filled it with handsome, tall and well-built inhabitants. She herself dictated its laws, they follow them in peace and make up the happiest society on this globe. Lawmakers and philosophers, come and see here all that your imagination has not been able even to dream up.

Bougainville’s gain of utopic vision becomes one of “again,” that is, “once more” – the possibility of being repeated, i.e., iterability at the heart of the very possibility of his
journal writing that is capable of communicating his utopic (nowhere) vision as the possibility of the now and the here.

Curiosity works for Banks in Tahiti as the re-markable place of the singular. Tattooing stimulates a singular curiosity; Banks comes across “a figure of a man made of Basket work, roughly but not ill designed” near Marae Mahaiatea. The architecture of the Marae, the apparatus of sacrifice is particularly singular in the eyes of Banks. Aside from serving a religious function, it is a site of social events such as the wrestling competition Cook, Banks, and Solander witnessed: “Here was prepared for our diversion an entertainment quite new to us, a wrestling match at which the other gentlemen soon joined us. A large court yard railed with Bamboo about 3 feet high was the scene of this diversion.” For this diversion the religious and political significance of the marae was not yet discernible to Banks, but, when he visited the grand Marae Mahaiatea in the joint circuit of Tahiti, he understands that the Marae was an important open-air venue for social and religious ceremonies by the lineage personage which constructed it. Purea has built the grand Marae Mahaiatea for her seven year old son named Teriirere. Banks has found the site remarkable, since “it is almost beyond belief that Indians could raise so large a structure without the assistance of Iron tools to shape their stones or mortar to join them.” He has also noticed that the marae in the Windward islands, such as Tahiti, Moorea, and Meetia, are much more sophisticated and refined in stonework than those of the Leeward islands, such as Maiao, Tupai, Raiatea, Huahine, and Maupiti: “The stones are polished and truly as stones of the kind could be by the best workman in Europe.” In providing a singular arrangement for the new experience, Tahiti exceeds Alan Bewell’s assessment of Tahiti as “the island of tropical flowers and accommodating women” or
“the place where scientific exploration and botanical study are fused with sensual love,” where “male scientific and sexual desire find their appropriate goal in the floral realm.”

When Banks negotiates a local knowledge that Tupia equips himself with, he states that Tupia is not simply an object of curiosity:

He is certainly a most proper man, well born, chief of Tahowa or priest of the island, consequently skilled in the mysteries of their religion; but what makes him more than anything else desirable is his experience in his navigation of these people and knowledge of the islands in these seas. . . . Thanks heaven I have a sufficiency and I do not know why I may not keep him a curiosity, as well as some of my neighbors do lions and tigers at a large expense than he will probably ever put me to; the amusement I shall have in his future conversation and the benefit he will be of to this ship, will I think fully repay me.

Instead of being diverted by any oddity at all, Banks is, as an in-between figure, fascinated by the nexus between native life and local knowledge.

Rather than negating or affirming the one variant view in favor of the other Banks, I’ve problematized, first of all, a pre-established assumption of the relationship between the metropolitan center and the local periphery. Although the center and the periphery may form the useful co-ordinates of exploration and, by extension, cartography, I understand that the schema of the metropolis and the local runs the risk of presupposing symmetrically stabilized power relations between the civilized and uncivilized world. As Nicholas Thomas and Nigel Leask have suggested in their respective work, the self-sufficient power relations of European travelers begin to be “entangled” in local places. Put differently, the local status of encounter is much complicated than its metropolitan status. As Bruno Latour also emphasizes, “who includes and who is included, who localizes and is localized is not a cognitive or a cultural difference, but the result of a constant fight” in the unstable, uncertain power
relations of encounter. Not only did seaward Europeans bring venereal disease as well as the invasive, fatal impact of foreign plants and animals on the flora of Tahiti, but landward Tahitians also incorporated the foreigners in their own way, oscillating between the two poles of hostility and hospitality. Samuel Wallis’s effort to land Matavai Bay, for instance, bears witness to the fact that Tahiti is a gaping opening, a “borderline” that drives mad the very interior self of Wallis, serving as an ambivalent hiatus, or a sort of abyss. When the Tahitians incorporate the foreigners, they quickly learn how to manipulate the European sentiment by mourning. While Bougainville sentimentalizes the mourning of an old man’s weeping at his departure after his short stay, Banks leaves the island of Tahiti with the local knowledge embodied by Tupia and the memory of mourning as a “custom we had often condemned in conversation as savoring more of affected than real grief.”

A generic category of romance does not evoke a cartographic abstraction of scattered islands but rather a contingent negotiation as a particularly provisional result of encounter among new entities, singular things and temporal ruins. This is the way in which one acknowledges the “plurality of histories” and the “islands of history” as Marshals Sahlins calls it: “the heretofore obscure histories of remote islands deserve a place alongside the self-contemplation of the European past –or the history of civilizations – for their own remarkable contributions to an historical understanding. We multiply our conceptions of history.” Then one would not speak of history deriving from the Eurocentric past, but rather understand that historical movement comprises its own co-ordinations and utopian, fantastic reorientations at once continuous with and discrete from the European past, present, and future in the island of Tahiti. The island of
Tahiti singularly de-nominates the very fantastic spacing of remote, indeterminate, and new space.
CHAPTER IV

THERE IS NO MORAL WORLD OUTSIDE OF GEORGIC EXPRESSION

When William Roy (1726-1790) and his successor William Mudge (1762-1820) carried out the Survey of the British Isles, their military cartography became nationally significant in the subsequent mapping of the South Seas making “dominance at a distance feasible” as Latour puts it. This authorial figure, which climbs to the height of a mountain, was mirrored in the “cognitive mapping” of the British loco-descriptive, topographical, and georgic poetry. The question of why there is an image of concentric circles in the British topographical and georgic poetry is indissolubly linked with the premise of Jameson’s cognitive mapping: an “ideological extrapolation” by means of the “play of figuration”:

This positive conception of ideology has the merit of stressing the gap between the local positioning of the individual subject and the totality of class structures in which he or she is situated, a gap between phenomenological perception and a reality that transcends all individual thinking or experience; but this ideology, as such, attempts to span or coordinate, to map, by means of conscious and unconscious representations.  

Given the incapacity to map spatially the ultimate cause for urban experience, it follows that the missing or unrepresentable cause is immanent in the material conditions of reality. That is, the conception of Jameson’s cognitive mapping engages in the possibility of extrapolating “our historical moment to the totality of class relations on a global scale.” And as such come in the play of figuration as part of connecting the work of art with a socialist political project. Against the backdrop of Jameson’s politically
inflected play of figuration, Rachel Crawford pays attention to this political agenda of the British Georgic poetry: the “isometric relations of words and space are revealed in eighteenth-century texts that situate changes in the concept of social space in the interstices of topographies and literature.”63 The isotopic relationship between the work of art and the world allows Crawford to articulate two strategies of the British Georgic. On the one hand, it offered a visual image of the world that issued from a single English center. The visual center is a temporal center. Englishness becomes a means of locating the heart of a present moment which is both geographical and temporal which is unified by an invisible point of view. This means that the English literature sets up the coordinates of what is happening out there in the world. To this extent, literature becomes a telecommunications form (or play) of intelligence and information. On the other hand, it represents the space of England at the same time when it produces English space. The georgic is, for Crawford, both a representational space in that the capacious form of the poetry epitomizes the prospect it represents. Indeed, Suvir Kaul emphasizes, “the poems [of the British georgic tradition] reveal such repression (or representation), or more often than not, manage such contradictions by thematizing them, with the plastic, expansive dynamic of each poem providing a formal structure for the expression, and the reconciliation or sublimation of, such contradictions.”64 A georgic formalization, then, entails the landscape of events. Within this current state of criticism, I argue that the authorial figure serves as a “fidelity operator” to retrace, reconfigure, and rearticulate what has happened to the author as a human subject.

The human subject continually invites outside forces and influences in the processes of not only incorporating but also inscribing place. It has worked itself out
through a kneading process of difference that is close to geography itself; that is, the human subject is locally born out of different semiotic, somatic, and material places. To deal with this place is to reassert the materiality of place, a specific effect of placing, arranging, and naming materials, things, and objects within a given locale. There has been an important stream of work on the improvisational, the repetitive, and the taken-for-granted rhythms and routines of “everyday life.” Among others, Michel Foucault, Erving Goffman, Henri Lefebvre, and Michel de Certeau have been exemplary in illuminating the ways in which everyday life takes place in the modern and the no less postmodern production of space. But it is equally important to articulate the necessary conjunction and the no less signifies disjunction between the topographies of everyday life and the tracings through which their materiality takes place in the subject and the eye: this is precisely why Michel de Certeau has performed “spatial practices”; it’s why Kevin Hetherington, Heidi Nast, and Steve Pile have practiced “the mapping the subject”; and it is also why many others have been interested in the connection(s) between cultures of colonialism and collecting, cultures of traveling and travel-writing, cultures of cartography and space, as well as in the links between visual perception and sometimes less ordinary, even extraordinary spatial practices of “light, motion, and speed” in an actual landscape. No one ever elaborates a politics of place and taking place without a topographical and also topological formalization.

It has been suggested by recent theorists of cartography and space that the encounter between the subject and the objects within a given locale is not a simple case of enjoyment, where the senses (especially the eye) organize and consume the view, or where the body situates itself in attitudes most apt for pleasure; but that this encounter
may partly or wholly consist in impressions caused in the subject by the things
themselves, and that aesthetic appreciation is not a purely interior event. Instead of the
subject saying, “What am I doing in this space,” he or she might ask, “What is this space
doing?” In the Severn River Valley in the West of England during the 1720s an
exemplary subject bore witness to the fact that the improvement of one urban network
raised the value of improvement in a neighboring urban network. In that decade, all of
major market towns in this trans-Severn area had turnpike trusts established along the
radial roads entering the neighboring cities: Ledbury in 1721, Gloucester in 1723,
Worcester and Tewkesbury in 1726, and Hereford in 1730. The chorography of turnpike
trusts system provides John Dyer with a cultural prospect for geographical movement
across the scale of national boundary. To this extent, the poet looks to praise
commercialized British imperialism while representing the political economy of wool
industry. This point of view is, however, an (optical) illusion emanating from a perfect
suturing of the poetic subject-matter (the fleece) into georgic expression and its
geographical signification.

My critical engagement in the British topographical poem(s) involves the
rechanneling of the contemporary theoretical spatial practice of “topolitics” and begins
with a dissociating analysis of the eighteenth-notion of topography as the description of
one’s own soil, the ownership of habitat, the genus or the spirit of place. British
topographical poems organize the field of perception of an actual landscape to take into
account the urban, architectural, agricultural, and political consequence of what has
happened to the land. John Dryden’s London, John Dyer’s Siluria, and William
Wordsworth’s Blackcomb mountains provide a specific place for and the taking place of the “topolitics” of empire.

Permit me to say it and straight out that the inhuman elements of the topographical poems under my discussion consist of light, speed, and motion; that the eye comprises the human element; that the materiality of place constitutes a sense of place, a topographical “undersense”; and that the “zooming” eye underwrites the integrity and legitimacy of a specific cultural community, indexing itself to a continuum progressing from past to future.

