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INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth-century moral weekly adapted the Enlightenment dictum to combine edification and entertainment and helped popularize proactive reading by critiquing mores and dramatizing moral experience. Enlightenment anthropology as the "Wissenschaft vom Menschen" defined the human relationship to the world and the internal interplay of body and soul, of man's material and intellectual being. Through the analysis of human experience in the world, philosophical, theological, legal and medical texts integrated anthropological themes and converge with the seemingly unrelated moral weekly. A prime example of this interplay is the integration of the case study into literary and professional writing, and its application to the essay in weeklies. The goal of this study is to examine how Enlightenment moral and anthropological discourses develop symbiotically not only in novels of sensibility but also in moral weeklies.

In the forefront of this investigation are German-language texts published between 1720 and 1798, in particular in the years from 1740 to 1770. This middle phase of the Enlightenment represents a period of refinement and reorientation of the moral weekly and at the same time, the consummation of Enlightenment anthropology. The focus on the observation of human experience at this time acknowledges the larger paradigm shift in human self-evaluation, what Reinhard Koselleck has called a 'Sattelzeit' and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Ralph Häfner have described as an 'anthropologische Wende' (Schmidt-Biggemann and Häfner 168; Koselleck 1:XV). While existing research on eighteenth-century philosophical anthropology has argued that an anthropological turn occurred with the publication of Ernst Platner's Anthropologie für
Ärzte und Weltweise, this study suggests with Carsten Zelle that the shift occurs at least as early as 1740 ("Nachwort" 80-84).

In the search for the sources of eighteenth-century anthropological and moral discourses, I turn to Halle (Salle). With the 1694 founding of the Brandenburg University of Halle, also called the Fridericana, Halle led the German university reform movement. Renewing university education involved developing modern systems for scientific research and bureaucratic training under the new leading sciences of law and history. With the appointment of August Herman Francke as parish pastor at Glaucha, just outside of Halle, the city also emerged as an international center for the social and religious reform movement of Pietism. Together Halle Pietism, philosophy, and medicine made significant contributions to anthropological and moral discourses on the academic and the popular level. Using knowledge developed in theoretical writings, Halle natives Samuel Gotthold Lange and Georg Friedrich Meier published long-lived weeklies focused on educating and entertaining readers in essays and stories about human nature. The periodicals exemplify the Enlightenment as a complex dynamic that incorporated literature and anthropology in the public sphere.

There are multiple reasons to look beyond the novels of sensibility in the first half of the eighteenth century and to include periodical literature in an investigation of the interrelationship of eighteenth-century moral and anthropological discourses. During the Enlightenment, many literary authors also worked as journalists and published reviews, essays and fictional texts in magazines and journals (Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend 3). Institutions of literary public opinion shaped the development of the eighteenth-
century writer, especially in the context of the evolution of the professional writer, the expansion of the book trade and book production, the slow rise in the literacy rate, and the establishment of a literary market (Wilke 1:64-65). The periodical publication represents one of these institutions that provided opportunities for novice and experienced writers as columnists, editors, critics and literary historians. Writers determined to achieve success wrote for periodicals for literary or economic reasons--or both.

Thus journalists, literary and scientific authors, and readers were connected. Jürgen Wilke's *Literarische Zeitschriften des 18. Jahrhunderts (1688-1789)* provides a summary of the most important literary periodicals of the German Enlightenment and reviews secondary literature published up to the beginning of the 1970's. Paul Raabe's article "Die Zeitschrift als Medium der Aufklärung" contextualizes Enlightenment magazines as one of the most popular and varied means of communication, education, moral edification and entertainment for a diverse public of readers and authors. Reinhard Wittmann's chapter "Die Entstehung des modernen Lesepublikums--die 'Leserevolution'" functions as a sociological history of Enlightenment reading and situates magazines in a bourgeois context focused on practical and moral applications for the benefit of society. In the article "Die Geburt des Journalisten in der Aufklärung" (1974), Wolfgang Martens defines the function of the Enlightenment journalist as one who improves the individual through moral edification, education, aesthetic critique and engagement for societal improvement.

The periodical provided Enlightenment authors the opportunity to publish for an anonymous, general reading public. This mode of publishing provided readers with
moral-religious edification as well as education and thereby played a critical role in the creation and development of public opinion. In some instances, moral weeklies and literary magazines functioned as political instruments, especially for women or members of the advancing middle class. The periodicals thus document a desire for social change in the eighteenth century. In the literary realm, magazines serve as important archives of eighteenth-century popular and professional literature because they excerpt passages from longer articles, combine popular and professional literature on a range of topics from different authors, provide a record of the evolution of a text from manuscript to periodical to book and record the different meanings at each stage. The journal articles reflect their socio-historical milieu and have their own significance even when they are readily available in a book version.

Two sources provided initial guidance in the search for periodicals with anthropological themes. Joachim Kirchner's *Das deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen* and *Bibliographie der Zeitschriften des deutschen Sprachgebiets bis 1900, Bd. 1* categorize periodicals and summarize their content in several keywords. Martens' *Botschaft der Tugend* (1968) provides a basis for the evaluation of the Halle Moral weeklies. In five sections, the study outlines (1) characteristics of the moral weekly form, (2) an overview of production and reception, (3) a survey of moral worldview, (4) the weeklies' representation of society, and (5) their relation to other literature. While *Botschaft der Tugend* characterizes the moral weekly form by citing hundreds of moral weeklies, this dissertation focuses on the weeklies' contributions to continuity in the development of anthropological theory. Martens discusses the evolution of the literary journals such as
Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur* from the perspective of the popular moral journals and thereby posits a continuity in the development of Enlightenment periodicals.

One of the newest and most informative sources for research into eighteenth-century media is *Von Almanach bis Zeitung: ein Handbuch der Medien in Deutschland 1700-1800*, edited by Ernst Fischer, Wilhelm Haefs and York-Gothard Mix. In the introductory article "Aufklärung, Öffentlichkeit und Medienkultur in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert" editors Fischer, Haefs and Mix define the Enlightenment as an age of media revolution in Germany: for the first time there is a conscious recognition of the relationship between media's power and its potential for social change (Fischer et al., 9). This change is characterized by (i) the programmatic goals of the Enlightenment to disseminate knowledge, information and reason, (ii) the accelerated dispersion of information and news, especially through periodicals and (iii) the instrumentalization of knowledge transfer (Publizität) for social reform and the establishment of a sphere of public opinion (10). The journal has primary and secondary functions, the most significant being the transmission of practical knowledge and new information, the discussion and development of specialized knowledge and the definition of geographic and cultural space in the context of entertainment and empirical modes of knowledge (12-13). According to Fischer et al., the Enlightenment media develops (a) in connection with political events (14), (b) an increasingly greater complexity, for example a heightened degree of reflexivity through self-analysis and self-criticism (15) and (c) a two-fold goal of national edification. Around 1800 this includes the development of a unified national German culture while simultaneously supporting the cultural and socio-political heterogeneity of the German states (17).
A primary medium of popular enlightenment through the middle of the eighteenth century was the moral weekly. In her article "Moralische Wochenschriften", Helga Brandes locates the Enlightenment goal of replacing prejudice with rational, moral and virtuous decision making in the theory of universal human equality promulgated in the philosophy of natural law (225). By relegating religious, political and scientific themes to a secondary role, the moral weeklies employ a fictitious editor and diverse forms such as letters, dreams, poems, fables, dialogs and narrative illustration (Beispielgeschichten) to develop a space for public discourse (228). In order to establish a self-image of moderation and virtue, the moral weeklies prescribe the separation of the bourgeoisie from the amoral nobility and uneducated lower-class farmers and day laborers (228). The critique aims to remedy social abuses, eliminate meaningless conventions (dueling) and abolish exaggerated social customs (extreme compliments) (230). The rationalist motif extends to literary critique, with a rejection of excessive baroque ornamentation in favor of rational exposition and the purity of the German language (Gottsched) or imagination and the preservation of a pluralism of dialects (Bodmer and Breitinger) (230-231).

In his article "Literarisich-kultureller Zeitschriften," John A. McCarthy situates the literary and cultural journal in the context of a combination of instruction and entertainment for the establishment of the public sphere. Christoph Martin Wieland propels the literary-cultural journal one step beyond this dictum claiming not only the periodical medium, but specifically the institution of literature should serve nation and humanity (McCarthy, "Literarisich-kulturelle Zeitschriften" 176-177). The establishment of the literary-cultural journals in the Enlightenment stems from the specific conception of community and a comprehensive understanding of social communication, so that
Thomasius defines humanity foremost on the basis of social engagement, not on its rational faculties (180). The journal plays multiple roles, first mediating between the collective authority of the state and individual desires and alternately promoting a moral standard in public life (181). Amid many literary journals Wieland's *Teutscher Merkur* stands apart for its metacritique based on principles of impartiality, empirical and anthropological epistemology and a common search for truth (186). Wieland's employment of an empirical-anthropological epistemology as a basis for cultural critique is a characteristic Enlightenment development and an interdisciplinary nexus of experimental psychology, medicine and literature.

Ernst Fischer's article "Psychologisch-anthropologische Zeitschriften" focuses on the developments in empirical psychology in the wake of Moritz's popular *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde*. In the late Enlightenment, popular psychology magazines appeal to an educated bourgeois audience with varied qualifications and professional careers (Fischer 322). These periodicals demonstrate that the transformation of the space for literary public opinion occurs as a development with the educated middle classes. Empirical psychology develops out of the broad context of Enlightenment anthropocentrism, more specifically from Wolff's *Psychologica empirica*, the anthropological theories of Krüger and Platner, the reception of sensualism and materialism (Hume, Rousseau and Holbach), Pietism and Moritz's *Anton Reiser* and *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (316-317). The *Magazin* is a paradigm for the establishment of popular psychology and the ability of media to solicit participation from readers and authors, creating a literary public sphere (321-322). In their cultural functions, the psychological and anthropological magazines assume a similar significance.
to the moral weeklies in earlier decades, as Wolfgang Riedel avers: "Die psychologisch-
anthropologischen Zeitschriften dieser [1780er und 1790er] Jahrzehnte sind für die späte
Aufklärung ebenso signifikant wie die Moralischen Wochenschriften für die frühere" (W.
Riedel, "Anthropologie und Literatur in der deutschen Spätaufklärung. Skizze einer
Forschungslandschaft" 127).

The moral weeklies selected for this dissertation develop in tandem with novels of
sensibility. McCarthy's article "The Gallant Novel and the German Enlightenment (1670-
1750)" argues for the connection between Baroque and Enlightenment narrative,
highlighting links between the moral weekly and the novel. The German Enlightenment
novel develops in relation to the French, English, but especially the 17th century
"indigenous' [German narrative] tradition" (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel" 57). Similar to
the French 17th century sentimental novel, the German gallant novel combines the gallant
attitude with a psychological sensibility, as in Hunold's Satirischer Roman (1706) (56).
While an exaggerated gallant style can contradict with a bourgeois code of ethics (76),
when integrated into a socially acceptable moral framework, gallantry complements
virtue (57). In narrative theme, the combination of pedagogical and entertaining elements
in the gallant novel prefigures the ethical instruction of the moral novel (59-60). The
normative qualities of a good novel are also strikingly similar across periods, as
Thomasius' categories of balanced instruction and entertainment, practicality, plausibility,
and instruction of critical thinking have a resonance similar to the narrative critique of
Blanckenburg or Wieland (62). Moreover, there is a reciprocal relationship between
different narrative forms as seen with the example of Thomasius' Monats-Gespräche. The
journals idealize the combination of historical and fictional reality and simultaneously
advance readers' psychological, aesthetic and moral sensibility through narrative techniques adopted by the novel (73-74). In sum, McCarthy rediscovers the importance of continuity in the history of indigenous German narrative and identifies common elements in this heterogeneous tradition.

In the 1980's and 1990's, researchers in literary studies established the intersection of literature and anthropology as a field of stylistic, thematic and cultural-historical inquiry. The definition and integration of anthropology into interpretative modes is problematic, however. The difficulties and contradictions arise (1) in the attempt to separate Enlightenment anthropology from empirical psychology as well as (2) in the differentiation of medical, philosophical and theological anthropology (Ziche 75ff). (3) A further level of difficulty stems from the unique terminology for 'anthropology' in various Enlightenment European cultures (for example, "science de l'homme" in France). (4) Anthropology is a historicized discipline, so that the current meaning of anthropology differs from its meaning in the eighteenth century. Today the term 'anthropology' primarily refers to the ethnological direction of research institutionalized in universities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In German, 'Volkskunde' most closely approximates the 21st-century meaning of 'anthropology' in English. Neither of these meanings equivocate the semantic content of 'Anthropologie' in the German-speaking Enlightenment. 'Anthropology' is thus the study of humanity that pursues questions of ethnology as well as the mind-body, spirit-materiality of individual existence developed in Descartes' Meditationes.

There is no definition of anthropology in the handbook Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. For further differentiation of the meaning of anthropology, Odo
Marquard's article "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs 'Anthropologie' seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts" (1973) and Mareta Linden's book *Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts* (1976) provide the most helpful introduction. Marquard locates the origin of philosophical anthropology in the sixteenth century and provides a panoramic review of the term and bibliography between 1770 and 1970. By profiling the similarities and differences of anthropology in comparison to the philosophy of history, he defines philosophical anthropology as a uniquely modern epistemology that departs from traditional metaphysics and mathematical operations of natural science in favor of a turn to human life ("Lebenswelt"). A second defining characteristic is the change of philosophical anthropology from a philosophy of history to a philosophy of the nature of the human (Marquard, "Zur Geschichte des philosophischen Begriffs »Anthropologie« seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts" 124-125).

In addition to Marquard's definition of anthropology, the intensification of the investigation of melancholy fueled the development of anthropological approaches in literary studies. Wolf Lepenies' *Melancholie und Gesellschaft* and Michel Foucault's *Histoire de la folie a l'age classique* spurred academic interest in melancholy and the investigation of mind-body dualism and abnormal psychology from a literary perspective. In his *Melancholie und Aufklärung* (1977), Hans-Jürgen Schings combined primary source research with an interdisciplinary approach to produce one of the most innovative explorations of the connection of anthropology and literature. This monograph and the conference proceedings published as *Der ganze Mensch (Der ganze Mensch: Anthropologie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert: DFG-Symposion 1992)* provide two of the most diverse sources of information on the nexus of literature and anthropology in the
eighteenth century. Schings' student Wolfgang Riedel provided another significant step in the research of anthropology and literature in his Forschungsbericht "Anthropologie und Literatur in der deutschen Spätaufklärung." Riedel's article combines a historical framework for the study of anthropology, an acknowledgement of anthropology's inclusion of epistemological models based on physical being or irrationality in addition to the rational paradigm and a summary of themes for literary and anthropological investigation. The introduction to Jutta Heinz' book Wissen vom Menschen (Wissen vom Menschen) supplements Riedel's evaluation of research in literary anthropology with a one-hundred-page overview of anthropology in the eighteenth century. In preparation for a positive evaluation of the ideals of humanity and social dialogue in Enlightenment narration, Heinz outlines eighteenth century anthropological themes, such as 'commercium', the emotions, imagination and the individual. She also recounts anthropology's evolution in conjunction with neighboring disciplines such as philosophy.

In the 1980's and 1990's, researchers of literary anthropology produced a number of studies on canonical authors, themes and individual literary forms. Among these are Riedel's Die Anthropologie des jungen Schiller, Wolfgang Pross' "Herder und die Anthropologie der Aufklärung," and Lothar Müller's study of Moritz, Die kranke Seele. Enlightenment themes are explored in Rudolf Behrens' and Roland Galle's Leib-Zeichen and Gabriele Dürbeck's Einbildungskraft und Aufklärung. The interdisciplinary study Self-Generation: Biology, Philosophy and Literature around 1800 by Helmut Müller-Sievers combines a theory and a history of epigenesis in the late Enlightenment. In his Körperströme und Schriftverkehr, Albrecht Koschorke reinterprets the Empfindsamkeit as the nexus of shifts in human physiological knowledge and communication technology.
By linking the change from the Hippocratic theory of fluids to a physiological understanding of the human nervous system and the communication revolution of letter writing, he integrates the physiological and intellectual shifts that represent human psychological development at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Finally, critics have examined the role of anthropology in major literary forms, such as Helmut Pfotenhauer's study of autobiography in *Literarische Anthropologie*, Heinz' study of the anthropological novel titled *Wissen vom Menschen*, Alexander Kosesina's study of drama in *Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst* and Jörg Krämer's book *Deutschsprachiges Musiktheater im späten 18. Jahrhundert*. Little research has been done on anthropology in the German novel of sensibility or in the moral weekly (as an exception cf. Koschorke e.g. 29-30, 408).

This dissertation proposes that both the German novel of sensibility and the moral weeklies play key roles in the development of eighteenth-century anthropological discourses. Both the novels and the weeklies begin to deploy body/soul interaction in the 1740's, decades before the current dating of the anthropological turn to the period between Christoph Martin Wieland's *Geschichte des Agathon* (1766/1767) and Ernst Platner's *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* (1772). Though they are not anthropological novels (cf. Heinz, *Wissen vom Menschen* 339-344), the novels of sensibility also employ anthropological discourses and archive their development in the genre. Similarly, the moral weeklies illustrate early use of the interaction between the material and the metaphysical in periodicals. Both the *empfindsame Romane* and the
moral weeklies include the body in defining the moral. And both forms popularize anthropology in the middle of the eighteenth century.

To argue this thesis, chapter one defines Enlightenment anthropology as an interdisciplinary science, as illustrated in lexicon definitions and three key anthropological monographs. Additionally, because of its interdisciplinarity, anthropology as the study of human nature never achieved significant institutional recognition in the university. In further defining anthropology, chapter two argues that Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* (1726) conceived of "Anthropologie" as the interrelation of body and soul, of the physical and the moral. Cross-references on topics of causation, temperament, and the emotions underscore this relation.

In chapter three, Richardson's *Pamela* (1740) and Johann Gottlob Krüger's *Naturlehre* (1740-1750, 3v.) figure prominently in pushing back the date of the anthropological turn to 1740. Loëns *Der redliche Mann am Hofe* (1740) is also cited as an example of an early German novel of sensibility. Chapter four traces how body/soul discourses in the moral novel evolves into an anthropological sub-genre. During the period from 1747 to 1767, this development occurs in Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's *Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747/1748), Johann Timotheus Hermes' *Miß Fanny Wilkes* (1766), and Wieland's *Geschichte des Agathon*.

Marking a shift from novels to theoretical treatises, chapter five argues critiques on the nature of intersubstantial causation shapes early German anthropological discourse. Debates between Georg Ernst Stahl and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, between Joachim Lange and Christian Wolff, and between Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann August Unzer illustrate the contentiousness of explaining if and how body and soul
interact. Each of these writers, excepting Leibniz, works for a significant time in Halle. Thus Halle emerges as an Enlightenment center that significantly shapes anthropological discourses. Chapter six argues that Meier and Samuel Gotthold Lange popularize these discourses in moral weeklies.
PART 1: ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN THE EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT
CHAPTER I

ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Differentiating Terminology: Contemporary Versus Historical Usage

As it was understood in eighteenth-century Germany, the term anthropology poses lexicographical problems for scholars writing in English. This chapter differentiates German-language use of anthropology in the Age of Enlightenment from current English usage. Existing research on the term in the German context has favored primary sources written in Latin and German (Linden; Marquard, "Zur Geschichte"). This combination coincided with a gradual shift in academic publishing during the eighteenth century, which saw a move from the international academic language of Latin at the beginning of the century to the vernacular.¹ An early Enlightener, Christian Thomasius, exemplified this trend, for he lectured and published in German in a conscious effort to reach out to a broader public.² Despite the gradual change to a national language for education and academic publishing, eighteenth-century students, academics, and members of the educated class retained an international view of their fields (Schindling,

¹ Notker Hammerstein notes that during the Enlightenment, the use of Latin for academic publications in German lands shrank to 20 percent of all academic publications ("Aufklärung und Universitäten" 204). According to Reinhard Wittmann, the percentage of all new publications in Latin at the semi-annual German book markets declined from 27.7% in 1740 to 14.25% in 1770 and 3.97% in 1800 (Geschichte 122).
² In 1687, Thomasius offered a German-language lecture titled "Collegium über des Gratians Grund-Regeln [sic] Vernünftig [sic], klug und artig zu leben" at the University of Leipzig. He was thereby one of the first professors from any German-speaking territory to lecture in the vernacular (Ueding 1984, 615). Thomasius subsequently published a number of his philosophical works in German such as Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre (1691), Ausübung der Vernunftlehre (1691), Einleitung zur Sittenlehre (1692), Ausübung der Sittenlehre (1696). Other titles were also translated into German, such as Grundlehren des Natur- und Völkerrechts (1709, Lat. 1705). Hammerstein identifies Thomasius as the first successful professor to lecture in the German language, but not the first overall ("Aufklärung und Universitäten" 203).
Educated Germans also spoke or read Latin, French and other classical and national languages and oriented themselves to knowledge from Italy, the Netherlands, France and England (Bildung 89). From an early date, French and British writers had engaged anthropology (Zammito 221). Accordingly, in this chapter I supplement standard sources for defining anthropology in a German context with a selection of definitions from English and French encyclopedias. "Anthropology" appeared in various written forms through the middle of the eighteenth century, yet it did not have the institutional status as a discipline at this time. I make the case that anthropology existed on the margins of several eighteenth-century disciplines. In the final section of this chapter, I cite representative anthropological monographs to argue that authors at the end of the century worked from their own disciplines in creating interdisciplinary type of anthropology.

According to popular use in English, the science of anthropology, investigates the origins, the physical and social development, common biological and social attributes, social practices, and beliefs of humanity ("anthropos" is Greek for man). Anthropologists study the languages and cultures of other peoples as well as those of one’s native population. This focus is paradigmatically represented by Franz Boas’ studies of Native American populations or Margaret Mead’s investigations of Pacific island cultures. But the scientific description of individual cultures (ethnography) represents only one aspect of anthropology. This concept can also include research in comparative zoology, or a philosophical investigation of human nature (Grammercy Books 63). Current use in English favors the first definition.
The Early Modern Period and the Study of Human Nature

These concerns of ethnology, comparative anatomy, and anthropology in defining human nature are not new. Indeed, since antiquity academics speculated about the origin and purpose of humanity. For example, Herodotus’ *Histories* described the contact of Greek civilization with other peoples of the Mediterranean and the Near East, while Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey* explored individual codes of honor (Mühlmann 25-26). Sophocles penetrated human psychology in his drama *Oedipus Rex*. In the treatise *de Anima*, Aristotle contemplated the nature of the soul and its relation to the body. In a broad sense, these fields of inquiry represent ideas omnipresent in the western tradition.

In the early modern period, new scientific discoveries gradually altered philosophical speculation about humans and their purpose. In the process, traditional religious views were challenged. Using detailed experiments and measurements, Nicolas Copernicus (1473-1543) identified the sun as the center of our solar system (Davies 507). Expanded by Johann Kepler’s (1571-1630) theory of elliptical planetary orbit and confirmed by Galileo Galilei’s (1564-1642) observations with a telescope, this heliocentric theory questioned the longstanding Ptolemaic cosmology and removed earth and humankind from center stage (508). The methodology for the Copernican hypothesis helped initiate an epistemological challenge to truth based on Scholastic metaphysics by recognizing science as a legitimate partner in the quest for knowledge (Alt 25-28).

People explored their environment in new ways, redefining the ends of the earth and the interactions of forces on its surface. European explorers expanded geographical horizons, mercantilist goals, and colonial visions beyond the Atlantic Ocean: Vasco de Gama charted ship passage around the Cape of Good Hope (1498) and Ferdinand
Magellan sailed beyond Cape Horn (1520) (Palmer and Colton 105-106, 108). Isaac Newton (1642-1727) used experimental data and calculus to propose uniform mathematical theories of movement in his *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (1687) (286). In the desire to integrate new breakthroughs in natural science and to classify knowledge within a framework compatible with divine order, writers such as scientist John Ray explained the wisdom of God through the completeness of creation in his *Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation* (1691).

Similarly, artistic production confronted human modes of being. In his *Essais* (1580), Michel de Montaigne pursued self-knowledge through writing about his personal experiences, yet producing universal observations on human nature available in the accessible, new form of the personal essay. Self-reflexivity also motivated the melancholic and speculative inwardness of one of Shakespeare’s signature evaluations of the human character, *Hamlet* (1601).

Like the arts, anatomy and philosophy also probed the nature of human existence. After studying neo-Aristotelian medicine in Padua, William Harvey proposed a model of the human circulatory system. His treatise *Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in animalibus* [An Anatomical Essay Concerning the Movement of the Heart and the Blood in Animals] (1628) replaced existing theories about the origin and circulation of the blood (Porter, *Greatest Benefit* 212-214). In the initially anonymously published *Discourse on Method* (1637), René Descartes located the verification for human existence not in Scripture or God’s creation, but in the thinking individual.

In the early modern period, human knowledge and human aptitudes evolved significantly. These representative examples of changes in human perception of the
universe, human environments, and the self motivated renewed attempts to define the nature of humanity. The answers to this philosophical question correlated at times with science, at other times with theology, and occasionally with both. This intermingling will be quite obvious in the ensuing chapters. Such theories were the purview of a developing field called anthropology or the science of humanity.

This concept of a science of humanity should be differentiated historically and culturally. Eighteenth-century versions of the science of humanity anticipated the three discourses on human nature mentioned above (ethnology, comparative anatomy, philosophy of human nature). Carsten Zelle identified three similar semantic fields for anthropology in eighteenth-century Germany. Cultural anthropology analyzed peoples and cultures, past and present. Physical or biological anthropology compared the similarities and differences between human beings and other animals. Philosophical anthropology investigated the problematic relations of body and soul, as well as the relationship of the human organism to other living things in the great chain of being (Zelle, "Sinnlichkeit und Therapie" 5n1). Additionally, a theological anthropology traced the telos of humankind from birth through baptism and a life of Christian faith to earthly death and eternal life (Porter, "Anthropology" 28). Within the area of philosophical anthropology, I will analyze the contribution of the historical discourse of body and soul to the creation of the moral individual.

The European Context of Anthropology: Lexica and Encyclopedias

Mareta Linden's Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts (1976) offers the best overview of German-language texts published before 1800 that
attempt to define anthropology. As an investigation of philosophical anthropology, the
study traces the interrelationship of mind and body. The author provides international
representatives for the early history of the term: from German-speaking lands, we find
texts by Magnus Hundt (1501) and Otto Casmann (1594); from England, by Francis
Bacon (1623); and from France, by René Descartes (1649). Each thinker approached
anthropology from an alternate disciplinary perspective. While Hundt as an anatomist,
Casmann as a psychologically oriented philosopher, and Bacon as an epistemologist
classified human nature as a union of body and soul, the philosopher Descartes
viewed the essence of the individual dualistically (Linden 1-9). The publishing of
individual writers on this topic represented a personal interest, but not a profession or a
field of study. Within existing systems of knowledge and the institutional structure of the
university, anthropology had no established home. From 1500 to 1700, the science of
humanity as anthropology was predominantly heterogeneous, uninstitutionalized, and
international in scope. Hence, it is a challenge to achieve absolute precision in assessing
its essence.

Eighteenth-century lexica and encyclopedias highlighted the debate about
humanity's double nature. According to Linden, Stephan Chauvin provided one of the
first detailed descriptions of scientific anthropology in the *Lexicon philosophicum* (1713)
(15). Within the definition of anthropology, Chauvin uses the theory of spirits to define
the interrelationship of body and soul. The spirits function as an "inner band" to connect
physical and spiritual nature. The definition for anthropology addresses other
paradigmatic problems such as the location of the soul in the body and the faculties of
dualistic human nature. These faculties include physical and moral feeling, the will, desire, voluntary motion, and irritability (17).

Johann Georg Walch’s *Philosophisches Lexicon* (1726, 4th ed. 1775) defines anthropology according to the Greek term designating the doctrine of human beings. Human life combines physical and moral nature, both of which body and soul depend on (Walch and Hennings 172-173). While many historians read this definition as presenting a dualistic anthropology, Linden questions this hypothesis. In the next chapter, I will further discuss Walch’s definition of anthropology and analyze both sides of the debate. But here I only want to introduce Walch's concept of humanity's double nature. The *Philosophisches Lexicon* is important as an early German-language source that counters the Cartesian separation of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* by positing that the metaphysical and the material are interrelated.

*Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff* provides a first orientation to mid-eighteenth-century anthropology with greater detail on the second half of the century. The pre-1750 overview focuses on texts by writers from the German territories. Because Enlightenment scientists communicated, travelled, and studied internationally, a brief consideration of English and French definitions here provides a broader context for situating German anthropology. Similar to Walch, important English and French lexica conceived of anthropology in the context of a body/soul nexus.

Ephraim Chambers’ *Cyclopædia or, an universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences* (1728) identifies two meanings for anthropology. One definition refers to a theological discourse that anthropomorphizes God to make his actions comprehensible. The other describes anthropology as "a discourse, or treatise upon man, or human nature:
considered as in a found or healthy state" (Chambers 1:unpaginated). This doctrine acknowledges that bodily states depend on health and selects the healthy state as the normal one. By making this distinction, Chambers invokes a medical predisposition to the normal human functioning and excludes cases of mania, delirium, etc. Like Walch, the discourse of anthropology in this work refers to a dualistic image of humankind and the interrelationship of body and soul. Chambers circumscribes this field as follows: "Anthropology includes the consideration of the human body and soul, with the laws of their union, and the effects thereof, as sensation, motion &c. See BODY, SOUL, SENSATION, MOTION, &c" (Chambers 1:unpaginated). Through the union of body and soul, the discourse on human beings investigates human perception and movement. The *Cyclepædia* provides evidence that the discourse of anthropology exists in Great Britain after Bacon, even if writers discuss the body-soul relationship less under the term of anthropology and more according to individual elements of body, soul, or sensation. Chambers’ extensive system of cross-references purposely extends the meanings of individual concepts by directly linking semantic fields.

In his study of the anthropological elements of eighteenth- and Nineteenth-century autobiography, *Literarische Anthropologie* (1987), Helmut Pfotenhauer claims that encyclopedias by Walch and Johann Heinrich Zedler document the continual establishment of anthropological ideas to a level of self-evidence during the eighteenth century (4). Zedler’s *Grosses vollständiges Universal=Lexicon aller Wissenschaften und Künste* (1732-1750) describes anthropology as a discourse on humankind under the umbrella of physics. As in Chambers’ *Cyclopædia*, Zedler’s theory of humanity defines the human organism in a specified, normal state, i.e. healthy and with natural faculties.
Thus, the term refers primarily to physical existence. The author notes that a broader
definition of the term would include a theory of human volition and reason, yet pauses
with concern at the expansion of knowledge and the prospect of combining all three parts
of human life, physical existence, willing and rationality, within one field. To tame such a
leviathan as the description of humanity, the article advocates maintaining separate
spheres for ethics and logic (Zedler 1:522).

The *Universal=Lexicon* locates the theory of humanity in natural science, but also
acknowledges that it has counterparts in philosophy and medicine. According to
"Anthropologia," the natural scientists provide a fragmented rendering of human nature,
one which medical doctors complete. The science of humanity organizes knowledge in
two ways. Dividing human nature into the physical, the moral, and the rational, the
*Universal=Lexicon* assigns moral human nature to ethical philosophy and rational human
nature to the realm of logic. According to Zedler, disciplinary forces demarcate the
semantic fields for anthropology; "Weltweisen" and "Medici" interpret them differently.
On the one hand, disciplines categorize human nature according to constituent elements,
including physical, natural, and moral characteristics. On the other, physicians and
philosophers define human nature from the standpoint of their individual discipline.
Enlightenment anthropology crosses disciplinary fields but has no theoretical or
institutional home (1:522).

Samuel Johnson’s *Dictionary of the English Language* (1755) similarly defines
anthropology in physical terms. In a brief entry, Johnson describes the discourse on
humankind as "The doctrine of anatomy; the doctrine of the form and structure of the
body of man" (Johnson 1:unpaginated). While Chambers’ *Cyclopædia* addresses both
physical and moral nature, and Zedler’s *Universal=Lexicon* acknowledges a moral component to anthropology, Johnson’s *Dictionary* views anthropology from the perspective of material human nature. Even the sole cross-reference directs attention to the corporeal essence of humanity: "see body."

Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond D’Alembert’s *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers* (1751-1780), like Chambers’ *Cyclopædia*, characterizes anthropology in a theological and a philosophical sense. This term illustrates how Diderot and D’Alembert consulted Chambers’ work, in this instance adopting two similar meanings, but rewrote the texts with abridgments and corrections.\(^3\)

The philosophical entry defines the term "anthropology in the animal economy; it is a treatise about man. This word comes from the Greek *anthropos*, man, and from *logos*, treatise" (Diderot and D'Alambert 1:497).\(^4\) Two brief bibliographical entries supplement the definition, introducing Teichmeyer’s *Anthropologia* (1719) and Drake’s *Anthropology* (1707) (cf. Linden 23-27).\(^5\) The brevity of the philosophical entry belies the significance of the cross-references. With the link to *oeconomie animale*, the *Encyclopédie* locates anthropology within a physiological context. The term *animal*
In a later paragraph, the author elaborates on the role of mind and soul in shaping the animal economy. In the spirit of the age, the author cites a defining phrase of Enlightenment psychology: *connois toi toi-même*; this is the same phrase Karl Philipp Moritz writes thirty years later on the title page epigraph of the *Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde* (1783-1793), *gnothi sauton*, know thyself. The entry detailing the animal economy thus presents a dualistic view of humanity. Human nature includes body, but also soul:

L’*œconomie animale* considérée dans l’homme ouvre un vaste champ aux recherches les plus intéressantes; elle est de tous les mystères de la nature celui dont la connaissance touche l’homme de plus près, l’affecte plus intimement, le plus propre à attirer & à satisfaire sa curiosité; c’est l’homme qui s’approfondit lui-même, qui pénètre dans son intérieur; il ôte le bandeau qui le cachoit à lui-même, & porte des yeux éclairés du flambeau de la Philosophie sur les sources de sa vie, sur le mécanisme de son existence; il accomplit exactement ce beau précepte qui servoit

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6 Cited text translated: "in the more exact and the more common sense only the order, the mechanism, and the collection of functions and movements which sustain the life of animals, which the perfect and universal exercise, done with constancy, alacrity, and facility constitutes the state of more flourishing health." Original: "OEconomie animale, ( Médec.) le mot oeconomie signifie littéralement lois de la maison; il est formé des deux mots grecs OIKOS2, maison, & NOMOS2, loi; quelques auteurs ont employé improprement le nom d’*œconomie animale*, pour désigner l’animal lui-même; c’est de cette idée que sont venues ces façons de parler abusives, mouvements, fonctions de l’œconomie animale; mais cette dénomination prise dans le sens le plus exact & le plus usité ne regarde que l’ordre, le mécanisme, l’ensemble des fonctions & des mouvements qui entretiennent la vie des animaux, dont l’exercice parfait, universel, fait avec constance, alacrité & facilité, constitue l’état le plus florissant de santé, dont le moindre dérangement est par lui-même maladie, & dont l’entière cessation est l’extrême diamétralement opposé à la vie, c’est-à-dire la mort."
This part of the entry reveals the movement or action of the soul, including the search for knowledge, limitation according to societal norms, and the deliberate pursuit and discovery of the self. Using a characteristic Enlightenment metaphor of unmasking, and linking light with critical thought, the passage idealizes the prospect of human knowledge and human potential.

To fully and precisely understand the animal economy, the reader must recognize the interaction of the two spheres of physiological and spiritual function. Through engagement with the emotions and moral action, the animal economy highlights the anthropological foundations of human nature.

La connaissance exacte de l'oeconomie animale répand aussi un tres-grand jour sur le physique des actions morales: les idées lumineuses que fournit l'ingénieux système que nous exposerons plus bas, pour expliquer la manière d'agir, & les effets des passions sur le corps humain, donnent de fortes raisons de présumer que c'est au défaut de ces connaissances qu'on doit attribuer l'inexactitude & l'inutilité de tous les ouvrages qu'il y a sur cette partie, & l'extrême difficulté d'appliquer fructueusement les principes qu'on y établit: peut-être est-il vrai que pour être bon moraliste, il faut être excellent médecin. (11:360)8

The animal economy functions especially to further understanding of moral behavior and the effect of the passions on the body. It provides strategies to read the corporeal signs produced in everyday human interaction. In coordination with the demand to know

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7 "Considered from the [perspective] of man, the animal economy opens a vast [collection?] of particularly interesting research. It is, of all the mysteries of nature, that in which knowledge meets man more closely, which affects him more intimately, which tells him how to dress properly and satisfy his curiosity; it is man who examines himself, who penetrates into his interior; he removes the blindfold which he hides from himself and has eyes sparkling from the torch of philosophy over the well-springs of his life, over the means of his existence. It fulfills exactly the beautiful principle that serves as an inscription of the celebrated temple from antiquity: Gnothi Sauton, know thyself."

8 "The precise understanding of the animal economy also responds to a very large gap/daylight/facility on the appearance/constitution of moral action: the luminous ideas that furnish the ingenious system which we reveal at the most basic level for explaining the function [manner of action] and the effects of the passions on the human body give a strong reason to presume that it is the imperfection of this knowledge to which one must attribute the inexactitude and uselessness of all the works that there are on this subject and the extreme difficulty of fruitfully applying the principles that it establishes. Perhaps it is true that to be a good moralist, it is necessary to be an excellent doctor."
oneself, this semiotics of the soul asserts the imperative of trained observational
technique and interpretative skills that transcend the social regulation of mores, limited
knowledge, or poor scholarship. The author appeals to the empirical methods and
diagnostic training of the medical doctor as goals for the writer describing human nature.
In this sense, he acknowledges the positive predisposition of Enlightenment culture
toward the philosophical doctor: he is an educated intellectual, who combines
physiological and moral knowledge to describe, diagnose, and shape physical and moral
human nature.

The editors Diderot and D’Alembert assigned the article "oeconomie animale" to
the class of medical knowledge within the *Encyclopédie*. The functions of the material
body, the author argues, define human nature. The body does not only perform vital
functions necessary to sustain life (such as respiration) and natural functions (such as
digestion or blood production); it also includes "animal functions": "Enfin, les fonctions
animales forment la troisième classe; elles sont ainsi appelées, parce qu’elles sont
censées résulter du commerce de l’âme avec le corps" (11:362).9 Thus from the
perspective of medicine, the body-soul interaction represents one of three key functions
of corporeal existence. One could define this relation as anthropology. From the
perspective of this author in the *Encyclopédie*, the interaction is a mere extension of the
materialist component of human nature and is therefore subsumed under the animal
economy.

While the Paris *Encyclopédie* classifies the anthropological knowledge of the
animal economy according to medicine, Fortunato Bartolomeo de Felice, editor of the

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9 "The animal functions form the third class. They are called this because they are reputed to result from
the exchange of the soul with the body."
Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines (1770-1776), classifies the term "anthropologie" philosophically. The author acutely identifies the differences in approach to this science: the naturalist tends to view humans physically and materially in terms of organic function, whereas the psychologist views humans as pure spirit. Based on two arguments, divine wisdom and common personal experience, the writer argues for the interdependence of *soma* and *psyche*, of the physical and spiritual spheres of human existence.

De Felice’s Yverdon *Encyclopédie* replaces the physiological approach to human nature with a theological, philosophical model. In proposing a union of the two spheres, the oft-segregated physical side with the spiritual side, the article posits a similar position to that in the "animal economy" article of the Paris *Encyclopédie*. But the context is clearly different: the "anthropologie" article by de Felice articulates more verbosely, yet in a general fashion how the spheres interact, while the article "oeconomie animale" in

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10 "Man [is] the work of an infinite wisdom, which has never made anything except for the greater good and which has made man, a composite being, composed of an organized body and a rational soul so intimately united that these two substances can only form a single individual, which we only know in this composition, without having any idea of the manner in which these two substances might exist separately. As a matter of fact, we could not imagine what ideas, what sensations, what knowledge we would have without the assistance of our senses, of our organs, which are our body; nor [would we be able to know] what actions we would be capable of doing without this immaterial principle of intelligence and of activity, which is our soul."
Diderot and D’Alembert’s work matter-of-factly notes the interaction as one of the functional strategies of the human organism.\(^\text{11}\)

The entries in the two French encyclopedias capture the role of disparate, disciplinary knowledge in shaping the diverse field that is the study of human nature. The German sources cited above offer a similar paradigm: Walch argues from a philosophical perspective for a holistic view of the human being’s two spheres. By comparison, Zedler situates anthropology among existing disciplines. As a result, Zedler divides human nature into three fields and appropriates logic for the study of human reasoning, ethics for the study of volition, and anthropology for the study of physical human nature. Like Walch and Chambers, the Yverdon _Encyclopédie_ develops a philosophical explanation for the interrelatedness of body and soul. Akin to Zedler, the physiological analysis of human beings predominates in the Paris _Encyclopédie_. Certainly, each of the sources here uses a heterogeneous base of evidence and arguments to define anthropology. Nevertheless, in each source, I argue, either a functional explanation of the human organism or a rational account prevails.

The reference works published by Chambers and Johnson in England, by Walch and Zedler in German-speaking states, by Diderot and D’Alembert in France and de Felice in Switzerland demonstrate a European engagement with questions of philosophical anthropology. Despite some differences in terminology, these sources explore, for example, the function of bodily sensation and movement, the effect of passions on the body, and the possible avenues to gain self-knowledge, i.e. the nature of

interaction between body and soul. In each encyclopedia, authors analyzed and transmitted anthropological knowledge based on their intellectual specialties and interests. Thus instead of a philosophical anthropology, there were anthropologies. For the articles above, Walch, Chambers and de Felice approached the science of humanity from philosophy, while Zedler included the natural sciences and medicine, and Johnson and Diderot/D’Alembert focused on physiology. Knowledge from diverse fields shaped interdisciplinary Enlightenment anthropology.

The heterogeneous approach to the study of humankind encouraged interaction between the disciplines. According to some idealistic descriptions of anthropology, the science of humanity held promise as a nexus of late eighteenth-century science. De Felice represents this idealism in a characteristic fashion:

Toutes les sciences que l’homme cultive ou pourra cultiver, tiendront toujours par quelque endroit à l’anthropologie, qui est la plus importante des sciences, la plus digne d’occuper l’homme: sans cette connaissance de nous-mêmes, quelle perfection, quelle félicité pourrons-nous atteindre? Toutes les sciences servent à perfectionner l’anthropologie, & celle-ci ne sera parfaite, qu’autant que les autres seront parvenues à leur perfection, & elles ne seront utiles qu’autant que nous les rapporterons à la science de l’homme telle que nous venons de la décrire. (de Felice 3:22B)

The science of humanity, de Felice claims, represents the most significant human occupation. As a source of self-knowledge and a wellspring to achieve happiness, anthropology depends upon knowledge from other disciplines. This relationship implies a teleology: for humankind to achieve its potential in the study of human nature, it must perfect other sciences. Anthropology had to draw knowledge from anatomy, physiology, neurology, chemistry, physics, psychology, even natural history and philosophy to best

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12 “All of the sciences man cultivates or will be able to cultivate will always have some connection with anthropology, which is the most important of the sciences, the most worthy to occupy man. Without this knowledge of ourselves, what perfection, what felicity can we attain? All of the sciences serve to perfect anthropology and the latter will only be perfect to the extent that the others have reached their perfection. They [the other sciences] will only be useful to the extent that we relate them to the science of man as we have just described it.”
develop a science of humankind. Despite the enthusiasm and idealistic vision expressed in this excerpt, it reflects the true heterogeneity of research approaches to the common interest in human nature during the eighteenth century. From the unique perspective of each of these disciplines, writers contributed to a complex image of anthropological inquiry.

**Institutional Frameworks and Interdisciplinarity**

In eighteenth-century German-speaking lands, anthropology lacked an institutional home. The traditional four divisions of study, theology, law, medicine, and philosophy (with a possible fifth faculty for music), structured German university education in the eighteenth century (Hammerstein, "Aufklärung und Universitäten" 191; on music cf. Davies 361). In addition to the longstanding goal of humanistic education, universities understood themselves as institutions to educate theologians for pastoral work and to train civil servants for administration (Hammerstein, "Aufklärung und Universitäten" 197). In some cases, this meant that specialized academies for fields such as medicine or mining more successfully achieved goals of original scientific research, progress in knowledge, and sharing newly won scholarship with students and colleagues than scholastic, tradition-bound universities (Hammerstein, "Aufklärung und Universitäten" 198; Porter, "Scientific Revolution" 560). Many philosophical and theological faculties held fast to Aristotelian scholasticism at the beginning of the eighteenth century and limited innovation in thought through the challenges of fields like psychology or anthropology (Schindling, *Bildung* 52). Though the field of jurisprudence

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13 Porter notes other institutions that shaped Enlightenment science included courtly academies, voluntary societies, and specialized research centers such as observatories.
surpassed theology as the primary discipline at reform universities such as Halle and Göttingen, the theological faculty only gradually relinquished power at the university. Theology’s power hinged on cultural values and institutions that extended beyond the university: the discipline shaped the epistemological worldview of a large percentage of the populace and it trained men to serve God as pastors and priests, as shepherds of the church.\textsuperscript{14} Additionally, theology enjoyed the tradition of being a primary field of study at the university.\textsuperscript{15}

Anthropological questions challenged the authority of Christian theology, for example from the fields of natural history and philosophy. The field of natural history raised questions for Christian theology through its classification of human beings with living and non-living things according to what we now call physical anthropology. The discovery of fossils with the million-year-old remains of plants and animals challenged Biblical accounts of history, namely the theological dogma that dated the world to only six or seven thousand years from the point of creation. Similarly, in philosophy the theory of physical influence, i.e. that the body influenced the soul, and the soul the body, whether in physical motion, sensation, or as a result of emotions, challenged the theological view that God was the first cause of motion in the universe. In this case, theorists of reciprocal influence distanced themselves from existing theories that maintained God as the original cause of all actions. The incongruent nature of

\textsuperscript{14} Jurisprudence assumed key importance at universities in coordination with doctrines of natural law. In Halle, however, the theological faculty subsequently paralyzed some of the university’s initial reforms and reinstated some restrictive tendencies. See Notker Hammerstein, "Die deutschen Universitäten im Zeitalter der Aufklärung," \textit{Zeitschrift für historische Forschung} 10 (1983): 73-89, here 76, 79-80.
anthropological theory in comparison to theology challenged theological power at the university.

German universities gradually reformed the structure of higher education, however, with newly founded universities in Halle and Göttingen leading the way. Founded in 1694, the University of Halle quickly ascended to the role of the leading university in the German lands through the scholarship and guidance of Christian Thomasius in law and philosophy, August Hermann Francke in theology, and Christian Wolff in philosophy and natural law (Wehler 1:294-295; Schindling, Bildung 39). With Thomasius and Francke, Halle replaced Lutheran orthodoxy prevalent at the neighboring Universities in Wittenberg and Leipzig with philosophy and Pietist theology focused on practical moral behavior (Schindling, Bildung 38). By emphasizing the study of history for law and administration, Thomasius effected a reform of knowledge that had consequences for the organization of the university.16 Around 1750, the University of Göttingen eclipsed Halle as a center for research (Hammerstein, "Deutsche Universitäten" 78-79). Instead of choosing theology as the leading discipline of the new institution, university founders in Göttingen, such as Gerlach Adolph von Münchhausen, granted history a leading role in organizing knowledge (Schindling, Bildung 27-28; Wehler 1:295-296). While history and the natural sciences gradually gained prominence

16 Schindling also credits Samuel Stryk, Thomasius’ mentor from the University of Frankfurt/Oder and his colleague in Halle beginning in 1691, for reform of the study of law. They emphasized the study of law based on reference to primary sources and imperial history. This empirical method characterized the spirit of reform in other disciplines as well: complete and unbiased study of the Bible in theology, open acknowledgement by Christians of their born again faith through trials and practice in daily life, the role of reason in establishing higher standards of behavior and equity when weighing the needs of society and the individual through natural law, and clinical practice in medicine. Anton Schindling, Bildung und Wissenschaft in der frühen Neuzeit, Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte 30, ed. Lothar Gall, 2 ed. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999) 39. See also Hammerstein: "Die deutschen Universitäten" 73-89, here 74-78.
as valid fields of study, it took longer to establish empirical psychology and anthropology.

Despite gradual inclusion of new fields at German universities during the eighteenth century, anthropology remained an endeavor characterized by other disciplines. It lacked institutional autonomy. Isolated examples illustrate professors’ efforts to separate anthropology from related disciplines, or to subordinate it to existing fields. Linden cites the Leipzig University Professor for Rhetoric and Poetry Gottfried Polycarp Müller (1685-1747), who in a lecture announcement from 1719 posited that anthropology should be established as a field separated from the other philosophical disciplines (Linden 18). By contrast, writers more commonly approached anthropology from the perspective of their own field or another existing discipline such as natural science, medicine, or philosophy. In his *Elementa anthropologiae sive theoria corporis humani* (1719), Jena University Professor Hermann Friedrich Teichmeyer (1685-1746) subordinated the representation of the physical human being to the new empirical, experimental study of physics (Linden 24-25).

Research originating from the University of Halle around 1740 further typifies how academics pursued anthropological themes from within existing disciplines of medicine and philosophy. During his study of medicine, natural sciences, and mathematics, and from 1743 as an instructor in medicine, Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715-1759) published his *Naturlehre* (1740-1749), a three-volume natural history. The second volume, *Physiologie* (1743), not only describes the function of the human body, but investigates the interaction of body and soul in chapters on sensation and inner sense (Krüger, *Physiologie* 536-637, 763-781). Combining knowledge from his training as a
doctor with his interest in philosophy, Krüger develops an interdisciplinary investigative method combining medical and philosophical approaches that he presents in a more developed form in the *Experimental-Seelenlehre* (1756). In philosophy, Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777) published a philosophical account of the relationship of the soul and the body in his monograph *Theoretische Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen überhaupt* (1744). Future studies should investigate the constellations of different fields that define anthropology at a given university or intellectual center to enable a better analysis of anthropology’s disciplinary roots during the eighteenth century.17

**Anthropologies: Key Monographs of the Late Enlightenment Anthropological Turn**

The study of anthropology in the German states continued to develop from 1750 until the end of the century from the perspective of individual disciplines. In his *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise* (1772), Ernst Platner argued as a physician and philosopher that interactions of body and soul shape human reason, memory, creativity, and health. Deriding the emphasis on physiology in the study of humanity, Immanuel Kant’s philosophical approach in the *Anthropologie von pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798) redefined the proper subject of anthropology as the rational choice to pursue moral character.18 In his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791) Johann Gottfried Herder created a historical account of human nature through the

17 An initial example of this type of institutional history includes an investigation into anthropology and empirical psychology in Jena around 1800. Though the editors provide an overview of the establishment of the discipline through summaries and quantitative history, further detailed readings would be required to interpret their sources. See Georg Eckardt, Matthias John, Temilo van Zantwijk and Paul Ziche, eds., *Anthropologie und empirische Psychologie um 1800: Ansätze einer Entwicklung zur Wissenschaft* (Köln: Böhlau, 2001).

