Consolidatory Genocide: Final Solutions to Elite Rivalry

By

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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Central Question</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Central Argument</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure of the Book</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 A Typology of Political Violence</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Ideal Types of Mass Political Violence</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 A Theory of Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Explanations of Mass Indiscriminate Violence</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Theory of Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Testing the Theory of Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empirics</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Within-Case Evidence, the Process of Consolidatory Violence in Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background to the Genocide</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explaining the Violence</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deadly Elite Competition</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalyzation of Elite Rivalry and Genocide</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Data</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Elite Rivalry and Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Consolidatory Genocide and Elite Purges</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Bibliography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Theory of Consolidatory Genocide Process</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hypotheses related to Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Average Treatment Effect of Consolidatory Genocide on Adverse Leader Fates within 5 Years</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Theory of Consolidatory Genocide Process</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A Typology of Mass Political Violence</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Descriptives of Dependent and Independent Variables</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mass Indiscriminate Violence Leaders</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Elite Rivalry and Mass Indiscriminate Violence Onset</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Probit on Elite Purges for Consolidatory and Counter-Guerrilla MIV Spells</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>Comparison of Banks and ACER Purge Data for all MIV Countries 1950-2004</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>Consolidatory Genocide on Elite Rivalry</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2</td>
<td>Counter Guerrilla MIV on Elite Rivalry</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.3</td>
<td>Two-Stage Elite Rivalry Models</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1</td>
<td>Probit on Elite Purges for Consolidatory and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abstract

In this dissertation, I present and test a political theory of mass indiscriminate violence (i.e. genocide or politicide). Extant scholarship explains mass indiscriminate violence as a counter-guerrilla strategy. Almost half of these episodes, however, occur outside guerrilla conflict and have therefore been explained by unfalsifiable leader ideology or as unique cases only. I argue that leaders under conditions of heightened elite rivalry, adopt genocidal violence against outgroup civilians to coerce ingroup civilians and local leaders into support. This allows leaders to capture state institutions from the bottom up and consolidate their power, while undermining support for elite rivals. These rivals can ultimately be purged from the regime. In my theory, therefore, authoritarian leaders sometimes unleash mass indiscriminate violence on outgroup civilians because they seek to purge regime elites. Based on newly collected original data on elite purges and on the type of genocide for the years 1950-2004, I show that this type of violence, which I call ‘consolidatory genocide,’ is intimately connected to authoritarian consolidation. Within-case analysis further demonstrates that the theory can explain some of the darkest episodes of mass violence, such as the Rwandan Genocide.
Chapter 1

Introduction

After his defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was faced with a Shi’ite uprising in the South. With the help of his republican guard, the rebellion was quickly and violently put down. In order to ensure that no rebels could hide within the Mesopotamian Marshes, the marshes were drained by diverting the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. The Marsh Arabs (Ma’dan), dependent on the marshes for their livelihoods, were left destitute and over a hundred thousand were displaced (Moumin 2007). From his advent to power, Saddam Hussein adopted a wide arsenal of violence to safeguard his power, including mass indiscriminate violence against civilians. During his twenty five year reign, the dictator committed countless crimes and was responsible for the deaths of thousands of civilians. In doing so, Saddam Hussein survived many challenges. Beyond draining the marshes, notable examples are the massacre of Kurdish villages and the use of chemical weaponry against civilians in Halabja. And yet, when we look at comparable humanitarian crimes in the twentieth century, Saddam has shown considerable restraint. Saddam never set out to kill all Kurds or Shi’ites, like all the Tutsis were targeted in Rwanda, nor did he ever escalate to the country-wide mass indiscriminate violence of Stalin, Mao or Pol Pot. Rather his violence was concentrated at the fringes of the Iraqi state in areas of active rebellion. The type of counter-guerrilla mass violence of Saddam has been well-explained, but Pol Pot’s nationwide mass indiscriminate violence remains a puzzle.
The previous century saw unprecedented systematic and mass indiscriminate killing of civilians in only a handful of regimes. Why did these governments kill many thousands, even millions of civilians? What drove leaders like Pol Pot to countrywide mass murder, where leaders like Saddam Hussein did not? We have such difficulty understanding mass violence that we commonly attribute an ideological extremism to genocidal leaders like Stalin or Mao that goes beyond that of authoritarian leaders like Saddam Hussein. That extremist ideology drove Rwandan and Cambodian leaders to mass indiscriminate violence seems plausible at first glance. Some people may simply be drawn to extremism, because of personality or socialization. However, authoritarian leaders are not randomly selected, but are skilled survivors and politicians that survive in a deadly environment. Within the context of authoritarian regimes, physical survival is dependent on political survival. Consequently, most authoritarian leaders are skilled in political survival and unlikely to take huge risks for ideological reasons alone.

Mass indiscriminate violence, whether it is in the form of mass collectivization, mass starvation, or genocide, is not without risk. In Rwanda, Cambodia, or Darfur, for example, mass indiscriminate violence resulted in armed resistance. That mass indiscriminate violence is costly also has strong theoretical underpinnings. Indiscriminate violence targets groups of people irrespective of their actual behavior. This leaves the targets of the violence with very few options. For civilians, cooperation with the state does not provide any security against the violence. This solves coordination problems and generates armed resistance. Not only are authoritarian leaders willing to bear the costs of resistance that mass indiscriminate violence generates, but as this book will show, they do so at times when their regime is deeply divided. Why would authoritarian leaders that are skilled in political survival, take these risks when they are least secure? Extremist ideology seems to be a poor explanation for the occurrence of mass indiscriminate violence.
The Central Question

This book aims to provide a new explanation for mass indiscriminate violence. Mass indiscriminate violence in the form of genocide, mass collectivization, and mass internment and starvation comes at an unimaginable cost in human life. For the societies stricken with the violence, it has enduring consequences for security, health, economic development, and transitional justice. Over the previous century, genocide was responsible for approximately two to four times as many civilian deaths as the battlefield deaths of civil and interstate war combined (Valentino 2004). This book addresses a fundamental question in the production of mass indiscriminate violence: why do leaders initiate mass indiscriminate violence? Is it ideology or do they do so for instrumental reasons? It seeks to provide an explanation for why leaders would initiate genocide that accounts for two seemingly anomalous empirical observations: i) authoritarian leaders commonly simultaneously initiate mass indiscriminate violence and purges of rival elites; and ii) authoritarian leaders tend to initiate genocide when they are least secure vis-a-vis rivals within the regime. This pattern is common to all incidents of genocide that are not related to counter-guerrilla campaigns and it encompasses quintessential genocides such as Stalin’s collectivization, the Cambodian killing fields, and the Rwandan genocide.

From a leader’s perspective, genocide targets mass violence against an out-group outside the regime, while elite purges target violence towards an in-group within the regime. Both types of violence not only have distinct targets, but they are also independently risky to leader survival. Given these risks, it is surprising that they coincide. Genocide targets people irrespective of their behavior. Because of this, it demonstrates to civilian targets that collaboration with the leader will not shield one from violence. This realization helps coordinate resistance (Wood 2003) and generates costly opposition to a leader (Kalyvas 2006). Purges of elite competitors within the
leader’s regime are also risky to authoritarian leaders, because the targets of the purge may seek to counteract with a coup (Roessler 2011, Chiozza and Goemans 2011). Though Valentino (2004) suggests that leaders initiate genocide because of extreme leader ideology (i.e. communism or racial supremacy), his explanation seems lacking. Why not consolidate power first before embarking on a pet project of genocide? Why do authoritarian leaders simultaneously engage in independently risky genocide and elite purges? Why does within-group competition (e.g. elite purges) commonly coincide with between-group violence (e.g. genocide)? These are the core questions I seek to address.

The Central Argument

The book deals with the elite politics at the top of authoritarian regimes and its relation to mass indiscriminate violence. I argue that mass indiscriminate violence is a strategy initiated by leaders that seek to restructure power from the “bottom up” to increase their security vis-a-vis rivals at the top of the regime. I posit this to be a four-stage process. First, the leader establishes a machinery of violence by relying on parallel state structures and paramilitary groups (e.g. Verwimp 2006). For this, the leader may rely on poor or unemployed co-ethnics that gain from the redistributive nature of violence. Genocidal violence generates wealth, status and formal positions; and can therefore provide payment and patronage to the perpetrators.

Second, the parallel state unleashes mass indiscriminate violence. Armed militias are unlikely to directly threaten the power base of rival elites, but they do effectively terrorize civilian populations (Mueller 2004). Armed militias prey on the marginalized out-group, while local government and security institutions are pressured into non-intervention within a fast-changing environment of nationwide insecurity. Third, this chaotic situation allows the leader to capture local institutions. This is actually a
seizure of a divided state apparatus by a single faction from the regime under a veil of extreme genocidal violence. As part of this process, the majority of in-group civilians and local elites are effectively coerced into non-intervention and complacency because: i) the violence is demonstrative: people see the costs of intervention; ii) any resistance is met with selective violence; iii) they risk retaliation from out-group extremists should the tables turn; and iv) action is risky and inaction implies support for the leader. Under these conditions of coercion, ordinary people may seem to become “willing executioners” (Goldhagen 1996). This violent capture of local institutions is a recurring pattern of mass indiscriminate violence (e.g. in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda - Kiernan 1996, Oberschall 2000, Straus 2006).

Fourth, the resulting grass-root consolidation allows the leader to purge rival elites. As violent militias take control of the state from the bottom up, rival elites find their pillars of support eroded and they are powerless to intervene. Subsequently, rival elites can be (violently) purged. The genocidal violence may turn into civil war, but the leader will have resolved a greater internal threat at the cost of a lesser external threat. Mass indiscriminate violence is therefore intimately connected to processes of authoritarian consolidation.

In answering why leaders initiate mass indiscriminate violence, this book provides four innovations. First, I identify and classify a new type of genocide that has not been examined as a separate class of political event. While we have a good understanding of mass indiscriminate violence within the context of irregular counter-guerrilla operations, extant scholarship treats all other mass indiscriminate violence as being motivated by ideology rather than an explanation based on leader’s incentives for self-preservation. The focus is therefore on these under-explained spells of mass indiscriminate violence that are observably distinct from counter-guerrilla genocide. Unlike counter-guerilla genocide, these episodes have previously occurred with little

1E.g. Guatemala (Valentino 2004) and Chechnya (Lyall 2009)
warning, quick resolution, and mass civilian casualties - e.g. Rwanda, Cambodia. A better understanding of the mechanisms underlying mass indiscriminate violence may therefore help improve early warning systems.

Second, I provide an innovative leader-level explanation for initiation of mass indiscriminate violence that to date has been “explained” by ideology or local processes only (e.g., Valentino 2004, Straus 2006). The lack of a leader-level explanation is a critical theoretical shortcoming as previous studies have demonstrated that mass indiscriminate violence is driven by political elites (e.g., Valentino 2004, Verwimp 2006). I argue that mass indiscriminate violence is a process through which leaders coerce their in-group populations into mass violence against out-group civilians in order to capture local institutions and win elite competition. Consequently, my theory implies that genocidal communities do not merely consist of “willing executioners” (Goldhagen 1996), but that perpetrators that provide auxiliary support to genocide may simultaneously be victims in a cynical process of authoritarian consolidation that forces civilians into non-intervention and regime support. This may lead us to expand the definition of victim and to focus our efforts on reintegration of perpetrating victims, improving post-conflict stability and transitional justice.

Third, my theory also provides novel insights into the processes of authoritarian consolidation. Authoritarian leaders rely on elite support for survival and therefore cannot purge all potential rivals within the regime. Leaders’ and challengers’ overlapping base of support creates significant uncertainty with respect to the outcome of purge attempts. Leaders that fear coups, must nonetheless be selective with purges as purges generate resistance from the regime elite on which the leader depends for survival. Specifically, if elite supporters fear to be purged, the leader may incentivize the coordination of rivals to remove the leader (Svolik 2012). Purges are therefore no less dangerous to execute than coup attempts. Though Roessler (2011) and Svolik (2012) argue that leaders have a variety of “coup-proofing” strategies at their disposal
that reduce coup risks, these are not viable unless the leader has reached a certain threshold of power vis-a-vis elite rivals. I argue that mass indiscriminate violence is instrumental to leader security when rivals are too strong to contain by alternative means.

Last, the book examines a key, but often overlooked, dimension in the production of political violence: whether it is driven by between- or within-group competition. The past two decades of conflict research rest on the assumption that violent conflict in its many forms - e.g. war, civil war, and genocide - is destructive. Because this destruction reduces the “pie” for all, there should always exist a bargain that both parties prefer over conflict. Causes of conflict should therefore be found in bargaining failure (e.g., Fearon 1995). However, when between-group conflict is a product of within-group competition, this key assumption that violence is destructive no longer holds. Violence may destroy life and property, but also generates direct security benefits to the leader. When these benefits outweigh the costs of the conflict, any room for a bargained agreement between groups disappears. As a consequence, violent leaders may seem to act irrationally when they are actually playing a different game. This has profound consequences for both our understanding of violent conflict as well as its resolution.

Structure of the Book

Chapter two provides a typology of mass political violence, including genocide, and describes the scope of the argument presented in this book. It introduces a new key dimension in the production of mass political violence that is often overlooked: whether the violence is a driven by between- or within-group competition at the level of elite politics. Moreover, it shows that certain types of violence that are currently considered similar may actually be very different. It also introduces mass indiscrimi-
inate violence that occurs outside the context of guerrilla war as a distinct type of mass indiscriminate violence. This chapter establishes the scope of my argument with respect to seminal studies of violence.

Building on the scope conditions of chapter two, chapter three develops the theoretical argument in detail. It deals with the importance of elite rivalry for authoritarian politics. From a western democratic perspective, authoritarian regimes are commonly misunderstood and seen as irrational unitary actors. In reality, authoritarian regimes commonly have deep divisions within their ranks. This rivalry directly affects physical survival of leaders and elites in authoritarian regimes. The remainder of the chapter ties elite rivalry to mass indiscriminate violence. Mass indiscriminate violence affects the pillars of support on which elites build their security. Here, I argue that the process of mass indiscriminate violence may help restructure elite pillars of support and is therefore tied to authoritarian consolidation.

In chapter four, the theory is tested quantitatively using a large sample time series of country-years as well as matching on the leader level. To test the theory, new data is leveraged on mass indiscriminate violence and purges for all major instances of mass indiscriminate violence since 1945. Analysis of the data suggests that: i) mass indiscriminate violence corresponds to a greater probability of elite purges; ii) that high risk to a leader’s tenure corresponds to a greater likelihood of mass indiscriminate violence onset; and iii) that leaders that initiate mass indiscriminate violence have a reduced risk of death, imprisonment and removal by rivals from within the regime compared to similar (matched) leaders. Despite the small number of mass indiscriminate violence episodes, these results are statistically and substantively significant and suggest that the initiation of mass indiscriminate violence allows leaders to win elite competition.

In chapter five, I qualitatively trace the process of mass indiscriminate violence

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2 As explained in chapter 4, this study adopts a threshold of 10,000 deaths per year.
within the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Here, I establish the causal chain that connects mass indiscriminate violence to internal consolidation for a large number of observations within a single case. It therefore captures both the sequential nature of mass indiscriminate violence (i.e. tenure risks, militias, violence, capture of local government, consolidation, and elite purges) and the mechanisms through which mass indiscriminate violence reconstructs the pillars of authoritarian support. As expected, the violence in Rwanda was ultimately connected to internal intra-Hutu competition and consolidation. I provide a summary of the empirical findings and discuss the implications of the theory both with respect to future research into mass indiscriminate violence as well as potential policy implications in chapter six.
Chapter 2

A Typology of Political Violence

Let me here introduce three incidents of violence: one of Nazi violence in Rome; one of Russian military violence in Chechnya; and one of Hutu violence in Rwanda. These examples differ with respect to time and place, but are similar with respect to the indiscriminate nature of the violence where victims are targeted irrespective of their actual behavior:

On March 24, 1944, a group of young Nazi officers led by SS Captain Erich Priebke gathered at the Ardeatine Caves at the outskirts of German-occupied Rome with several cases of Brandy and the order to execute 330 Italian male civilians in retribution. The previous day, on March 23, 1944 the Communist resistance had orchestrated a bomb attack in Rome, killing thirty-three policemen. Priebke went beyond the initial orders to select prisoners who had already been sentenced to death and included other political prisoners as well as civilians rounded up from the streets in order to arrive at the required ratio of ten Italians to every German. Due to a miscount, a total of 335 prisoners ranging in age from 15 to 70 were shot by sometimes reluctant Nazi officers. Following the mass executions the caves were detonated with explosives to cover the bodies (Holocaust Memorial Museum 2013).
The Ardeatine Caves atrocity may have been an outlier with respect to its massive scope, but was otherwise similar to the punitive razzias committed by the Nazis following partisan attacks. Compare the Nazi violence to Russian indiscriminate violence against Chechen villagers:

On 29 December, 2001, Russian soldiers surrounded and cut-off the Chechen village of Tsotsin-Yurt. In the early morning of the following day Russian forces began a massive raid into the village. During the raid the Russians killed two Chechen fighters that had taken refuge in the house of an elderly villager. In their assault on the house, the Russians used the son of a village elder and another young male villager as human shields. These villagers were wounded in the assault, taken, and later found to have been extrajudicially executed.

In Rwanda, much of the violence was no less indiscriminate:

Following the assassination of president Habyarimana, a mob of the Interahamwe militias set out to attack neighboring Tutsi farmsteads under the leadership of Jude. Unsurprisingly, Jude relied on his Interahamwe militia to carry out the violence. However, Jude also relied on a group of Hutu outsiders that were not members of the militia: any Hutu’s close to the centers of militia power, with familial ties to Interahamwe members were asked to join the group of looters; similarly, Hutu that the group encountered en route to Tutsi homes were requested to join in. To those Hutus singled out to join the band it was clear that refusal would be considered treason and dealt with harshly. Mixed groups consisting of hardliners and selected joiners therefore participated in indiscriminate atrocities (Fujii 2009).
These three examples of indiscriminate violence have some seemingly similar characteristics, but they are also very different. In the Nazi case, the violence, a punitive razzia, was secret and aimed at a population it sought to control. In the Russian case, security forces seem to adopt ethnicity as a shortcut for rebel identification, but in the Rwandan example ethnicity was more than a shortcut to enemy identification; the public act of violence itself provided a local militia leader with identification of support within the in-group and forcing fellow Hutus into complicity, allowing co-optation of non-extremist Hutus into complacency by witnessing and contributing to the violence. The distinction between these examples of indiscriminate violence should induce us to think in broader terms about the mechanisms that produce mass political violence.

This chapter seeks to problematize, clarify and conceptualize the multifaceted concept of mass political violence. As part of this process, I seek to develop a broad typology of mass political violence that builds on traditional distinctions between violence, but that aims to be more methodical and capture differences in violence that have been largely ignored before. I argue that different ideal types of mass political violence may seem observably equivalent, but have distinctly different underlying causal mechanisms. As such, we cannot seek to explain the occurrence of mass political violence without first untangling and unpacking the multifaceted concept of violence. One way to deal with this is to generate more precise typologies that will provide the scope conditions to examine the distinct parts of the broad concept of mass political violence. I argue that at the aggregate level of elite politics, mass political violence is part of a bargaining process that occurs not only between, but

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1To study mass political violence is to study the occurrence of a rare event with a high level of equifinality - eg. that an outcome may have multiple causes. Equifinality is a sign of unit heterogeneity that poses real problems to analysis. Surely many of the outcomes we are interested in have multiple causes. This is the main reason scholars rely heavily on multiple regression for analysis. However, equifinality is not just multiple causes but distinct causal processes. In other words for outcomes in which equifinality is a problem, there are multiple sets of causal variables that form distinct causal mechanisms.
also within rival factions. I further argue that within these categories it is useful to
distinguish between conventional (interstate) and irregular (intrastate) violence, as
well as between selective and indiscriminate violence.

Four Ideal Types of Mass Political Violence

Mass political violence has traditionally been reduced to three aggregate categories: i)
interstate war; ii) intrastate or civil war; and iii) genocide or politicide. In this frame-
work interstate war is violence between states, civil war is violence between groups
within states and genocide is the violence aimed at the extermination of groups.
Though these distinctions are easily recognizable and have proven helpful, I argue
that these traditional distinctions do not fit the underlying mechanisms that generate
violence, are imprecise, and therefore merit reconsideration. Though the distinction
between inter and intrastate war has proven important for international law and ques-
tions of sovereignty, scholars of peace and conflict have increasingly asked whether
this distinction is useful to the explanation for conflict onset, termination, conflict
processes and violence (e.g. Gleditsch 2004, 2007).

As an alternative, Kalyvas (2005) introduces the technology of war, denoting
the distinction between conventional and irregular conflict. In conventional conflict
enemy forces can clearly be identified, whereas in irregular conflict there exists an
identification problem: it is difficult to identify support and resistance within the
population. In many respects the conventional - irregular distinction is superior to
the interstate - intrastate war distinction for the understanding of the mechanisms
that produce mass political violence. Moreover, within irregular war, Kalyvas (2006)
provides us with deeper understanding of the mechanisms and processes of political
violence by clearly distinguishing between selective and indiscriminate violence.

Building on the main dimension of technology of conflict, I introduce a third di-
mension in the production of mass political violence: whether the violence is a driven by between- or within-group competition at the level of elite politics. Considerable scholarly advances have been generated through the study of violence and conflict as a contest between rational actors (e.g. Kalyvas 2006, Fearon 1995) However, mass political violence can both be a product of between-group and within-group competition at the dimension of elite politics. The distinction between violence as a product of between-group and within-group competition is a key, but often overlooked source of unit heterogeneity. Though it is obvious that between-group competition corresponds to between-group violence, I argue that competition within groups may drive between-group violence as well. Although the violence produced as part of within- and between group competition may at first glance look very similar, the underlying mechanisms predictably differ, because the target audience for the violence differs. Therefore, mass political violence should not only be part of the bargaining process between groups, but likely of the bargaining process within groups as well. If we partition mass political violence on the key dimension of the technology of conflict and elite competition we arrive at four ideal types that affect the production of mass political violence, presented in table 1, namely: i) conventional between-group conflict; ii) diversionary conflict; iii) irregular between-group conflict; and iv) consolidatory genocide.