Why light, speed, and motion? One can ask if “light, speed, and motion” are the common poetic tropes, suggesting that they may not necessarily be connected with the topographical sense of place. Let’s recall that tropes are tours, changes of place, from somewhere to somewhere else; that rhetoric presents itself as a theory of places: displacement, voyage, transfer, metonymy and metaphor, translation or quotation. The quotation as such is, according to etymology, equivalent to setting in motion to move from one place to another. And pay attention to the language of a mathematician, Mandelbrot: “Look at the fractal object; if its dimension is comprised between 1.1 and 1.5, then you will easily find a geographical object that resembles it.” Metonymy gradates across the surface of that small, fractal, geographical object. Then, the psychological thesis that there is no sexual rapport may be paraphrased into a proposition that there is no geographical rapport but struggle and resistance. I am not going to defend and practice the rhetorical analysis of the poems, but I propose two answers to the question.

Drawing on John Barrell and Svetlana Alpers, the first answer is description; the second the organization of the field of perception. They both concur that the eye,
attracted by an area of light, travels immediately toward a landscape; and the eye captures the new objects in the landscape. And conversely, the new objects invite and perceive the eye for describing landmarks. The second point extends the first into a reading of eighteenth-century pictorial representation. According to Barrell, the representation of landscape develops a certain set of patterns: viewpoint and vanishing point. The eye is stretched at speed to the vanishing point and comes back to the foreground; and the eye “telescopes” the landscape, tracing the landscape to the vanishing point and following back the singular or new objects in the landscape forward, from near. “The eye moves at such speed over the landscape, only because it can organize so efficiently the objects in its path into a preconceived structure, which allows them an identity only as landmarks on the journey the eye makes to the horizon” (Barrell 22). From his explanation, I derive my point of the emergence of the traversing eye to trace forward the landscape. The forward movement of the eye particularly provides the coordination of a prospective, conic eye-view of the landscape, which entails the inseparability of the conic view with the cartographic survey. A few corollaries ensue that the eye organizes and determines the field of perception for describing the scene of what has happened to a specific place.

It is with these concerns in mind that I read first John Dryden’s poem titled *Annus Mirabilis*. The poem traces forward “the year of wonder 1666,” the taking place of the two events: war and fire. The sea provides the scene for describing a wondrous, naval victory of Britain over Holland: “Our little fleet was now ingag’d so far, / That, like the swordfish in the whale, they fought: / The combat only seem’d a civil war, / ’Till thro’ their bowels we our passage wrought” (Stanza 79) The panoply of the acts of the naval war is organized at a distance or rather organizes the distance of vision; the visual signals
of the victory are “zoomed” in at a speed exceeding vocal signals: “And now reduc’d on equal terms of fight, / Their ships like wasted patrimonies show; / Where the thin scatt’ring trees admit the light, / And shun each other’s shadows as they grow” (Stanza 126). The “tracing forward” movement of the eye also traces in time to evoke history as an invocation of the future anterior, that is, the smooth timing belt of diachronic history formation of the British naval empire: “Then, we upon our globe’s last verge shall go, / And view the ocean leaning on the sky” (Stanza 164). The survey writes an unbounded victory at a distance, from afar.

I pay particular attention to another event of fire, because the city of London after the fire provides a crucial link between topographical reading and the rereading of rebuilt topography. It is not simply wondrous that the city survives the Great Fire, but the fire is the most singular and monstrous for the eye: “th’ infant monster, with devouring strong. / Walk’d boldly upright with exalted head . . . No help avails, for hydra-like, the fire, / Lifts up his hundred heads to aim his way” (218, 249). The fire is the event to “implode” the whole of the city; it decomposes the city like a hydra-like movement into further smaller parts and ultimately “the ground zero.” As the city is burnt and destroyed totally, topographical reading is concerned with a newly established textured geography. The taking place of rebuilding means that a different kind of order emerges out of that hydra-like, opportunistic movement, a “chaotic” order contingent upon the continuous, contiguous encounter of the disorder of the fire which it is opposed to but also closely aligned with. As Daniel Defoe describes it, rebuilding “has spread the Face of it [London] in a most straggling, confused manner out of all Shape, uncompact, and unequal; neither long or broad, round or square . . . and yet all these put together are still be called
London: Whither will this monstrous city then extend? And where must a Circumvallation or Communication Line of it be placed?” (318). London is destroyed but somewhere between the uniformly turned ashes something happens: the Line, architectural, cartographic, topographical, and also textual, happens for Defoe. Any effort to remap or redraw the contours of the city is, then, tantamount to an effort to recover, redefine, and reconfigure the city itself. Since the topographical referent is all gone, rebuilding, rearranging, replacing London literally takes place in writing London. It is non-representable, non-mimic, and non-narratable. To put it in terms of Defoe, “it is, in the first place, to be observed, as a particular and remarkable Crisis, singular to those who write in this age, and very much to our advantage in Writing, that the great and more eminent Increase of Buildings, in and about the City of London, and the vast extent of Ground taken in, and now become streets and Noble Squares of Houses, by which the Mass, or Body of the whole, is infinitely great in our Time” (326). Writing London is descriptive; the rebuilt city is phase-transitional. At this conjuncture, Dryden re-defines the phase-shifting London as a commercially textured body of empire: “Methinks already, from this chymic flame, / I see a city of more precious mold . . . more great than human, and more august, [and] a constant trade-wind will securely blow / And gently lay us on the spicy shore” (293-304).” This determination comes out of the poetic formalization or organization of an indeterminable, uncertain, “transistant” place, into an on-going process of fluid empire.65.

British commerce, notably, the exemplary trade in wool moves from the local, domestic “Siluria,” the Trans-Severn area, into global realms beyond the British borders, into the Mediterranean, Russia, the Indies, Africa, Asia, and even the Americas. John
Dyer’s *The Fleece* (1757) keeps the track of the routes of the very geography that Visco da Gama and Columbus explored more than two centuries ago. The prospective of the Severn is associated with the unifying vision of sheep sheering and the commercial prosperity of localities and its implied prosperity of a nation and the felicity of a naval empire: “near at hand, the wide Majestic wave of the Severn slowly rolls / Along the deep-divided glebe: the flood, / And trading bark with low contracted sail, / Linger among the reeds and copsy banks / To listen; and to view the joyous scene” (1. 713-720).

Dyer’s topographical prospect favors a kind of “holographic” selection that reflects (or refracts ideologically as an instance of anamorphoscopic vision) the whole domains of labor related to wool trade. The poet’s survey, for example, flows the rhythm of repetitively laborious everyday life across scale from the rural hills of Siluria to the city of Leeds as the exemplary city of the British clothing industry: “And ruddy roofs, and chimney-tops appear / Of busy Leeds, up-wafting to the clouds / The incense of thanksgiving: all is joy; And trade and business guide the living scene, . . . they issue from cells / In bands unnumber’d eager for their work . . . repeat their virtuous efforts, and succeed. / Thus all is here in motion, all is life” (3. 303-321). The commerce of fleece makes it possible to make horizontal, fraternal connections across a variety of labors.

The taking place of interior furnishings, such as “folds,” “tapestries,” and “dress” props and replaces the world into a new order grounded on the British commercial, naval empire: “The whole globe/ is now, of commerce, made the scene immense; / Which daring ships frequent, associated / Like doves, or swallows, in th’ethereal food . . . For these, o’er all / The Kingdoms round, our draperies are dispersed” (4. 169 -344). Dyer’s
geographically traversing vision of commerce provides a way station to reappropriate the whole unity of Britain by means of the political economy of the fleece: “Thus feeble man, / With man united, is a strong nation . . . to find / Whate’er may soothe distress, and raise the fall’n, / In life’s rough race: O be it as my wish! ‘Tis mine to teach th’inactive hand to reap / Kind Nature’s bounties, o’er the globe diffus’d” (4. 488-502). Siluria serves, then, as a poetical as well as economic crossroad to bridge rural to urban and also national to international domains. Rather than a pastorally extensive area, the Trans-Severn area is indissolubly linked with the poetic dynamic of national and international commerce, the political economy of which involves the production and distribution of labor: “the care of sheep” for raw material, “labors of the loom” as the means of production, and “the arts of trade” as the means of distributing and consuming the national commodity. Dyer’s topographical sense consists of speed and motion: “the labors of the loom bring / Superior treasures speedier to the state . . . to speed / And to celebrate the union” (3. 609-10). The kinetic geography of commercial labor is represented as a “circular machine” of motion in the poem: “We are shown / A circular machine, of new design, / In conic shape: it draws and spins a thread without the tedious toil of needless hands. / A wheel invisible, beneath the floor . . . gives motion.” The poet’s poetic formalization of the topographical sense of Siluria articulates the will to clothe the world with the soft fleece and, by extension, the British commercial civility: “Man / With soft fleece shall everywhere be cloth’d” (4. 686-687).

My “topolitical” reading also engages in a critical reading of the ways in which Dyer represents Siluria’s local identity in linear time, indexing itself to a continuum progressing from a past pastoral haven to a way station to the ongoing progress of
commercial empire: “Siluria’s flowery vales, /Where the first springs arise of Britain’s happy trade, / now spreading wide, / Wide as th’Atlantic and Pacific seas, / Or as air’s vital fluid o’er the globe” (4. 691-695). The invocation of diachrony is a method of using collectivity selectively by manipulating the past in a functional way, a method of representing the land to meet some “moral” purposes for the author. Inventing the optical image of the continuous “time belt,” Dyer reinforces an imperial mode of vision to be compared to that of William Wordsworth in his poem titled “View from the Top of Black Comb (1810).”

In his unpublished *Guide*, Wordsworth declares a topographical preeminence of Black Comb: “Ascend to the top of the Mountain Black Comb, from which I can assert, on the best authority, may be seen a more extensive view than any other eminence the Island affords” (302). While explaining the outlook of the Dudon from the summit of the Black Comb, he writes: “The Stream is very interesting for the space of a mile above this point, and below, by Ulpha Kirk, till it enters the Sands, where it is overlooked by the solitary Mountain Comb, the summit of which, as that experienced surveyor, Colonel Mudge, declared, commands a more extensive view than any point in Britain” (161). When Wordsworth took a holiday at the seaside to improve the health of his two children, he obtained the account of the British Ordnance Survey from a neighbor at Bootle. The Reverent named James Satterthwaite as the incumbent of the Bootle parish provided information on the Survey in conversation while the Wordsworths were on the holiday. Wordsworth traces forward the taking place of the British Triangular Survey in the northern areas in the 1810s.
While Wordsworth invokes the cartographer as a “ministering Angel,” he situates himself in the same cartographic station that Mudge must have taken in his survey, for “from the summit of BLACK COMB/ the ampest range/ of unobstructed prospect may be seen/ That British ground command.” The vision of the Romantic poet traverses the courses of the British Ordnance Survey following the great rivers of Britain: the Trent, the Annan, Tweed and Clyde. “British ground commands/ low dusky tracts / Where Trent is nursed, far southward/ to the south-west/ The hoary peaks of Scotland that give birth/ To Tivot’s stream, to Annan, Tweed, and/ Clyde. Wordsworth’s line of eyesight overlays a series of concentric circles on the terrain, thus securing the author a “conic” view, since the line of eyesight emanates from the summit of Black Comb. The cartographic quality of Wordsworth’s perspective echoes with Mudge’s cartographic survey.