18 The 1798 version of the anthropology represents a snapshot in the development of a lecture Kant gave regularly starting in 1772. For a record of its development through notes on 9 different versions of the lecture, see Immanuel Kant, *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*, 29 vols., *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 25 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1997).
combination of ethnography, natural history, physiology, and philosophy. Indeed, the period around 1772 marked a point of crystalization of anthropological theory. While Platner published his anthropology in that year, it also marked Kant's first reading of the anthropological lectures, which he repeated regularly thereafter. Herder's *Ideen* are a significantly redeveloped version of the essay "Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit" from 1773, printed in 1774. Thus the anthropological interests of Platner, Kant, and Herder achieved a significant expression around the same period, 1772-1773. This should not discount, however, the complex genesis and subsequent development of each of the author's works. Moreover, each thinker anchored his interdisciplinary interpretation of the anthropological enterprise in a different discipline, Platner in medicine, Kant in philosophy, and Herder in history.19 Their monographs represented epistemological differences and at the same time formed anthropological knowledge in a ways comparable to earlier scholars, including those writing definitions of anthropology for encyclopedias.

Ernst Platner's *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise* approaches the science of humanity as an intersection of philosophy and medicine. Though not the first book in the German Enlightenment to theorize human life from this perspective, the work represents a school of development in science and has recently gained notoriety as the first German

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19Pfotenhauer makes this distinction in a similar manner in the introduction to *Literarische Anthropologie*, for example differentiating a physiological science of humanity, a charge Kant makes against Platner, from the psychological approach to humanity by Georg Ernst Stahl or Marcus Herz. Pfotenhauer compellingly notes that most writers on anthropology chose a heterogeneous approach and that distinctions between their views nevertheless remain. Claiming that each author's presuppositions are shaped by a combination of their professional training and interests, This dissertation attributes the differences to the epistemological basis used for each text. See Helmut Pfotenhauer, *Literarische Anthropologie: Selbstbiographien und ihre Geschichte – am Leitfaden des Leibes*, Germanistische Abhandlungen 62 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1987) 4-5.
monograph to use the German term *Anthropologie* in the title.\(^{20}\) In the programmatic and
oft-cited foreword, Platner claims that the separation of the field of medicine from
philosophy after the time of Hippocrates provided more disadvantages than advantages
and the author therefore recommends the study of these fields together. Assessing the
integration of medical and philosophical skills in his own age, Platner argues that
between doctors and philosophers, doctors have learned the least about their
complementary discipline. Yet recognition of their interrelation is essential. Philosophy,
deferred broadly as "die Wissenschaft des Menschen und anderer Körper und Geister,
welche zu seiner Natur ein Verhältnis und auf seine Glückseligkeit eine Beziehung
haben" can even include the field of medicine (Platner iii-iv). Thus the proper care of
humankind, especially given its dualistic nature, requires philosophy and medicine (iv).
By uniting etchings of Hippocrates and Plato, the title page reinforces this rhetoric (\(\)):\(^{(1)}\).

The foreword of the *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise* diagnoses the
organization of scientific disciplines and envisions a reorganization of natural science. In
order to understand human beings, Platner argues, one must evaluate all aspects of human
nature, physical and spiritual. In point of fact, various problems restrict the productive
integration of medicine and philosophy. Political motivations may combine disciplines
without consideration of their substantive integration (v). The combination of medicine
with related fields thus suffers under whimsical organization, for example the
combination of botany with the study of human health while excluding psychology (vi).

notes the exception of Johannes Praetorius, *Collegium curiosum privatissimum physiognom-, chiromant-, metoposcop-, anthropologicum* (Frankfurt, Leipzig: Philipp Wilhelm Stock, 1704). Due to the breadth of
subjects, however, Kosenina doesn't regard the *Collegium curiosum* as a pure anthropology, see Alexander
Dyckischen Buchhandlung, 1772) 308.
Prejudices—whether initiated in the medical profession or by the public—shape the qualifications and duties of medical doctors and philosophers and hinder the integration of these fields (vii). Popular opinion and traditional division of expertise necessitate that doctors provide for the physical health of human beings, philosophers (and theologians) for their intellectual and emotional being—despite the fact that physical and spiritual natures influence each other. Finally, Platner believes that physicians schooled to think in casuistic terms and to use empirical evidence distance themselves from the soul based on its concealment and unintelligibility (ix-x). Perhaps these perceptions stem from publicly ingrained interpretations of the responsibilities of the doctor and the philosopher; perhaps they derive from the self-limitation of doctors who feel unprepared to address the complexities of psychology. As a beginning academic, Platner took risks to identify real obstacles to the perception of the human organism as an interdependent relationship of body and soul and to the inclusion of philosophy in the field of medicine.21

Addressing the debates of materialists and vitalists on the relationship of body and soul, the *Anthropologie* of 1772 divides the science of humanity into three subfields. This division clarifies the specific focus of anthropology, which for Platner was not synonymous but a subfield of the science of humanity. The first science explores the parts and activities of the human being as a machine through anatomy and physiology and thereby focuses on the body alone. The second science, which explores the faculties of the soul without consideration of the body, integrates psychology, logic, aesthetics and

the greater part of moral philosophy. For the philosophical physician, the knowledge of
humanity exists in the harmony of body and soul, in the study of "der ganze Mensch."
Anthropology, the third science, investigates the reciprocal relationships and restrictions
of body and soul: "Endlich kann man Körper und Seele in ihren gegenseitigen
Verhältnissen, Einschränkungen und Beziehungen zusammen betrachten, und das ist es,
was ich Anthropologie nenne" (Platner xv-xvii). Though fields such as psychology and
anthropology approach each other, anthropology differs, according to Platner, in that it
studies the effect of the body on the soul or the soul on the body.

Evidence from everyday life supports this claim. Triggered by things in the world,
sensory perception can stimulate ideas in the soul. But ideas in the soul, with or without
an outside impetus, can produce motion in the body (xii). With these simple examples,
Platner illustrates the complementary nature of the body-soul relationship and emphasizes
the importance of the exchange between physical and spiritual natures. Whether a divine
or natural cause spurs the communication, the relation between the two spheres provides
insight into the dualistic nature of human existence. Though the preface does not name
Malebranche's occasionalism, it does identify the other theory of divine communication,
Leibniz's preestablished harmony rooted in Divine Providence, and the multiplicity of
theories of natural communication between body and soul known as physical influence.

The Anthropologie discusses the interrelation of the material body and the
metaphysical soul in general psychological categories similar to those in Enlightenment
psychological texts. This despite the fact that the author explicitly states his intention not
to write a psychological work (xv). The book's aim is to identify how psychology
together with physiology defines complete human nature. Nevertheless, psychological
themes predominate an organizing principle in chapters II to VII, with the first chapter devoted to an introduction of anthropology. While the chapter headings don't directly reflect any one psychological work, they indicate an organization based on mental faculties:

I. Vorerkenntnisse und Grundlehren der Anthropologie
II. Von der Erzeugung der Ideen
III. Von dem Gedächtnis
IV. Von der Phantasie
V. Von der Vernunft und ihren verschiedenen Aeußerungen
VI. Theorie der Krankheiten, welche aus der Anstrengung des Geistes entstehen
VII. Vom Genie

The creation of ideas (II), their storage (III), the power of invention (IV), the order of logic (V), and aberrations from the normal human state of equilibrium, spiritual illness (VI), and genius (VII) represent common categories in works of Enlightenment psychology such as John Locke's *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1689) and David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-1740). Platner's *Anthropologie* uses the framework of rational terminology and topics as a template to investigate the corporeal engagement with rational functions. Exemplifying the kind of research called for in the preface, the author demonstrates his willingness to think beyond the structures of his own field of medicine and underscores the commitment to have physicians engage with philosophy.

According to Platner, the body engages the rational faculties on the level of perception and of reason. In the chapter on the formulation of ideas, one section questions the idea of innate ideas and claims: "Alle Ideen entstehen zuerst durch die sinnliche Empfindung" (50). Thus anthropology engages the powers of reason on multiple levels: the lower rational faculties and aesthetics (the study of the improvement of sensory
perception) and that of the higher rational faculties and logic (the study of the improvement of cognition). The will plays a peripheral role, receiving a brief mention in the body/soul connection (xi, §109-111, 31, §122, 33). Compared with Enlightenment psychologies by Locke or Wolff, however, the anthropology of 1772 lacks any significant treatment of the powers of the will. It incorporates neither ethics nor the will’s mechanical response to the emotions (cf. Locke book 2, chapter 21, §5-6, 236, §15, 240-241, §29-30, 249-250; C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott §404-497, 247-302).

Though Platner planned to discuss volition’s role in a second volume of the anthropology (which was completed in manuscript form according to the preface to the first volume), it was never published (Platner xxvii).

By investigating the interdependence of psychological and physiological aspects of human nature, Platner differentiated his Anthropologie from psychology and physiology alone. Instead of employing speculative metaphysics to understand the connection of soul and body, the Leipzig doctor called for an empirical process of making observations and recording them in protocols (xi). Throughout his text, however, speculation in combination with observation formed an interdisciplinary description of the interaction between body and soul (Wöbkemeier 162). The doctor Platner explained this connection through physiology, identifying the neurological system as the interface for communication between substances (Platner 39-44). In reality, human thought and action presuppose such a functional union (34). The brain, a physical structure and initiator and archive of neural signals, serves as a nexus of the author’s theory of physical influence (44-49). Platner used the analogy of Harvey’s circulatory system to understand brain functions. According to the Leipzig professor’s theory, the brain is a system of
tubes served by circulating blood and neural fluid ("Lebensgeister"). Through this network, the soul receives impressions and directs motion (39-40).

Physiology plays a significant role in describing the interaction of body and soul throughout Platner’s anthropology. In the formation of ideas, the neural fluid carries an external sensation into the body, where the attentive soul re-presents them (64, 70). For memory to function, the interdependent soul and brain (spirit and body) require activation (105-106). Certain physiological conditions, such as actuated neural tubes, physically promote memory (117). Fantasy, or imagination, similarly hinges on the unhindered flow of neural fluid for proper function, i.e. the individual depends on bodily function for imaginative creation (173-175). By continually returning to physiological explanations of psychological or psychosomatic functions, Platner anchors his interpretation of the body/soul interaction in medical science.

In the preface to his Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, Kant places humanity at the center of human reflection. Echoing Alexander Pope's declaration that "the proper study of mankind is man," the Anthropologie of 1798 reiterates a sentiment widely held by scientists, academics and readers at the close of the eighteenth century. All developments in culture, says Kant, including knowledge and skills, have their purpose through application in the world, and by world he refers to the human sphere (Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 399-400). Knowledge of humanity represents information of utmost significance and encapsulates a learned amalgamation of the nature of human knowledge and skills as part of a historical process. For each individual, the faculty of reason shapes this development through socialization, the engagement with arts and sciences, increased civilization, and moral training (Kant,
Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 678). This teleology focuses the reader on the study of individual potential and is one of the characteristic gestures of the work.

Knowledge represents a recurring focus in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. In order for individuals to promote the pragmatic side of what they know, they must narrow their focus to promote the understanding of human beings as world citizens (Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 400; Brandt, Kritischer Kommentar 67). Encounters with residents from the local city or region provides valuable exposure to various languages and manners and thereby practical experience in the evaluation and understanding of human character. Travel or travel diaries, especially in conjunction with meeting local individuals, broaden an individual's knowledge of humanity (Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 400). For Kant, as long as the reflection focuses on moral constitution, it provides valuable information for one's personal development.

The preface definitively differentiates the scope of the Anthropologie from similar writings by other authors. Highlighting the main theme of the work, the author simultaneously defines pragmatic anthropology and distinguishes it from the physiological approach of medical doctors. Accentuating the human potential, the Anthropologie separates fields of inquiry: "Die physiologische Menschenkenntnis geht auf die Erforschung dessen, was die Natur aus dem Menschen macht, die pragmatische auf das, was er, als freihandelndes Wesen, aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und soll" (399). Though the work necessarily incorporates an evaluation of knowledge and defines it from a human perspective, Kant ultimately wants to identify what the human can and should achieve. With a focus on what humans can know and what they should
do, the text approaches anthropology from a moral-philosophical position and minimizes empirical investigation. The book shifts anthropology, a science of humanity, from the investigative and empirical method of physiologists, doctors and natural scientists to the theoretical method of philosophers and promotes greater delineation between their modes of inquiry. In emphasizing the role of reflection on the constitution of the science of humanity, the work views anthropology through a philosophical lens.

The introduction outlines a system for the science of humanity. For Kant, anthropology, though classed outside the system of philosophy, uses philosophical methods: it defines terms, analyzes relationships of categories, and illustrates the theoretical relationships with real-world examples. It is an application of the practice of reason to the question of what the human should become. The author maintains classification provides the necessary means to understand human characteristics. Kant sketches the goals of the work as follows:

Eine systematisch entworfene und doch populär (durch Beziehung auf Beispiele, die sich dazu von jedem Leser auffinden lassen) in pragmatischer Hinsicht abgefaßte Anthropologie führt den Vorteil für das lesende Publikum bei sich: daß durch die Vollständigkeit der Titel, unter welche diese oder jene menschliche, ins Praktische einschlagende beobachtete Eigenschaft gebracht werden kann, so viel Veranlassungen und Aufforderungen demselben hiermit gegeben werden, jede besondere zu einem eigenen Thema zu machen, um sie in das ihr zugehörende Fach zu stellen; wodurch die Arbeiten in derselben sich von selbst unter die Liebhaber dieses Studiums verteilen und durch die Einheit des Plans nach gerade zu einem Ganzen vereinigt werden. (402)

Through an appeal to the reader’s capacity to differentiate and group its topic, the Kantian Anthropology promises to function as a tool to that end.

In his Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie (1999) Reinhard Brandt identifies three levels of investigation that proceed from the preface and provide the skeleton of Kant's work. First, the text explores the psychological motivation of human action (Brandt, Kritischer Kommentar 9-10). A large section of the work records how senses influence the creation, organization, and possibility of knowledge. Second, in the tradition of
Balthasar Gracian's *Handorakel und Kunst der Weltklugheit* (1647) and Christian Thomasius' *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* (1696), the psychology and phenomenology of anthropology provide practical guidance for human action (*Kritischer Kommentar* 9-11).

Third, guided by reason, the investigation of the nature of humanity culminates in a vision of a goal for the human race (9, 11-12).

Kantian anthropology has a metaphysical heritage and a philosophical focus.

Kant's program for anthropology developed in response to the empirical psychology within the system of metaphysics devised by Christian Wolff and Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (*Kritischer Kommentar* 49). According to Reinhard Brandt, the Königsberg philosopher separated psychology from metaphysics in an initial lecture on empirical psychology in the winter semester of 1772-1773, and as a result of this course decided to pursue the study of humanity "not psychologically or speculatively," but pragmatically (49). In his essay "Kant and the Problem of Human Nature," Allen Wood illuminates this differentiation in four ways: (1) as an alternative to the physiological approach of Ernst Platner; (2) as knowledge of the world based on personal experience in contrast to scholastic theories developed from observation of others; (3) as a vehicle to shape human action; and (4) as a means to achieve happiness (Wood 40-42). By summarizing his theory of cognition in part one, book one of the *Anthropologie*, Kant provides an epistemological groundwork to theorize how desire and volition influence human action in part one, books two and three.

As in the preface, the opening of the second part of the book, "Die anthropologische Charakteristik," includes a turn from an empirical to a theoretical perspective and provides the framework for Kant's teleology. According to his vision for
humanity, the study of human character supercedes the investigation of temperament (Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* 634). Both temperament and character represent systems to evaluate human action. Humoral pathology or temperament, a theory of the interaction of body and soul through a series of fluids or through the nerves, focuses on human physiology and its effect on human psychology. This dualistic theory defines humanity in naturalistic terms and evaluates reason in its relation to instinct, a view Kant criticizes because it subordinates human nature too much to the drives. Character, in the sense of "diejenige Eigenschaft des Willens, nach welcher das Subjekt sich selbst an bestimmte praktische Prinzipien bindet, die er sich durch seine eigene Vernunft unabhängig vorgeschrieben hat" represents the predisposition to define humanity according to reason rather than nature (633). To accomplish its task of achieving greater humanity, the author eschews the import of the natural, physical being and focuses on reason as a source for the ethical improvement of society. For Kant, the gift of rational thought, the essence of the difference between human beings and their animal cousins, necessitates a responsibility to improve the conditions of all people. "Improvement" includes socializing others to a productively moral and civil life and an active, creative existence in spite of the attraction of human material existence, i.e. of physical perception and biological drives.

This goal of instilling dignity also necessitates a kind of social control, a normalization of the production of individuality to achieve a vision of humanity within communities. For Kant, the formation of the individual represents simultaneously the development of a moral self and the role of that individual in shaping civilization. In the *Anthropologie*, the teleology of human existence, a standardizing force on the formation
of identity, begins in nature and progresses through culture to morality (682). According to this excerpt, human ontogenesis evolves through sequential phases like the life cycle of a butterfly. In a following excerpt, the individual progresses through the antagonism of multiple formative powers, good and evil (683). Kant evaluates human striving for happiness in this context. While nature drives the individual to aim for happiness, which he describes as the pursuit of physical pleasure, reason limits individuals through mores so that they can achieve their psychological and physiological determination (680). Human identity develops in the ever-shifting realm of the pursuit of physical desire and the civilizing patterns of thought that make the achievement of human potential and dignity possible.

For Kant, human beings as a group achieve rational self-determination through a process of civilization. In his essay "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" (1783), Kant takes a position similar to that in the Anthropologie: reading enlightened texts and conversation with other members of society—i.e., sociability—trains individuals to use reason and enables them to pursue Enlightenment (Kant, "Was ist Aufklärung?" 53-54). He contrasts mature individuals to the unenlightened, the mündig to the unmündig, who are each at different stages in the process of attaining reason. While Kant takes interest in the development of individual minds, his focus in the essay on Enlightenment and in the Anthropologie includes the pursuit of a greater moral and social responsibility of the human species (Brandt, "Guiding Idea" 93-99, esp. 98).

In his text Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784-1791), Herder considers anthropology to encompass different questions. In place of Kant's moral trajectory, Herder's work builds on the broad base of his previous writings with
anthropological themes, among them Über den Ursprung der Sprache (1772), Vom Erkennen und Empfinden (1778), and Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit (1774). Through four parts, the Ideen from 1784 incorporates insights on the formative role of language for human experience from the language essay. It draws on the interdependence of knowledge and perception and on the significance of empirical knowledge from the essay Vom Erkennen und Empfinden. Revisiting philosophical and historiographical problems introduced in Auch eine Philosophie, the text of the Ideen references empirical studies to analyze humanity in combination with the more rational approach of Kant's Anthropologie. Though both authors use travel reports in their writings, Herder cites findings from natural science experiments more readily than his fellow philosopher.

The Ideen focuses on the relationship of the human being to nature in general and climate in particular. As individuals, as mere fragments of the larger world, humans exist in an interdependent relationship with all elements of their environment. Describing the place of the individual in the world, Herder avers: "Der Bau des Weltgebäudes sichert also den Kern meines Daseins, mein inneres Leben, auf Ewigkeiten hin. Wo und wer ich sein werde, werde ich sein der ich jetzt bin, eine Kraft im System aller Kräfte, ein Wesen in der unabweichlichen Harmonie einer Welt Gottes" (Herder, Ideen 3,1:20). The history of humanity is a circular hermeneutic, a uniting and encompassing discipline that includes the unity and diversity of human forms among the eternally renewing forms of the earth.

The concentration on sense of place pervades this work. Human beings coexist and evolve in competition and in concert with other living things, but also under the influence or duress of other elemental factors. Physical characteristics such as
temperature, electricity and atmospheric pressure determine the human habitability of any
given region and represent uncontrollable influences on human existence. Though the
citations only hint at the author's understanding of climatological factors, he implies
comprehension of current empirical research in a list of influential scientists, including
Boyle, Boerhaave, Hales, Gravesant, Franklin, Priestley, Black, Crawford, and Achard
(3,1:34). Physical geography, the location of water and land, influence the character of
human civilization from its origins to its methods of survival. Mountains represent for the
author a kind of original climate for humankind as well as a natural dividing element
between peoples. By shaping the distribution, dispersal, and technical development of
civilization, they represent a key element that shaped the survival and variation of the
human species. In consideration of environmental factors on human civilization and the
development of the species, history plays a more traditional role and marks human
change in a cause and effect chronology.

One of the most clear differences between the views of Herder and Kant stems
from their thoughts on the source of reason. While Kant believes a process of civilization
elicits rational self-determination from individuals in society, Herder proposes human
beings possess the faculty of reason from birth through nature. For the author of the
Ideen, the human being exists in its relationship with the chain of being, with organisms
from the worm to the monkey, and stands alone at the pinnacle of creation. The Ideen,
through the integration and evaluation of research by other writers, compares the family
of monkeys to humans and acknowledges the existence of similar instincts and emotions
in each species. The two species remain separated, however, because the apes appear
unable to generate thought or combine external thoughts with their own. Demonstrating
the difficulty of identifying distinctive physiological factors in Haller's *Physiologie* that determine the ability to use reason, Herder continues the search for an anatomical sign of the application of reason. Brain mass, an inconclusive measure in the judgment of the rational abilities of an organism, plays a subordinate role to the physiological structure of the organism's brain. In this way, Herder finds a means to maintain an empirical basis for his evaluation. He isolates the structure of the head and the upright stature of the body as unique characteristics of the reasoning animal and infers that these characteristics separate the human being from other species. Nature instills each species with instincts and a nervous system or brain, but humans have the unique combination of perfected brain structure and upright posture to take advantage of this position (*Ideen* 3,1:117). The biological evolution of the human being to an upright posture and of the skull makes the refined human reason possible.

Though he devotes a large portion of his investigation of the sources of reason in the *Ideen* to physiological factors, Herder also identifies other sources. In a characteristic manner, Herder develops a theory of networked causes of the sources of reason. The essay "Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache" (1772), the prizewinning entry in the 1771 contest organized by the Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, combined six sources of the origin of language into a web of factors that contribute to the formation of human language. The search for the sources of human reason also includes theological and philosophical factors. In addition to physiological causes, Herder names language as a source of reason. While Kant might see language as a product of social interaction, and thereby intertwined in the development of human reason, Herder discusses another possible source of human speech. Words and sentences—the linguistic equations that
help make rationality not only communicable, but in some sense possible—derive also from divine breath. If language is of divine origin, and reason is linked to language, then reason also comes from God (Herder, "Ursprung der Sprache" 260). Just like the sources of language in the origin of language essay, there are multiple sources of reason. By combining physiological, linguistic and theological sources of reason, Herder illustrates the complex network of physical, psychological, social and self-reflective factors that shape human beings and their purposes.

Kant followed the periodic publication of the Ideen and in 1785 reviewed the first two parts in the Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung. In the evaluation of part one, the Königsberg mentor questions the work's method and several of its conclusions. His critique claims that two components of a key analogy, the elevation of the individual to a more complete existence in another life and the human station on the chain of being, have no similarity with one another (Kant, "Rezension zu Herder" 791). The review questions the validity of Herder's comparative anatomy, relegating the unity of energy \([\text{Kraft}]\) in nature to speculative philosophy instead of empirical science 792). Kant finds the conclusions of Herder's empirical study, including the idea that the source of reason lies in erect human posture, unproven and therefore mere creative fictions (793). For Kant, Herder's conclusions are all too speculative and lack a substantive foundation in logic. To conclude his review, the mentor calls for future parts of the work to define terms instead of alluding to them, to observe laws instead of anticipating them, and to use reason instead of fantasy in thinking (793-794). The thrust of the argument calls for a more consistent use of logical thought.
The *Ideen* certainly use a different methodological model than Kant's *Anthropologie*. Through the introduction, each author situates the work in a manner that typifies the entire text. Kant defines, classifies, and creates a rational structure for the interpretation of the science of humanity. The introduction of Herder’s *Ideen* defines a different reading experience, one based on a calculation of common experiences by the writer with the reader. The shared perceptions provide an "invisible exchange of spirits and hearts" through an estimation of audience, a joyous awakening to knowledge through reading, a communication of an inner being, and a trusted exchange of ideas with a true friend (Herder, *Ideen* 3,1:11). Creating an intimate link driven by emotion, this book personally engages the reader to follow an emotive look at the structure of nature.

According to Herder, humans intuitively seek to order their experience, for example using the faculties of memory and recollection (storage and recall) in narrative. Humans also order their knowledge according to place (3,1:13). The categories of organization therefore derive from human interaction with nature, time, and place. In a deist gesture, these unities provide evidence of divine order in the natural world; observation in the world represents reading the book of nature as God's creation (3,1:12). Anticipating the critique that he argues too broadly with too much information, Herder says the work should not be judged on its first part, but as a whole. The author argues that he uses the best approach to understanding humanity because people can only comprehend human fate in the world on an individual level. The reader gleans knowledge of humanity through experience in the world and through analogies of nature, not through rational systems such as Kant's anthropology:

The epistemology in Kant's Anthropologie therefore differs from Herder's Ideen on a foundational level. Focused on the future, Kant theorizes the integration of human faculties and their role in the realization of the potential of human dignity. The Ideen combine three theoretical alternatives to the Königsberger's primacy of reason. Comparing and contrasting the "analogies" of nature, the text situates the human being in the natural history of plants and animals (Part I). The analytical method, a humanistic approach to argument, draws distinctions, highlights similarities, and creates organization by valuing words and rhetoric in addition to logic. Using empirical tools, the work anticipates modern ethnography by comparing peoples according to geographic regions and climate. The environment, along with organic drives and social forces, shapes the particular configuration of civilization. Despite different geographical realities and experiences, Herder thinks humans possess the same drives and faculties (Part II). Surveying civilizations from ancient and medieval periods according to their location, the work combines geography with historical method to argue for the constancy of the human race in the pursuit of humanity through reason (Parts III and IV).

Several structural similarities separate the Platner and Kant texts from Herder's work. Platner and Kant begin their anthropological texts in similar ways, starting with the explanations of how humans achieve knowledge and proceeding to the role of the will. These texts also use a common philosophical vernacular to develop their theses about the
nature of humanity, even though Platner's writing employs a comparatively more Spartan narrative style. The similarities are only partial, however. Kant's *Anthropologie* culminates in the anthropological characteristic of the second book and thereby takes a moral turn not present in the extant Platner text. In the introduction from 1798, Kant explicitly discounts the physiological approach and the empirical methodology in anthropology that plays a central role in Platner's work. Dismissing the influence of nature on humankind, the Königsberg philosopher strives instead to illuminate individuals' agency in their development to the role of moral world citizens. While Kant bases his *Anthropologie* on the human drive to develop moral consciousness through the application of reason, Platner grounds his text in the nearly universal human faculties of observation and experience (Platner, xxiv). Herder conjoins these empirical approaches with the numerous methodologies in his *Ideen*.

These three selected works provide an initial overview of several key texts for twenty-first-century readers and researchers of eighteenth-century anthropology. The selection is necessarily subjective and limited, yet it provides insight into the kinds of methods and themes Enlightenment academics discussed in the developing science of humanity. As the variety of approaches used by Platner, Kant, and Herder indicate, anthropology was not a monolithic field of research, but an uninstitutionalized, dynamic one. Scholars from diverse disciplines—as illustrated by the medically-trained Platner, theologically-educated Herder, and philosophically-schooled Kant—promoted and

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exchanged new thought on the essence of being human (Pfotenhauer, 4, 12). Drawing on varied sources of knowledge made their argumentation truly interdisciplinary (5).

Anthropology connected representatives of specific disciplines and their unique questions about humanity. Platner's *Anthropologie* (1772), asks "What is the individual?" surveying the reciprocal relation of body and soul. Herder's *Ideen*, which developed a theory of human nature through a philosophy of human history, raises the question "What shapes the human being in history?" Addressing the body as site of individual and social moral self-determination, Kant's *Anthropologie* seeks a confirmation of his vision of humanity through the question "What should the individual become?" As a mediator between different approaches to the nature of humanity, anthropology's disparate interests continually push it to the point of dissolving its sense of common interest.

Writing on anthropology was diverse. Many of the philosophers, historians, physicians, scientists and theologians who addressed anthropological themes wrote monographs, usually from the perspective of their discipline. Books that developed theories or histories of humanity according to human physical and spiritual nature, e.g. that constructed an anthropology, often did not use "anthropology" in the title. Instead, the titles connected a discipline to humanity, for example philosophy to humanity in Johann Nicolas Teten's *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung* (1777). Using a popular alternative, Johann Karl Wezel's *Versuch über die Kenntnis des Menschen* (1784-1785) substituted the word(s) "Menschenkenntnis" or "Kenntnis des Menschen" for "anthropology". Though anthropology only gained a small institutional presence within the established fields of philosophy, theology and medicine at universities through the middle of the eighteenth century, printers and booksellers
distributed an increasing amount of material on human nature. Authors penned more than monographs on the topic; they also published lexical entries, novels, essays, and short narratives. Thereby, they distributed their ideas in varied ways to a broader reading public.

In the following three chapters, I demonstrate how writers developed a discourse of anthropological thought in lexica and magazines. Johann Georg Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* is the focus of the next chapter. This philosophical compendium not only defined anthropology, but described its permeation of philosophy from the doctrine of natural law to neurology. It presents anthropological knowledge for readers who are not specialists in the field. Chapters three and four analyze a similar dispersion of anthropological discourse to the novel through examples in Samuel Richardson's *Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded*, Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's *Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, and Christoph Martin Wieland's *Agathon*. This approach provides the framework for the innovative thrust of my dissertation: an investigation into the role of anthropology as a constitutive discourse for Enlightenment moral identity as viewed in periodicals around 1750.
CHAPTER II

ANTHROPOLOGY IN LEXICA

Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon: Taking a Second Look

Our fuller understanding of eighteenth-century philosophical anthropology demands taking a closer look at how the term was defined. Historians of the Enlightenment have rediscovered significant elements of the eighteenth-century anthropological discourses. Whereas Odo Marquard and Mareta Linden have reconstructed anthropology's philosophical history, others have traced its development as a literary theme, for example Helmut Pfotenhauer in autobiography (1987), Alexander Kosenina in drama (1995), and Jutta Heinz in the novel (1996). For an initial definition of the term, these authors readily turn to historical lexica, particularly Johann Georg Walch's (1693-1775) Philosophisches Lexikon (1726, 4th edition in 1775) and Johann Heinrich Zedler's Universal-Lexicon (1731-1750). Walch and Zedler's definitions of anthropology have become standard reference points for tracing later developments.

Historians disagree about how to read the anthropology article in Walch. In Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff (1976), Mareta Linden emphasizes that one of several statements about humankind's dualistic nature is made using the subjunctive:

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23 This chapter references the fourth edition of Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon. Walch prepared the first editions released in 1726, 1733, and 1740. Hennings edited the 1775 fourth edition and demarcated his additions with []. The Walch definitions provide an important record of philosophical knowledge between 1726 and 1740, the chronological starting point of this dissertation. Hennings's addenda take into account later anthropological works such as Ernst Platner's Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise (1772) and Isaac Iselin's Geschichte der Menschheit (1768), updating the definitions, bibliographies, and cross-references with more diverse medical and philosophical knowledge. His additions only support the theses of this chapter. But because this chapter serves as a starting point for discussing eighteenth-century anthropology ca. 1740, Henning's updates will be excluded until the close of the chapter.
Auf diese Weise haben beyde Naturen [die physische und die moralische] den Leib und die Seele zum Grunde, von deren beyderseits sowohl ihrer Beschaffenheit nach an sich selbst; als auch in Ansehung ihrer Vereinigung unter einander kann gehandelt, und bey dieser Abhandlung dieser beyden Theile Gebrauch und Verrichtungen, wie sie sich entweder in einem natürlichen; oder aussernatürlichen Stande befänden gezeiget werden. Dieses alles könnte man unter dem Worte Anthropologie fassen (Walch and Hennings I:172-173). (emphasis added according to Linden's reading)

Alleging that the syntax only suggests that body and soul interrelate in anthropology, Linden argues that this interdependence remained hypothetical. Scientific anthropology had, Linden claims, refocused on the physical nature of humanity. She additionally supports her argument by noting that Walch created a taxonomy for physical anthropology, but not for moral anthropology (Linden 19-20n62). Therefore, Linden reads Walch as conceiving anthropology merely in physical terms. These arguments are inconclusive. While most Walch articles achieve an overall logical coherence, Linden's reading of "Anthropologie" diverges from the article's opening declarative sentences, which state human nature is double yet interrelated. Such an interpretation renders the article self-contradictory. Moreover, the subjunctive passage in Walch allows alternative readings. For example, it might be read as expressing the possibility of excluding individual characteristics of body and soul to focus only on their interaction. In contrast to Linden, literary historians Pfotenhauer and Kosenina have interpreted Walch's "Anthropologie" as layered (Pfotenhauer 4; Kosenina, Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst 9-10).

Re-reading "Anthropologie," (Re-)Discovering a System of Knowledge

This chapter argues, then, for a new reading of "Anthropologie" as defined in Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon. My intent is to flesh out the meaning of eighteenth-century anthropology in general and to specify how Walch links the branches of
knowledge. I propose that the common reading practice of this lexicon, i.e. the choice of an article based on the heading title, be expanded to include second and third terms related to the first word. In this case, the modern reader would study the definition of "Anthropologie," follow the author's cross-reference to "Mensch," and integrate the related bits of knowledge. By the same token, the cross-references in "Mensch" and articles on other terms further expand understanding of anthropology. Similarly, when an entry defines "Anthropologie" as the relationship between body and soul, the reader could search under "body" and "soul" and include information that further describes the anthropological relationship. By linking related terms, the reader can better imagine what constituted anthropology in this Enlightenment lexicon and gain a broader sense of the Enlightenment discourse on the topic.

To better comprehend historical meanings of anthropology, I advocate an intensive reading practice that requires the reader's creative and active participation. During the age of Enlightenment, reading creatively meant rereading and discussing what one had read to gain greater understanding (McCarthy, *Crossing Boundaries* 107-109). In the *Philosophisches Lexicon*, the imaginative review of articles included other aspects as well. Like a dictionary, the *Philosophisches Lexicon* alphabetizes articles and provides some cross-references to related topics. The editors explicitly name relatively few links between terms in comparison to the network of terms implicitly connected in the body of keyword entries related to anthropology. For example, the "Anthropologie" entry in Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* presents no cross-references to the articles titled "Körper," "Seele," or "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper," each of which contributes to the anthropological knowledge in the anthropology article.
In the introduction to the first edition, Walch suggests this kind of intensive reading practice. The lexicon was designed to define and differentiate terms, thereby providing convenient reference and illuminating sciences in their interrelationships. As such it supplemented the systematic exposition of a single science with information necessary to learn a science in its "völligen und richtigen Zusammenhang" to other disciplines (Walch a3v). Placing a science in context was part of a larger project to replace scholastic knowledge with practical knowledge, and to situate the handbook as a vehicle for the process of enlightenment (a6r, a8r). Walch intended to engage readers in a hermeneutic process of creating links between terms, and thereby in enacting enlightenment. It was an expectation fully commensurate with emergent essay writing in the eighteenth century.

Because we define many terms differently today, this kind of cross-reference provides a network of similar concepts that may increase our understanding of the source, its authors, and of the culture of the period. By reading the Walch article "Anthropologie" in the context of other articles on the relationship of the physical and moral nature of human beings, it may be possible to better grasp Walch's understanding of the science of humanity. Before demonstrating how this reading strategy could work, revisiting key ideas in Walch's entry "Anthropologie" is in order.

According to Walch, "Anthropologie" is the theory of human beings in their hybrid nature, the physical and the moral. The body and its appetites are designed for the

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24 In the fourth edition, Hennings’s introduction reaffirmed the lexicon’s original purpose: to define philosophical terminology and philosophical problems for a broad public of students and educated readers (b1r). By cross-referencing articles, readers could supplement the meaning of one term with its opposite: "Weil ich auch oft bey Erklärung einer Materie, zugleich das Gegenteil nach der Regel opposita iuxta se posita magis elucescunt mitgenommen habe, so hat der Leser zu bemercken, daß er jederzeit mit einem Artikel dessen Gegenteil lesen und aufschlagen muß, wenn er die Lehre vollständig übersehen will" (b1v).
self-preservation of the organism. On the other hand, as the manifestation of human moral nature, the soul maintains discretionary control of thought and the appetites, directs its natural reciprocal relationship with the body, and coordinates its actions with the divine plan for felicity. Thus, the moral nature functions individually and reciprocally with the physical essence. Each nature draws on the material and the spiritual being. Natural drives, on the one hand, and reflection and volition, on the other, necessitate a subdivision of the theory of humanity into physical and moral anthropology. In its investigation of material human nature, physical anthropology includes the general category of historical anatomy, a part of what scholars called "Physik" or the study of the natural sciences. As a complement to the general category, the particular physical anthropology incorporates the health and wellness of the individual, and thereby enters the field of medicine. Moral anthropology, a counterpart to physical anthropology, emphasizes the nature of the soul and moral action, what we call ethics (Walch and Hennings 1:172-173).

Definition and classification, the key foundations of philosophical reflection, are the main goals of "Anthropologie." Walch's taxonomy identifies the compartmentalization of knowledge about human nature, yet simultaneously accentuates the interplay between body and soul in defining what it means to be human. Even with the duplexity of the physical and moral natures, body and soul together interpenetrate each other. The investigation of physical nature thus explains human anatomy and appetites by examining the body's makeup and its areas of interaction with the soul. The inquiry into moral nature elucidates the volitional relationship of the soul to the regulation of bodily functions and drives. Though these two faculties can be isolated, to
be human means living with them inexorably intertwined: body and soul act out their being in and through their interdependency.

Ignoring the cross-reference to the article "Mensch," critics have summed up early eighteenth-century science of humanity based solely on the entry for "Anthropologie."

Reading Walch with an eye toward the late Enlightenment, historians such as Pfotenhauer have noted the similarity between the conception of anthropology in the Philosophisches Lexicon and in Platner's Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise (1772) (Pfotenhauer 4). But Walch elaborates on anthropology in other articles as well. To disregard his networking of knowledge excludes significant anthropological debates not present in the entry, "Anthropologie," for not only does it provide a reference to "Mensch," but the latter cross-references "Seele" and leads to a string of other directly related terms. Schematically, the references function as follows:

![Figure 2-1: Cross-references on anthropology in Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (1726)](image)

Hence, reading the Philosophisches Lexicon in the eighteenth century involved heeding the cross-references. Curiosity, which was a product of extensive reading (McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 108), likely sent readers to the lexicon for additional information. Uniting a variety of insights, Walch's reference work informed readers and quelled their curiosity through definitions, surveys of academic books, annotated bibliographies, and
editorial opinions. Linking terms to each other also served this function, as a review of
the following cross-references indicates.

Active Reading: Acknowledging References

In the first section of the article "Mensch", Walch postulates the contentious
relationship of the individual's physical and moral being. The entry categorizes
definitions of human nature into four main positions on the relation of the material and
immaterial being: (1) the body defines human nature; (2) the soul constitutes the human
being; (3) human nature consists of three essential parts: body, soul and spirit; and (4)
human beings have a dual nature of body and soul. The examples of thinkers who define
human nature through the body, including Cicero in the Tusculan Disputations, Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) in the Leviathan, and the English physician William Coward (1656-
1725), demonstrate the breadth of Walch's sources from ancient philosophy to early-
modern anatomy (Walch and Hennings 2:89-90). The immaterialists (group 2) include
Platonists, Pythagoreans, Stoics, Henry More, and Rene Descartes. Like the materialists
(group 1), they are discussed in less than one column each. By contrast, theories of
human nature based on three parts – body, soul, and spirit – occupy eight columns and
those based on dualistic human nature two-and-a-half columns. Through the allocation of
more space and a greater number of examples to the third and fourth groups, the author
de-emphasizes the body-only and soul-only theories in favor of models that postulate
their interaction.

Thinkers in the third category, who argue that human nature comprises three
parts, illustrate diverse and complex ways to define the human. The essence of human
individuals differs according to the philosophical, theological, mystical, or medical viewpoint of the author, as the following examples illustrate. For Plato, human nature lay in the interplay of the wrathful, willing and rational souls (2:91). By contrast, the theologian Martin Luther (1483-1546) separated the body and soul from the spirit, which functioned as the center of belief and a storehouse of God's word (2:96). In his work *The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft* (1610, German tr. 1719), John Webster used Paracelsus' model of elementary matter to differentiate the mortal body and the perceptive/bodily soul (astral spirit) from the immortal and immaterial soul that returns to God after death. The physician Thomas Willis (1621-1675), a founder of neurology, argued that human nature is comprised of a body, a material/perceptive soul, and a rational soul (2:95). This section summarizes the relations of the three parts of body and soul through the beginning of the eighteenth century. Instead of viewing the relation of the corporal and the spiritual in only one way, scholars actively debated the complex nature of their interaction. Drawing on the traditions and innovations of various disciplines, academics in the eighteenth century constantly negotiated the relation of man's physical and moral natures.

Throughout the era, academics increasingly explained the body/soul interaction with theories of the human as hybrid. The article "Mensch" uses a twofold concept of human nature to situate humanity within an Enlightenment cosmology. On the chain of being, humankind occupies a level between animals and angels as "animal rationale," or "vernünftiges Thier" (2:102). Human beings represent unique mental and physical refinement among other living organisms: people possess the capability for abstract reasoning, carry their heads upright, and possess hands with great dexterity and
adaptability (2:103). The faculty of reason and the upright physical stance complement each other. Upright posture makes it easier to "look heavenward"; i.e., to live one's life in accordance with the divine will, while at the same time applying reason to shape the self and the surrounding world (2:104-105). In its physical and moral nature, humanity connects beast and divine being, incorporating them into a hybrid whole.

The entry on "Mensch" shares a similar view of human nature with the article on "Anthropologie":


**Mensch**...Es hat also der Mensch eine zweyfache Natur, eine physische und eine moralische: jene ist das Wesen des natürlich=belebten Leibes und die Connexion desselben mit der körperlichen Natur in Ansehung seiner Erhaltung; diese aber ist das Wesen der vernünftigen Seele in Absicht auf die menschliche Glückseligkeit (2:103).

Both entries define humankind bifocally. As a whole, "Mensch" emphasizes the inconstancy of human virtue and the frailty of human volition/emotions. It identifies how physical and mental unease are heightened by desires and thoughts shaped in memory and imagination (2:104). According to this entry, body and soul figure equally in human unhappiness.

The article "Seele" underscores the hybridity of human nature insofar as the "Vereinigung der Seele und des Körpers" accounts for "das völlige Wesen des Menschen" (2:761). This entry amounts to being an apology for the existence of the soul.
Arguing that the body can neither think nor desire on its own, "Vereinigung" pleads against materialism. Willing and thinking originate in the soul alone (2:762-763). In weighing a neurological (i.e. physical) explanation for delirium, mania, and melancholy, the author of the article on "Seele" dismisses the idea because it bypasses the soul's will and negates human freedom (2:767-770). The article contributes to the anthropology discourse by denying bodily forces the power to influence the soul.

But how do body and soul relate? Walch's article "Anthropologie" does not explain this relationship; neither do the articles on "Mensch" or "Seele." In the chain of cross-references, "Seele" then directs readers to the entry on "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper." The latter addends "Anthropologie" by citing this interface according to the western religious and philosophical tradition as well as the newly privileged mode of empirical investigation. The author argues that the different modes of thought—theology, law, science—already operate on the assumption that body and soul directly influence each other. Despite the contentious nature of how that influence functions, examples indicate that thinkers had already accepted the complex reality of the human organism. In theology, the Christian crucifixion—the destruction of the body for the preservation of the soul—could only occur with a subordination of the body to the soul. Similarly, corporal punishment of moral crimes, like murder, robbery, or blasphemy, implied a connection between the two spheres (2:808). To a theologian, a lawyer, or to an average educated member of society, the interrelationship of body and soul was a common and a necessary presupposition for understanding scientific change in the seventeenth- and early-eighteenth centuries. The details of the relationship were contested.
Walch's dictionary entry on "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper" offers three alternatives. At the beginning of the text, the author defines the exchange between body and soul as a relationship instead of a union. Based on the empirical sources of experience and perception, readers and scientists observe that the body promotes patterns of responses from the soul and the soul directs changes in the body (2:806, 2:808). Three theories — physical influence, occasionalism, and preestablished harmony — outline how body and soul relate. To describe how the soul affects the body, the proponent of physical influx claims that the soul's faculties of imagination and willing activate and move the body. Similarly, the body influences the soul by transmitting perception from the exterior to the interior of the organism. Sensation, says Walch, involves the transmission of bodily motion as vibration from the extremities via the Geisterchen [little spirits] to the soul (2:807). The theoretical explanation of this influence assumes a healthy, normal functioning body (2:808). The idea of influence between physical and moral spheres received a mixed reception, yet represented the ascendancy of physiological explanations of perception, such as Albrecht von Haller's research on irritability, over earlier theories. Leibniz's critique that the theory of physical influence contradicted some laws of nature could not halt the success of the theory of physical influence as developed by philosophers and researchers in the natural sciences (2:809-810).

The other two theories argued that such movement cannot originate from the closed system of body and soul, but instead stems from God. For the occasionalist, God intervenes as necessary to negotiate between body and soul but is not continually interacting. Descartes provided the inspiration for this theory and followers such as
Malebranche perpetuated the idea (2:815-816). The harmonists represent preestablished harmony and supported a deistic approach, one in which God set the universe in balance like a clockwork. Following Divine Providence, the physical and the moral spheres function in parallel, yet separately as "preestablished". Subsequently, the two spheres act without divine intervention.

In the article, "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper," the analysis of twofold nature details anthropological interaction in several ways. Examining the causation hypotheses of occasionalism, preestablished harmony, and physical influx helps to explain specific physical and psychological actions. In turn, comparing these theories increases overall understanding of how the body and soul function in unison (2:820). Evaluating these three options, the article proposes two variations. One-sided physical influence of the soul on the body is possible. In a second option, the soul stimulates changes in a divinely-regulated body (2:821). For the body to direct the soul, even temporarily, opens the possibility of mechanistic determinism and places human dignity in question. Instead, the soul retains control of human action based on the assumption that free will is a necessary element of human experience. In this scenario, anthropology involves the predominance of the soul.

The next entry, "Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele," critically revisits the three explanations of intersubstantial causation and emphasizes the theory of preestablished harmony. Beginning with Leibniz and continuing with Wolff, the article calls into question the key anthropological experience of the body/soul influence in regards to motion or sensation. Wolff's *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und die Seele des Menschen* (1719, hereafter *Deutsche Metaphysik*) claims experience does not prove a
causal link between changes in the material and metaphysical spheres (1:1878, 1880). If the two spheres could influence each other, one could assume, for instance, that the soul wills movement. Yet the article cites how the soul's initiation of bodily movement would involve creating a new force and thereby be incongruent with the law of the conservation of energy. According to physics and to the Cartesian division of substances, such an influence would be inexplicable and therefore impossible (1:1879). Instead, the two spheres are coordinated according to the theory of preestablished harmony. The remainder of the entry surveys twelve writers who oppose Wolff's preestablished harmony, primarily because it limits human freedom. It thus provides an introduction to the anthropological debate over intersubstantial causation, a key point of philosophical discussions during the early Enlightenment.

Wolff played a pivotal role in shaping debates on anthropology through his system of philosophy. In his *Deutsche Metaphysik*, Wolff argued that the interaction of body and soul had to cohere to a system of metaphysical laws. Based on the printing of this text that ran to twelve editions between 1720 and 1752, his metaphysics were extremely influential. Many German thinkers choose his system as the best available option to explain intersubstantial causation and the world. Walch's focus on Wolff and the controversies surrounding his philosophy generally affirm the philosopher's importance during the 1720's and 1730's. Furthermore, researchers applying his philosophy to new projects frequently pursued particularly novel research (Watkins, *Kant and Metaphysics* 44-45). Innovators included Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who expanded the ideas to aesthetics, Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten who used them to rethink theology, and Johann Gottlob Krüger who adapted Wolffian philosophy to physiology.
Associative Reading: Implied Connections to Body

The trail of direct cross-references in the *Philosophisches Lexicon* that originates with the anthropology entry ends here. But where is the body, the other part of the anthropological equation? Many of the Walch entries discussed thus far share a common reference to soul, as evidenced in their terminology: "Seele," "Seelenbeschaffenheit," "Seelenvereinigung mit dem Körper," and "Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele." But they also refer to body as do the entries "Anthropologie" and "Mensch." Discourse on the soul invokes the body, and vice versa, as "Seele" makes clear: "Nach der gewöhnlichen Bedeutung dieses Worts ist die Seele diejenige geistliche Substanz, welche mit dem menschlichen Körper vereiniget, so daß durch diese Vereinigung der Seele und des Körpers das völlige Wesen des Menschen entsteht" (Walch and Hennings 2:761). Despite the fact that the system of cross-references proceeding from anthropology does not directly refer to body, the prominently implied references to body warrant further consideration of the term for anthropology.