**Conventional between-group conflict**

Most of the scholarship on mass political violence has either explicitly or implicitly focused on violence that is produced as the result of a bargaining process between groups (e.g. Fearon 1995). The perception that mass political violence is a product of between-group competition goes back to Von Clausewitz (1909) with the observation that conflict is the continuation of politics by forceful means. Conventional between-group conflict does not have identification problems; both support and opposition
### Table 1: A Typology of Mass Political Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology of violence</th>
<th>Elite politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between-group competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conventional conflict</strong> (no identification problem)</td>
<td><em>Conventional between-group conflict:</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Allied Bombing of Germany</em></td>
<td>Iraqi invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Second World War 1942-45</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Arab Israeli Wars 1948; 1967; and 1973</em></td>
<td>Falklands War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>American Indian Wars and Resettlement 16th-19th century</em></td>
<td>Nazi invasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Irregular conflict</strong> (identification problem)</td>
<td><em>Irregular between-group conflict:</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Spanish Civil War Violence 1936-39</em></td>
<td>Cambodian Killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Boer War Civilian Internment 1900-02</em></td>
<td>Rwandan Genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Guatemalan Counter-Guerrilla Genocide 1981-83</em></td>
<td>Stalin’s Collectivization</td>
</tr>
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are easily identified. Therefore, the production of violence can largely be explained through the onset and termination of conflict as bargaining failure (e.g. Fearon 1995).

The onset of conventional between-group conflict may be explained by information or commitment problems that preclude the conclusion of a peaceful bargain. In conventional between-group conflict, the goal of the violence is to break enemy resistance or the rival war machine in order to win a political bargain (Von Clausewitz
1909). As both parties exercise control over territory, both have clearly identifiable bases of support within their respective territories. In order to arrive at the best bargaining outcome both parties aim to destroy the rival’s military capacity or will to resist. Still, violence may be no less extreme and indiscriminate. Downes (2008) shows violence against non-combatants to occur in conventional conflict due to denial and coercion. Under denial, civilian targeting occurs when civilians are viewed as part of the rival war machine, because they work in arms factories, for example. Moreover, rising costs of conflict may push governments to strategies of indiscriminate violence in rival-controlled territory to break enemy resistance through coercion. This is demonstrated in the starvation blockades of World War I or the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II, for example (Downes 2008). However, indiscriminate violence in conventional war differs from indiscriminate violence in irregular war because the rival support base is identified. Because both parties exercise almost full control in their territories, their respective populations have no real option to switch sides. Indiscriminate violence may therefore break resistance through coercion, but does not risk the support of the rival population as it is already firmly under control of the rival camp.

A special case of mass indiscriminate violence in conventional between-group conflict are conflicts over territory between settlers and native populations. Conflicts between settlers and native populations do not generally have an identification problem: it is clear who the enemy is. Therefore it is more akin to conventional conflict than irregular conflict. However, because the colonists seek to control the territory rather than seek to govern the native population it commonly leads to forced dis-

2Note that these bases of support are a function of control of the territory and need not depend on popular support of the regime.

3Downes (2008) focuses on civilian victimization, which he defines “as a government-sanctioned military strategy that intentionally targets and kills noncombatants or involves operations that will predictably kill large numbers of noncombatants”. Common forms include bombardments, sanctions, massacres, forced movement, and internment of civilians that cause widespread deaths. Here, I will treat civilian victimization in its relation to indiscriminate (or selective - see below) violence.
placement, starvation, and mass indiscriminate violence. Examples are the mass indiscriminate violence against Native Americans or violence to displace the Arab populations during the 1948 Arab - Israeli War (Downes 2008).

**Diversionary conflict**

When conventional conflict is the product of within-group competition, the conflict itself may hold value, becomes ex-post efficient, and bargaining failure can therefore no longer explain the occurrence of conflict. Conflict may be a product of within group competition because violence: i) may generate rally around the flag effects; ii) has distributional properties; and iii) provides leaders with information about elite support. The notion that the outbreak of conflict may induce people to rally around the flag, thereby increasing nationalism and support for the leader (e.g. Levy 1988), has been around for centuries: in Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Henry IV advises his son to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels”. The diversionary war thesis leads us to expect that leaders are more likely to initiate conflict when the risk to tenure is high. However, Chiozza and Goemans (2003, 2004a - among others) find little substantive evidence for the diversionary war thesis.4

Rather, Chiozza and Goemans (2011) develop the argument that the means of losing office rather than risk of losing office influence a leader’s decisions to initiate conflict. In authoritarian regimes, elite competition occurs in a sometimes dangerous environment of anarchy, which is unregulated by institutions that can reliably offset defection. Moreover, losing office commonly implies losing life or liberty. Therefore, in authoritarian regimes, we should expect within-group competition to be much more salient than between-group competition.5 Chiozza and Goemans (2011) show that

4Specifically, increased risk to tenure does not correspond to crisis initiation, increased risk of conflict does not correspond to an increased risk of losing office (Chiozza and Goemans 2003), and leaders with a high risk of losing office are less likely to be targeted in international crises (Chiozza and Goemans 2004a).

5Another mechanism through which violence may be the product of within-group competition deals
lethal within-group competition between an authoritarian leader and the military may induce leaders to initiate conventional conflict. By sending the generals to war, the leader forces rivals within the military to either pre-occupy itself with the planning and execution of the conflict, or to openly demonstrate their disloyalty (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). Moreover, the conflict may help the leader and generals to reliably commit to not violently remove each other. Alternatively, because the costs of losing office are truncated and emerging victorious from conflict may provide a leader with immediate security gains, leaders may opt to gamble for survival (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). This leads authoritarian leaders in particular to initiate conflict when they are insecure.

Potential examples of authoritarian leaders that initiate conventional conflict as a result of within-group competition abound. For, example, the timing of the Falklands war and of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait can both be explained by leader’s need to deal with immediate threats from the military (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). There is a notable correlation between failed coup attempts from the military followed by almost irrational warlike behavior by authoritarian leaders. In these cases of within-group competition as a driver for violence the mechanisms cannot be reduced to issue indivisibility, asymmetric information, and commitment problems, but are the result of the value that conflict itself provides. Because the conflict itself holds value to leader survival, the intergroup bargain may prove less important and bargaining problems (e.g. Fearon 1995) should not exist. Surely, all else equal, authoritarian leaders will prefer victory over defeat. However, because the conflict solves commitment problems between the leader and the military and generates security for the leader, the leader may seek more limited war aims. As such we may observe seemingly irrational conflicts, initiated by authoritarian leaders when the conflict is a product of within-group

with the unequal distribution of costs and gains of conflict. This would lead us to expect that the unequal distribution of costs and gains to play a role in the onset of conflict. Authoritarian regimes that rely on a narrow selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) may therefore prove more conflict-prone than democracies.
competition.

To demonstrate that elite within-group competition may provide novel explanations for key conflict events, let us turn to the Second World War, which has been argued to be an anomaly, explained by an irrational war-prone disposition of Hitler (e.g. Mueller 2004, Byman and Pollack 2001). Within-group rivalry between the Nazi and military elite may provide a explanation for Hitler’s path to war, that does not rely on Hitler to be irrationally war-prone.\footnote{Note that any leader’s behavior may be explained by a leader’s particular disposition and therefore is not of much use as an explanation at all. At best, leader preferences provide us with a null hypothesis against which to test alternative theories.} Competition between the military staff and the Nazi civilian leadership reached critical levels in 1937. This was mirrored in a critical animosity between army soldiers and the SS (Deutsch 1974). By early 1938, competition between Nazi and army elites had culminated in the Fritz crisis, resulting in active coup and anti-coup posturing (Deutsch 1974, Von Klemperer 1994). Gisevius (1947, 264) recounts that as the Fritz crisis came to resolution by the summer of 1938, Hitler quite unexpectedly presented the plans to attack Czechoslovakia.\footnote{Although we cannot be certain of the causal direction, if any, elite rivalry with the German army elite and Hitler’s war-prone behavior are undeniably interlinked.}

It is well documented that Hitler desperately wanted to fight a war with Czechoslovakia and was not seriously interested in territorial gain through non-military means; even though appeasement had provided Germany with diplomatic success and the territory of Sudeten Deutschland, Hitler expressed feeling ‘cheated’ out of war in Munich (e.g. Weinberg 2012, 1996, Overy 1999). It is probable that Hitler’s strong preference for war was not a result of his war-prone nature, but that it originated from his immediate need to contain dangerous rivals remaining in the army. Therefore, within days of Munich, Hitler turned its military planning towards Poland and the future destruction of Czech independence (Overy 1999). The timing of real coup risk and rushed war-prone behavior provides interesting circumstantial evidence for the thesis that seemingly irrational behavior of Hitler and therefore the Second World
War may be explained by the rational need to win elite competition.

**Irregular between-group conflict**

Irregular between-group conflict is similar to its conventional counterpart because it can be conceived as a bargain between groups. At the same time it is different due to the identification problem that is generated by irregular conflict. The previous decade saw a wealth of research on irregular between-group conflict that has sought to address the occurrence and duration of civil war (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier, Hoefler and Rohner 2009). Similar to conventional between-group conflict, the bargaining theory of war provides us with a parsimonious explanation of the onset and resolution of irregular between-group conflict (e.g. Walter 2009). Irregular conflict is similar to conventional conflict in that they can both be perceived as a bargaining process between competing groups.

However, irregular conflict is radically distinct from conventional conflict because of the identification problem that rival parties experience. In his seminal work, Kalyvas (2006) provides us with the mechanisms through which identification of support leads to violence in irregular conflicts. Irregular conflicts are characterized by a lack of front lines, a patchwork of zones of control, and the inability to identify support within the local population. Moreover, in irregular conflicts multiple rival factions compete for public support, which leaves individuals with the choice which party to support. Kalyvas (2006) convincingly argues that as individuals seek survival, individual preferences do not really matter for civilian support: support is fluent and generated through territorial control.

Territorial control generates collaboration through *selective violence*. Violence in irregular conflicts is not merely coercive, but it is demonstrative to a civilian audience comprised of potential collaborators and defectors as well. Selective violence targets individuals based on their behavior, thereby demonstrating the high costs of resis-
tance to an audience that may potentially support the enemy. Moreover, selective violence communicates relative security in exchange for cooperation. Consequently, individuals in controlled areas have an incentive to comply with the violent actor, which allows the violent actor to solidify local support (Kalyvas 2006). However, selective violence is dependent on identification, which is commonly provided by civilian denunciation. Pointing towards the considerable variety in the level of violence over conflicts and over regions within conflict, Kalyvas (2006) argues that the combatants’ need for identification of friend or foe interacts with the willingness of the population to provide the information/identification required to produce high levels of selective violence.

Indiscriminate violence targets individuals on the basis of their group identity (e.g. ethnicity, religion, class) and personal characteristics rather than selectively on their individual behavior. Where selective violence generates control, indiscriminate violence is generally counter-productive in irregular conflict: it makes cooperation more costly than resistance, thereby solving collective action problems (e.g. Wood 2001), and pushing people towards opposition. Indiscriminate violence communicates to potential targets that collaboration with the violent party will not shield a person from becoming a target of its violence and is therefore generally costly and irrational (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Selective violence is therefore more effective than costly indiscriminate violence, but as it requires local information

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8 Note that the perception of selective violence is more important than whether the selection mechanisms actually target the right people. When people have reason to believe that the right people are generally targeted they feel they can control their fates by compliance. However, when the violence is clearly random there is no longer any reason to act cooperatively (Kalyvas 2006).

9 The extent to which a party can rely upon information from civilian collaborators is dependent on the ability to shield civilians from the violence of the rival party. The most contested zones are areas in which both parties have the highest need for information. However, in contested zones, where the incumbents rule by day and the rebels rule by night for example, civilians that seek survival will be unwilling to denounce. Any information provided to the government will leave them vulnerable to retaliation from the rebels. Therefore, the more security a party can provide, the more likely civilians will be to denounce. However, the more secure a party is, the less need the party has for selective violence. Therefore, most selective violence will occur in areas that are contested, but in which one of the parties has dominant control of the territory (Kalyvas 2006).
it is generally not available in instances where the opposing party enjoys firm control. Moreover, because the credible threat of violence in absence of a strong opposition is enough to keep support from the population, we are likely to find little violence in the regions firmly under either incumbent or insurgent control (Kalyvas 2006).

Despite the high costs of indiscriminate violence it nonetheless occurs.\textsuperscript{10} In order to illustrate the mechanisms of indiscriminate violence, let me here revisit two incidents of indiscriminate violence from the beginning of the chapter: The Nazi Ardeatine Caves massacre and Russian military violence in Chechnya. The Ardeatine Caves atrocity may have been an outlier with respect to its massive scope, but was otherwise similar to the punitive razzias committed by the Nazis following partisan attacks. What is remarkable about this case is that the local Nazi command tried to hide the executions by detonating the caves, while the Nazi leadership clearly wanted a demonstrative retaliation (Holocaust Memorial Museum 2013). Hiding one’s retributive violence does not send any signal and therefore does not seem to make much sense. This counter-intuitive behavior might be explained if the local command was aware of the counter-effective nature of indiscriminate violence, leading it to carry out its orders in secret.

Compare the Nazi violence to Russian indiscriminate violence against Chechen villagers. In the Chechen case, the violence was in an area in which there was high guerrilla activity. Even though selective violence is superior to costly indiscriminate violence, indiscriminate violence can be strategic in irregular between-group conflict under conditions of guerilla war, in which the incumbent has coercive power, but limited information. Here group identity can become a shorthand for identification in an attempt to starve a guerilla of the local support on which it relies. Factions with superior repressive capacity may rely on a scorched earth strategy of uprooting or

\textsuperscript{10}There exist countless examples in which irregular conflict as competition between groups produced mass selective and indiscriminate violence. Irregular conflict examples such as the Greek or Spanish civil war were extremely violent, but are characterized by outbreaks of predominantly selective violence (e.g. Kalyvas 2006).
killing the population and thereby ‘draining the sea’ of the civilian support (popular or forced) on which guerrillas rely (e.g. Valentino 2004, Downes 2008, Zhukov 2010, Lyall 2009). These ‘drain the seas’ massacres are especially common in protracted irregular guerilla wars. For example, when the British experienced great difficulty fighting the Boer guerilla in the Boer wars, the British responded with a mass internment campaign (Downes 2008). In Guatemala, as the irregular conflict raged on, the military began to adopt increasingly ruthless mass indiscriminate violence. In order to starve the guerrilla General Rios Montt set out on a campaign to “dry up the human sea in which the guerilla fish swim” (quoted in Valentino 2004). As the rebels were hidden, massive retaliation following rebel strikes was aimed at the civilian population. Moreover, the military categorized villages into zones of rebel support, completely eradicating villages that were suspected of local guerrilla support. (Valentino 2004). Villages in the wrong zones had to accept forced resettlement, flee into the mountains or be killed. Seventy-five thousand people, mostly civilians, were killed in the first eight months of Rios Montt’s counter-guerrilla campaign of mass indiscriminate violence, but also left the guerrillas severely weakened (Valentino 2004). The Guatemala and Boer war examples show that campaigns of mass indiscriminate violence in irregular conflict can provide a rational counter-guerrilla tactic when targeted at areas under the control of an invisible foe.

Consolidatory genocide

Mass indiscriminate violence in the form of genocide or politicide also manifests itself outside of guerrilla conflict. The Rwandan example has some seemingly similar characteristics as the other examples of indiscriminate violence, but it is also very different. In the Nazi case the violence was aimed at population it sought to control. In the Russian case, security forces seem to adopt ethnicity as a shortcut for rebel identification, but in the Rwandan example ethnicity was more than a shortcut.
enemy identification. The act of violence itself provided a local militia leader with identification of support within the ingroup. This in turn allowed for the coercion of non-extremist Hutus into complacency by witnessing and contributing to the violence.

Genocides that provide information and control of the in-group are observably distinct from counter-guerrilla genocides because they occur in areas that lack guerrilla activity. Based on the mechanisms put forth in the following chapter, I refer to this type of violence as *consolidatory genocide*, which encompasses Valentino’s (2004) categories of communist killings and ethnic killings. Consolidatory genocide may seem similar to other types of indiscriminate violence such as indiscriminate counter-guerrilla violence, but it is nonetheless observationally distinct. First, where between-group mass indiscriminate violence is concentrated within territories where the guerrilla is dominant, consolidatory genocide tends to be aimed at populations within areas of secure territorial control that have no real guerrilla presence. Second, the indiscriminate violence against outgroups under consolidatory genocide is accompanied by selective violence against ingroup defectors as well as the removal of local ingroup elites. The seemingly random indiscriminate violence has led extant scholarship to treat these irregular conflicts as motivated by leader ideology (e.g. Valentino 2004). However, while this type of violence may seemingly be initiated by extremist leaders, this explanation does not account for the strategic nature of the violence.

While seemingly irrational indiscriminate violence generates costly resistance from the target outgroup, it may actually establish control over an ingroup. The violence is demonstrative and signals broad support for the violent actor within the ingroup population even if this support is absent. In these consolidatory genocides the identification problem is of a different nature as the violent actor seeks to identify support within the ingroup population. The Rwanda example demonstrates that though the outgroup bears the brunt of the indiscriminate violence, ingroup non-compliance is met with severe selective violence. This coerces ingroup civilians and local elites
to tacit approval of the violent actor. Consolidatory genocide is therefore expected to be instrumental in coercing ingroup civilians and institutions into a supportive coalition. It should therefore be intimately connected to processes of authoritarian consolidation.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to provide a typology of mass political violence and thereby provides some of the scope conditions for research into mass political violence. Two broader observations follow with respect to the study of conflict and violence. First, certain types of violence that have been classified as similar may actually be very different. For example, the Guatemalan counter-guerrilla genocide, and the Khmer killing fields are both examples of mass indiscriminate violence and therefore have been classified as examples of the same phenomena. However, the mechanisms that underly these genocides are predicted to be radically different, which has implications for our understanding of the production of violence. Second, not all conflict and violence can be examined as a bargaining problem between two actors. Especially in conflicts in which authoritarian regimes seem to act irrationally violent and bellicerent, the conflict may be better explained by within-group competition and the benefits to elite survival that conflict may generate. This book deals with seemingly irrational mass indiscriminate violence that cannot be explained by existing theories of selective and indiscriminate violence. In the following chapter I will set out to address this dearth of conflict research and provide a rational-leader-based theory of consolidatory genocide.
Chapter 3

A Theory of Consolidatory Genocide

All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.¹

With the assassination of Habyarimana, president of Rwanda and a Hutu, the country entered one of the darkest episodes in human history. Within the timespan of just a few months, Hutu militias meticulously rounded up and massacred over a million Tutsi civilians. While Tutsi life was violently discarded, Hutu life was cheap; from the first days of the genocide, “moderate” Hutu elites were assassinated or forced into hiding, while local Hutu officials that did not support the violence were killed. Only with the invasion of the Tutsi RPF rebels from neighboring Burundi did the genocidal violence in Rwanda come to an end.

Mass indiscriminate violence (also referred to as mass killing (Valentino 2004), democide (Rummel 1994), politicide (Harff 2003), or genocide) is a type of political violence that is directed towards any group outside of the governing coalition and is not aimed at political control of that group. The incomprehensible scale and indiscriminate nature of the violence has generated broad scholarly interest and provided us with a wide range of explanations for its occurrence. In the case of Rwanda, these explanations range from age-old ethnic hatred between Hutus and Tutsis stem-

¹Commonly attributed to Edmund Burke.
ming from colonial history and previous episodes of genocide (e.g. Lemarchand 1998); racial supremacist ideology at the top of the Hutu regime (Valentino 2004); or regime attempts at mobilizing the Hutu population to fight the RPF rebels (Straus 2006). However, if we accept that political elites (leaders) seek political survival (e.g. Chiozza and Goemans 2011, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), the example of Rwanda contains an empirical anomaly that points us towards a limitation of the predictive power of existing theories: why did the extremist leadership take on mass indiscriminate violence against Tutsi civilians and purges of Hutu elites at the same time?

By itself, mass indiscriminate violence comes at high risk to a leader, because indiscriminate targeting on the basis of group identity (e.g. ethnic, religious, or political) generates increased resistance. While all authoritarian regimes adopt repression, this repressive violence is mostly selective. Selective violence targets people based on their behavior and is therefore instrumental to political control of an area, a population, or government (Kalyvas 2006). Selective violence demonstrates to potential opponents that resistance is costly whereas compliance provides relative security. Consequently, individuals have an incentive to comply, which allows the violent actor to solidify support within areas it controls (Kalyvas 2006). Indiscriminate violence, on the other hand, targets people irrespective of their behavior. Therefore, indiscriminate violence demonstrates to its targets that collaboration with the violent party will not shield one from becoming victim to the violence. This realization helps coordinate resistance (Wood 2003) and generates opposition (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Moreover, mass indiscriminate violence may undermine the ability of the armed forces to respond forcefully to external threats, while the resulting humani-

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2 In Darfur, for example, mass indiscriminate raids by Arab militias and the army directly led to an armed insurgency of the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit tribes in the Spring of 2003 (e.g., Cockett 2010). Similarly, in Rwanda the RPF rebels recruited among survivors of the genocide in the civil war (e.g., Prunier 1995), while Stalin’s collectivization project was met with open rebellion in the countryside (e.g., Viola 2008).

3 For example, in Rwanda, senior Hutu military officers defected to the Tutsi RPF rebels during the war.
tarian and refugee crisis may invite foreign intervention, as was the case in Cambodia and Kosovo. Consequently, the domestic and international opposition generated by mass indiscriminate violence makes it an especially risky strategy for authoritarian leaders that seek survival.

Purges of regime elites also come at high risk to a leader, because authoritarian leaders rely on elite support for survival. It is apparent that rivals may pose high risks to a leader’s survival. Nonetheless, authoritarian leaders must take great care before they move against ingroup rivals, as the targets of the purge may counteract with a coup themselves (Roessler 2011, Chiozza and Goemans 2011). That purges would ever coincide with mass indiscriminate violence is puzzling. Not only are the ingroup elite targets of purges unrelated to the outgroup civilian targets of mass indiscriminate violence, but purges and mass indiscriminate violence are independently risky as well. Therefore, it seems ill-advised for leaders to embark on mass indiscriminate violence of outgroups and purges of ingroup elite rivals at the same time. Yet, as this paper will demonstrate, purges of regime elites occur in almost half of mass indiscriminate violence episodes, such as Rwanda, Cambodia, and Serbia. Extant scholarship cannot explain why independently risky mass indiscriminate violence and elite purges coincide. Building on recent insights on authoritarianism, I argue that mass indiscriminate violence is actually a rational reaction to elite rivalry: authoritarian leaders experiencing volatile intra-regime rivalry may adopt mass indiscriminate violence to consolidate power. Unable to target rival elites directly, leaders can couple mass indiscriminate violence against an outgroup with selective violence towards an ingroup to allow the capture of local government and security structures by hooligan patrons. This in turn bolsters a leader’s pillars of support and captures or neutralizes those of elite challengers that can subsequently be purged from the government. I refer to this type of mass indiscriminate violence as consolidatory genocide.