Wordsworth reconfigures the “taking place” of the Ordnance Survey on the top of Blackcomb to reinforce authorial power. To produce a paramount authorial figure, which stands on a “lofty mountain” or “above the convex of the globe” is a power-laden activity, since it is to force a particularly dominant, representational exercise. “As we left the plain, uplifting slowly/ (Above the convex of the watery globe)/ into clear view the cultured fields that/ streak/ Her habitable shores, but now appears/ A dwindled object, and submits to lie/ At the spectator’s feet.” The author requests the reader to align himself with his cartographic point of view, since the author embodies the national event and thus empowers himself to give people national pride. “Look home/ ward now! / In depth, in height, in circuit, how serene/ The spectacle, how pure!- Of Nature’s/ Works.” The cartographic survey reinforces imperial assumptions for Wordsworth. The image of a series of concentric geographic circles expands from the domestic place into realms
beyond the territory of Britain. The poet overlays his wheel-spoke line of the eyesight from Cambrian Hills to the shores of Spain, thus securing him an imperial mode of vision: “Look homeward now!” Wordsworth traces forward the landscape, from afar: “In depth, in height, in circuit, how serene / The spectacle, how pure! – of Nature’s works, / In earth, and air, and earth-embracing sea, / A revelation infinite it seems; Display august of man’s inheritance, / Of Britain’s calm felicity and power (28-34).

My reading of the topographical poems has discussed the taking place of the events within a given locale, suggesting the ways in which place not only provides a stage, an arena, or a “theater” for each poet’s “topolitical” formalization to trace forward the landscape of the event but place also gives place “a doing.” The “topolitical” negotiation between performance and performative, between writing and spacing, between memory and anticipation, (and equally important, between reason and affect) engages itself in a critical reassertion of the circularity of the materiality of place. My topographical and “topolitical” conjunction has a theoretical affinity with Joseph Addison’s georgic procedures of “dressing” meaning spatially. I discern the generic procedures of the Georgic: moral expression, spatial design through geographical digression, and description of the landscape “put in a dress” (Addison 4). One could say that there is no georgic morality outside of its geographical expression⁶⁷; that a moral percept “enters, as it were, through a byway” (Addison 6); that the innumerable Crowd of Thoughts whirled through the great thoroughfares of the Brain (Defoe 181). By paying attention to the geographical expression of “the byway and thoroughfares,” I understand that the geographical techniques that will be enacted concurrently in “scaping” the land, for instance, the turnpike road system, provide the precondition and the outcome for a
topological and georgic formalization. The double articulation of the “topistical” formalization as the taking place of and the tracing forward of the events in the actual landscape operates therefore as a poetic or further cultural logic that a specific locale will perform in its material taking place in writing place.
CHAPTER V

SALISBURY PLAIN, SALISBURY PLACE

This chapter attempts to provide a history of the evolution of the Salisbury Plain texts, including how William Wordsworth changes the characters and their roles from Salisbury Plain to Adventures on Salisbury Plain, and then use this as the basic framework for my psychoanalytically inflected reading of Salisbury Plain poems. Other literary historical points will be established: the poetical significance of the French Revolution and the general, growing popularity of old English verse ancient ballads as a context for the renewed interest in Spenser and Shakespeare. The issue of forgery in relation to *dighting* concerns four-tiered signification, first of all, in relation to language, which is old-fashioned, out of date, and antique; and in relation to its referent, which is made to seem ancient and/or ruinous, like heritages in landscape gardens; and also in terms of the old and the new, of which the logic of *dighting* moves from the imposing monument of the old to the transistant monument of the new (taste) by deconstructing the old. This “*dighted*” space both depends on, and assists in, the political context of the time when Wordsworth as a “very angry young man” is working on his first version of the poem. When I approach the issue of the ancient transport in Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain poems, I aim to chart a new territory to reveal the complex geographies of Romanticism.

“The Sailor has risen in my esteem. Heaven knows there was need,” William Wordsworth writes in a 1799 letter to Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in order to pick up a
strong nodal point of revising of his early *Salisbury Plain* poem into *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. One particular way to read Wordsworth’s knots of revision is to track the transference of narration, the transference of speech from one interlocutor in *Salisbury Plain* to the other in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. A traveler’s speech is replaced by the “artless” story of the Female Vagrant, which is given to the Sailor in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*.

My reading of *Salisbury Plain* poems engages itself in Wordsworth’s different need to “salvage” the Sailor from the Female Vagrant in the revision of *Salisbury Plain* into *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. What I hope to suggest is that Wordsworth’s *Salisbury Plain* poems both anticipate and exceed the “libidinous” economy of the Unconscious as Freud represents it, especially in his own critical essay, “The Uncanny.”68 When Wordsworth joins the disjoined parts of Romantic social life by using romance narrative to explore the “obscure walks of destiny”69 of those who must pursue it, he elaborates the poet’s role through the other roles filled by unknown others, such as the Traveler, the Female Vagrant, and the Sailor, which he adopts in relation to each other. Much in the same way as the modern physician Freud in the analytical scene of transference, the Romantic poet selects and verifies garbs and roles of each character. These roles of the Female Vagrant and the Sailor do not come “over and above”: they are, on the contrary, the internal generic elements of repetition, particularly Spenserian revision.70 What defines the extraordinary power of that disguised repetition more profound than bare revision is the reprisal of social accidents, the condensation one into another, with an echo or resonance which makes each the double of the other, as he states a dynamic of revision in the same letter: “Now by way of a pretty moving accident and to
bind together in palpable knots the story of the piece I have resolved to make her the widow or sister or daughter of the man whom the poor Tar murdered.” The invention of “palpable knots of the story” to make the vagrant woman the widow or sister or daughter of the murdered by the local, homeless Sailor provides the best example of the master puppeteer motif and of formal consonance with the issue of transference, the Freudian notion of “an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our intervention” (“Recollection” 165). To read Wordsworth with the Freudian notion of the uncanny and the issue of transference is particularly to analyze the development of Wordsworth’s poetic force, or to put it in Freudian terms, to make his poetic power accessible and intelligible to the reader of Salisbury Plain poems. My work rethinks questions about the ways in which Wordsworth achieves power as a poet.

But I shall argue that Wordsworth, unlike Freud, does not have a strong stake in curing transference neurosis; he gives that job to the vagrant woman in his revised Adventures on Salisbury Plain. He wants to learn how the transference is induced so that he can practice his poetic technique of narrative intervention. That is, Wordsworth argues, like Freud, that artificial illness as dangerous as real ones, and no less dangerous for the analyst as for the analysand. In this essay, I claim that Salisbury Plain poems represent all illnesses as artificial- that is, in the vocabulary of the poem, as the result of a political cause which has the social consequence of making an illness transferable from person to person, poem to reader.71

The emergence of an “abysmal,” itinerary traveler in the Plain lends attention to the issue of the “turns of chance” in relation to Wordsworth’s career. As the Traveler of Salisbury Plain asserts:
As Wordsworth explains how he arrives at Salisbury Plain in the *Advertisement of Guilt and Sorrow; or Incidents Upon Salisbury Plain* in the year of 1841, “the monuments and traces of antiquity, scattered in abundance over that region, led me unavoidably to compare what we know or guess of those remote times with certain aspects of modern society, and with calamities, principally those consequent upon war, to which, more than other classes of men, the poor are subject” (Gill 217). The Plain comes upon him as a savage soil where there isn’t a certain blockage or threshold between the modern man and the ancient savage as a consequence of war, revolution, and social displacement.

What is peculiar to Wordsworth’s modern society from a political point of view is that it is a process that turns people into indeterminable beings who do not fit into organic community or integrate quite smoothly into the state. The modern society unleashes patterns or flows of migration that put people into a situation where, in relation to each other, they are not able to tell who they are. The modern men become no worse than “savages without homes” (SP 36). The “transnational” situation of displaced people is a modern case in point; that is, the phenomenon of social dislocation consists in moving, changing land or terrain, going from one place to another, or beyond (trans) one terrestrial or earthly place toward another. Wordsworth might speak of a principle of the indefinite of the body; each of us is becoming capable of anybody. Wordsworth gathers
the same passion as anybody in the same political situation, as he asks himself, “in those wild assemblies / men who all of his hard lot partake, / Repose in the same fear, to the same toil awake?” (SP 16-19) The indefinite body is experienced as a portent state of being that forces him to rearticulate some of critical stances that he maintained in the 1793 Letter to Robert Watson, bishop of Landaff: “You should have felt like the bulk of mankind; their sorrows should be familiar to you” (47).74

Wordsworth’s search for form is a search conditioned by losing his ground. The traveler says, “Life is like this desart broad, / Where all the happiest find is but a shed, / And a green spot’ mid wastes interminably spread” (420-3). The desire for the “green spot” is symptomatic of the anxiety of losing one’s ground, the absolute anchorage, the ownership of habitat, or the common place. From the outset Wordsworth’s poetic trope “unhouzed” represses a social reading that there was a formerly home, and is thereby capable of prefabricating identifiable common places for virtual, “homeless” reader rather than empirical merchant, artisan, or householder: “Hard is life when naked and unhoused / And wasted by the long day’s fruitless pains75 / The hungry savage’ mid deep forests, roused / By storms, lied down at night on unknown plains / And lifts his head in fear (emphasis added SP 1-4). In the moment of “pining for happier days” (12) comes pain, but it is not enough to remember the “memory of pleasures” (22) in the abstract nor even to represent the repressed event in all its particularity. Wordsworth seeks to install himself directly in the Spenserian legacy in order to accomplish a living working through blockage, i.e., the repressed in the unconscious.

Wordsworth has to figure out what would be the condition for him to be the poet; and his first choice is Edmund Spenser. As Karen Swann has asked, “Why should
Wordsworth have composed his most ambitious and significant poem, Salisbury Plain, in one of the most taxing of metrical patterns, the Spenserian stanza?” Wordsworth couldn’t have written in blank verse, because of Milton, or to put it another way, because of the Oedipal anxiety of influence that Harold Bloom theorizes. To write the blank verse is to go on the Plain “unarmed,” so to speak. Spenser is a benevolent father figure in contrast with Milton. In this respect, Greg Kucich’s work on Romantic Spenserianism provides a historical insight into the eighteenth-century reception of Spencer as “malleable,” “adaptable,” “vulnerable,” “flexible,” or “correctible.” Further than this, Kucich articulates another crucial trait to fit in the historical conditions of an incommensurable gap or “rift” that Wordsworth couldn’t resolve politically: allegory, which implies revisionary dualism. Kucich says, “The Romantics are especially inspired by what appeared to be the dramatic center of Spenser’s allegorical world: the mind’s particular division between real and ideal experience” (95). While arguing that the tension of reality and ideality sets into resisting romance, Kucich elaborates:

In adapting Spenser’s allegorical duality to their own situation, the Romantics radicalized his politics to give him a more palpable social consciousness and to intensify his drama of the mind in conflict. Behind this important revisionary maneuver lay their inclination to … cultivate the more subversive, dissatisfied element of Spenser’s political experience, a discontent that greatly appealed to the revolutionary sentiments of the young Wordsworth, Coleridge, and many of their contemporaries. (101)

Spenser equips Wordsworth to poetically engage the world in which he moves and toward which he is moving and wants to move. Wordsworth both anticipates and exceeds the libidinous economy of the unconscious repression in order to engage himself in a
liminal “trance” logic that would be elevated to the position of a poetic law to “move” the public in the phase of his early poetic career in the 1790s.