![Figure 2-2: Implied references to body in Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (1726)](image-url)
Individual articles on the body and the soul similarly emphasize the necessity of interaction between these two spheres and their subordinate systems. Of the two terms used to describe the body, "Cörper" (Körper) and "Leib", the first is more general and refers to something with physical presence (1:646; uses "ausgedehnte Materie" to translate the Cartesian "extension").25 "Leib", on the other hand, refers to this physical being, specifically in its relationship with the soul. The capabilities of the body ("Leib") include sensation and motion in coordination with the soul: "Leib ist ein aus gewissen Theilen zusammen geseßtes und nach einer besondern Art gestaltetes Wesen, welches zu empfinden und sich zu bewegen tüchtig ist. Bey dem menschlichen Leibe kommt dieses noch ins besondere hinzu, daß derselbige zur Vereinigung mit der Seele von dem Schöpfer eingerichtet werden" (1:2243). Body and soul necessarily belong together from this theological point of view and from the view of the comparative anatomist. This scientist recognizes the uniqueness of the human soul among similar human and animal bodies, as well as the essential role of body and soul in making the human being whole. Viewing the body as a liability, in the manner of Plato, the Stoics (or by extension like seventeenth-century writers) was strongly criticized (1:2245).

Beyond sensation and motion, the body contributes to the anthropological dynamic in coordination with morality. Living well means properly regulating the body. On the most basic level, this "Diät" involves a regiment for eating, drinking, exercise, and sleep to maintain health (2:389; "Pflichten gegen sich"). Through constitution and

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temperament, the body shapes an individual's desires and customs (1:2248). "Leib" thus implies that the physical being influences the will.

The article "Temperament des Leibes" details how the material/metaphysical nexus functions. Developed in antiquity by Hippocrates (ca. 460 BCE-ca. 377 BCE) and adapted by Aristotle (384-322 BCE) and Galen (129-ca. 216 CE), the theory of temperament hypothesized that the mixture of blood and other bodily fluids caused physical and moral effects. This was prime anthropological territory. In accordance with the received doctrine, the article summarized four main mixtures of fluids: the choleric, the melancholic, the sanguine, and the phlegmatic temperaments (Walch and Hennings 2:1093-94). Individual personality developed from an infinite variation of the four primary types (2:1094).

In contrast with the philosophical exposition of the theories of causation in "Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele" and the skeptical view of experience, temperament theory emphasized the validity of empirical observation and experience in analyzing the human organism. Everyday life experiences provided evidence of a body/soul congruence any reader could identify – whether in terms of causes (physical influx) or coordination (preestablished harmony). Because effects of a given temperament could be observed based on signs in the body as well as the soul, the theory encouraged development of its own semiotics. The blood could arouse detectable alterations in the body as well as the soul, as summarized in the following table:
Table 2-1: Characteristics of Temperament as outlined in the article "Temperament des Leibes" in Johann Georg Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* (4th ed., 1775).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merkmal (Spalte)</th>
<th>Cholericus</th>
<th>Melancholiker</th>
<th>Sanguiniker</th>
<th>Phlegmatiker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wortbedeutung</td>
<td>Galle</td>
<td>schwarze Galle</td>
<td>Entzündung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenschaften nach Naturstoffen (1094)</td>
<td>warm und trocken</td>
<td>kalt und trocken</td>
<td>warm und feucht</td>
<td>kalt und feucht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeichen des Leibes</td>
<td>Gesicht (1094)</td>
<td>schwärzlich, rötlich</td>
<td>schwarz, blass</td>
<td>weiß, rot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprache (1095)</td>
<td>männlich, hell, geschwind</td>
<td>männlich, rau, langsam</td>
<td>weiblich, hell, geschwind</td>
<td>weiblich, rau, langsam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augen (1095)</td>
<td>ernsthaft, muter</td>
<td>mürrisch, matt</td>
<td>freundlich, muter</td>
<td>freundlich, muter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leibesgestalt (1095)</td>
<td>hager</td>
<td>hager</td>
<td>mittelmäßig fett u. wohl gewachsen</td>
<td>sehr fett, schwülstig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang (1095)</td>
<td>steif, gravitatisch</td>
<td>langsam, neglignet</td>
<td>lustig, hurtig</td>
<td>verdrossen, neglignet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeichen in der Seele</td>
<td>Verstand (1095)</td>
<td>gutes Judicium</td>
<td>treffliches Gedächtnis</td>
<td>gutes Ingenium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wille (1095)</td>
<td>hochmütig</td>
<td>geizig</td>
<td>wollüstig</td>
<td>zu Völlerey geneigt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Temperament des Leibes" evaluated temperament theory with a healthy dose of skepticism. It argued that observed correlations of physical and mental states may be certain, but that their causes could not be known. It especially cautioned against interpreting the body as the sole cause of psychological actions. Viewing temperament categories as fixed and decisive was discouraged because other factors, such as
environment and habits, could also shape individual behavior and constitution. Warning against careless classification of people into types, the caveats aimed to preserve human individuality (Walch and Hennings 2:1103). There was nonetheless a certain impetus to apply these principles to life, as books like Christian Thomasius's *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* (1696) and Georg Ernst Stahl's *Disputatio inauguralis de passionibus animi corpus humanum varie alterantibus* (1695) ["On the Influence of the Passions on the Human Body"] attest.

As a further extension of "Anthropologie," the article "Temperament des Leibes" implied a reference to "Affect," the emotions. In the extensive bibliographical essay on texts from antiquity and the early modern period, the authors diverged in their opinions as to whether the body or the soul caused emotions. "Affect" named both as sources. It defined the emotions as extraordinary desires and aversions accompanied by extraordinary movement of the blood. Of the five sources of the emotions, at least two involve anthropological interaction: sensation and movement. The theory of affect shows that the body played a role in the agitation of the soul (1:89-90).

The theories of causation, temperament, and emotion underscore the interdependence of the material and the metaphysical in anthropology. If the concise anthropology article in Walch neglected to explain all aspects of body/soul interaction, the cross-references supplemented this definition. It must be underscored that the comparison and networking of terms suggested here is merely the enactment of reading strategies explicitly outlined by Walch and Hennings in their introductions. Eighteenth-century lexica and encyclopedias frequently made use of cross-references; Zedler's *Universal-Lexicon* and Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* were the most prominent...
examples of this practice (cf. Vila 52-65; Anderson 91-124). Given this structural characteristic of the lexicon/encyclopedia, comprehending anthropology (or any other term for that matter) required the engaged reader to connect related terms. In using the *Philosophisches Lexicon*, critical thought meant participation in the text's production by actively engaging explicit references and by associating implicitly linked terms. A visual representation of concepts that shape knowledge of anthropology thus forms a web:

![Figure 2-3: Cross-references (solid arrows) and implied references (dotted arrows) encourage reading Anthropologie in the Philosophisches Lexicon as a semantic network.](image)

Using Walch's philosophical dictionary to determine what anthropology meant between 1726 and 1740 necessitates creating a semantic network. Combining the direct references and implied connections noted here provides a useful start. Other terms not cited here by direct references from anthropology also play a role in determining its meaning. These might include: "Nerve," "Empfindung," "Sinne," "Leidenschaft," "Physiognomie," "Diät," "Idee," "Moral," "Erziehung der Kinder," "Sitten,"
"Verbesserung der Seele," "Freyheit," and "Geilheit." Further research could mine these sources for signs of even more complex interactions.

Creative Reading: Comparing Lexicon Editions

At the opening of this chapter, I indicated I would focus on Walch's 1740 edition. In the 1775 update, Hennings clearly denoted what text he had added. In some cases, he significantly expanded selected articles. Taking the article on "Harmonie zwischen Leib und Seele" as an example, Hennings added six-and-one-half columns to the existing ten, increasing the article length by a good sixty percent. More importantly, however, within an article originally focused on preestablished harmony, the additions argued for the theory of physical influx using neurology. In previous editions, the developments in neurology since Thomas Willis's *Cerebri anatome* [1664, *The Anatomy of the Brain*] had received little treatment. Describing how the nerves coordinated the material and the metaphysical, Hennings cited Ernst Platner's *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* (1772), Moses Mendelssohn's "Briefe über die Empfindungen" (1755), Albrecht von Haller's *Elementa physiologiae corporis humani* (1757-1766), Johann August Unzer's *Erste Gründe einer Physiologie der eigentlichen thierischen Natur thierischen Körper* (1771), Johann Gottlob Krügers *Naturlehre* (1740-1750) and *Versuch einer Experimental=Seelenlehre* (1756), and Georg Friedrich Meier's *Anfangsgründen aller schönen Wissenschaften* (1748-1750). Evaluating German texts in the context of writers such as Charles Bonnet, George-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon, David Hartley, and Claude-Adrien Helvétius, Henning's expansion of the *Philosophisches Lexicon* in the
context of the new European philosophy, medicine, and natural science points to growing interest in the study of human nature between 1740 and 1775.

Like other texts of its age, it reveals paradigm shifts in the conception of human nature, especially in the shift from temperament theory's circulatory model to a neurological paradigm (cf. Koschorke). By supplementing the *Philosophisches Lexicon* with offset text, Hennings makes the historical evolution of ideas readable. As a resource created for a broad audience, it provides one account of that development. Moreover, by defining terms around 1740 and around 1775, it frames the beginning and the ending dates of material investigated in this dissertation. Therefore, the *Philosophisches Lexicon* provides a context to survey the history of anthropological discourses in novels, moral weeklies, and Enlightenment magazines in the following chapters.
PART 2: PUSHING BACK THE DATE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL DISCOURSE AS LITERARY MODEL – THE EUROPEAN AND GERMAN EMPFINDSAMER ROMAN
CHAPTER III

FEELING MORALITY: EARLY CONFLUENCE OF BODY/SOUL
DISCOURSE AND SENSIBILITY

In the previous two chapters, the coexistent eighteenth-century discourses of cultural, theological, physical, and philosophical anthropology stood front and center. I chose to concentrate on philosophical anthropology, the focus of paradigmatic essays in works by Johann Georg Walch and Ernst Platner. Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* (1726, 4:1775) defines anthropology as the study of man in his physical and moral nature ("Anthropologie" 1:172), a description that Platner refines as "Körper und Seele in ihren gegenseitigen Verhältnissen, Einschränkungen und Beziehungen zusammen betrachtet" (Platner xvi-xvii).26 A comprehensive rendering of philosophical anthropology could additionally include developmental models of the individual or the species. Revising Walch's and Platner's definitions of anthropology, I investigated philosophical anthropology as the study of the interaction of body and soul revealed especially in the emotions and the multiple capacities of reasoning, willing, and sensation. German-language secondary literature on the Enlightenment refers to the influence of the body on the soul and vice versa in the passions, in judging, in desiring, and in perceiving as the *commercium* problem. In the wake of Descartes's dualism of body and soul, research on philosophical anthropology in the Enlightenment recovered historical debates about conceptions of the human.

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26 The original orthography and punctuation is maintained throughout.
In the second half of the eighteenth century, writers created "den ganzen Menschen" in literary characters while scientists experimented to discover the foundations that make human nature whole. Both groups develop exemplary dichotomies – such as nature/spirit, feeling/reason, heart/head, or body/soul – for their representational and empirical purposes of defining what it means to be human. German literary scholars have developed a tradition of critique that analyzes these classical themes from the middle of the eighteenth century. Research into the anthropological nature of this literature proposes to trace not only the body/soul theme, but also the interdependent causation of psychology and physiology as perceived at the middle of the Enlightenment. Literary and intellectual history asks questions such as: How does a physical sign (shaking, fainting, etc.) represent a psychological response? Or, how do people develop ideas, when all knowledge is created from a basis of sensation? The general purpose of this investigation is to ask why and illustrate how the theme of body and soul shapes the moral individual.

This chapter investigates the development of the body/soul discourse in the eighteenth-century European novel to offer an important context for the analysis of the moral individual in German periodicals around 1750. The focus here is on the evolution of writing about body and soul between 1730 and the early 1740’s, while chapter four follows the unfolding of this context between 1747 and 1767. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the moral weeklies denounced the adventure novel due to its

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underdeveloped form and immoral themes,\textsuperscript{28} But the gallant novel and the moral weeklies developed interdependently between 1690 and 1740 (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel"). Moral weeklies helped transition the reading public from intensive reading (repeated apprehending of the same text) of the Bible and devotional literature, to extensive reading (a single progression through a text or pursuit of breadth) of moral periodicals and moral novels (Engelsing 113; McCarthy, \textit{Crossing Boundaries} 108).

After 1740, novels such as Gellert's \textit{Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***} (1747-1748) or Ernst Tröltsch's \textit{Geschichte eines Kandidaten oder die Sitten und Schicksale junger Gelehrten} (1753), rework themes from the moral weeklies (Grimminger 685-686).

Gellert's and Troeltsch's novels also develop a language of sensibility, a capability which Janet Todd defines as "the faculty of feeling, the capacity for extremely refined emotion and a quickness to display compassion for suffering" (7). With the advent of positive moral characters in novels, several moral weeklies recommend, in particular, the works of Gellert and Richardson to their readers because of their value for moral education.\textsuperscript{29}

These two authors' sentimental, i.e. morally reflective novels discuss feeling in an

\textsuperscript{28} Wolfgang Martens summarizes common moral complaints against the novel genre: "(1) Die Romane geben sich mit Liebessachen ab und verführen zur Wollust; (2) Sie verwirren den Kopf mit Chimären und absonderlichen Fabelwerk; (3) Sie sind eine Schule der Eitelkeit; (4) Sie sind die Beschäftigung von Müßigängern; und (5) Sie verderben den guten Geschmack." The protest against the novel's "Eitelkeit" and seduction to "Wollust" represent a form of class critique against affectations of a largely French-inspired gallantry by the wealthy – nobles or monied middle class – and may include a nationalist critique of foreign-inspired behavior. Wolfgang Martens, \textit{Die Botschaft der Tugend. Die Aufklärung im Spiegel der deutschen moralischen Wochenschriften} (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1968) 494, 499.

increasingly detailed manner that reveals a language of mind/body interconnection around 1750. This is neither a full-fledged anthropology, nor it is merely a psychology, but a demonstration of the increasing importance of the interdependent causation of mind and body in shaping the moral individual.

**The Anthropological Turn of the Eighteenth Century: Pushing Back the Date**

Research on the anthropological novel of the German Enlightenment has focused on the last four decades of the eighteenth century. In a foundational article titled "Der anthropologische Roman: Seine Entstehung und Krise im Zeitalter der SpätAufklärung" (1980) Hans-Jürgen Schings locates the birth of the anthropological novel in Christoph Martin Wieland's *Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerei, oder die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva* (1764) and *Die Geschichte des Agathon* (1766/67) and sketches the development of this subgenre with particular reference to later novels by Jean Paul ("Anthropologische Roman" 255-256). Wieland's early writings, Schings rightly claims, provide a paradigm for the anthropological interests of the late Enlightenment in their analysis of enthusiasm. In a second claim, Schings reads key passages in Friedrich von Blanckenburg's *Versuch über den Roman* (1774), including the genre's definition of humanity via a connection of inner and outer worlds (body and soul) and the creation of a chain of life events by cause and effect, as a theory of the anthropological novel ("Anthropologische Roman" 256-257). By contrast, Jean Paul's *Vorschule der Aesthetik* (1804) tries to re-establish the significance of the soul in a world shaped by materialism ("Anthropologische Roman" 260-262). The aesthetic program in the *Vorschule* essay and Jean Paul's novels argues for an anthropology based in the soul, not the dualism of Walch
and Platner, and is one form of a late Enlightenment self-critique of anthropological theory. While highlighting key moments in the creation and radicalization of the anthropological novel, Schings does not define the subgenre or explain why it begins with Wieland. The examples create a partial profile of an implied definition of the anthropological novel: the subgenre may address enthusiasm (Wieland), may deal with the interdependence of body and soul and a narrative logic of cause and effect (Blanckenburg), and may challenge a dualistic anthropology with an emphasis on the aesthetic, rational component of human nature (Jean Paul). This list of possible characteristics of the anthropological novel remains fragmentary. With Wieland and Jean Paul, Schings plots the origin and crisis of the anthropological novel. Jutta Heinz connects these coordinates by outlining the development of the form between Wieland's *Agathon* (1766-1767) and Jean Paul's *Vorschule der Ästhetik* (1804).

In her study *Wissen vom Menschen und Erzählen vom Einzelfall: Untersuchungen zum anthropologischen Roman der Spätaufklärung* Heinz also locates Wieland's *Don Sylvio* and *Agathon* at the beginning of a tradition of the anthropological novel (*Wissen vom Menschen* 172). Like Schings, Heinz offers little explanation for why Wieland's novels mark the beginning of the form, citing only their combination of *Schwärmerthematik* and narrative through dialogue. Researcher have a tradition of regarding Wieland's novels as the beginning of the modern novel in Germany (cf. McCarthy, *Christoph Martin Wieland* 58, 83), and this may contribute to their placement by Schings and Heinz at the beginning of the anthropological tradition.

Lieselotte Kurth-Voigt has shown, however, that modern forms of the novel exist prior to Wieland's novels (Kurth). It is an objective of chapters three and four in this dissertation to provide a clearer identification of the beginnings of the anthropological novel.

Heinz focuses on the development of the form in the three decades following Agathon. The selected texts laudably extend beyond major works of the current late Enlightenment canon by Wieland, Goethe, Moritz, and Jean Paul. The study includes novels by the once again popular Wezel and the now neglected writers Meißner, Thümmel, Jacobi, Engel, Hase, Klinger, and Hippel. Based on this examination, Heinz groups the works in three intervals of roughly a decade each and applies an empirical method to develop a composite definition of the form.

Wissen vom Menschen identifies obligatory and optional characteristics according to themes and form for the late Enlightenment anthropological novel. The obligatory thematic content includes a concentration on the commercium problem as represented in everyday experience and a frequent focus on the emotions or the conflict between individual moral systems and social expectations for behavior (Heinz, Wissen vom Menschen 339). Optional themes may therefore include a characterization of problematic identity, and it may paint the setting close to the author in terms of place and historical time. In terms of form, the anthropological novel must narrate from multiple perspectives

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that reveal the uniqueness of individual perception; Heinz calls this polyperspectival
narration (340). The anthropological novel's form may additionally exhibit various
combinations of
- an autobiographical or personal narrative;
- a panorama of characters;
- forms such as a Dialogroman, epistolary novel, or hybrid form;
- a compensation of the absence of the author through diverse paratexts (prefaces,
  figurative expressions);
- an underdeveloped pictoral or symbolic level of meaning;
- and more common connections to other types of discourse than to the system of
  literature (342).

Numerous other studies on the nexus of anthropology and the novel have focused
on authors such as Goethe, Wezel, Jean Paul, and Moritz, i.e. on works published after
Wieland's Agathon, from ca. 1770 to ca. 1800. Novels selected as examples of the

32 John A. McCarthy and Lieselotte E. Kurth-Voigt have investigated this perspectivity in Wieland's novels
in detail. See John A. McCarthy, Fantasy and Reality: An Epistemological Approach to Wieland (Bern:
Herbert Lang, 1974) 49, 76, 80-81, 86-87. Also Lieselotte E. Kurth-Voigt, Perspectives and Points of
View: The Early Works of Wieland and Their Background (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

33 On Goethe: Hans-Jürgen Schings, "'Agathon,' 'Anton Reiser,' 'Wilhelm Meister': Zur Pathologie des
modernen Subjekts im Roman," Goethe im Kontext: Kunst und Humanität, Naturwissenschaft und Politik
von der Aufklärung bis zur Restauration, Ein Symposium, ed. Wolfgang (ed.) Wittkowski (Tübingen:
Niemeyer, 1984). Robert Deam Tobin, Doctor's Orders: Goethe and Enlightenment Thought (Lewisburg,
Wolfgang Riedel, "Influxus physicus und Seelenstärke. Empirische Psychologie und moralische Erzählung
in der deutschen Spätaufklärung und bei Jacob Friedrich Abel," Anthropologie und Literatur um 1800, eds.
wohltemperierte Mensch: Aufklärungsanthropologien im Widerstreit, Quellen und Forschungen zur
Schmidt-Biggemann, Maschine und Teufel : Jean Pauls Jugendsatiren nach ihrer Modellgeschichte,
Symposion, philosophische Schriftenreihe, 49 (München: K. Alber, 1975). Rita Wöbke, Erzählte
Moritz: Raimund Bezold, Popularphilosophie und Erinnerungsseelenkunde im Werk von Karl Philipp
Lothar Müller, Die kranke Seele und das Licht der Erkenntnis : Karl Philipp Moritz' Anton Reiser
anthropological subgenre by German literary historians were published at the time of or after Platner's *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* (1772). They have therefore helped solidify the placement of the so-called anthropological turn around 1770. But the themes that Heinz identifies as representative of the anthropological novel – *Schwärmer, Hypochonder, Empfindler* and their critique; the conflict between individual moral systems and social regulation; corporeality and the fear of death – begin to appear in a preliminary form prior to Platner's famous text.

In other genres, researchers of German Enlightenment anthropology have located this shift at an increasingly earlier date. Surveying the cultural history of eighteenth-century German literature, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Ralph Häfner claim that the anthropological turn in the fifth and sixth decades of the eighteenth century (1740-1760) must be regarded as "the most significant historical discovery" of the German Enlightenment (168). At mid century, writers conceptualize the physical and psychological natures of humankind (it's anthropological essence) in diverse texts and contexts. Representative examples of the development of anthropological knowledge during the period preceding 1760 include philosophical texts by Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai that investigate the nexus of psychology and morality. Lessing extends their debate on the anthropological nature of sympathy to his dramatic oeuvre with *Miss Sara*

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Sampson (1755). In philosophy, the investigation of the interconnectedness of body and soul is focused on the sources of causation, including the influence between body and soul. Gottsched and Crusius provide early answers to this question, and the nature of this influence is later developed by Kant and Herder. Poetry, the most-prized genre of the early Enlightenment in Germany, also develops a theme of anthropology. Brockes in his poem "Bewährtes Mittel, Gemüths-Bewegungen zu stillen" from the collection *Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott* (1730), Haller in *Über den Ursprung des Übels* (1734), Wieland in *Die Ordnung der Dinge* (1751), and Uz in *Versuch über die Kunst, stets fröhlich zu seyn* (1760) each represents one facet of this body/soul nexus. Lutheran preacher and Pietist autobiographer Adam Bernd probes the human fascination with the problem of faith in relation to one's material and spiritual being in his *Eigene Lebensbeschreibung* (1738).

In light of the prevalence of anthropology in other genres before the 1760's, one must

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ask: Did it play a role in the novel before Wieland's *Don Sylvio* (1764) and *Agathon* (1766-1767)?

In the essay "Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur Anthropologie der Frühaufklärung" Wolfram Mauser argues that anthropology draws an image of life between the spheres of desire and virtue for Albert Julius, the grandfather, primary settler, and archive of tradition for the Robinson-like tale of Johann Gottfried Schnabel's *Insel Felsenburg* (1731-1743). To be clear, this is not an anthropological novel, but one that includes a discourse of body and soul, i.e. a discussion of the balance and interaction of physical and moral being and how they make us human. For Mauser, this occurs as Albert Julius finally achieves stability in his subsistence on a South Seas island with Concordia, but feels torn between his promise to refrain from expressions and advances of erotic love toward her and his conflicting natural desire for her. Albert recalls this tension as an impetus to an existential dilemma: "Ich fiel fast gantz von neuen in meine angewöhnnte Melancholey" (Schnabel 230). Initially, Albert believes himself without a solution to this quandary and withdraws from Concordia and his work farming to bemoan the dilemma in a song that describes his love. Albert sings:

ACh hätt' ich nur kein Schiff erblickt,  
So wär ich länger ruhig blieben  
Mein Unglück hat es her geschickt,  
Und mir zur Quaal zurück getrieben,  
Verhängnis wilstu dich denn eines reichen Armen  
Und freyen Sclavens nicht zu rechter Zeit erbarmen?  

Soll meiner Jugend beste Krafft  
In dieser Einsamkeit ersterben?  
Ist das der Keuschheit Eigenschaft?  
Will mich die Tugend selbst verderben?  
So weiß ich nicht wie man die lasterhaftten Seelen  
Mit größer Grausamkeit und Marter solte quälen.  

Ich liebe und sag' es nicht,  
Denn Eid und Tugend heist mich schweigen,  
Mein gantz verdecktes Liebes-Licht
The ship represents civilization and awakens Albert's hope for marital community. If he were to successfully signal to the ship, he could create new social networks and marry a woman from beyond the island. Following the shipwreck on Insel Felsenburg, however, both Albert and Concordia simultaneously appreciate the simple subsistence living as a haven from the moral corruption of European society. Because Albert values virtue, he acknowledges the necessity to subordinate his desire to reason and his promise of only platonic friendship to Concordia. But he considers the sacrifice of his youthful virility an unprecedented punishment. This dilemma represents the essence of his being. It marks a human quandary: many people confront this conflict of balancing physical being, including sexual fulfillment in a committed relationship, with thinking being, which requires respect for principled living as a step toward defining subjectivity and achieving freedom. Albert and Concordia, Mauser argues, conceive of themselves in terms of rational virtue and physical desire, and it is the duality of this nature that makes them "ganzen Menschen" ("Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur Anthropologie der Frühaufklärung" 218). By showing their attempts to harmonize their dualistic nature, Schnabel dramatizes the interdependence of body and soul.

Mauser maintains that body/soul dualism and the concept of the whole person are examples of key formative schemata in *Insel Felsenburg* for the formation of the eighteenth-century subject. And there are other paradigms. Through their own dissatisfaction, Albert Julius and Concordia show how one's own ideas can make the pursuit of happiness impossibly difficult, and thereby point toward the inconsolable ruminations of Karl Philipp Moritz' *Anton Reiser* (1785-1790). In the tradition of
Montaigne's *Essais* (1580-1588), eighteenth-century German writers, including Schnabel, develop a new language to pursue self-knowledge and to directly iterate their internal conflicts in their pursuit of *Glückseligkeit* (*Glückseligkeit und Melancholie: Zur Anthropologie der Frühaufklärung* 216-217). The pursuit of self-knowledge implies the development of the correlative skill of self-observation. Each of these themes – the whole individual, the difficulties in the pursuit of happiness, and the search for self-knowledge through a new language and self-observation – highlights key elements of the body and soul discourse found in the moral periodicals.

Mauser's critique of *Insel Felsenburg* (1731-1743) challenges us to seek a discourse of body and soul in the eighteenth-century novel prior to the publication of Wieland's *Agathon* (1766-1767). In Germany, this discourse developed in part through a reception of English sentimentality, especially in the novels of Samuel Richardson. As a fan of Richardson, Christian Fürchtegott Gellert modernized forms from the German adventure novel into a sentimental epic that succeeded in gaining broad public support for the novel genre. In the novels of Richardson, Gellert, Hermes, and Wieland, moral action is represented in combination with a body/soul link. Two spheres, virtue and neurological sensibility, develop an interdependent and new way to describe human nature. An investigation of the rise of the discourse of body and soul in Germany through a sample of novels, including works by Richardson, Gellert, and Hermes promises a reassessment of *Agathon* as one of the first anthropological novels. Furthermore, the body/soul discourse of moral life in the novel provides a context for essays and narratives in the moral periodical of the 1750's and 1760's.
The analysis of body/soul discourse and neurological sensibility as anthropology necessitates specific kinds of interpretive practices. Literary historians have often lamented the lack of a theoretical framework to analyze anthropological contributions to intellectual history and the function of the text (Pross). In *Melancholie und Aufklärung* (1977), Hans-Jürgen Schings argues for an interdisciplinary and historical investigation of a theme because of the interdependence of literary texts and philosophical, theological, and medical concepts prevalent at their genesis. For his study of melancholy, he notes that literary texts aid in the description of the psychological and medical condition of this affliction, while the scientific texts provide inspiration for literary creations (*Melancholie und Aufklärung* 7). *Melancholie und Aufklärung* implies that cultural historians should research these connections to develop a history of ideas, yet without trying to compete with historians of individual disciplines (6). Schings keeps his methodology broad, and rightly points to the productive interdependence of these fields as a focus of further investigation. While his stated purpose of not trying to compete with historians of individual disciplines may accurately reflect the difficulty of doing good interdisciplinary work, it seems the goal should remain to engage, instruct, and inspire researchers through analysis applicable to multiple related fields.

Horst Thomé proposes a more concrete methodology in *Roman und Naturwissenschaft* (1978). This study seeks to supplement the investigation of influences between the thought of natural science and literature with the identification of their homologous structures (Thomé 61). For example, the empirical method of observation and causal evaluation in Zimmermann's *Von der Erfahrung in der Arzneykunst* (1763-1764), garners Wieland's attention as a theoretical model. The Biberach author
subsequently plans a heroic poem about Alexander the Great to uncover idealized representations through observation and causal analysis of his life (125-126). *Roman und Naturwissenschaft* also aims to identify the unique contribution of literature in scientific controversies (129). Whereas a scientific investigation of the nature of the soul would deduce, or observe and describe its essence, Wieland's literary oeuvre emphasizes the scientific process in language, amplifies it through metaphor, and criticizes it by commenting on its place in relation to society (205-208, 232).


• The first level of a reading attempts to directly **verify influences**. It asks how readers and writers circulated anthropological knowledge and then transferred it to literature, or how writers circulated literary styles and adapted these forms in scientific writing. This transfer is easiest to prove if one person produces texts as poet and scientist, or as writer and patient (Heinz, "Literarische oder historische Anthropologie?" 202).

• A second, thematic reading **investigates the transfer of themes**. This includes the adaptation of anthropological themes in literature, as well as how science consults literature as an archive of scientific discourse, which enables reconstruction of past theories. This interpretation also identifies how writers use literature as a secondary reference for scientific theses (202-205).

• A third reading **evaluates the transfer of structural modes**. On this level, one must ask how scientific paradigms influence literary representation of time or causality,
i.e., the organization of the plot. Similarly, one must identify how anthropological prose integrates poetic tools, ranging from images and metaphors to rhetorical flourish (205-206).

These reading strategies acknowledge the impact of biography on writing, while looking beyond the intricacies of author and text to see how the texts function in their historical setting. Heinz's model analysis provides a useful starting point for the identification and critique of anthropological and moral themes in novels available to the eighteenth-century German readership.

This chapter and the following one analyze texts primarily using Heinz's first level of reading. Each chapter aims to identify influences on the construction of the body/soul discourse in works of exemplary authors such as Richardson, Gellert, Hermes, and Wieland. In a simplified sense, the attempt to verify influences involves a re-evaluation of the relationship between biography and literary production. The analysis draws on the biographical as well as literary texts to help identify each author's take on the body/soul discourse. While biographical details about Richardson's or Gellert's health, for example, do not allow us to make definite (or indisputable) assertions about their position on the body/soul nexus, they do enlighten readers about the author's attitude regarding this discourse. Recovering the evolution of this discourse in Germany from *Pamela* (1740/1741) to *Agathon* (1766-1767) allows the reader to trace the beginnings of the anthropological novel. Outlining the history of body/soul discourse from *Pamela* to *Agathon* also provides a context for the evolution of a German anthropological discourse in periodicals as discussed in chapters six to eight of this dissertation.
The Richardsonian Model of the Sentimental Novel in Germany

English and French novels served as models for the development of a new German counterpart from the 1740's. The sentimental novels in French, such as Prevost's *Manon Lescaut* (1731, first translation 1732 as part seven of *Mémoires d'un homme de qualité* under the title *Miraculos Florisonti*) and Marivaux's *La vie de Marianne* (1731-1742, first trans. 1737) proved popular among German readers, both in the original language, and in German translations issued shortly following the original publication. On the basis of its depiction of obsessive passion in adventurous episodes, *Manon Lescaut* emphasized a feeling heart. Its influence paralleled Pietism and helped open German literature to *Empfindsamkeit* in the novel, which was eventually succeeded by Richardson (Friedrich 84-86). Marivaux gained an audience through the French and German performances of his comedies, which proved very successful on German stages (Kramer 94). *La vie de Marianne* was published eighteen times in German translation during the eighteenth century (42-44). German critics frequently praised its psychological introspection, as in the 1739 review in the *Franckfurtschen gelehrten Zeitungen*: "Der Herr von Marivaux beschreibt uns hier die Geschichte des menschlichen Herzens, und er dringt bis in das Innerste, um alle seine geheime Bewegungen, seine Ausflüchte, seine Fehler und seine Vorzüge zu entdecken" (610, col. 2, cited in Kramer 175). German readers also gained increased appreciation for the moral lessons in the novels of Prévost and Marivaux after reading Pamela (Friedrich 18-19; Martens, *Die Botschaft der Tugend* 513).

Texts from England increasingly gained attention, particularly Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* (1719-1720, first trans. 1720), which generated multiple German translations and
imitations, from Schnabel's *Insel Felsenburg* (1731-1743) to Johann Heinrich Campe's *Robinson der Jüngere* (1779) (Foermann). German readers also gained access to German translations of Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels* (1726, trans. 1728), Henry Fielding's *Joseph Andrews* (1742, trans. 1745), and *Tom Jones* (1749, trans. 1749-1751) (Blackall 197). Though not as popular as *Robinson Crusoe*, Richardson's three sentimental novels spread rapidly through Europe and Germany. *Pamela* (1740-1741), *Clarissa* (1747-1748), and *Sir Charles Grandison* (1753) achieved broad approval in Germany through recommendations in the German moral weeklies, in literary-cultural magazines, and from individual readers. The positive reception in the periodicals continued from the 1740's to at least 1770: "Gottsched, Bodmer and the 'Bremer Beiträger' in their organs all urged the reading of Richardson," as did von Murr in *Der Zufriedene* (1764) and Friedrich Schmit in *Das Wochenblatt ohne Titel* (1770) (Price 170). The *Zeitvertreiber* from Leipzig (1745) and *Der Gesellige* (1750) from Halle both recommend *Pamela* for its education of the reader to virtue and appropriate emotion through what the *Gesellige* terms *Menschenkenntnis* (Martens, *Die Botschaft der Tugend* 512-515). *Der Mensch* (1752), the successor to *Der Gesellige* and a later focus of this dissertation, similarly recommends reading *Pamela*, particularly to an audience to test another person's humanity and capacity for empathy through the physical sign of crying (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Mensch* III:110, no. 100). Peter Uwe Hohendahl notes that because moral weeklies schooled eighteenth-century German readers and critics on the educational function and realistic nature of literature, the German audience openly welcomed Richardson's moralizing realism (44-45).
Extant sources provide only scant evidence regarding the response of the popular audience to Richardson's novels in Germany. Lending records before the middle of the eighteenth century are difficult to come by and the extant sources provide only incomplete data on actual reading practices (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 47, esp. footnote 47). Nonetheless, the lending records (1714-1799) of one of the early princely lending libraries, the Herzog August Bibliothek (HAB) in Wolfenbüttel, show that readers in this ducal residence regularly lent *Pamela* (M. Raabe 3:365). In French. This was the third most popular language for all books lent (3:594, table 18), conceivable in a court town where the court, students, and academics could learn French. It seems also problematic, however, that the lending records for this French translation begin in 1763, twenty years after the German translations by Mattheson (vols. 1-2) and Jacob Schuster (Leipzig: 1743). The German translations go unmentioned in the lending records, indicating that the HAB likely had no German translation of *Pamela* available at this time. Richardson's other novels, *Clarissa* (1747-1748, trans. 1749-1753) and *Sir Charles Grandison* (1753, trans. 1754-1755), as well as those of Sterne, Goldsmith, Wieland, Goethe, and the anthropological novels studied by Heinz (see note 6 above) also do not appear in the HAB circulation records. One would hypothesize that if readers regularly read *Pamela* in French twenty years after its German publication, some readers may have bought or lent the German translation from another source. As conceived in the Eighteenth century, the collection of the HAB functioned as a scientific library and therefore may have not collected Richardson's works because of their popular status. Further, access to the library was limited largely to the court until 1753, and may have influenced the number

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40 I have been unable to verify the existence of the Schuster translation beyond Price, 164.
of readers and what was read (Martino 13). The fact that the HAB annexed significant numbers of books (including novels from the ducal collection) after the middle of the eighteenth century might explain why readers lent *Pamela* beginning twenty years after its publication (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 56). There are significant gaps in the HAB readership data, and additional archival material would be required to reconstruct further details about *Pamela*'s empirical readership in Germany. This is not my purpose here. The HAB lending records provide evidence that *Pamela* remained popular among German readers in the 1760's and 1770's.

Critics in German-speaking lands gave Richardson's novels mixed reviews. This included alternately praise and disdain for the morals depicted in his novels, praise for his knowledge of humanity, and general admiration – evaluation focused more on content than on form (Price 165-174). Richardson's depiction of morality and an excess of feeling became the target of satire by Nicolai in *Sebaldus Nothanker* (1773) and Musäus in *Grandison der Zweyte* (1760-1762). Writers such as Hermes, La Roche, Goethe, Wieland, Müller, and Wagner modeled scenes of seduction, death, madness, and declarations of love on Richardson's texts (175-176). Richardson's first epistolary novel also likely influenced Gellert's writing of the *Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (173, cf. Meyer-Krentler 1974).

Many aspects of Richardson's epic texts appealed to contemporary readers. Written in a series of letters, the novels reproduced language in a form similar to that which readers spoke. Richardson used this language to explore and represent common concerns such as the relationship within the family, the interaction between the sexes, and the confrontation with representatives of power – all perfect venues for the exploration of
human psychology (Doody). These social relationships were governed partially by religious doctrine (Richardson's novels are written from a decidedly Christian perspective) and partially by the pragmatics of an individual situation. The original purpose of Pamela, to provide a conduct book, spawned the confrontation of the individual with society and morality that characterizes each of the novels. In their depiction of social confrontation, Richardson's novels dramatized moral dilemmas by describing the physical effects of emotional stress as well as the emotional effects of physical struggles. The novels provide a veritable store of the linguistic representation of melancholia, hysteria, hypochondria, and the vapours.

**George Cheyne: Richardson's Empathetic Hypochondriac**

Already in Richardson's debut novel Pamela (1740), his characters demonstrate an intimate knowledge of human motivations and reactions to psychological and somatic stress. The author's awareness of the body/soul connection and psychosomatic problems came first-hand. In the 1730's he developed a degree of moodiness and had problems with headaches, temperament, and nerves. A series of letters from Doctor George Cheyne to Richardson about the printing of Cheyne's latest manuscripts as books provides important insight into Richardson's temperament. This exchange, which runs from 1734 to Cheyne's death in 1743, represents one of the few pieces of surviving evidence that describes the London printer's psychological state during this period. In all but three of the surviving letters Cheyne addresses Richardson, so the reader must cull information about the printer from the second-hand evidence of Cheyne's responses. Beginning in December 1734, the Bath physician acknowledges the printer's low spirits and prescribes
medicine for this condition and poor appetite (Mullett 31-32). The doctor's advice to Richardson on his health complaints on 4 September 1737 recommends exercise, a light diet, limited alcohol consumption, and varied medicinal regimens (34-35). On 22 June 1738 the physician adds purgation and bloodletting to the treatment, emphasizing the attempt to alter a psychological state with physical remedies. He offers a kind of warning: "I hope your case is more Hypochondraical than Apoplectic", (i.e. caused by a nervous disorder rather than the rupture of a blood vessel) (37-38). Cheyne offers consolation and repeated variations of the same treatment on 30 September 1738, 4 February 1739, and 13 May 1739. On 4 June 1739 the diagnosis leans decidedly to a nervous disorder: "Your Noise in your Ears is a common Symptom of nervous Hyp and of no possible Consequence. I have had it often, and much Exercise and abstemious Living always cured it; 'tis Hypochondriac Wind on the Drum" (50). A subsequent complaint about wind confirms the doctor's finding on 20 April 1740:

Your present Complaint, as you very accurately describe it, is entirely nervous from Wind in the Primae Viae and Membranes of the Muscles and is no Manner of dangerous consequence. If it comes to any Height so as to produce Terror or Confusion or inattention to Business your only present Relief is Tea Spoonful or two of the Tincture of Soot, and Assa Foetida made on Peony Water in a cold Infusion drunk any Time in a Glass of Peper Mint Water Simple. This will make you break Wind plentifully and so relieve you. I have had that Complaint now and these Twenty Years, and thought and thought the Walls and Floor of the House playing up and down with me, but the solid Cure is a Vomit every now and then; especially when very bad about new Moon, but when tolerable twice a Year, Michelmas and Lady-day. In short, your total Case is Scurbutico Nervose from a sedentary studious Life. (59)

Cheyne attributes the printer's nervous disorder to diet, digestion, and lack of exercise. While Richardson eventually took up riding the chamber horse according to Dr. Cheyne's prescription in the same letter, it seems that his complaints had multiple causes. According to the physician's responses, Richardson's condition seems to have deteriorated in the later half of the 1730's. In a letter to Lady Bradshaigh from 15 December 1748, the printer referred to a much earlier period of time during which he
experienced more acute version of his anxiety, intensified by the deaths of eleven relatives and friends in two years (Barbauld IV:217-238; Carroll 103-116). Though Richardson doesn't definitively date this period, it may have occurred around 1737, about the same time as his descriptions of his illness and appeals to the Bath physician for an effective therapy intensified (Eaves and Kimpel 84). From 1748 looking back, the printer identifies his main problem as psychological stress. Cheyne, however, identified physical sources of the nervous illness, hypothesizing obstructions to the glands and capillaries, excessive weight, nerve damage, and weak digestion as the causes of his patient's discomfort (Mullett 76 [12 December 1741]). On 7 December 1741, the physician warns Richardson to change his diet or risk apoplexy or a hypochondriac palsy: to achieve a better balance of his mental state, the printer must alter his physical program to avoid physical debilitation (74-75). Cheyne responds to repeated "Tremblings", "Startings and Twitches", "Startings and Cramps", and "Fits, Paroxisms, and Plunges" with encouragement toward the routine and perseverance (86-93 [9 March, 14 March, 2 April, 26 April 1742]). This symptom of shaking was likely in part caused by the onset of Parkinson's Disease (Eaves and Kimpel 84).

A third reason may have additionally prompted Richardson's nervous temperament. In addition to his worrying about his physical state (a nervous, psychological cause) and the possibility of Parkinson's disease (a physical cause) there may have been a social motivation that sparked his nervousness as well. In an insightful article titled "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Toward Defining the Origins of Sensibility," George S. Rousseau uses a letter to Richardson to illustrate how the cult of sensibility increased the desirability of the social demonstration of feeling. The letter from Mrs.
Donnellan essentially argues that the more an individual demonstrates personal sensibility, the more that person is capable of writing with feeling (Rousseau 152). The expression of feeling begets the expression of feeling to a unique degree. In *The English Malady* (1733), a work Richardson printed for Cheyne, the doctor similarly created a feeling elite. Cheyne stratified society based on class, claiming that nervous illness more readily afflicted the upper classes who possessed greater intelligence and sensibility than the working class (Guerrini 281). Richardson may have desired to perform his own sensibility, something Cheyne inculcated with repeated demands to have regular written updates on the printer's condition. Richardson's protocols may have provided personal confirmation of his nobility of feeling. More significantly, this rehearsal may have contributed to his inward meditation so that he could recall his own experience when imagining the representation of feeling appropriate for his characters' trials. According to John Mullan, the London printer would not have been alone in viewing sensibility from opposing points of view. Writers and readers of the eighteenth century viewed sensibility with ambivalence: as a debilitating affliction and an exclusive capacity (Mullan 141, 144-146).

"Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres" makes a larger point that requires additional consideration. The article argues that the origin of the sensibility demonstrated by Richardson lies not in his correspondence with Dr. Cheyne, that is, not with a particular person's ideas historians can now link to the printer's life, but to an earlier revolution in thought about the human being. This is especially contentious because it would appear to contrast with the methodology of Heinz detailed above. Using a model based on Thomas Kuhn's paradigms, Rousseau locates the change in thought about humankind in the
seventeenth century. As a challenge to existing theories of the soul that located it throughout the body, Thomas Willis argued in *Cerebri anatome* (1664) that soul was located in the brain,\(^1\) with the cerebrum controlling voluntary movements and the cerebellum controlling involuntary motion (Rousseau 149). Because this implied a neurological control center, it necessitated an integrated physiological doctrine of the brain and nerves, that was at that time uncharted, to enable the development of a theory of sensory perception. Willis in physiology and Locke in philosophy provoked a change in the conception of human nature, even on the popular level, to a body directed by a neurological soul. Even though Willis made some errors in his theory, Rousseau argues, he and Locke spurred the Enlightenment conception of neurological human nature that included sensibility (150). The fact that a lay correspondent of Richardson's demonstrated this knowledge provides an example of its popularization and mitigates, according to Rousseau, the singular importance of Cheyne's scientific knowledge to Richardson (152-153).

The author of *Pamela* demonstrates the literary application of physiological and psychological knowledge much after Willis's *Cerebri anatome* (1664) and his subsequent physiological publications, or even Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690). Rousseau argues that because writers needed a physiological theory of perception to adequately motivate character's complex feelings psychologically, there was a delay in the literary integration of the new neurological knowledge (154). And in the broadest sense, Richardson's goal in writing a sentimental novel, to instill virtue, depended on

\(^1\) Rousseau actually states that Willis argued the brain was located in the soul, but this must be an error, because the location of the soul is in question among scientists in the seventeenth century, not the site of the brain. See Thomas Willis and William Feindel, *The Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves* (Birmingham, Alabama: Classics of Medicine Library, 1978) ch. XIX.
advanced physiological knowledge in accordance with the theory of moral feeling. This necessitated a material grounding, definition, and determination of moral crises (155). The article "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres" makes a strong case for an origin of sensibility with the investigators of brain function and the nature of the soul.

Rousseau's theory of the rise of sensibility focuses on its beginnings. Richardson's knowledge of the interaction of body and soul need not have been only formed by a tradition widely available in the eighteenth century. This sensibility that develops from Willis and Locke may, for Richardson, have been additionally shaped by Cheyne, who repeatedly links psychological afflictions to physical causes (diet, exercise, occupation). The doctor's correspondence spurs the reader to attain self-knowledge. The Bath physician regularly relates his own maladies in a gesture of empathy and as an instructive example (Mullett 57 [26 October 1739], 92 [19 April 1742]). He further encourages this mode of confession by making repeated calls for epistolary protocols of the valetudinary printer's self-observation (Mullett 50 [13 May 1739], 54 [1 July 1739], 94 [2 May 1742]). Ultimately, Richardson imaginatively combines elements of inwardness to create the unique searching individuals in his novels. Examples abound in Pamela.

The Bath physician's prescriptions were written around the time of Pamela's composition, which the author dated to the brief period from 10 November 1739 to 10 January 1740. The first two volumes of the novel appeared on 6 November 1740. Pamela (trans. 1742 and 1743) interests me as an early example of this kind of representation of sensible individuality, and as Richardson's first effort in the epic genre.
The Body as an Emotional Trigger in *Pamela*

The challenges to virtue accentuate the body/soul link in *Pamela*. These trials largely result from the narrator’s report of self-evaluation as an attempt to understand her experiences. Though a servant girl, Pamela is unusually well-prepared to document her experiences because she had parents who successfully taught her principles of virtue. Her mistress, Mr. B’s mother, likewise inculcated this sense of moral responsibility and educated her in women's crafts, including singing, dancing, drawing, flowering, and sewing. As she anticipates a return to peasant life with her parents, Pamela laments these skills for their limited usefulness for a life on the land (Richardson 108, 112). For the reader, the young girl's greatest training lies in her abilities to read, write, and think using rational principles – skills that convey her blossoming subjectivity in confrontations with Mr. B and herself.

The heroine's life as a maidservant is one of learning, purpose, friendship, and order. As a young girl in the service of a wealthy woman, Pamela enjoys the Christian education and privileged access to her lady's company as if she were part of the wealthy woman's family (43, 108). Her future promises employment as a maidservant for the lady, by which she is to use her skills of sewing, conversation, and general cultured civility to earn a daily wage. Beyond the favor shown her by her mistress, Pamela enjoys the friendship and respect of the other servants, including Mrs. Jervis, Mr. Longman, and Jonathan, who form a kind of second family for her while she is away from her parents. In summary, her life promises years of service at the call of a generous lady and among affable fellow servants. Her circumstances forebode a kind of teleological individual order based on service in an aristocratic family.
When the wealthy woman becomes ill and faces death, she individually praises each servant, recommending every one to the service of her son. At his mother's death, Mr. B gives Pamela several coins from his mother's pocket change in recognition of work well done. The anticipated order of the lady's house is interrupted by her death, but Mr. B's generous gift of four guineas – Pamela genuinely believes this, despite it being a mere pittance for the young lord – provides hope for continuity of employment and recognition of good work. Pamela reveals her hope and doubt that her new master will be virtuous, foreshadowing a central conflict of the novel: "Indeed, he [Mr. B.] was once thought to be wildish; but he is now the best of gentlemen, I think!" (45).

Mr. B. appeals to the image of a reformed libertine. When he commands: "Be faithful and diligent; and do as you should do, and I like you the better for this," the son demands a continuation of her good work, and thereby a continuation of the order Pamela knows. For her industrious labor, she is promised the reward of further employment and of respect from her employer. Yet Mr. B.'s fancy for Pamela leads to his use of power to gain pleasure by her.

Mr. B.'s attempts to seduce Pamela shake the rational basis of her worldview. As she is sewing in the summerhouse, Mr. B. enters and she is trembling and on guard. The lord begins an elusive conversation by making her an offer to continue working for him, instead of waiting on his sister, Lady Davers. For Pamela, such an offer is confusing because she would have no woman to serve; she politely declines. Frustrated by her choice and independence, Mr. B. spitefully calls her a fool, makes an empty promise to make her a gentlewoman, and hugs and kisses her. This transgresses the servant – master order Pamela knows, as she later states (55). The introduction of the rules a liaison
simultaneously challenges her virtue so that she is momentarily immobilized, physically
trembling because of the terse denial of her hope to work for Lady Davers and, more
importantly, the ethical transgression of her employer's embrace. Pamela recalls the scene
for her parents: "I struggled and trembled, and was so benumbed with terror, that I sunk
down, not in a fit, and yet not myself; and I found myself in his arms, quite void of
strength; and he kissed me two or three times, with frightful eagerness. At last I burst
from him […]" (55). In the midst of Mr. B.'s advance, Pamela's intellectual and moral
responses are periodically silenced, while her body trembles and is frozen in a
momentary physiological reaction to it. She has an automatic intellectual and physical
aversion to the immoral sexual advances.