Throughout this book purge will refer exclusively to the (violent) removal of ingroup elites from the regime.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold. First, it provides a single parsimonious explanation for genocides that to date have been explained by untestable leader preferences (Valentino 2004) or as unique cases (e.g. Straus 2006) only. Even after 1945, consolidatory genocides alone account for 8-11 million (mostly civilian) deaths, in contrast to less than 4 million battle deaths in civil war (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003). Yet, political science research into mass indiscriminate violence trails behind research into (civil) war. While we have a good understanding of mass indiscriminate violence within the context of irregular counter-guerrilla operations, extant scholarship treats all other mass indiscriminate violence as motivated by leader ideology (Valentino 2004). However, leader ideology is unfalsifiable and cannot explain why mass indiscriminate violence occurs during within-regime rivalry: why not consolidate power first, before embarking on risky ideological ventures? The theory of consolidatory genocide improves upon Valentino’s seminal leader-level contribution, but provides a falsifiable explanation based on leader incentives for self-preservation.

Second, this chapter argues mass indiscriminate violence to be a process that produces private benefits for leaders. The past two decades of conflict research rest on the assumption that violent conflict is destructive and inefficient. The occurrence of conflict is therefore explained in terms of bargaining failure (e.g. Fearon 1995). However, when between-group conflict (e.g. Hutu vs. Tutsi) generates within-group (e.g. intra-Hutu) security benefits that outweigh the costs of conflict, violence is no longer inefficient. This explains instances in which authoritarian leaders may seem to use violence irrationally: they are actually seeking internal self-preservation. In these cases, conflict resolution attempts to resolve bargaining failures are likely to fail.

Third, this chapter provides new venues for research into little-known processes of authoritarian consolidation. Researchers have examined a variety of coup-proofing

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5 Note that this huge number of casualties excludes Stalin’s collectivization or counter-guerrilla mass violence like that of Guatemala or El-Salvador.

6 E.g., Guatemala (Valentino 2004) and Chechnya (Lyall 2009)
strategies that leaders may use to reduce coup risks (e.g. Roessler 2011, Svolik 2012). However, these strategies to manage elites are typically not viable when the leader is at power parity with strong rivals, as these rivals may counteract with a coup. By focusing on elite pillars of support, this chapter contributes to the theoretical refinement with respect to the disempowerment tactics that authoritarian leaders may adopt to manage rivalry. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: it first enters into a discussion of existing explanations for mass indiscriminate violence, before elaborating on the theory of consolidatory genocide.

Existing Explanations of Mass Indiscriminate Violence

Under specific conditions of guerrilla conflict, mass indiscriminate violence has been shown to be effective in order to starve a guerilla of its support. These ‘drain the seas’ massacres are especially common in protracted irregular guerilla wars (Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004, Valentino 2004). Consequently, counter-guerilla mass indiscriminate violence is concentrated within territories where a guerrilla is dominant. However, in roughly 40% of mass violence episodes (e.g., Rwanda & Cambodia), the violence was aimed at populations within areas of secure territorial control. This book focuses on those instances of mass indiscriminate violence in areas that lack any real guerrilla presence.

Outside of irregular guerilla conflict, the lack of theoretical explanations for the occurrence of mass indiscriminate violence is surprising. While there exist excellent case studies of mass indiscriminate violence (e.g., Straus 2006, Gagnon 2006), large-n comparative studies have yet to provide compelling theoretical explanations for the correlations that are uncovered (Harff 2003). Moreover, though it has been
well established that governments initiate mass indiscriminate violence (e.g., Verwimp 2006, Valentino 2004), violence is commonly examined with the implicit assumption that governmental actors lack agency and are carried away by larger societal forces. For example, scholars have previously imposed irrational hatred on violent actors, caused by primordial cleavages and age-old rivalry that erupts following some shock (e.g. Kaplan 2005). However, preexisting hatred can explain all violence, yet can be the cause of none, as pre-existing hatred is mostly constant. Therefore, primordialism cannot explain why long spells of peace suddenly turn to extreme hatred and violence. Consequently, ethnic hatred and primordialism are best conceived as a null-hypothesis, against which to test falsifiable alternative explanations of mass indiscriminate violence. Explanations that do address why governments initiate mass indiscriminate violence fall into two broad categories: i) (irrational) leader preferences; and ii) between-group conflict.

By introducing non-constant leader behavior, Valentino (2004) offers the seminal political science explanation for the occurrence of mass indiscriminate violence. Valentino provides a typology that contains a wealth of information with respect to mass indiscriminate violence, as well as a convincing explanation for the occurrence of mass indiscriminate counter-guerrilla violence. However, with respect to all other instances of mass indiscriminate violence, the study argues that leaders have a personal preference for the extermination of groups that they perceive as a threat to their vision of society. Like the ethnic hatred argument, the personal beliefs of leaders may greatly affect the occurrence of mass indiscriminate violence, but this explanation is hard to falsify. More importantly, the timing of the violence does not seem to correspond to this explanation. Both in Cambodia and Rwanda, mass indiscriminate violence occurred in an environment of high insecurity at the top of the regime (e.g.

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7 Also note that the observation that people kill because they hate does not provide deeper insights.
8 Valentino (2004) refers to these as Communist or Ethnic Supremacist mass killings.
9 This is most clearly demonstrated in Valentino’s (2004) exposition of Communist and Ethnic Supremacist leaders that did not engage in mass indiscriminate violence.
Straus 2006, Kiernan 1996). If Valentino (2004) is indeed correct, why would leaders
risk life and liberty to achieve their vision of society when they are least secure? Why
not consolidate power first, before establishing one’s vision of society? If ideology
does indeed explain mass indiscriminate violence, we should expect rational leaders
to be most likely to execute their pet project when they are most, not least secure.\textsuperscript{10}

Related to leader ideology is the argument that leaders initiate mass indiscriminate
violence because of a personal and irrational preference for violence (e.g., Byman and
Pollack 2001). If so, mass indiscriminate violence and purges might coincide because
these leaders have a personal preference for violent resolution of conflicts without
regard for their security. If this were to be correct, we would expect violence to occur
irrespective of whether a leader is threatened, but also expect these leaders to suffer
a higher risk of adverse leader fates such as death and imprisonment.

The second explanation posits mass indiscriminate violence as a strategy of re-
moving an outgroup threat. Several scholars have made the empirical observation
that mass indiscriminate violence is more likely to occur following civil war (e.g.,
therefore argues that mass indiscriminate violence results from a one-sided victory in
civil war. Similarly, Straus (2006) argues that the Hutu leadership instigated mass
violence as a desperate measure to win an impending civil war. In both instances,
mass indiscriminate violence is argued to be aimed at the civilian support-base of
outgroup rebels that may pose a future threat. However, there are two problems to
this approach. First, as noted before, mass indiscriminate violence is risky because
it may generate coordinated resistance, reduces the ability of the military to force-
fully respond to outside threats, and may invite foreign intervention. Unsurprisingly,
most authoritarian regimes successfully control large outgroup populations through
selective violence. Consequently, these arguments do not explain why genocidal gov-

\textsuperscript{10}This notion is supported by Rummel (1994), who argues that authoritarian regimes are more likely
to turn genocidal, because of unrestricted power.
ernments adopt indiscriminate violence in areas of secure territorial control where selective violence is feasible and would be more effective (Kalyvas 2006).

Second, these studies do not address the actual mechanisms through which mass indiscriminate violence against civilians would be an effective strategy to deal with an outgroup threat. These studies implicitly adopt a counter-guerrilla mechanism to explain violence that occurs in areas far from areas with any actual guerrilla activity. It hinges on the assumption that outgroup militants can more effectively rely on co-ethnics for support (e.g., Roessler 2011) and that mass indiscriminate violence undermines the ability of outgroup militants to pose a future threat. In other words, governments seek to starve these militants from a potential civilian support base. However, while guerrilla forces do rely on civilians for food, supplies, and recruitment (Valentino 2004, Zhukov 2014), they do not actually require the support of a willing or co-ethnic population. Guerrilla forces commonly coerce and prey on civilians to survive (e.g., Weinstein 2003). Through the use of selective violence, militants can coerce civilian populations into support in areas in which it is dominant (e.g., Kalyvas 2006) even if it does not share ethnicity. This explains why in Guatemala, for example, much of the government violence was aimed at native American villages that did not share ethnicity with the rebels and were actually preyed upon by rebel forces. Consequently, the mechanisms from counter-guerrilla mass violence cannot simply be exported to a non-counter-guerrilla environment.

Moreover, from many instances of mass indiscriminate violence an outgroup guerrilla was completely absent. In other instances the argument for an outgroup threat

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11 Several scholars explicitly acknowledge that indiscriminate violence may be ineffective and have argued that leaders must therefore underestimate the costs of indiscriminate violence (Valentino 2000, Straus 2006). Like the explanations that revolve around leader preferences, the beliefs of leaders with respect to the effectiveness of the violence cannot be tested or falsified. However, we should be able to observe whether mass indiscriminate violence effectively deals with an outgroup threat. If mass indiscriminate violence is an effective strategy, we should expect leaders to have a reduced risk of removal by the target outgroup; if it is not, we should expect an equal or increased risk of removal.

12 Examples are Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, Nigeria, Indonesia, or Uganda. Even in Sudan, the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit tribes did not mobilize until after the start of the
does not hold up to scrutiny. In Cambodia, for example, the Lon Nol regime had been thoroughly defeated with the capture of Phnom Penh and cannot explain four years of mass indiscriminate violence against various outgroups. Admittedly, the presence of a current or previous guerrilla conflict may support the mobilization of militias and irregular groups that execute mass indiscriminate violence. However, this does not explain government initiation of the violence, nor does it allow us to export a guerrilla explanations to areas in which outgroup guerrillas were not a concern. More importantly, none of the explanations that posit mass indiscriminate violence as a strategy to remove an outgroup threat would lead us to expect the violence to be related to heightened ingroup competition or purges of ingroup elites.\footnote{13}

Chapter 4 of this book will demonstrate that mass indiscriminate violence corresponds to elite competition in those cases in which the violence is not part of a counter-guerrilla strategy. These cases account for roughly forty percent of mass violence cases and most of the casualties. This correlation suggests a different causal mechanism: in cases such as Cambodia, victory in civil war resulted in risky competition among regime elites (e.g., Kiernan 1996). Without a common enemy, existing differences within the victorious coalition become salient and may turn deadly. It is therefore not an outgroup threat, but elite ingroup rivalry that drives leaders to initiate mass indiscriminate violence. Let us now turn to the mechanisms by which mass indiscriminate violence is connected to authoritarian competition.

\footnote{13}{A notable exception is provided by Roessler (2011), who argues that leaders rely on co-ethnics as a coup proofing strategy, which reduces control of ethnic outgroups and leads to civil war. While this provides a convincing explanation for civil war resulting from elite competition, mass indiscriminate violence is explained as part of a counter-guerrilla strategy to fight the rebellion.}
A Theory of Consolidatory Genocide

At the highest level of authoritarian politics, leaders, potential challengers, and other elites commonly interact in an environment of anarchy. Specifically, the absence of a capable third-party actor that predictably enforces interactions between elites forces individual elites to rely on their own sources of support within the winning coalition and on alliances with other elites.\(^{14}\) The constitutional checks and balances that protect elites from violence from competitors in liberal democracies are mostly weak or absent in authoritarian regimes.\(^{15}\) As a result, elites within the winning coalition of an authoritarian regime find their power checked by rival coalition members (Svolik 2012), which has far reaching consequences for elite rivalry.

Insecurity at the top of authoritarian regimes can result in a deadly commitment problem, which is exacerbated by a high risk of losing life or liberty for both the leader and elite rivals\(^{16}\) upon losing office (Chiozza and Goemans 2011, Roessler 2011). Leaders in authoritarian regimes are generally aware of potential rivals from within and may prefer collaboration over risky competition. However, even when leader and rival prefer cooperation over deadly competition, both cannot commit to cooperation: either would be most secure by removing the other and neither can commit not to remove their rival at the first opportunity. As a result, leader and challenger are locked into a security dilemma; they will rationally seek to strengthen their position

\(^{14}\)This is in many ways similar to anarchy in the international system (e.g. Waltz 1979).

\(^{15}\)This is a common feature of authoritarian regimes, but exceptions do exist. Stable single party regimes (e.g., China) can develop institutional structures that mostly lift its elites out of anarchy (Svolik 2012).

\(^{16}\)For elite rivals to pose a challenge to the leader they require official or unofficial influence over key political or security institutions within the regime that they can leverage in a power struggles - e.g., the military or other security forces, the central government, key regional governments, the bureaucracy, or secret police. This also means that the difference between the leader and challenger can often be cosmetic. Both are part of the regime and both have their own pillars of support. Therefore, the pillars of support that the leader relies upon in one regime may be similar to the pillars of support that an elite challenger may have in another regime. Here, the distinction between challenger and leader is made for expositional purposes only.
versus their competition, effectively decreasing security for all.\(^\text{17}\) Coups from within the regime are secret, sudden, of close proximity, and, unlike rebellions, do seldom allow for a fighting retreat. Civil wars and rebellions tend to start at the fringes of the state and commonly take months or years to resolve. Within-regime coups, on the other hand, commonly unfold in a matter of hours and if unsuccessful may nonetheless kill the leader, as was the case with the coup against Nigerian President Murtala Mohammed in 1976 (Ejiogu 2007), for example. Consequently, to leaders that seek political and physical survival, the threat of elite or intra-group competition is much more acute than that of any inter-group (e.g. ethnic, religious, or ideological) competition originating from outside the regime (Roessler 2011).

Authoritarian leaders rely on elite support for survival and therefore cannot indiscriminately purge potential rivals from the regime; they need support and information to selectively purge the most dangerous challengers. The overlapping support base that both leaders and challengers draw upon, creates uncertainty with respect to the outcome of an attempted purge or coup. It is generally accepted that coups carry high risks (e.g., Svolik 2012), but so do purges. Leaders need to be selective with purges as indiscriminate purges generate resistance from the elite or ingroup on which the leader depends (Roessler 2011). In Indonesia for example, a botched purge by Sukarno of his military staff killed six but not all senior generals and put General Suharto in the drivers seat of an extremely violent counter-coup. Specifically, if elite supporters feel they are next in line to be purged, the leader may solve coordination problems that coup plotters face. This may make purges almost as dangerous to execute as coup attempts and therefore not something that a leader under the stress of elite competition can undertake lightly.

Rivalry at the top of authoritarian regimes tends to be especially high following civil war victory or a successful coup. This may seem counterintuitive as these are

\(^{17}\text{Active coup posturing fuels competition, strains relations, and generates volatility at the top of the regime.}\)
commonly regarded as resolving existing differences. However, there are countless examples of rebel or coup coalitions that disintegrate following the resolution of the external threat. In Cambodia, for example, victory in civil war resulted in immediate and violent infighting within the Khmer Rouge salient. Most successful coups are followed by another coup or purge aimed at rivals within the victorious coalition within one or two years. Examples are the removal of General Maldorano Schaad and Colonel Gordillo by General Rios Montt in Guatemala (Schirmer 1998), the removal of Ramos by Gutierrez in El-Salvador (Mazzei 2009, Herman, Hans and Sharpe 1986), or the removal of 'Abd al-Salam 'Arif by Abd al-Karim al-Qasim following the Free officers coup in Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001).

As argued in chapter 2, recent studies provide some insight into the coup-proofing strategies that leaders adopt to deal with the commitment problems and threats originating from elite competition. Chiozza and Goemans (2011), for example, show that leaders at risk of a military coup may start an interstate war: “fighting for survival” when they tie up potential coup plotters in the execution of a war, limiting the ability of high ranking military officers to execute a coup; and “gambling for survival” on the increased support that may result from winning a war (Chiozza and Goemans 2011). Strategies to tie the hands of the military are common and likely effective when the coup threat comes from institutions, such as the army that can be occupied or kept at bay in the execution of a war. During the Vietnamese civil war, for example, the generals that might threaten Diem were kept away from the capital. However, strategies to tie the hands of the military are likely less effective in situations in which internal divisions run deeply within all sectors and institutions of the regime.

Alternatively, leaders may take information shortcuts by homogenizing (e.g. ethnically) their inner circle to break the commitment problem (Roessler 2011) or slowly

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18Ultimately Generals Van Don, Van Minh, and Van Kim convinced General Dinh, who was the only one with forces in the capital to join them in disposing the Diem regime in 1963 (e.g., Miller 2013).
creep into power to the point where a coup becomes too costly (Svolik 2012). However, though ethnic homogenization may alleviate the commitment problem, it is unclear how it would solve it, as co-ethnics commonly displace authoritarian leaders as well. Roessler (2011) acknowledges that coup proofing - e.g. reshuffling government, appointing co-ethnics, and purging coalition allies - initially exacerbates the security dilemma, increasing coup threat. Though coup proofing becomes a viable strategy once the leader has reached a threshold of power consolidation (Roessler 2011, Svolik 2012), it is unclear how leaders at risk from powerful elite rivals establish the level of control needed to be secure when rivals are strong and the leader’s need for security is highest. How do authoritarian leaders at dangerously volatile power parity vis-a-vis their rivals deal with this dilemma?

**Political Consolidation through Genocide**

Leaders facing threats from elite rivals need to secure control over their elites in order to ensure survival.\(^{19}\) I argue that embattled leaders avoid the aforementioned security dilemma and win internal competition under the shroud of mass indiscriminate violence. Mass indiscriminate violence is therefore part of a process, whereby leaders restructure elite pillars of support from the bottom up to increase their security vis-a-vis rivals at the top of the regime. This process from high-risk elite competition to authoritarian consolidation has four stages in which the threatened leader first leverages a machinery of violence in the form of irregular, militia, or paramilitary clients; second, these militias unleash mass indiscriminate violence; third, as part of the violent project, the militias take control of local government and security institutions; and last, grass-root consolidation neutralizes rival pillars of support and culminates

\(^{19}\)The theory I present here deals with mass indiscriminate violence as part of a process of authoritarian competition and consolidation. In order to not needlessly complicate the argument, the theory makes a distinction between the leader and his/her rival. However, it is possible that a strong rival may be in a position to initiate mass indiscriminate violence and win elite competition, in which case the rival would be the “leader”
in the purge of rival elites. Because the violence is part of the process of authoritarian consolidation, I refer to this type of mass indiscriminate violence as “consolidatory geno-/politicide” or simply “consolidatory genocide”. To provide a roadmap of the theory, a causal diagram of the full process of consolidatory genocide is presented in Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1: Theory of Consolidatory Genocide Process**

Consolidatory genocide should occur at times of high threat to a leader’s position. When pressure comes from within the leader’s ingroup (ethnic, religious, ideological) and is then channeled by rival elites in the regime, the leader is most vulnerable. There are many reasons why authoritarian coalitions may disintegrate. In Cambodia, for example, factionalization within the winning coalition turned salient and violent following a successful civil war (Vickery 1983, Kiernan 1996). Other times the leader is confronted with a (post-revolutionary) drive for more openness and democracy from within his own regime, as was the case in for Milosevic in Serbia and for “extremists” in Rwanda (e.g., Gagnon 2006, Storey 2012).

Not every leader may be in a position to initiate consolidatory genocide, as leaders would need to have or establish control over a machinery of violence that may execute the self-coup. To execute the violence, the leader may rely on poor or unemployed

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20 In Rwanda, for example, the top of the Hutu government was deeply split and senior military officers were openly supporting the opposition (Straus 2006, 43).

21 Consolidatory genocide is therefore not a strategy that we should expect when a leader is especially
co-ethnics that will gain from the redistributive nature of violence. In Rwanda and Yugoslavia, for example, hooligans were secretly armed by the government to create militias (Verwimp 2006, Oberschall 2000, Mueller 2000). In other cases such as Cambodia, China, or Darfur militias existed as legacy from civil conflict. By facilitating violence, the leader can provide armed thugs with the wealth, plunder, and positions that violence provides. Mass indiscriminate violence can be a means of paying these groups, create mutual goals, and build a patron-client relationship. Even when banded together in paramilitary groups, these armed thugs are no match for professional forces and are unlikely to directly threaten the power base of rival elites.

They are, however, highly effective at terrorizing civilians (e.g. Mueller 2004).

A leader that has established a patronage relationship with a machinery of violence can unleash sudden and overwhelming indiscriminate violence on the outgroup. Armed thugs and militias assault the marginalized outgroup and plunge the country into chaos. The majority of ingroup civilians will likely have close relations with members of the rival outgroup (e.g. as neighbors, friends, or spouses). However, they will also be powerless to intervene for four reasons: first, the violence against the outgroup is demonstrative: it is painfully clear to observers what might befall them if they are branded a traitor when attempting to intervene; second, any remaining attempts at intervention to stop the violence against the outgroup are met with extreme selective violence; third, because of their relation to their own group, they will become potential targets for retributions from the outgroup. Mass indiscriminate violence commonly forces the outgroup to mobilize. Civilians from the ingroup therefore weak, but rather when elite rivals are at power parity. Moreover, some leaders will be in a better position to rely on irregular militias than others, which should influence their choice for mass indiscriminate violence over alternative strategies for resolving elite rivalry. Similarly, when elite rivals control these militias, they may initiate consolidatory genocide to establish power vis-a-vis the leader instead. In Indonesia, for example, mass indiscriminate violence was adopted by General Suharto to undermine Sukarno’s pillars of support.

22 Under contested autocracy, rival elites commonly have their own pillars of support, creating a fragile balance of power (Svolik 2012). In Rwanda, for example, Hutu moderates had their own support base within the military, which they retained during the initial stages of the genocide.
are acutely aware that they cannot be certain of clemency from outgroup militants should the tables turn. Last, but not least, all that is needed for evil to triumph is indeed for good people to do nothing.\footnote{Commonly attributed to Edmund Burke.} In order to control the ingroup population the leader does not require active support, but merely requires inaction. When action is costly and inaction signals implicit support for the leader, the leader can seem to have broad support from those that seek to keep their heads on by keeping them down.

Rwanda demonstrates how a few civilians can be singled out and coerced into participating in the violence. While the Interahamwe militias carried out most of the violence, the group of perpetrators was broader: any Hutu with familial ties to militia members were expected to join the violence. Similarly, Hutu that the militias encountered en route to Tutsi homes were asked to partake in the violence. To those Hutu that had been singled out to join the mob, it was clear that refusal would be considered treason and dealt with harshly (Fujii 2009). Under these conditions, ordinary people that are reluctant to take part in the violence or associate themselves with the leader can appear to be “willing executioners.”\footnote{Term coined by Goldhagen (1996) to denote broad support for the Holocaust among German civilians.} This in turn signals broad societal support for the genocidal regime even if the majority of the population is privately opposed to the violence.

Like the rest of society, local officials are pressured into non-intervention and support of the violence. Rapidly changing facts on the ground coupled with signals of broad ingroup support for the violence hamper the ability of local government, police, or military officials to respond forcefully, especially when they have extremists in their ranks. This induces some to jump on the bandwagon to consolidate their own power. Though some local officials resist, most are unwilling to risk their lives under the extreme uncertainty generated by the violence, especially since resistance
to the genocidal violence makes local officials a prime target of selective violence. In Rwanda, for example, local officials were increasingly likely to step down or fall in line as the genocide spread. The few that didn’t were mostly killed or forced to flee (Straus 2006).