Wordsworth sets up poetic diction of Salisbury Plain to the extent to which Spenser’s archaic diction retrofits Wordsworth circumstantial awareness of “roam[ing] the deep of social life,” that is, floating or abysmal indeterminacy. In so doing, Wordsworth’s terminology is akin to Freud’s terminology in his critical essay, “The Uncanny.” Wordsworth’s doubling or twinning in “twin swans” (SP 212) blurs distinction between identity and otherness. More significantly, Wordsworth takes on liminal interface by adopting romance narrative. It is no accident that Freud invokes romance in his unprecedented study of the uncanny. Freud steps into another section of aesthetics in search for an internal condition of the uncanny.

He [psychoanalyst] works in other plans of mental life and has little to do with those subdued emotional activities, which, dependent upon a multitude of concurrent factors, usually furnish the material for the study of aesthetics. But it does occasionally happen that he has to interest himself in some particular province of that subject; and then it usually proves to be a rather remote region of it and one that has been neglected in standard works. … The subject of the “uncanny” is a province of this kind. It undoubtedly belongs to all that is terrible – to all that arouses dread and creeping horror; it is equally certain, too, that the word is not always used in a clearly definable sense, so that it tends to coincide with whatever excites dread. Yet we may expect that it implies some intrinsic quality which justifies the use of a special name. One is curious to know what this peculiar quality is what allows us to distinguish as “uncanny” certain things within the boundaries of what is fearful. As good as nothing is to be found upon this subject. (219)

For Freud, a remote region is a place he comes back to and goes away from; that is, generic mass or magnetism is associated with romance. Just like Freud who filters out some peculiar quality of the uncanny from all that is terrible, Wordsworth seeks for a
positive internal condition of uncanny repetition in the Stonehenge and the savage Druids, both of which are “fearful” and “arouse dread.”

The province of Salisbury Plain is “as good as nothing” for Wordsworth, as well: a blank sky, void, a vacant plain, no moon, no shepherd, and no watchdog.

No shade was there, no meads of pleasant green,
No brook to wet his lips or soothe his ear,
Huge piles of corn-stack here and there were seen
But thence no smoke upwreathed his sight to cheer;
And see the homeward shepherd dim appear
Far off – He stops his feeble voice to strain;
No sound replies but winds that whistling near. (SP 46-52)

Wordsworth searches, in caesura of vision, for a figure to articulate the voice of hiatus – hio in Latin, from which comes hiatus and also chaos as in chaino, when one opens one’s mouth. “While to those walls he hied / A voice as from a tomb in hollow accents cried” (SP 80-81). The geographical Salisbury Plain de-nominates the very spacing of its poetic site as a void to convoke chiasmus, or as a liminal borderline that is capable of driving mad the very traveler in the Plain: “Once did the lightening’s pale abortive beam /
Disclose a naked guide-post’s double head, / Sole object where he stood had day its radiance spread” (SP 105-7). The event of arriving at Salisbury Plain provides the material chance of writing the poem of rupture for Wordsworth to pursue a path of the poet.

Wordsworth’s way to disclose a naked guide-post’s double head accords in crucial aspects with Freud’s way to (re)discover the uncanny. In a long etymological discussion, Freud unfolds, deliberately slowly and cumulatively, that “heimlich is a word
the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich” (30). While calling attention to Freud’s lengthy display of etymological research, Helene Cixous points out, the cumulative effects of such dictionary research circled, almost uncannily, around the concept of the uncanny by way of Grim, Sanders, and Hoffman. Freud’s text is itself “a strange theoretical novel,” “a kind of puppet theatre in which real dolls or fake dolls, real or simulated life, are manipulated by a sovereign but capricious stage-setter” (525). Freud’s “theoretical” strategy is to read repression and its symptomatic, recursive repetition in sheer moments of the same, in “the constant recurrence of similar situations” or “twist of fortune” (39). The Plain represses the fact that there was once a home: the prefix “un” in the word “unhouzed” may be a token of repression. And yet the absence of blockage or threshold in the primordial world brings in the returning of the repressed modern unhomely to the savage.

The idea of gravity toward submerged weight provides a particularly genetic means for Freud to define that Unheimlich is in some way or other a sub-species of Heimlich (emphasis added 30). Pensive weight flows under Wordsworth’s mind:

The thoughts which bow the kindly spirits down  
And break the springs of joy, their deadly weight  
Derive from memory of pleasures flown  
Which haunts us in some sad reverse of fate  
Or from reflection on the state  
Of those who on the couch of Affluence rest  
By laughing Fortune’s sparkling cup elate,  
While we of comfort reft, by pain depressed,  
No other pillow know than Penury’s iron breast.  
(17-24)
A weighty thought may become a chance of hope in the reflection of the very repressed, submerged weight. It is, however, in the first place for himself that Wordsworth is determined to lead his life as a resuscitated druidic savage, before becoming capable of violence that the druidic savages have begun in the mode of a proper past, therefore under such external conditions of war, famine, and plague that he necessarily identify with a figure from the historical past. Rather than a repressive concept of reflection as in Freud, I argue, repetition is a dynamic of the Wordsworth in the process of writing Salisbury Plain.

The traveler’s faltering and repetitive movement is uncanny. “O’er Sarum’s Plain the traveler with a sigh / Measured each painful step, the distant spire / That fixed at every turn his backward eye / Was lost, tho still he turned, in the blank sky (SP 37-41). His punctual, mechanistic movement mimes traveling; it migrates without ceasing; but becoming lost is a kind of advance. His movement is transversed “laterally” by the Sailor, the Dead House, and the Female Vagrant. It migrates beyond but does not gain an inch of ground. This endless repetition is uncanny and “artless” by virtue of its doubled movement to get at a place without spatial movement. The traveller’s movement is marked by the infinitely floating movement of a “vessel” to find a spot, a place, or a port where one calls in the poet’s language as the privileged site of decision, of authority or power. The traveler’s uncanny repetition is not the finding of the hidden half to complete itself in the present but an activity to testify to the “other” virtual half which the present continues to lack.

Michael Wiley notes the significance of the geographical name “Sarum” to consider Wordsworth’s social placelessness. Indicating precisely that Sarum was once a
central, thriving Wiltshire town which residents long ago had abandoned for Salisbury just over a mile to the South, Wiley asks what it ultimately means for Wordsworth to repress that the poem’s many non-places or absent features are locatable (21). For Wiley, the blanking of the highest spire in the Plain implies first and foremost the absence of social time and by extension social disorientation. The emergence of a blank space inscribes “its own new form of (perhaps revolutionary-utopian) temporal order” (27). However, Wordsworth’s acute awareness of circumstantial gravity may have kept him from actualizing or materializing the society, which “blanks out or deconstructs on his poetic landscape as more than a spot of momentary spot” (37).

The Stonehenge is indeed more than a “spot” of comfort. The memory of the Plain does not merely convoke sheer pleasure derived from having a home. The Stonehenge could have been an artifice of violence as much as it could have been a place of beauty, harmony, and concord; that is, it serves as the unsettling hiatus that deconstructs the distinction between the modern and the savage, as the “double head” which has been consigned to the other world. Since the savage also have “thoughts” that weigh on the poet, it will pose a threat to the poet to thematize the Stonehenge and its repressive, weighty thoughts:

It is the sacrificial altar fed
With living men. How deep it groans- the dead
Thrilled in their yawning tombs their helms uprear;
The sword that slept beneath the warrior’s head
Thunders in fiery air: red arms appear
Uplifted thro’ the gloom and shake the rattling spear. (SP 184-9)
The Plain is a particular possibility, chance, or threat of repetition. Stonehenge provides a secret, exoteric substance of the uncanny for the poet, whose potent expression keeps reader dizzy, that is, losing one’s balance in the repetitive Spenserian form. Wordsworth explores the possibility of recapitulating, replacing, in other words, internalizing the conditions of power in the Druids. Wordsworth’s poetic power to write the effect of “harrowing” voice exceeds the vicious, ruthless, and barbaric attempts of the Druids to sacrifice the living men. I argue that Salisbury Plain takes account of how you would put yourself in another whose statement is committed to violence, whose statement enforces cultural power.

Wordsworth seeks to find an object toward which to enact his newly forged power as a poet. At the very instant, he hears the human voice: “It was the voice of one that sleeping mourned, / A human voice! / … At dusk a female wanderer hither turned / And found a comfortless half-sheltered bed” (136-9). The emergence of the first human voice may be contingent in that it may be man’s voice or woman’s voice, but Wordsworth would want the female and reinscribe the female as an artist and the artist as an “artless,” i.e., “homeless” conjuror who has a design in the Plain. The poet’s access to another human voice, to the Female Vagrant’s narrative, is the process of practicing the condition of the exemplary poet’s movement.

Freud’s reading of a nurse in Hoffman’s Sandman takes rational account of Wordsworth’s reinscription of the female as the uncanny conjuror. Freud’s analysis of a nurse’s story starts with the mother who warns Nathaniel that the “Sand-man was coming” before she sends him to bed. Freud explains the role that the nurse plays in the child’s mind:
When questioned about the Sand-man, his mother, it is true, denied that such a person excited except as a form of speech, but his nurse could give him more definite information: “He is a wicked man who comes when children won’t go to bed … Those who lean towards a rationalistic interpretation of the Sand-man will not fail to recognize in the child’s phantasy the continued influence of his nurse’s story. (32-33)

The nurse is not in the story, but her continued story is committed to immersing her auditor into a state of complete bewilderment. In Salisbury Plain a nurse-like woman, who seems to be artless, recounts her story and implants bewilderment.

He [the traveler] waked her and at once her spirits fail
Thrilled by the poignant dart of sudden dread,
For of that ruin she had a tale
That might with a child’s fears the stoutest heart assail
Had heard of one who forced from storms to shroud
Felt the loose walls of this decayed retreat
Rock to his horse’s neighings shrill and loud,
While the ground rang by ceaseless pawing beat,
Till on a stone that sparkled to his feet
Struck and still struck again the troubled horse.
The man half raised that stone by pain and sweat,
Half raised; for well his arm might lose its force
Disclosing the grim head of a new murdered corse.
Such tales of the lone Spital she had learned. (141-154)

As Steinman notes, the Vagrant’s “artless” story – meaning natural, uncrafted, and also guileless -reveals Wordsworth’s “arfulness.” Steinman elaborates: “His [Wordsworth’s] readers hear a story in Spenserian Stanza (anything but artlessly uncrafted), and the plot has [a] design[s] on its audience” (63). In accounting for the female vagrant, therefore, the English word seems to be more fitting than Freud was willing to admit: beyond ken –
from “canny,” which means skilled in magic, artful, supernaturally powerful, easy, and comfortable, much in the same way that unheimlich is affiliated with heimlich. I argue that the female vagrant is represented as a rationalistic source of the uncanny.