As Mr. B. taunts her, the power balance shifts. When she refuses to stay with him
in the summerhouse, he mocks her and demands obedience. Pamela knows, however, that
his power as an employer lies not in sexual advances and mockery and regains her
composure to protest his behavior as inappropriate. Mr. B. attempts to reassert his
dominion over her in two ways, by demanding her silence about the advances and by
paying her with gold. The offended maidservant refuses both. Before she exits the
summerhouse, Pamela leaves the money to its keeper. And despite seriously weighing
Mr. B.'s demand "Be secret, I charge you, Pamela," she divulges the master's
transgressions to her confidante, Mrs. Jervis (56-57). From the beginning, this
confrontation is a psychological battle in which the lord flirts with and kisses his servant
and bobbles his power, then Pamela, initially caught off guard, asserts her dignity and

42 In an engaging study, Geoffrey Sill unnecessarily foreshortens the summer-house episode by saying that
Pamela "neither faints nor succumbs." In reality, however, in Richardson's "writing to the moment," the
astounded Pamela momentarily loses her ability to react, and thereby her means of resistance that allows
his embrace – she partially does both faint and succumb. Geoffrey Sill, The Cure of the Passions and the
chastity, and thereby her own limited power, and finally Mr. B. promises her forgiveness in the midst of his offenses and reasserts his power.

In a series of subsequent advances, Mr. B. attempts to force Pamela to submit to his power by charging her of plotting against him, by openly kissing her against her will, and by inventing accusations of an affair with Chaplain Williams. The lord's psychological strategy involves defaming her and bringing her to tears so that she will relent in her resistance to him. To force his advances on the heroine, Mr. B invokes her confusion. He interrupts and argues with her as she is sewing (63-64), uses self-serving logic to accost her in her plain (peasant) clothes (88-90), and surprises her as she and Mrs. Jervis settle into bed (95) – in each case to steal kisses despite Pamela's well-guarded virtue. Each of Mr. B.'s flirtatious embraces provokes a physical reaction in Pamela.

In the absence of the lady of the house, Pamela's life becomes entangled with the passions of her lady's son and his power games. Physical responses repeatedly have a role to play in the heroine's moral crises. For example, in Mr. B.'s second advance on Pamela, he looses an argument about his honor when she convinces him that it must include respect for her virtue. Disarmed in oratory, he returns to seduction. Mr. B. offers his maidservant his knee, pulls her down on it, and gloats she will be unable to resist his power to bed her. He even offers to take the blame and give her the "merit" of rape.

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43 Mr. B. decries Pamela for having resisted his advances and for having told Mrs. Jervis about these private matters. The heroine catches him in his own doubletalk and asks why he is so angry about the revelation if he truly "intended no harm?" (62, cf. 55) When Pamela says she has not talked with any other person about the incident, Mr. B. reveals that he knows she wrote about the confrontation in a letter to her parents. She counters that he could not have known of her request for advice from her parents had he not read her outgoing mail. He complains of being "exposed" by a gossip ("saucebox"), and she responds that she does not expose him by telling the truth. Indeed, she insists on honesty, which in her case includes her virtue. When he charges her with disobedience, she refuses to follow commands contrary to her first principle of honesty and virtue.
which she can share with Mrs. Jervis and her parents as a "pretty tale" or "romance" (63, 66). She gathers her physical strength to escape the barrage of kisses: "Indignation gave me double strength, and I got from him by a sudden spring, and ran out of the room" (63). On reaching solitude behind a locked door, however, she faints. When he appears several hours later to check up on her condition, her anxiety over the assault on her virtue triggers the physical reaction and causes her to faint again.

Though Mr. B.'s pursuit never directly threatens her life, it repeatedly threatens her virtue, and a life without virtue is, she claims, a life not worth living (63, 74, 83). The threats to her virtue elicit desperate tears and struggles, but also nervous reactions, such as trembling, being stunned, and fainting. Mr. B.'s turpitude tests her resolve to do good and pushes her to a limit state of cognizance of transgression and resistance to actions that threaten her virtue, indeed, her social life. If deflowered, she believes she would be as good as dead (63, 226). The body semiotics dramatize her moral trials by making the silence psychologically readable, by conveying responses to experience through the description of body language.

The representation of sensibility in Pamela relies on the interdependence of body and soul. The influence occurs in several ways: an emotional state causes physical effects, a physical state causes emotional effects, or there is a combination of both. The most common case of the emotional state prompting a physical effect occurs when Mr. B. gruffly subordinates Pamela and threatens her virtue. Generally, this occurs when he is in her presence, as in the scenes cited above. But he also belittles her and reiterates his plan to steal her innocence in letters to Mrs. Jewkes, one of which he mistakenly addresses to Pamela and which Mrs. Jewkes unknowingly gives her. Just like his presence evokes her
fear, reading Mr. B.'s letter and his plans to conquer her also frightens her to near fainting (201-202).

Richardson focuses sensibility in the female lead character, Pamela, but Mr. B. also demonstrates episodes of sensibility that expand his character. Her ultimate departure from her imprisonment in Lincolnshire at a much later time brings her master to an emotional abyss. In letting her return to her family, Pamela and Mr. B. discover the depth of their attraction to each other, no matter how uneven the power balance in its development (280-281, 283, 285-286). The lord is lovesick: "I [...] am really indisposed; I believe, with vexation, that I should part thus with the delight of my soul, as I now find you are, and must be, in spite of the pride of my heart" (286). Mr. B.'s emotional loss at her departure induces a debilitating fever that requires a bloodletting, a common physical treatment for psychological stress, and sack-whey (286). Irregardless of the effectiveness of these physical cures, he claims she is the reason for his recovery, i.e. that her presence promotes joy (an emotional remedy) that lifts his physical illness. Indeed, he hints at his own sensitive nature in his assessment of the cause of the illness:

"O my Pamela! you have made me quite well. [...] I can't be ill,' said he, 'while you are with me. I am well already [...] Life is no life without you! If you had refused to return (and yet I had hardly hopes you would oblige me) I should have had a very severe fit of it, I believe; for I was taken very oddly, and knew not what to make of myself: but now I shall be well instantly. You need not, Mrs. Jewkes,' added he, 'send for Dr. Harpur from Stamford; for this lovely creature is my doctor, as her absence was my disease" (291).

44 Sack-whey is a medicinal remedy of white wine and the thin milk that separates from the curd in the making of cheese. In his letters to Samuel Richardson, Dr. Cheyne diagnoses Richardson's low moods as hypochondria and prescribes, among other cures, bloodletting every two or three months and regular exercise. The characterization of Mr. B. reflects elements of Richardson's personal experience of nervous disorder prior to publication of Pamela in 1740. Charles F. Mullett, ed., "The Letters of Doctor George Cheyne to Samuel Richardson (1733-1743)," The University of Missouri Studies XVIII (1943): 38 [22 June 1738].
Just as the emotional state provokes physical effects, the physical state can also prompt emotional changes. One of the most striking examples involves the psychological effects of one of Pamela's pregnancies, diagnosed by one of her friends as the vapours, i.e. a case of depression. In a letter, Pamela enjoins her good friend Miss Darnford to visit an ill servant, Mrs. Jewkes. The heroine organizes women's social networks, directing Darnford's sensible faculties, such as empathy and friendship, for the benefit of others. Yet Pamela also wishes Darnford would call on her. She pleas with Miss Darnford for a visit, claiming her request is punctuated by the strains of her pregnancy. Pamela petitions: "[I long] for the Company of my dear Miss Darnford. O when shall I see you? When shall I? – To speak to my present Case, it is all I long for; and, pardon my Freedom of Expression, as well as Thought, when I let you know in this Instance, how early I experience the ardent Longings of one in the Way I am in" (italics as printed, Richardson 3:405). The heroine recognizes her language of intense feeling transgresses decorum and causally links her spiritual state to her dynamic material being. This is an insistent address that reverberates a sense of desperation:

I am a sad weak, apprehensive Body; to be sure I am! How much better fitted for the contingencies of Life are the gay, frolick, Minds that think not of any thing before it comes upon them, than such thoughtful Futurity-Pokers as I! But why should I trouble you, my honoured and dear Friends, with my idle Fears and Follies – just as if nobody was ever in my Case before? – Yet weak and apprehensive Spirits will be gloomily - affected sometimes; and how can one help it? – And if I may not hope for the indulgent Soothing of the best of Parents, and of my Miss Darnford, in whose Bosom besides can one disburden one's Heart, when oppressed by too great a Weight of Thought? (3:406)

Pamela describes her state of sadness, weakness, and apprehensiveness in juxtaposition to the "gay, frolick Minds": she cannot be happy because of her worry. On a first reading, the opposition appears to extend to the categories of body and mind. Yet in this passage,

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45. The subsequent quotations from parts III and IV of Richardson's novel are cited from the Shakespeare Head edition.
body and mind function equally as synonyms for "human being," making the relationship of the words to each other more ambiguous. The heroine desires sympathy – not from just anyone who has experienced pregnancy, but from people in her intimate circle with feeling hearts, such as father, mother, and Miss Darnford. As an expecting mother, Pamela's physiological state necessitates an emotional cure.

    Alarmed at this confession, Miss Darnford writes to moderate Pamela's lamentations: "My dear friend, are you not in danger of falling in too thoughtful and gloomy way?" (3:408) In addition to concern for Pamela’s emotional stability, Darnford may be concerned for her physical or social being. In eighteenth-century England, medical and popular knowledge of women’s physiology linked the physical and mental spheres through the nervous system, so that disorder in one area could affect the other (Peters 435). Miss Darnford might be worried not only for Pamela’s mental balance, but for her physical strength, which was especially desirable for a healthy pregnancy. Additionally, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, society had begun to mock women afflicted with vapours (441). Miss Darnford might be anxious to moderate Pamela’s anxiety to preserve her status in her family as well as among extended family and friends. Warning with a coterie of women against falling into a "vapourish Habit" (Richardson 3:410), Miss Darnford explains away her friend's worries as part of pregnancy. She recommends: "Think little, and hope much, is a good Lesson in your Case, and to a Lady of your Temper; and I hope that Lady Davers will not in vain have given you that Caution. After all, I dare say, your Thoughtfulness is but symptomatical, and will go off, in proper Time" (3:408). Miss Darnford acknowledges a link between body and soul in stating that Pamela's emotional trials result from pregnancy. Her advice
to be headstrong by "hoping much" approximates a call for positive thinking. Mind (hope) should prevail over matter (and the worry of the "thoughtful and gloomy way" it induces).

From fainting, to lovesickness, to pregnancy, Richardson represents human nature as an unstable thing, as a nervous organism. These extreme states dramatically show how the body influences the soul, and how the soul influences the body. Pamela's anxiety over the loss of her virtue, Mr. B.'s respect for her moral framework, and his fear of losing her create turning points in the novel. These key scenes incorporate sensible human nature into an overall picture of what it is right to be, a state Pamela demonstrates from the beginning, developing through the course of the novel, but not changing. Mr. B. models a reform to virtue, yet with his affair in the novel's third and fourth volumes, this moral transformation also ends unsuccessfully. The nexus of body and soul plays an important role in dramatizing the characters, yet the novel's focus lies in human sentimental nature. The discourse of sensibility supports the representation of sentimentality.

**Pamela and German Physical Sensibility**

*Pamela* (1740) illustrates a confluence of discourses about the body, the soul, and morality available to German readers in 1742 with the translation by Mattheson. While this is a text of English origin, it is essential here to re-emphasize that it was also read and circulated in Germany. The combination of sensibility and the body/soul nexus provoked responses among German readers and writers. For example, in a letter to Johann Jakob Bodmer, who had embraced the moral function of physical sensibility in poetry, the

> "Die Sinnen sind die ersten Lehrer der Menschen. Alle Erkenntnis kommt von ihnen" (Bodmer 4, cited in Siegrist 297).
anacreontic poet Friedrich von Hagedorn admitted being emotionally overwhelmed when reading *Pamela*. Hagedorn defended his bravado while describing the novel's effect: "'Ich könnte Ew. Hochedelgeborenen jemand nennen, der nicht ein weibisches Herz hat, der aber dieses Buch nicht ohne viel Thränen [hat] lessen können…. Ich würde mich beklagen, wenn es mir nicht gefiel'" (Unpublished letter from Hagedorn to Bodmer on 11 May 1745, cited in Price 164). The reader's tears give physical evidence of his empathy for Pamela and represent one aspect of the interconnections of the body/soul discourse with sensibility. The last sentence quoted from the letter confirms that Hagedorn grasped the moral thrust of these interconnections and acknowledged his responsibility not only to be moved, but implicitly to pursue the novel's example of moral human action.

Dr. George Cheyne's reception of *Pamela* further indicates how Richardson struck the nerve of the time. Convinced of the persuasive power of the popular novel *Pamela*, Cheyne proposed a commercial follow-up book to Richardson. The project involved printing a collection of texts to cure melancholy, hypochondria, and hysteria and to promote virtue. In this way, moral instruction and medical knowledge could be sold to an eager public. The project never came to fruition, but Cheyne's title page for the proposed series describes its all-encompassing scope:

*The Universal Cure of Lingering Disorders either of the Mind or of the Body, being The Characters, a brief Summary and Catalogue of the most approved Books, Their Prices, and the Places where to be had, in all the Sciences fit to instruct in the Cure of Chronical Distempers, to Eradicate the black Passions, to bend the Vices to Virtue and Piety, to sooth Melancholy, Vapours, and Pain, and to support the Spirits under Misfortunes or Bodily Ails…. With a general Preface and Reflections on the Use and Benefit of such a Work and of such Writings as agreeably withdraw the Mind from Thinking* (Shuttleton 59).

Cheyne's Universal Cure addresses a dualistic image of humankind similar to Hagedorn's. This combination of writing about body and soul, of sensibility, and of the development of moral individuality echoes earlier themes from Marivaux's comedies (which played in
many German states) and its development in the theory and practice of the rührende Lustspiel and bürgerliche Trauerspiel by Gellert and Lessing between 1745 and 1755.

In her article titled "Literary Empfindsamkeit and Nervous Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Germany" (2001), Catherine J. Minter also links Enlightenment anthropology – defining the term with Platner as "Körper und Seele in ihren gegenseitigen Verhältnissen, Einschränkungen und Beziehungen zusammen betrachte[t]" – to sensibility (Platner xvii). The analysis acknowledges shared language between the moral and physical spheres: "for example, the word Empfindsamkeit in its moral sense signifies the quality of being easily affected by emotional influences; in its physical sense, it denotes physiological (nervous) sensibility" (Minter, "Literary Empfindsamkeit" 1017). Using words such as zücken, rühren, zittern, and reizen, the article adeptly looks at the positive sides of Empfindsamkeit as well as its critique, at the weakness and illness in Empfindelei as well as the active vigor of feeling, and at the positive elements of sympathy. The study proves insightful – the text includes numerous references to non-canonical authors such as Caroline von Wolzogen, Christiane Benedikte Naubert, and Karl Theodor Beck – but Minter primarily references literary sources published after 1770 and uses Albrecht von Haller's physiology textbook (1788 German edition cited, orig. 1747 Latin) as her reference for the language of neurology (Primae lineae physiologiae). The essay focuses on Empfindsamkeit during the period of its critique, i.e. after 1770, and except for a mention of Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747), avoids the pre-1770 discourse of sensibility and anthropology in physiological and literary works.
Physical sensibility can be directly linked to anthropology through earlier texts purposely written to explore the physiological and philosophical basis of the mind/body interrelationship. This includes neurological function that is so important in discussing physical sensibility. The historical record typically emphasizes the monumental effect of Haller's discoveries in neurology, regarding him as a "towering figure" in the negotiation of meaning of the nexus of body and soul (Porter, *Greatest Benefit* 250). Between 1740 and 1760, Johanna Geyer-Kordesch notes, however, other philosophers and physicians, including the University of Halle students and later instructors Johann Gottlob Krüger, Johann August Unzer, Ernst Anton Nicolai, and Georg Friedrich Meier, provided significant theories about physical sensibility (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst Stahl" 368). The earliest of their publications include Krüger's dissertation *De sensatione* (1742) and the second part of his *Naturlehre, the Physiologie, oder Lehre von dem Leben und der Gesundheit der Menschen* (1743), with 250 pages on sensation, covering topics from irritability to the five senses to the imagination (Krüger, *Physiologie* 519-769). Krüger develops a vocabulary of physical sensibility in German. His terminology is likely based on the work of physiologists before him, from Thomas Willis to Georg Ernst Stahl and Friedrich Hoffmann. These words represent a reference point on neurological function and include general terms surrounding sensation, such as *Empfindung, Empfindlichkeit,* and *empfinden* (*Physiologie* 540). Minter has noted that "Typically, verbs that describe nervous and vital processes in the physiological and psychological literature of the time also play a starring role in accounts of emotional processes in the literature of sensibility" ("Literary Empfindsamkeit" 1017). She goes on to cite German verbs from Haller's *Physiologie* (1747 Latin, 1759-1776 German). Already in 1743, Krüger's *Naturlehre*
(vol. 2) uses verbs to explain neurological function that appear in the literature of sensibility to explain psychological processes, including *berühren* (Krüger, *Physiologie* 542), *rühren* (*Physiologie* 610), *zittern* (*Physiologie* 563), and *erschüttern* (*Physiologie* 570, cf. Minter 1017).

Novelists in Germany began to use elements from the vocabulary of sensibility and anthropology to define the human as a moral being, for example in Schnabel's *Insel Felsenburg* (1731-1743). Brockes's "Bewährtes Mittel, Gemüths=Bewegungen zu stillen" (1730) in poetry and Bernd's *Eigene Lebensbeschreibung* (1738) in autobiography helped create these historical discourses. Frank Baasner has shown that the physical and moral elements of sensibility develop historically in France, for example, and shape the modern discourse in the seventeenth century. The German discourses of body, soul, morality, and literature must be seen within this European context. Richardson's *Pamela* (1740-1741) represents one of the best examples of interplay between themes of dualistic human nature, sensibility, and morality in the novel (next to *La vie de Marianne*). Through early translations into German and a reception by a broad readership, it conveyed these connections. My reading of *Pamela* could easily be extended to *Clarissa*, but my point has been made. Other German novelists contemporary with Schnabel also employ this nexus.

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47 I intend to develop this argument in a future article. Raymond Stephanson provides the groundwork for such a study. See Raymond Stephanson, "Richardson's 'Nerves': The Physiology of Sensibility in Clarissa," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49.2 (1988): 267-285.
Sensibility and Body/Soul Discourse in Loën's Contemporaneous Novel

The gradual nature of the combination of body/soul discourse with morality in German fiction is evident in Johann Michael von Loën's *Der redliche Mann am Hofe* (1740), which I address briefly. Loën uses the literary model of the speculum, a narrative designed to train a ruler, to structure Count Rivera's story. Each chapter of the novel contributes either to Rivera's biography, or recounts a moralized life story of a person he has encountered during his adventures. Sensibility is an underlying theme of these adventures, especially when the topic centers on love or the emotions. In the biography of Baron Riesenburg, for example, the author employs the physiological vocabulary of sensibility. Riesenburg, disguised as a man of limited means named Rossan, meets the beautiful young noblewoman Miss Thurris, who is traveling to a noblewoman's cloister to become a novitiate. Distressed by the idea of the young woman being locked away (and desirous to personally liberate her from a commitment to the abbey and to a celibate life), Riesenburg questions her and discovers her own ambivalence about being confined to a convent. When they meet in a church, a place of dedication to god, he shows that spiritual dedication can be a part of lay life by proposing marriage. Like Des Grieux and Manon in Prévost's *Manon Lescaut* (1731), Riesenburg asks for Miss Thurris's dedication to him:


Her response of trembling and tears demonstrate a bodily response to a situation of emotional and sexual tension. Riesenburg effects her commitment to a secular life and
aids her process of self-definition by encouraging her self-determination and by revealing his ability to financially support her in marriage.

Physical sensibility also plays a role in the love triangle of the lead character, Count Rivera. As the king's chamberlain, the count receives orders to persuade Countess Monteras, a woman he himself loves, to become queen. When the king becomes suspicious that Rivera may have a secret love pact with Monteras, the ruler banishes the count to Rozzomonte, a distant fortress. Countess Monteras, horrified at hearing Count Rivera had been removed from the city, suffers trembling limbs and a sudden strong fever (reprint cited here wrongly paginated, second occurrence 96-97). Because she loves Rivera and has rejected the king, she blames herself for Rivera's troubles. Her sense of moral responsibility expresses itself in physical sickness. The countess had been submitted to a bloodletting to aid her illness, but nonetheless experienced a rising fever that drove her to unconsciousness (101). Through a medication used to subdue fever and agitation of the blood, Countess Monteras recovers her consciousness. The medicine mitigates the physical symptoms of her illness. By comparison, news of Count Rivera's well-being – a moral impetus – provides the means for her emotional and physical recovery:

Her investment in the moral responsibility for the Count's life affects her physical health. Countess Monteras's recovery at the news of Count Rivera's safety approximates Mr. B's recovery from a fever when Pamela returns at his request to his country estate.
Though the anthropological system works similarly – worry over lost love provokes illness, and evidence proving no loss of love promotes recovery – the motivations of the actors are different in each work. Countess Monteras's illness is a response to her concern for Rivera's well-being and an expression of personal anguish over a fear of losing him. Mr. B's loss of love reveals less magnanimity, as he solely wants Pamela back in his presence. Overall, though Loën describes the sensibility of his characters using the interdependence of body and soul, it remains episodic in *Der redliche Mann am Hofe*. The interrelationship of body, soul, and sensibility is much more prevalent and more focused in Richardson's first novel. Because both novels were published in the same year, and Richardson published *Pamela* at the end of 1740, the appearance of a similar scene in the two novels may be a trope of debilitation and nervous sensibility prevalent in European literature at the time. Neither novel represents an example of the anthropological subgenre, but both use the discourse of body and soul and sensibility to represent and analyze the increased interest and attention to the emotions and nerves in representing moral life.

Reading the physiological explanations of human nature in Cheyne's correspondence or Krüger's *Naturlehre* alongside novels by Richardson and Loën, respectively, should serve neither to equate nor to rank their importance as sources of knowledge about humankind. In their own way, the examples of writing in natural science and literature cited here are asking the same important questions of the long eighteenth century. Both forms of knowledge seek answers to questions about how the human psyche functions and how body and soul interact in human emotions and ethics. To answer these questions, physiologists build on the organic functioning of the human
body, especially the system of neurology proposed by Willis. At the same time, writers of literature, philosophy, and theology draw on the introspective contemplation of Descartes and the Pietists. Reading physiological, philosophical, and literary works from a specific historical and geographic context parallel to each other informs and accentuates important themes that define human experience. In Germany of the mid-Eighteenth century, the interplay of body and soul via the nerves shapes human morality.
CHAPTER IV

PHYSICAL SENSIBILITY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF HUMAN NATURE

For eighteenth-century German writers, one of the starting points for talking about the nexus of body/soul discourse and morality was located in feeling and the exploration of the sources, nature, and limits of the emotions. In the preceding chapter, novels by Schnabel, Loën, and Richardson demonstrated the intwinement of body and soul: corporal sensations make the soul readable just as physical states can affect psychological mood. Contemporaneous with the publication of Richardson's novels (1740-1753), sensibility experienced a semantic shift. Gerhard Sauder argues that the English term gradually moved from the French sentiment (thought, opinion, or sense) to an increasingly emotion-based sentimentality, including moral feeling (3).

Today, Pamela is classified as empfindsame Literatur. Beginning in the 1730's and 1740's, the novels of Prévost, Marivaux, and Richardson helped shape the German discourse on sensibility. Only gradually did German writers develop their own vocabulary to describe sensibility. The term empfindsam first appeared around 1750, but it did not become popular until after Lessing’s 1768 translation of "sentimental" in Sterne's A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy. Similarly, the term Empfindsamkeit dates to a letter from 1757 by Louise Adelgunde Victorie Gottsched. Like the term sensibility, Empfindsamkeit combines the elements of thought and feeling. According to Sauder, it refers to a "Gefühlmäßiges als Intellektuell-Moralisches" (4).
Based on German lexicographical history, it appears that the history of the term *Empfindsamkeit* follows French and English predecessors.

Yet German texts also prepared the German reception of sensibility from England and France. In his *Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre* (1691), Christian Thomasius placed sensation at the center of his epistemology, arguing that physical sensibility provided the impetus for knowledge formation (103-104). Observation and experience superceded theoretical speculation as sources of reliable conclusions and of true knowledge (*Einleitung zur Vernunftlehre* 275-276, 252-260; cf. H. M. Wolff 30). Georg Ernst Stahl similarly argued for the primacy of sensation as a source of knowledge about the natural world. In his *Negotium Otiosum* (1720), Stahl viewed objects as dynamic entities. Knowledge production therefore required observation and interpretation of the expressions and signs of bodily processes, including physiological, emotional, kinetic, and mental change (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst Stahl" 323-325). Additional contributors to a German discourse on sensibility included the moral weeklies from the 1720's and their "culture of feeling," which Sauder draws from Wolfgang Martens's study *Die Botschaft der Tugend* (Sauder 32). Pietist vocabulary from the early eighteenth century also contributed to the language of *Empfindsamkeit*, as August Langen's *Wortschatz des deutschen Pietismus* argues (cf. Blackall 407-408), although the exact relationship is disputed (Sauder 8-11). While my purpose here is not to give a detailed analysis of sensibility's German sources, some acknowledgement is due. German sources of sensibility created a fertile environment for the reception of English and French philosophical theories on sensibility from John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human*
Understanding (1690) through Richardson's trilogy of novels (1740-1753) to Rousseau's Julie, ou la nouvelle Hêloïse (1761).

Continuing the investigation of the intersection of body/soul discourse with morality from chapter three, the present chapter traces the history of dualistic and sensible human nature in three German novels published from 1747 to 1767. Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** (1747/1748) reveals a multi-faceted use of themes of body and soul to represent and motivate moral action. Johann Timotheus Hermes' Miß Fanny Wilkes (1766) provides evidence of how this discourse had entered popular language to describe specific types of mental illness such as melancholia. Finally, Christoph Martin Wieland's Agathon shifts the concentration of the body/soul discourse from the popular to the philosophical realm. Letters and essays by Gellert and Wieland viewed alongside their novels help substantiate their participation in the creation of a unique discourse about body and soul. Although biographical details about Gellert's health or Wieland's reading habits, for example, do not allow us to draw concrete conclusions about their position on the body/soul nexus or morality, they do enlighten readers about the authors' attitudes regarding this discourse. Tracing the evolution of the body/soul conjunction in novels shows the constitutive role of sensibility in the birth of the anthropological novel. Physical sensibility plays a role here.

Gellert, Hypochondria, and Moral Cures

Gellert, like Richardson, personally experienced symptoms of an anxiety-induced illness that restricted his physical and intellectual pursuits. While Cheyne's letters revealed fairly specific symptoms in Richardson's complaints, Gellert provided more
general information about his illness in his correspondence to friends and family. In the
spirit of his age, he termed his illness hypochondria. In tandem with the essay "Von den
trostgründen wider ein sieches Leben," the letters not only define hypochondria, but also
propose physical and intellectual cures. Dating from 1742 to 1766, Gellert's surviving
correspondence shapes the German discourse on hypochondria twenty to thirty years
prior to its popular discussion in works of the late Enlightenment. These include Karl
Philipp Moritz's *Magazine of Experimental Psychology* (1783-1793) and, as Robert
Tobin has argued, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's novel *William Meister's
Apprenticeship* (1796).

Before turning to Gellert's letters, it is important to note that hypochondria in the
eighteenth century meant more than it does in our current common usage. Merriam-
Webster defines the term as an extreme depression of mind or spirits stemming from
imagined physical ailments. The eighteenth-century usage extended this term to include
numerous disorders with physical and moral causes. Zedler's *Universal-Lexicon*
surveys German use of hypochondria in the early Enlightenment. Published in 1739, the
hypochondria entry begins as follows:

Hypochondrisches Übel, Milz=Krankheit, Milz=S[e]uche, Milz=Weh,
Milz=Beschwerung...ist eine beschwerliche Krankheit, welche wegen ihrer vermischten und
widerwärtigen Zufälle, von denen Alten ein Gegen=Streit derer natürlichen Verrichtungen
genannt wird. Und weil *Hippocrates* eine dergleichen Krankheit unter dem Namen der
Milz=Blehung oder Milz Geschwulst beschrieben, hat man daher Anlaß genommen, die erste
Schuld alles solches Übels der Milz beyzulegen. Insgemein wird es die *Krankheit derer
Gelehrten* genannt, weil diese, durch ihr vieles Sitzen, den Bauch für und für drücken, wodurch
die Bewegung derer Eingeweide verhindert und die Verstopffungen verursachet werden. Es giebet
in dieser Beschwerung vornemlich drey Grade.... Der erste Grad ist, wenn die Patienten nur über
 einige Angst klagen, bey welcher sich aber doch bald Verstopfung des Leibes, bald
abwechselndes Grimmen[,] bald Aufblehung derer Weichen findet. Die Patienten sind im übrigen
noch gesund, haben Appetit zum Essen, Schlaffen und stehen ihren Verrichtungen noch vor. Es
fehlet ihnen sonst nichts, als daß sie nur bißweilen eine Angst bekommen, und wissen nicht
warum und woher....Der andere Grad gegenwärtiger Krankheit ist, wenn ausser die angeführten
Zufälle die Angst grösser und öffterer kommt, die Patienten kurzen und schweren Athem kriegen,
und dem Hertzkloppen unterworffen sind, als wenn ein Gewächse in dem Herte wäre, wodurch
die Angst dergestalt arg und schlimm wird, daß sie Tag und Nacht anhält, und dahero Traurigkeit
entstehet, die Patienten alle Gesellschaften fliehen, und, wenn sie nur alleine seyn und schwermütigen Gedanken nachhängen können, zufrieden sind. Bey diesen allen aber haben sie doch noch ihren Verstand. Indessen sind sie nicht beständig mit gedachten Zufällen geplaget, sondern haben manchmahl ziemlich Zeit Ruhe, und behalten nur die Zufälle des ersten Grades. Etliche Wochen sind sie gut, hernach aber gehet es wieder an. Und ob sie schon noch zur Zeit ihren Verstand haben, so stellen sie sich doch die geringsten Kleinigkeiten, als die wichtigsten Sachen vor. Der dritte Grad der Milz-Krankheit entstehet endlich, wenn Melancholye dazu kommt, welche sich offmahls in die Tolsucht verwandelt. Diese ist aber entweder alleine zugegen, da die Patienten noch starck sind, oder mit dem abzehrenden Fieber, welches Marasmus heisset, und dem höchsten Abnehmen des Leibes vergesellschaftet, und macht also den höchsten Grad der Milz-Sucht. 48 (Zedler 13:1479)

Hypochondria thus represents a long-term debilitating condition with varying degrees and combinations of symptoms. Its principal causes are inactivity, poor digestion, and the imagination. In its multifaceted nature, the disease remains highly specific to the experience of the individual. The term thus becomes a kind of catch-all for debilitating mental illness such that when someone like Gellert does not explain his symptoms, the appellation hypochondria is inherently vague. Authors attributed hypochondria and the equivalent in women, hysteria, to wide-ranging physical and mental sources and symptoms (Tobin 100-102).

One can assume that by the time Gellert diagnosed his hypochondria in 1742, he was familiar with elements of the hypochondria discourse outlined in Zedler. Gellert may have gained knowledge about the nature of hypochondria through his study and work at the University of Leipzig. Under the care of his physician, Johann Tilling, who specialized in mineral bath cures often prescribed for mental illness, he traveled to Karlsbad multiple times with hope of a reprieve. In addition, Gellert certainly was acquainted with the hypochondria discourse from literature, such as fellow Leipziger Adam Bernd's 1738 autobiography Eigene Lebensbeschreibung or Theodor Johann Quistorp's 1745 play Der Hypochondrist. Quistorp's comedy was printed in Leipzig as

48 Spelling, punctuation, and orthography are maintained throughout.
part of Johann Christoph Gottsched's multi-volume collection, *Die deutsche Schaubühne* (Tobin 101). As a fervent reader of Samuel Richardson's novels, he may have gained further exposure to the discourse of nervous illness in *Pamela* (trans. 1742), *Clarissa* (trans. beginning in 1748), and *Sir Charles Grandison* (trans. 1754-55).

In his correspondence to friends and family, Gellert initially described how his nervous illness interrupted his life. As early as June 1742, the Leipzig poet directly complained about how hypochondria restricted his work, excusing himself for a poorly written poem and canceling a meeting with Gottsched (Gellert, *Briefwechsel* I:6). The malaise limited activities in his private life as well, preventing him from attending family events such as his sister's wedding in January 1746 (*Briefwechsel* I:17). Though he depended on friends for psychological support as "Schwärmer in der Freundschaft" and for consultation about professional opportunities, he distanced himself from marriage (*Briefwechsel* 1:21-22). Defying his mother's wish that he would marry, Gellert deplored hypochondria and marriage equally. Gellert explained to his sister: "Die Mama würde von Freuden weinen und ich vor Betrübniß, daß ich eine Frau hätte. Zur Hypochondrie auch noch eine Frau; das wäre zu viel Kreuz. Ich kann das eine allein kaum ertragen" (*Briefwechsel* 1:16 [14 January 1746]). Marriage and hypochondria both represented burdens to Gellert. Ironically, other members of society might have viewed each "burden" positively: proponents of the nuclear family would have embraced marriage, and those who saw hypochondria as a unique capacity to feel may have welcomed the nervous affliction (Mullan). In most of Gellert's surviving early letters, the hypochondria was a personal diagnosis and the symptoms went virtually unexplained. With resignation,
the poet reluctantly accepted his fate to suffer a debilitated body and its restriction of his intellectual activity.

In the same year that the first volume of *Das Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G**** (1747) appeared, Gellert also published an essay on the consolation for a life plagued by illness: "Von den Trostgründen wider ein sieches Leben." Gellert explores here the causes, diagnosis, and treatment of sickness. On one level, the essay functions as an apology for religion. Despite the multiple causes of illness and the varied effectiveness of treatments, Gellert argues that religion offers the virtuous solace for life's suffering. (Gellert, "Trostgründen" 75). The text uses moral characters, a device familiar to Enlightenment readers from the moral weeklies, to reach a broad audience and to make the moral immediate.

More than representing a moral code, "Trostgründen" also describes human nature. Both psychological and physical factors can induce illness. Psychological origins of ill health may include poor judgment, haste, stress, uncontrolled or sudden emotion (anger, revenge), debauchery, disorder, or foolishness. Examples of physical factors include a medication that is rejected by the body or the "careless" (i.e. immoderate ?) use of alcohol ("Trostgründen" 24). According to Gellert's conception, the causes of illness stem from the will as choices based either on flawed knowledge (the medication) or on moral turpitude (all other examples). And individuals should be held accountable for the moral outcome of their actions. Setting aside the epidemiological and physiological causes of sickness, Gellert confronts human nature and focuses on correcting moral foibles (26).
Proper diagnosis of illness requires self-knowledge, even though self-observation may not be as easy as it appears. Obstacles to self-knowledge are plentiful. The human ego can blind reason, some causes of life events are indeterminable, and ultimately, anxiety frequently causes infirmity (24-25). Thus, the essay intimates that the soul affects the body and that the body affects the soul. Gellert explains:

Wer aus natürlicher Schwermuth und Furchtsamkeit die Leiden seines Körpers für selbstgemachte Plagen und für den Lohn seiner Thorheiten ansieht, da es doch Folgen der Beschaffenheit seiner schwachen Natur, oder göttliche Schickungen sind, der wird die Bangigkeit seiner Seele eben so wenig bestreiten, als ein Mensch, der durch sein wallendes Blut in eine furchtsame Einbildung im Schlafe geräth, und doch glaubt, daß er von bösen Geister beunruhiget werde. (25)

Here the author also acknowledges providence as a possible source of illness, but overall the text focuses on illness resulting from human failures. Human folly contributes significantly to self-induced physical suffering, yet many people fail to recognize the true cause of their ailments and disease.

The essay aims to curb these human missteps through virtue and religion while acknowledging that religion provides different degrees of solace to different people. Here Gellert offers a brief look at symptoms that can plague the hypochondriac. These may include a pervasive fear that provokes a bodily sense of inescapable restriction. The hypochondriac may be plagued by melancholy, or given over to a debauched imagination (65). As constructed by Gellert, hypochondria combines symptoms of nervous anxiety, melancholy, and enthusiasm. Trostgründen regards hypochondria as a nervous disorder, i.e. as located in the body and as an ailment incurable by religion. Hypochondria represents a moral problem because the souls of the afflicted cannot be calmed or turned to virtue. The analysis of nervous conditions in the essay diagnoses individual symptoms to facilitate individual moral edification. In an effort to maintain the image of a homogeneous society of virtue, the essay excludes the morally corrupt individual as a
pathogen. For the pedagogue Gellert, hypochondria demonstrates the nexus of body, soul, and morality. It remains worthy of representation, even when there is no moral cure. What Gellert outlines in this seminal essay, he utilizes in his novel that represents nervous disorders as a problem for both the individual and society.

In letters from the 1740's and early 1750's, Gellert periodically bemoaned his own state of health. Until 1753, the letters rarely reveal any details about his condition, however. Perhaps this had to do with the medial event of the letter during the Enlightenment. Correspondents frequently shared private letters with family and friends, even making copies for further distribution. In this way, letter writing involved participation in the public sphere (Arto-Haumacher 70). Thus, Gellert may have consciously used his illness to excuse himself from work or social functions, but may have only occasionally revealed its nature in a self-reflective manner. While the surviving correspondence refers to physical indisposition fairly frequently, the contours of what constituted hypochondria remains vague into the 1750's.

Two of Gellert's friends provide insight into his illness. In Johann Fürchtegott Gellerts Leben (1774), Johann Andreas Cramer dated a first highpoint of Gellert's ongoing struggle with hypochondria in the year 1752. Cramer notes that Gellert followed the common prescription for hypochondria to eat a moderate diet and exercise, but suffered debilitating anxiety and nightmares. The effects were not only psychological, but also physical: "He suffered frequently under anxiety, and the powers of his spirit were stifled through the heaviest bodily suffering in all of his activities. He seldom experienced the vivacity, which accompanies a healthy and free circulation of blood and bodily fluids. An extraordinary affliction spread from the most hidden source of his
debilitating life over his entire spirit" (Cramer 91). Cramer's account invokes temperamental theory and implies that anxiety interrupted the circulation of blood and other fluids. In turn, the debilitated body promoted sullenness; using temperamental theory to interpret this change, the slowed circulation hampered flow of blood to the brain and thereby caused the hypochondria. Thus, Cramer's biography suggests the intertwined of the material and the metaphysical.

A letter from Carl Wilhelm Christian von Craussen that responded to Gellert's symptoms is also especially insightful. It confirms Cramer's description of Gellert's anxiety as a "Brust Beschwerung" and reassures him that the malady will subside with time. More importantly, von Craussen prescribes physical cures common at the time: drinking diluted white wine instead of heavy beer, limiting sedentary office work, riding a chamber horse, and periodic bloodlettings. His treatment also recommends psychological cures, such as limiting contemplation and writing; avoiding poetry composition, which exhausts the body; and reading Moliere's satires of the medical establishment (Gellert, Briefwechsel 1:122-123). These may have included Le médecin malgré lui (1668) and Le malade imaginaire (1673). Therefore, von Craussen directed Gellert to "appropriate" objects of contemplation and proposed literature as an imaginative cure for his friend's nervous disorder.

Years before, Gellert had tried psychological cures to moderate his illness. In a letter to Johann Adolf Schlegel from February 1749, he playfully tried to treat his condition:

Mein lieber Schlegel
Witzt mag freylich nicht für alles helfen. Wenn ichs gleich versuchen wollte, ob ich mich an Carolinchen gesund küssen könnte. Was meynen Sie? Es kann mir doch wenigstens nichts schaden, und Sie verlieren nichts dabei. Ich habe mir immer sagen lassen, daß ein Kuß von einem lieben Mädchen was recht balsamisches seyn soll. Ach was müßten nicht tausend, nicht noch einmal tausend, für Stärkungen geben! Ich will es also immer wagen; u. Sie sollen der erste seyn, dem ich meine Gesundheit melden will, wenn das Mittel anschlägt. Was thut man nicht der Gesundheit wegen, u. was läßt sich nicht ein guter Freund gefallen, um dem andern dazu zu verhelfen! Machen Sie sich keine Sorge, es soll keine Gewonheit daraus werden: Sie sollen auch nicht dabei vergessen werden: Ach, will ich sprechen, noch eins, Carlinchen, nur noch eins, nicht für mich, für Herr Schlegeln, für den lieben Herrn Schlegel. Sehn Sie, so küßt Herr Schlegel! – – Doch nein, er küßt nicht ganz so: aber so — Ich will gleich gehen, mein lieber Schlegel, denn es wird über dem Schreiben immer schlimmer. Itzt trifft mirs recht ans Herze. Leben Sie wohl, Brüderchen!

Ihr lieber Gellert (Briefwechsel 1:37)

The letter begins with the author’s admission that he is sick. He then plays with possible diversions, noting that reading fails to alter his current condition, and wonders if writing to Schlegel might provide him the peace of mind he seeks. In his letter, Gellert talks about writing as a medium for self-knowledge and exploration at the same time as he performs this process of self-reflection. His reflections emphasize the performative aspect of identity formation and literary communication (cf. Reinlein 33-34). Like he does in a letter of 4 July 1745 to Wilhelmine Steinauer, Gellert demonstrates in his letter to Schlegel that personal reflection and a playful imagination are as important as communicating with the addressee (Briefwechsel 1:11-13).

The letter at first seems to playfully flirt with Caroline, like a love letter, but more likely represents a cult of friendship between Gellert, Caroline Schlegel, and Johann A. Schlegel. It is a variation on the "Wollust um das Gefühl der Freundschaft" he offers to Pastor Johann Jacob Mack (Gellert, Briefwechsel 1:22 [Early 1748]). The kissing fantasy invokes the imagination for a playful experiment that treats the depressed psychological state with desire. Certainly this has homoerotic overtones, but that is not my focus here. This is an egocentric therapy with unforeseen or at least postponed closure, evidenced by the frequency and manner of kissing ("was müssen nicht tausend, nicht noch einmal...)
tausend [Küssen sein]"; "nicht ganz so: aber so"). Gellert's nervous state with its tendency to periodic fits requires physical closeness, or at least imagined closeness, to balance his spiritual condition. Comparing his earlier protestations against marriage to this fantasy, he abhors the idea of a relationship but idealizes momentary rapture.

In Trostgründen, imagination is also key. When the imagination fails to directly quell a physical pain, the next best therapy is to imagine an idea that will create a pleasing effect in the soul. When reason fails to console, imagination is an alternative. Citing an example of a miser, Gellert explains how disappointment of business losses might be subdued through the hope of even greater gains. Thus a feeling of joy could counteract despair with the anticipation of an imagined reprieve.

Gellert repeatedly attempted to "write himself well" and "read himself well." Activating extreme emotions through the imagination provided a respite from his hypochondria, if only briefly. While "reading himself well" failed in the letter just discussed, several years later the moral actions of Richardson's Sir Charles Grandison overwhelmed Gellert's fantasy and induced a state of enthusiasm lasting several days. In reading Richardson's novel, Gellert generated a feeling that provided momentary transcendence from the weight of his bodily pains. This was an example of what he had argued in the "Consolation" essay, that when pain could not be quelled, the sufferer must create a joy of greater magnitude to supplant the pain. This may have been what he aimed for with the kissing fantasy letter, a friendly and erotic interlude that through play elevated his soul momentarily out of the realm of physical suffering.

Gellert’s case history of hypochondria provides evidence for selected physical and psychological theories practiced in the German states at the middle of the eighteenth
century. In a manner characteristic of the Enlightenment he sought both to entertain and educate his readers. Writing and reading engaged the imagination in the solution of moral dilemmas. Discourses of the material and the metaphysical shape these goals in Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***.

The Body/Soul Discourse and Reader Sympathy in Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***

The moral program of Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** derives from life experiences that invite reader identification (Meyer-Krentler 90). Orphaned as a child, the titular heroine receives an exemplary moral education at home. In the development of the psychological action, the first part of the novel details the Countess's confrontation with a series of moral challenges: adultery, incest, homicide, mental illness, and bigamy. Maintaining a focus on the conflict between the individual and society, the second part reveals how her closest friends surmount their own confrontations with power and social mores. According to Bernd Witte, the novel depicts immoral relationships as negative examples for the bourgeois readership to reify marriage as a defining institution of bourgeois life (Witte 121-123). Thus in the first book, the marriage of the Graf and Gräfin contrasts with the Prinz von S.'s proposition to the Gräfin to have an affair, with the Graf's early liaison with Caroline, with the incestuous marriage of their children Carlson and Mariane, and with Dormund's murder of Carlson to possess Mariane.

These comparisons serve to persuade the reader of the ubiquity and force of virtue. In Der andere Roman: Gellerts »Schwedische Gräfin«, Von der aufklärerischen Propaganda gegen den »Roman« zur empfindsamen Erlebnisdichtung (1974), Eckert Meyer-Krentler argues that the first part of Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von
G** reshapes elements of the gallant novel and moral narration for moral storytelling. The novel adapts three key kinds of narrative techniques from existing prose forms. First, in a variation on the gallant novel, the Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** functionalizes an episodic story to illustrate the conversion of vice to virtue (the Gräfin resists repeated advances from the Prinz von S** with statements of her commitment to her husband) (Meyer-Krentler 86). Second, the Countess narrates the triumph over progressively greater challenges of vice to confirm the greater power of virtue (she informs Carlson and Mariane that they are siblings and cares for Mariane after Dormund confesses that he murdered Carlson) (57, 87-88). Third, the novel provokes the reader to sympathize with the fictional characters, to analyze the characters' struggles, and to pursue virtue (97-98). Meier-Krentler shows that the first section of the novel appeals to the reader claiming not only that the novel genre can represent moral content, but also argues rhetorically that a moral life is desirable.

On another level, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** depicts the intersection of an individual's moral existence with a discourse on body and soul in the description of human nature. It uses metaphors to describe that nature through the representation of emotion, especially love and suffering. By representing moral human action, the novel inherently includes the discourse of body and soul. In telling her life story, the Countess of G. uses a dualistic model of human nature. When describing her love for her second husband, Mr. R**, she ascribes this dualism to him: "Ich liebte ihn, wie ich aufrichtig versichern kann, ganz ausnehmend und so zärtlich als meinen ersten Gemahl. An Gemütsgaben war er ihm gleich, wo er ihn nicht noch in gewissen Stücken übertraf. Aber
an dem Äußerlichen kam er ihm nicht bei" (Gellert, Leben 37). This contrast of character illustrates the proper priority of soul over body in love.

Yet the body is not to be neglected. The Countess of G. sometimes digresses from her story to philosophize about the reason why sentimental love decreases in marriage. She underscores the necessary balance between the physical and the intellectual aspects of love:

Man denke ja nicht, weil wir die Wissenschaften liebten, daß wir an uns nur unsere Seelen geliebt hätten. Ich habe bei allen meinen Büchern über die metaphysische Geisterliebe nur lachen müssen. Der Körper gehört so gut als die Seele zu unserer Natur. Und wer uns beredet, daß er nichts als die Vollkommenheiten des Geistes an einer Person liebt, der redet entweder wider sein Gewissen, oder er weiß gar nicht, was er redet. Die sinnliche Liebe, die bloß auf den Körper geht, ist eine Beschäftigung kleiner und unfruchtbarer Seelen. Und die geistige Liebe, die sich nur mit den Eigenschaften der Seele gattet, ist ein Hirngespinst hochmütiger Schulweisen, die sich schämen, daß ihnen der Himmel einen Körper gegeben hat, den sie doch, wenn es von den Reden zu der Tat käme, um zehn Seelen nicht würden fahrenlassen. (38-39)

The text outlines a two-fold pedagogic lesson on love. While sentimentality may decrease in marriage, the intensity of the relationship between partners can remain "fiery and lively" if both parties have a well-founded love. Together, the material and the metaphysical contribute to the completeness of this affection. According to the heroine, humans cannot, in fact, do not want to rid themselves of this dualistic existence. Nature condemns people to a life that combines sensuality and intellect. The reader is encouraged to embrace both aspects in pursuit of a moral life.

The text develops a dualistic perspective of human nature by using physiological metaphors to describe psychological states and processes. In her digression on the nature of love, the Countess argues for the possibility of romantic love over the length of a marriage. Through prudence and care, couples can survive the routine of marriage without smothering tender affection. Like the beating of the human heart, love can become mechanical, and even emotionally suffocating:
Viele können es nicht vertragen, wenn sie die Liebe verehelchter Personen so zärtlich abgeschildert sehen als die Liebe zwischen unverehelichten, weil man sieht, daß die meisten Ehen die Liebe eher auslöschen als vermehren. Doch solche Leute wissen nicht, was Klugheit und Behutsamkeit in der Ehe für Wunder tun können. Sie erhalten die Liebe und befördern ihren Fortgang wie das Herz durch seine Bewegung den Umlauf des Geblüts. (38)

Human emotion suffers when it devolves into a mechanical process. In a later passage, the narrator uses a metaphor of invasive therapy to describe how misfortune promotes understanding of good fortune. Like a vaccination, a bad experience provides a context to better appreciate a good one:

Das Unglück, das uns zeither betroffen, hatte unsere Gemüter gleichsam aufgelöst, die Ruhe nunmehr desto stärker zu schmecken. Man dürfte fast sagen, wer lauter Glück hätte, der hätte gar keines. Es ist wohl wahr, daß das Unglück an und für sich nichts Angenehmes ist; allein es ist es doch in der Folge und in dem Zusammenhange. Wenigstens gleicht es den Arzneien, die unserm Körper einen Schmerz verursachen, damit er desto gesünder wird. (Leben 53)

The waning hope for Carlson's recovery from sickness and the ultimate confirmation of his death plunges Mariane into despair. The torrential emotional experience gives way, however, to an ensuing calmness that proves much more satisfying for her simply because she is so much more responsive to sensations of all types.