These pressures allow for the replacement of local officials with the leader’s hooligan patrons from the bottom up. Kiernan (1996, 185) provides a telling account from a ‘full rights’ (ingroup) peasant in Cambodia:

“When the villagers where separated by category in 1977, the full rights people remained in [the village of] Leay Bo, but where now joined by other poor peasants [...]. The newcomers where described as the support base of the revolution. Though some where illiterate, they took over the village and subdistrict administration, and killed many people.” [emphasis mine]

This capture of local government by marginal outsiders is a recurring pattern under mass indiscriminate violence. Oberschall (2000) provides us with another example of Serbian armed militants taking control of the local government in the town of Prijedor; not only driving out Muslims, but also forcefully replacing Serbs at the start of the Bosnian conflict. As the violent parallel state takes control of the state, rival elites will find their pillars of support eroded and become powerless to intervene. Under the rapidly changing conditions of consolidatory genocide, rival elites may maximize their odds of survival by siding with the leader and hoping to be spared.

During the final stages of consolidatory genocide, selective violence can be fully turned towards rival elites or “moderates” at the top of the government. Competing elites that have now lost their pillars of support are vulnerable and can be freely targeted as collaborators with the outgroup and (violently) purged with the aid of the renewed lower level power structures. In Rwanda, for example, key officials in

25Note that the violent mechanisms described here generate control for the leader even without generating broad support or a rally around the flag effect.
the military were forced into hiding. Similarly, in the USSR Stalin’s consolidatory
genocide did not end with Dekulakization in the countryside, but was followed by
lesser known mass indiscriminate violence in the cities (Shearer 2009). The secret
police that had risen to power as part of these operations then purged the communist
party elites from the bottom up during the great purges (e.g. Viola 2000, Shearer
2009). Consolidatory genocide is not without its costs. It helps coordinate resistance
from the outgroup, it may invite foreign intervention, and the reliance on militias
may undermine state structures such as the military (e.g. Ahram 2014). However,
the leader will be more secure as he will have resolved the greater direct internal
threat at the cost of creating a lesser indirect external threat.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has introduced consolidatory genocide as a previously unexplained type
of mass indiscriminate violence that is instrumental to processes of authoritarian con-
solidation. I have argued that consolidatory genocide is instrumental to win ingroup
rivalry and therefore intimately related to authoritarian competition. Unable to tar-
get rival elites directly, mass indiscriminate violence is coupled with selective violence
to allow the capture of local government by hooligan patrons. This in turn bolsters
a leader’s pillars of support and undermines those of elite rivals, which can then be
purged from government. Consolidatory genocide may be rare, but comes at a very
high cost in life, even when compared to other types of mass political violence. The
next chapter will test the theory of consolidatory genocide through a series of quan-
titative tests that are designed to evaluate the theory against existing explanations
at the hand of empirical evidence.
Chapter 4

Testing the Theory of Consolidatory Genocide

This chapter aims to establish whether consolidatory genocide (non-counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence) differs from counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence; whether consolidatory genocide is connected to elite rivalry and elite purges; and whether it is instrumental to authoritarian survival. The theory of consolidatory genocide as outlined in the previous chapter leads to several expectations. First, we should expect non-democratic leaders to be more likely to adopt mass indiscriminate violence under conditions of high elite rivalry when their tenure is threatened. The arrow $H_1$ in Figure 2 below, visually illustrates how this expectation is related to the theory of consolidatory genocide. However, if Valentino (2004) is correct and a leader’s ideological vision for society leads him to pursue policies of mass indiscriminate violence, we should expect rational leaders to be more likely to instigate violence when they are most secure and at the pinnacle of their power.

$H_{1a}$: High elite rivalry corresponds to the onset of consolidatory genocide.

Here we should also distinguish between counter-guerrilla mass violence and consolidatory genocide, as there is no reason to assume that an increased risk to tenure would correspond to the onset of counter-guerrilla mass violence.
**H₁₆**: High elite rivalry does not correspond to the onset of counter-guerrilla mass violence.

**Figure 2: Hypotheses related to Consolidatory Genocide**

![Diagram of hypotheses related to Consolidatory Genocide]

Note that control of militias is not included as hypothesis here, because militias correspond to all potential consolidatory genocides as detailed under Empirics below.

Second, we should expect leaders that are unable to win elite competition through non-violent means to seek to reconstruct the power structures through consolidatory genocide in order to eliminate their ingroup rivals. Consequently, the theory leads us to expect that consolidatory genocide should be followed by purges of elites, which represent the leader’s increased consolidation.¹ This is illustrated by arrow **H₂₁** in Figure 2. Alternative explanations that posit mass indiscriminate violence to be aimed at an outgroup support base, would not expect purges of regime elites during spells of mass indiscriminate violence.

**H₂₆**: Spells of consolidatory genocide increase the likelihood of elite purges.

¹Specifically, the theory stipulates that there needs to be some form of consolidation of control over local and lower level institutions to purge rival elites. Therefore, it is expected that the most influential rivals are dealt with last. Consequently, we should also expect a higher propensity for purges any time after the initial stages of consolidatory genocide.
Again, we do not expect an increased propensity for purges during counter-guerrilla mass violence, as it is expected to be unrelated to elite rivalry.

\[ \textbf{H}_26: \] Spells of counter-guerrilla mass violence do not increase the likelihood of elite purges.

Third, we should expect consolidatory genocide to be a rational strategy that increases the likelihood of a leader’s survival, rather than an irrational preference of leaders with a propensity for violence. Still, consolidatory genocide is a form of indiscriminate violence and is therefore expected to generate coordinated resistance from its targets. As such, consolidatory genocide should result in a greater propensity to win intra-regime or ingroup conflicts, but only at the cost of a reduced propensity to win inter-group conflicts. Moreover, it is likely that those leaders that are already at great risk (due to the competition from rival elites) are also the most likely to initiate consolidatory genocide. Consolidatory genocide is a risky strategy that we expect leaders to pursue only because of a greater risk from rival elites.\(^2\) Because leaders at high risk of losing tenure are also most likely to turn to consolidatory genocide, the proposition that consolidatory genocide is instrumental to survival is not readily observable. Therefore, we should account for these selection effects by comparing leaders that adopt consolidatory genocide to their most similar counterparts. Accounting for the relevant counterfactual via matching, we should expect leaders that adopt consolidatory genocide to have a lower probability to suffer irregular removals originating from within the regime and suffer less adverse fates (i.e., death, imprisonment, or exile) than similar leaders that do not. Specifically, the reduction in the more acute risk of internal removal should translate into a lower probability of death and imprisonment fates in particular. Moreover, because of the inherent risks of mass indiscriminate violence, leaders may have a higher risk of removal from

\(^2\)It seems obvious that if consolidatory genocide by itself was not a risky strategy, we would expect consolidatory genocide to be more common.
externals sources, such as rebellion and foreign intervention. These risks of external removal might translate into a higher probability of exile, but not death or imprisonment as these do allow for a fighting retreat. Arrow $H_3$ in Figure 2, illustrates that the reduced probability of adverse leader fates is a signal of intra-group consolidation. Alternative explanations, that rely on violent or irrational leaders that underestimate the costs of mass indiscriminate violence would predict a higher likelihood of adverse fates.

$H_{3a}$: Leaders that initiate consolidatory genocide are less likely to experience adverse fates originating from within the regime than similar leaders that do not.

**Empirics**

To examine the relationship between consolidatory genocide and elite competition this study leverages newly collected original data, both on mass indiscriminate violence and on elite purges in nondemocratic countries from 1950 until 2004.$^3$ The expected relationships outlined above each have a distinct empirical approach for in-depth examination. The first analysis seeks to establish whether elite competition corresponds to the subsequent onset of mass indiscriminate violence. Here, the unit of analysis is country-year, the main independent variable is elite competition, and the dependent variable is counter-guerrilla or non-counter-guerrilla mass violence. Elite competition is captured both as observed coup risk (as measured by coups, coup attempts, coup rumors, and coup allegations), and a latent measure of coup risk as part

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$^3$The scope of the argument requires leaders to be at risk of harm (e.g., exile, imprisonment, or death) upon losing office, which mostly excludes democratic regimes. A country with a polity score of 5 or lower is considered non-democratic, which includes competitive authoritarian regimes in which disposed leaders may face imprisonment. Also, mass indiscriminate violence does not occur in developed or small states. States with a population under 3 million or a GDP per capita over 3000 were, therefore outside the scope of the study (e.g., Mahoney and Goertz 2004).
of a two-stage model. The second analysis seeks to establish whether mass indiscriminate violence years correspond to purges of regime elites. Here, the unit of analysis is country-year, the independent variable is counter-guerrilla or non-counter-guerrilla mass violence, and the dependent variable is elite purges. The final analysis seeks to establish whether the initiation of mass indiscriminate violence corresponds to irregular removals and adverse fates of leaders. Here, the unit of analysis is the leader, the independent variable or treatment is the initiation of non-counter-guerrilla mass violence, and the dependent variables are adverse fates (i.e., death, imprisonment, or exile) and irregular removals within five years. Descriptives of these key variables are provided in Table 2 below. For ease of reference, elite purges and leader level variables will be introduced after the first analysis when they first enter the models below. Moreover, all quantitative analyses are further supported by the in-depth qualitative examination of the processes in all non-counter-guerrilla genocides.

Two Types of Mass Indiscriminate Violence

The theory of consolidatory genocide expects the mechanisms that underlie counter-guerrilla and non-counter guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence to predictably differ. Therefore, I constructed a new dataset that distinguishes between all instances of counter-guerrilla and non-counter guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence from 1945 until 2004. The leaders that initiated the different types of Mass Indiscriminate Violence are presented in Table 3 below. These mass indiscriminate violence spells build on Harff (2003), Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2006) and Valentino (2004). Because the theory provides an explanation of mass violence, I follow Valentino (2004) and adopt a casualty threshold of 10,000 annual deaths to be considered Mass Indiscrimi-

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\[4\] Both types of mass indiscriminate violence include genocides and politicides. The data do not distinguish between genocides and politicides, because while victim identity differs for genocide and politicide they are otherwise identical and the underlying mechanisms are expected to be either counter-guerrilla or non-counter-guerrilla in nature.
Table 2: Descriptives of Dependent and Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Indiscriminate Violence:</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>sd</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
<th>count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidatory Genocide Onset</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-counter-guerrilla mass violence onset)</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence Onset</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(non-counter-guerrilla mass violence)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Elite Rivalry:                                        |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Elite Rivalry                                        |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| (coup rumors - incl. allegations, attempts and successful coups) | 0    | 0   | 1      | 318 |     |       |
| Coup or Attempted Coup                                |      |     |        |     |     |       |

| Elite Purges:                                         |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Elite Purges                                         |      |     |        |     |     |       |

| Matched Leader Fates:†                                 |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Death                                                 |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Prison                                                |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Exile                                                 |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Irregular Exit (Internal)                             |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Irregular Exit (External)                             |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Irregular Removal (any)                                |      |     |        |     |     |       |

| Latent Model and Control Variables:                   |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Irregular Conflict                                   |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Militias                                              |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Minor Purge (non-elite)                               |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| New Leader (inc. transition year)                     |      |     |        |     |     |       |
| Leader Tenure                                         | 8.59 | 7.85| 6      | 1   | 46  |       |
| GDP Per Capita (log)                                  | 6.62 | 0.89| 6.64   | 4   | 9   |       |
| Population (log)                                      | 9.54 | 1.14| 9.35   | 8   | 14  |       |
| Polity                                                | 5.99 | 3.12| 5.00   | 2   | 20  |       |

| Observations (country-year)                           | 2682 |
| Observations (country-year, incl. Elite Purges)       | 745  |
| Observations (country-year, incl. Militias)           | 1174 |
| Observations (matched leaders)                        | 396  |

† Observations in matched leader sample.
The first advantage of a focus on mass violence is that it ensures that the phenomena under examination are similar. For example, the academically problematic legal definition of genocide may include massacres of small groups or tribes that are incomparable to the mass violence in Guatemala, Cambodia or Rwanda. Moreover, counter-guerrilla mass violence commonly has a much lower magnitude than potential consolidatory genocides. The threshold ensures that counter-guerrilla mass violence and consolidatory genocide are comparable. The second advantage of a focus on mass violence is that it aids the distinction between indiscriminate and selective violence at the aggregate level. While it might be possible to selectively kill thousands of civilians, mass violence that runs in the ten thousands of civilian casualties is predominantly indiscriminate.

To establish the type of mass indiscriminate violence (i.e. counter-guerrilla or non-counter-guerrilla), the data builds on Lyall and Wilson (2009) that list guerrilla conflicts from the early 19th century until 2005. To code *Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence*, I first determined whether a guerrilla was present based on Lyall and Wilson (2009). If a guerrilla was present during a mass indiscriminate violence spell, I determined whether the violence occurred in the areas where the rebels were active. If the mass indiscriminate violence occurred predominantly in the areas of rebel activity, the violence was coded as Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence. If the mass indiscriminate violence occurred predominantly in the areas outside of rebel activity, the violence was coded as non-counter-guerrilla violence. If Lyall and Wilson (2009) did not have a guerrilla presence, non-counter-guerrilla mass violence was coded. In the analyses

---

5Valentino (2004) adopts a threshold of at least 50,000 deaths for the entire violence mass indiscriminate spell. However, mass indiscriminate violence commonly occurs over multiple years. Annual violence allows us to better compare mass violence episodes of similar intensity.

6E.g., in Burundi, the onset of the 1972 mass indiscriminate violence followed a failed Hutu rebellion. Though it is possible that the violence in the principal areas of the rebellion was counter-guerrilla in nature, mass indiscriminate violence immediately spread streamed across the whole of Burundi and well outside of the area in which the rebels were active (Lemarchand 2011, 41). Therefore the 1972-73 massacres in Burundi have been classified as consolidatory genocide.

7The only exception is the blockade of secessionist Biafra in Nigeria, which was coded as Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence, because it targeted the rebel area only. Upon publication, the data on
Table 3: Mass Indiscriminate Violence Leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gowon</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Mao Tse-Tung</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya Khan</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Kayibanda</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcos</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Suharto</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suharto</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Mao Tse-Tung</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Al-Bakr</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Gowon</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neto</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Amin</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobutu</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Micombero</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardar Mohammad</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Pol Pot</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gutiérrez</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Sindikubwabo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rios Montt</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Al-Bashir</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimeiri</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussein</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siad Barre</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndadaye</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dos Santos</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milosevic</td>
<td>Yugoslavia/</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that follow *Consolidatory Genocide* is operationalized as non-counter guerrilla mass violence. However, it is important to note that these non-counter guerrilla mass violence spells are merely unexplained instances of mass indiscriminate violence. Their only distinguishing feature is that they occur outside guerrilla conflict. While these are expected to be cases of consolidatory genocide, there is nothing in their coding that would favor one explanation over another.

**Elite Rivalry**

The first analysis adopts two measures of *Elite Rivalry* as the independent variable. One measure relies on coup data provided by Marshall and Marshall (2009), which not only includes successful and failed coup attempts, but also includes alleged and rumored coups. Together these provide a good proxy for *Elite Rivalry* within the regime. The other measure of *Elite Rivalry* is a latent measure that relies on an estimation of the probability of a *Coup Attempt*, which consists of observed coups or coup attempts. Here, I rely on data from Powell and Thyne (2011), which integrates various sources of coup data. To estimate the latent Elite Rivalry measure, the model estimates the probability of a *Coup Attempt* based on the time that a leader has been in office (*Leader Tenure*); whether the leader has entered office in the previous two years (*New Leader*); and *Minor Purges* in addition to control variables. *Leader Tenure* captures increased stability over time, while *New Leader* captures initial instability associated with new leaders; both are estimated from Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009). *Minor Purges* indicate whether regime members are purged in a given year, irrespective of their pillars of support or ability to actually threaten the position of the leader. As such, it includes purges of rank-and-file members of the regime and is a measure of instability within the regime. Because it is available for all country years, I adopt data provided by Banks (2012) as the main proxy for counter-guerrilla and consolidatory genocide spells will be made publicly available online with the replication files at [the author’s website here] and on the Dataverse Network.
Minor Purges in the paper. However, several scholars have privately expressed doubts regarding the validity of the Banks data on purges within authoritarian regimes due to a lack of transparency; these concerns are addressed in full in the Appendix.\textsuperscript{8}

**Elite Purges**

The second analysis adopts *Elite Purges* as the dependent variable. To measure Elite Purges, I rely on a new collection of original data on purges of potential challengers within the regime for all years from 1950 until 2004 in 20 states that had one or more years of mass indiscriminate violence, resulting in 745 observations. These cases include all periods of mass indiscriminate violence, but have multiple leaders and regimes and mostly consist of periods of non-violence. Therefore, these cases have considerable variation on key dependent and independent variables, and are comparable on control variables. Consequently, adding additional countries beyond the scope condition is not expected to be informative of the relation between mass indiscriminate violence and elite purges (e.g., see King and Zeng 2001, Mahoney and Goertz 2004).

In contrast to Minor Purges, Elite Purges are conceptualized as the purge in any given year of elite rivals that may actually threaten the leader’s tenure and physical security. Simply being a civilian cabinet minister was not sufficient to be considered an elite rival, as coup attempts require control of armed pillars of support. Therefore, purged elite rivals should have formal or informal control of pillars of support that have an armed component, such as the military, secret police, armed paramilitary

\textsuperscript{8}I collected original data on non-elite Minor Purges from 1950 until 2004 on all 20 countries that have one or more mass indiscriminate violence episodes and cross-checked it with the Banks data. This comparison of the two data sources shows that Banks occasionally codes the removal of non-regime opposition figures as purges. This could potentially affect the validity of the current study, as purged opposition members may be conflated with mass indiscriminate violence against an outgroup. Therefore, any non-regime purges in the Banks data have been recoded as zeros for all years for the key countries that had one or more mass indiscriminate violence spells. As shown in the appendix, analysis with my Purge data strengthens, but does not otherwise change any of the results in the article.
groups, or praetorian guard. These rivals were operationalized as Vice Chairmen, senior military officers, Chiefs of Staff, Defense Ministers, Heads of the secret police, or regional Governors in control of armed forces. These elites have a key function within the regime and are not purged alone: Elite Purges consistently coincide with the removal of rank-and-file members that form their pillars of support. In order to determine the elite’s official position and pillars of support within the regime, Elite Purges were coded only when the name of the purged elite could be established. It is dangerous to purge elite rivals and Elite Purges are correspondingly rare. Only at four times did Mao purge elite rivals, for example: Manchuria’s Governor Gao Gang in 1954, General Peng Dehuai in 1959, Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi in 1966, and General Lin Biao in 1971. Each of these Elite Purges corresponds to Minor Purges of junior regime members that formed these rivals’ pillars of support.

**Adverse Leader Fates and Irregular Removals**

The adverse fates, *Death*, *Imprisonment*, and *Exile*, code whether the leader suffers the specific fate within five years, excluding natural death. *Irregular Exit* captures whether the leader is forcefully removed from office within five years. Data on adverse fates and irregular exit was adopted from Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009), which has the advantage over coup data that it is collected at the leader level. It also allows us to distinguish two types of *Irregular Exit*: *Internal Irregular Exits* that originate from within the regime and *External Irregular Exits* that originate from outside the regime (i.e., rebellions and foreign interventions).

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9 Named elites also ensure transparency and replicability. Data on Elite Purges and names will be made available with the replication files: see footnote 7 on page 50.

10 Five years is a considerable time in authoritarian politics; as the median tenure is only six years.

11 Also note that irregular removals are highly correlated with coups, but do not fully overlap as even successful coups are sometimes reversed and do not end in the permanent removal of a leader. Moreover not all irregular leader removals are through coups. Coups and attempted coups are a good proxy for competition with a regime, while irregular removal is a better indication of a leader’s ability to survive.
Control Variables

The analyses adopt several control variables that are expected to be related to the onset of mass indiscriminate violence or to the occurrence of elite purges. The level of authoritarianism, as indicated by the Polity IV score, is expected to affect both mass indiscriminate violence as well as elite rivalry and was adopted from Cederman, Hug and Krebs (2010) without the PARREG component. Similarly GDP per Capita and Population size have been found to correspond to various types of political violence. These were coded as the log of a country’s GDP per capita and population and were taken from Gleditsch (2002). Moreover, the existence of conflict has been found to correspond to the onset of mass indiscriminate violence (e.g. Harff 2003). The existence of Irregular Conflict in particular is expected to ease the armed mobilization of the ingroup (e.g., see Straus 2006) for both types of mass indiscriminate violence. Data on Irregular Conflict is provided by Lyall and Wilson (2009). In the appendix, the analysis is repeated with Civil Conflict data (25 deaths or greater), which is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). Last, the theory expects parallel state structures in the form of militias and paramilitary groups to be part of the consolidatory genocide process. However, militias could potentially be related to Elite Purges irrespective of the occurrence of mass indiscriminate violence. Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013) provide data on the existence of pro-government Militias, which has been collected from 1981 until 2004. For all mass violence observations before 1981, the presence of formal or informal pro-government Militias was researched. With respect to potential Consolidatory Genocides (non-counter-guerrilla violence), pro-government Militias are active in all cases before and after 1981. While this supports the expectations in the theory, Militias cannot be estimated as part of a regular logit or probit regression on the onset of Consolidatory Genocide, because its absence predicts non-occurrence perfectly. However, this is not a concern, because Militias are theoretically and empirically part
of the consolidatory genocide process and post-treatment to Elite Rivalry.

**Elite Rivalry and Consolidatory Genocide Onset**

Based on the theory, we expect to observe the onset of consolidatory genocide during periods of high elite rivalry. In the analyses that follow *Consolidatory Genocide* is operationalized as non-counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence as explained above. To test H1, the models in Table 4 examine the relationship between Elite Rivalry (IV) and mass indiscriminate violence onset in the following year (DV). Here, I first estimate a simple model that relies on rumored coups (i.e. coups, coup attempts, as well as rumored or alleged coups) as a proxy for Elite Rivalry. Coup rumors capture the coup and counter-coup posturing within authoritarian regimes and therefore provide an observable measure of Elite Rivalry and the corresponding risk to a leader’s tenure. The first column of Table 4 reveals that high Elite Rivalry does indeed correspond to a significantly higher probability of Consolidatory Genocide onset. Furthermore, the second column shows that Elite Rivalry is unrelated to the onset of Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence as expected. While Consolidatory Genocide is extremely rare, the effects of Elite Rivalry are considerable, especially when we consider that consolidatory genocide has on average resulted in 700,000 to a million (civilian) deaths. Therefore, a single percentage point increase in the risk of consolidatory genocide corresponds to an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 deaths. For example, in any given year a median non-democratic regime has essentially a 0 percent chance [CI 95%: 0.0%; 0.2%] of Consolidatory Genocide onset; during Elite

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12 Temporal order of coup attempts and potential consolidatory genocides was determined by contrasting coup dates and violence start dates. Coups occurring within 12 months year before the violence onset were coded as coups, but coups that followed the onset of the violence were not coded as coups in the onset analysis.