The poet’s access to another voice provides the occasion for the poet to enact his poetic force for a particular audition. As Coleridge notes in Chapter 4 of Biographia Literaria, he recalls a particularly singular impression that Wordsworth’s recitation of Salisbury Plain gives rise to: “I shall hardly forget the sudden effect produced on my mind, by his recitation of a manuscript poem, which still remains unpublished, but of which the stanza, and tone of style, were the same as those of the ‘Female Vagrant’ as originally printed in the first volume of the Lyrical Ballads” (79). Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain poem engages the occasion of narration: how the telling of a story engages a reader both by rendering the scene of telling and by establishing the listener as a surrogate for the reader of the poem that the poet aspires to move. I argue that Salisbury Plain poem takes account of how you would put yourself in the position of attending to someone whose statement commits violence. The vagrant woman recounts her story:

“The pains and plagues that on our heads came down,
Disease and Famine, Agony and Fear,
In wood or wilderness, in camp or town,
It would thy brain unsettle even to hear.
All perished, all in one remorseless year,
Husband and children one by one, by sword
And scourge of fiery fever: even tear
Dried up, despairing, desolate, on board
A British ship I waked as from a trance restored.” (316-24)
Her voice is queer in the double sense that she doesn’t have her mind at all and that it is almost indistinguishable whether the voice of the Female Vagrant reiterates or represents the voice of the poet. All the pairings in the vagrant woman’s story, such as “pains and plagues,” “wood or wilderness,” camp or town,” “sword and scourge,” “one by one,” “fiery fever,” “board a British” attest to the female’s emotional and the physical paralysis of her homelessness, i.e., her state of trance. The homonymic mechanics of the female vagrant’s language inscribes the poet’s sophisticated investment in the feminine feeling of suffering. As Adela Pinch’s study of the feminine in Wordsworth’s lyric suggests, the issue of gender “emerges in a turn away from a natural object, a turn into the self and into representation. . . . For Wordsworth, representing the power of imagination as the power of a woman’s voice represents a search for poetic power without agency, for affective lyric voice unhindered by the labor of its own production” (846). The female vagrant is exploited and “subjectivized” by the poet; that is, she serves as a local conduit through which the poet’s voice transits. The poet’s metrical “shuttling” back and forth in Spenserian repetition weaves and fashions the voice of the female woman whose rhetorical efficacy is capable of harrowing and moving a virtual public to be distinguishable from the public that will witness the gibbet at the end of Adventures on Salisbury Plain.

The female vagrant has power to fundamentally unsettle one’s mind, because she has been expelled by force from home.

“Three years a wanderer round my native coast
My eyes have watched yon sun declining tend
Down to the land where hope to me was lost;
And now across this waste my steps I bend:
Oh! Tell me whither, for no earthly friend
Have I, no house in prospect but the tomb.”
She ceased. The city’s distant spires ascend
Like flames which far and wide the west illume,
Scattering from out sky the rear of night’s thin gloom. (388-96)

While keeping the reader imagining a social predicament of homelessness, Wordsworth exercises his poetic power in the two procedures of adjunction and condensation. The female vagrant’s story specifies the adjunct fields of social problems in all their dimensions: the British participation in the American war, the death of husband and children, the loss of home, family, income, and self-respect “that is dear in being,” the “loss of little range of water,” her father’s right of access to his property, and the dreadful tale of a murderer. The female vagrant’s narrative is true not because it persuasively depicts casual links, but because it forcefully prescribed sympathy. Her story is so instrumental that she seems to appeal to the immediate political programs, but her unintentional words of trance is far more actionable than any prescribed political programs.

The sheer bulk of her continued story is now committed to throwing “an old man [who] comes tottering sidelong down to ask the hour” (SP 165-7) in the epochal suspense of a trance. The kind of perspective that I am adopting by the term “trance” indicates a constellation of meanings: not only, as the OED tells us, a state of dread or suspense, or an unconscious or insensible condition, or an intermediate state between sleeping and awaking, or a dream-like state; not only these, but a connection as well with a potent state of being— that is, an unwilled paralysis derived from a multitude of causes. Taken together, all these meanings are all inflected in the following notions of psychoanalysis: that of a state of the unconscious; and that of the resistance to transference.
The Sailor of Salisbury Plain, who remained inapparent, hidden, or latent as in metaphoric stoppage, is brought to Adventures on Salisbury Plain. Wordsworth “salvages” the Sailor from a different “need” from the occasion for the poet to practice the voice of a moving trance that the Female Vagrant carries in order to “unsettle thy brain to bear” in his early Salisbury Plain. Why does Wordsworth make the Female Vagrant’s moving narrative serve as a “cover” for a more profound repetition, which is played in another dimension, a staff or the gibbet in which roles and garbs are furnished by the “death instinct” of the Sailor? How is it that the theme of death can be in itself the most positive element to the point of affirming repetition and also of “transcending” the gibbet audience in the practical sense of “being capable of interesting the other readers?”

The emergence of the Sailor constitutes disguised repetition in the sense that an entirely other announces itself in disguising itself in the Soldier’s garb. What defines the extraordinary power of that clothed repetition is the poet’s dramatization of social accidents by staging them in the “puppet theatre” that Cixous theorizes and thereby condensing them one into another with a resonance which makes each the double of the other. Wordsworth’s reference to the Sailor in the 1799 letter to Coleridge strengthens the case:

He [the Sailor] has risen in my esteem. Heaven knows there was need. The third part I think interesting a praise which I give myself with more pleasure as I know that in general I can lay little claim to it. I also took courage to devote two days (O Wonder) to the Salisbury Plain. I am resolved to discard Robert Walford and invent a new story for the woman. The poem is finished all but her tale. Now by way of a pretty moving accident and to bind together in palpable knots the story of the piece I have resolved to make her the widow or sister or daughter of the man whom the poor Tar murdered. So much for the vulgar. Further the poet’s invention goeth not (Emphasis added 1799 256-7).
Wordsworth attempts to congeal, condense, and precipitate “circumstance which did all faith exceed” (ASP 24) into “knots” of social accidents, in order to give testimony to the “truth” that society is unjust and also that “hard is the world’s law” (ASP 659). As Wordsworth declares to Francis Wramgham in 1795, its [ASP’s] object is to expose the vices of the penal law and the calamities of war as they affect individuals (Letters 159).84

Early in the Letter to Landaff, Wordsworth recalls: “Our penal code is so crowded with disproportioned penalties and indiscriminate severity that a conscientious man would sacrifice in many instances a respect for the laws to the common feelings of humanity… [that] a man cannot be instrumental without forfeiting his self-esteem and incurring the contempt of his fellow citizens” (40). Instead of adopting the story of a local murderer, whose name is arguably Robert Walford, Wordsworth reinvents a new story in which an “eventful” encounter of the two remote entities, that is, the Female Vagrant and the Sailor, come closer once again into the relationship between father and daughter, between husband and wife, or between brother and sister. Such an encounter is eventful in the sense that another always thinks in him, another who must also be of “all present thought forlorn” (ASP 558); and that the female vagrant’s narratives induce an involuntary trance toward the Sailor in order to move him into her compelling affect of sympathetic narrative.

I argue that this poetic “turn” – a “revolution” in feeling draws the poet all too closer to the modern physician, Freud, who “revolutionized” hypnotic therapy by constructing the analytical treatment of the transference and its related resistance. Just as one reads so often, Freud “knows how to listen to his patients,” Coleridge knows how to listen to Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain to analyze an “involuntary dislike” that
Wordsworth’s poem causes to the patient-reader. In Chapter 4 of Biographia, Coleridge is describing the force of genius as to inducement of transference: “And therefore is it the prime merit of genius so to represent familiar objects as to awaken in the minds of others a kindred feeling concerning them and that freshness of sensation which is the constant accompaniment of mental, no less than of bodily, convalescence” (emphasis added 81).

Much in the same way, Freud argues, in his essay titled “Remembering, Repeating, and Working through,” that transference is still repetition; that if repetition makes one ill, it also heals one; that all cure is a voyage to the bottom of repetitive compulsion. Freud says, “The main instrument for curbing the patient’s compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive for remembering lies in the handling of transference” (164). The more “repetitive” and “dramatic” operation by which the resistance and the cure take place has the name of transference:

We admit it [compulsion] into the transference as a playground in which it is … expected to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic instincts that are hidden in the patient’s mind. Provided only that the patient shows compliance enough to respect the necessary conditions of the analysis, we regularly succeed in giving all the symptoms of the illness a new transference meaning and in replacing his ordinary neurosis by a “transference-neurosis” of which he can be cured by therapeutic work. The transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness and real life through which the transition from the one to the other is made. The new condition has taken over all the features of illness; but it represents an artificial illness which is at every point accessible to our intervention. (155)

The analyst initiates an intermediate state that has all the aspects of an “artificial” compulsion; and the analyst invents a procedure that converts repetitive compulsion as a driving force of analysis. The patient is supposed to repeat the whole of his disturbance in artificial condition, taking the person of the analyst as “object.” By reorganizing the
patient’s compulsive repetition around the analyst, transference renders it intelligible, accessible, as Freud says, to the “artifice,” i.e., intervention of the analyst.

I argue that Wordsworth does not have a strong stake in curing transference neurosis, unlike Freud whose “hubris” is to cure all symptoms of illness with an intelligible, veritable technique, the transference that is transmissible and thus, in principle, practicable by anyone. Wordsworth’s poetic intervention in the Sailor is, as far as poetry is concerned, far more abrupt and eventful to the extent to which the sacrifice of the Sailor “seals off” further eventfulness of committing a social crime even under “the vices of the penal law and the calamities of war” that Wordsworth suggests in the letter to Wrangham.

The Sailor walks through the instrumental destiny of homelessness in propping himself on a staff: “An aged old man with feet half bare / Prop’d on a trembling staff he crept with pain / … His ragged coat scare showed the Sailor’s faded red” (ASP 2-9). The Traveler on the skirt of Sarum’s Plain asks: “And dost thou hope across the Plain to trail / That frame o’ercome with years and malady, / Those feet that scarcely can outrawl the snail, / These withered arms of thine, that faltering knee?” (ASP 10-14) The proximity of the Sailor and the Traveler prompts the Sailor to ask “any causal theme” concerning his homelessness: “His mind was still as a deep evening stream; / Nor, if accosted now, in thought engross’d, / Moody, or inly-troubled, would he seem / To traveler who might talk of any causal theme” (ASP 132-136). The Traveler, however, gives the vagrant woman the job to give the Sailor causal links to his homelessness.

The Female Vagrant’s “causal theme” represents social causes that would allow her narrative to flourish in history and that would allow her to thrive in a coherent,
biographical course of life by virtue of her individual closure of history. When she recounts some causality from which her story subsequently unfolds and to which it can repetitively return, her compulsive narration is not, however, the act of repression. The impulsive instinct is awakened by “some precipitating cause” into the Female Vagrant:

“Three years a wanderer, often have I view’d,
In tears, the sun towards that country tend
Where my poor heart lost all its fortitude:
And now across this moor my steps I bend-
Oh! tell me whither –for no earthly friend
Have I.”- she ceased, and weeping turned away,
As if because her tale was at an end
She wept; - because she had no more to say
Of that perpetual weight which on her spirit lay.

She ended, of all present thought forlorn,
Nor voice nor sound that moment’s pang express’d (ASP 550-562).

The Female Vagrant regrets not having any more story or loss, because her story defends against pain, or to put it in psychoanalytical terms, the “ego defense” is shattered by the potent representation of suffering. From a formal point of view, however, the “perpetual weight” that the Female Vagrant carries as a surrogate narrator in Salisbury Plain and also as a surrogate “analyst” in Adventures on Salisbury Plain comes to a close.