Another way Gellert's characters pursue moral goodness is by balancing extremes, seen especially in the characters' reactions to incest between siblings. The background to this episode is brief. Before the count meets the Countess of G., he has fallen in love with a bourgeois woman, Caroline, who has borne their two children out of wedlock, a son Carlson and a daughter Mariane. The count has chosen not to marry his bourgeois lover because the royal court would not have assented. Caroline has ended their relationship. As a single mother, Caroline is forced to separate the children. Years later, at an abbey in the Netherlands, the soldier son unknowingly falls in love with his sister and they elope. The recognition of Carlson and Mariane's incestuous relationship, socially and religiously forbidden, shocks all involved. Anticipating a messy resolution to the conflict between
individual desire and social regulation, the countess reacts with a physical shudder and not just morally (43). Meanwhile, the unsuspecting Mariane exhibits signs of distress at the unexplainable and secretive silence of the Countess and their visitors. Confronted with knowledge of her transgression, Mariane faints. The psychological trauma weighs so heavily on her that she remains virtually unconscious for the remainder of the day.

In the first edition of the novel, her condition is further exacerbated by the fact that she is pregnant (Leben 46, 157). Linking the fainting spell to pregnancy suggests a physical cause for a physical reaction. By eliminating this passage, the text relies on Mariane's psychological characterization to explain her blackout. This editing emphasizes more forcefully the influence of the soul on the body. Based on the psychosomatic representation of the Countess and Mariane, the novel acknowledges an interrelationship of the psychological states of worry and dread and of the physical effects of shuddering and fainting.

The denouement of the Mariane and Carlson subplot further links the physical and moral spheres. After Carlson dies in military service on the front, Mariane falls in love with Dormund, Carlson's friend from the army. In a final letter to Mariane, Carlson recommends Dormund as one person worthy of her love and thereby her instinctual attraction appears to be morally condoned '(52). The new marriage falters, however, because the friend's conscience plagues him for having poisoned Carlson in order to court Mariane. Feeling guilty for the murder, he exhibits psychopathic behavior, begins to neglect Mariane, and eventually stifles their relationship. Ultimately, the crisis of

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conscience results in physical sickness (55). His doctors warn him that he is near death; his dire physical and psychological state prompts his confession. The Countess describes this nexus of emotional torment and physical debilitation:


The psychological release of admitting his crime provides him a physical reprieve from the unidentified illness. After a partial recovery, he chooses self-induced banishment, declares himself unworthy of pity, and dreams of earning forgiveness by dying in war as a soldier, of gaining moral absolution through physical sacrifice (57). In Dormund's case, the moral redemption of confession opens the way to physical recovery.

Dormund's declaration of guilt has an opposite effect on Mariane. The confession induces an emotional storm and she descends into a depression (56). The verbal communication has psychological and physical ramifications. Using a common medical treatment for psychological disorders, the Countess as Mariane's caretaker organizes two simultaneous bloodlettings (58). This therapy incorporates temperament theory, which proposes that the distribution of elementary fluids (black bile, yellow bile, phlegm, and blood) significantly affects an individual's psyche. By effecting a physical change, the heroine hopes to balance the bodily fluids and induce a psychological change: a decrease in agitation. In the end, however, the physical treatment of the patient's psychological state fails. While Enlightenment medicine viewed bloodletting as a key therapy to
remove toxins and balance the humoral system (Porter, "Health and Disease" 216), mechanical physicians such as Friedrich Hoffmann regarded this treatment as ineffective for ailments of psychological origin (Ingo Wilhelm Müller 232). Thus either because the countess provides an inappropriate treatment, or because the patient removes the bandages applied after the bloodlettings and weakens herself, Mariane dies. A primarily physical treatment fails to provide the desired moral effect: a psychological respite for Mariane. Her moral dilemma also requires a treatment of the soul to balance her state of health.

The Countess represents the principle of moral balance. Since her childhood, she has accepted bourgeois moral codes that promote love in marriage and has refused an extramarital affair with the prince. Faced with Dormund's crime, she again takes a middle position: "Wir mußten ihn als einen Mörder hassen; doch die allgemeine Menschenliebe verband uns auch zum Mitleiden" (Gellert, Leben 57). Her ability to humanly sympathize with Mariane's love for Carlson, despite their incestuous relationship, means that she must disavow Dormund's murderous act. But her sympathy for the crying Dormund, who signals repentance with an apology and the physical sign of tears, also demands recognition for his humanity. In her pursuit of virtue, she balances her physical, intellectual, and moral natures and attempts to return Mariane and Carlson to a life of moral equilibrium. They are mixed characters. While she condemns their actions, she empathizes with their suffering. This acknowledges their humanity, however fallible it might be, and expresses her own.

In his essay "Pro comoedia commovente" (1751, trans. "Abhandlung für das rührende Lustspiel" by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 1755) Gellert cites sympathy as a key
principle in the composition of comedies, an innovative move. This apology for the
rührende Lustspiel provides guidelines for a new comedic form. In doing so, it reveals
the author's use of intersubstantial causation, i.e. causal interaction between humankind's
physical and intellectual capacities, to create moral entertainment (cf. Zammito 44-49).
More generally, the essay functions as a guide for the production of effective Enlightenment
literature. Comedy focuses on a recognizable action that evokes feeling and pathos
(Gellert, "Abhandlung" 121, 123). The comedic text investigates the private lives of
ordinary persons and their experiences of friendship, constancy, generosity, and gratitude
(123, 127). By differentiating between a Posse (farce), which prompts the viewer/reader
to laugh at the character's folly, and the rührende Lustspiel, which selectively contrasts
laughing to pathos, Gellert argues for a new comedic subgenre that follows a natural
voice to achieve edification (125-129).

The theory of feeling in the "Abhandlung für das rührende Lustspiel" focuses on
how a play triggers viewer/reader empathy with a character's moral dilemma. Instead of
describing the representation of anthropological concerns, it analyzes their function in the
reception of a drama. This evocation is similar to the intent of the Leben der
schwedischen Gräfin von G***: to edify the reader. Central to Gellert's definition of
comedy is its pedagogical purpose: "[D]ie Komödie sei ein dramatisches Gedicht,
welches Abschilderungen von dem gemeinen Privatleben enthalte, die Tugend anpreise
und verschiedene Laster und Ungereimtheiten der Menschen auf eine scherzhafte und
feine Art durchziehe" (120). The definition applies also to Gellert's conception of the
moral novel despite obvious differences between the two genres. If rewritten for the
novel, it would read: "Ein moralischer Roman ist ein episches Gedicht, welches
Abschilderungen von dem gemeinen Privatleben enthalte, die Tugend anpreise und verschiedene Laster und Ungereimtheiten der Menschen auf eine scherzhafte und feine Art durchziehe." (Italics mark my word substitutions in the previous sentence.) Though the Countess of G** begins her life in noble privilege, it applies to a greater extent to her middle-class life during her exile in Holland. The didacticism of the essay on the sentimental comedy incorporates overarching principles of enlightenment evident in the novel.

By juxtaposing bad and good, the author inspires pathos and heightens the reader/viewer's perception of moral qualities (125). This is most effective when the characters' morals motivate the action:

Denn wenn dasjenige, was der Dichter, Glückliches oder Unglückliches, wider alle Hoffnung sich ereignen läßt und zu den Gemütsbewegungen die Gelegenheit geben muß, aus den Sitten der Personen so natürlich fließt, daß es sich fast nicht anders hätte zutragen können: so überläßt sich alsdann der Zuschauer, dessen sich Verwunderung und Wahrscheinlichkeit bemächtigt haben, er mag nun der Person wohlwollen oder nicht, willig und gern den Bewegungen und wird bald mit Vergnügen zürnen, bald trauern und bald über die Zufälle derjenigen Personen, deren er sich am meisten annimt, für Freuden weinen. (126)

When the moral motivation is captivating, viewers or readers are more likely to engage their imaginations and become angry, distressed, and moved to tears. Der Mensch, a moral weekly published in the same time frame as Gellert's works, recommended a similar ethos for authors because by engaging emotion, one can effect moral change (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 53). Outlining essential qualities of the effective writer, Der Mensch emphasized that the writer must know the human heart in order to animate feeling in the reader: "Ich verlange überhaupt, daß ein Verfasser die Menschen kenne, vor er schreibt. Diese Kenntniß der Menschen beruht […] auf der Erkenntnis des menschlichen Herzens. Alle Wahrheiten müssen so vorgetragen werden, daß sie der
Leser fühle, alsdenn ist sie nüßlich" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch II:207-208, no. 61).

The Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** models this evocation of emotion. The crisis situations of the first book, such as the Mariane-Carlson-Dormund love triangle and Countess-Mr. R**-Count love triangle, are designed to heighten emotional response. Elliciting identification, the novel engages the reader with stages including dramatic tension, identification with the characters, agitation, sympathy, and participation in the character's test of virtue (Meyer-Krentler 97). Gellert reveals this intent in the novel itself, when the Countess reflects: "Ich weiß, daß es eine von den Haupttugenden einer guten Art zu erzählen ist, wenn man so erzählt, daß die Leser nicht die Sache zu lesen, sondern selbst zu sehen glauben, und durch eine abgenötigte Empfindung sich unvermerkt an die Stelle der Person setzen, welcher die Sache begegnet ist" (Gellert, Leben 61). In the second part, the novel promotes using moral feeling to guide social action. This culminates in the ideal of middle-class marriage. In telling her life story, the Countess expands the narrative material to include stories of other people's relation to her. When individuals narrate their own life events, she emphasizes, they captivate audience emotions more fully: "Es ist immer, als wenn man mehr Anteil an einer Begebenheit nähme, wenn sie der selbst erzählt, dem sie zugestossen ist" (68). Thus the multiple first-person perspectives in the second book (the heroine's biography, personal accounts by the Count, Steeley, and Amalie) invite the reader to a closer experience of moral trials.

Modelling moral behavior, the characters exemplify how readers can respond to suffering. Steeley rejoices when the count frees him from imprisonment in Siberia. Out of
friendship, the count gives Steeley new clothes, an act that moves his English friend to tears. The reader can surmise from Steeley's speechlessness that he did not encounter this kind of humanity during his Siberian detention (96). When Steeley later visits the count in Holland, the count trembles with joy. The Countess describes this second reunion as follows: "Der Graf zitterte, daß er kaum von dem Sessel aufstehen konnte, und wir sahen ihren Umarmungen mit einem freudigen Schauer lange zu" (116). Demonstrations of friendship produce physical responses of speechlessness, crying, and shaking. The text emphasizes that these strong emotions help shape moral life, and that they connect the movements of body and soul. Steely's reunion with the count in Holland invites reader participation in the count's fate.

Using Andreas as an example, Meyer-Krentler notes that in contrast to the broad appeal to virtue addressing all readers in part one of the novel, the second part's social experience of feeling can be exclusionary: "Der Empfindsame richtet sich an die Gleichgesinnten; Autor und Leser bilden einen geschlossenen Zirkel, in dem für den Außenstehenden, den nicht Empfindsamen, kein Platz ist: Das Verhältnis zwischen dem empfindsamen Zirkel der Freunde im zweiten Teil und dem zwar gutmütigen, aber extrovierten Andreas ist dessen getreue Spiegelung" (Meyer-Krentler 142). The range of emotive response also differs. For instance, the Countess invokes empathy with those who suffer misfortune. She describes her theory of feeling after hearing a pastor's lesson on providence. She gives thanks for her divinely-directed fate. Despite the suffering caused by her husband's captivity in Siberia and her separation from him, she concedes that this may seem unbelievable:
Leuten, die nie unglücklich gewesen, Leuten, die zu frostig sind, anderer Unglück zu fühlen, wird das Vergnügen, das wir aus dieser Rede schöpften, als ein scheinheiliges Rätsel vorkommen. Sie werden sich nicht einbilden können, wie sich solche ersthafte Betrachtungen zu einem Tage der Freude und der Liebe schicken; allein sie werden mir auch nicht zumuten, daß ich ihnen eine Sache beweisen soll, die auf die Empfindung ankömmt. (Gellert, Leben 137)

For people who have not lived through misfortune, or who refuse to imagine it, her appeal to feeling may not resonate with their life experience. They may not acknowledge strong emotion as a valid basis of argument, thus prompting a divide in understanding between an empfindsame person and a nicht-empfindsame person. But with the tears exchanged by the count and Steeley at their reunions, Amalie's weeping about Steeley's suffering, and the heroine's lamentations about the count's suffering, the novel illustrates appropriate situations and ways to show emotion (121, 124, 128). In the key display of empathy, the characters demonstrate to the reader when to shed tears for those who suffer; it is the physical response to a moral impetus. Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** (1747/1748) points to the function of empathy to elicit another's feelings that Gellert develops more fully in Pro comoedia commovente (1751), and Lessing expands upon in the Briefwechsel über das Trauerspiel (1756-1757) and installments of the Hamburgische Dramaturgie (1768).

Because it focuses on moral pedagogy, Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G** can be labeled a sentimental novel. The text includes the body/soul discourse as a means to demonstrate a moral response to the emotions. Using the principle of contrast emphasized in the essay on the tearful comedy, the novel represents immorality in the incestuous love between Mariane and Carlson, and lust as Dormund's motivation for murder to possess Mariane. While it may be natural to experience intense passions, these belong, according to the novel, in a moderate form in marriage, such as the one between the Countess and the count. The love triangle of Mariane, Carlson, and Dormund
illustrates the extremes the passions may provoke, and how psychological conflicts produce physical effects. By contrast, the love triangle between the count, Countess, and Mr. R.** demonstrates the pain of those emotions and their moderation in an appropriate manner. Furthermore, in part two, the Countess positively influences the recovery of the unwed couple, Wid and his lover, through financial support, personal caregiving, and their reintegration into society as a married couple (Gellert, Leben 110-112, 138-140, 144-145). In contrast to the counseling she gives Mariane, Carlson, and Dormund, the reintegration of Wid and his family as useful members of society succeeds. The venues for the nexus of morality and the body/soul discourse include representation within the work, such as the Countess's attempts to heal and reform Mariane and Dormund. This nexus extends, in the example of Steeley and Amalie's friendship and love, to the novel's engagement of the reader's tears of pathos.

Between 1748, when Wendler published the second volume of Gellert's Leben der schwedischen von G*** and 1764, when Bartholomäi published Wieland's Der Sieg der Natur über die Schwärmerey, oder die Abenteuer des Don Sylvio von Rosalva, German novelists gravitated to an anthropological discourse. Inspired by French and English models, Gellert and others created sentimental (i.e. moral) novels with a focus on sensibility. Johann Timotheus Hermes' Miß Fanny Wilkes illustrates one way a foreign literature of sensibility shaped anthropological knowledge in German literature.

Richardsonian Sensibility and Melancholy in Miß Fanny Wilkes

Hermes, a Breslau pastor and admirer of the novels of Richardson and Fielding, further popularized the discourse of sensibility in German literature. Like Gellert, Hermes
used the novel as a pedagogical tool. But for the Breslau pastor, religious principles overwhelmingly guided plot and character development (Weber 250a). Inspired by the example of the English moral weeklies, he aimed to teach and entertain according to the doctrine of a rationalized Christian theology (Bautz 2:762-763). His early novels Miß Fanny Wilkes (1766) and Sophiens Reise von Memel nach Sachsen (1769-1772) were the most influential. A key focus of these novels, as well as other novels by Hermes published in the 1780's and 1790's, lies in the effort to discipline feeling (Weber 250b).

Miß Fanny Wilkes combines discourse about body and soul with writing about morality. In its moral content, the novel exhibits multiple themes of sensibility similar to those in Richardson's novels. The full title Miß Fanny Wilkes; so gut als aus dem Englischen übersetzt points to the novel's heritage; in fact, it is closely modeled after Richardson's novel Sir Charles Grandison (1753-1754). In the following, I compare the struggle with power and the fate of the virtuous heroine in Miß Fanny Wilkes with Pamela because the texts use similar plot devices. In Pamela, Mr. B. unsuccessfully tries to seduce the heroine and instead falls in love with her. When he acknowledges her virtue and sends her home to her parents, her absence immediately provokes his melancholic sickness. In Miß Fanny Wilkes, Lady Foster assigns her chambermaid Betty the seduction of Herr Handsom, but the servant instead falls hopelessly in love with him. When Handsom does not return her love, she falls deathly ill. The physical changes provoked by Pamela's pregnancy make her melancholy, and Hermes' Elizabeth also develops a nervous temperament during her pregnancy. Pamela and Clarissa suffer fainting spells during episodes of nervous stress. Similarly, Hermes' Fanny faints when she sees Mademoiselle DuBois going into the mill, as someone who, like herself, has escaped the
attack of robbers at the Foster estate. In another example, when Herr Handsom, the
Foster's tutor, meets Jinny Heavy and on behalf of Lady Foster asks for her to tell about
herself, she shows signs of uneasiness and also falls unconscious. Handsom tries physical
means to return Jinny to consciousness, sprinkling her face with water, holding alcohol
under her nose, and removing a choking necklace. Herr Handsom can not know that her
life represents an existence based on the trials of a virtuous person – not unlike Pamela –
and that his question will provoke a crisis of conscience that prompts her fainting spell.
The accounts of virtue in Jinny's history and Handsom's past comprise the remainder of
the novel.

The representation of sensibility involves two further themes that affect the
body/soul nexus: the preservation of virtue and how unrealized love induces melancholy.
Hermes' novel demands the preservation of virtue and contrasts this ideal with
lasciviousness and moral turpitude. The sensible body conveys signs that dissociate Jinny
from vice and mark her commitment to virtue. Recalling her youth, Jinny details two life
crises in discussions and letters with Elisabeth Handsom. In these flashbacks, she
remembers how her father made her learn French and Italian and then demanded that she
translate "die abscheulichsten Schriften." Through beatings, he also forced her to draw a
copy of whatever he asked: "Die allerfrechsten Zeichnungen in den Tabatieren der
Ungesitteten sind nichts, sie sind keusch in Vergleichung der Stücke, die ich habe
machen müssen" (Hermes 1:113). Just the memory of this part of her childhood brings
back strong emotion, which she releases in tearful dialogue with Elisabeth. Their
sympathetic (i.e. sensible) exchanges illustrate a typical morally reflective (sentimental)
friendship (cf. Todd 7-8).
Confronting her with what is likely pornography, Jinny's father has tried to corrupt her innate moral sense to gain her willing participation in his reproduction business. Ultimately, he has planned to arouse her lasciviousness so that he could sell her as a mistress on the open market. To this end, the father has also ordered her to spend time with her licentious brother and coquettish women she abhors. It is these experiences that put Jinny into her sick bed. She recalls:

Ich war damals fünfzehn Jahr alt, und nunmehr fieng man an, mich mit Gewalt zu gewissen Dingen bewegen zu wollen, zu denen die allerfrechsten Reden und Beyspiele mich nicht hatten [sic] bringen können.
Ich fiel damals in einen Zustand, den ich fast nicht ohn ein Wunderwerk mit dem Begriff des Lebens zusammendenken kann, der aber unter allen möglichen Dingen das einzige war, was mich retten konnte. – Ich ward totkrank, und nie war eine Krankheit dieser gänzlichen Zerrüttung ähnlich." (Hermes 1:114)

Forced to witness the foundation of life in debauchery, Jinny's moral sense has provoked a stress-induced illness. Her doctor has diagnosed this sickness as mental illness, which he believed offered little hope for recovery. To promote her convalescence, her father has sent her to London. Unbeknownst to Jinny, she has landed in the care of a woman intent on her physical recovery to enable her further indoctrination as a courtesan.

Though removed from the direct interaction with her defiling father and brother, Jinny's seeming respite from immediate moral danger in London has allowed her to reflect and has prompted a crisis of conscience. She has felt self-condemnation for participation in her father's trade of pornographic drawings and texts. In her discussion with Elisabeth, she recalls her self-loathing:

Fifteen years before Schiller's *Die Räuber* (1781), this episode and the echo of Herr Poor's suicide (1:251-252) provide a glimpse of the self-criticism that achieves full form in late Enlightenment nihilism (Schings, "Philosophie der Liebe"). Highlighting the interaction of moral and physical human nature, Jinny's crisis has multiple sources. She rebuffs her father's morals and feels self-loathing over her own behavior under her father's influence. This self-criticism helps generate her psychosomatic illness. Holding herself responsible for committing misdeeds, she refuses medicinal treatment. This worsens her condition, leading to self-endangerment. Her self-destructive judgment exemplifies, if only momentarily, the self-hate more prominent in literature during the late Enlightenment.

In a second episode, the heroine tells Elisabeth another story of how her moral sense saved her from debauchery. When she is forced into a whorehouse, Jinny has frantically defended her separation from the prostitutes. By refusing their welcoming embraces and by crying, Jinny has postponed having to sleep with customers and has avoided descent into a life of vice (Hermes 1:352-353). The recollection of this trial brings back feelings of fear and desperation and prompts her to shake and cry. Recalling the brothel owner's threats to have her bound and forcefully misused prompts a similar response (1:357). Working together, the spiritual faculties of memory and imagination induce feelings of fear/empathy and trigger weeping.

The novel also encodes an intended response to this story. Sobbing and crying at the memory of it all, Jinny and Elisabeth model the proper moral response for the reader. In this short passage, the discourses of body and soul and of morality function on three
levels: first, as a retelling of Jinny's experience; second, through Jinny and Elisabeth's identification with the past events; and third, as the presentation of a moral norm to the reader as mirrored in the characters' sobs and tears. To establish her sense of identity, Jinny, like Pamela, narrates her memories, judges her behavior, and perceives her virtue. This is a performative act.

The narrator in Miß Fanny Wilkes directly addresses the female reader to ensure that she realizes how the intended identification with the heroine should function:

A confrontation with the abyss of turpitude thus activates an internal moral sense. Fear of moral danger, the narrator insists, prompts a physical and a moral reaction. The call for reader sympathy echoes Gellert's Trostgründen Essay and Lessing's Mitleidstheorie. Together with Pamela and Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, Miß Fanny Wilkes chronicles the rising prominence of the body/soul discourse.

Hermes' novel also links sympathy to the imagination. Sympathizing with young women, Jinny wishes to preserve them from the abyss: "O, sagte Jinny mit der leisen Sprache eines aus der heftigen Erschütterung sich erholenden Herzens, wie sehnlich wünsche ich allen Personen unsers Geschlechts, die sich aus Unwissenheit oder Leichtsinn in solche Gefahr [ihre Tugend zu verlieren] begeben, unsere Empfindungen!" (1:354). Accompanied by copious tears, she imagines the fate of young women who receive moral instruction only through the Bible and who thus are susceptible to dissembling rogues. Temperate sensibility, on the other hand, provides appropriate
guidance to help women avoid losing their virginity. Hermes makes an indirect reference to the natural tendency to follow virtue as a human universal, as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson claim and Richardson's heroines illustrate. Other factors such as temperament also shape the individual's moral action (1:355). Thus from Jinny's crying as a physiological response to other women's fate, to the acknowledgment of temperament as a contributing physiological factor to moral action, Hermes' sensible moral characters assume the interaction of the material and the metaphysical.

If abused, sympathy's moral basis can be subverted. Handsom recalls his relationship with Frau Widow, and how she manipulates him using moral claims to achieve her desires. She acts the moral role, dismissing appearances of immorality. At the same time, she wins Handsom's sympathy through her copious tears and reports of digestive sickness and a fever. Her ruse involves winning his emotional investment in her physical state. She then blames Handsom's excessive virtue for her illness, predicting her own death and representing the physical sign of her suffering through shaking. Imagining her claim to be true, Handsom uncritically reads her bodily signs of illness as the product of his virtue. He wants to avoid having the blood of another life on his hands. Moved by extreme melancholy, Handsom sympathizes with Widow's suffering and proposes marriage, only to discover she has feigned her illness (2:282-284). She has manipulated his moral sense using strategies of seduction to appeal to his desire, sympathy, and conscience. In contrast to Jinny's linking of sympathy and imagination, Handsom's conscience leads him awry because Widow exploits signs of connections between the material and metaphysical for personal advantage. Whereas the novel posits the reliability
of the material/metaphysical link for discerning moral intention, it also warns against that link's pernicious simulation.

*Miß Fanny Wilkes* creates characters in a constellation that regards women as more guarded with their virtue than men and men as especially subject to melancholy. "Melancholy" referred to black bile, so named for the excess of black bile in comparison to other basic bodily fluids. It could also be caused by an overactive imagination or heavy thoughts (Zedler 36:464). Within the theory of temperament, it was characterized by slow speech, slow movement, a good memory, and miserliness (Walch and Hennings 2:1094-1095). A person with melancholy might share characteristics with *Hypochondristen* (Schings, *Melancholie und Aufklärung* 3).

Hermes offers exceptions to stereotyped gender characteristics such as when Handsom tries to redeem his virtue in the hope of marrying Jinny, and Jinny also falls prey to melancholy. Male disquietude frequently stems from unrealized love. When Handsom, the family tutor, surprises Jinny in the Foster's garden and she faints, Handsom's anxiety about her paleness provokes his own fainting spell and sickness. The narrator reveals the cause of Handsom's illness to the fictional reader using theories of temperament and neurological function.

The tutor's illness stems from a unique capacity of feeling. On the one hand, Handsom has a melancholy temperament characterized by slow reactions to sad or painful situations (1:124). Because he delays or suppresses emotion, when he does respond, his emotion flows like a torrent. In this overpowering feeling "wird [das Herz] von der Heftigkeit der lange zurückgehaltenen Empfindung so gewaltsam überfallen, daß die ganze Natur nachgiebt; und ich glaube, erfahren zu haben, daß die Seele alsdenn
entweder alle Nerven auf einmal, oder keine einzige spannt" (1:125). Handsom's recognition that Jinny loves him provokes this tidal wave of emotion that overwhelms his sense of feeling. Awaking from his fainting episode, the tutor confesses his sensitive nerves to Jinny: "Ich habe, sagte er, ein gar zu empfindliches Herz; Sie konnten mir nicht gleichgültig sein – war es also nicht natürlich, daß meine Ruhe durch Ihre Leiden mußte gestört werden? O wie befürchte ich, daß sie nur zu sehr gestört worden ist" (1:126).

Handsom has previously defined his personal moral standards by distancing himself from Betty's alluring flirtations because she demonstrates little knowledge of religion and little interest in it (1:91). By contrast, his infatuation with Jinny, who critically judges herself, confirms his attraction to women with a noble moral feeling. The body's sensitivity serves the tutor as a conduit for the transmission of emotion and as a sign board to others of his capacity to feel.

Sir James Hope, who at one point rescues Jinny from a bordello, also has an enhanced capacity of feeling that descends into melancholy. Lord Hope reaches his state of lovesickness when, after the rescue, he longs for Jinny's love, but realizes she will only grant him sympathy. Though he tries to be happy with Jinny's bliss, he instead confesses "traurige Stunden" and "finstre Tage" and despairingly awaits a "zu langes, unglückliches Leben." The problem, he recognizes, lies in his inability to recover from unrequited love: "Ich kann mein Herz nicht mehr heilen! So trägt ein Jüngling das schleichende Gift des Todes in den Adern der blühenden Wangen, bis sein Innres anfängt verzehrt zu werden, und die Schwindshucht ihn unter den Blicken seiner Freundinn niederreißt, wie Blumen unter Sonnenstrahlen, die andere beleben, dahin sinken und verwelken" (2:6). The metaphor of the creeping viper in one's veins describes not only James's view of death,
but the effect of melancholy's slow poison on his mental health. As his spiritual condition worsens, so does his physical health (2:8). James promises to renounce his love for Jinny and honor her love for Handsom.

Yet James, overwhelmed by emotion, eventually confesses his love to Jinny. Lord Speed, James's brother-in-law, sympathizes with Hope's sadness, but regards the disclosure as an act of desperate egoism. Speed recommends moderation of Hope's love: "Sie müssen also Ihre Traurigkeit mäßigen. Eine unverdroßne Anwendung Ihrer Gemüthskräfte in jeder Arbeit, die Sie jeßt beschäftigt, wird das Schmachten hemmen, durch das eine verletzte Liebe die Fähigkeiten der Seele müßig macht, und den Körper auszehrt" (2:227). James's melancholy temperament, already tending to sadness and slow, festering emotion according to the personality characteristics of the theory of temperament, moves even further out of balance. A wounded, jealous love such as Sir Hope's dulls the soul and physical strength. Mental health not only influences physical well-being, but is a key factor in James's overwhelming melancholy. Speed offers Hope the social reintegration of friendship and impells him to turn to God to mend his "kranke Seele" (2:229).

James Hope embodies a kind of obsessive personality similar to Anton Reiser. Despite periods of less despondency, Sir Hope, like Anton Reiser, fails to achieve a state of stability. In a poem to Jinny, James admits weakness and resolves to abandon his love. More than a renunciation, however, the poem confesses the extent of his love:

An Jinny
Ich fühle Schmerzen! Doch will ich nicht klagen!
Nein! du bleibst meine Trösterin. —
Sey du ganz glücklich! Ich will es ertragen,
Daß ich durch dich nicht glücklich bin. (2:331)
As consoler of his pains, Jinny takes on a muse function for James. Though he promises not to complain, the poem literally reveals the pain of love he feels and endures.

*Miß Fanny Wilkes* shows how characters shape their moral status through the faculties of memory and imagination. Jinny's narration allows her to distance herself from her past, which was blemished by coercion to sing lewd lyrics, by forced translation of pornographic literature, and by her detention in a whorehouse. By reporting her biography to Eduard and Elisabeth, Jinny relives her moral trials, sheds tears over past misdeeds, and reasserts her moral nature. Through her imagination, Jinny sympathizes with young women who fail to receive adequate moral instruction and provides further evidence of her strong ethical impetus. By contrast, Frau Widow feigns illness and manipulates Handsom's sympathy to induce his marriage proposal. Handsom reluctantly confronts this episode of youthful moral ineptitude, but reaffirms his virtuous character in his relationship with Jinny. Because he fails to find balance in love and friendship, James Hope remains trapped in his melacholy. Despite Jinny's engagement to Handsom, Hope persists in his dream of wooing Jinny, remaining distant from reality.

Hermes' novel classifies the egoistic melancholy of Sir Hope and the lasciviousness of Frau Widow or Lord ** – predominantly spiritual or physical ways of being respectively – as immoral. By contrast, Jinny learns to manage her fear of turpitude and self-hate, and Handsom moderates the hold of melancholy on his imagination. Both Jinny and Handsom demonstrate how virtue moves body and soul. Their lives embody a moral framework based on mixed character and belief in perfectibility. Ultimately, when combined with critical self-examination and the admission of errors, memory and imagination can help promote moral redemption. In navigating the interaction of body
and soul, of the world and the imagination, the title character of Wieland's *Agathon* similarly struggles to achieve moral balance, to which we now turn.

**Origins of Wieland’s Anthropological Thought**

Researchers have identified major sources of Wieland's anthropological thought up to *Agathon*. From early published texts, such as the didactic poem *Die Natur der Dinge oder die vollkommenste Welt* (1751), the Biberach author works to locate human nature in the intersection of body and soul (cf. Hacker). This poem, inspired by the author's love for Sophie Gutermann (later married to Georg Michael von La Roche), presents an Enlightenment cosmology that situates humankind in the chain of being (McCarthy, *Christoph Martin Wieland* 19). The human place in this puzzle lies in the pursuit of spiritual life. In this context, Schings reads the poem as a lens focused on the teleological movement of sensitive beings through the spiritual world ("Anthropologische Roman", 248). Wieland echoes a criticism of solely materialist existence from *Die Natur der Dinge* in a letter to Bodmer, which asserts his detestation of La Mettrie as a "Schrift Spötter." At this point in early 1752, the eighteen-year-old author works to order his philosophical knowledge with a framework of divine providence and seems thereby to confirm Schings's identification of young Wieland's predisposition for the spiritual (Wieland, *Briefwechsel* 1:52 [6 March 1752]). McCarthy notes, however, that despite an orientation to the subject of the soul, the poem's combination of "spiritual entities" with "bodily components" already shows an inherent interdependence of body and soul (McCarthy, *Christoph Martin Wieland* 21). The text represents human beings in a manner that characterizes a recurring ideal in the author's writing, one of moderation and balance.
Die Natur der Dinge also directly addresses philosophical systems of influence between body and soul, with Wieland postulating a unique solution for causation: "ein subtile[r] ästherische[r], unsichtbare[r] und unsterbliche[r] Leib" (Schings, "Anthropologische Roman" 250). This body, separate from our perceptible physical being, would coordinate between the material and the metaphysical. Published in 1755, the Betrachtungen über den Menschen again focuses humankind on the chain of being, on climbing the ladder to the angels and bypassing the problematic elements of material existence. Schings describes Wieland's writing, interspersed with quotes from

Betrachtungen über den Menschen:


According to this text, humankind is much nobler than the animal – that is caught solely in a life of the senses – by virtue of its pursuit of the divine. Such a persistent focus propels human nature beyond the lower parts of the chain of being "– dafür also, daß die Betrachtungen über den Menschen die 'Chain of being' gewissermassen halbieren, aus der Wesensleiter eine Geisterleiter machen und deshalb, so paradox es klingt, just die Anthropologie vermeiden" (249). Yet the focus on solely the spiritual development of human nature comes at the cost of another element that makes it human: the desirous and the physical being.

From his arrival as Bodmer's guest in Zurich in October 1752, Wieland studied and wrote. Entering Bodmer's circle, he also made social and professional contacts (McCarthy, Christoph Martin Wieland 24). In 1756, Breitinger passed a poem titled "Die
Zerstörung von Lissabon" to Wieland. Intrigued by the poem's footnotes to David Hartley's *Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations* (1749), the young man from Biberach began a correspondence with the author of "Die Zerstörung," Johann Georg Zimmermann (Schings, "Anthropologische Roman" 251). In an initial letter to Zimmermann, Wieland acknowledges having read the first part of Hartley's treatise, the physiology, and asks for a continued loan of Zimmermann's copy of the *Observations*. Like in the *Betrachtungen über den Menschen*, he especially desires knowledge of humankind's spiritual nature. Wieland writes:


The nerves transmit sensation from the body to the soul, but are not the soul itself. Physiology thus threatens, in Wieland's view, to supplant the autonomy of the soul. It raises the danger, already heated to a boiling point in 1748 with La Mettrie's publication of *L'homme machine*, of viewing the body/soul nexus as essentially a physical entity. The Biberach author resists viewing the human soul as subject to the direct influence of the body:

> [N]ach der Meinung der allergeistigsten unter den denkenden Köpfen, der Platoniker u:nd Idealisten[,] der Leib ist ein Spiegel der Seele. Wo ich also nicht in die Seele selbst hineinschauen kann, da gucke ich in Ihren Spiegel. Man muß nur nie so reden[,] als ob der Leib etwas in der Seele per influxum physicum gleichsam erschaffe, welches ein sehr gemeiner Fehler ist, der mir nicht um metaphysischer sondern um m o r a l i s c h e r  G r ü n d e willen mißfällt. (*Briefwechsel* 1:260 [12 June 1756])

The letter harbors fears that a body that directly influenced the soul would reduce morality to sensation. What it is good to be and right to do is in danger of being decided based on subjective criteria about the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain.
At the latest by February 1759 Wieland experienced an "empiristische Wendung," a turn to the sciences as a new source of knowledge (Thomé 117-127). This involved the recognition that individuals create their own knowledge through perception and thought. Further, Thomé stresses, Wieland realized individuals develop knowledge if sciences are also active (118). On 20 August 1758 Wieland provides evidence of a change in perspective when he writes to Zimmermann seeking a discussion partner on the article "Experience" in Diderot and D'Alembert's Encyclopédie (1751-1772) (Wieland, Briefwechsel 1:354). Two months later, Wieland again recommends an article from the Encyclopédie to Zimmermann, this time "Abstraction" (1:370 [17 October 1758]). Wieland's interest in the encyclopedia articles, Thomé avers, shows an embrace of popularized science and an abandonment of the principle of the soul as the center of identity, but not an acceptance of a mechanistic anthropology (122). The Encyclopédie, like Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, emphasized a theoretical position that located the origin of knowledge in sensation and thereby acknowledged the body's function, along with the soul, in knowledge formation (cf. Oettinger 57). The evolving reading list reveals the Biberach poet's slow embrace of Enlightenment philosophy, from the admission that Locke requires some patience to the "discovery" of Helvétius's De l'esprit (1758) (Wieland, Briefwechsel 1:365 [6 October 1758], 1:399 [1 February 1759]).

In the late 1750's the writings of Helvétius and La Mettrie represent two models of anthropological knowledge that helped shape Wieland's views about human nature. Helvétius's influence lay in the conception of new natural laws, especially the translation of the term "force" from Newton's laws of motion to moral situations (Thomé 132).
definition of what it is good to be or to do received a biological foundation (138). The French Enlightenment thereby removed theology from Newton's cosmology, secularizing the basis for moral action (136, 144). La Mettrie specifically developed a materialistic anthropology that prioritized physiology and the individual pursuit of happiness, without reference to an overarching answer to the problems of what is right (144). By 1760, when Wieland published *Araspes und Panthea* and cast Araspes as a "patient," he was well on his way to viewing humankind from the perspective of a philosophical doctor as he does in *Agathon*.

Thomé shows how the representation of the character Hippias combines the materialist philosophy of Helvétius and La Mettrie (145-157). Schings stresses the classification of *Agathon* as the first anthropological novel, but only spends two pages pointing to anthropological moments in the novel ("Anthropologische Roman" 254-256). For her part, Heinz avoids *Agathon* entirely, perhaps in deference to Schings, perhaps in an effort to direct the reader to her other essays (Heinz, *Wissen vom Menschen* 172-173; Heinz, "Figur des Schwärmers"). Thus, without detailing its anthropological base, critics nonetheless regard Wieland's text as establishing a tradition. The following reading of *Agathon* draws on Thomé's interpretation by identifying the diagnosis and treatment of the title character's *Schwärmerei* as an essentially anthropological rather than a religious problem.

**Agathon’s Homeopathic Cure and the Anthropological Novel**

The *Geschichte des Agathon* (1766/1767) explores the role of body and soul in shaping humankind's moral being. In a series of dialogues, Hippias and Agathon critique
each other's philosophy sketching out the positions of materialism and Platonism. While Hippias contends that Agathon's life revolves too much around his imagination, Agathon defines his identity by pointedly restating the Cartesian "cogito ergo sum" as "sentio ergo sum" (McCarthy, *Fantasy and Reality* 81): "Ich empfinde mich selbst, ich bin also; ich empfinde, ich sehe diesen obersten Geist, er ist also" (Wieland, *Agathon* 73). This move essentially equates the reality of an object with that of the imagination. Even if one concurs with Thomé that this kind of language recreates a lyrical, hymnic tone, one need not conclude that this language lacks a speculative aspect (Thomé 159). The words also represent a poetic or rhetorical idea, and thereby the title character's reality. To the extent that a world is shaped by the intricate choices of language, Agathon makes his world out of his chosen fantasies and their activation in words.

In the manner of a philosophical doctor, Hippias proclaims this sensualism a possible sickness, concluding that Agathon has succumbed to enthusiasm (Wieland, *Agathon* 74, 76). This diagnosis includes a moral condemnation of Agathon for failing to remain realistic (75). The Sophist argues isolation and an overactive imagination drive individuals to pursue fulfillment through fantasies (77). Lauding moderation and contentment, Hippias warns Agathon that he is on the wrong path and suggests a more judicious use of reason as a possible cure (77-78).

Since his separation from his beloved Psyche, however, Agathon experiences no pleasure in the real world. In a soliloquy, Agathon prefers his enthusiasm to Hippias' hedonism. Instead of pleasure, Agathon insists that human nature includes as a key element an inner moral sense, which the sensualist Hippias lacks. Persuading worldly men about the essence of moral feeling is difficult: "Die Weltleute sind in der Tat nicht
zu verdenken, wenn sie uns andre für ein wenig mondsüchtig halten; wer will ihnen zumuten, daß sie glauben sollen, es fehle ihnen etwas, das zu einem vollständigen Menschen gehört?" (81) In this way, Agathon emphasizes the difficulty of persuading other people to work at shaping their moral compass. Agathon's version of the moral individual thus requires more spirit, while Hippias pursues the balance of body and soul to achieve happiness.

After trying to alter Agathon's Platonic idealism through Sophistic argumentation and sexual seduction (Danae), Hippias employs a hedonistic argument to countermand Agathon's recalcitrance. In an excursus on happiness, Hippias believes humankind generally lacks the knowledge to achieve lasting contentment. This presents a dilemma because most people pursue happiness, but like Sisyphus with the boulder, they must continually pursue their chosen virtue. The pessimistic view of human nature groups individuals into three categories:

Einige Menschen scheinen kaum einer größeren Glückseligkeit fähig zu sein als die Austern, und wenn sie ja eine Seele haben, so ist es nur so viel, als sie brauchen, um ihren Leib eine Zeitlang vor der Fäulnis zu bewahren. Ein größerer und vielleicht der größte Teil der Menschen befindet sich nicht in diesem Fall; aber weil es ihnen an genügsamer Stärke des Gemüts und an einer gewissen Zärtlichkeit der Empfindung mangelt, so ist ihr Leben gleich dem Leben der übrigen Tiere des Erdbodens zwischen Vergnügen, die sie weder zu wählen noch zu genießen und Schmerzen, denen sie weder zu widerstehen noch zu entfliehen wissen, geteilt. Wahn und Leidenschaften sind die Triebfedern dieser menschlichen Maschinen; beide setzen sie einer unendlichen Menge von Übeln aus, die es nur in einer betrogenen Einbildung, aber eben darum, wo nicht schmerzlicher, doch anhaltender und unheilbarer sind als diejenigen, die uns die Natur auferlegt. Diese Art von Menschen ist keines gesetzten und anhaltenden Vergnügens, keines Zustandes von Glückseligkeit fähig. (Agathon 90-91)

The first is virtually incapable of achieving happiness, while the second lacks the developed understanding and sensitivity of perception to rise above an existence caught between pleasure and pain. Hippias argues that many individuals limit themselves to the body, failing to refine the soul. Such individuals, machines as he calls them to emphasize their physical function, lack essential human qualities. True humanity, by contrast,
requires an element of sentimentality and control of desire to enable the pleasure and satisfaction that comprise happiness. Hippias argues against pure physicality and for moderation of physical pleasure and fantasy:

Es scheint also unmöglich zu sein, ohne eine gewisse Zärtlichkeit der Empfindung, die uns in einer weiteren Sphäre, mit feinern Sinnen und auf eine angenehmere Art genießen läßt und ohne diejenige Stärke der Seele, die uns fähig macht, das Joch der Phantasie und des Wahns abzuschütteln und die Leidenschaften in unserer Gewalt zu haben, zu demjenigen ruhigen zustande von Genuß und Zufriedenheit zu kommen, der die Glückseligkeit ausmacht. Nur derjenige ist in der Tat glücklich, der sich von den Übeln, die nur in der Einbildung bestehen, gänzlich frei zu machen. (91)

Addressing Agathon in the guise of a philosophical "doctor," as a person who knows the interdependence of physical and moral human nature, Hippias diagnoses Agathon as sick. That illness involves a denial of the body:

Du wendest die Stärke deiner Seele an, dein Herz gegen das wahre Vergnügen unempfindlich zu machen, und beschäftigst deine Empfindlichkeit mit unwesentlichen Gegenständen, die du nur in der Einbildung siehst und nur im Traume genießst; die Vergnügungen, welche die Natur dem Menschen zugeteilt hat, sind für dich Schmerzen, weil du dir Gewalt antun mußt sie zu entbehren; und du setzest dich allen Übeln aus, die sie uns vermeiden lehrt, indem du, anstatt einer nützlichen Geschäftigkeit dein Leben mit den süßen Einbildungen wegräumst, womit du dir die Beraubung des wirklich Vergnügens zu ersetzen suchst. Dein Übel, mein lieber Kallias, entspringt von einer Einbildungskraft, die dir ihre Geschöpfe in einem überirdischen Glanze zeigt, der dein Herz verblendet und ein falsches Licht über das, was wirklich ist, ausbreitet; einer dichterischen Einbildungskraft, die sich beschäftigt, schönere Schönheiten und angenehmere Vergnügungen zu erfinden, als die Natur hat; einer Einbildungskraft, ohne welche weder Homere noch Alkamene noch Polygnote wären, welche gemacht ist, unsre Ergötzungen zu verschönern, aber nicht, die Führerin unseres Lebens zu sein. Um weise zu sein, hast du nichts nötig, als die gesunde Vernunft an die Stelle dieser begeisterten Zauberin und die kalte Überlegung an den Platz eines sehr oft betrügerischen Gefühls zu setzen. Bilde dir auf etliche Augenblicke ein, daß du den Weg zur Glückseligkeit erst suchen müßtest, frage die Natur, höre ihre Antwort und folge dem Pfade den sie dir vorzeichnen wird. (92)

The cure of a body/soul imbalance requires an anthropological treatment, one that returns material and metaphysical being to a state of balance. The "doctor's" treatment calls for healthy reason, unemotional judgment, and following the demands of nature (93).

In the first treatment for Agathon's enthusiasm, Hippias attempts to remedy his patient's overactive imagination by educating him in the principles of materialist philosophy. The cure of the soul lies in acknowledging limits of the reality produced in
the imagination. Such a cure also requires embracing the body. Achieving happiness involves pursuing nature's simplicity and innocence [Einfalt]. By appealing to nature in evaluating the human condition, the Sophist presents a hedonism derived from the originary innocence of the natural world. This claim assumes a doctrine of the primacy and the universal applicability of reason to humanity characteristic of natural law theory. Living according to nature requires satisfying needs, experiencing pleasure, and avoiding pain. Hippias also argues that it is morally good to pursue the innate drive for happiness. The hedonistic moral doctrine provides a simpler path to happiness than other codes of virtue.

The materialist rationale for prioritizing physical pleasure includes a description of bodily functions. Hippias' theory of sensation can be viewed as anthropological theory. Insisting pleasurable sensation is naturally good, Hippias asserts: "Es ist unleugbar, daß nicht alle Arten und Grade des Vergnügens gut sind. Die Natur allein hat das Recht, uns die Vergnügen anzuzeigen, die sie uns bestimmt hat" (Wieland, Agathon 96). Natural forces shape decorum, either through the physical senses or the imagination. Spiritual pleasure derives from activation of sensual pleasure through different rational faculties such as memory, imagination, and poetic verve (97).

This anthropological system evokes a physiology of pleasure based on body and soul. Pleasures of the heart, Hippias claims, are in fact the most sensuous. The activation of emotion produces physical results: it triggers a feeling of physical warmth, increases blood pressure, enlivens the nerves, and sets the physical being at ease (99). In every sensual emotion, whether admiration, love, desire, hope, or empathy, there is a common
response. Thus the mechanical function of the corporal/spiritual connection in response to emotions differs primarily in degree.

Without balance of the spiritual and the physical, one-sided renunciation of the body risks serious psychosomatic illness, in particular melancholy (107). By participating in the life of the body, one can limit the imagination and thereby prevent the onset of madness (110). Setting limits promotes an equilibrium of the material and the metaphysical. Hippias' ethical code clearly represents a materialist position: "Befriedige deine Bedürfnisse, vergnüge alle deine Sinne, und erspare dir, soviel du kannst, alle schmerzhaften Empfindungen" (95). These three principles represent a way of knowing and an ethical stance rooted in physical pleasure. Nonetheless, the argument defines human nature in more than a material way. In a second formulation, Hippias reestablishes the order of the three principles:

Wir haben die Natur gefragt, Kallias, worin die Glückseligkeit bestehe, die sie uns zugedacht habe, und wir habe ihre Antwort. Ein schmerzenfreies Leben, die angenehmste Befriedigung unserer natürlichen Bedürfnisse und der abwechselnde Genuß aller Arten von Vergnügen, womit die Einbildungskraft, der Witz und die Künste unseren Sinnen zu schmeicheln fähig sind. (105)

Thus imagination, intelligence, and artistic production engage the senses next to the physical sensations and body and soul work in tandem. Having failed to persuade Agathon with physical pleasure alone, Hippias acknowledges a moderate role of imagination and thought in the pursuit of happiness.

The moral individual must also pursue an active public life. In an advanced society organized around market principles, Hippias proposes that the individual can achieve happiness in seeking personal profit. By inculcating human beings to pursue their personal interest, this model creates an economy of desire transferable to all areas of life. Pursuing this advantage includes activating others' imagination and action for personal
benefit. In this sense, the practical pursuit of happiness is a political philosophy. Society also requires self-limitation through work and the moderation of the passions (116). While community enables the pursuit of personal advantage through others, it also limits the pursuit of pleasure. Reversing altruism, Hippias encourages using the community for personal gain to achieve happiness.

As a "priest" of the body, Hippias fails to convert Agathon to hedonism. Hippias has attempted to moderate Agathon's predilection for the soul by offering alternatives: the body as an object of desire and materialist philosophy as a moral theory. Both are means to attain happiness. These appeals argue Agathon must experience the physical world.

The Sophist also knows, however, that his beautiful servant's flirtations evoke Agathon's desire (158). Despite a vocal dismissal of a materialistic existence, the enthusiast feels corporal drives as any other human being would. To rehabilitate Agathon from his overwrought imagination, Hippias persuades the hetera Danae to join his project. Reflecting with Danae on his failure to reform Agathon, the Sophist calls him a "Schwärmer und ein unbrauchbarer Mensch" (157). The materialist uses the courtesan to effect a psychosomatic treatment. Hippias aims to cure Agathon's overactive intellectual fantasy through the body.

Though Hippias provides the diagnosis of Agathon's fantasy, Danae alone initiates an effective treatment. After hearing Hippias' diagnosis of the enthusiast's condition, Danae anticipates that she can win Agathon if she activates his soul. In her calculations, she dismisses Hippias' strategy of rational argumentation and of bodily sensuality to instead activate Agathon's imagination (Agathon 165). By priming Agathon's memory, Danae aims to create a new story and a new experience through
observation and fancy. Like Hippias' efforts, her plan to sway the enthusiast requires repeated attempts, much like a scientific experiment.

To initiate Agathon's new therapy, Danae invites both men to a party. During dinner, dancers portray the myth of Daphne and Apollo to inspire the guests' imagination. The partygoers observe the enactment of Cupid's revenge: with a golden arrow he made Apollo love Daphne, and with a leaden arrow, Cupid made Daphne refuse love. Apollo pursues Daphne through the forest, and when he catches her, she turns into a tree, so that his love remains unrequited. Though the drama pleases some viewers, Agathon reads the dance intellectually and judges the performance of Daphne as overly flirtatious compared to his memory of her traditional representation. Agathon recalls the heroine as more indifferent and innocent (171). Because the two representations do not match, because Agathon fails to acknowledge the dancer's depiction of a vanquished morality and a longing for physical embrace, he finds the production inadequate (170). In his disdain for the actors and in his intellectual approach to the drama, Agathon fails to notice the dancer's beauty, revealing costume, and the nuance of her performance (169). The dramatic rendition of the myth ignites Agathon's interest and his criticism, but it does not change him.