13 Leaders in coup-prone countries are very insecure. This is supported by the data in which coups are a very strong predictor of coups and coup attempts in the following year. Therefore, irrespective of its success, coup rumors provide an observable measure of the elite rivalry that a leader faces.

14 Admittedly, the number of civilian deaths depend on population size and other factors, but the average civilian cost of consolidatory genocide provides some intuition of the impact of Elite Rivalry.
Rivalry this percentage increases to 0.6 percent [CI 95%: 0.1%; 1.5%]. Similarly, a large country with guerrilla activity, like Indonesia before the return to democracy in 1998, would have an estimated 1.0 percent risk [CI 95%: 0.0%; 4.8%] without Elite Rivalry and 4.8 percent risk [CI 95%: 0.5%; 14.9%] with Elite Rivalry. Moreover, as shown from the R², the model explains a quarter to a third of the variation in the onset of Consolidatory Genocide. As demonstrated in Table A.1 of the appendix, these results are robust to: Random Effects; Correction for Temporal Dependence; Rare Events Logit; and the inclusion of Militias (using Firths Penalized Likelihood), Civil Conflict Victory, or Civil Conflict. The hypothesis that elite rivalry corresponds to consolidatory genocide in the following year, therefore, appears to receive strong support.

Note that Elite Rivalry is actually a latent risk that we only occasionally observe: when there is a coup or coup attempt. Instead of relying on coup rumors and allegations, we can also estimate Elite Rivalry by modeling the risk of a coup or coup attempt that a leader faces. In order to capture the latent rivalry that a leader faces, I estimate a two-stage probit model - after Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) - that first predicts the risk of coups and coup attempts and then adopts the corresponding estimate as a predictor of Consolidatory Genocide and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence onset. The first stage generates an estimation of the latent risk of coups or coup attempts as a proxy for Elite Rivalry and is presented in column 3 of Table 4.¹⁵ I

¹⁵The first stage probit or “reduced” model to estimate the latent rivalry has the following functional form: \( \Pr(z_i = 1) = \Pr(\hat{z}_i > 0) = \Phi(Z\theta + \epsilon) \) in which \( z \) represents the occurrence of a coup or attempted coup; \( \hat{z} \) represents the estimated latent rivalry; and \( Z \) is the vector of variables used to estimate \( \hat{z} \). The functional form of the second stage or “structural” probit model is: \( y = \Phi(X\beta + \hat{z}\gamma + \epsilon) \) in which \( y \) represents consolidatory or mass indiscriminate counter-guerrilla violence; and \( X \) is the vector of control variables. \( \epsilon \) and \( \hat{z} \) represent the error terms of the models. I analytically derive the standard errors in the second model after Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) to account for the additional uncertainty of using an estimate as dependent variable in the second model. Note that the model captures a latent risk and that the endogeneity of Coup Attempt is not actually expected to be of concern. Still, as the reduced model explains a considerable part of the variation in Coup Attempt \( (R^2 = .401 - \text{instruments: } R^2 = .275) \), bias due to a weakness of the instruments should not be a concern either (e.g., Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995). Also, the instruments themselves are strongly predictive of the variation in Coup Attempt \( (R^2 = .275) \).
Table 4: Elite Rivalry and Mass Indiscriminate Violence Onset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cons.</td>
<td>Counter-Guerrilla</td>
<td>Coup Attempt</td>
<td>Cons. Genocide</td>
<td>Counter-Guerrilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Rivalry</td>
<td>.86**</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Coup rumors, allegations, attempts &amp; successes)</td>
<td>(.29)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Rivalry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Latent probability of coups &amp; attempts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita t−1</td>
<td>-.32*</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.30†</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population t−1</td>
<td>.18†</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.08†</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Conflict</td>
<td>.94**</td>
<td>1.33**</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.79**</td>
<td>1.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.04**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Purges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Non-elite)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.93**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl. transition year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.57†</td>
<td>-2.90**</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
<td>-2.88**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.81)</td>
<td>(.56)</td>
<td>(.39)</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Onsets only, ongoing mass indiscriminate violence dropped from the analysis. Corrected for temporal order of Elite Rivalry and Mass Indiscriminate Violence Onsets.

†significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%, two-tailed. Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is McKelvey & Zavoina’s.
adopt the time that a leader has been in office (i.e. Leader Tenure, New Leader) and Regime Purges as exclusion restrictions to ensure the model is identified. Based on the theoretical framework presented earlier, none of these variables are expected to directly correspond to the onset of mass indiscriminate violence. However, leaders are expected to face reduced coup risk over time (e.g. Svolik 2009, 2012) whereas purges are expected to increase coup risk (e.g. Roessler 2011). Therefore, any correlation between these variables and the onset of Consolidatory Genocide is expected to be a direct function of heightened Elite Rivalry.

Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 present the effects of the estimated latent Elite Rivalry on Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence and Consolidatory Genocide. The results are supportive of hypotheses H1a and H1b: Elite Rivalry corresponds strongly to Consolidatory Genocide (column 4), but not to Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence (column 5). Elite Rivalry robustly corresponds to Consolidatory Genocide onset even despite the very small sample of 12 Consolidatory Genocide observations. Moreover, the latent model captures a considerable part of the variation in Consolidatory Genocide as demonstrated in a pseudo $R^2$ of .29. Moreover, as shown in Table A.3 of the appendix, these results are even stronger when adopting my newly collected original data on non-elite Regime Purges instead of the Banks data; and are robust to the inclusion of Civil Conflict or a first stage model that estimates the risk of successful coups. Admittedly, two-stage models have their limitations and effects are estimated on the basis of a small number of mass indiscriminate violence onsets only. Nonetheless, the strong relationship between both measures of Elite Rivalry and Consolidatory Genocide provides considerable support for the theory and cannot be explained by rival explanations.

Our confidence in the models as an accurate description of the data (e.g., Berk 2004) would be greatest if we qualitatively observe the relationship between elite rivalry and mass indiscriminate violence onset as well. As mentioned, mass indiscrimin-
inate violence in Rwanda and Cambodia took place under conditions of heightened elite competition. Similarly, Indonesia, Uganda, and Nigeria had coups or coup attempts in the months before the onset of mass indiscriminate violence. Moreover, at the advent of the cultural revolution in 1965-66, Mao both faced an alleged coup plot and was in open conflict with his Vice-Chairman Lui Shaoqi, who had been rapidly gaining influence within the party (Dittmer 1973, 1978, 720-22; 37-38). Most of the cases that did not have coup events in the data did demonstrably experience severe competition between factions within the regime at the start of mass indiscriminate violence, such as Rwanda in 1964, Sudan, Serbia, and Burundi. The qualitative evidence therefore suggests that the quantitative models are correctly capturing high elite rivalry within the regime preceding the onset of consolidatory genocide. Together these sources of evidence suggests that consolidatory genocide does indeed occur under heightened elite rivalry. Extreme leader ideology as proposed in Valentino (2004) therefore lacks explanatory power vis-à-vis the theory of consolidatory violence.

Mass Indiscriminate Violence and Elite Purges

Leaders are more likely to turn to consolidatory genocide during high elite rivalry, but do they successfully purge elite rivals as part of the consolidatory genocide process? According to the theory, consolidatory genocide should be followed by elite purges (H2). The columns in Table 5, do indeed demonstrate a strong relationship between Consolidatory Genocide in any given year (IV) and Elite Purges the following

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16In Serbia in 1990, the rivalry within the Communist party between the reformist faction of Prime Minister Markovic and the conservative faction of Milosevic turned salient as communist parties lost power throughout Eastern Europe (e.g., Gagnon 1994, 2006, 89-94). In Rwanda in 1964, Violence against Tutsi civilians was driven by intra-Hutu competition between the Kayibanda’s Hutu faction and rival Hutus from Butare (e.g., Barrington 2006, 86-89). In Sudan, Al-Bashir split with Al-Turabi before 2000, after which they competed for control until 2004. Al-Turabi had his pillars of support in the Darfur region (e.g., De Waal 2007, Serbo and Ahmed 2013, 45-46). In Burundi, the Banyararuguru Tutsi and rival Hima Tutsi faction of president Micombero vied for power in the 1970-1972 period, with an alleged coup plot from Banyaruguru faction members late 1971 (e.g., Weinstein 1972, Marchak 2003, Lemarchand 2008, 2011).
year (DV). The first column shows that when we pool Mass Indiscriminate Violence and do not distinguish between Consolidatory Genocide and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence, Mass Indiscriminate Violence corresponds to Elite Purges.

| Table 5: Probit on Elite Purges for Consolidatory and Counter-Guerrilla MIV Spells |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                                 | I       | II      | III     | IV      |
|                                 | Elite Purges | Elite Purges | Elite Purges | Elite Purges |
| Mass Indiscriminate Violence $t-1$ | .71**    | (.18)   | .71**   | (.21)   |
| Consolidatory Genocide $t-1$    | 1.15**   | (.22)   | .73**   | (.21)   |
| (non-counter-guerrilla)         |          |         |         |         |
| Consolidatory Genocide          | 1.69**   | (.21)   |         |         |
| (non-counter-guerrilla)         |          |         |         |         |
| Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence $t-1$ | .19     | (.25)   | -.09    | (.18)   |
| Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence | .34      | (.50)   |         |         |
| Irregular Conflict              | -.83**   | (.21)   | -.64**  | (.14)   |
|                                 | (-.63*)  |         |         |         |
| Population                      | .08     | (.05)   | .05     | (.06)   |
| GDP per Capita                  | .09     | (.10)   | .18†    | (.10)   |
|                                | (-.99)  |         |         |         |
| Polity                          | .05     | (.05)   | -10*    | (.05)   |
| Leader Tenure                   | .02     | (.01)   | -.02*   | (.01)   |
| New Leader (incl. transition year) | .48**   | (.17)   | .52**   | (.09)   |
| Militias                        | .23     | (.26)   | .17     | (.25)   |
| Constant                        | -1.82   | (.24)   | -2.47*  | (.17)   |
|                                 | (.86)   |         | -.60**  | (.03)   |
| $R^2$                           | .266    | .275    | .136    | .278    |
| Observations                    | 391     | 391     | 733     | 733     |

Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses.

†significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%, two-tailed. Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is McKelvey & Zavoina's.

‡First year of consolidatory genocide omitted for each consolidatory genocide spell.

When we consider the type of mass indiscriminate violence in column 2 of Table 5, however, it becomes clear that only Consolidatory Genocide corresponds to Elite Purges, while Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence does not. This provides strong
support for H2a and H2b and also demonstrates that Consolidatory Genocide significantly (at 5% level) differs from Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence. Column 3 shows that the findings are robust to dropping Militias from the analysis.\textsuperscript{17} The final model presented in column 4 shows the preferred specification. Based on the theory, we expect elite purges to occur predominantly in the later stages of consolidatory genocide. Therefore, I drop the onset year of each consolidatory genocide spell from the data. Again, the findings are statistically significant as well as especially sizable. A median non-democratic regime without militias has a predicted probability of elite purges of 0.13 [CI 95%: .06; .22]. During the later years of consolidatory genocide, however, a median authoritarian regime has a predicted probability of elite purges of 0.70 [CI 95%: .48; .88], which is a statistically significant increase in probability of .57 [CI 95%: .40; .70]. These results are robust to the inclusion of Civil Conflict and the correction for unobserved heterogeneity using random effects.\textsuperscript{18} The relationship between mass indiscriminate violence and purges of ingroup elites cannot be explained by rival explanations and is strongly supportive of the theory of consolidatory genocide.

The finding that elite purges follow consolidatory genocide are mirrored in the case studies. In Cambodia, for example, the consolidatory violence process was executed consecutively by region. Regions would first be engulfed in the process of mass indiscriminate violence and followed by purges of Khmer elites. The most dangerous competitor to the Pol Pot’s Khmer faction was the Eastern Vietnamese-trained Khmer branch, which found its support base in the Eastern regions of the country. Early attempts at purging this rival branch had failed. As such, the Eastern regions were last to be targeted in a massive operation of indiscriminate violence followed by purges of the Eastern Khmer elites (e.g., Kiernan 1996). Similarly, following the assassination of president Habyarimana in Rwanda, Col. Bagasora from the genocidal

\textsuperscript{17}The available data on militias runs from 1981 until 2004, which causes the loss of a great number of negative observations before 1981.

\textsuperscript{18}See appendix Table A.1.
Akuazu Hutu faction failed to take control of the Rwandan military and the “moderate” Hutu Col. Gatsinzi was appointed as Chief of staff. As the genocidal violence engulfed the country however, the military lost control and Col. Gatsinzi who had opposed the genocide was forced to go into hiding (e.g., Straus 2006). Most other potential cases of consolidatory genocide saw the purge of key rivals as part of the process of mass indiscriminate violence. Evidence suggests that non-counter-guerrilla mass indiscriminate violence corresponds to purges of ingroup elite as predicted by the theory of consolidatory genocide. Alternative explanations that posit mass indiscriminate violence as a strategy of removing an outgroup threat (e.g. Licklider 1995, Straus 2006) cannot account for this relationship.

Consolidatory Genocide, Adverse Fates and Irregular Removals of leaders

Leaders under conditions of high elite rivalry adopt consolidatory genocide to purge key elite rivals, but does this strategy translate to greater odds of political and physical survival? According to the theory, Consolidatory Genocide (IV) should correspond to a reduced likelihood of adverse leader fates and irregular removal (DV) originating from outside the regime. In order to arrive at the effects of consolidatory genocide on leader survival, we need to account for selection effects. Specifically, the theory

19 For example in China, Collectivization, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution led the fall of regional leaders Kao Kang (Manchuria) and Jao Shu-Shih (East China); General Peng Teh-huai; and second-in-command Lui Shaoqi among countless others. In Serbia, the pro-Yugoslav army leadership was first purged with Kadijevic in 1991 (Sudetic 1992); and Blagoje Adzic, Col. Gen. Mihutin Kukanjac, and the Military Chief of Staff Gen. Zivota Panic were purged with six dozen senior generals in 1992 & 1993 (Burns 1992, Bieber 2008, New York Times 1993). Furthermore, in Indonesia indiscriminate violence allowed Suharto to sideline his superior General Nasution and remove Sukarno (Dake 2006, Friend 2009). Similarly, following indiscriminate pogroms throughout Nigeria, Gowon and Murtala Muhammed disposed of most of their fellow officers that had come to power in an earlier coup. Chukwuemeka Ojukwu survived and subsequently led the Biafra secession (eg Siollun 2009). Even cases that did not have conclusive evidence of elite purges, such as Rwanda in 1964 and Burundi in 1972, have considerable circumstantial evidence such as assassinations of ingroup elites and high ingroup rivalry before and consolidation after the violence (e.g. Lemarchand 1975, Barrington 2006, Straus 2006).
of consolidatory genocide leads us to expect that those leaders that experience the greatest risk of losing office are also the most likely to adopt consolidatory genocide as a strategy to win elite rivalry. Consequently, it is not sufficient to simply estimate the effects of Consolidatory Genocide on leader survival. Rather we should establish the relevant counterfactual: are leaders that adopt consolidatory genocide more likely to survive than their most similar counterparts that do not. To arrive at this counterfactual, I match leader observations on the estimated propensity of initiating Consolidatory Genocide. The propensity score is estimated on observed covariates by regressing the Consolidatory Genocide Onset on GDP per Capita, Population, Polity IV, Tenure, New Leader, and Non-Elite Purges (e.g., see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984, Sekhon 2008, 2009).

Results indicate that leaders who initiate Consolidatory Genocide do have a considerably higher probability of survival than their most similar counterparts that do not. The filled dots in Figure 3 present the average treatment effect of Consolidatory Genocide on adverse leader fates and irregular leader exits of leaders that adopt Consolidatory Genocide. Positive coefficients correspond to an increased probability of adverse leader fates and irregular exits, while a negative coefficient corresponds to a reduced probability. The bars represent the 95% confidence interval and tics represent the 90% confidence interval. The analyses in Figure 3 are at the leader level in which Consolidatory Genocide leaders are matched to most similar leaders within a propensity score range of .01 as counterfactuals. For each leader in the control group only the year with the greatest propensity for Consolidatory Genocide was used.

With respect to adverse leader fates, Figure 3 demonstrates that leaders that adopt Consolidatory Genocide have a statistically significant reduced risk of Death or Imprisonment. This supports the expectation that consolidatory genocide protects the leader from the more acute dangers of elite rivalry. A Sensitivity Analysis reveals
Figure 3: Average Treatment Effect of Consolidatory Genocide on Adverse Leader Fates within 5 Years

Leaders are matched on the estimated propensity score of initiating Consolidatory Genocide (based on GDP per Capita, Population, Polity IV, Tenure, New Leader, and Non-Elite Purges) with a caliper of 0.01. N = 396; Treated = 12; and Control = 384. Filled dots represent the average treatment effect of Consolidatory Genocide on the treated (leaders that initiate consolidatory genocide); open dots represent the average treatment effect of Counter Guerrilla Mass Violence, which is included as placebo; bars represent the 95% confidence interval; and tics represent the 90% confidence interval.
that these results are robust to unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum 2002). At the same time Consolidatory Genocide does not affect the risk of Exile, which may also be related to threats originating from outside the regime. With respect to Irregular Exits, Figure 3 demonstrates that leaders that adopt Consolidatory Genocide on average have a statistically significant reduced risk of Internal Irregular Exits that originate from within the regime in exchange for a slight increased risk of an External Irregular Exit induced from outside of the regime. Though we cannot show that leaders initiate consolidatory genocide because of within-group threats, these results seem to imply that those that do have an increased likelihood of survival. Moreover, leaders that adopt consolidatory genocide seem to exchange the greater risks of elite intra-group competition for the lesser risks of inter-group competition, as predicted.

An additional robustness check with Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence as a placebo treatment demonstrated no effects on adverse leader fates or internal exits as expected, as represented by the open dots in Figure 3. As expected in the theory leaders that initiate Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence are no more likely to survive than most similar leaders that do not, with the exception of External Irregular Exits. Recall that External Irregular Exits are foreign or rebel induced. Leaders that initiate Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence do have a slightly reduced risk of External Irregular Exits that originate from outside the regime. Where consolidatory genocide is expected to be at a

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20At the 95% confidence interval, to attribute the lower risk of Death (Γ 3.01) or Imprisonment (Γ 3.22) following Consolidatory Genocide to an unobserved covariate rather than to Consolidatory Genocide, that unobserved covariate would need to produce a three-fold increase in the odds of Consolidatory Genocide and it would need to be a near perfect predictor of Death or Imprisonment.

21The effect of consolidatory genocide on internal exits (Γ 1.46) is only moderately robust to unobservables.

22Like the Consolidatory Genocide treatment, the placebo treatment matches leaders on the propensity of to adopt mass indiscriminate violence. However, the placebo test matches of the propensity to initiate Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence rather than Consolidatory Genocide. Consequently, the Treated and Control observations for the placebo treatment differ from the main test. Therefore, because both the treatment and placebo treatment have their own control groups, the error bars do not provide us with any indication of whether there exists a significant difference between the Treatment and the Placebo. Treatment effects are the difference between the treated and the most likely to be treated; and placebo effects are the difference between the placebo treatment and those most likely to receive the placebo treatment.
higher risk of foreign intervention, Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence should not affect foreign intervention; Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence is, however, expected to be an effective strategy in guerrilla conflicts and should therefore reduce the probability of being removed by rebels.

Again, qualitative evidence shows that leaders that initiate mass indiscriminate violence under conditions of high internal rivalry successfully deal with elite rivals. Even in cases such as Rwanda and Cambodia where leaders lost power during the mass indiscriminate violence, they were ruthlessly successful against ingroup rivals. Ultimately, they were not ousted by their rivals within the regime, but through militarily intervention from outside the country. Moreover, because of the safer distant threat of military intervention as opposed to the close threat of a coup, both Pol Pot’s regime as well as the genocidal Akuza regime were able evade capture.\(^{23}\) Other leaders, such as Mao, Suharto, and Milosevic successfully consolidated their power and became able to purge their competition as part of the mass indiscriminate violence process. Moreover, the neutralization of acutely critical ingroup rivalries allowed Micombero, Amin, Gowon, Kayibanda, and Bashir to survive. These results suggest that consolidatory genocide is not simply driven by leaders filled with hatred and a preference for violence, but that it is likely a rational strategy by authoritarian leaders that seek political as well as physical survival.

### Conclusion

This Chapter has established that: 1) consolidatory genocide is distinct from mass indiscriminate counter-guerrilla violence; 2) elite rivalry corresponds to a greater likelihood of consolidatory genocide; 3) consolidatory genocide corresponds to a greater probability of elite purges; and 4) leaders that initiate consolidatory genocide have a

\(^{23}\)Pol Pot’s inner circle evaded capture for 20 years. With respect to the Rwandan Akuza, it wasn’t until three years after the genocide that some of their leading members were arrested at their exile location in Cameroon.
significantly reduced probability of adverse leader fates such as death and imprisonment as well as of irregular removal through internal sources. Fortunately consolidatory genocide is rare, which challenges us to base its understanding on a relatively small body of evidence. Therefore, these quantitative findings by themselves provide only partial evidence for the theory. However, taken together and in combination with the qualitative evidence, these findings do provide considerable support for the theory of consolidatory genocide versus alternative explanations. Thereby supporting the proposition that consolidatory genocide is instrumental to leader survival and suggesting that it should be viewed as part of a process of authoritarian competition. The next chapter will take a closer look at these processes within the case of Rwanda.
Chapter 5

Within-Case Evidence, the Process of Consolidatory Violence in Rwanda

This chapter focuses on the processes and dynamics of genocide within the case of Rwanda. In Rwanda, mass violence resulted in an extremely high number of civilian casualties. The goal of this chapter is to show novel empirical aspects of the violence have not been identified and integrated before. Therefore, the relationship between elite rivalry, consolidatory genocide, and elite purges is examined through process tracing and pattern matching, combining within-case methods specifically designed to get leverage over this highly salient case. Specifically, I trace the process of the violence based on mostly secondary sources in Rwanda in 1994.\footnote{Rwanda has seen considerable scholarly interest over the previous two decades and therefore has a considerable body of research associated with it. This study avoids selectivity by relying on multiple historical accounts. Building on a broad body of scholarship allows me to reduce issues of historiography (e.g. Lustick 1996) and guard against conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). See also Skocpol (1984), Lustick (1996), and Thies (2002).} The main rationale for selecting this particular case is that it experienced a guerrilla conflict during the violence. I argue that the mass indiscriminate violence occurred far outside the areas of rebellion and that the violence was unrelated to the guerrilla conflict. As such, Rwanda can be considered a most-likely case for the between-group argument and a least-likely case for the theory of consolidatory genocide. If mass indiscriminate
violence that occurs far from rebel activity is indeed unrelated to guerrilla conflict and instead related to elite rivalry, we should be able to observe it in the Rwandan case.