The vagrant woman has tries, in a continual effort to “treat” the Sailor in a trance, to multiply the versions of her narrative: “But soon her heart on other thoughts was bent / so friendly was his voice . . . Meanwhile discourse ensued of various kind / Which by degrees a confidence of mind / And mutual interest fail’d not to create” (254-259). The
multiple samplings of her “artifice” suggest that the transference of her “learned” and “artificial” narratives is as dangerous as real ones and no less dangerous as the analyst-vagrant and as for the analysand-Sailor. Wordsworth’s interventional naming of the displaced populace of vagrancy, such as the “wild assemblies,” the “wild brood (ASP 503),” and the “earth tenants” recuperates the Jacobins in the historical development of the French Revolution, which accounts for the Sailor’s counter-pulsation and thus establishes the counterpoise to the delusive identification of the Female Vagrant’s narrative: “Nor to her friendly summons answer could return” (405).

The “fruitless pains” of the Female Vagrant’s inducement of transference, nevertheless, bears fruit, fruit that bears the weight in the figure of the Sailor.

The woman from the ruin’d tenement
Did with a light and cheerful step depart,
But deep into his vitals she had sent
Anguish that rankled like a fiery dart
She with affectionate and homely art
His peace of mind endeavour’d to restore (586-591).

Unlike the Female Vagrant, who reaches the closure of her story with “all forlorn thought present” in the poem, the Sailor becomes the one who takes the responsibility for what has happened to him.

The Sailor’s encounter of the gibbet manifests his unconscious destination; that is, the gibbet comes athwart the Sailor’s “all track quite lost (ASP 165).” “As he [the Sailor] plodded on, with sudden clang / A sound of chains along the desert rang: A human body that in irons swang, / Uplifted by the tempest sweeping by” (ASP 113-116). A “gride” iron puts the Sailor’s “turns of chance” into a “quaestio,” the Latin for process,
proceeding, and also trial. The Plain emerges, in this light, as a site of multiple
determinations between chains and chance, between pain and plain, and between gride
iron and gibbet:

In spot so savage but with shuddering pain
Nor only did for him at once renew
All he had feared from man, but roused a train
Of mind’s phantoms, horrible as vain.
The stones, as if to sweep him from the day,
Roll’d at his back along the living plain;
He fell and without sense or motion lay,
And when the trance was gone, feebly pursued his way. (118-126)

It is no doubt that the stones rolled as if they had an intention to sweep him. The stones
serve as the natural signs that would attest to the power that the vagrant woman’s potent
story conjures up. And yet the phenomenon of transference is arguably manifested in the
trance that the Sailor seizes; the resistance to transference is, as Freud says, “as it were,
drawn over by the ego to its side” (25). 89

In crucial aspects that an impassible political fate be may recuperated, the Sailor
looks like “ghosts . . . on nightly roam intent” as if his ideational representative of his ego
is denied entrance to the psychic apparatus and thus a fixation is established in the Plain.
In the trance of the Sailor, Swann elaborates:

The Sailor, whom we and he have been mistaking for an “individual
mind,” is suddenly exposed as the trope or figure – as one signifier in a
structure like an unconsciousness, or apparently less mysteriously, as one
character in a poetic text. The poem’s repeated sudden openings onto an
“other world” shock not because one sees ghosts, but because in these moments one intuits “oneself” as a ghost (815).

As in the transference of affect from an unconscious idea onto a preconscious one, “a train of mind’s phantoms” is roused in the Sailor. The mind’s phantoms are the true elements of theatre of justice: “Gigantic beings ranged in dread array; such beings, thwarting the traveler’s way, … stride across the wold, … their state unfold, / And … mysterious council hold” (ASP 238-243). The Plain reinforces its figurative operation; that is, primordial earth writing in the Wordsworthian sense of geo-graphy compensates for the Sailor by resisting to narrative.

Although the Sailor remembers nothing of what is repeated, he expresses it in action. “In sight of his own house, in such a mood / That from his view his children might have run, / He met a traveler, robb’d him, shed his blood; / And when the miserable work was done, / He fled, a vagrant since, the murder’er’s fate to shun” (95-99). The Sailor repeats the crime without knowing that he repeats it; that is, he strikes the traveler down as the father stroke the infant in exactly the same place the Sailor had struck his murdered victim.\textsuperscript{90} The Sailor repeats committing a murder on the threshold of home as if he is inhibited from crossing the threshold. In the process of working through the transference, the Sailor is all the more bound to the spot of the gibbet: “Through his brain / At once the griding iron passage found/ Deluge of tender thoughts then rushed amain/ Nor could his aged eyes from very tears abstain” (645-648).

The “passion” (ASP 634) of the Sailor carries the weight of his staff to the gibbet. The Sailor constitutes an allegorical figure that would be compared to Spenser’s Redcross
Knight or a figure of Druidic Sacrifice par excellence. The Sailor’s “rusty gun” in *Salisbury Plain* is now displaced into the staff that he leans on and the weight of “the gridding iron” to cross his person. The Sailor’s allegorical movement is disturbing, because the Sailor’s “trajectivity,” though errant, kneads out difference from the public management of spectacle as a puppet. Social accidents derived from the Sailor’s homelessness—“I had hopes that I my home might yet regain” (ASP 738) inhibits his neighbor from keeping their imagination at home. “They, alone and tranquil, call’d to mind / Events so various; recollection ran / Through each occurrence and the links combin’d, / And while his silence, looks, and voice they scan, / And trembling hands, they cried, “He is the man!”” (ASP 803-6) The *Ecce Homo* moment is eventful in that it testifies to the recurrence of an ancient form of violence: “The law must weigh him in her scale / Most fit it is that we unfold this woeful tale” (ASP 810-11). The Sailor’s “woeful tale” reinforces the power of suggestion that “hard is the world’s law” into the reader’s imagination.

They left him hung on high in iron case,
And dissolute men, unthinking and untaught,
Planted their festive booths beneath his face;
And to that spot, which idle thousands sought,
Women and children were by fathers brought;
And now some kindred sufferer driven, perchance,
That way when into storm the sky is wrought,
Upon his swinging corpse his eyes may glance
And drop, as he once dropp’d in miserable trance (820-828).

It may be that the sky is wrought or condensed into an eye drop of the storm, but what is certain is that the Sailor is not of this world of “idle” spectators to “plant their festive booths” beneath his fractured eye. Not only does the Sailor’s “passion” to cross him preclude the Romantic poet from committing a “crime” of violence himself, but, more
importantly, it also signifies the upsurge, as in *surrection*, of an “other” character at the end of the trance movement. By allowing the Sailor to occupy the position of sacrifice, the Romantic poet, William Wordsworth, comes very close to saintliness at the end of *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*.

The Female Vagrant’s compelling power of affect orbits around the hollow ground in *Salisbury Plain*. The vagrant woman’s unsettling voice weaves out a series of the homonymic words of “horror,” “hollow,” “vacant,” and “vagrant” as if meaning is produced within the incommensurable hiatus of juncture like a caesura in blank verse. Much in the same way as the Traveler’s orbits, she has a diabolical movement in the sense that her narrative is capable of convoking a multiple sense of social “movement” without spatial movement. The Female Vagrant’s potent narrative calls not only in a libidinous economy of the unconscious repression but also in a liminal materialism of “destabilization on the move”: her uncanny, homeless narrative carries its own cultural enforcement in order to indelibly harrow one’s mind. By bringing home the vagrant woman’s story as a deliberate art and connecting it to his life, the Sailor states the theme that he is representing the inability of escaping “transference neurosis” when, under the stress of war, revolution, and social dislocation, transference neurosis has *become* ordinary neurosis. By ultimately holding the Sailor responsible for what has happened to him, however, Wordsworth testifies to the fact that the Sailor accepts the social consequence of the crime that he has himself given rise to, without escaping into the artificial and unpredictable pre-texts that the vagrant woman’s narrative suggest in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. Subject to “strange repetitions,” Swann explains further, “they [the Female Vagrant and the Sailor] dramatize, both minimally and
sensationally, not simply the material conditions of writing, but the demands of the most elaborate and repetitive of poetic forms, the Spenserian Stanza” (817). While Swann suggests a poetic law of movement by means of Spenserian repetition, I’ve also found that Willy Maley’s *Salvaging Spenser* is useful in accounting for the traces of cloth in *Adventures on Salisbury Plain*. Keeping the track of the Spenser’s use “salvage” in The *Faerie Queen*, he is explaining that “Selvage” is defined as an “edge of cloth so woven that it cannot unravel; [as] border of different material or finish along edge of cloth intended to be removed or hidden; [or as] edge plate of lock with opening for the bolt,” derived from Middle English “self” and “edge” and that “the selvedge” is the margin between Self and Other, somewhere between salvage and savage (7). While “salvaging is a process of self-fashioning,” I suggest the textual possibility that the iron “gride” has been “salvaged” and “forged” in Wordsworth’s *Salisbury Plain* poems. Wordsworth might speak of a hope of poetry as an ideal world by means of the Spenserian iron “gride.” Swann is elaborating that this rough word [of Gride] is also elegant, in the highest degree “poetic.” An archaism with a well-documented pedigree, it always functions as an allusion: [that] the poet who revives “gride” pierces back to a restricted number of literary instances of its use (823). When Coleridge mentions in *Biographia Literaria* that Wordsworth makes a progress as a poet, Coleridge is describing that the Spenserian own style would doubtless have authorized in his then opinion a more frequent descent to the phrases of ordinary life, that it was the depth and height of the ideal world around forms, incidents, and situations, of which, for the common view, custom had bedimmed all the luster (80). Wordsworth recalls in his 1805 Prelude that “I seemed about this period to have sight / of a new world, a world, too, that
was fit / To be transmitted and made visible / To other eyes” (368-373). Freud might also define as an “ideal” scene the theoretical construction of the analytical scene in which marks a therapeutic progress in the treatment of transference. In this light, Wordsworth’s *Salisbury Plain* poem is “overdetermined” in relation to what causes would be associated with what effects.

By referring to Badiou’s notion of “subjectivization” as the “interventional naming from the point of view of the situation, i.e., the rule governing the intra-situational effects of putting a supernumerary name into circulation,” I claim that Wordsworth’s “interventional naming” of the Female Vagrant as artless is a process of subjectivation in the sense that her artless voice “traces in situ the multiple becoming of the true” voice in relation to social dislocation. In other words, the character of a philosopher that Wordsworth took in his 1793 Letter to Robert Watson, bishop of Landaff resembles the Female Vagrant in terms of “character traits.” In the Letter, Wordsworth searches for an “other,” “alien” form of political expression that would be distinguishable from Edmund Burke’s French Revolution as the irreconcilable Other. The Letter, however, puts one into the perspective of a longer process, than his poetic counterpart Coleridge, in which Wordsworth gets out repression, which is symptomatically derived from a political cause of which he stands in for. To make a counterargument against Watson, Wordsworth equips himself with the robe of a philosopher; that is, the character of a philosopher is woven out of the process of a fidelity to the political event, which is contingent upon the French Revolution. From a formal point of view of the Letter, the philosopher’s argument repeats, revolves around, and swing back and forth between Watson’s terms of argument and the terms of the
French revolution. The surrogate philosopher that Wordsworth adopts tries to speak, like William Godwin, from a position where truth and rhetorical persuasion may converge into a political praxis to perform its truth claim. However, he expresses an anxiety that he is losing his political ground. The philosopher whom Wordsworth adopts embodies the multiple determinations of “generic” republicanism in the sense that the philosopher’s engaged subjective perspective “generates” its own designation of the “other,” foreign principles.