In a second performance, however, Danae dons the actress's costume and transforms herself into Daphne to enact the virtuous version of the mythic character from Agathon's fantasy. With grace Danae gives his imagination wings and successfully garners his attention: "Ihr ganzes Spiel drückte die eigenste Idee des Agathon aus, aber mit einer Anmut, mit einer Zauberei, wovon ihm seine Phantasie keine Idee gegeben hatte. Die Empfindungen, von denen seine Seele in diesen Augenblicken überfallen
wurde, waren so lebhaft, daß er sich bemühte, seine Augen von diesem zu sehr bezaubernden Gegenstand abzuziehen; aber vergeblich!" (173). Moonstruck, the enthusiast cannot remove himself from the rapture over her constitution. Danae thereby uses homeopathy as the first step in a cure for his overactive imagination. She employs his most active faculty, the imagination, to ensnare him and reduce its effects on his person. Through the artistic demands of combining body and soul in performance, Danae engages Agathon's desire and persuades him to pursue a balance of physical and spiritual life.

Homeopathy has traditionally been dated to the close of the eighteenth century. It was formally developed by Samuel Hahnemann (1755-1833), who outlined the method in Organon der rationellen Heilkunde (1810) (Porter, Greatest Benefit 390). As a critic of contemporary, unsystematic physicians and pharmacists, he proposed that a naturally occurring disease could be treated with a slightly stronger medicinally-induced disease (King, The Medical World of the Eighteenth Century 167-168). While Hahnemann developed his system in a series of papers from the 1790's (The Medical World of the Eighteenth Century 164-166), philosophical doctors had previously considered similar ideas. Literary studies such as Georg Reuchlein's Die Heilung des Wahnsinns bei Goethe, Orest, Lila, der Harfner und Sperata and Tobin's Dr.'s Orders (2001) recover how Goethe integrated the idea into his literary works from the 1770's. Together with Wieland's Agathon, Goethe's Lila archives an early example of homeopathic treatment in anthropology and psychology. In Wieland's novel, Danae draws Agathon from his Schwärmerei by gradually over-stimulating his imagination.
In the ensuing relationship, Danae and Agathon fall in love and Agathon momentarily realizes a balance of his physical and spiritual life. Upon hearing from Hippias that Danae has had multiple lovers, Agathon experiences jealousy and rejects Danae. By leaving Smyrna for Syracuse, Agathon casts off the body to concentrate on Archytas's practice of Platonism. Agathon's quest to define moral nature through a balance of body and soul leads him to attempt a balance of individual needs and the promotion of the commonwealth. In *Fantasy and Reality: An Epistemological Approach to Wieland* (1974), John A. McCarthy suggests that Agathon does not regain this balance until the end of the novel because his conception of the moral individual changes in response to Hippias' sensualism and Archytas's Platonism. The hero must distance himself from Hippias' materialist philosophy, Archytas's subordination of the body by the soul, and his own ego to achieve the desired equilibrium (McCarthy, *Fantasy and Reality* 85, 96-98).

In conclusion, like the *Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G****, the *Geschichte des Agathon* sees in the interaction of body and soul the moral core of human nature. For Gellert, this core involves a balance of the intellect and the body expressed in bourgeois reading and in sensual love. The Countess's social network reinforces this equilibrium by depicting her encounters with adultery, murder, abandonment, and suicide. *Miß Fanny Wilkes* also depicts the danger of not achieving balance in one’s ethical life. Hermes' novel paints morality in terms of a dualistic logic of good and evil: Jinny and Eduard Handsom achieve a balance as heroine and hero, whereas James Hope fails to moderate his love and melancholy and lives an unbalanced life. Wieland's text similarly argues against the extremes of fantasy by depicting Agathon's *Schwärmerei*. The novel
discredits hedonism by showing how it leads away from moral life. By contrast, Danae and Agathon demonstrate how genuine balance can be attained.

_Das Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***_ and _Miß Fanny Wilkes_ elicit the reader's sympathy and activate the anthropological connection of physical and spiritual spheres in readers to evoke their edification. In Gellert's novel, the Mariane – Carlson subplot links the psychological and physical spheres in moral crises and models of caring for the whole person. In _Miß Fanny Wilkes_, physical signs of sensibility, such as crying and fainting during psychological stress, verify Jinny's and Eduard Handsom's inherent moral virtue. Neither novel makes direct references to specific medical or philosophical theories for their representation of sensibility. Each is a sentimental novel that illustrates the increasing use of anthropological discourse into a larger narrative framework.

_Die Geschichte des Agathon_ emphatically places the interaction of body and soul at the center of theories of knowledge and of ethics, and reveals an awareness of the state of the contemporary debate on the subject. Wieland's famous work displays the same characteristics observable in later examples of the anthropological novel: the commercium problem and conflict between an individual's moral system and social mores. _Agathon_ prefigures preferred techniques of the anthropological novel: polyperspectivity, dialogue, paratexts (prefaces and fictional editor), and clear resonance with other disciplinary discourse (philosophy and medicine) (see characteristics in Heinz, _Wissen vom Menschen_ 339-343, summarized in Chapter 3 above). As an example of the anthropological subgenre, Agathon debates the role of morality in human life, not as a theoretical concept, but a real artifact. The book's title and the eponymous character immediately reveal the author's ethical intent, for _agathon_ is Greek for virtue. The lead
character's pursuit of the good shapes his reconciliation of his dual nature as an active member of society.

Moreover, the title plays with the plurality of meanings unique to the German term *Geschichte*. The "History of Agathon" points to a history of an imagined character, his fictitious life, and his relationships insofar as they are believable, like Fielding does in *The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling*. At the same time, it participates in the early discourse on human nature, the history of anthropology. We turn now to anthropology's early development in one of the German centers of Enlightenment reform, a provincial town on the Saale river: Halle.
PART 3: ANALYZING ANTHROPOLOGY *AVANT LA LETTRE*
We must now take a step back in time in order to take a step forward in the development of eighteenth-century anthropological knowledge. In the remainder of the dissertation, I investigate how authors transferred anthropological knowledge from philosophical and medical essays to literature, as well as how they used narration in expository writings. Searching for evidence of an early anthropology requires examining diverse sources in a process like panning for gold. In "sifting" philosophical, medical, and theological texts from around 1750, I will clear away the unnecessary material to reveal a few select nuggets of wisdom that illustrate how German writers conceptualized human nature. Because writers had not yet institutionalized anthropology in an academic setting, I must draw on different evidence than the hard and fast proof one could cite in evaluating changes in law, medicine, theology, or philosophy.

This chapter argues that Halle's unique intellectual culture significantly shaped eighteenth-century anthropological discourses. Building on Brandenburg's policy of religious tolerance, Halle leaders redefined their social institutions. Pietists reformed religious practice and emphasized helping the poor. At the same time, the founders of Halle's university developed a new hierarchy of sciences, displacing theology as the leading discipline. Amid these changes, Halle reformers also negotiated the body/soul relationship in new ways. Arguing from medical, philosophical, and theological perspectives, thinkers such as Georg Ernst Stahl, Christian Wolff, and Joachim Lange
confronted the Leibnizian hypothesis of preestablished harmony through dialogue. In the following generation, Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann August Unzer contested the appropriate epistemological framework for studying the emotions. In each of these debates, consideration of the problem of intersubstantial causation – the question of how body and soul interact – promoted a further flowering of Halle's anthropological knowledge.

**Halle's Enlightenment Origins**

Throughout its history, the achievements of Halle citizens have inevitably been compared to those of its neighbor, Leipzig. This intensified as Halle and Leipzig grew during the Enlightenment. Located only thirty kilometers to the northwest of Leipzig, Halle's atmosphere differed economically, politically, religiously, artistically, and demographically from its sister city. This was especially true as the eighteenth century began.

After the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), Leipzig solidified its position as a center for trade. The city marked an intersection of trade routes from Cologne in the west to Breslau in the east, from Augsburg and Nürnberg to Poland and Russia, and from Bohemia to the Baltic Sea (Bruford 183). Growing in importance with the expansion of its three annual fairs, Leipzig surpassed Frankfurt (Main) as the leading German marketplace in 1681 (Martens, "Das Bild Leipzigs" 14). Visitors easily identified the city's unique tenor as the product of an open, international merchant community that encouraged a gallant style of life – Leipzig was dubbed "little Paris" – along with middle-class values (16). In addition to the clergy, authors from the university and private life
directed public discourse on how to integrate gallantry into an active, ethical life. To persuade others to pursue middle-class values, writers addressed their audiences in books and periodicals. The authors' intense work boosted Leipzig's reputation as a center of printing and of learning (18-19). Numerous Enlightenment thinkers began their careers at the University of Leipzig: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Thomasius studied philosophy with Jakob Thomasius (Christian's father); August Hermann Francke garnered popularity for teaching Pietist biblical exegesis; and Christian Wolff earned his M.A. and began teaching there. Philosopher Erhard Weigel, natural law and political theoretician Samuel Pufendorf, jurist Nikolaus Hieronymus Gundling, and jurist J. Gottlieb Heineccius also studied or taught there. Despite these fruitful beginnings, all of these thinkers left Leipzig, not least due to the preponderance of restrictive university, state, and Lutheran orthodox traditions (Mühlpfordt 49). Around 1700, the University of Leipzig was decidedly conservative; only gradually did the university as a whole pursue a moderate curriculum and political position (Hammerstein, "Die Universität Leipzig" 125, 137).

By contrast, the city of Halle represented a spirit of reform. It was part of a larger renewal undertaken in Brandenburg state. Since 1613, Brandenburg princes such as Johann Sigismund (1572-1619, 1608-1619 prince elector of Brandenburg and Herzog and co-regent of Prussia) and Frederick William, the Great Elector (1620-1688, 1640-1688 Brandenburg prince elector) had promoted religious toleration to gain popular acceptance of their Calvinist faith. Multi-confessionalism – Catholics lived alongside Lutherans in parts of the western territories, and Lutherans and Calvinists coexisted in the middle and eastern parts – characterized the Hohenzollern state and provided another impetus for
toleration. Further, in the wake of the Thirty Years War that purged both Brandenburg proper and the duchy of Magdeburg of up to half of their inhabitants, Brandenburg regarded immigration as a tool for economic revitalization (Deppermann 7, 22-23). As a result, the state encouraged workers from largely Catholic Poland to resettle in Brandenburg (1667), and granted asylum to French Huguenots in the 1685 Potsdam Tolerance Decree (23). Reform aided the educational, religious, political, and economic needs of Brandenburg citizens.

Brandenburg-Prussia's policies of religious toleration affected Halle directly. In response to Frederick William's Toleranzedikt, a colony of French Huguenots settled in Halle in 1686. Another Huguenot group from the Pfalz arrived in 1689, Swiss Huguenots followed, and the community grew continually, establishing its first school in 1711 (72). In 1692, Jewish leaders founded a community in Halle. Writing on behalf of Jewish friends and at the behest of Brandenburg officials, Halle theologians such as Johann Heinrich Michaelis (1668-1738) supported toleration of Jewish religious practices (Arnoldi 230-241). And King Frederick William I (1688-1740, reigned as King in Prussia from 1713-1740) granted Catholic students (1716), Italian traders (1717), and Catholic mercenaries (1723) the privilege to live in the city proper before later extending the right to all Catholics. Thus all three Christian confessions and the Jewish community lived side-by-side in Halle (Kathe 57). Brandenburg-Prussia's politics of expansion and religious tolerance during the seventeenth century shaped Halle's multi-confessional and international profile at the beginning of the eighteenth century.

Halle's spirit of reform extended into additional areas, including the promotion of academic freedom at Halle's knightly academy, the institution for noble-courtly education
that preceded the local university. In Leipzig, August Hermann Francke's success in teaching Pietist biblical hermeneutics challenged the doctrine and existence of Lutheran Orthodoxy and cost him his job (Stoeffler 6; Deppermann 65-66). Christian Thomasius had a similar experience at Leipzig University. Attacking state religion and Saxony's political interests – Thomasius defended bigamy (1686); supported natural law, proposed the autonomy of legal studies from theology, and critiqued social inequalities (Monats-Gespräche, 1688-1690); supported popular sovereignty based in reformed Protestantism (1688); and defended marriage between a noble Saxon (Lutheran) and a princess of Brandenburg (reformed Protestant) (1689) – prompted officials to prohibit Thomasius from publishing and teaching (Lieberwirth 33-38). This effectively ended his career in Leipzig.

Called to serve Brandenburg, Thomasius began teaching in Halle in 1690 and Francke arrived in 1692. The new start was not easy. Working in Halle meant Thomasius and Francke had to outlast initial resistance by Halle's Orthodox Lutherans (Lieberwirth 41; Deppermann 69-87). Yet in contrast to the unsympathetic Saxon ruler, Frederick III intervened on Thomasius's behalf when he was critiqued by government representatives from Denmark and Saxony (Lieberwirth 40). Supporting Francke in a similar fashion, the Brandenburg prince elector promised Francke personal protection, forbade preaching against Pietism in Brandenburg state and in Berlin, and outlawed public criticism of Pietism and Pietists in Halle (Hinrichs 217, 219). Frederick III promoted a degree of academic freedom crucial for Thomasius and Francke, especially underwriting their critiques of Orthodox Lutheran positions.

Frederick William I and Frederick III pursued policies of religious toleration and
academic freedom for political ends. Supporting Pietism was a calculated move to enhance its profile in the public sphere. With their sanction of reformed Protestantism, Thomasius and Francke's firings from Leipzig and Erfurt played into Frederick III's hands. To continue strengthening Brandenburg as begun under Frederick William I, Frederick III wanted to demonstrate the state's power and prestige to foreign rivals. Maximizing Halle's political, strategic, and economic position displayed power. Showcasing Brandenburg's institutions, for example in a university, also aided this goal (cf. Hammerstein, "[University] Relations" 143).

Like rulers in other German states, Friedrich III opened a university to increase the state's prestige (Schindling, Bildung 38; Mühlpfordt 46). Founded in 1694, Halle's Fridericiana aimed to compete with the large and prominent University of Leipzig (Schindling, "Die protestantischen Universitäten" 13). Functioning on multiple levels, the inauguration of the university represented Hohenzollern power symbolically through the grandeur of unique university regalia, including a bejeweled scepter. The founding of the Fridericiana represented state power academically, because appointments of Thomasius and Samuel Stryck in law, Francke and Franz Budde in theology, Friedrich Hoffmann and Georg Ernst Stahl in medicine, and a decade later, Christian Wolff in mathematics and philosophy, emphasized new theoretical models and thereby accentuated a renewal of university education in Brandenburg. Establishing the university entailed a practical exercise of power by curtailing the export of students to neighboring states. Within a short time, Halle's steady enrollment of around 1000 students made it one of the largest universities next to Leipzig, Jena, and by mid-century, Göttingen ("Die protestantischen Universitäten" 13). By educating youth within Brandenburg, the Halle university
prepared them to serve as pastors, bureaucrats, lawyers, teachers, and doctors in service to the Hohenzollern state (Mühlpfordt 46-47).

Led by Thomasius's emphasis of law and history as lead disciplines, the new university reshaped the social atmosphere and the means for creating knowledge. For Thomasius, this meant creating new, respectful means of comportment and a correlating focus on psychological needs (Hammerstein, "Halle's Ort" 24). Concerned equally with proper living and inner absolution, Pietists in Halle shared similar concerns. Halle's reform of knowledge also principally challenged established norms by emphasizing individual responsibility and autonomous thought (26). As the first among the German universities of its time, the Fridericiana thus combined a new life philosophy and a new scientific approach, as Notker Hammerstein has claimed: "Die erste in dieser Weise moderne, frühaufgeklärte Universität war mit der Fridericiana in Halle ins Leben getreten. Hier war ein neuer Wissenschaftsbegriff, eine neue Universitätspraxis und ein neues Universitätsleben verwirklicht worden" (24). Halle symbolized a new beginning. This was true specifically for the sciences, to which we now turn.

**Holism or Monadology: Stahl and Leibniz**

From the university's founding, the medical faculty contributed key elements of Halle's scientific innovation. Leading the medical division was Halle native Friedrich Hoffmann the Younger (1660-1742), who recruited his colleague Georg Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) for the second medical professorship in 1694. In 1679, Hoffmann and Stahl had studied briefly together in Jena, where each began teaching several years later. Troubled by poor health and conflict with the medical faculty in Jena, Hoffmann
journeyed to Holland and London, meeting Robert Boyle, before working as a doctor in
Minden and Halberstadt between 1685 and 1693. From 1683 to 1687 Stahl taught at the
university in Jena and then served from 1687 to 1694 as personal physician to Duke
Johann Ernst II of Saxony-Weimar (1664-1707) (I. W. Müller "Mechanismus" 246). In
Jena and Weimar Stahl worshipped with members of Thüringen's revivalist movements
(Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 75). At the command of the
ducal family, Stahl worked to recruit August Hermann Francke for the post of court
preacher in 1691, but failed.

Stahl's renown as a scientist stemmed partly from his work in chemistry. After
initially supporting the study of alchemy, he became one of its early critics. By
synthesizing results from diverse chemical experiments, Stahl provided an early
systematic account of chemical theory (Liliencron et al. 35:781). He also explained
combustion and oxidation by arguing that the release of phlogiston enabled these
chemical transformations. The theory inspired much of eighteenth-century chemical
research (35:782-783). Between 1770 and 1790, Antoine Lavoisier conducted oxidation
experiments and eventually replaced the phlogiston theory by attributing oxidation and
combustion to oxygen (King, Philosophy 143; Rothschuh 74-75).

After Hermann Boerhaave in Leiden, Hoffmann and Stahl were two of the most
important doctors of the early eighteenth century (Helm 62; Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E.
Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 75). This judgment may stem in part from the fact that
between 1700 and 1740, the Halle faculty educated far more medical students than any
other German university (Konert 25). In contrast to many university physicians of their
time, both Halle physicians placed particular emphasis on their skills as clinicians. For
Hoffmann, treating patients required the judicious application of practical experience and theoretical knowledge to an individual case. Focusing on physical motion, Hoffmann's iatromechanical theory argued that changes in fluid circulation enabled sensation and movement; the healthy body functioned like a clockwork (I. W. Müller "Mechanismus" 248). Disruption of the hydraulic system prompted infirmity. Treating illness in the human machine required restoring normal circulation of fluids such as the blood (251, 253). Hoffmann's mechanical physiology accorded the soul little influence in bodily function and his therapy left treatment of the soul to men of the cloth (249).

Though Stahl shared with Hoffmann a primary interest in the practical treatment of patients, he set different theoretical accents. Declining Hoffmann's theory of "nerve spirits" as the material intermediary between body and soul, Stahl believed the body's mechanism was controlled by the soul. The soul used the blood to regulate cellular respiration and thereby to sustain the mechanism. Illnesses developed, like for Hoffmann, from disturbances in circulation and excretion; at worst, they could become toxic. While blockages in the body's hydraulic system were to be avoided, other symptoms of sickness such as fever and infection increased circulation and aided the larger healing process (258). Treating illness by normalizing circulation, Stahl proposed therapies like those of Hoffmann and additionally emphasized bloodletting (259). In his medical practice, Stahl thus integrated mechanistic doctrine into his animistic philosophy (King, Philosophy 146). This combination in Stahl's Theoria medica vera (1708) prompted a challenge issued in a series of letters by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716).

Stahl published an account of Leibniz's challenges and his own responses in Negotium otiosum (1720). Because of the way it recounts multiple exchanges, the book
has an unusually complicated structure. After opening with Leibniz's initial objections (Dubia), Stahl included his own replies (Enodationes) and a review of contested ideas (Conspectus). A second exchange ensued, beginning with thirty-one Exceptiones from Leibniz, followed by Stahl's equal number of Replicationes (Duchesneau 218; cf. table of contents in Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 22-23). In 1709, Leibniz penned a critique of the Theoria medica vera and asked Pietist theologian and founder of Halle's Biblical Institute Karl Hildebrandt von Canstein (1667-1719) to deliver it to Stahl (Hartmann 98). Continuing until 1715, the exchange surveyed views contesting the relationship of the material to the metaphysical. Three differences were particularly relevant for the development of anthropology, including Leibniz and Stahl's different views of organism vs. mechanism, of causality and the laws of nature, and of theories of motion and the emotions.

While Cartesian dualism and materialist theory explained life processes mechanically, Stahl made the case that human beings were more than machines (Hartmann 110). The physician defined a mechanism as a physical thing governed by logical and mechanical principles of undesigned movement (Duchesneau 218). Like a divinely-regulated clockwork, mechanisms functioned, but did not determine their own purpose (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy II" 62). By contrast, an organism chose to act within and using the body to accomplish its own goals. Stahl's organism generated its heterogeneous, dynamic, and complex chemical nature under direction of the soul (Duchesneau 219). The term "organism" meant something different from our current popular usage. "When Stahl writes about the organism," Johanna Geyer-Kordesch notes, "he does not mean a body 'endowed with organs'. 'Organic' to him means
a coordinated and integrated whole, the 'organism' adjusting to its environment both on a conscious and unconscious level (sensually, emotionally, and mentally) with immediate physiological results. Thus Stahl's medical theory is essentially a theory of a holistic, self-determined 'organism'" (Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 69).

Leibniz shared Stahl's dissatisfaction with Cartesian dualism's mechanistic interpretation of human faculties and embraced a reformed view of mechanism (Hartmann 110; Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 28). Using the phrase *omnia in corporibus fieri mechanice*, Leibniz evaluated qualities of bodies – their size, shape, and motion – to explain physical phenomena rationally (Hartmann 113; Duchesneau 223-224). Physical things changed based on cause and effect and laws of motion. For those complex mechanical states that escaped explanation, Leibniz reverted to teleology (227). Meanwhile, perception and appetition shaped the psychic realm (228). Organisms were refined mechanisms that developed from an endless series of functional processes, the physical and the psychological alike (Duchesneau 225; Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 29). Whereas for Stahl the organism established its own purpose, for Leibniz divine providence guided the organism.

Theories of intersubstantial causation, of how body and soul influence each other, further illustrate Leibniz's and Stahl's theoretical differences. Representatives of occasionalism, most notably Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), argued that because the material and the immaterial could not interact on their own, God intervened whenever necessary to facilitate between the body and the soul. Leibniz proposed a different idea. Functioning separately in parallel spheres, the body and the soul (entelechy) responded to each other with complementary actions as pre-determined by God (Rather and Frerichs,
"Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 26-27). This system of preestablished harmony relied on the correlation of the soul's representations with bodily movement and vice versa, though each sphere remained bound to its own laws and limited to action in its own realm (Duchesneau 232). Prepared by the correlation, each domain responded internally to perceived changes in the other realm, as Leibniz illustrates: "Therefore when the soul wills something with success the machine is inclined and ready to do this spontaneously out of its own natural motions; and on the other hand, when the soul perceives changes in the body she draws new perceptions from her own series of earlier (but confused) perceptions, rather than from the fact that the body is disturbing the laws of the soul" (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 26). Such coordination might even go unnoticed, Leibniz claimed, because the physical body could synchronize imperceptible actions with representations in the soul (Duchesneau 231; Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy I" 28).

Years of medical experience led Stahl to reject Leibniz's hypothesis. Placing himself among physicians, Stahl acknowledged interaction between the material and the metaphysical: "But it is that I, along with the whole school of medical physiologists, attribute to the soul the energy for actively exciting movements suited to the conservation as well as to every other need of her body. Alternatively, of providing and supervising her body with vital as well as animal movements" (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl Controversy II" 57). The soul directly influenced the body, thus any aid from spirits, as Leibniz proposed, was false and simply weakened the claim of an interrelationship. Interdependence meant that the two spheres were not in opposition, as preestablished harmony implied, but complementary. Emphasizing integration versus division was a key
aspect of Stahl's holistic understanding of the organism. Refusing to recognize the co-
dependence of the material and the metaphysical implied the nonexistence of key life
experiences such as action and passion (58).

The theories of Leibniz and Stahl differed most in explaining emotion and
voluntary bodily motion. While Leibniz admitted affections in the soul and the body
corresponded, each realm remained separate according to the theory of preestablished
harmony. People who attributed bodily change to emotions neglected their physical
cause. For Leibniz, the logic of the physical universe was at stake: bodies had to follow
mechanical laws. He surmised that there must be a physical cause for each bodily change
in the emotions (Hartmann 118). And insofar as the emotions affected the soul, they
represented confused ideas that complicated the hierarchy of cognition. From Leibniz's
perspective, disorder stemmed merely from illness or a lack of human perspective in
divine purposes (114).

Stahl viewed motion not according to physics and the law of nature as power or
energy, but as an element of life's dynamic process (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst
Stahl" 322). De-emphasizing the question of how movement started, he shifted the focus
from causation to continuation of organic processes (Rather and Frerichs, "Leibniz-Stahl
Controversy II" 60). In this holistic framework, the emotions were an important test case
for the theories of causation. Stahl emphasized that Leibniz's preestablished harmony
hypothesis failed to explain how emotions diverted divinely pre-programmed matter,
producing agitation or even death. The emotions prompted symptoms in the material and
metaphysical realms:
For since those movements seated within the body itself were properly and directly established and intended for the conservation of the body, since the soul is supposed to have nothing in common with them, even with conservation itself as a whole, yet indeed the soul does not have an appetite for injury and destruction of the body whether immediately or only mediately, surely the fact remains inexplicable how, I say, from a sudden inconsidered idea (such as are formed by the emotions with such little clarity that a man himself does not recall that he thought of, wished for, or grasped after any such thing as that which powerfully results) not only do movements so prompt and powerful follow, leaving orderly vital management far behind, but also those not intended by the soul even in thought, let alone in appetite, for example collapse, pallor, chill, trembling from fear, nausea even to the most violent attempts at vomiting, from subject matter falsely imagined, recalled, or prefigured in the memory, not so much detestable as only adversely made, since by agreement of all other men it is good or even desirable. Palpitations of the heart, anxious sweats, panting, breathing, changeable pulse, from fear; none of which the soul either desires, or even directly knows or remembers, etc. (63)

Extending his own philosophy to the emotions, Stahl assumed that the soul influenced the body, naming common signs. Physical and emotional cues included: "fainting, pallor, chills, fearful trembling, nausea, anxious sweats, panting," and a "changeable pulse." But in the passions physical influx was unpredictable. Bodily signs made this exchange visible, if not always decipherable.

Confronting each other's ideas, Stahl and Leibniz were forced to clarify their argumentation. Diverging from Newtonian mechanics, Stahl conceived of motion as
a dynamic action. Leibniz developed his idea of preestablished harmony by working out the principles of the monadology (Hartmann 123). Both Leibniz and Stahl reacted critically to Cartesian definitions of dualism, yet reached separate anthropological conclusions. Leibniz defined the human based on the individual and cosmological structure of monads, i.e. immaterial components of all things that contained a whisper of divine essence and were ruled by perception and appetite (Hartmann 121; Jolley 67-68). Stahl described the human based on a holistic conception of organism as he observed in his clinical practice. Additionally, though Leibniz and Stahl shared a teleological worldview, their horizons diverged. Beginning with the Cartesian categories of the res cogitans and res extensa, Leibniz insisted upon cosmological order by classifying human functions as either corporal or spiritual. Intermediary states were problematic. Because the emotions were difficult to understand, he attributed them to the sensorial body (Hartmann 114). By contrast, Stahl integrated the emotions as an imperfect dimension of human nature, a mode of being equal to and indivisible from reason, the imagination, or volition (Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 77).

This debate resonated in Halle and across Germany. Leibniz's theories of intersubstantial causation and mechanistic theory shaped Wolff's philosophy (Geyer-Kordesch, "Georg Ernst Stahl" 326, 348-350). Stahl's hypothesis that the soul could influence matter paralleled Pietist beliefs in transformative processes, i.e. that the natural could be changed by rebirth (Geyer-Kordesch, "G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 78). By faithfully questioning mechanist views of the universe and incorporating the soul into his medical theory, Stahl gained Pietist support. Likewise his view that intelligence involved sensation, imagination, and the emotions as well as reason intersected with the
Pietist focus on spiritual growth through imagination and emotion (81). By probing the nature of the soul, the role of the nervous system, and the imbalance of the mind, Stahl proves to be a pioneer in bridging the realms of the material and the metaphysical ("G. E. Stahl's Radical Pietist Medicine" 87). Ultimately, his lasting medical contribution was anthropological in nature.

**Determinism versus Freedom: Wolff and Lange**

Defining human nature and describing causation also shaped a debate between Halle philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) and theologian Joachim Lange (1670-1744). Wolff was educated in Breslau, Jena, and Leipzig, and began teaching mathematics and physic in Halle in 1707. In 1709/1710, he added philosophical lectures to his repertoire and increasingly taught metaphysics, logic, and ethics (C. Wolff, "Eigene Lebensbeschreibung" 14). Amid early Latin treatises on mathematics, Wolff published his own logic, ethics, and metaphysics in German with titles such as *Vernünftige Gedanken, von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes, und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntniß der Wahrheit* (1713, also called *Deutsche Logik*) and *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt* (1719, also known as *Deutsche Metaphysik*) (cf. Gottsched 2:104-105). He gained notoriety throughout Germany for the *Vernünftige Gedanken* series of publications, and his profile rose through debate with Lange.

After a youth devoted to theological study, Lange attended Francke's *Collegium Philobiblicum* in Leipzig, living with Francke during the founding years of Pietism. After Leipzig's theological faculty forbade Francke's philological courses in 1689, Lange
followed his mentor to Erfurt, then on to Halle, where he developed ties to other Pietists from 1691 to 1693 (Kühnel 11). While studying in Halle, Lange tutored children of prominent families, including those of Thomasius, and from 1693 in Berlin, children of Baron von Canitz (12). Though educated for the clergy, Lange saw teaching and writing as his real calling and declined numerous pastoral positions. He subsequently directed a Berlin school (1698-1709) before assuming a theological chair at the Fridericana in 1709 (13).

The impetus for Wolff's clash with Lange and the Pietists dates to 1721. At the annual ceremony marking power transfer from the outgoing to the incoming university president, the philosopher Wolff was transferring the rotating office to the theologian Lange. Wolff spoke on ethics in Chinese philosophy. Arguing that reason could provide a systematic basis for ethics without revelation, Christian doctrine, or God, the lecture displaced Christian theology with human reason to determine what it is good to do and to be. Additionally, while maintaining his own Christian faith, Wolff proclaimed Christian and Chinese ethical systems equally valid. Protesting the lecture, dean of theology Francke asked for a lecture transcript; Wolff refused. Determined to take action, the Pietist professors each read a portion of Wolff's oeuvre to examine his moral positions and to identify traces of atheism (14). Lange directed the ensuing Pietist critique of Wolff's philosophical system, an exchange that continued from 1723 to 1736.

Writing from the Pietist viewpoint, Lange identified two key philosophical problems with Wolff's philosophy. Lange argued Wolff chose the wrong explanation of intersubstantial causation, preestablished harmony. This made Wolff's philosophy inherently deterministic and denied the Enlightenment subject the possibility of self-
determination, which was essential for the Pietists. The argument here closely follows Bruno Bianco's essay "Freiheit gegen Fatalismus: Zu Joachim Langes Kritik an Wolff."

Whereas Bianco cites Lange's *Modesto disquisitio* and Wolff's response in the *Luculenta commentatio* and *Monitum ad commentationem luculentam* from 1723, my analysis draws on Lange's writings in German. Like Wolff, Lange published in the traditional academic Latin as well as in German for a broader audience. Because this dissertation aims to trace the popularization of anthropological concepts in Germany, the focus falls here on the *Bescheidene und ausführliche Entdeckung der falschen und schädlichen Philosophie in dem Wolffianischen Systemate Metaphysico von Gott, der Welt und den Menschen [...]* (1724, hereafter *Bescheidene Entdeckung*).

In §765 of *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen*, Wolff drew his explanation of intersubstantial causation from Leibniz. Both human spheres functioned concurrently:

> Da nun die Seele ihre eigene Kraft hat, wodurch sie sich die Welt vorstellet (§753): hingegen auch alle natürliche Veränderungen des Leibes in seinem Wesen und seiner Natur gegründet sind (§630); so siehet man leicht, daß die Seele das ihre für sich thut, und der Körper gleichfals seine Veränderungen für sich hat, ohne daß entweder die Seele in den Leib, und der Leib in die Seele würcket, oder auch Gott durch seine unmittelbare Würckung solches verrichtet, nur stimmen die Empfindungen und Begierden der Seele mit den Veränderungen und Bewegungen des Leibes überein. (478-479)
Neither realm directly influenced the other. The material and the metaphysical remained parallel and functioned separately in a synchronized fashion.

Lange saw Wolff's explanation of causation using preestablished harmony as fundamentally flawed. In the introduction or Protheorie to Bescheidene Entdeckung, Lange posited the reciprocal relation of body and soul. People were made of two natural substances, which must have a natural coexistence and interaction (J. Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung" 39-40). And experience confirmed the dualistic interrelationship based on the soul's control and movement of the physical organism, and the soul's use of sensations to form representations and ideas (41, 47). Thus logic and experience provided evidence for material and metaphysical interaction. As a theologian, Lange made an appeal to the authority of the Bible, which also stated in "almost innumerable cases" that the soul directs the body, and must guide it well. For example, he cited Paul in 1 Corinthians 9: "[Every athlete exercises self-control in all things. They do it to receive a perishable wreath, but we an imperishable. …] I pommel my body and subdue it, lest after preaching to others I myself should be disqualified" (43). Certainly this passage represented the biblical hierarchy of body and soul, yet it did little to explain how their connection functioned. This reference to the Bible served as a claim to the authority of the Holy Scriptures, an argument that carried greater weight in the eighteenth century than it might among a general audience today. Overall, Lange's case used Scripture moderately. According to his account, reason, experience, and the Bible supported physical influx as the explanation of causation and not Wolff's preestablished harmony.
To underscore the validity of the physical influx argument, Lange gave it a cosmological scope. Paralleling the soul's choices of bodily action, God shaped the material world through his will (49). The sphere of a single human will analogically represented a microcosm of the divine will directing the universe. By extending the significance of physical influx beyond the individual, Lange gave his hypothesis a systematic thrust Leibniz and Wolff had already developed for preestablished harmony.

In addition to these arguments for physical influx, Lange also discredited opposing arguments. For example, he claimed that those who supported another theory of causation failed to disprove the real-world experience of physical influx; the actual connection was replaced with a metaphysical one ("Bescheidene Entdeckung" 43-44). And though opponents objected that Lange had misrepresented experience, he said such claims were unfounded and judged metaphysical explanations of causation (preestablished harmony and occasionalism) as unbelievable (44-45). Despite the body's mechanical structure, human beings depended on the soul for movement and were neither machines nor automata. Because the soul commanded the body, materialist claims were unfounded. Further, the soul's direction of the body varied according to the will and demanded an explanation beyond the one mechanists offered (46).

In his most important claim against Wolff's philosophy, Lange argued the Deutsche Metaphysik denied the soul freedom and invoked fatalism.\footnote{Wolfgang Riedel notes that new empirical methods in psychology (including Wolff's Psychologia empirica, 1738) made the concept of the soul's freedom from nature questionable. I received Riedel's essay just as I was to submit the dissertation and could no longer integrate it into my discussion. See Wolfgang Riedel, "Erster Psychologismus: Umbau des Seelenbegriffs in der deutschen Spätaufklärung." Zwischen Empirisierung und Konstruktionsleistung: Anthropologie im 18. Jahrhundert, eds. Jörn Garber and Heinz Thoma, Hallesche Beiträge zur europäischen Aufklärung 24 (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 2004) 1-17.} Freedom was the distinguishing human characteristic: "Die Freiheit aber ist dasjenige, welches die aktive
Kraft der Seele von allen andern Kräften, welche andern lebendigen und zugleich
körperlichen, auch leblosen, Geschöpfen eigen sind, sehr weit unterscheidet, und ihre
Vortrefflichkeit anzeigt" (35). More important than reason or volition on its own, more
important than perception through sensation, freedom represented the active potentiality
of human life. The soul's essence originated from autonomy:

Die Freiheit des Verstandes und des Willens bestehet und äußert sich sonderlich darinnen, daß die
Seele selbst ist die freie Ursache ihrer Herrschaft, ohne durch eine äußerliche, oder durch eine
innerliche aus ihrer eignen Natur herrührende Notwendigkeit daran verhindert zu werden, nach
ihrer freien Willkür dies oder das, so oder anders, zu beschließen, zu wollen, und zu handeln;
dergestalt, daß das, was wirklich beschlossen und geschehen ist, entweder gar nicht, oder doch
anders hätte geschehen können (35).

Guiding the use of judgment, volition, and action, freedom as self-directed force thus
shaped the real trajectory of one's life choices. Throughout the introduction to the
Bescheidene Entdeckung, autonomy was Lange's anthropological marker. It was
introduced in contradiction to the mechanistic underpinnings of other systems, including
Wolff's.

Wolff defined the soul in a fundamentally different manner. Representation was
its essence: "Die Seele [hat] eine Kraft sich die Welt vorzustellen, nach dem Stande ihres
Cörpers in der Welt. [...] Weil demnach diese Kraft der Grund ist von allem demjenigen,
was veränderliches [sic] in der Seele vorgehet, so bestehet in ihr das Wesen der Seele"
(C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott 468-469). Yet using the soul as primarily an
image-processing center, Lange's argued, subordinated it to laws of necessity. Due to its
dependence on incoming sensations for ideas, Wolff conceptualized the soul's
representation as a necessary reaction instead of as a choice.

Mechanistic metaphors also became touchstones in the debate over human nature.
In the Deutsche Metaphysik, Wolff wrote that the human will functioned like a scale,
with the soul weighing motives (310). However the scale, a mechanical device without
autonomy, threatened as a metaphor to misrepresent the entire nature of the soul (J.
Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung", 77). Lange opposed Wolff's metaphor because
freedom was not attributed to the soul: "Denn die Waage ist nicht ein Ding, so in seiner
Freiheit stehet und handelt, also daß sie bei gleichem Gewichte in Bewegung kommen
und den Ausschlag auf einer Seite geben könne, sondern sich mit ihrem Züngelein
notwendig in der Mitten halten, oder nach dem größern Gewicht lenken oder sich ziehen
lassen muß: Die Seele aber in der Freiheit stehet" (77-78). The scale was subject to the
exterior forces of gravity and was governed by the laws of nature. By contrast,
autonomous subjects created their own "forces" through their choices.

Lange argued that the preestablished harmony supported by Leibniz and Wolff
relegated human beings to a universe of necessity. As we have seen, Wolff maintained in
Deutsche Metaphysik that representations in the soul and sensations in the body occurred
in parallel, yet without directly influencing each other (C. Wolff, Vernünftige Gedancken
von Gott 483). Challenging conclusions about experience of the world, this interpretation
divided the anthropological unity of psyche and soma into a double mechanism (Bianco,
121). Lange responded critically: "Hier siehet man abermal ganz klar, daß der Körper und
die Seele in dem Zusammenhang, den sie mit der ganzen Welt haben sollen, als 2 Uhren
vorgestellet werden, welche so eingerichtet sind, daß sie aufs allergenaueste in allen
zusammen treffen" (J. Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung" 84). Like occasionalism, this
hypothesis left the seeming interaction between the material and the metaphysical
inadequately explained. Each clockwork or sphere operated according to regular
principles, like a machine. Synchronizing two spheres did not make a human being because Lange's defining characteristic of the subject, freedom, was excluded.

For Lange, the debate of free will versus necessity had great stakes. Freedom was an essential part of Pietist life because acts of repentance required self-evaluation and following a new path in life. Similarly, confessions of faith involved choosing to be born again in Christian redemptive history. Pietism also made it a duty to serve others. Without exercising freedom in their spiritual lives, Pietists neither fulfilled their calling to a spiritual rebirth nor to serving their community.

The *Bescheidene Entdeckung* warned that Leibniz and Wolff's deterministic worldview threatened to nullify freedom, and consequently nullify morality and religion. By removing choice from human action, people would become automata. Lange believed that individuals had to will participation in moral orders. Without freedom, morality and religion were not possible. And it was a slippery slope of degeneration, Lange argued, to asocial behavior, animalistic desire, and atheism (J. Lange, "Bescheidene Entdeckung" 87). Over the next thirteen years, Wolff defended the soul's freedom in preestablished harmony and sought to discredit the charge of determinism (Bianco 122-123).

The Lange-Wolff debate featured two Protestant philosophers who took different views on the role of theology in philosophy. Like Stahl, Lange argued from experience that the material and the immaterial interacted, and from faith that the soul possessed the power to choose its action and to direct the body. Like Leibniz, Wolff insisted *a priori* that the Cartesian division of material and immaterial substance necessitated the theory of preestablished harmony as the most logical explanation of intersubstantial causation. Building on the Stahl-Leibniz debate, the Lange-Wolff controversy came to a head on the
issue of determinism. By claiming that both body and soul of necessity followed particular laws, Wolff's comprehensive explanation of the human system left no choices for human actors (C. Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott* 483-486; Saine 148). Though the Leibniz-Wolff school attempted to diffuse the critique, skeptics such as Antoine Arnauld, Christian Langhansen, as well as Louis de Jaucourt in the *Encyclopedie* voiced continued critique on this issue (Bianco 128). Whereas some historians have dismissed Lange's negative evaluation of Wolff's philosophy (Wundt 238), the questioning of radical determinism was a weak point in the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy and a key issue for modern subjectivity (Bianco 129-136).

The struggle between systematizing knowledge *a priori* and *a posteriori* significantly shaped anthropological theory. Like Leibniz, Wolff largely deduced his metaphysical principles, but the latter shaped them to the needs of an overarching system. Like Stahl, Lange chose physical influx in part based on empirical knowledge. The tools of reason and observation further shaped the epistemological framework and thereby the interpretation of causation for subsequent generations of Halle academics, to whom we now turn.

**The Halle Milieu in the 1740's**

Around 1740, a half century of Halle reform had advanced the creation of knowledge and the structure of the university. August Hermann Francke had welcomed university students to his successful primary and secondary schools by offering practical teaching experience. Stahl, Hoffmann, and their medical students had initiated the clinical practice of medicine and grown Halle medical student enrollments to the largest number
in Germany (Oehme cit. in Konert 25). Similarly, Christian Wolff had revolutionized philosophy and become a symbol of the Enlightenment by consistently using German terminology and by ordering concepts. In the wake of Wolff's system, opposing theologians were forced to acknowledge philosophy's appeal to truth based on reason alone. Young theologians such as Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten even applied the mathematical method to the study of religion. But researchers were unable to definitively explain intersubstantial causation.

Halle researchers from diverse fields continued to explore the nexus of the material and the metaphysical in new ways. Among them were three local students: Samuel Gotthold Lange (1711-1781), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777), and Johann August Unzer (1727-1799). As the son of Pietist theologian Joachim Lange, S. G. Lange had completed a theology degree in Halle while also studying philology, natural sciences and medicine (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" 402). The pastor's son Meier was born in a village near Halle and received private tutoring before studying theology and philosophy at the Fridericiana (403). Finally, Johann August Unzer, the son of a local wigmaker, attended Francke's Latin school and thereafter studied philosophy, mathematics, and medicine in Halle (Bilger 47). In addressing anthropological questions, these writers drew on their contemporary Halle context.

In an essay entitled "Intellectual Field and Creative Project," (1966) Pierre Bourdieu argues that the communicative context of social relations shaped intellectual creation (89). Historians have already applied this insight to Enlightenment culture (see, for example, McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries chs. 4 and 6). We all know ideas influence ideas. Thus around 1740, new impulses of reform shaped Meier, Lange, and Unzer's
Halle milieu. Beginning in 1735, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten canonized aesthetics as the "science of sensuous perception" (Baumgarten 3). This rhetoric-based philosophical discipline represented both an epistemology and the capacity to create something (Franke 73). Between 1738 and 1742, Immanuel Jakob Pyra integrated insight from Baumgarten's aesthetics into one of the first German-language treatises on the sublime (Zelle, "Einleitung" 7). As a critic, he wielded his aesthetics in the Leipzig-Zürich Literaturstreit (Zelle, "Pietismus"). Collaborating with Samuel Gotthold Lange, Pyra produced the first volume of German poetry of sensibility, the Freundschaftliche Lieder (1745) (Siegrist 295). Another poetic model developed simultaneously in Halle: rococo poetry. Inspired by Friedrich von Hagedorn's (1708-1754) verse, Johann Nikolaus Götz (1721-1781), Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719-1803), and Johann Peter Uz (1720-1796) developed the Halle school of anacreontic poetry.51 Praising women and wine, they sang the joys of life in love, friendship, and sociability. Thus at the beginning of the 1740's, Halle's philosophers and poets emphasized the role of the body and of sensation in understanding human nature and in living a good life.

Natural scientists also eagerly investigated the nexus of physiology and psychology. By virtue of their Hippocratic oath, Halle's physicians worked to heal the body, yet they also explored connections of the material to the metaphysical. In his three-volume *Naturlehre* (1740-1750), Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715-1759) departed from the standard historical or mathematical conceptualization of nature to theorize how the body functioned and how it worked with the soul in the emotions, the senses, and bodily movement. A key concept here, as well as in his 1742 dissertation entitled *De sensatione*, was the role of the nerves. Combining transmission of external perceptions to the brain and of the will's commands to the body, the nerves enabled communication between the physical and moral spheres. Building on Krüger's theories, Johann Christian Bolten's (1720-1757) *Gedancken von psychologischen Curen* (1751) argued for the integration of aesthetics into psychological therapy. Bolten understood aesthetics in a Baumgartian sense as the science of sensuous perception: "Die Ästhetik lehret ferner die Regeln...die Sinne,...die Einbildungskraft,...den Wiz,...die Scharfsinnigkeit,...das Gedächtnis,...die Dichtungskraft,...den Geschmack,...[und] das Bezeichnungsvermögen zu verbessern" (Bolten 67-79). It promised to remove debilitating distraction by increasing capacities of concentration and abstraction for the lower cognitive faculties (64-65).

Halle's reformers addressed human nature from diverse perspectives. Tapping the poetic imagination and the medical/philosophical investigation of sensation, writers explored the causal relationships between the material and the metaphysical. Distancing themselves from the humanistic tradition of publishing in Latin, Halle authors frequently published in German. Thus, their writings highlighted anthropological questions for a broad reading public. Scanning the titles of anthropological texts inspired by the Halle
reforms and published during the 1740's and 1750's reveals the authors' interest in the nature of body/soul causation. Titles included *Gedancken von den Würckungen der Einbildungskraft in den menschlichen Körper, aus den Gründen der neueren Weltweisheit hergeleitet* (Nicolai, 1744) or *Gedanken vom Einflusse der Seele in ihren Körper* (Unzer, 1746). Explaining the psychological and physical origins of everyday phenomena also took center stage, for example in *Abhandlung vom Seufzen* (Unzer, 1747), *De sternutatione [On Sneezing]* (Unzer, 1748), *Abhandlung von dem Lachen* (Nicolai, 1746), and *Gedancken von Thränen und Weinen* (Nicolai, 1748). Combining physiological knowledge and human observation, Ernst Anton Nicolai (1722-1802) and Unzer developed their conclusions empirically. Before turning to how Meier, S. G. Lange, and Unzer presented these ideas in popular periodicals, a brief look at how causation affected theories of emotion will provide insight into Halle's unique intellectual culture at this time.

**Emotions from Volition and Sensation: Meier and Unzer**

Meier and Unzer's theories of the emotions were part of an ongoing discussion in Halle. In 1695, Halle physician Georg Ernst Stahl had published an essay entitled "On the Influence of the Passions on the Human Body," which identified the passions as agitators of the soul and thereby as causes of moral and physical illness. Drawing on the temperament theory from antiquity, he linked psychological states to the circulation of fluids throughout the body. The essay sought physical health and moral happiness by minimizing extreme effects of the passions. In his *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* (1696) Christian Thomasius argued a similar thesis: the three vices lust, egoism, and greed
fueled the emotions. Virtue resided in the moderation of such vices and pursuit of a vernünftige Liebe (Schneiders 183-225). The passions were not only negative, but, as Thomasius maintained in the Cautelen zu Erlehnung der Rechts=Gelahrheit (1713), also the means to virtue and health (Braungart 368). Through their schooling in Francke's Glaucheschen Anstalten, Meier and Unzer were acquainted with classical Aristotelian rhetorical strategies for evoking and quelling the emotion. They would have encountered the emotional theories of Stahl and Thomasius as their studies advanced from the Glaucheschen Anstalten to the Fridericiana.

Meier's Theoretische Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen (1744) located the study of the emotions within psychology. The psychological examination of the emotions encompassed ethics (excluded here) and the theoretical system. The theoretical again subdivided into the psychological and aesthetic emotional systems. The aesthetic system was aimed at orators and poets and included strategies for how to amplify the passions, how to subdue them, and how to read their signs (characteristics). The characteristics produced ambivalent signs; due to their symbolic complexity, Meier contemplated excluding them.

Thus at first reading, the detailed definition of terms and systematic construction might remind the reader of a Wolffian approach: define and outline. But upon closer study, the book's seven parts are organized by a rhetorical model (van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 88). The first part describes a general theory of the emotions based on desires and dislikes. This theory is developed in the second part by combining Wolff's rational and empirical psychology, Baumgarten's focus on analogue reasoning in

52 In the following exposition, the terms emotions and passions are used interchangeably.
aesthetics, and the rhetorical tradition (Pozzo 150). The third part pursues the psychological function of the passions. The fourth and fifth parts describe strategies to increase and decrease passions in one's reader/listener. The sixth part argues for the soul's control of the emotions. Finally, the seventh part describes "Changes of the Body in the Emotions" and thereby provides an introduction to characteristics. It is this final part, because it outlines the changes the spiritually-directed emotions evoke in the body, that places the Theoretische Lehre squarely in anthropological debates about the influence of the soul on the body (van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 88).