Background to the Genocide

To better follow the matching of the Rwandan case pattern to the different theories, I will here provide a concise historical overview to the genocide. Even before the genocide Rwanda has had a long history of ethnic violence. Before independence, the German Belgian colonial rulers had created ethnic categories among the population to better control the area. These ethnic divisions were based on pre-existing categories coupled with vague physical characteristics and class. These artificial ethnic categories - Twa, Hutu, and Tutsi - would remain a key tool for political control even after independence. After independence, Hutu military officers under the leadership of Gregoire Kayibanda took control of the country in a coup. In 1963, the Kayibanda regime resolved internal differences among Hutu factions and sidelined Tutsi during a campaign of mass indiscriminate violence that killed over ten thousand Tutsis (e.g. Lemarchand 1975, Barrington 2006, Straus 2006). After the genocidal violence of 1963, the regime consolidated and governed mostly unopposed until 1973, when Kayibanda was disposed in a Hutu military coup led by Habyarimana. The Habyarimana regime was less discriminatory towards Tutsi, but all key state functions remained solidly under Hutu control. For two decades President Kayibanda would successfully preside over a single-party state.

The end of the Cold War coincided with two important changes in Rwanda. First, the 1990s saw the start of a civil war between the Hutu regime and Tutsi exiles. Descendants from exiles Tutsi that had fled Rwanda in 1963 had mobilized in Uganda with the support of Museveni’s NRA and created the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
In October 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda from Uganda, which was the beginning of a civil war between the Hutu Habyarimana regime and the RPF (e.g., Des Forges 1999, Straus 2006). The RPF rebels had been fairly effective, which increased the dependence of the Habyarimana’s regime on its Western backers, such as France. Second, in 1992 Rwanda became a multi-party state under increasing pressure from Habyarimana’s Western backers. The opening of the political system brought pre-existing differences within the Hutu regime to the fore. Before long, political competition at the local and national level turned violent and generated a high level of insecurity among the Rwandan Hutu elite. The civil war and violent intra-Hutu competition forced Kayibanda to negotiate with the RPF rebels.

In 1993, the Arusha accords were signed, which not only would mean power sharing with the RPF and the Hutu opposition, but were otherwise highly unfavorable to the reactionary ruling elite. Of the various factions in Rwanda society, the “hardliner” or reactionary faction was most threatened by the changes of the early 1990s (Straus 2006, 28). Habyarimana stalled the implementation of the Arusha accords, but his power was already slipping. On April 6, 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was struck over Kigali by a rocket. To this day it is unclear whether Habyarimana was assassinated by the RPF or by the reactionary core of his own regime. However, it is clear that with the assassination of the President the violence escalated to genocide. While the different Hutu factions fought for political control of the Rwandan state, the reactionaries formed an interim government. Within only two weeks the genocide had spread to all regions under the control of the interim government and the interim government assumed complete political control. However, in the end this was to no avail as the RPF rebels slowly, but steadily took control of the country, forcing the Hutu government to flee after three and a half months of fighting.

At the surface, the Rwandan genocide may seem different from the process described in chapter three. For one, there is no clear genocidal leader. The assassination
of President Habyarimana set the genocide in motion and even before his death, the President’s position and involvement with the preparations of the violence is unclear. However, as argued in chapter three, the process of consolidatory genocide does not actually require the genocidal actor to be the leader. In the Rwandan genocide the rivalry is not between the leader and challenger, but between a dominant reactionary Hutu faction and a rival reformist Hutu faction within the regime. Otherwise Rwanda is similar, because it was the old-guard reactionary elite of the regime that prepared and executed the genocide under conditions of intra-regime rivalry. Another reason why Rwanda seems different is that the genocidal regime ultimately lost the civil war with the RPF. However, as I will demonstrate in this chapter, the genocidal faction successfully dealt with the internal rivalry in only two weeks. The reactionaries thereby consolidated their power over the Hutu regime even though it was removed by the rebels three months later. The Rwandan case should therefore clearly demonstrate the trade-off of internal consolidation versus external vulnerability that genocidal regimes face.

**Explaining the Violence**

Theory not only provides us with an explanation for a phenomenon of interest, but it is also a lens through which we perceive the world. As such, theory plays two roles in the study of a particular case. First, when we conceive of theory as an explanation, we must ensure that it is falsifiable. In-depth case study should allow us to test whether the mechanisms and processes predicted by the theory actually materialize in the case. Therefore, in this chapter, the in-depth study of the Rwandan genocide may lead to the conclusion that the theory of consolidatory genocide does not fit the empirical processes of the genocide. Second, when we conceive of theory as a lens, a theory should provide us with a new or better understanding of the mechanisms
and processes underlying the case. For example, theory may induce us to look at parts of the case that may have previously thought of as less important or explain observations that were previously unexplained. The theory of consolidatory genocide introduces the intra-hutu competition as a key component of the genocide that should be scrutinized. In doing so the theory aims to not only provide new explanations, but also provide new venues for research.

**Theory Testing: Process Tracing**

To test the theory of consolidatory genocide, the remainder of this chapter relies on a combination of process tracing and pattern matching. Process tracing establishes the causal chain that connects the independent and dependent variable for a large number of observations within a single case (George and Bennett 2005). Here, I seek to capture both the sequential nature of consolidatory genocide (i.e. elite rivalry, militias, violence, capture of local government, elite purges, and authoritarian consolidation) and the mechanisms through which consolidatory genocide reconstructs the pillars of support that authoritarian elites rely upon. Particularly, this study relies on narrative analysis of a large body of mostly secondary historical scholarship in order to discern the unique temporal and sequential unfolding of events within a single case (George and Bennett 2005).

**Theory Evaluation: Pattern Matching**

Pattern matching comes in when we compare the observed process in the case to the processes we would expect for each theory. Here, we are not only testing the theory of consolidatory genocide, but are also comparing its utility and explanatory power to rival theories. Recall that there exist three main rival explanations for mass indiscriminate violence: leader ideology, between-group competition, and the
theory of consolidatory genocide. The first rival explanation of leader ideology as argued by Valentino (2004) predicts the genocidal violence itself to be unrelated to consolidation. It argues that the reactionaries committed genocide because of a racial supremacist and a deep seated hatred of the Tutsi minority. As we will see, the theory fits the empirical evidence. The reactionary faction did propagate the ideology that the Tutsi sought to rule over the Hutu. However, the theory does not explain all that much. For one, extreme ideology is likely to be part of the technology of genocide. We would likely observe some sort of extremist ideology to rationalize the violence and mobilize the population even if the government executed the genocide for non-ideological reasons. Both the between-group and consolidatory genocide explanations would predict an extremist ideology. Therefore, the ideology explanation provides few insights into the genocidal process and has less potential for explanation than the other theories.

The second rival explanation is that the violence was a counter-guerrilla reaction to between-group competition as argued by Straus (2006) and Licklider (1995). Here, the expected pattern encompasses more of the process than that of leader ideology. Not only would we expect the reactionary faction to push an anti-Tutsi ideology, but we expect them to do so for instrumental reasons. Specifically, while we should still expect the extremist ideology be an integral part of the genocide, the genocide itself is not driven by ideology, but is an instrument to mobilize the Hutu population against the RPF and win the civil war. Several studies demonstrate that Rwanda experienced inter-ethnic competition in the form of an armed insurgency in the years before the genocide. Specifically the early 90s saw increasing pressure from the RPF rebels and a failure of the Hutu state to fight the rebels, especially under the risk of withdrawal of French support. The emergence of the RPF as an armed contender in the 1990s follows the pattern predicted by inter-group rivalry explanations (e.g., Straus 2006). However, the intra-ethnic rivalry pattern predicted by the theory of
consolidatory genocide may be equally true. If the between-group conflict explanation is correct, the genocide should actually support the reactionary Hutu government in the civil war against the RPF. We should therefore observe Hutu mobilization in direct relation to the rebellion. The central government should utilize the militias, the civil defense programme, and the mobilized local Hutu in the war to stop the RPF. Also, the indiscriminate violence should not support the mobilization of the RPF.²

This chapter will demonstrate that the genocide did not help and even hampered the Hutu war effort. The militias and civil defense program did not engage the RPF until the end of the war when the RPF attacked the last remaining stronghold of the reactionary government.³ At the commune level, Hutu stepped down and abandoned the reactionary government wherever the RPF neared. Moreover, the genocide undermined the ability of the army to fight the RPF and helped the RPF to recruit among survivors and the Hutu armed forces during the war. Straus (2006) acknowledges that the genocide was ineffective and argues that the reactionaries therefore likely mis-characterized the effectiveness of the genocide for mobilization and winning the war. False beliefs may very well exist, but these are hard to falsify. It is here that the theory of consolidatory genocide has the potential to contribute to a better understanding of the Rwandan genocide.

The theory of consolidatory genocide predicts a much more central role for internal Hutu divisions in the motive for genocidal violence. Earlier research has recognized the importance for intra-Hutu divisions in explaining variation in the time to genocide onset across regions. Straus (2006) and McDoom (2014), for example, argue that local internal divisions had to be resolved first in order execute the genocide and that these internal divisions therefore explain differences in the time to onset of the genocidal

²Here we have to rely on the counterfactual.
³The militias and mobilized Hutu in the civil defense program lacked the equipment to be effective in war, fighting with bows, machetes, clubs and spears.
violence across regions. This chapter goes beyond these finding and argues that the process of genocide itself resolved internal divisions and that the genocide allowed for the reactionary Hutu faction to capture the state. It did not, however, help the Hutu regime to fight the civil war. Therefore, if we find the genocidal violence to provide little support in fighting the rebellion and at the same time, find that the genocidal violence supports internal consolidation of the Hutu regime. Then, we should conclude that the theory of consolidatory genocide has greater explanatory power and is more plausible than its counterpart.

In structuring the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on three political spheres that are of particular interest according to the theory of consolidatory genocide: elite politics, elite pillars of support, and local level politics. Moreover, this study will focus on these spheres in three broad stages: the pre-onset stage, the start of violence stage, and the consolidation stage. At the elite level we expect high rivalry before the onset of the violence, which should not abate until late in the consolidatory genocide process. Rivals are purged following institutional capture, which should lead to consolidation at the top of the regime. With respect to pillars of support, we should see deep cleavages that mirror the rivalry within the top of the regime, these cleavages should disappear as part of the consolidatory genocide process. Within the sphere of local politics, we should observe generally peaceful civilian relations before the onset of violence followed by sudden militia violence which results in the capture of the local communities and spillover into other localities.

Rwanda has received a huge amount of scholarly attention in various fields. However, even though a lot of attention has been focused on the decision at the top of

4 Though these spheres are not as clearly delineated in practice as in theory, this is a useful way of thinking about the interrelated levels of support in a regime. I assume that the elites have their pillars of support in state institutions and that state institutions have their roots in society. Therefore changes in local level politics can affect institutional support especially when this is not moderated by elite level politics. When there is a political struggle at the elite level, changes at the local level can tip the balance of power in institutions one way or another, just as changes within pillars of support can tip the scale at the elite level.
the regime to turn to genocide, very little attention has been given to the component of elite competition between Hutus at the top of the regime as an explanation. In the remainder of the chapter, we will focus on the process of the genocide from the level of elite politics and the elite pillars of support to see whether it fits the pattern predicted by the theory of consolidatory genocide.

The expected pattern for Rwanda is shown in figure 1 below. In the case of Rwanda the genocide spread rapidly with most of the violence taking place in only two weeks (Straus 2006, 57). To divide the process into stages, I build on Straus (2006), who looks at the variation in onset time across various regions in Rwanda. He divides the onset of genocide in three stages. Early onset within only two days after the assassination of the President (April 6-8). Intermediate onset within a week of the assassination (April 9-14). And late onset more than nine days following the crash (after April 14). Although the time to onset of the violence differed between regions, all regions followed roughly the same pattern of violence once it had started. On onset, the violence spiked rapidly, killing most of the Tutsi population within days thereafter (Straus 2006, 56). The rest of this chapter is structured by the pattern matching. First, it examines the three political spheres before the crash and assassination of president Habyarimana on April 6. Then it follows these spheres in the first three days, where we expect the extreme violence to change the facts on the ground, but continued struggle at the top of the regime. Then we follow these spheres in the first week, here we expect the balance of power within pillars of support to be shifting to the reactionaries. Last we trace the process in the final stage, where we expect the complete takeover of the state by reactionaries and the purge of elite

5 According to Straus (2006), the violence was immediately completely indiscriminate: the killings of women and children that according to interviews were not seen as combattants, closely followed the killing of men (58).
6 Note that Rwanda also saw the killing of a substantial number of Hutus, that are of special interest to this study. The actual number of Hutu casualties is very hard to estimate. Valentino (2004), for example, estimates the number of Hutu killed somewhere between 10 and 30 thousand and Verwimp (2003) estimates the number of Hutu killed by the interahamwe to be around 20 percent.


**Figure 4: Theory of Consolidatory Genocide Process**

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|                      | April 6:           | April 14:        | Time          |
|                      | Assassination     | Late Onset       |               |
|                      | Habyarimana       |                  |               |

**Deadly Elite Competition**

To test the theory of consolidatory genocide we need to focus on the internal divisions between Hutu factions. In the decades before the genocide, the Rwandan state was firmly under Hutu control. Even though Habyarimana had been more tolerant of Tutsis than the Hutu regime of Kayibanda, his predecessor in the 60s and early 70s, Tutsis were absent from positions of influence within state institutions. As expected in a single-party state dominated by a single ethnicity, major political cleavages existed between Hutu factions. In Rwanda, the historical cleavage between Hutus is regional. After independence, Kayibanda’s Rwanda was dominated by Hutu from South/Central Gitarama region. As such, Kayibanda’s Gitarama regime had his pil-
lars of support from Hutus in the South and Southwest (Verwimp 2013, Straus 2006, 24). In 1973 Habyarimana took power with support of Hutu officers from the Gisenyi region in the Northwest of the country. As a result, Habyarimana’s regime was undeniably a Gisenyi regime: those in the small circle at the top were from Gisenyi. Unsurprisingly, Northwestern Hutus had a monopoly on power in the government, military and state-run companies (parastatals) by 1990 (Straus 2006, 23). As such, the Northwestern Hutu clique had most to lose and the would therefore form the core of the reactionary Hutu faction.\(^7\)

With the end of the cold war, however, Habyarimana’s regime came under pressure from France and the wider international community to open up. Within the context of a civil war with the Tutsi RPF, Habyarimana’s regime was dependent on French support and therefore susceptible to pressure. Habyarimana responded by formally allowing the establishment of opposition parties other than his Mouvement Rvolutionnaire National pour le Dveloppement (MRND).\(^8\) In 1991, Hutu from Southern Gitarama sought to share in the power of the Northwest and organized in the Mouvement Dmocratique Republicain (MDR).\(^9\) Other parties soon followed: the centre-left Parti Social Dmocrate (PSD) had its support in the Southern Butare region and consisted of middle class teachers and civil servants; the urban Parti Libral (PL) had no geographical base and attracted Hutu and Tutsi businessmen alike; and the Christian democratic Parti Dmocratique Chrétien (PDC) was close to the Catholic Church which had always supported the Habyarimana regime (Prunier 1995, 122-6).

The opening of Rwanda to opposition parties cannot simply be characterized

\(^7\) The reactionary faction is commonly referred to as hardliner or extremist, because of its role in the genocide. However, we cannot uncouple the relationship between the material interests and their policy preference to deal with the RPF.

\(^8\) Habyarimana soon renamed his party Mouvement Rvolutionnaire National pour le Dveloppement et la Dmocratique (MRNDD) for ease of reference and consistency it will be referred to as MRND throughout this document.

\(^9\) Which was a reference to the old Partymutu-MDR party of Kayibanda regime (e.g. Prunier 1995)
as a mobilization of a pre-existent opposition from outside the regime. For one, Habyarimana facilitated the creation of a wide variety of small opposition parties that were actually allied to his MRND. Moreover, factions that had previously been part of the MRND at the top and sub-top of the regime now moved to become players in the new multi-party structure, joining opposition parties like the MDR. In March 1992, an extremist faction broke away from MRND, which it argued to be too soft on the RPF and created the Hutu-supremacist Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) (Prunier 1995, 128).

Moreover, the biggest opposition party, the MDR, had its support in the South and a considerable part of its the influential state bureaucracy, such as préfets and burgomasters moved from the MRND to the MDR. Gitarama, which had been the center of Kayibanda’s regime became the center of MDR support. Still, even in Gitarama many officials remained with the MRND (Verwimp 2013, 198-9). Moreover, it wasn’t just the local MDR notables that originated from within the regime, the MDR leadership itself had been part of the regime, which they had left due to conflicts with the president or the Akazu core (Prunier 1995, 129). The Hutu opposition had its pillars of support with the regime and the reluctant process of democratization brought conflicts previously contained within the Hutu MRND regime out in the open.

Before long, the reformist opposition that originated from factions within the regime fell apart. Habyarimana was losing influence due to the external pressures from the RPF and his Western allies as well as internal pressures originating from the multi-party system. Nonetheless, he demonstrated to be a shrewd politician in times of insecurity. As he had done when Rwanda was a single-party regime, Habyarimana tried to build new coalitions and successfully played the leadership of the different

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10 An exception was the PSD, which was led by relatively respectable civilian politicians (Prunier 1995, 130). Therefore, the PSD was also less dangerous, as it was unlikely to launch an armed challenge to the regime.
parties against each other. As a result of infighting, the most influential reformist parties like the MDR and LP split in the middle. The external threat of the RPF and the Arusha accords further catalyzed this process and resulted in every party to have a Hutu power faction. Hutu Power was movement that had its proponents throughout parties and that had allied itself with the reactionary faction. Hutu Power sought a return to the status quo ex-ante as well as a the continued Hutu domination of the state (Guichaoua 2010, Prunier 1995, Verwimp 2013, 144). Note that from the creation of the Hutu Power movement, we cannot simply deduct an ideological racial supremacist motive. The preferences of Hutu Power politicians closely mirrored their material interests. If the Arusha accords would come to pass the reactionaries would lose their influence in the country, not just to the RPF, but also to their reformist rivals. They would be vulnerable to prosecution and lose their base of power and wealth. Within the context of extreme regionalism as explained below, the Hutu elite had to consider elite threats from rival parties, but also from within their own party and region.

Not only were Hutu extremists at risk of losing power, rivalry within the regime had turned extremely violent. One aspect that demonstrates the violent rivalry among elites are the many assassinations at the top of the regime in the months preceding the genocide (Straus 2006, Viret 2010, 198; 41). These assassination attempts hit throughout the Hutu political spectrum and included reformist as well as reactionary elements. For example, in May of 1993 Emmanuel Gapyisi from the MDR and Gregoire Kayibanda, the son in law of the previous president were assassinated (Prunier 1995, 185). On the other end of the spectrum, Martin Bucyana of the Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), was pulled from his car by a mob and killed with machetes in Januari 1994, while Justin Mugenzi head of the Liberal Party (PL) and a reactionary supporter of Hutu Power barely survived an assassination attempt
in January of 1994 (Prunier 1995, 206-7). By all accounts the political environment in Rwanda had not only become deeply insecure, but had also turned violent. Consequently, as predicted by the theory, physical survival had become intimately connected to winning the political struggle at the top of the regime.

**Institutional and unofficial pillars of authoritarian support**

Extreme insecurity within the elite was mirrored within the formal institutions and informal networks that formed the elite pillars of support. Particular to Rwandan society were ruralization and regionalism. Habyarimana had put forth a peasant ideology and had restricted the migration, in particular to the cities. This strategy had been instrumental to the control of the population and also undercut the formation of an opposition (Verwimp 2013, 34-5). The policy of state enforced ruralization also affected the creation and maintenance of pillars of elite support. As a result, elites from the city had to rely in part on rural politics to maintain their pillars of support.

Within the rural context of Rwandan society, formal state power was built on officials that wielded local authority: préfets (prefects), burgomasters (mayors), and conseillers (sector heads). Rwanda was divided into 11 Préfetures, which in turn were divided into approximately 13 communes. The most influential official in the commune was the burgomaster (mayor), who was in control of the local security institutions. Each commune was in turn divided into 10 sectors, each headed by a conseiller (sector head). Together burgomaster and conseiller were responsible for security in the commune. While the burgomaster was the more influential official, the conseillers were commonly in control of communal outskirts (Straus 2006, Fujii

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11 The politicians targeted in these assassination attempts do not seem to have control of armed pillars of support that may challenge.

12 Verwimp (2013) argues that this policy caused overpopulation and the competition for land was the biggest contribution to the genocide. Land competition may be part of the story, as it widens those sections of society that gain from violence. Therefore, it likely helped the mobilization of unemployed Hutu to join militias.
Mobilization within Rwandan society for work, party rallies, and security also ran through these officials.

The effects of ruralization on elite politics were deepened by a tradition of regionalism. As noted before, the Habyarimana regime relied heavily on Hutu from Gisenyi. The Akazu, a reactionary Gisenyi clique, which was centered around the President’s wife, controlled key positions and provided their clients with support and benefits. However, to control a largely rural society one needs to control the local pillars of support. The Gisenyi clique had to contend with rival regional mafias that were just outside this Gisenyi core (Prunier 1995, 85). Particularly Ruhengeri Hutu that had been second to their Akazu rivals (Prunier 1995, 86) and had often lost out. Following the opening to opposition parties Ruhengeri Hutu elites joined the reformist MRD in opposition (Prunier 1995, 123). Habyarimana did not have his own regional clique other than the family of his wife on which he relied. The conditions of extreme elite competition saw these mafias undercut each other using local thugs (e.g., Prunier 1995). However, this also meant that the most dangerous rivals to the elites that governed these regional mafias were inside their own region. As we will see, challenges to formal state power during the genocide came from the rural business elite (e.g., Straus 2006). Though we do not have the data to reconstruct these informal regional mafias, their existence likely played a role in the genocidal process.

These conditions of highly volatile and dangerous rivalry induced the reactionaries to build parallel pillars of support. All political organisations in Rwanda created a youth wing to provide political muscle. Moreover, elites built private militias (Vermimp 2013, 199). The MRND youth wing, the interahamwe, was dominant but certainly not the only faction to use violence. In the South, there were many organized attacks from the reformist MDR youth on MRND Burgomasters (Des Forges 2009). There had been early signs of contention in 1988 and of Habyarimana losing control. Most notably the murder of Habyarimana’s close friend and potential successor Mayuya in April 1988 (Prunier 1995, 84).
1999, 63-66). Even before the genocide this violence generated an environment of lawlessness. Présidents and burgomasters officials would often only intervene to stop rivals or arrest clients to rivals. As a response, the reactionaries used their control of state institutions to arm and train the interahamwe militarily. The Akazu regime also invested in sections of the military that were loyal to their reactionary faction (Straus 2006, 44).