Therefore, Wordsworthian “it” convokes the void of the truth that life is hard without home. This procedure lends particular attention to causality in Salisbury Plain poems: “Does that which arrives at Salisbury Plain mean an event- ‘to happen,’ or ‘to arrive’ in the sense of the coming as well as the event?” “Does “fruitfulness” concern a possibility, or a chance of a political cause having its social consequence?” “Is, then, writing the Salisbury Plain poem the political result of his certitude in and a hope of small republicanism?” Or is it a yield of another pleasure of a different sort but none the less a more direct, acting cause?” Rather than answering this series of questions, Wordsworth sought for a poetic law of movement that would simulate real geographic movement in the material world.
NOTES

Chapter II: Robinson Crusoe and the Counter-spaces of Imagination

1. For the reading of Romantic space not as a matter of subjective internalization of discipline, but as an effect of the extension of the techniques that constitute the physics of disciplinary power, as a portable substrate of power relations, refer to Ira Livingston’s *An Arrow of Chaos* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. I am also indebted to his brilliant reading of Foucault’s discourse throughout my dissertation.


Weighing Engines Act, 1751 - Weighing Engines Amendment Act, 1753 - Broad Wheels Act, 1757 - General Highways Act, 1767, 1773 - General Turnpike Act, 1822 - Turnpike Act, 1855 - General Highways Act. For further discussion, see Eric Pawson’s *Transport and Economy*. The establishment of turnpike trusts was a means of transferring the costs of main roads from those who happened to live alongside them to their users. The word “turnpike” originally meant a gate and there were gates at which tolls were collected on roads controlled by turnpike trusts. Such roads came to be called “turnpikes” and the processes of brining a road under the authority of a trust came to be described by the verb “to turnpike.”

4. John Galt’s *Annals of the Parish* (1821) describes how the construction and development of the turnpike road reconfigures the social life of the minister Balwhidder’s parish, Dalmailing, near the west coast of Scotland. At the heart of Galt’s parish is a revealing change and transformation that the turnpike road causes to accelerate. While Moretti has noticed how the system of central places works within the “changing geography of village narratives,” I read that the turnpike road shapes and affects a continuous process of societal restructuring of the parish across the scale of geography. The “system of central places at work” that Moretti enumerates consists of “school in Irville, university in Glasgow, lawyers and doctors in Edinburgh,” thus forming the radius of the central-peripheral zone based on the dichotomy of the city and the country. For Moretti, cotton-mill manufacture in Glasgow is a determining social event to “re-center social life”: “the building of the cotton-mill, a new genius, as it were, had descended upon the earth, and there was an erect and out-looking spirit abroad that was not to be satisfied with the taciturn regularity of ancient affairs” (Galt 128). Moretti reads that the sense of the “region” is “gone, replaced by a “web of commercial reciprocities” ranging from Cayenneville via Glasgow and Edinburgh to London. Galt notices how city economy invents things that are to become city imports from the rural world, and then reinvents the rural work, how the new work is added to the older work and then the new divisions of labor are added to other appropriate varieties of older work⁴, as is the case of “tambouring, in such a manner as to supersede by precept and example that old-time honored functionary, the spinning-wheel” (Galt 128).

Whereas Moretti reads a commercial web of central places, I call attention to the ways in which a communications network, such as the turnpike road, canals, and mails, underpins such a concatenation of developments as the contemporaneous, the almost real time information transmission. It is from the mid-eighteenth century when the development of the turnpike road system acquires national resilience that real
time supersedes real space. The turnpike road system underpins not only information at a distance, but also the power to act and move instantaneously, from afar. The turnpike road system contributes to the social formation of knowledge and power.

5. For Pawson’s “schema of relations between the parish repair system, Justice trusts, and turnpike trusts,” see the page 91 and also refer to the figure 2. Unlike his “source domination” approach, my reading of the turnpike road contributes to a critical, spatial reading of the capitalist production of space in England. Turnpike tolls were a matter of serious concern to William Cobbett, largely because he believed that toll owners and gate-keepers were changing the public more than they were legally entitled to charge. See Cobbett’s The Law of Turnpikes or an analytical arrangement of, and illustrative commentaries on, all the general acts relative to the turnpike roads of England. London: W. Cobbett, 1828.


7. Mythological analysis of Roland Barthes scrutinizes everything that is considered as normal or natural in the name of myth. His analysis of myth bears witness to the fact that myth always has an “alibi” ready; that is, in images or spectacles of direct intelligibility, cultural mechanisms of signification are deeply involved. The mythologist way is in the semiological reading of the sign on the pages of a culture in order to decompose the sign into two series: signifier and signified. Barthes’s distinction is not necessarily concerned with two terms on their own but with correlation or trialectics by which the sign under consideration is bifurcated into double articulation. In the first articulation, the literary meaning of signifier is occupied fully by its analogous pair of content, signified- the arbitrariness of the sign is not necessarily arbitrary but rather conventional. In the second articulation, the sign becomes an empty signifier (like the zero) and keeps expanding laterally into a chain of mythical signifiers. Seen this way, the sign becomes a singular point, which stands at the end of its first exhausted meaning and simultaneously at the beginning of an empty code to be filled with second-order cultural implication.

8. “It would be a great satisfaction to the Gentleman of the county to know the sentiments of the Duke of Sommerset, the Duke of Portland, the Earl of Carlisle, the Earl of Burlington, the Lord of Lonsdale and the
other Members of Parliament of the County in relation to the turnpike bills. And that the Duke of Portland be acquainted that it is the general opinion of the Gentlemen that no turnpike road between Cockermouth and Penrith can be of any service to the county in point of trade or accommodation” (The Order Book for Cumberland County, July 1745).


Chapter III: In Search of Fantastic Geography in the South Seas

11. Rolland Munro also argues that the labor of division is also black-boxed in a truth regime in “Ideas of Difference: Stability, social spaces, and the labor of division,” in Kevin Hethrington and Rolland Munro’s Ideas of Difference. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 16. In arguing that there is no vision without division, he criticizes the black boxing of the claim to truth of vision: “Once a view has been ‘black-boxed,’ it lends itself to surveillance over its stability – say by asking the other to repeat itself” In terms of the South Seas as the place to resist black boxing, Jonathan Lamb would argue as follows: “After the South Sea Bubble of 1720, the South Pacific is the notorious object and medium of these pretenses [to truth], and therefore the hardest place of all in which to lodge a truth claim, which explains why many narratives of Oceanic discovery defensively present themselves as experimental natural history, not because the narrative egos believe themselves to be veridical, but because they require alibis for the uncertain testimony that coincides with their dilapidation” (203). For a detailed discussion, refer to his article titled “Eye-witnessing in the South Seas,” The Eighteenth Century Vol. 38. (1997): 201-211.

distinction between fact and factish, see Srinivas Aravamudan’s discussion of The Interesting Narrative in Tropicopoliticans: Colonialism and Agency, 1688-1804.

13. Rolland Munro also argues that the labor of division is also black-boxed in a truth regime in “Ideas of Difference: Stability, social spaces, and the labor of division,” in Kevin Hethrington and Rolland Munro’s Ideas of Difference. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 16. In arguing that there is no vision without division, he criticizes the black boxing of the claim to truth of vision: “Once a view has been ‘black-boxed,’ it lends itself to surveillance over its stability – say by asking the other to repeat itself” In terms of the South Seas as the place to resist black boxing, Jonathan Lamb would argue as follows: “After the South Sea Bubble of 1720, the South Pacific is the notorious object and medium of these pretenses [to truth], and therefore the hardest place of all in which to lodge a truth claim, which explains why many narratives of Oceanic discovery defensively present themselves as experimental natural history, not because the narrative egos believe themselves to be veridical, but because they require alibis for the uncertain testimony that coincides with their dilapidation” (203). For a detailed discussion, refer to his article titled “Eye-witnessing in the South Seas,” The Eighteenth Century Vol. 38. (1997): 201-211.

14. Isabelle Stengers’s Invention of Modern Science (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 100 -101 and Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer. Leviathan and the Air-pump (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 46. Stengers argues that Robert Boyle’s experimental laboratory constitutes such a black boxing. Boyle’s air-pump and his experimental laboratory consolidate the common interests in empirical scientific experimentation so much so that Thomas Hobbs’s political interest in the plenary discussion of the void is rendered futile and void to the extent to which Hobbs is not willing to enter into the laboratory experimentation. To put it in the terms of Steven Shapin, Boyle’s laboratory is a space in which to do experiments and generate matters of fact without falling into futile metaphysical dispute, an experimental space about which new discursive and social practices could be mobilized to generate assent. Citing Latour, Stengers elaborates further, “Around the work of the air pump we witness the formation of a new Boyle, a new Nature, a new scholarly sociability, a new Society that will henceforth include the vacuum, scholars, and the laboratory.” On the other hand, Hobbs and Kant were faced with a violent choice: they either enter the laboratory – Hobbs discovers a weak detector for his ether wind- or they fall silent; unless they protest that science does not think.
15. Shapin, p. 56.


25. Ibid., p. 24-25.

26. Ibid., p. 33.

27. Ibid. p. 30.


30. This looks forward to Alexander von Humbolt.


32. As a point of observation, six other stations in the Pacific might have done as well and in fact no one in England even heard of the island of Tahiti until Captain Wallis in the Dolphin came back with the newly


35. Quoted in Koerner, p. 129.

36. The Younger Linnaeus assessment provides a link to Latour to discuss the open-boxed status of Banks’s journal writing. A variety of writing forms, ranging from Buchan’s and Parkinson’s drawings and figures to Banks’s description of his infatuation, performs additional work to make Banks the case of going scandalously native, thus prolonging any “nth+ 1 form” of the literary inscription, such as satiric poems (as the “n+2nd form” and dramas (as the “n+3rd form). To put it in terms of Latour, “the nth order form gives an unexpected supplement – as if coming from another world; they are the result of a concrete work of purification- as if related to practical matters; they tie more elements – as if they were more real than any other convention passed among men” (original emphasis). The persona of Banks is an artifact and “factish” as Latour has called it. Latour, *Science in Action*, p. 246.

37. Banks, 6 April 1769.

38. Ibid, 29 May 1769.

39. Ibid. 13 April 1769.

40. Ibid. 14 April 1769. Emphasis is added.

41. Ibid. 10 May 1769.

42. Ibid. 9 June 1769.

43. Ibid. 14 May 1769.

44. Ibid. 28 April 1769.

45. Purea was estranged from Oamo as the grand chief of Papara by the time of the Endeavor’s visit, but since Wall’s visit had lost much of her power and influence after being defeated by Tuteha. Banks also romanticizes the King of Borabora, who defeated Tupia and expelled him from the island of Raiatea, as a fierce young chieftain with the “terror of all other Islands.” But he is disappointed to be presented to “an old decrepit half blind man who seemed to have scarce reason enough left to send hogs, much less
gallantry enough to send ladies.” These examples illustrate how Banks romanticizes his encounter with the Tahitian people.