Looking beyond the seventh part, the Theoretical Treatise contains significant anthropological claims throughout; three important examples follow. First, Meier challenged Cartesian claims about the bodily nature of the emotions. In Les passions de l'âme (1649), Descartes defined emotions as "perceptions or sensations or excitations of the soul which are referred to it in particular and which are caused, maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits" (Descartes 34). Emotions were thoughts received from the nerves, i.e. they were a passive product of the soul. The interaction between thoughts and nerves, between the metaphysical and the material, produced confused and obscure ideas (emotions), instead of rational ones (Descartes 34). By comparison, the Theoretische Lehre defined emotions as desires and detestations and thereby as actions of the soul (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 39). Thus, Meier argued volition triggered the emotions.

While Descartes proposed the interaction of body and soul, Meier discredited his position. Singling out Descartes's phrase "perceptions or sensations," Meier argued Les passions de l'âme erred by citing the body as a possible cause of spiritual states
(Theoretische Lehre 40). Based on the observation of real life, Meier wanted to argue that an influence of material being on the immaterial is possible, even proportional (394). Stahl had made a similar claim in Negotium otiosum. For Meier, however, the different nature of the two spheres made a mathematical proportionality between them impossible (Theoretische Lehre 393). Additionally, though human observation indicated parallel material and metaphysical change, no certain evidence existed to causally link bodily movement to spiritual states (395). Body and soul are exactly coordinated, Meier cited in an example, therefore they are also coordinated in the emotions. Because emotional states invoke a significant change in the soul, which is signaled by a large representation and large desire, there must also be great movement in the body. Here Meier used the example of blood. In accordance with preestablished harmony, emotions that excite the mind must also excite the circulatory system. Therefore, blood circulation visibly increased in an onset of emotions, but changes occurring in each sphere developed within that sphere. Changes in the emotions, Meier claimed, accompanied but were not caused by changes in the body (394-395). Interpreting the physical account of the emotions in Les passions de l’âme as a straw-man argument, the Theoretische Lehre replaced it with a metaphysical position.

In a second way, Meier made anthropological claims to explain the different effects of specific emotions on individuals. Physicians and philosophers typically referenced Hippocrates's temperament theory to explain individual psychology. According to this theory, personality was dynamic and shaped by the circulation of a mixture of four elements in the body: blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm. An individual's physical activity and psychological state could alter or be altered by the
changing balance of the elements, the so-called humors. In some cases, the dynamic
theory's many permutations drew on biological as well as social factors, including diet
and geographical location.

This hydraulic model of individual psychology inherent in temperament theory
acknowledged causation between body and soul, a position Meier thought false.
Recognizing the diverse conceptions of the temperaments among physicians, Meier
commented: "Der Streit der Arzneyverständigen in diesem Puncte ist so verwirrt, daß
man nicht weiß was man dazu sagen soll. Wir wollen diesen Streit ganz beyseit setzen."
Invoking a rhetoric of rising above the medical controversies over temperament theory,
he claimed "complete neutrality" by not following an existing theory (Meier,
Theoretische Lehre 180). While not taking sides sounded like taking an objective
position, his system of temperament based only on the soul belied a break with
physiological knowledge. The new formulation of temperament highlighted volition:

Die Erfahrung lehrt, daß ein jeder Mensch, gewisse Dinge leichter, öfter und stärker begehre oder
verabscheue, als andere Dinge, und man muß sagen, daß dieses von dem Verhältnisse seiner
Begehrungskräfte herrühre, weil die Begehrungskräfte eben die Quellen der Begierden und
Verabhscheuungen sind. Dieses Verhältniß der Begehrungskräfte, in so fern es den Menschen auf
gewisse Gegenstände neigt, wird sein Temperament genannt. (181)

Conceived as a psychological entity, temperament represented a nexus of two dynamic
qualities: a motivator (reason or zeal) and a graduated like or dislike. In Meier's
incarnation it excluded the body, focusing instead on the intersecting axes
vernünftig/sinnlich and lustig/niederschlagen. Individual temperament derived from a
unique mix of these qualities. This definition implied a geometrical model that one could
plot on an x-y axis:
While this concept of temperament avoided espousing a physiological school, it was anything but neutral – it was a provocation. By re-imagining the theory of temperament, the *Theoretische Lehre* attempted to write the body out of the theory of emotions. Temperament remained a key concept for understanding the emotions, but emotion was defined as volition. Departing from Descartes's anthropological concept of the emotions, Meier understood them metaphysically.

Based on the experience of everyday life, Meier was forced to acknowledge that the body could not be so easily erased. In a third way, the *Theoretische Lehre* linked body and soul to the emotions. Meier hypothesized that body language could signal shifts in emotion. Seven readable bodily signs made emotions visible: a change in facial color, an alteration of facial expression, a change in breathing, loss of speech, unnatural physical strength, heart palpitations, and the onset of illness (Meier, *Theoretische Lehre* 401-405).
While not complete, this list represented a partial index of indicators for reading another person's emotions. Utilizing external signs, this section on characteristics promised to make the soul and its varying emotional states decipherable.

The introduction to the *Theoretische Lehre* outlined four rhetorical uses for this anthropological knowledge of the emotions that will prove useful in the ensuing investigation of “case” narratives. Learning about the signifying nature of the emotions meant developing better knowledge of the soul and the whole human being (13). By providing instruction on how to evoke and quell the emotions, the text promised practical advice on how to direct an audience (14). The *Theoretische Lehre* offered strategies to examine another person's soul and to hide one's own emotions (15-16). Finally, Meier's text offered tactics for using the emotions to direct another person's action (17). Promising keys to self-knowledge, empathy, dissimulation for political purposes, and persuasion, the theoretical treatise argued knowledge of the emotions provided a tool for personal success.

Published only two years after Meier's treatise, Johann August Unzer's *Neue Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen* (1746) responded directly to the Halle constellation of Stahl, Meier, and Krüger. In relegating the emotions and temperament theory to the soul, Meier made himself vulnerable to divergent interpretations by natural scientists and medical professionals. Stahl's essay "Disputatio inauguralis de passionibus animi corpus humanum varie alterantibus" ["On the Influence of the Passions on the Human Body"] from 1695 provided a medical model from which to address the emotions. And Krüger's *Naturlehre*, with its emphasis on sensation, provided Unzer with the tools to shape his reply.
The *Neue Lehre* is an essay-length defense of the body's role in the emotions. Compared with Meier's book, the structure of the *Neue Lehre* is simpler. In eighty-five pages and thirty-nine sections, Unzer defined the emotions, linked them to the body through a theory of temperament, and explained causal connections between temperament and the emotions. The last quarter of the essay expanded the typology of temperament to briefly discuss the effects of age, sex, and nationality on the emotions (Unzer, *Neue Lehre* 62-65). Only the final paragraphs addressed the role of the soul. Arguing for a direct influence of the soul on the body, Unzer dismissed theories of temperament that separated the body from the soul according to "ein vernünftiges, ein sinnliches, ein aufgeräumtes, und ein niederschlagenes" temperament as mere fashion (65). These were Meier's categories. The *Neue Lehre* also rejected as faddish Meier's attempts to mathematically describe the relation between the material and the metaphysical (cf. van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 92).

Challenging Meier's theory of preestablished harmony, Unzer posited intersubstantial causation played a key role in the emotions. In the *Neue Lehre*, nerve impulses appeared simultaneously with ideas during thought (28). Using a hydraulic model of neural function, the essay suggested two possible sources of nerve impulses: ideas and sensations. Additionally, emotions amplified perception and evoked intensified neural responses (29). Though medical research during the eighteenth century eventually replaced the hydraulic explanation of neural function with an electric one, Unzer nonetheless popularized the biological basis of human cognition and the emotions. Whereas Meier considered the emotions only in terms of systematic philosophy, i.e. non-biologically, Unzer viewed them from metaphysical and material perspectives.
Unzer insisted *sensations*, not ideas, were the primary source of the passions (29). This perspective necessarily challenged Meier's metaphysical interpretation of human feeling. Reaffirming the role of the physical in the emotions, the *Neue Lehre* rehabilitated emotional sources that Meier had condemned in Descartes's *Les passions de l'âme*.

In the *Neue Lehre*, the nerves themselves represented a material element of the human body, while also linking the soul to the human *corpus* in additional ways. The pulse was a key marker for how the emotions affect the body:

> Und wie sich die Bewegung des Bluts zu der Bewegung der Nerven verhält, so verhält sich auch die Bewegung der Nerven zu denen der Affecten. Denn je heftiger sich das Blut, je geschwinder sich das Blut bewegt, desto heftiger, desto geschwinder muß sich das Herz bewegen. Je heftiger, je geschwinder sich das Herz bewegt, desto heftiger, desto geschwinder müssen sich seine Nerven bewegen, desto stärcker ist der Affect § 4. Also muß auch der Affect desto stärcker seyn, je heftiger und je geschwinder sich das Blut bewegt.

Integrating neurological function and the sources of the passions, the essay proposed a chain of causal relationships: the emotions influenced the nerves, and the nerves influenced heart rate, and the heart rate impacted the passions. These changes, Unzer argued, took place in a proportional fashion, so that as the intensity of the emotions increased, the frequency and intensity of the neurotransmissions and the pulse also grew. As an example, Unzer used an insane person:

> Wir können uns, um dieses vollkommen zu bestätigen, nur einen Menschen vorstellen, welcher die Person eines Rasenden spielt. Ein solcher ist immer im Affect, und man mag ihn betrachten auf welcher Seite man will, so findet man hiervon die deutlichsten Spuren. Bald befürchtet er ein Unglück und erschreckt, bald will er einiges ihm angethanes Unrecht rächen und gerächt im Zorn; sein Zorn nimmt überhand, und der Rasende wird ein wütendes Unthier. Alle diese, und noch mehrere solcher Affecten, welche sich bey ihm befinden, sind von grosser Geschwindigkeit und heftigen Würckung. Demzufolge, was wir vorhin gesagt haben, müste es mit der Bewegung seiner Nerven, mit der Bewegung des Hertzens, und mit dem Umlaufe des Geblüts eben eine solche Beschaffenheit haben. (*Neue Lehre* 31)

The essay thus suggested that the extreme psychological states of the emotions produced physical results. Additionally, an individual's voluntary movements coordinated with
their emotional states and functioned as signs. For the careful observer, watching a person's movement could provide clues to evaluate their state of mind (32).

Analogous to instrument strings, nerves differed in quality and tension, and thereby provided a means to differentiate types of temperament. Adopting traditional categories, the *Neue Lehre* featured sanguine, choleric, melancholic, and phlegmatic temperaments. The essay substituted humoral divisions with nerve qualities, each of which was readable through unique bodily signs. Instead of being characterized by yellow bile as under the humoral system, an individual with choleric temperament had delicate, taut nerves, which moved quickly and heftily (*Neue Lehre von den Gemüthsbewegungen* 33). Because Unzer's schema aligned qualities of the nerves with similarities in heart rate and bodily motion, choleric individuals incited by an emotion would have a hard, driving pulse and display agitated behavior such as babbling, thumping their hands and feet, or dancing (33). Characterized by coarse, taut nerves, melancholic individuals would react slowly, but potentially violently to emotions. If the nerve transmissions slowed, yet were sufficiently acute, melancholy types might gnash and grind their teeth or appear pale (35). With their fine, relaxed nerves sanguine individuals represented a balanced life. Combining a steady, even pulse with a moderate level of animation, this group exhibited good behavior, composure, attentiveness to others, and frequent sighing (43-45). Phlegmatic individuals would have coarse, relaxed nerves and usually not exhibit extreme emotions. They were characterized by calmness and satisfaction; therefore, this type was also regarded as a moderating force on the other temperaments (59-60). In the case of each temperament type, the movement of the nerves corresponded to characteristic actions (27).
Like existing temperament systems, Unzer's four temperaments necessarily generalized personality traits to make differences distinguishable. To provide further distinctions, he specified gradations by introducing mixed temperaments and differentiating their qualities. For example, the choleric sanguine had quick and light nerve impulses and a joyful disposition, while a sanguine choleric had even lighter nerves and a greater degree of merriment (56). Unzer and Meier recognized that any attempt to describe human personality using temperament unavoidably erected norms through the choice of categories (Unzer, Neue Lehre 27; Meier, Theoretische Lehre 182). But differentiations included in systems of temperament proved useful. By developing the neurological basis for the emotions initiated by Krüger, Unzer emphasized the function of the nerves in moderating between psychic and material life.

Avoiding a purely mechanistic interpretation of the passions, Unzer argued that the soul also played an important role. In response to feelings, the soul primarily directed thought. But it also regulated the nerves, directing nerve responses to actuate specific regions of the body (Unzer, Neue Lehre 67). In section one, the Neue Lehre analyzed emotions to emphasize differentiated organ function. Drawing on anatomical discoveries, the treatise posited that the cerebrum received messages from the body's sensuous network via the central nervous system (what we now call afferent nerves) (Soderquist 5). Using a second neural network (what we now call efferent nerves) (4), the cerebellum sent most central nervous system commands to muscles and glands (Unzer, Neue Lehre 23).

Epistemological differences prescribed different limits for Meier and Unzer's theories of the emotions. Meier explained intersubstantial causation with the
preestablished harmony hypothesis to preserve existing theological doctrine and the
immortality of the soul. Avoiding theological issues, Unzer analyzed how the nerves
linked the material and metaphysical sides of human nature. This did not preclude him
from integrating religious perspectives into later works, such as Philosophsiche
Betrachtung des menschlichen Körpers überhaupt (1750). An explanation for Unzer's
professed conversion to preestablished harmony in the 1750 text is beyond the immediate
scope of this dissertation.

Summing up, Meier and Unzer pursued different purposes in their theories of the
emotions. The Theoretische Lehre elucidated the psychological function of the passions
according to Baumgartian/Wolffian philosophy and the use of the passions for self-
advancement. While the Neue Lehre also defined the passions' psychological function, it
sought to better describe people and their psychosomatic experience of the emotions.
Unzer viewed himself as a contributor to a larger project to survey the neurological
nature of the emotions, one begun by Krüger, developed further by himself, and prepared
for completion by a future physician (no one is mentioned) (Neue Lehre von den
Gemüthsbewegungen 69). Unzer thereby intimated that a physician was necessary to
interpret the emotions because they were shaped by the body.

Together Meier and Unzer pursued an understanding of the psychic and physical
causes of the emotions and their effects on psychic life. Like the Stahl/Leibniz and
Lange/Wolff controversies before them, Meier and Unzer made their contribution to
anthropology through disputation (van Hoorn, "Affektenlehre" 93). Each of these pairs
thus participated in the larger Enlightenment project of critique (McCarthy, "Criticism
and Experience" 13-22). Explaining causation was a focus of each of these contests. In
the first example, physician Stahl and philosopher Leibniz contested the human role in causation. While Stahl insisted that an autonomous soul directed all actions of the body, Leibniz maintained a divinely initiated law of nature guided body and soul. In the second example, Lange attacked Wolff's systematic formulation of Leibnizian causation, casting it under a persistent cloud of determinism. Despite the radiant clarity of Wolff's system, he could not disperse the shadow cast by charges of mechanism and atheism and by Lange's demand for an autonomous subject that could will its spiritual rebirth. Finally, Meier and Unzer wrestled over the source of the emotions. In the spirit of preestablished harmony's parallel and divided spheres, Meier saw the origin of the passions only in the soul. Unzer argued they also originated in the body and invoked the nerves as the communicative medium for the physical influx hypothesis.

As the holy grail of philosophical questions in the early Enlightenment, writers paid considerable attention to the problem of causation. It played a deciding role in two of the primary transformative movements of the early eighteenth century, Pietism and enlightenment. It therefore addressed questions relevant not just in scientific disputes followed by a few, but also in the broadly discussed pursuit of happiness in the era. For this reason, we now turn to essayistic and fictional representations of the emergent, new anthropological concepts. Their popular manifestations appeared in the iconic media of the eighteenth century: moral weeklies and Enlightenment journals.
Halle’s anthropological knowledge appeared in popular form. Since the late seventeenth century, works in German such as Christian Thomasius’ *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* (1696) and Christian Wolff’s *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und die Seele des Menschen* (1719) theorized what comprises human nature. Both connected material being to the metaphysical sphere. In the 1740’s, Georg Friedrich Meier, Johann August Unzer, and the physicians Johann Gottlob Krüger, Ernst Anton Nicolai, and Johann Christian Bolten addressed a broad audience of philosophers, theologians, doctors, as well as an educated reading public with their treatises on humankind. Yet the anthropological theories of the day also began to appear in shorter texts written for educated and uneducated readers alike, for example in the moral weeklies.

This chapter proposes that Samuel Gotthold Lange and Georg Friedrich Meier's moral weeklies *Der Gesellige* (1748-1750) and *Der Mensch* (1751-1756) incorporate anthropological insights into their investigation of moral human nature. Contemporary theories of what it means to be human were being shaped by Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock's *Messias* (1748-1773), Johann Joachim Spalding's *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (1748), and Julien Offray de La Mettrie's *L'Homme machine* (1747). In this context, Lange and Meier drew on Halle's own heritage of anthropological theory. By evoking the traditions of Friedrich Hoffmann and Johann Gottlob Krüger in diet, the tradition of Christian Thomasius in shaping the gallant style, and the tradition of
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's aesthetics, Der Gesellige and Der Mensch produced a popular mosaic of what it meant to be human. Using essays and moral narratives, Lange and Meier sought to capture a broad audience in the moral weeklies.

**Context and Composition of Der Gesellige and Der Mensch**

As the son of Pietist theologian Joachim Lange, Samuel Gotthold Lange (1711-1781) spent his youth at Francke's Glaucheschen Anstalten and the Fridericiana preparing for a pastoral career, which he began in nearby Laublingen in 1737. Beyond his theological profession, he pursued literary aspirations as a poet, essayist, and translator. After helping to found a Society for the Advancement of the German Language, Poetry, and Rhetoric in 1733, Lange wrote in a circle including Jakob Immanuel Pyra and Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim. Lange's greatest poetic success was the co-publication with Pyra of Thyrsis und Damons freundschaftlicher Lieder (ed. Bodmer, 1745), the first German poetry of sensibility. The Horatzie Oden (1747) followed, temporarily earning Lange the title of "Deutscher Horaz." Lessing's negative review of Lange's Horace translation stifled further literary fame. Subsequent projects included religious poetry, essays, a biography of Meier, and letters (Bohnen 142-143; Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige" VI:403).

Georg Friedrich Meier was also born into a pastor's family near Halle. Like Lange, his youth included schooling in the Glaucheschen Anstalten, among others with tutor Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, before continuing at the Fridericiana. Meier took his master's degree in 1739 and began lecturing in philosophy at Halle with A. G. Baumgarten before the latter moved to the University of Frankfurt/Oder in 1740. In the
same year, Christian Wolff returned to the philosophical faculty in Halle. Meier subsequently studied with theologian Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten, Alexander's brother. Meier's reputation stemmed from his adaptation of A. G. Baumgarten's aesthetics lectures in *Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften* (1748-1750). He published books on philosophy, theology, poetry, and popular philosophy. Our historical view of early Enlightenment theories of literary form favors the continuity of three major genres since antiquity: poetry, drama, and the epic. Perhaps in this context, recent evaluations of Lange and Meier's creative output have minimized or ignored their writing (primarily essays and short narrative prose) in periodicals (cf. Pozzo; Bohnen; Schenk 78-80). A re-evaluation is in order.

As moral weeklies, *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* developed from a European tradition. With the *Monatsschriften* (1688-1689) Christian Thomasius had published one of the first literary-critical periodicals in Germany (McCarthy, "Literarisch-kulturelle Zeitschriften" 176; Wilke 1:54). By pursuing a popular style, the *Monatsschriften* prepared the German reading public for the reception of the moral weekly following its English inception (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 43). Joseph Addison and Richard Steele's *The Spectator* (1711-1712, 1714) created the moral weekly as a periodical that encouraged everyday readers to evaluate their lives with reason (cf. no. 10). In Great Britain, Ireland, and across Europe this new form achieved success in reprints, translations, and adaptations (Rau). Dutch writer Justus van Effen (1684-1735) produced the first imitation, *Le Misantrope* (1711-1712) (Rau 191-209). Shortly thereafter, Johann Mattheson's (1681-1764) *Vernünftler* (1713-14) translated and adapted the English original for his Hamburg readers (215-220). Original German-language moral weeklies
were first published in bourgeois Enlightenment centers: *Die Discourse der Mahlern* (1721-1723) in Zürich, *Der Patriot* (1724-1726) and *Die Matrone* (1728-1730) in Hamburg, *Die vernünftigen Tadlerinnen* (1725-1726) and *Der Biedermann* (1727-1728) in Leipzig. The first moral weeklies thus developed from and mirrored a bourgeois class consciousness (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige" 424; H. M. Wolff 67). By propounding the essential equality of all people according to natural law theory and by critiquing prejudice, the moral weeklies became one of the most important media for enlightenment (Brandes 225).

This trend of moral weeklies captured the imagination of Halle's literary circles, but local authors' early attempts at the form such as Pyra's *Gedanken der unsichtbaren Gesellschaft* (1741) appeared only briefly (cf. Nadler 2:82). This was certainly influenced by the Pietist atmosphere, which encouraged reading the Bible and devout (auto-)biographies. Whereas orthodox Protestants accepted the practice and study of the arts, including the moral weeklies, Pietists warned that pursuing worldly literature and art was sinful (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige" VI:340). In particular, early leaders of the Pietist-dominated Halle University plead with local magistrates and the prince elector to ban fairs, masquerades, dance, Mardi Gras celebrations, and comedies. Such entertainment wasted valuable time for reflection and aiding the community and was thus immoral. As a result, in 1700 the prince elector forbid all theater performances in Halle; the ban continued until the close of the eighteenth century (Martens, *Literatur und Frömmigkeit* 27-30). Though some virtuous literature was tolerated, pastors and devout parishioners opposed reading secular material because it interrupted study of the Bible

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53 The *Vernünftige Tadlerinnen* was initially printed in Halle, but written in and distributed from Leipzig.
(88). Love songs and novels focused on matchmaking were especially irreproachable because they promoted "carnal desires" and disrupted student work (93-94).

From the 1730's, these opinions began to gradually change. After achieving a full professorship at the *Fridericana* in 1734, the theologian Sigmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706-1757) displayed greater openness by gradually steering Halle theology away from Pietist revivalism toward a rational and historical study of religion (Martens, "Moralische Wochenschriften" 89-90; Sparn 81-85). By reorienting theology and introducing aesthetics, the brothers Baumgarten helped open Halle's public sphere to literary projects like the poetry of Lange, Pyra, and Gleim, and the essays and narratives in *Der Gesellige*. In this context, the establishment of a successful moral weekly re-created a cultural model that was decades old in other leading German Enlightenment centers (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'") VI:408). For Halle, it was a literary-cultural innovation. We will return to the literary nature of the Lange/Meier periodicals in a moment.

Readers throughout the German states read Halle's moral weeklies *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch*. While distribution focused on middle Germany and Saxony, they also were read in Westphalia, Mark, and Wolfenbüttel (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'") XII:417; M. Raabe 1:liii). The print run size for both magazines is unknown. Given the fact that at the time, selling a thousand copies made a weekly profitable, historians have estimated these periodicals had a larger circulation (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'") VI:406). Among German weeklies, *Der Patriot* likely had the largest distribution with a stated circulation at 5500 copies. The next most popular moral weekly, *Die vernünftigen Tadlerinnen*, expressed satisfaction at selling 2000 copies. According to reader interest, individual issues of a weekly may have garnered spikes in circulation (Martens, *Die*
Botschaft der Tugend 112). The fact that Der Gesellige and Der Mensch were sold in weekly issues as well as in book form supports the hypothesis of a print run larger than 1000. Additionally, the original publisher, Gebauer, newly typeset and printed both magazines in 1764, which suggests that they had sold out and that amid reader demand, they remained profitable. By surpassing a successful periodical's normal life (of several months to several years) by additional years, the Halle magazines provide further indirect testimony to their success (118). Viewed together, the twenty-one year joint publication history of Der Gesellige (1748-1750), Der Mensch (1751-1756), Das Reich der Natur und der Sitten (1757-1762), and Der Glückselige (1763-1768) is unique for German Enlightenment moral weeklies.

Readers bought the Lange and Meier weeklies either at a bookseller or by mail, with each issue costing 12 Pfennig. This was two-thirds of the cost of a meal at an inn (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'' VI:406; "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'' XII:415). Therefore, in price and in content the weeklies addressed primarily bourgeois readers: civil servants, academics, merchants, officers, and especially their wives and daughters. Members of bourgeois society and the lower nobility had the ability and the time to read, with isolated handworkers, farmers, or higher nobility filling out the spectrum of readers (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'' VI:407). Other indirect evidence confirms this kind of reading public for the Halle weeklies. To further edification, moral weeklies encouraged reader identification by describing characters like their readers. Taking "Die Begebenheiten der Frau Elisabeth Irrwisch" from Der Mensch as a representative example, we can assert that the characters of salesman, soldier, schoolteacher, mother, and daughter reflected the experience of the weekly’s middle-class audience. Through
identification strategies, the editors encouraged the reader's moral improvement. In Wolfenbüttel, extant lending records from the eighteenth century confirm that Der Mensch was primary lent by the middle class. Additionally, a similar weekly's subscription list provides evidence that bourgeois readers were the primary subscribers to moral weeklies (Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend 150-151).

In "Lektüre und Lesertypologie im 18. Jahrhundert (1730-1770): Ein Beitrag zur Lesergeschichte am Beispiel Wolfebüttels" (1983), John A. McCarthy analyzes Der Mensch to identify characteristics of mid-eighteenth century readers in general and readers of the moral weekly in particular. Because this essay also provides insight into the goals of reading that figure in the development of this chapter, key findings are addressed here. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, writers emphasize reading's function in shaping moral values. Despite the private nature of exploring a text individually, reading teaches ethical standards and thereby fulfills a social goal. Indeed, the emphasis on reading appears parallel to the goal of the weeklies to encourage and train readers in critical thought and virtue. Thus, moral weeklies sought through reading to educate, to entertain, and to socialize the public. Given this context, Johann Jakob Bodmer (1698-1783) in Discourse der Mahler (1721, no. 1) encouraged other authors to more closely consider the reader's reception of a text and to write for a broad audience (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 43).

Between 1720 and 1760 professional writers pursued this goal (45). They increasingly addressed a non-academic audience, but also sought to persuade their audience of reading's more noble functions, i.e. education and socialization. To emphasize how books and magazines provided more than entertainment, Der Mensch categorized readers and their material in view of specific goals into three categories. "Elende Leser" took no interest in education and socialization, but read for entertainment alone, favoring chap-books, gallant novels like Der göttingische Student, and "Robinsonades." "Mittelmäßige Leser" were more difficult to define, but obsessively and uncritically read mystical, atheistic, and religious works by authors from Jakob Böhme or Madame Guyon. By contrast, the best readers make reading a reflective experience characterized by faculties of empathy and critical judgment. To achieve these abilities, Der Mensch encouraged perusing Fielding's Tom Jones, Prévost's Memoires d'un homme de qualité, Richardson's Pamela, Fenelon's Télémaque, Gellert and Lichtwer's fables, poetry by Gleim, Hagedorn, Opitz, and Milton, texts by Leibniz and Newton, and the moral weeklies (McCarthy, "Lektüre" 51-52). Through its pages, Der Mensch aims to make all interested persons more reflective and more sociable.

Due to a lack of empirical evidence, one can only hypothesize about how eighteenth-century men and women read the Halle weeklies. Der Gesellige idealized its readership in representations of individuals reading while sewing or in private, others reading orally for a group, and still others intensively (repeatedly) reading the weekly (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:407-408; Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" XII:418; cf.Engelsing). Reading aloud to a group fulfilled human destiny as a social being (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'" VI:420-421). Engaged by particular issues,
some readers submitted letters, participating in the production of the public sphere
(Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch" XII:417-418). Certainly some of the letters were
fictionalized, but some were real; some reader correspondence was simply never
published. In readership and ways of reading, the Halle weeklies were representative of
their form.

Traditionally, moral weeklies combined elements including a fictitious editor, a
religious-philosophical viewpoint, and thematic variation within a single issue. *Der
Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* nominally incorporate a fictitious editor, creating the narrator
der *Gesellige* and naming the readers *die Gesellschaft der Geselligen*, but refer to them
little thereafter. The combination of Protestantism and philosophy in the weeklies
represented Lange and Meier's chosen professions and a natural extension of their
education and interests. Based on Martens' attribution of issues to individual authors,
Lange and Meier both created religious and philosophical contributions. In most cases,
the religious and philosophical viewpoints are interwoven.

Diverging from the moral weekly tradition, the Halle weeklies typically limit each
issue to one theme. In most cases this means a single topic is developed in prose or poetry
over eight to sixteen pages, from a half to a full signature. Additionally, each journal
includes several serialized contributions, a rarity for this literary form. In *Der Gesellige*
this includes "Die Geschichte von des Ritters Lucidors Geist" (begins no. 227). *Der
Mensch* features at least six, including "Nachrichten von den Begebenheiten bey
Besetzung des Bälgentreterdiensts zu Einersrode" (begins no. 48).

The majority of issues are written in prose, thus making *Der Gesellige's* 271
issues and *Der Mensch's* 488 issues rich resources of essayistic writing and short
narrative. From Thomasius's *Monatsgespräche* (1688-1699) through Bodmer and Breitinger's *Discourse der Mahlern* (1721-1723) to Gottsched's *Die vernünftige Tadlerinnen* (1725-1727), moral weeklies helped shaped the early German tradition of the Enlightenment essay. In *Der Biedermann* (1727-1729), Gottsched (1700-1766) links philosophy, rhetoric, psychology, and morality as key elements of the essay. Crafting an essay, and by extension an issue of a moral weekly, involves creating poetic prose, a style combining clarity of argument with rhetorical appeal (McCarthy, *Crossing Boundaries* 136-137, 190). At their best, *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* unite Gottsched's four elements with success, reproducing the amusement, relevance to daily life, and critical nature, all qualities of the gallant style. They thereby build on the contribution of earlier moral weeklies to the German essay tradition (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel" 62, 75-76; cf. Schlote 21-42, cit. in Heinz 2001).

In *Crossing Boundaries: A Theory and History of Essay Writing in German 1680-1815*, McCarthy re-evaluates the essence of essay style for the eighteenth-century and thus provides key insight for analysis of the essay in this chapter. Combining functional goals of scholarly communication and poetic verve, the essay employs a middle style (McCarthy, *Crossing Boundaries* 16). Essayistic writing is the collective term for many literary forms that in the triangular relation of writer, text, and reader especially emphasize the author-audience connection (19-20). The act of reading recreates the writer's experimental thought process and thereby produces essayistic writing's aesthetic quality: a kinetic, creative exposure to new knowledge and new opinions (23). Emphasizing thought as process, essayistic writing engages writer and reader to enact enlightenment (80). In its heterogeneity, essayistic style displays characteristics such as:
(1) associative thought;
(2) dialogic structure or tone;
(3) the consideration of possibilities;
(4) an open form that stimulates thought;
(5) polyperspectivity;
(6) subjectivity;
(7) an experimental nature;
(8) non-dogmatic views;
(9) a skeptical attitude;
(10) playfulness of tone;
(11) criticism (with an invitation to co-judge);
(12) and frequent re-making of what has been given cultural form (42).

These characteristics will be useful in evaluating the journal article on materialism in Der Mensch. Understanding their nexus in a middle style is essential for evaluating German essayistic writing between 1700 and 1800.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, McCarthy argues, theories of prose writing concentrated on a balanced presentation. Defining this style was not only Gottsched's aforementioned Biedermann, but also Christian Thomasius. He argued that all people could become a galant homme, i.e. they could be educated in cultivated manners, sensibleness, erudition, sound judgment, politeness, and a pleasant manner (McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 138). Thomasius' qualities of gallantry are representative of the gallant style. In Anweisung zu Teutschen Briefen (1709), Benjamin Neukirch (1665-1729) argued for a balanced approach on multiple levels, first between
natural and cultivated speech. And instead of an overt display of artful composition, Neukirch favored writing in a colloquial manner; balancing the astute, witty, and satirical modes of thought; and adding touches of playfulness and irony (McCarthy, *Crossing Boundaries* 139-140). In *Anweisung zur verbesserten Teutschen Oratorie* (1725), Friedrich Andreas Hallbauer (1692-1750) esteemed similar qualities of clarity, normalcy, naturalness, balance, and elegance as representative of good style. Subsequently, Gellert's *Briefe, nebst einer praktischen Abhandlung von den guten Geschmack in Briefen* (1751) echoed the call for a natural and simple tone. The Leipzig professor asserted that the ideas should determine form and supported individual expression (*Crossing Boundaries* 143). From Thomasius to Gellert, McCarthy surveys writers who propose a balanced mode as the best way to engage readers and thereby not only to communicate, but to promote changes in thinking. In his survey of guidelines for eighteenth-century essayistic writing, McCarthy substantiates a claim for the continuing symbiosis of writers embracing the audience and choosing a middle style (*Crossing Boundaries* 142).

In her article "'Gedanken' über Gott und die Welt. Die Erprobung der Anthropologie im Essay bei Meier, Krüger und Nicolai," Jutta Heinz sketches anthropological contours of the essay around 1750, the time frame for the chapter here. To focus her study, Heinz empirically evaluates a selection of individually-printed essays on human nature, combating superstition, and arousing curiosity – all typical Enlightenment themes. The three writers appeal to readers as equal partners in critique (Heinz, "Gedanken" 145-147). To define being human, Meier draws on philosophy, and Krüger and Nicolai refer to clinical medicine. Heinz argues that Meier’s systematic argumentation keeps readers at a distance, while Nicolai and Krüger observe people and
more closely address the problems of actual human beings and their contingencies. Drawing upon experience, Nicolai and Krüger's approach is more open to the occurrence of error ("Gedanken" 148-150).

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, theories of the divine directly influenced the evaluation of human beings. In modeling human nature, theodicy followed a drive based on divine perfection for perfectibility in the world; that is, the moral improvement of people. Over time, these theories gave way to the representation of physical and moral human nature, a move that invoked the relation of the double natures in the body/soul problem. Instead of a monolithic spiritual perfection, a balancing of the material and the metaphysical became the new goal (150-152). In aesthetics, Meier's emphasis on logic proves, by comparison with Krüger and Nicolai's irony and pleasurable digressions, less appealing (152-154). Combining McCarthy's nuanced evaluation of the philosophical and aesthetic history of the Enlightenment essay and Heinz's anthropological reading of mid-century essays provides the theoretical framework for an evaluation of the anthropological nature of essayistic prose in *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch.*

Lange, Meier and Unzer also wrote anecdotes and stories using anthropological discourses. In his article "Influxus physicus und Seelenstärke. Empirische Psychologie und moralische Erzählung in der deutschen Spätaufklärung und bei Jacob Friedrich Abel" (1992), Wolfgang Riedel identifies moral narrative as a source of late-Enlightenment

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56 This move simulates the ancient *mesotes* doctrine (Greek: "middle"), which Aristotle integrated into ethics as an option for ethical action based on rationalized moderation of other options. In this sense, one would respond in generosity to a natural disaster instead of with wastefulness or avarice. Likewise, in consoling a friend in a dilemma, a person would act in friendship instead of with flattery or argument "Mesotes Lehre," *Der Brockhaus Philosophie. Ideen, Denker, Begriffe* (Mannheim, Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 2004).
psychological narration and anthropology. Narration in moral weeklies, Johann Gottlob Benjamin Pfeil's *Versuch in moralischen Erzählungen* (1757), and Friedrich von Blanckenburg's *Versuch über den Roman* (1774) increasingly encourage psychological narration that evokes (1) reader identification and empathy and (2) cultivation of moral judgment. (Riedel, "Influxus physicus" 34-36). Simultaneously, moral narration emphasizes physical sensibility that Gellert and Lessing develop in drama and Wieland incorporates in the novel. Favoring satire, *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* integrate anthropological discourse into select narratives. "Die Begebenheiten der Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch," a serialized satire written by Meier, will serve here as a representative example of this new kind of writing. However, before turning to it as a sample of anthropological discourse in moral narrative, it is first necessary to survey the anthropological themes that comprise the journalistic program.

**The Anthropological Program**

Like many other Enlightenment magazines, the first issue of *Der Gesellige* opens with a quotation, an excerpt from Albrecht von Haller's "Über den Ursprung des Übels" (1734). The philosophic verses cited resonate with the cult of friendship and community at the time:

Sie, diese Liebe, war der Menschen erste Kette,  
Sie macht uns bürgerlich, und sammlet uns in Städte;  
Die Freundschaft stammt von ihr. (Haller, "Über den Ursprung" 64)

Friendship and community underscore for Lange and Meier the centrality of sociability in civilized society. Two drives regulate human evolution in Haller's poem: self-love and neighborly love. But the editors overlook "Liebe für sich selbst" in favor of "Nächsten Liebe" (Haller, "Über den Ursprung" 63). Born into interdependence on other people,
human beings – the opening essay asserts – are pushed by needs and the natural desire for comfort to seek closer relations with others (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Gesellige I:1-2).

Lange and Meier thus encourage the development of sociability through an expanded view of humankind:

Ich verstehe unter einem geselligen Menschen, einen solchen, der sich in seiner innern und äussern Einrichtung nicht als einen einzelnen Menschen, sondern im beständigen Zusammenhange mit seinen Nebenmenschen betrachtet, und sich daher in seinen Handlungen so zu verhalten bestrebt, daß er zu dem allgemeinen Wohl so viel möglich beytrage, um des allgemeinen Wohls insbesondere theilhaftig zu werden. (I:2)

To be human means viewing oneself as interconnected with others. By freely helping others as much as one can, the sociable person also has the most to gain from society.

Participating in community life creates a mutually beneficial relationship and ultimately defines the individual human being.

In their double nature, individuals represent infinite possibility. But it is the social sphere that nurtures physical growth and polishes personality. People often underestimate their contribution to the social network and its positive effect on their improvement:

Der Mensch ist nicht so klein, als sich mancher einzubilden pflegt. Er ist nach Leib und Seele, und nach seinem äusserlichen Zustande betrachtet, unendlich vieler Vollkommenheiten fähig....Ein Mensch vor sich allein ist völlig ungeschickt, sich selbst alle diese Vollkommenheiten zu verschaffen. Er trete aber in die Gesellschaft mit andern Menschen, die Vollkommenheiten werden von allen Seiten her durch tausend Canäle auf ihn zuströmen. Der eine wird seinen Geist bearbeiten, der andere seinen Körper. (I:34)

People cannot achieve their potential on their own, but require a supportive environment. To function as a social being means eschewing notions of exaggerated individualism and seeking exposure to outside influences. In Der Gesellige, community moulds all aspects of twofold human nature.

In Lange and Meier's subsequent weekly Der Mensch, the investigation of individual human nature is the primary focus. Citing dualistic Cartesian heritage, the first issue highlights the body/soul interrelationship: "Der Mensch ist ein vernünftiges Wesen,
das aus Leib und Seele bestehet. Sein vornehmster Theil ist die Seele: diese wird unser Gegenstand seyn, sowol an sich selbst, als nach der Verbindung, in welcher sie mit dem Leibe, und durch denselben mit den übrigen Dingen, stehet" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch I:3-4). Emphasizing rationality underscores the importance of soul before body, yet each sphere plays its role. What makes humans unique, the editors claim, is the interconnection of religion as a guide to purpose, reason as a guide to action, and the mediation aesthetic pleasure through the senses (I:4-5). Hence, the moral sense, reason, and sensation each have a proper function. Therein we see the influence of Thomasius and Shaftesbury.

Combining physical and metaphysical spheres, humans occupy a higher rung on the chain of being (cf. Lovejoy). In "Über den Ursprung des Übels" (1734), Albrecht von Haller represents human fate in this in-between:

Fern unter ihnen [Engel] hat das sterbliche Geschlecht
Im Himmel und im Nichts, sein doppelt Bürgerrecht.
Aus ungleich festem Stoff hat Gott es auserlesen,
Halb zu der Ewigkeit, halb aber zum Verwesen
Zweideutig Mittelding, von Engeln und von Vieh,
Es überlebt sich selbst, es stirbt und stirbet nie. (Haller, "Über den Ursprung " 62-63)

Like angels, Haller claims, people are drawn to God and to virtue and thus they pursue the good. Yet with their hybrid nature, they also heed earthly drives that are unknown to angels. In contrast to angels, humans are subject to death. What makes one human is the interconnection of two determining natures, the sensual and the spiritual.

In Der Mensch, Lange and Meier also define being human through the twofold nature and the chain of being. The image begins as a nearly exact quotation of Haller: "Der Mensch ist halb ein Engel und halb ein Vieh. Seine Natur ist, so zu reden, eine Zwitternatur, welche etwas von einem Geiste und etwas von einem Viehe an sich hat,
oder sie ist aus der Vernunft und der Sinnlichkeit zusammen gesetzt" (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Mensch* I:45). Using *Zwitternatur* as a predicate adjective underscores the hybridity of human nature.

Lange and Meier continue by explaining that body and soul do not exist in isolation from one another, for their very interaction shapes the human being. To live according to human nature involves acknowledging that interaction. Pursuing solely spiritual life in developing logical thought and exercising freedoms is impossible. While people are capable of creating ethical systems to regulate and even fully subdue the body and its drives, sensuality belongs to the hybrid essence of humanity. No one, Lange and Meier aver, would recommend ignoring sensuality (I:45). This opinion is a variation on that of the countess in Gellert's *Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, who chides proponents of spiritual love for denying their sensuality (Gellert, *Leben* 38-39). Like Gellert's countess, Lange and Meier argue: "Ein solches bloß geistiges Verhalten ist gar nicht menschlich: denn es ist nur dem einen Theile der menschlichen Natur gemäß" (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Mensch* I:45).

To be human does not mean being angelic. There is no expectation of living by the spirit alone in the pursuit of the highest moral laws to the exclusion of the body. Instead, human existence involves both spiritual and earthly passions. To be human means that we acknowledge the call to rise to the level of angels but must also accept the limits of the animal. The balancing of these forces should lead to moderation in enjoying the pleasures of material life. If something else had been intended, the editors argue, if the true good were only following moral law, humans would have been created
differently. Here and throughout the weekly, balance of the material and metaphysical emerge as the ideal.

In the essay "Von der Gesundheit des Cörpers und der rechten Diät, solche dauerhaft zu erhalten" (no. 221) the editors of Der Mensch suggest real-world strategies to achieve balance in everyday living. In the eighteenth century, dietetics (Diät) referred to practical principles for living a healthy, long life. Key proponents included the Halle physicians Friedrich Hoffmann and Johann Gottlob Krüger. In Diät oder Lebensordnung (Diät oder Lebensordnung), for example, Krüger draws on his experience with patients to provide guidance for good living in chapters on children's education, good air, nutrition, sleep and rest, exercise, the emotions, excretion, and wellness. While related works such as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's translation of Juan Huarte's Examen de Ingenios (1594, trans. 1747) provide suggestions to the state on regulating things like reproduction, child-rearing, and education for the social good, the texts by Krüger, Lange, and Meier emphasize rules for individual benefit.

In their attempt to reach a broad audience with Der Mensch, the authors make moderation a central thematic and structural issue when they suggest: "Es haben manche Gelehrte weitläufige Schriften von der Diät geschrieben. Allein unseren Einsichten nach ist eine gar zu grosse Menge diätetischer Regeln der Diät zu wider" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:35). Offering an alternative to works like Krüger's Diät (567 pp.), "Von der Gesundheit des Cörpers und der rechten Diät" (16 pp.) concentrates on six rules. First, one must try to maintain a healthy soul; second, eat and drink within the limits of health; (3) moderate body temperature; (4) exercise regularly; (5) strive for

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57 The six chapter subjects from air (i.e. environment) to excretion recall Galen's sex non res naturales, whose regulation provided natural body balance (Porter, Greatest Benefit 107; Sarasin Reizbare Maschinen 36).
regularity in the excretion of body waste; and (6) do fitness training (*Der Mensch* VI:36-47). Sharing topics with Krüger's *Diät*, "Von der Gesundheit" proposes guidelines of moral wisdom. The philosophers Lange and Meier leave the details of therapy for specific illnesses to physicians (VI:35).

The ethic of moderation directs physical and moral life. In the physical realm, this means not only limiting but also increasing some processes and actions. Finding a balance in nutrition means eating more often and on a regular schedule rather than sporadically in excess (VI:43). Likewise, an appropriate exercise regimen involves neither too little movement, nor too much, but a "proportional" level of activity that engages and sets all parts of the body in motion. Walking and horseback riding are ideal (VI:45-46). More physical activity is also required to strengthen the body ("mäßig strapzire") (VI:47). Underlying the call for physical renewal is a critique of specific social groups (e.g. scholars and women of means) who are not normally engaged in physical activity (VI:46). Being alive necessitates caring equally body and soul; that is, tending to *der ganze Mensch*.

In the moral realm, moderation refers to limiting indulgent behavior. Gluttony, drunkenness, fornication, and adultery are examples of overindulgent and sinful behavior. "Von der Gesundheit" argues from a Christian moral framework that such transgressions can provoke extreme sickness as a natural punishment (VI:48). Representing overindulgence as physically and morally dangerous serves the purpose to socialize readers against such behavior. In this sense, it can be regarded as "a program of bourgeois living" (Tobin, 117). On the other hand, an inflated concern for one's health is equally objectionable (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Mensch* VI:39).
Ultimately, "Von der Gesundheit" proposes that body and soul must be regulated because they are interconnected. Like lasciviousness and gluttony, the emotions (especially sadness, anger, and fear) also demonstrate the influence of the soul on the body, because strong emotions can increase blood pressure and provoke sickness or death (VI:38). In the same way, a melancholy temperament can concentrate and slow bodily fluids, hinder digestion and excretion, and immobilize the body (VI:37). Considering the influence of material being on one's mental state, illness can inhibit the use of reason and intellectual faculties, as well as one's ability to fulfill moral obligations (VI:33).

Dietetics thus affirm the anthropological nature of humankind. On a practical level, it outlines principles for individual day-to-day living. It also reveals the connections between the physical and moral spheres in illness and volition (the indulgences and emotions defined as extreme desires and aversions). It therefore shows how managing the physical or the moral being requires treatment of the whole person.

**Body/Soul Discourse as a Counterargument to Materialism**

The approach to human nature in *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* is infused with Christian values. The soul is the human connection to the divine. Lange and Meier acknowledge the existence of the body, not only for the history of Christian salvation, but as part of a revised Protestant theology that embraces pleasure – in moderation – and thereby happiness in this life. Though *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* embrace the materiality of human existence and incorporate the senses via the latest aesthetic theory and poetry, they do not use motion to define human nature, even though materialism was a prominent world view.
By around 1750, Lange and Meier wrote in their weeklies that materialism posed threats to existing knowledge and put representatives of entrenched power at unease (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VII:313). The new icon of materialism came from France: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751). Born in Saint-Malo, Brittany, La Mettrie studied in Paris, receiving his doctorate of medicine in Reims in 1733. From 1733 to 1734, he attended lectures in Leiden, possibly with Boerhaave, whose work he translated for a French readership (Vartanian 2-3). After publication of *L'Histoire naturelle de l'âme* (1745)\(^{58}\), the Paris Parlement ordered the book burned and La Mettrie fled France for Holland. There he wrote and published *L'homme machine* (1747), which openly posited a materialist view of the soul (Thomson, "Introduction" xxvii). When religious authorities prohibited further sales, destroyed available copies, and admonished the book's publisher Luzac, La Mettrie had to flee further, this time to the Prussian court. Thus, as his name became synonymous with materialism across Europe, Frederick II granted him asylum in Potsdam, the state governmental center for Halle residents Lange and Meier. La Mettrie arrived in Berlin on 7 February 1748, within two months of the first issue of *Der Gesellige* (Vartanian 7).\(^{59}\)

What made La Mettrie's ideas so contested was their rejection of metaphysical systems, for example in *L'Histoire naturelle de l'âme* (1745) (Thomson, "Materialism: La Mettrie" 315-316; Wellman 148). The move alienated clergy and philosophers alike. Drawing on Haller's theory of irritability, La Mettrie explained reflection as a product of

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\(^{58}\) Republished in a revised form and now known as *Traité de l'âme* (1750).

\(^{59}\) The fiftieth issue and end of the first half-year of *Der Gesellige* is dated 3 June 1748. Cf. Lange and Meier 1987, I:406. Thus, Lange's first utterances against materialism in issue seven appeared about the time La Mettrie arrived in Berlin, and the second reference in issue forty-nine would have been at the end of May 1748. La Mettrie's presence in Brandenburg may have contributed to the impetus to take an anti-materialist stance.
physiological sensations joining ideas within the soul. Judgment was a passive faculty that required the soul to revisit the truths that made the concept clear and distinct (Wellman 160-163). In *L'homme machine*, La Mettrie argues that humans, like animals, have no innate moral sense and that there is no such thing as natural law. Morality stems merely from a socialized sense of remorse in the individual (La Mettrie, "L'homme machine" 171-173; La Mettrie, *Machine Man* 20; Crocker, 118-120). For Christians like Lange and Meier, this theory was a provocation.

Because of their insistence on the existence of a soul and their goal of moral education, *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* openly oppose materialist philosophy from their inception. In the seventh issue of *Der Gesellige*, Lange argues Christian religion and divine revelation offered the best resource for improving morals and creating social life. Christian moral codes edify the spirit and promote moderation of the passions. Downplaying the brutality of Christians in war during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the essay reasons teleologically that human nature has become more civilized since antiquity (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Gesellige* I:57). Lange views human history as moral progress toward increasing sociability.

Enemies of religion, whom Lange calls "Feinde der Menschlichkeit," mock their own human nature by ignoring moral codes and destroying the social regulation of government for individual gain. Mimicking the anti-religious stance, Lange portrays it with irony:

Ich will mir keine Mühe geben, ihre Meinungen umzustossen. Lasset uns die Religion abschaffen. Die Kanzeln mögen diesen Weltweisen eingeräumet seyn, um ihre Beredsamkeit gegen das Daseyn eines höchsten Wesens anzuwenden. Die Obrigkeiten sollen, um sie nicht im Zaum zu halten, abgeseßet sein. Es sey also kein Richter in Israel, und jeder thue, was seinem Herzen gut deucht. Der Eigennuß und die Wollust sey das einzige Band, welches die Menschen zusammen halte. Dieses wird wohl, nach dieser Herren Meinung, die Saturnische Zeit und das güldene Jahrhundert seyn.
To achieve the golden age, the essay derisively suggests, one need only abolish religion, replace the clergy with self-serving philosophers, and allow all people to pursue their desires (I:58). Such egoism threatens to destroy the social bonds of brotherhood (I:59).