Like in many authoritarian regimes, the Rwandan military, army, and police were key pillar of support for state power. The deep cleavages that had come to the fore within the Hutu regime were mirrored in the military and police, both at the local and elite level. At the local level, the national police and military sometimes refused to assist officials that tried to keep order, they also occasionally attacked MRND or CDR members (Des Forges 1999, 66). Morale was low and thuggery was common among soldiers that preyed on civilians irrespective of ethnicity (Prunier 1995, 174). At the state level, the military top mirrored the political elite: it was deeply divided between a reactionary old guard and a reformist opposition. While the top of the military was under control of the President, the military staff considered a military coup by rival officers a real possibility (Verwimp 2013). High ranking reactionary officers such as Rwagafilita and Serubuga had been dismissed by Habyarimana in 1992 as part of a military purge (Viret 2010, 37). Similarly, Bagasora and high ranking officers from the Gisenyi prefecture had been retired at the eve of the genocide, but Habyarimana had kept Bagasora in the circle of power by appointing him as the director of Defense Minister Gasana’s cabinet (Verwimp 2013, 146). With highly ranked military officers openly supporting the opposition (Straus 2006, 43), it was unclear who would be in control of the military in the event of a coup. These fluctuations in leadership among

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14 The role of Habyarimana himself in these processes is unclear. He was likely part of the reactionaries and aware of the mobilization. However, it may very well be that the Akazu clique did no longer trust his power to protect their interests.

15 Also, considering the rural nature of Rwanda.

16 President Habyarimana was clearly in a dangerous position. While his position in this struggle is unclear, but there was significant conflict among the Hutu elite (Straus 2006, 23).
an elevated coup risk indicate that the volatile cleavages in society were mirrored in
the military even before the genocide.

At the level of formal and informal pillars of support, Rwandan society was as
deeply fractionalized as the elites. This clearly matches the predicted theoretical
pattern. Rwanda was a rural society with a deeply factionalized Hutu elite that
competed in an political environment of regional mafias, political murders, armed
militias, violence and discord in the military, and risk of a military coup. In these
volatile conditions, political consolidation had become connected to physical survival
and extremists were at a dangerous risk of losing the power they once enjoyed within
the regime.

**Relations between Hutus and Tutsis**

In this environment of insecurity at the top, there were several violent episodes even
before the genocide in which local elites mobilized riots against Tutsi and Hutu op-
position. In areas in which the reactionary faction was in control or in which there
was little opposition from the establishment, quite a number of civilians were killed in
these riots (Prunier 1995, 138). There is little information whether these riots allowed
local reactionary Hutu elites to consolidate power versus reformist Hutu rivals, but
this may very well have been the case. It is also likely that some of the violence was
related to the civil war with the RPF and was therefore selective in nature (Straus
2006, 192-5). Still, at the commune level, relations between Hutu and Tutsi were
mostly cordial. Hutus and Tutsis shared their lives together and were deeply inte-
grated (Fujii 2009, Straus 2006, 90-1;128). For example, interviews of perpetrators
of the genocide by Straus (2006), not only indicate that almost all génocidaires had
Tutsi neighbors and friends, but also that most had Tutsi family members and would
have had no problem with their daughters marrying a Tutsi. Moreover, Tutsi sur-
vivors recounted friendly relations with neighbors (Fujii 2009, 92-3). Though Hutu
politics in Rwanda had turned violent, social relations between civilians at the local level remained intact. As predicted by the theory, even before the genocide, where local violence existed, it was elite-driven rather than coming from Hutu society itself.

**Catalyzation of Elite Rivalry and Genocide**

We have seen that by the spring of 1994, the situation in Rwanda was highly explosive. Not only between the Hutu regime and the RPF, but also between reactionary and reformist Hutu factions within establishment itself. In an environment of assassinations, armed clashes, and the possibility of a coup from various factions, a simple trigger could tumble the entire Hutu elite into deadly peril. That trigger, was a big one. On April 6, the plane of president was shot from the sky above the Rwandan capital of Kigali.\(^\text{17}\) A single ground to air missile did not only take out president Habyarimana, but with him the reactionary military leadership as well (Straus 2006, 44). As the smoke billowed from the hills outside the Capital, visible to all in Kigali, the Hutu elite came into action. The Hutu elite, whether reactionary or reformist, fled with their families to Western embassies, which illustrates the intense insecurity within their ranks. At the same time, death squads moved to kill the Kigali-based civilian reformist elite. One of the first victims was the MDR Prime Minister (Prunier 1995, 230).

As deaths squads roamed through Kigali, the remainder of the military top met to determine political control of the military. While civilian politicians were extremely vulnerable amidst the chaos and assassinations, the military elite was not so easily removed, nor was it easily cowered into submission. The reactionaries under the leadership of Theodore Bagasora sought to take control of the military. However, to

\(^{17}\)To this day it is unclear which faction executed the assassination, but this knowledge is not really needed for the analysis of how the genocide proceeded.
the dismay of Bagasora and his reactionary clique, rival reformist officers were blocking their candidates and by the end of the meeting reformist Col. Marcel Gatsinzi was appointed to chief of staff. Gatsinzi was not stationed in Kigali, but in Butare. Therefore he was secure and had the loyalty of a considerable part of the military. While the reactionaries were fighting for control of Kigali and began killing civilians, their rivals assumed control of a deeply divided military (Prunier 1995, 229).

A Divided Military

As a new interim government was created which was comprised of reactionary Hutu Power members from all parties (Prunier 1995, 232-3), divisions ran deep through Rwandan society: both between and within regional and national institutions. The deeply divided military soon clashed as loyalist sections of the Rwandan army fought to stop the emerging genocide. This resulted in open military clashes with the hutu-power controlled Presidential Guard. For three days in and around Kigali, the Rwandan army exchanged gun- and even artillery fire with the Presidential Guard (Prunier 1995, 229). The military would remain divided until most of the country was under control of the reactionaries.

The Eruption of Local Violence

Within the context of divided elites and divided institutions, violence initially followed the distribution of power. In those areas where the reactionary faction was dominant, extreme violence resulted in immediate consolidation. In areas in which reformists were influential or dominant violence took more time to start. Once started, however, mass violence and Hutu-power consolidation rapidly followed. Straus (2006), Des Forges (1999), and Fujii (2009) provide us with micro-comparative studies of the various onset patterns of violence in areas under control of reactionary and reformist
Here I will show that mass indiscriminate violence itself was part of the process that allowed Hutu reactionists to consolidate. We will see that the Rwandan genocide took place in a self-enforcing process.

After the downing of the plane on April 6, a high sense of insecurity ran through the communes. In some Hutu-Power dominated areas, such as Kigali and Gisenyi the violence erupted almost immediately (e.g., Straus 2006). This consolidated power in the areas in which the reactionaries had the immediate advantage. Armed pillars of support of the MRND, MDR, and CDR Hutu power faction, such as the Presidential Guards and the interahamwe militias initiated mass violence against Tutsis. The interahamwe militias had recruited among the poor and were now joined by some of the poorest that hoped to gain from the violence (Prunier 1995, 231). Therefore, while the militias had been created before the onset of the genocide, the genocidal dynamics induced a rapid growth in the militias’ numbers. Thereby strengthening the violent pillars of support amidst the chaos. In Kigali, these militias set up roadblocks, killing anyone suspected of being a Tutsi that moved through. The killings in Kigali were first and the resulting unrest demonstrably affected the process in the remainder of the country.

Outside of the capital, commune members were acutely aware of killings of Hutus and Tutsis in Kigali and of violent incidents occurring throughout the country (Straus 2006, 69). However, to many, it initially seemed that the conflict would be between Hutu factions themselves. Straus (2006) provides us with examples of divided communes in which the MRND was dominant. In these areas, such as the surrounding area in the préfecture of Kigali and the regional support base of the regime in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri violence erupted almost immediately (McDoom 2014, 39). Hutu-power Burgomasters and Préfets rallied local Hutu militias to begin killing Tutsis. In these areas, forcing civilians to participate in public killings dissipated any remaining room

18 Together these studies provide us with detailed evidence of the processes at the ground within various communes.
for opposition. Both the distribution of power and the physical dangers of opposition were visible for all to see. Within this violent environment, Hutu rivals fell in line and were easily disposed off (e.g., Straus 2006).

In Kanzenze near Kigali, for example, the extremists went almost completely unchallenged. Mainly because a nearby military base commanded by the reactionary general Augustin Bizimungu, ensured their local dominance ( Straus 2006, 77-9). Due to absolute reactionary dominance over local military and police, there was little room for defection and the elite easily coordinated on violence. Even though the burgomaster had been seen as evenhanded towards Tutsi before the assassination of the president, he was quick to embrace the new genocidal policy ( Straus 2006). Similarly, in the Kayove commune, violence was promoted by local elites while the burgomaster was passive. In these communes in which the reactionaries had overwhelming force, resistance to the violence was mostly absent and limited to a few sectors where conseillers mobilized to contain the violence. However, because the violence had the support from the regional military, local elites, as well as the burgomaster, any resistance from local conseillers was quickly broken. After mass mobilization of Hutu and killings of Tutsi throughout the communes, security agents would travel with neighboring mobs to resisting sectors and pressure the resisting conseillers to concede to the genocide. Those conseillers that had resisted were then killed or forced to flee ( Straus 2006).

However, in most areas power was more divided and it is these areas that are of particular interest, because it demonstrates the process through which the genocide

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19 Bizimungu played a central role in the violence. He influenced reluctant elements in the Rwandan army ( Prunier 1995, 240), and was left in control of Kigali after the government fled on April 12 ( Prunier 1995, 268).

20 In some regions the reactionist factions within the military determined the balance of power, while in others militias played a more dominant role.

21 As predicted by the theory, the Rwandan case was characterized with high levels of coercion for the civilian population to mobilize and participate in the genocidal violence (e.g., McDoom 2013, Fujii 2009). Not only is the percentage of killers regionally distributed (McDoom 2013), but familial and friendship ties important for coerced mobilization and can explain the mass mobilization of the Hutu population in support of the violence ( Fujii 2009)
allowed the reactionaries to capture power from their rivals. Straus (2006) provides examples of areas in which the reactionary faction was not dominant, but nonetheless were quick to gain control under conditions of deep insecurity. In the Gafunzo commune, the stage had been set by the assassination of two civilian leaders of the Hutu opposition on April 7 and 8. This drove the remainder of the civilian opposition in hiding. The earliest onset of violence in the commune was not therefore not against Tutsis, nor was it interpreted that way. Still, at the outset of the violence, rural elites challenged the burgomaster and took power. The local elites were led by a small group of local businessmen, who under the conditions of Rwandan regionalism may quite possibly be described as part of the local mafias. The burgomaster proved either unable or unwilling to resist. Though a couple of the burgomaster’s conseillers did mobilize and organize patrols and were initially successful in resisting the violence, the lack of support from the burgomaster and selective violence led them to fall in line or flee (Straus 2006). While the violence took a few days longer to erupt in these divided areas (i.e. April 10-12) selective violence and threats to local officials acutely aware of killings in other parts of the country shifted the balance of power to the extremists.

The strongest resistance to the genocide was observed in regions in which the local security actors resisted the violence. In the Musambira and Runda communes, for example, the burgomaster and préfet mobilized and resisted the killings (Straus 2006). Though the burgomasters did face similar incidents and challenges as in the other regions, their behavior differed. They mobilized the security resources available to them, which allowed them to successfully resist the genocidal violence from erupting in their regions. However, as the genocide spread over communes throughout the country, extremists consolidated in neighboring communes. The militias that had been mobilized in other regions then began to make armed incursions into these holdout communes. Under conditions of increasing external pressure burgomasters
and préfets broke down and conceded to violence (Straus 2006). The genocide spread from sectors and communes under reactionary control to incorporate the entire Hutu state and breaking all opposition.

A notable feature of the violence once it erupted was its public nature. The killings were mostly executed by day and in clear view of the population. Killings were widely announced before and after the event and the local Hutu population was made to watch even when it occurred in remote areas. (Fujii 2009, 172-5). Killings were theatrical and public. Though groups of killers were generally large, ranging from 15 to a hundred, most of the actual killing was done by a few people. Joiners to the violence were expected to provide auxiliary support. Sometimes this would mean supporting the killing of close friends and family. Hutu that tried to save Tutsi were forced to kill the Tutsi themselves or be killed as a traitor (Fujii 2009, 175). While these joiners were able to help Tutsis when they were alone or in small groups, it was impossible to stop the killing as part of larger groups (Fujii 2009, 177-8).

Based on the accounts in Fujii (2009), it is easy to see how the unresisted and public act of violence signalled the dissolution of the old power structures. Straus (2006) and McDoom (2014) show that wherever reactionary faction assumed control, genocide immediately followed. However, the genocidal violence itself was part of power consolidation as it provided a visible signal for all to see. Joining in the violence against ones neighbors acted as a clear and costly signal of support for the new political order. As such it is not unlike similar displays of support within the context of authoritarian regimes, such as the grocer that displays a “workers unite” sign under communism as described by Havel (1985), or a picture of the leader in the Middle East as described by Wedeen (1999). Once violence erupted, it was clear to local elites and civilians who had local power and mass mobilization soon followed. Those that did not join became targets. Fujii (2009) demonstrates how Hutu civilians were coerced into joining the violence. For example, when they had family members
in the militias or when they came across militias en route to a killing.\textsuperscript{22} The strong
signal of support from civilians and officials alike dissolved any space for dissent. Thereafter, consolidated regions would no longer require the presence of militias for control, which could thereafter be moved into neighboring communes.

This pattern of consolidatory genocide that we observe in Rwanda’s communes is analogous to a pattern of popular revolutions as described by Kuran (1991). Assume that society is divided and that there exist various sectors that differ with respect to the level of pressure that is needed for local officials to turn to violence, to step down, or to be killed. In some areas the genocidal faction is already dominant. In these sectors the killing of the president is enough to mobilize Hutus resulting in the killing of Tutsi as well as rival Hutus and extremist power consolidation. The knowledge of violence occurring throughout the country increases the level of pressure in all sectors. The killing of Tutsi was accompanied with the threat that Hutu traitors should be killed as well. In this volatile environment, local Hutu officials are acutely aware that their lives are potentially at risk. In some of the remaining sectors this is enough to tip the scales, either because local officials are unwilling to resist or because this emboldens radicals to take on their rivals. Again the pressure rises now that considerable parts of the country are in control of the extremist faction. The next step is a move of militias from areas with genocidal consolidation into neighboring areas. Though strong local officials are able to mobilize and resist these regional incursions, other officials drop out or fall in line. Genocidal consolidation occurs throughout the country spilling over from nearby regions. Now with only few areas resisting the genocide, national pressures from government, militias, and military increase pressure to the breaking point, resulting in full genocidal consolidation.\textsuperscript{23}

The domino effect of consolidatory genocide can rapidly change pillars of support

\textsuperscript{22}Fujii (2009) even interviews a Tutsi that is able to survive by joining the interahamwe militias in his sector, because of his personal relationships with Hutu interahamwe members.

\textsuperscript{23}Also note that all officials even within institutions like the military face these pressures.
throughout the country, which in the case of Rwanda the genocidal consolidation took less than two weeks.

**Reactionaries take Power and Purge the Elite**

When the president was killed, the reformist army officers went head to head with the reactionaries. Though the reformists at first held out, they soon lost control of Kigali and its Préfeture. The extremist general Bizimungu was the most senior officer in Kigali and amidst the violence from militias and the presidential guards, the Kigali sectors of the army fell to the extremists. While reformists in the army held out in their power base in Gitarama and Butare and supported the préfets in resisting the violence (Prunier 1995, 246), they could no longer stop the violence in the rest of the country. Col. Gatsinzi ordered to terminate the violence against civilians by force if necessary on April 10 (Lanotte 2007, 298-300), but was unable to control events outside his immediate zone of control. On April 12, Col. Rusatira Leonidas, Col. Marcel Gatsinzi, and Lt. Col. Ephrem Rwabalind put out a statement denouncing the violence, but it had little effect (Lanotte 2007, 366). By the second week, the national power balance had drastically changed in favor of the genocidal regime and genocidal consolidation had taken place in most communes. Still, it had taken the Hutu-Power coalition ten days to take full control of the military and replace Col. Marcel Gatsinzi as Chief of staff: on April 16 extremist Gen. Augustin Bizimungu took over as Chief of Staff (Prunier 1995, Lanotte 2007, 229,298-300).

Even after Gatsinzi had been disposed as Chief of Staff, he assumed command of the Butare region and continued his support of the préfet in resisting the violence (Prunier 1995, 246). By now however, resistance of the reformists was at the breaking point: by 17 April, the Butare and Kibungo prefects were killed and the following day the burgomasters and the préfet in Gitarama were ordered to desist their intervention in the violence or face the consequences. Finally, on April 19 The Presidential Guard
took control of Butare and the regime consolidated its power throughout all regions that were not under RPF control. The reformist military leadership went into hiding and the Government council established a list of 12 officers it considered Hutu traitors to be assassinated on May 20. Among them were Lt. Col. Ephrem Rwabalinda and Col. Marcel Gatsinzi (Lanotte 2007, 316). The purge of elites was complete.24

Matching the Patterns of Violence

The question remains, however, whether the mobilization of Hutu society as described above was predominantly a process of intra-Hutu consolidation or whether it was an effective counter guerrilla strategy as well. If genocidal consolidation was a counter-guerrilla strategy, we should observe the violence to occur in areas which have the greatest risk of Tutsi joining the RPF rebels. Alternatively, we should also observe Hutu militias and the mobilized population to provide resistance to the RPF. Last, we should not observe the genocide to help RPF recruitment from within genocidal areas. However, the expected patterns of mass violence as a counter-guerrilla strategy do not fit the data.

The areas that were closest to the RPF were also the most likely to see the most successful Hutu resistance to the genocide. In these areas, Hutu officials experienced the same pressures as in the other areas. However, if local officials were among those to resist the pressures for a week, they were sometimes able to hold out until the proximity of the RPF pacified the area (Straus 2006). Also, local genocidaires did not put up any resistance to the RPF. The consolidation did not prove effective against RPF pressure, as the Hutu population proved quick to implicate the local leadership and the most active killers. As a result the reactionaries commonly fled the RPF advance. This included the militias, which were not fielded against the RPF until the RPF had reached the final stronghold of the regime. Lastly, the genocide and internal

24Notable Hutu elites that have been violently purged since the beginning of the violence are: prefect Godefroid Ruzindana; Lt. Col. Ephrem Rwabalinda; Col. Rusatira Leonidas (Viret 2010).
violence among Hutu allowed the RPF to recruit among Tutsi survivors and as well as the Rwandan armed forces (Prunier 1995, 270). As argued by Kalyvas (2006) indiscriminate violence generates resistance and helps solve coordination problems. As expected, there is no indication that the genocide helped the Hutu regime against the RPF. If anything, the genocide may even have provided the RPF with strategic gains, allowing the RPF to benefit militarily from the genocide. Consequently, explanations that attribute the genocide to the Hutu-Tutsi civil war do not match the observed patterns of the violence in comparison to the theory of consolidatory genocide.

Conclusion

By synthesizing existing information on the elite politics of the Rwandan authoritarian regime and its pillars of support, this chapter fills a gap in the literature on a key component of the Rwandan genocide. As argued in chapter three, extreme competition at the top of authoritarian regimes is especially dangerous to the physical survival of elites. An internal challenge is therefore much more salient than any external challenge can be. Upon close examination, there is overwhelming evidence that intra-Hutu rivalry had turned extremely volatile and violent in the period before the genocide.

The genocide itself resolved this competition. Control of the army and the movement of militias from areas in which the reactionary regime had consolidated to areas

25This may not be immediately obvious as both internal and external challenges may result in a loss of power. However, the means of losing power is very different for internal challenges, which are much more likely to threaten the physical survival of elites. Internal challenges like coups are generally resolved in a matter of hours or days and can result in the death of elites irrespective of the coup outcome. In the case of internal challenges, there is often little time or opportunity to flee. External challenges like civil conflict commonly take months or years to come to conclusion and allow for a fighting retreat. As this chapter will demonstrate, Rwanda is no different; it only took a matter of hours to kill civilian targets like the Prime Minister and only 10 days to purge the rival military command. The resolution of the civil war in favor of the RPF, on the other hand, took over three months.
in which reformists held out, resulted in the reactionary coalition to assume full control of all elements of the Hutu state within only two weeks. Hereafter, the genocide raged on and the fight moved from a struggle within the Hutu elite to a struggle between the reactionary regime and the RPF. Reformist Hutu elites that had survived the power struggle went into hiding and sought to flee to RPF controlled areas where they joined forces with their former Tutsi adversaries. The RPF also recruited Tutsi survivors of the genocide (Prunier 1995, 270). Despite the instrumental value of the genocide for winning elite rivalry and taking control of the Hutu state, it proved of little help in the struggle with the RPF and the reactionary faction ultimately lost the civil war. The regime was forced to flee to neighboring Congo.

Still, the internal struggle has likely cost the lives of two to six thousand Hutu (e.g., Valentino 2004, Verwimp 2003). Even though the reactionary faction had to cede control to the RPF in civil war, they survived as a result of their genocidal coup when most of their Hutu rivals had not. The processes of genocide in Rwanda therefore seem to be tied to intra-Hutu rivalry, intra-Hutu consolidation, and survival. At the same time, the genocide proved of little use in fighting the RPF. It provided the RPF with the motive to resume the conflict, recruitment from Tutsis and Hutu that had escaped the violence, and proved to generate no resistance to the slow but steady RPF advance. These processes demonstrate that the mechanisms that were expected from the theory of consolidatory genocide to exist in the Rwandan. Also it demonstrates that counter guerrilla explanations have inferior explanatory power.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

The central argument introduced in this book is simple: mass indiscriminate violence affects political consolidation within authoritarian regimes and is therefore caused by processes of elite rivalry within these regimes. This book has demonstrated that some of the most deadly and incomprehensibly violent episodes of mass indiscriminate violence, such as Rwanda and Cambodia, can be explained by taking elite rivalry into account. To develop the argument, chapter two showed that mass political violence that may seem similar at the surface may actually have very different underlying mechanisms and processes. It provided a typology of mass political violence that determines the scope conditions of the arguments introduced in this book and set the stage for the theory of consolidatory genocide, introduced in chapter three.

Chapter three developed the theory of consolidatory genocide. Politics at the top of authoritarian regimes is often volatile and dangerous. However, from a Western perspective authoritarian regimes are commonly misunderstood and seen as irrational unitary actors firmly under the control of a single strong leader (e.g., Putin, Assad, or Saddam). In reality, authoritarian regimes commonly have divisions within their ranks; various factions are likely to vie for power and influence. While authoritarian regimes do care about foreign policy outcomes, these are secondary to within-regime rivalry, as elite rivalry directly affects physical survival of leaders and elites in authoritarian regimes. We should therefore expect elite rivalry and consolidation to be tied to a wide range of authoritarian behaviors. Authoritarian leaders have a variety
of tools at their disposal to lessen the risks from elite rivalry. Examples range from rotating positions to keep potential rivals from building a power base to keeping generals at a physical distance, and supporting a praetorian guard. However, when elite rivals are at power parity and rivalry is high, the options of leaders to contain their rivals are greatly diminished. Under these conditions, consolidatory genocide may restructure the pillars of support on which leader and challengers rely.