46. Banks, 13 April 1769.


49. Bougainville, p. 60.


53. Banks, 5 May 1769.

54. Banks, 3 July 1769.


56. Banks, 12 July 1769.


58. Richard Grove. Green Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 12. The Western environment concerns both assist in and depend on the “presence of a coterie of committed professional scientists.” Banks’s fellow voyager, James Cook anticipates his expedition with Banks: I could venture to traverse a greater space of sea, till then unnavigated, to discover greater tracks of country in high and low South latitudes, and to preserve longer in exploring and surveying more correctly the extensive coasts of these new discovered countries, than any former Navigator, perhaps, had done during one voyage. Quoted in Stafford, Voyage into Substance (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1984), p. 21.

59. Banks, 12 July 1769.


Chapter IV: Georgic Poetry and the Topolitics of Empire


65. While Dryden’s logics of perception and its renewed vectors delocalize optics, it is also ushered in eugenics of sight, a reemergence of a singularly fractured “species” with the soft flesh inside and the hard bones exterior, which moves singularly by the smell of the prey.

66. The Satterthwaite anecdote did not specify the name of the engineer, but the likelihood that Wordsworth would have known Mudge and his Survey project is still high when we delve into a range of influential people Wordsworth met. A year after the Bootle holiday, when Wordsworth was in London, he met a colleague of Mudge’s, Charles Palsey (1780–1861). He had awards for bravery against the French and had met Coleridge during his work in 1805 at Malta. Equally as important as tracing “networks” of the famous at this period is to note that Mudge’s godfather was no less a personage than Samuel Johnson and his father an associate of Sir Joshua Reynolds. For this information, refer to John Wyatt’s article titled “Wordsworth’s Black Combe Poems: The Pastoral and the Geographer’s Eye,” in Signatures, Vol. 3. (2001): 1-19.

67. For instance, John Dyer’s will to clothe the world with the fleece is coterminous with a georgic formalization to dress the geographical surface of the world in the moral praising of a pre-idealized British civility: “Rejoice, ye nations, vindicate the sway / Ordain’d for common happiness. . . She [Britain] never breaks / Her solemn compacts in the lust of rule: Studious of arts and trade, she ne’er disturbs / The holy peace of states” (4. 653-663).

Chapter V: Salisbury Plain, Salisbury Place
1. Douglas Wilson’s study of Wordsworth’s poetics of the unconscious explores the uncanny to interrogate
the relation of the “spots of time” with memory by drawing on Schelling’s definition of the uncanny. In
contrast, my work rethinks the relation of the Freudian notion of the uncanny to the Plain to reconsider how
place becomes a staff, a port as well as a spot in Salisbury Plain poems. Refer to Douglas Wilson, The
Romantic Dream: Wordsworth and the Poetics of the Unconscious, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1993).

124. See also Wordsworth’s unpublished Letter, “A Letter to the Bishop of Landaff on the extraordinary
avowal of his Political Principles contained in the Appendix to his late Sermon by a Republican” in Prose

70 See Karen Swann’s excellent essay, “Public Transport: Adventuring on Wordsworth’s Salisbury Plain,”
ELH (1998): 811-831. She reads that Wordsworth “resembles all the vagrants, travelers, gypsies, who are
opaque figures and inhabitants of another world, who halt and then pursue their way, ‘measuring’ and
following the ‘dreary lines of measuring more antique systems of transport’” (817).

71 The Preface of The Borderers reinforces the commonality of this theme: “In real life we rarely see either
the one or the other; and, when the distress comes, it prevents us from attending to the cause. This
superstition of which I have spoken is not without its use; yet it appears to be one great source of our vices;
it is our constant engine in seducing each other. We are lulled asleep by its agency, and betrayed before we
know that an attempt is made to betray us. I have endeavored to shake this prejudice, persuaded that in so
doing I was well employed. It has been a further object with me to show that, from abuses interwoven with
the texture of society, a bad man may be furnished with sophisms in support of his crimes which it would
be difficult to answer.” In this sense, the Sailor establishes a counterpoise to the Female Vagrant in
Adventures on Salisbury Plain. See The Borderers, Ed. Robert Osborn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1982).

4. For a different formal question of Wordsworth’s “turns of chance,” refer to Swann’s essay. She
understands that Wordsworth’s “turn” is his poetic venture to “revolutionize” the structure of feeling in the
1790s. She reads Wordsworth’s resistance to narrative as the resistance to the sensationalism that Steinman
maps out in her discussion of Wordsworth. Steinman asserts, “The Salisbury Plain poems and ‘The Female Vagrant’ might be almost thought of as samples of narrative strategies—Thomsonian, Gothic, sensationalist, political, and allegorical— that test the capacity of poetry to resist sensationalism while remaining relevant” (63-64). See Lisa Steinman’s Masters of Repetition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998). Hereafter Salisbury Plain is cited as SP and Adventures on Salisbury Plain as ASP in my quotations of the poems.

Everything that counts falls under the unity of a count, while, inversely, only what lets itself be counted in this way can circulate. See David Simpson’s essay titled “Figuring Class, Sex, and Gender: What is the Subject of Wordsworth’s ‘Gypsies’” in Romantic Poetry: Recent Revisionary Criticism, ed. Karl Kroeber and Gene W Ruoff (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993). For the criticism of Simpson’s discussion of “Gypsies,” see James M. Garrett’s “The Unaccountable ‘Knots’ of Wordsworth’s ‘Gypsies’” in SEL 40.4 (autumn 2000): 603-620.

The Letter, however, puts one into the perspective of a longer process, than his poetic counterpart Coleridge, in which Wordsworth gets out repression, which is symptomatically derived from a political cause of which he stands in for.

Asking what would be in opposition to the adjective “fruitless” invests in a series of questions that one will pose in relation to what it would be imagined to be “fruitful.”


For the issue of the weight of sedimentation of genre, refer to Jameson’s essay titled “Magical Narratives” in The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a socially symbolic act (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). Jameson’s notion of sedimentation pays attention to the contemporaneous layering of temporality; that is, two time forms work alongside each other. The past works alongside the present, by virtue of which the present continues to be mobilized, displaced, and transformed. To put it in his terms, the past “persist into the later, more complex structure as a generic message which coexists with the elements from later stages” of the present (141).

Dorothy Williams describes Wordsworth’s habit of “backwards and forwards” while composing The Prelude, for instance, saying, “Though the length of his walk is sometimes a quarter or half a mile, he is as


80 See Geoffrey Hartman’s analysis of the *Salisbury Plain* poems in *Wordsworth Poetry 1787-1814* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Hartman reminds us that Salisbury Plain is a no-place, an “omphalos, or a strait between worlds and that it thereby rouses a nostalgia for specific place, for single or fixed points like spire, tree, or “one dwelling” (120 -123).

81 Calling attention to “yawning” and “thrilling” from rifted tombs, Kurt Fosso argues that the Stonehenge exercises a reciprocal power to transform the dead. See his article titled “The Politics of Genre in William Wordsworth’s *Salisbury Plain*,” *New Literary History* 30.1 (1999): 159-177.

82 Hartman explains that the “shuttle” stands for the weaver’s instrument by the synecdochal substitution of part of whole, but it also contains a metonymy which names the productive cause instead of product (338). See *Beyond Formalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). For the notion of “subjectivization,” I refer to a French philosopher, Alain Badiou, in his essay titled “On a Finally Objectless Subject,” *Topoi* 7 (1988): 93-98. Badiou reads: “I call subjectivization the emergence of an operator which is consecutive to the interventional naming that decides the event . . . Subjectivization is the interventional naming from the point of view of the situation, i.e., the rule governing the intra-situational effects of putting a supernumerary name into circulation” (95).


84 The premise of my argument is that Wordsworth’s does not simply revise *Salisbury Plain* into *Adventures on Salisbury Plain* to remark the moments of retreat from political to psychological. Wordsworth’s movement from London to Racedown does not constitute such a “retirement” into psychological disenchantment. For this kind of argument, See John Rieder’s article titled “Civic Virtue and Social Class at the Scene of Execution: Wordsworth Salisbury Plain Poems,” *Studies in Romanticism*
In terms of the Sailor, Wordsworth also traces back his treatment of the Sailor in *Salisbury Plain*: “Mr. Coleridge, when I first became acquainted with him, was so impressed with this poem, that he would have encouraged me to publish the whole as it then stood; but the mariner’s fate appeared to me so tragic as to require a treatment more subdued and yet more strictly applicable in expression than I had at first given to it” (recited from *Biographia* 79). For the discussion of the poetic transactions that occurred between Coleridge and Wordsworth, see Christensen’s “Ecce Homo” in *Contesting the Subject* (Perdue: Perdue University Press, 1991).

85 For a far more complicated discussion of the relationship of inversion between remembrance and recognition, between an “involuntary dislike” and a negative transference, see Jerome Christensen’s “The Romantic Movement at the End of History.” *Critical Inquiry* 20 (Spring 1994): 452-476. As Jerome Christensen argues, to cure means to bring up occult, pointlessly reproductive emotions, to recognize them, and to subject them to the guillotine of analysis, thereby adjusting the patient to the “artificial” world that Freud calls “real life” (466). Freud elaborates that every step of the treatment is accompanied by resistance; that every single thought, every mental act of the patient’s must pay toll to the resistance, and represents a compromise between the forces toward the cure and those gathered to oppose it. Pressing the metaphor of a “toll-gating” further, it may be possible to suggest that to cure means to put the patient on a controlled-access turnpike road, to inspect the movement or flow of the patient’s “unconscious feelings” under the surveillance of psychoanalysis that Freud aspires to intervene in. For Freud’s own explanation of the speeding-up of a therapeutic treatment, see his later essay titled “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” in *Therapy and Technique* (New York: Collier Books, 1963). For the issue of transference, I also rely on Cynthia Chase’s “Transference as Trope and Persuasion,” in *Discourse in Psychoanalysis and Literature*, ed. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (London: Methuen, 1987) and Stuart Schneiderman’s *Jacques Lacan: The Death of an Intellectual Hero* (Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1983). Insofar as the Sailor asks his homelessness to the law, he might also seeks for the juridical method of transference, which is different from the medical method of transference in that it speaks of sickness, cure, and healing. The juridical method seeks after truth as a process in a “quaestio,” the Latin for process.


See Toby Benis’s Romanticism on the Road (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Benis sees the Plain as a place where healing takes place for the Female Vagrant takes place. He also claims that the homeless is at the center of the social-geographical matrix of the 1790s. See also Celeste Langan’s argument of vagrancy in Romantic Vagrancy: Wordsworth and the Simulation of Freedom (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Langan argues that his project of Romantic Vagrancy describes a certain idealization of the vagrant: a reduction and abstraction.

See Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (New York: Norton & Company, 1961). The original passage reads, “The phenomena of transference are obviously exploited by the resistance which the ego maintains in its pertinacious insistence upon repression; the compulsion to repeat, which the treatment tries to bring into service is, as it were, drawn over by the ego to its side. A great deal of what might be described as the compulsion of destiny seems intelligible on a rational basis; so that we are under no necessity to call in a new and mysterious motive force to explain it” (25).

See the lines of ASP: the boy turn’d around / His batter’d head, a groan the Sailor fetch’d. / The head with streaming blood had dy’d the ground, / Flow’d from the spot where he that deadly wound /Had fix’d on him he murder’d (641-645).
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