Materialists, Lange claims, represent a grievous danger to society and morality, and the weekly's program of enhancing sociability and conscience (*Geselligkeit* and *Gewissen*) (I:2, 4, 10). Grounding a society in personal interest promises social turmoil they contend: "So kommen wir ganz natürlich zu dem ersten Grundsaß des Hobbesischen Naturrechts, welcher ist der Krieg eines jeden gegen jedermann." With a polemical turn, the essayist proposes that tolerating atheistic philosophy will denigrate religious belief and threaten the moral sense.

Da wir also uns auf nichts kommandes [kein Jenseits mit Gott] anzuschicken haben, da unser Geist (wenn der Atheist anders einen zulässt,) nicht der vornehmste Gegenstand unserer Handlungen ist: so werden wir nothwendig alles auf die Sinnlichkeit richten. Wir werden uns einzig beschäftigen, unsere Empfindungen zu vergnügen und darinnen unser wahres Leben setzen; also wird alle Geselligkeit aufgehoben seyn. Eine kleine ehrgeizige Maschine, wird tausend ihres gleichen aufopfern, um tausend solche Maschinen in demüthiger Stellung zu ihren Füssen zu sehen. Was wird mich hindern, die Maschine meines Nachbarn durch einen Dolch oder durch Gift zu zerstören, wenn ich seine weibliche Maschine zur Stillung der Wollust besitzen will. (I:60)

According to this view, Christian faith is the force for social regulation. Without it, the teleology of progress to politesse and decorum will cease and humans are reduced to the mechanics of self-serving sensuality. All sense of sociability is lost. Moreover, the balance of the material and spiritual that social networks refine no longer factors into human nature (cf. I:21). Characterizing egoistic human beings as machines, Lange argues with Hobbes that people who only respond to their senses are mere automata. While the critique is aimed at Hobbes, the materialists, and atheists in general Lange's representation of humans as murderous and adulterous machines might include an indirect critique of La Mettrie himself. Given the publication of *L'homme machine* a year
earlier, he was the most prominent European representative of the hypothesis man as
machine.

Later in the same year, Der Gesellige openly critiqued the machine-man theory.
In a letter submitted by a (possibly fictitious) reader, people are grouped according to
their willingness to help others. Using fellow individuals for personal gain characterizes
l'homme machine. Noting that an unnamed author (most likely La Mettrie) has dubbed all
human beings l'homme machine "zur Schande der Menschheit," the letter writer re-
appropriates the term and redirects the shame at the theory itself. Instead of imagining
people as beings without a soul and free will like La Mettrie, it chides those who make
choices only for individual profit. Such sheer egoism is a burden to others and lacks all
higher purpose. Thus the new use of the name "machine man" designates social
interaction:

Sie begnügen sich damit, daß andere ihnen nützlich sind, und bekümmern sich wenig darum, ob
sie des Stromes der Wohlthaten, so sich von den Geselligen dieser Erde auf sie ergiesset, würdig
sind, oder nicht....Sie schlafen, essen, trinken, holen Othem, bewegen sich, und bereiten sich
dadurch zu einer unanständigen Fortdauer ihres noch unanständigeren Lebens zu. Sie thun
eigentlich gar nichts, was nur einiger Aufmerksamkeit wert wäre; sie sind, mit einem Worte,
unnütze Bürden der Erde. (Der Gesellige I:402)

Given the fact that Der Gesellige, like other moral weeklies, targeted an audience of
women and non-academics, this may have been a strategy to influence their opinion.
While they might have heard of L'homme machine, they did not necessarily read it.
Tainting the phrase with laziness, exploitation, and unsociability places the theory in an
undesirable light. Perhaps it was designed to dissuade readers from reading L'homme
machine in the first place. Certainly, this re-appropriation of the term sought to create a
negative opinion.

Several years later, Der Mensch further develops the critique of materialism.
Citing reader requests, the editors defend the spiritual nature of the soul against
materialism in issue 250 (1753) entitled "Erweis der geistigen Natur der menschlichen Seele gegen die Materialisten" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:305). According to the 1756 preface to the weekly, Meier penned this piece and all other unsigned issues of Der Mensch (XI:) (3v). Having judged the dry style of a systematic presentation as inappropriate for a weekly, Meier chooses the essayistic mode to influence reader attitudes on materialism (cf. I:6). To this end, he seeks to counter materialist theories that describe reason and the will as physical faculties. Other materialist positions that describe the soul as "fine matter" are of secondary concern because they are virtually indistinguishable from spirit (VI:306). Relativizing the materialists' skepticism about the existence of a soul, Meier argues that human beings cannot know the essence of all things (VI:307). While the nature of the soul cannot be fully explained, a conscious being is unthinkable without one. The soul functions in union with the body to form the complete person (VI:308).

To argue the existence of an immaterial soul, Meier draws upon logic, rhetoric, and experience. The rational approach goes beyond the interaction of soul and body by showing how materialism calls existing knowledge into question (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:313-314). If there were no soul, theological study and Christian belief would have little meaning. In view of their ethical project, Lange and Meier insist on the existence of a soul. Employing logic, Meier proposes that it is not material being, but education and upbringing that shape moral nature (VI:315). Meier thus enters what we now call the nature versus culture debate by insisting that the social environment plays a greater role than biological factors in shaping thought, directing the will, and stirring up
the emotions (together: the soul). His assessments that materialists are myopic and only concern themselves with sensualism, or the claim that believing in a thinking, self-determining machine is less comprehensible than the mysteries of Christian faith, supplement arguments based on logic (VI:312, 316).

Some of the most provocative grounds for the existence of a soul stem from attempts to reconcile the coexistence of the physical and the moral functions. Using a series of four questions, Meier casts doubt on the persuasiveness of materialist theory and instead posits a dualistic anthropology. Assuming the soul is material, he asks, how do moral faculties and deep affections such as love, friendship, and sympathy work? (VI:308-309) Likewise, if one acknowledges that human beings are capable of reflective thought, does materialism explain reflection as a pre-programmed motion or as the result of an external impact? (VI:309) If language stems from physical being, do differences in language signal discrepancies in speakers' physical natures? (VI:310) How does aged-based physical degeneration affect the capacity for thought? (VI:311) This opening part of the essay argues that human nature is too complex to be circumscribed in only physical terms.

Experience, Meier maintains, confirms the existence of a soul because of its interaction with the body. Physical injury or degeneration inhibits the soul because of this union of the body and the soul (VI:313). And the interaction also functions in the opposite direction. When people becomes aware of a moral wrong, they can suffer a

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60 La Mettrie also asserted that thought and the will were socialized, but this occurred via sensation. See La Mettrie L’homme machine 171-173; Wellman ch. 6.
61 There was a contemporary context for asking how physical reactions reveal moral signs. In his Gedanken von Thränen und Weinen (1748), Halle physician Ernst Anton Nicolai experimentally differentiated tears generated by touch or pressure from those caused by a (complex) psychosomatic emotional reaction. Nicolai concluded that whoever cries for emotional reasons is more than a material being (Zelle, "Sinnlichkeit und Therapie" 14).
physical shock or a loss of appetite (VI:316). To discredit the idea of a material soul and bolster his claim of interaction, Meier briefly mentions the tradition of philosophical answers to the question of intersubstantial causation, citing the three hypotheses of occasionalism, preestablished harmony, and physical influx (VI:311). Although he tries to avoid academic debates, only giving his own treatise "Beweis, daß keine Materie denken könne" (1742) brief mention (cf. VI:307), his appeal to authority adds weight to his attack on materialism.

Overall, Meier's "Erweis der geistigen Natur der menschlichen Seele gegen die Materialisten" employs a logical mode of persuasion. With some rhetorical variation, it is effectively informative, but not overwhelmingly entertaining. The closing, which incorporates a fictitious letter, briefly engages the imagination and underscores preceding arguments with an amusing diversion. To accentuate the problems he envisions with a material soul, Meier's epistolary interlude addresses a friend in the manner of letters in a novel of sensibility:


As someone who identifies with Meier before he has seen him, the addressee Z. utilizes his powers of imagination, whereas Meier draws on memory. Both employ judgment to assess moral character. All of these abilities are faculties of the soul. In the context of Meier's preceding long argument assailing a materialistic view of humankind, an ordinary reader could separate imagination, memory and judgment as intellectual faculties from physical instincts. Communication through writing and shared imagination, the middle of the letter makes clear, is the basis for friendship as a value that cannot be attributed to
personal acquaintance. Friendship thus appears to be a feeling that transcends a physical presence and can do without a body. Meier concludes the letter with the remark:


The use of a machine metaphor in a letter of sensibility is clearly ironic. To imagine and address a dear friend as a "Materie" or "Machine" was unheard of at the time. By comparison, Gellert's address "Lieber Bruder" to his good friend Johann Adolf Schlegel represented the ideal of sentimental friendship (Gellert, Briefwechsel I:119). Building on his logical and rhetorical criticism of materialist theory at the beginning of the essay, Meier's playful irony in the letter accentuates his skepticism. Human beings differentiate themselves from other living beings through their powers of reason and their moral sense. La Mettrie, by contrast, used comparative anatomy to assert the similarity of humans to brute animals, including apes (La Mettrie, "L'homme machine" 158). Using irony in a playful manner provides evidence that the author wants to engage his audience and encourage their co-judging of materialism. For Meier, to characterize human beings as machines implies that they lack the distinguishing quality of what it means to be human.

Evaluating the final essay as a whole, Meier follows Gottsched's schema in linking philosophy, rhetoric, psychology, and morality (cf. McCarthy, Crossing Boundaries 137), and approaches the middle style favored by Neukirch, Hallbauer, and Gellert. Meier's essay on materialism addresses the reader in Neukirch's favored colloquial speech. "Erweis" proves to be a kind of thought experiment; it questions whether thought can function materialistically as a pre-programmed function or as a response to external input (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VI:309). Ultimately
Meier says no; he denies materialism a purely corporal explanation of thought in favor of a human being with a soul. Employing rhetoric to balance the preponderant logic, he claims that materialists do not prove their position and that humans cannot know all about the soul (VI:306-307). A further use of rhetoric is the letter introduced late in the argument, which provides an interlude to lighten the tone. By introducing irony and play to the piece in the letter, Meier re-engages and entertains readers in an attempt to earn their trust and shape their thought. The letter moves readers by psychologically anticipating and challenging their reactions with a cognitive dissonance from imagining a human being (even themselves) being affectionately called a machine (cf. VI:317). What is at stake for Meier is the soul's role in shaping human nature and the Christian culture's system of morality (VI:318-320). Combining levity in the fictitious letter and the pointed argument, Meier's text clearly and artfully participates in the German Enlightenment tradition of essayistic writing.

Materialism provides the backdrop against which Meier argues his traditional view of human nature, one that requires a soul independent of its body. Certainly, positing body/soul dualism as a corrective to materialist theory only underscores the anthropological theme of the essay. Obviously, Meier argues in logical fashion. What makes "Erweis" an anthropological version of the essay is the meandering thought – the shifting from logic to persuasive discussion to experience that imitates natural human non-linear reflection. What makes "Erweis" an anthropological essay is the citing of experiences in which body and soul interact, such as when apprehension of a misdeed causes a shudder or a loss of appetite (VI:316). Finally, it is the artistic counterargument
of the letter that implies the existence of a soul in identifying what is most human and employs irony to persuade readers of their dualistic anthropology.

**Reading Bodily Signs as Moral Markers**

Meier further develops anthropological and moral discourse in the serialized satire that begins in *Der Mensch's* twenty-fifth issue. The story entitled "Begebenheiten der Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" was published in ten issues over the period of six years. Combining identifiable characters from its target reading public (a daughter, a mother, a merchant father, an officer, a school director) the story illustrates the moral foibles of ordinary bourgeoisie people. In contrast to the tradition of one-dimensional moral characters common in moral weeklies, these characters achieve a more realistic representation of human nature (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige" VI:410-411). Elisabeth and her parents are mixed characters who frequently fail in their pursuit of appropriate moral action.

Drawing on the Horatian tradition of *prodesse et delectare*, the narrative combines essayistic and narrative texts to educate and to entertain (cf. Brandes 228). The first installment opens with an essayistic introduction on the uses of biography, problems with contemporary life writing, and different accents developed in this satire. The key function of biography is to discover human nature (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Mensch* I:201, No. 25). Already in *Der Gesellige*, a similar preface to the "Pragmatischen Lebenslauf eines Dorfschulmeisters" (1750), had recommended a redirection of biography: *Der Gesellige* suggests it is more useful for the public to read biographies of simple people. Such histories demonstrate the actions and moral principles closest to
those of normal readers (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Gesellige* V:329, No. 221).

Extending this call, *Der Mensch* solicits biographies from its readers to acquaint everyone with different temperaments and ways of thinking and acting. Human nature is best understood via empirical observation of human actions. Using biography for moral edification presents problems because everyone can manipulate their public image. Additionally, most biographies profile famous or noble subjects whose extraordinary experiences significantly differ from those of average readers. By choosing the biographies of ordinary citizens, Meier hopes to access the "most secret thoughts and actions" of people "as they actually are" (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Mensch* I:201-202).

Thus, biographies of queens, warriors, martyrs, and discoverers are to be superceded by those of middle-class persons. Each weekly sets a slightly different emphasis. *Der Gesellige* accents lives demonstrating social mores, while *Der Mensch* reorients this context by focusing on psychology and the social reasons for human action.

Reconceiving the poetics of biographical writing is part of the goal to train the public to be self-reflective, critical readers. In addition to choosing the proper subject for the readership, a middle-class person, the manner of presentation is also important. Not surprisingly, the goals of the middle style are also appropriate in fiction. To change a reader's thought, writers must engage their audience. In aiming for naturalness and balance, the writing guidelines outlined by Neukirch can be equally applied to narrative: a casual conversational tone, varying and balanced narrative modes, and creative touches of playfulness and irony are elements of a successful style (cf. McCarthy, *Crossing Boundaries* 139-140).
Of the two weeklies considered here, Der Gesellige initiates the focus on biography. In the introduction to the biography of the Knight Lucidor, the narrator emphasizes the process inherent in identity formation. Body and soul develop separately. Whereas the body follows pre-programmed stages of development from the womb, the spirit only begins to take shape after birth. By exposing individuals to varied experiences, the social environment plays a key role in shaping people over a lifetime. We read, for example:

Die Eindrücke, welche uns bilden, kommen und wirken unvermerkt und nach und nach, und daher kommt diese Unwissenheit, weil wir nicht acht auf uns selbst gegeben haben, und nicht im Stande gewesen sind, so viel Anmerkungen zu machen. Indessen sind doch die Begebenheiten der Seele weit wichtiger und weit anmerkungswürdiger. Es kommt das Verhalten eines Menschen durch seine ganze übrige Lebenszeit oft auf eine Kleinigkeit seiner ersten Jugendjahre an; und da so oft grosse Glücks- und Unglücksfälle ihren ersten Grund in diesen so wenig wichtig scheinenden Begebenheiten haben, so sieht man leicht, wie viel man daran gelegen ist, solche wohl zu bemerken. (S. G. Lange and Meier, *Der Gesellige* V:401-402, No. 227)

Impressions shape individual character. The development of the soul depends on perceptions archived as text, images, and memories, on which an individual can draw at a later date.

In this context, autobiography and self-reflection function as key tools. They enable reflection and analysis on the development of critical thinking, moral judgment, and one's moral stance:

Ich wolte daher, daß jeder, der die Gabe zu denken besitzet, die Geschichte seiner Seele aufzeichnen, und wenigstens zu seiner eigenen weiteren Ueberlegung anwenden möchte. Ich verstehe aber unter der Geschichte der Seele eine Nachricht, wie man habe denken lernen, und die Verzeichnung der Begebenheiten, dadurch man die Tugenden und das Laster, die Wahrheit und den Irrthum hat kennen lernen. Hieher gehören auch die kleinen Begebenheiten, und das auf uns wirkende Verhalten anderer, dadurch wir gerührt worden sind, und die ihren Einfluß auf die nachfolgenden Jahre unsers Lebens gehabt haben; indem sie uns besser oder schlimmer gemacht haben, als wir sonst würden gewesen seyn. (402)

Again emphasizing the significance of the details, the narrator encourages readers to reflect on how other people shaped their lives. This activation of moral reflection with Pietist traditions, which also encouraged a self-evaluation of one's moral history to
identify personal transgressions, causes for conversion, and divine blessings. One of the movement's founding texts was Philipp Jakob Spener's (1635-1705) autobiographical *Pia desideria oder Herzliches Verlangen nach gottgefälliger Besserung der wahren Evangelischen Kirchen* (1675). Johan Henrich Reitz' multi-volume *Historie der Wiedergebohrnen* (1698-1745, 7v.) and Johann Adam Steinmeß' periodical *Verbesserte Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes* (1737-1743, 4v.) each featured numerous Pietist biographies and autobiographies that served as form and model for middle-class self-evaluation (cf. Wagner-Egelhaaf 140). *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* thereby connected to an existing tradition of using life stories to inspire self-reflection, autobiographical production, and personal development. In addition, the Pietists and the editors of moral weeklies both targeted women readers (cf. 146-147). In the process, the moral weeklies stimulated an increasingly secular trend that encouraged self-reflection, telling one's story, and writing as a means to self-cultivation. Just as the biographies in *Historie der Wiedergebohrnen* and *Bau des Reichs Gottes* encourage reader identification, the satire "Begebenheiten der Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" in *Der Mensch* serves as a mirror for disidentification (Medina). Elisabeth's family name Irrwisch signals to the reader that she errs and that she should not to be emulated.

To increase their knowledge of human nature, readers must peruse Elisabeth's story, acknowledge family Irrwisch's moral foibles, and avoid replicating their choices. Reading thus recreates human actions through the imagination, and these actions can then be observed and analyzed as if one had experienced them in real life. In a adapting a critical stance, readers also observe the narrative as a case study that employs empirical methods to discover what it means to be human. Elisabeth's history is portrayed as an
archived example of human behavior. In an appeal for authenticity, the narrator characterizes himself as an impartial editor of the story's sources, which have been corroborated by "einen gerichtlichen Beweis" (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch I:202). The story thus employs the editor fiction popular in earlier novels such as Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Johann Gottfried Schnabel's Insel Felsenburg (1731-1743) and Der im Irr-Garten der Liebe herum taumelnde Cavalier (1738). While Lange and Meier minimize the use of the fictional editor for the moral weekly as a whole (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch" XII:423), Meier employs narration in "Die Begebenheiten der Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" to achieve the pedagogical goal of instructing the reader in critical thinking.

The story advocates principles of moderation and Lebensordnung by citing the Irrwisch's parenting model. Lebensordnung refers to a mid-eighteenth-century interest in direction for proper living, or Diät. In "Irrwisch," the parents raise their daughter with an inconstant concept of morality that ranges from no restrictions to strict discipline. When the fifteen-year-old Elisabeth becomes pregnant, the family mores seem unprincipled as the parents are more concerned with their reputation than with Elisabeth and the baby's well-being. While the mother only insists that Elisabeth complete her religious education, the father only wants a rich suitor with a marriage proposal for his daughter. These were important considerations for eighteenth-century middle-class families. Yet the toleration of fornication and the subsequent cursing (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch II:111, No. 55), later eclipsed by corporal beatings (VIII:316, No. 332), all lie outside the ethic of moderation (cf. Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige" 425), that is idealized in the Lange/Meier moral weeklies (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VIII:315).
Dramatizing the folly of poor parenting, Meier directs readers to instruct their children to act reasonably.

Whereas previous moral characters in moral weeklies represented a clear type, the introduction of mixed characters in Der Mensch promotes an emphasis on psychology (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'" XII:435). In the history of Elisabeth Irrwisch, psychological motivation of characters means that one must address both the corporal and the spiritual nature of the title character. Elisabeth receives an education representative of her middle class at mid-century that includes reading, writing, arithmetic, and religion. But she retains little. In addition to her mental limitations, her only natural beauty lies in soft skin. Under her mother's guidance, she trains her body to appear attractive. From childhood on, she follows a particular regimen: washing with the March snows, wearing gloves to bed to protect her hands, binding her feet in tight shoes to shape their growth, and styling her body with the stays of a corset (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch I:206, No. 25). She manipulates her appearance from youth through practices designed to help her conform to a standard of outer beauty. In addition, her habits and behaviors make her even more strange: as a child she is told that she should dress herself like a bride, while as a fifteen-year-old she remains attached to her dolls. "[Sie] gewöhnte sich an, sich auß sorgfältigste zu putzen und durchaus schön zu thun: denn die Begriffe von einer Braut, von einem Manne, und von der Schönheit waren von Kindesbeinen an in ihrer Einbildungskraft mit einander verknüpft worden. Sie lag demnach beständig vor dem Spiegel, und war in ihre eigene Gestalt ungemein verliebt" (I:207). In her youthful narcissism, she is captivated by outward appearances and obsesses over the image she projects to others. Her parents also instill in her an excessive self-love. Learning that her
husband will travel for six months, the mother takes a soldier as a lover and becomes pregnant (I:203). Her father, who only occupies himself with his business, fails to recognize that he could not have possibly been present at Elisabeth's conception (I:204).

"Irrwisch" also informs readers about human nature through psychological analysis of the emotions. Early in his career, Meier had published a monograph on the topic: the *Theoretische Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen* (1744). The study creates a system of the emotions to further knowledge of human nature and self-knowledge for all readers, but with particular consideration for the needs of writers, orators, and philosophers (Meier, *Theoretische Lehre* 3-4, 8, 12). Studying the emotions promises four outcomes: (1) "eine genauere Erkenntniiß der menschlichen Seele, ja des ganzen Menschen überhaupt" (13, §12), (2) the skill, necessary for writers and orators, to activate the emotions in readers and listeners (14, §13), (3) the knowledge and investigation of other people's minds to advance in the world and to persuade others to do one's will (15-16, §14), and (4) the achievement of an advantageous relationship with other people (17, §15). Learning to interpret, provoke, and guide the emotions meant acknowledging the body as a medium of communication and opened new ways to pursue sociability.

Key to the nexus of the material and metaphysical being is chapter seven in the *Theoretische Lehre*: "Die Veränderungen des Körpers in den Gemüthsbewegungen."

Simplifying the array of possibilities, Meier identifies seven bodily changes that signal emotive changes. The visual cues are linked to physiological changes such as the amassing of blood and increased pressure in the heart. The signs include: changes in facial color, alterations in facial expression, fluctuations in breathing, a loss of speech, an unnatural physical strength, anxiety (including melancholy), and sickness. The
Theoretical Treatise describes these bodily signs as effects of the passions altering the circulatory system, especially the movement of the blood. On anxiety, Meier avers:

In den Leidenschaften pflegt, gewöhnlicher Weise, das Herz beklemmt, und, wie man zu reden pflegt, schwer zu seyn. Und wie ist das auch anders möglich? Das Blut ist in der stärksten Bewegung. Es dringt mit grosser Heftigkeit und in grosser Menge in das Herz hinein. Das muß nothwendig dadurch mehr ausgedehnt und gedruckt werden. Es fühlt demnach die Last des Bluts und wird schwer. So bald die Leidenschaft aufhört, hört auch die ausserordentliche Bewegung des Bluts auf, und das Herz wird von seiner Last befreyet, und also leichter. (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 404-405)

Psychological and physiological changes occur simultaneously. In this work, Meier theorizes the relationship of the material and the metaphysical with preestablished harmony (392). The book thus argues that shifts in emotion and alterations in blood pressure occur parallel to each other, and because of causes within their separate psychological and physiological spheres. Regardless of what theory one chooses to explain the causation (preestablished harmony, occasionalism, physical influence), the simultaneity of corporal and spiritual fluctuation provokes bodily signs that make the emotions readable.

The satire of Elisabeth Irrwisch applies this theory to narrative. The attempts of father and mother to marry off Elisabeth, and Elisabeth's own search for a lover repeatedly cause family conflicts. Drawing on the theory of body language in the Theoretische Lehre, Meier psychologically motivates the characters through their physiological reactions. For example, one day Herr Irrwisch curses his daughter because she is not yet married: "Er sprach mit der verdrießlichsten Miene von der Welt: Ich weiß bey meiner Seel nicht Ließgen, warum du keinen Mann bekomst. Du bleibst mir über dem Halse, und wirst ein altes Thier. Aber so gehts! [...] Kann man doch den Koth hinter der Thüre vor Geld los werden, und ich sollte unsere Liese nicht los werden?" This inhuman confrontation triggers an immediate reaction from his wife and daughter.
Die Tochter brach in eine Fluth von Thranen aus, welche sie mit starkem Schluchzen begleitete. [...] Allein sie war wider ihren Vater deswegen erbittert, daß er sie ein altes Thier gescholten. Sie stürmte daher zur Stube hinaus, und lief heulend in ihr Zimmer.[...] [Währenddessen] saß Herr Irrwisch mit aufgesperrtem Maule, und erstaunte über das, was er sahe. Es war ihm nicht möglich, sich worauf zu besinnen, um etwas zu sagen. Seine Frau verzog ihr Gesicht in alle schreckliche Mienen einer Furie." (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VIII:306-307)

The narrator describes "erobernden und bestürmenden Augen, Waden, Minen" (II:109), paints tear-filled red eyes, flushed cheeks, and vivid portrayals of hopelessness: "Jungfer Irrwisch sank an die Lehne ihres Stuhls, und hieng ihren Kopf wie eine Nelke, die ein Wurm gestochen hat" (VII:317). Meier uses physical manifestations and metaphors to make a character's psychological state come alive.

Pushing one's mental and emotional limits to an extreme can also induce physical side effects. Not only does Meier propose a relation between the psychological state and the condition of the body, but the link is proportional. The degree of emotional agitation causes a correspondingly intense physical response: "Ich behaupte ausserdem, daß die beyden übereinstimmigen Veränderungen der Seele [und des Körpers], auch der Grösse nach, mit einander übereinstimmen" (Meier, Theoretische Lehre 392). Thus, the average reader can observe other people, decode their corporal semiotics, and inductively make generalizations about the intensity and the nature of their emotional state.

In the spirit of the time, Meier attempts to apply Newtonian theory to the body-soul relationship. This would mean that the energy present in a spiritual state shapes physical movement and is subject to the law of the conservation of energy. Anticipating objections by Cartesians, he concedes that the hypothesis of proportional intensity could not technically be proven because the body and soul are different substances. Eschewing pure reason, he insists that experience confirms his hypothesis of a proportional relationship: "Ich habe Erfahrung auf meiner Seite" (393). Thus, extreme emotions and extreme physical reactions develop concurrently:

This psychological-physiological knowledge takes narrative form in "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfers Elisabeth Irrwisch." For Elisabeth, reading a break-up letter from her lover Seladon crushes her hopes for a renewal of their love and causes her to faint. Her father, who dismisses the lover, yet pleads no intention of ruining his daughter's happiness, dies because of his sense of guilt (S. G. Lange and Meier, Der Mensch VIII:317). The fainting episode and the father's death represent a pinnacle of psychosomatic stress.

Further examples of the integration of bodily signs into the narrative of "Irrwisch" are summarized in the following table. All but one of the signs detailed in the Theoretische Lehre appear transposed in literary form in the satire "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch."
Table 6-1: The coordination of Meier's aesthetics of the emotions in theory and in narrative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bodily Signs</th>
<th>Literary Representation in &quot;Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch&quot; (Der Mensch, 1751-56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Changes in facial color</td>
<td>Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 190, P. 137); Maid Irrwisch &quot;lichterloh&quot; (N. 289, P. 309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Alterations in facial expression</td>
<td>Mr. Heißsporn (N. 55, P. 109); Mr. Irrwich (N. 126, P. 360); Maid Irrwisch (N. 190, P. 139, 142); Maid u. Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 332, P. 306-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Fluctuations in breathing</td>
<td>Maid Irrwisches Seufzer (N. 163, P. 289-90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Loss of speech</td>
<td>Maid Irrwisch (N. 163, P. 290); Mr. Irrwisch (N. 332, P. 307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Unnatural physical strength</td>
<td>Maid Irrwisch (N. 289, P. 317); Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 442, P. 302, 304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Anxiety, &quot;heavy heart&quot;</td>
<td>Maid Irrwisch (N. 332, P. 317); Mrs. Irrwisch (N. 478, P. 257)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By incorporating concepts from the Theoretische Lehre, "Irrwisch" illustrates how Meier translated philosophical ideas for a broad reading public. In narrative form, his ideas could entertain all and educate interested readers, much like Friedrich Schiller later did in "Der Verbrecher aus Infamie." Studies on Meier's anthropological thought have typically focused on his philosophical writings, ignoring the twenty-one year moral weekly project altogether. Read in combination with the Theoretische Lehre, "Irrwisch" provides an important literary manifestation of Meier's aesthetics of the emotions. This theory of bodily signs accentuates the foibles of the characters to further the moral education of readers.

In conclusion, reading the moral code necessitated embracing the body and the soul as both innately human. By re-appropriating l'homme machine to describe people who take advantage of others and thereby cheapen sociability and friendship, Lange and Meier embrace imaginative self-fashioning. Intellectual faculties like creativity, memory, and judgment, coupled with values like honor and friendship make a soul inherent to human nature. La Mettrie's denial of an immaterial soul calls into question the source of...
thought. Yet for Lange and Meier, physiology fails to explain the intricacies of creative and moral thought. They believe creativity, logic, and judgment originate in an immaterial soul. As intellectuals who contribute to society by shaping ethics and entertaining their public, Lange and Meier believe their own thought and writing stem from something greater than a physiological mechanism. A key means for the editors to counter La Mettrie and the popular materialist doctrine was by emphasizing creative production, which Lange and Meier accomplished in their writing.

The soul is, however, not the only source of the moral. Reading the moral code also means interpreting corporal signs as moral markers. In the history of Elisabeth Irrwisch, physiology registered emotional states. What might seem merely visceral in the representation of the emotions, functions to prompt moral reflection. Thus for Meier, the aesthetics of emotions assisted the production of ethical values based on reason and logic. As a sign system producing emotional identification and prompting the creation of moral values, "Irrwisch" illustrated the interconnectedness of the material and the metaphysical.

In view of the literary production of the time, the essays and narratives in Der Gesellige and Der Mensch creatively displayed anthropological thought for a popular readership. Whereas Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe (1740) and Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747/1748) integrated elements of physical sensibility, the moral weeklies published in Halle offered more anthropological content. This might be the outcome of an individual author's interests, but the tradition of anthropological thought in Halle was part of a local culture from which Lange and Meier drew inspiration. Though the historical record has relegated Der Gesellige and Der Mensch to a footnote in the literary and cultural history of the Enlightenment, they were some of the
most successful German periodicals in the mid-eighteenth century. By critically engaging theorists like Krüger, La Mettrie, and A. G. Baumgarten, *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* provide key insight into Enlightenment vistas on moral human nature.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation argues that anthropological discourses developed in Germany prior to Platner's much heralded *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* published in 1772. The Halle discourse on the intersection of the corporal and the spiritual begins with Christian Thomasius' *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* (1696). The book's subtitle, "Von der Arztney wieder die unvernünftige Liebe und der zuvor nöthigen Erkänntniß Sein Selbst," points to its focus on a "medical" treatment of the emotions and on an acquisition of self-knowledge that characterized anthropological inquiry into the late Enlightenment. Likewise, Georg Ernst Stahl's *Negotium Otiosum* (1720) critiques the parallel spheres of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's theory preestablished harmony and argues instead that the soul directs physical activity. While in the *Deutsche Metaphysik* (1719) Christian Wolff draws his account of intersubstantial causation from Leibniz, Joachim Lange contends that Wolff's machine metaphors consign human life to a deterministic existence. This stance is incongruent with experience and theology. In his 1724 *Bescheidene Entdeckung*, Lange explains causation with physical influx because it allows the individual self-determination in a metaphysical and in a religious sense. Continuing the Halle tradition of critique, Georg Friedrich Meier's *Theoretische Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen* (1744) proposes that physicians, particularly Cartesians, err by allowing the body to influence psychological states. Instead, according to his preestablished harmony approach, the physical and the metaphysical human spheres function in parallel and remain connected through Divine Providence. Intersubstantial causation is impossible; thus, only the soul shapes psychology. In response, Johann August Unzer's *Neue Lehre von den*
Gemütsbewegungen (1746) proposes a theory of physical influence in the emotions based on the neurophysiology of the day. Samuel Gotthold Lange and Meier continue to develop the rich Halle tradition of anthropological writings by addressing the emotions, dietetics, and causation (via opposition to materialism) in their periodicals Der Gesellige (1748-1750) and Der Mensch (1751-1756). After 1740, Halle's contribution to the product of German-language anthropological discourse intensified. Numerous important texts in this tradition have been excluded, in particular those of the "Vernünftige Ärzte" (cf. Zelle, Vernünftige Ärzte). Shaping this group were Johann Gottlob Krüger, his student Unzer, Johann Christian Bolten, and Ernst Anton Nicolai.

Beyond Halle, numerous writers contributed to the formation of German-language anthropological theory. Barthold Heinrich Brockes' Irdisches Vergnügen in Gott (1721-1748), Walch's Philosophisches Lexicon (1726), Albrecht von Haller's "Über den Ursprung des Übels" (1734), Adam Bernd's Eigene Lebensbeschreibung (1738), Johann Michal Loëns Der redliche Mann am Hofe (1740), and Christian Fürchtegott Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G*** (1747/1748) represent popular works with anthropological themes. Subsequently, the early writings of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, and Friedrich Nicolai (cf. Geyer-Kordesch, "Die Psychologie des moralischen Handelns. Psychologie, Medizin, und Dramentheorie bei Lessing, Mendelssohn und Friedrich Nicolai"; Kosenina, Anthropologie und Schauspielkunst) as well as of Christoph Martin Wieland, Johann Gottfried Herder and Immanuel Kant
(Zammito) shape German discourse on the body/soul nexus. German anthropological
thought in the 1770's thus evolves from an extensive German tradition. As formulated in
_Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise_, Platner's theory was not a break but a
continuation of German reflection on the relation of the material and the metaphysical,
and of sensibility and rationality. Researching earlier thinkers of anthropology provides
not only a context for anthropological theory of the late Enlightenment (Kosenina,
"Afterword" 310), but reveals the interesting and important nuances of writings by
Krüger, Unzer, Lange, and Meier in their own right. Attempts at periodization of the long
eighteenth century frequently emphasize dissimilarities, threatening to obscure the
complex and interconnected nature of thought at the time (McCarthy, _Crossing
Boundaries_ 317). Thus, while moving back the date of the "anthropological turn," I have
striven to reconstruct some of its early Enlightenment sources.

To emphasize the continuity of German anthropological thought, I have asked
readers to refocus on its origins multiple times. Chapter one argued philosophical
anthropology was a European discourse that discussed the interrelation of body and soul.
While surveying the writings of Platner, Herder, and Kant as representatives of the so-
called anthropological turn around 1770, the opening chapter redirected readers to the
Walch and Zedler lexica published earlier. In creatively redefining anthropology in
Walch's _Philosophisches Lexicon_, chapter two surveyed the cultural context around 1740.
Chapters three and four suggested that anthropological discourses developed in the
English and German novels of sensibility and culminated in Wieland's _Agathon_. Despite
careful readings of multiple novels, the combination of the epic genre and the lexica
provided only a partial account of German anthropology's development between 1740
and 1770. Thus, I again asked readers to reconsider how the knowledge of human nature developed by going further back in time. Academic debates in Halle (chapter five) and the moral weeklies of Lange and Meier (chapter six) provided a rich resource of anthropological writing during the first half of the eighteenth century. The dissertation thus highlights the intensified use and increasing popularization of anthropological discourses in lexica, novels, academic writing, and moral weeklies (narrative prose and essayistic writing) beginning in the 1740's.

While some historians claim that anthropology in the early Enlightenment was primarily an investigation of physical human nature (Linden 19-20n62), this conception invites reconsideration. Linking the material and metaphysical spheres – for example, in the *Ausübung der Sittenlehre*, in *irdisches Vergnügen in Gott*, and in *Bescheidene Entdeckung* – authors engaged multiple anthropological discourses. In addition to those who wrote on physical human nature, philosophers, theologians, and poets linked corporal being to moral human nature. Thus, for example, Thomasius in the *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* identifies emotional causes of immorality in *Wollust*, which is caused in part by the physical senses (Thomasius, *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* 185, 197-198). In a similar manner, Lange in *Bescheidene Entdeckung* insists that only the theory of physical influence explains intersubstantial causation without negating human freedom.

Philosophers and theologians may have had reason to beware of materialism and hedonism as challenges to their metaphysics and their way of life. Yet in defining what it means to be human, the writers featured here also embrace the body as the soul's equal partner. For Lange and Meier in the field of dietetics, this means regulating food, drink, exercise, and moderation to promote happiness, health, and longevity. By proposing that
emotions rely on neurological functions, Unzer's *Neue Lehre von den Gemütsbewegungen* acknowledges the complex psychosomatic interactions present in the passions. Finally, Meier's satire "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch" and Wieland's *Geschichte des Agathon* each uses the body to instruct readers in appropriate moral behavior.

In comparing the anthropological content of lexica (chapters one and two), novels (chapters three and four), essays and monographs (chapter five) and moral weeklies (chapter six), I propose that the sources interrelate in their uses of anthropological discourses. For example, Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* and Zedler's *Universal-Lexicon* provide an annotated bibliography of essays and monographs. In writing issues of *Der Mensch*, Meier refers to his own philosophical essays against materialism and on the emotions (Meier, *Beweis; Theoretische Lehre*). Considering the novels together, physical sensibility and the anthropological discourses in *Der redliche Mann am Hofe, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G***, and Miß Fanny Wilkes* are less pronounced than the fully-developed anthropological discourses in Wieland's novel. In contrast to the novels of sensibility, *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* more prominently feature discourses on the body/soul nexus. They are more distinguishable in the sense that theories of dietetics and an opposition to materialism are directly addressed. This is in part a product of essayistic writing, which combines rhetoric and reason, psychology and ethics (McCarthy, *Crossing Boundaries* 137). Nonetheless, the moral weeklies provide a concentration of anthropological discourses that informs both philosophy and narrative theory for a popular audience. Like the novels of sensibility discussed here, the Halle weeklies shape what it is good to be and right to do. It has been argued that the moral
weeklies and the German novel developed interdependently while also drawing on the 
gallant style (McCarthy, "Gallant Novel"). As an extension of their interrelationship, the 
moral weeklies and the novel both were vehicles for anthropological discourses.

Many of the authors cited in chapters three through six did not refer to 
anthropology by name, although they investigated the interrelation of body and soul, of 
the physical and the moral. In particular, writers from Halle engaged the following 
anthropological discourses: (1) explanations of intersubstantial causation (occasionalism, 
preestablished harmony, physical influence); (2) dietetics, Lebensordnung [life regimen], 
and moderation via the Mesotes philosophy; (3) an exploration of human nature through 
observation and self-observation; (4) theories of emotion; (5) polyperspectival narration 
through a combination of essays and stories in fictional texts. Walch's Philosophisches 
Lexicon, Loën's Der redliche Mann am Hofe, Gellert's Leben der schwedischen Gräfin 
von G***, Hermes' Miß Fanny Wilkes, and Wieland's Geschichte des Agathon each 
engaged at least several of these discourses. In addition, the novels by Loën, Gellert, and 
Hermes developed an anthropological mode that combined knowledge of the nerves and 
of the emotions in what chapter three terms (6) physical sensibility.

The dissertation title "Reading the Moral Code: Theories of Mind and Body in 
Eighteenth-Century Germany" summarizes the entwinement of defining the moral and 
the anthropological during the eighteenth century. At the time, observation was a 
principal means to learn and to assess mores as guides for human experience. 
Enlighteners taught that people learned by example. Reading a person's physiognomy, 
tracing their movements, or evaluating their judgments – in real life or in a book – thus 
required training in interpretation and critical thought, key goals of enlightenment.
This dissertation seeks to contribute to German Studies by engaging the fields of literature, history, the history of philosophy, theology, and the history of medicine. Evaluating texts by drawing on the cultural artifacts of their time allows literary and non-literary sources to come into contact with one another in a manner that allows for new perspectives. In the context of contemporary medical writings, for example, the physical nature of sensibility as depicted in *Pamela, Leben der schwedischen Gräfin von G****, and *Miß Fanny Wilkes* becomes more recognizable. Knowledge of Pietism's emphasis on observation, biography, pursuit of self-knowledge, and the insistence on choosing a personal rebirth makes Thomasius' close proximity to the Pietists in *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* identifiable, while also providing a context for life writing in *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch*. Reading *Miß Fanny Wilkes* in the light of the Enlightenment's focus on hypochondria and melancholia reaffirms the relevance of a once popular text long relegated to neglected status by literary histories. For the eighteenth century – when strong disciplinary boundaries had not been drawn – working between fields was a standard practice. Our efforts to understand how eighteenth-century culture functioned can be enhanced by current interdisciplinary investigations that recover details, interpret their contexts, and make their discourses comprehensible today. Working interdisciplinarily thus involves a kind of "thick description" (Geertz 20).

Hence, this dissertation provides an example of German cultural studies that reevaluates the role of Walch's *Philosophisches Lexicon* and the moral weeklies *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* in the rise of anthropology. By reading the *Philosophisches Lexicon* with attention to explicit cross-references, textual guides to appropriate reading, and implicit cross-referencing, the lexicon emerges as an archive of cultural knowledge.
Similarly, perusing the Lange/Meier moral weeklies to find articles of anthropological relevance yields the historian surprisingly great results. These periodicals are more than an alternative to sacred writing. *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* also contain a defense against scientific materialism. Through further research, it may be possible to confirm these political biases as the editors' response to Brandenburg-Prussia's implicit support of materialism by granting asylum to La Mettrie. The idea of a "nicht hinterfragten politisch-sozialen Ordnung" [an unchallenged socio-political order] in *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch* could, with verification of political intent in the writings on materialism, require a reevaluation of the weeklies' political stance (cf. Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige" VI:424). Thus, using once-popular sources that have fallen from view might provide insight into how authors, editors, censors, and other intellectuals iterated political positions and how they formed cultural knowledge.

Future research on the nexus of anthropology and magazines in the German Enlightenment should consider the role of Pietist autobiography in shaping anthropological discourses. In addition to Johann Henrich Reitz' (1655-1720) *Historie der Wiedergebohrnen* (1698-1745, 7v.), Graf Erdmann Heinrich Henckel initiated the Pietist monthly *Die leßten Stunden einiger [...] selig in dem Herrn verstorbenen Personen* (1720-1733, 4v.). Henckel's periodical was followed by five other Pietist magazines. The Pietist periodicals published after 1731 feature book reviews, articles

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63 Magazins that follow Henckel's monthly include Traugott Immanuel Jerichow's *Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes* (1731-1734), the *Fortgesetzte Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes* (1735-1737), *Supplementa der auserlesenen Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes* (1737-1740), *Verbesserte Sammlung auserlesener Materien zum Bau des Reichs Gottes* (1737-1743), and the *Closter=Bergische Sammlung Nüßlicher Materien zur Erbauung im Wahren Christenthum* (1745-1761).
on recent church conventions; on the progress of missionary work in Eastern Europe, North America, and Great Britain; and on biblical interpretations. Spanning the period from 1731 to 1761, the later magazines also feature numerous biographies and autobiographies that demonstrate the interconnection of self-reflection, reading, and writing. A further study could trace the development of biographical writing in the periodicals over thirty years. It might also compare discourse on self-observation and the body to that in Adam Bernd's (1676-1748) *Eigene Lebensbeschreibung* (1738) (cf. Pfotenhauer 55-76; Schings, *Melancholie und Aufklärung* 97-126).

The Pietist magazines provide an important context for evaluating the life writing in Lange and Meier's *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch*. Beyond the "Geschichte meines Geistes" and "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irwisch," the Lange/Meier periodicals incorporate numerous (auto-) biographical texts to promote moral reflection. Just as editors of Pietist autobiographies encourage readers to reflect on and write their own life histories, Lange and Meier recommend that readers keep a diary (*Der Mensch* No. 168). Recording one's personal history enables individuals to reflect on their actions over time. Histories, journals, and biographies promote self-observation, monitoring personal motivations, and contemplating the causes of one's emotions. Consequently, writing, reading, and reflection function together in a hermeneutic process to promote confession and self-therapy and thereby to increase self-knowledge.

In addition, natural law and aesthetics provide a basis for the anthropological discourses that has not been fully explored in this dissertation. Researchers have noted that the integration of natural law theory into the moral weeklies helps them argue for the

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64 In *Der Mensch*, these include "Schreiben Leberecht Spührers, des Packeseltreibers" (No. 22), "Geschichte des Herrn Redlichhausen" (No. 93), and "Des Freyers Schreiben und Abschilderung seiner Person, und des Frauenzimmers, welches er zur Ehe haben will" (No. 229).
equality of all human beings (Brandes, 225). And though Der Mensch has been cited as promoting human equality and social responsibility without regulations imposed through state power (Vollhardt), a more complete evaluation of the weekly's natural law sources is in order. Similarly, historians have recognized that Der Gesellige addresses aesthetic theory in some detail, including rhetorical questions of evoking emotions, while Der Mensch distances itself from the theory of sensual knowledge (Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Gesellige'", 427-429; Martens, "Nachwort: 'Der Mensch'", 442-445). In light of the use of aesthetics for moral instruction in "Die Begebenheiten des Jungfer Elisabeth Irrwisch," its role in the weeklies, including in stories, essays, and poetry, should be reconsidered.

Other articles in Der Mensch address anthropological topics that underscore my thesis regarding the participation of moral weeklies in popularizing anthropological knowledge. Let two examples suffice. Issue 147 asks "Ob die Verstellung der Aufrichtigkeit zuwider sey?" and proposes that dissimulation complicates the pursuit of human knowledge via observation (cf. No. 152). This issue provides cause to consider how to decode masked emotion and intention and how intimately one must know another person to accurately decode their bodily signs. It raises the question of if and when deceiving others is ethical. And it broaches the psychology of a conflicted individual, one who chooses to hide true feelings or knowledge to some end, yet may feel guilty about it. Psychology is a central topic in Der Gesellige and Der Mensch that deserves further attention. Acknowledging that some psychological problems require minimal treatment, issues 320 and 328 offer general strategies for a psychological cure of moral debilitation. In analyzing the periodical, one could also compare proposed physical treatments for
psychological problems in *Der Mensch* (e.g. no. 232) with those in the medical weekly *Der Arzt* (e.g. no. 150-152).

Johann August Unzer's *Der Arzt, eine medizinische Wochenschrift* (1759-1764) aims to improve the reader's *Lebensordnung* or way of living. Citing Addison and Steele's *Spectator* and Fontenelle's scientific writing as his inspiration, Unzer adapts the Enlightenment program of education and entertainment in pursuit of a wellness program. Issues focus on the mechanical nature of the human body (no. 6), the influence of the emotions on physical being (nos. 24, 198) the imagination's influence on the human body (no. 69), and hypochondria (Unzer, *Der Arzt : eine medicinische Wochenschrift* no. 25; cf. Bilger; Reiber, 149-162). Positing the interconnection of body and soul (no. 45), *Der Arzt* explores the impact of pleasure (No. 80), desire (No. 159), music (No. 141), and fear (No. 131) on one's state of health. *Der Arzt* thus makes physiological function and its influence on intellectual and moral life a topic of popular knowledge. It appears that Unzer featured the interaction of the physical and the metaphysical only sparingly in his fanciful fictional texts. But further study on this question is needed. With its wide range of anthropological topics and the magazine's resounding popularity during the eighteenth century, an evaluation of its discourses on human nature could provide a complement to similar discourses in *Der Gesellige* and *Der Mensch*. Even here I could provide only a sampling of the richness of material in the weeklies published by Lange, Meier, and Unzer.

Looking beyond a synchronic analysis, a future study could survey the development of writing on the body/soul nexus from the moral weeklies *Der Gesellige* (1748-1750) and *Der Mensch* (1751-1756) through *Der Arzt* (1759-1764) and Melchior
Adam Weickard's *Der philosophische Arzt* (1775-1777) to Karl Philipp Moritz' *Magazin zur Erfahrungseelenkunde* (1783-1793). Indeed, the Halle physicians and Moritz have already been shown to share an interest in empirical observation of the soul (Zelle, "Experimentalseelenlehre und Erfahrungsseelenkunde. Zur Unterscheidung von Erfahrung, Beobachtung und Experiment bei Johann Gottlob Krüger und Karl Philipp Moritz"). In looking at the breadth of materials from the late Enlightenment, historians have identified other magazines on anthropology and empirical psychology that could prove useful for a diachronic study (Eckardt et al.). Linking the development of anthropological discourses in magazines over a longer stretch of time would further strengthen the argument for the continuity of anthropological thought during the eighteenth century as proposed in this dissertation.

Finally, the recovery of anthropological discourses in the moral weeklies makes one question to what extent these discourses appear in other types of magazines during the eighteenth century. Taking Christoph Martin Wieland's *Der Teutsche Merkur* (1773-1810) as an example, future studies could trace the role of anthropological discourses penned by Wieland in his serialized novel *Die Geschichte der Abderiten* (1774-1781) or the many narrative and essayistic responses to Rousseau in the 1770's. One might peruse Johann Karl Wezel's "Ehestands-Geschichte des Herrn Philip Peter Marks" or the excerpt from Karl Philipp Moritz' *Anton Reiser* (both published in the *Teutsche Merkur*) to identify the role of the body/soul nexus in shaping human nature. Readers could also evaluate the selection from Johann Reinhold Forster's *Reise um die Welt* to see how it produces ethnographic discourses within the context of reading the moral code.
As the study of the nexus between body and soul, philosophical anthropology remains relevant today. In its challenge to Cartesian theory, the idea of an integrated human nature historically lost out in the European discourses. Since the nineteenth century, for instance, mainstream medical treatment has dissociated the body from the soul. Yet in our advancement of research and therapy in fields like neuroscience, we return to questions that inspired eighteenth-century holistic anthropological theory. How do thought processes work? How does one develop feelings of empathy and love? We are thus still asking how the physical and the moral interact and still pondering what makes us human.
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