Consolidatory genocide is a strategy that relies on irregular or paramilitary militias and security forces that recruit amongst those that have most to gain from violence. Even though these forces are unlikely to win a direct confrontation with police and military, these forces can exploit the intra-societal divisions to terrorize civilians, local leaders, and local security officials. While the indiscriminate violence of consolidatory genocide is aimed at the victim outgroup, selective violence threatens the ingroup and coerces the ingroup into tacit support. This allows the leader to capture divided local and national institutions and consolidate his power vis-a-vis rivals. These rivals can ultimately be purged from the regime. Oftentimes the indiscriminate violence generates resistance from the victim outgroup, but consolidatory genocide allows the leader to secure tight control of the ingroup. It therefore secures the genocidal leader from deadly ingroup challenges.

The remainder of the book tested the mechanisms developed in chapter three. Chapter four demonstrates strong empirical support for the theory between cases. Building on new original data on the type of mass indiscriminate violence and on elite purges, chapter four established that consolidatory genocide is empirically distinct from mass indiscriminate counter-guerrilla violence; that elite rivalry is a strong predictor of consolidatory genocide onset; that consolidatory genocide corresponds to a very high level of elite purges; and that leaders that initiate consolidatory genocide actually have a significantly reduced probability of adverse leader fates such as death and imprisonment as well as of irregular removal through internal sources. These
results from the between-case comparison are strongly supportive of the theory when compared to alternative explanations.

Chapter five traced the process of consolidatory genocide within the case of Rwanda. It demonstrated that genocide occurred within an environment of highly volatile intra-Hutu rivalry. Immediately after the assassination of the president this rivalry turned salient and armed conflict erupted between rival factions of the Hutu state. The chapter demonstrated the process through which the public act of mass indiscriminate violence allowed the genocidal Hutu faction to take control of the divided Hutu state. This process of stepwise consolidation across regions took only two weeks. The intra-Hutu consolidation did not save the genocidal regime from the RPF rebels, however. After internal consolidation, the war continued and was ultimately decided in favor of the RPF. Still, the processes examined in this chapter demonstrate how the consolidatory genocide is effective to generate control over the ingroup even if it risks losing a conflict with an outgroup.

The empirical findings of chapter four and five are highly supportive of the core argument developed in this book: consolidatory genocide differs from counter guerrilla mass violence and is driven by leaders that seek to consolidate their regime and establish control over their own group under conditions of heightened elite rivalry. The theoretical and empirical innovations introduced in this book provide us with a renewed understanding of a type of mass violence that is highly consequential to international politics. Rival theories that rely on leader ideology or between-group conflict cannot contribute to our understanding of this particular type of mass political violence.

Implications

Some broader observations follow with respect to the study of conflict, violence, and the emerging field of authoritarian politics. First, as this study demonstrates, not all
conflict and violence can be examined as a bargaining problem between two actors. Especially in conflicts in which authoritarian regimes seem to act irrationally violent and belligerent, the conflict may be better explained by within-group competition and the benefits to elite survival that conflict may generate. As argued in chapter three, when between-group violence (e.g. Hutu vs. Tutsi) generates private (e.g. intra-Hutu) security benefits to leaders that outweigh the costs of conflict, violence is no longer inefficient. This allows us to explain instances of seemingly irrational violence by authoritarian leaders. These leaders are not violent ideologues or madmen, but are actually seeking internal self-preservation. In these cases, conflict resolution attempts to resolve bargaining failures are likely to fail.

Second, indiscriminate violence cannot be instrumental to political control, unless the (indirect) target or audience of the violence is distinct from the population of (direct) potential victims. With respect to mass indiscriminate violence, this observation holds for both counter-guerrilla and consolidatory genocide. Indiscriminate violence undeniably helps coordinate resistance from potential victims. At the same time, however, the demonstrative nature of the violence facilitates control of ingroup observers that seek to avoid being branded as traitors. We therefore cannot understand this type of violence without taking the audience of the violence into account.

Last, the study provides an initial answer to the question how authoritarian leaders may consolidate power when they are least secure. This question merits further attention as part of the emerging field of authoritarian politics (e.g. Svolik 2012, Koga 2013) and points towards a strong connection between mass political violence and authoritarian politics; not based on absolute power as suggested by Rummel (1994), but on insecurity. This book shows that a greater focus on the pillars of support on which factions within authoritarian regimes rely as well as on the mechanisms for controlling these pillars of support should likely result in a deeper understanding of authoritarian politics.
Further research should determine the conditions under which authoritarian leaders that are at relative power parity vis-a-vis rival elites adopt consolidatory genocide, interstate war, or alternative strategies to undermine rival pillars of support. The theory and evidence presented here do suggest some venues for future research in this area. For example, all of the consolidatory genocides in the data rely heavily on militias and parallel security structures. Future research should determine whether leaders that are in a better position to leverage these parallel security structures are also more likely to adopt consolidatory genocide as a strategy. Furthermore, there may be specific conditions of power parity under which consolidatory genocide becomes more likely. For example, consolidatory genocide might be more effective than alternative strategies when the leader seeks to purge not just a few ingroup rivals, but rather a sizable faction within the regime. Alternatively, consolidatory genocide may very well occur in instances in which authoritarian pillars of support, such as the military, bureaucracy, or party, have deeply entrenched divisions, as was the case in Rwanda.

With respect to policy implications, there is reason for pessimism. Consolidatory genocides occur once a decade and, under conditions of deadly internal competition, they pay. Therefore, we should likely expect more occurrences in the future. A better understanding of the processes of authoritarian consolidation that drive mass indiscriminate violence should ultimately help us to design strategies to better manage and prevent these crises. In the case of consolidatory genocide, interventions should not only resolve bargaining failures between groups, but consider the strategic considerations of authoritarian elites as well. Moreover, consolidatory genocides have previously occurred with relatively little warning, quick resolution, and the highest possible number of civilian casualties. A better understanding of the mechanisms underlying this particular type of mass indiscriminate violence would be a first step towards improving early warning systems.
There are however, two important implications for outside intervention in consolidatory genocides. First, it should be noted that these genocidal regimes might potentially be particularly vulnerable to outside intervention. The theory and empirics contained in this book suggest that behind the scenes of consolidatory genocide, rival elites in the military, bureaucracy, and security institutions are fighting for survival. While in-group elites cannot show open defection, outside pressure may be secretly welcomed and lead the entire genocidal state system to come crashing down. The Rwandan military was remarkably passive against the RPF rebels during the genocide as senior Hutu officers went into hiding. Similarly, there was little resistance to outside intervention in Uganda, Cambodia or Kosovo. While, rapid outside intervention may be politically or militarily unfeasible and may even expedite the killing, it should be seriously considered in light of these findings. Ultimately, policy makers should design interventions that take elite rivalry within the genocidal regime into account.

Second, irrespective of the question whether outside intervention is more effective than previously thought, there is likely no moral hazard for intervention in consolidatory genocides. Kuperman (2004) argues that intervention in mass indiscriminate violence may create a moral hazard. Rebels may irresponsibly escalate a conflict without concern for mass indiscriminate violence from the government, because genocidal response may invite foreign intervention and therefore aid the rebel cause. As a result, he argues, intervention may result in more mass violence in the future. However, this book has argued that mechanisms that drive governments to consolidatory genocide are actually unrelated to rebel behavior. Because consolidatory genocide is aimed at rivals within the regime rather than at a rebel outsider, rebel escalation by itself does not lead to genocide. Therefore, intervention in these genocides should not generate a moral hazard for future conflicts. Though third parties may be unwilling to bear the costs of intervention, any moral hazards of intervention should not be a concern.
for intervention in consolidatory genocides like Rwanda or Cambodia.

Finally, the theory of consolidatory genocide suggests that genocidal communities do not merely consist of willing executioners, as argued by Goldhagen (1996) for example. In many of the cases, such as Rwanda, Cambodia, and Yugoslavia, coercion of civilians seemed to play a considerable role in the execution of the violence. While thugs and leaders are undeniably culpable, a substantial part of the civilian population may merely be victims in a cynical process of authoritarian consolidation that forces them into non-intervention and support for genocidal violence. Though this notion may be unpopular and more research is definitely needed, the moral implications for post-conflict stability and transitional justice should at least be examined.

Consolidatory genocide may be rare, but comes at a very high cost in life, even when compared to other types of mass political violence. Violent episodes as diverse as that of Stalins collectivization, the Cambodian killing fields, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the Rwandan genocide have enduring consequences for security and economic development. In this book, I have argued that consolidatory genocide is instrumental to win ingroup rivalry and therefore intimately related to authoritarian competition. While additional research is necessary, empirical results suggest that consolidatory genocide is not driven by the random madness of leaders, or the desire to kill an outgroup, but by the structural constraints and commitment problems that authoritarian leaders face.
Appendix

The aim of this concise appendix is to provide the interested reader with additional background information to the data and analyses as well as key robustness checks. This document is structured in order of appearance in the paper starting with the data, followed by further elaboration on the respective quantitative tests.

A Data

Purges

Some scholars have expressed doubts regarding the validity of the Banks (2012) data on purges within authoritarian regimes. The main issues of concern are with the transparency of the coding. Due to the commercial nature of the Banks data, it is unclear exactly what the purge event was, who was purged, when the purge was dated (e.g. on a removal, arrest, or execution), or what specific sources have been used. Therefore, I collected purge data (ACER)\(^1\) from 1950 until 2004 on all 20 countries that have one or more mass indiscriminate violence events. For these MIV countries, all non-democratic country years were checked for Purges and for Elite Purges, with a particular focus on: 1) years that were coded as purges in Banks; 2) years that had coups or coup attempts;\(^2\) 3) years that saw a leader change according to Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009); 4) years that saw a change in

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\(^1\) The purge data was collected as part of a larger data project on Authoritarian Consolidation and Elite Competition.

\(^2\) The removal of rival elites during coups were not coded as purges. However, if elites that took part in a successful coup were later purged this was coded as a purge.
source of leadership support according to CHISOLS (Leeds and Mattes 2014); and 4) years that saw a change of regime or a change in the type of authoritarian regime according to Geddes (Geddes 2003). The coding of Elite Purges followed the same strategy and is further discussed in the paper.

| Table A.1: Comparison of Banks and ACER Purge Data for all MIV Countries 1950-2004 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Purge observations in ACER and Banks correspond               | 77 (61.6%)      | 77 (50.3%)      |
| Purge observations ACER and Banks differ by one year          | 19 (15.2%)      | 27 (17.6%)      |
| Purge observation in Banks, non-regime in ACER                | 14 (11.2%)      |                 |
| Purge observation in Banks, no evidence in ACER               | 15 (12.0%)      |                 |
| Purge observation in ACER, no purges in Banks                 |                 | 39 (25.5%)      |
| Purge observation in ACER, missing in Banks                   |                 | 10 (6.5%)       |
| Total                                                         | 125 (100.0%)    | 153 (100.0%)    |

Table A.1 contrasts the Banks data with my “ACER” data collection on non-elite Minor Purges. As can be seen from Table A.1 roughly three quarters of the purge observations in Banks either fully correspond or are no more than one year off with the purge data I collected. For 25% of the Purge observations in Banks there was either no evidence (12%) or the purges targeted people outside the regime (11.2%). From my data collection, several potential issues with the Banks data become apparent: first, Banks codes non-elite purges, which includes purges of junior regime members that by themselves cannot challenge the regime; second, Banks seems somewhat imprecise in its coding of the year of the purge and tends to code arrests and executions, where ACER codes initial dismissal from power; last Banks sometimes includes purges
of key opposition figures. In the paper, I address the first issue by distinguishing between Elite Purges and Minor Purges. The second issue and potential miscoding do introduce noise in the data, but are not otherwise problematic. However, the coding of opposition figures as purges is a concern to the validity of this study; purged opposition members are not part of the regime and may therefore be conflated with mass indiscriminate violence against the outgroup. Therefore, any non-regime purges in the Banks data have been recoded as zeros for all years for the key countries that had one or more mass indiscriminate violence spells. In the analysis section of this appendix (Table A.3; cols. 1-3), the analysis that uses Banks purges as part of a model to estimate latent Elite Rivalry are repeated using the smaller ACER data for Minor Purges, which strengthens, but does not otherwise change any of the results in the article.

Missing data for mass indiscriminate violence observations

Because mass indiscriminate violence is very rare, this study aims to be comprehensive with respect to mass indiscriminate violence spells following the Second World War. In order to ensure that no mass indiscriminate violence spells are lost due to missing data-years of control variables, any missing data for mass indiscriminate violence years was researched (e.g., see King and Zeng 2001). For example, while the mass indiscriminate violence data is collected from 1945 with the first mass indiscriminate violence spell starting in 1949 (China), data on coups and coup attempts by Powell and Thyne (2011) starts in 1950. Consequently, I researched coups or coup attempts for China in 1948-49, which allows for China to enter the data in 1948.³

³The year before the onset of Mass Indiscriminate Violence is included to account for temporal order.
**Temporal order**

The small number of mass indiscriminate violence observations allowed for a precise determination of temporal order. Temporal order of Elite Rivalry and Consolidatory Genocide Onset was determined by contrasting coup dates, minor purge dates, and mass indiscriminate violence start dates. Coups and Minor Purges occurring within 12 months before the mass indiscriminate violence onset were coded as 1, but those that followed the onset of mass indiscriminate violence were coded as 0.

**Scope conditions**

The scope of the argument requires leaders to be at risk of harm (e.g., death, imprisonment) upon losing office, which mostly excludes democratic regimes. In competitive authoritarian regimes, disposed leaders may face imprisonment upon losing power.\(^4\) Moreover, extreme violence may occur in countries that are otherwise seen as democratizing such as Yugoslavia in the early 90s. Therefore this study considers non-democratic regimes at least partly in the set of relevant cases and includes all countries with a Polity score of 5 or lower. Restricting the sample to authoritarian regimes only, strengthens, but does not otherwise change results as shown in column 7 of table A.1 of this appendix. Also, mass indiscriminate violence does not occur in developed or small states. States with a population under 3 million or a GDP per capita over 3000 were, therefore outside the scope of the study (e.g., Mahoney and Goertz 2004).

\(^4\)For Example in Ukraine, former President Tymoshenko was arrested on charges of corruption after losing elections versus Yanukovych.
Table A.1 demonstrates that the relationship between Elite Rivalry and Consolidatory Genocide holds for alternative model specifications. The first column addresses potential unobserved heterogeneity by including random effects, which suggests that any heterogeneity does not affect any of the conclusions.\(^5\) The model in the second column corrects for temporal dependence by including non-Mass Indiscriminate Violence years and cubic splines as suggested by Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), which does not meaningfully affect results.\(^6\)

The third column of Table A.1 addresses potential bias origination from the small number of Consolidatory Genocide onsets in the data (e.g. see King and Zeng 2001). There are several ways to account for rare events by penalizing the likelihood; the Rare Events Logit by King and Zeng (2001) is most commonly adopted in political science. Here, I adopt Firths Penalized Likelihood Logit (Firth 1993), because it provides almost identical results to the Rare Events Logit (King and Zeng 2001, 148) and provides estimates in cases of perfect discrimination, which allows for better comparison with the model that follows. As can be seen from column three, accounting for rare events does not meaningfully affect any of the results. The fourth column includes Militias as a variable in a Firths Penalized Likelihood Logit analysis. Because all consolidatory genocides have pro-government militias, Militias cannot not be estimated as part of a regular logit or probit regression on the onset of consolidatory genocide, because it predicts non-occurrence perfectly. The Firth Logit addresses this problem by penalizing the likelihood. After the inclusion of Militias, Irregular

\(^5\)Random effects are feasible, more appropriate, and more efficient than fixed effects: 1) the sample is unbalanced (not all countries are non-democratic for all years, for example); 2) the countries in the sample are not functionally equivalent (they are unlikely to share a common effect size); and 3) there is no reason to expect that the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated to regressors in the model.

\(^6\)A cubic polynomial as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010) generates similar results.
Conflict no longer attains conventional significance, likely because the mobilization
effect of Irregular Conflict is in part captured by the Militias variable.

Some scholars have argued that mass indiscriminate violence occurs following in
civil war (e.g. Licklider 1995, Uzonyi 2014). In the paper I argue that victory in civil
war and elite rivalry are indeed related: in cases such as Cambodia, victory in civil
war resulted in risky competition among regime elites (e.g., Kiernan 1996). Without a
common enemy, existing differences within the victorious coalition become salient and
may turn deadly. It is therefore not an outgroup threat, but elite ingroup rivalry that
drives leaders to initiate mass indiscriminate violence. Still, our confidence in elite
rivalry as a cause of mass indiscriminate violence would be greater if it holds when
controlling for civil conflict victory. Therefore, column 5 of Table A.1 includes Civil
Conflict Victory as control variable. Based on the case studies of mass indiscriminate
violence, two of the twelve potential cases of consolidatory genocide listed in Table
2 of the paper were initiated after victory in civil conflict: Cambodia in 1975 and
China in 1949. These cases of consolidatory genocide onset were therefore coded
as Civil Conflict Victory. Beyond these two cases, Civil Conflict Victory was coded
whenever Civil Conflict had ended in the previous year. Civil Conflict data (25 deaths
or greater) was taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch
et al. 2002, Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). Column 5 shows that Elite Rivalry
robustly corresponds to the onset of Consolidatory Genocide even when controlling for
Civil Conflict Victory. Therefore, the correlation of Civil Conflict and Consolidatory
Genocide Onset is likely caused by heightened elite rivalry that results from the
breakdown of the victorious coalition.

Column six of Table A.1 repeats the analysis with Civil Conflict instead of Ir-
regular Conflict with similar results. In the last column, I repeat the analysis for
authoritarian regimes only, which improves the model fit, but does not otherwise
change results. All analyses in Table A.1, with the exception of the Victory in Civil
Conflict variable,\textsuperscript{7} were repeated with Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence Onset as dependent variable; as expected, none of these specifications uncovered a relationship between Elite Rivalry and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence Onset as can be seen from Table A.2.

\textsuperscript{7}Victory in Civil Conflict is a poor explanation when a guerrilla conflict is ongoing as is the case in Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence.
Table A.1: Consolidatory Genocide on Elite Rivalry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>I Random Effects</th>
<th>II Probit w. Cubic Time Trends</th>
<th>III Firth Logit</th>
<th>IV Firth Logit</th>
<th>V Probit</th>
<th>VI Probit</th>
<th>VII Probit‡</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite Rivalry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Latent probability of coups &amp; attempts)</td>
<td>1.11**</td>
<td>.94**</td>
<td>2.15**</td>
<td>2.11**</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>.72*</td>
<td>.95**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.27)</td>
<td>(.60)</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
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<td>-3.9*</td>
<td>-8.7**</td>
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<td>-3.4**</td>
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<td>-3.9*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.51)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log of Population t-1</td>
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<td>.18</td>
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<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.05)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
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<td>(.60)</td>
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<td>.542⁺</td>
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<td>2564</td>
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<td>2564</td>
<td>1808</td>
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</table>

Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses. †significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is McKelvey & Zavoina’s.

⁺ Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is Nagelkerke (Cragg-Uhler) calculated by author.

‡ Sample restricted to authoritarian regimes only.
### Table A.2: Counter Guerrilla MIV on Elite Rivalry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>I Random Effects</th>
<th>II Probit w. Cubic Time Trends</th>
<th>III Firth Logit</th>
<th>IV Firth Logit</th>
<th>V Probit</th>
<th>VI Probit†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite Rivalry (Latent probability of coups &amp; attempts)</td>
<td>.34 (.25)</td>
<td>.34 (.24)</td>
<td>.75 (.52)</td>
<td>.73 (.82)</td>
<td>.30 (.24)</td>
<td>-.34 (.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of GDP per Capita $t-1$</td>
<td>-.08 (.13)</td>
<td>.003 (.11)</td>
<td>-.95 (.26)</td>
<td>.89 (.65)</td>
<td>-.009 (.09)</td>
<td>.08 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of Population $t-1$</td>
<td>.02 (.10)</td>
<td>.04 (.07)</td>
<td>.03 (.20)</td>
<td>-.68 (.51)</td>
<td>.004 (.08)</td>
<td>-.08 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-.02 (.04)</td>
<td>-.03 (.05)</td>
<td>-.05 (.10)</td>
<td>-.38 (.26)</td>
<td>-.03 (.04)</td>
<td>-.03 (.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Conflict</td>
<td>1.45** (.32)</td>
<td>1.37** (.23)</td>
<td>3.50** (.68)</td>
<td>4.49** (.55)</td>
<td>1.57** (.36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.23** (.26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militias</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- .32 (.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.84* (1.33)</td>
<td>-2.94** (.89)</td>
<td>-6.39* (2.71)</td>
<td>-5.22 (6.01)</td>
<td>-2.94** (.74)</td>
<td>-2.79** (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.235†</td>
<td>.298†</td>
<td>.294†</td>
<td>.431†</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>2564</td>
<td>1808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses. †significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is McKelvey & Zavoina’s.  
† Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is Nagelkerke (Cragg-Uhler) calculated by author.  
‡ Sample restricted to authoritarian regimes only.
Table A.3 reports different specifications for the latent measure of Elite Rivalry. The analyses in the first three columns of Table A.3 repeat the latent analysis with the original (ACER) data that I collected on Minor Purges for all the countries that have one or more onsets of mass indiscriminate violence from 1950 until 2004. Again, the results do not change, if anything they become more robust with the ACER data despite the much smaller set of observations. Columns 4-6 includes Civil Conflict in the analysis instead of Irregular Conflict with similar results. Last, Columns 7-9 repeat the latent analysis, but instead of predicting coups or coup attempts in the first stage, it predicts only successful Coups only. This slightly weakens effects, but does not meaningfully change the results.
Table A.3: Two-Stage Elite Rivalry Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Rivalry</th>
<th>With ACER Purge Data</th>
<th>With Civil Conflict</th>
<th>Predict Coups in First Stage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Latent probability of coups &amp; attempts)</td>
<td>.64***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Rivalry</td>
<td>(Latent probability of coups)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log of GDP per capita t−1</td>
<td>-.20*</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Conflict</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.98**</td>
<td>1.36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.30)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
<td>-.03†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Purges</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Non-Elite)</td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leader</td>
<td>1.10**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl. transition year)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-2.36</td>
<td>-1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.81)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.502</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%, two-tailed. Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is McKelvey & Zavoina’s.
C Consolidatory Genocide and Elite Purges

Table A.1 repeats the probit analyses on Elite Purges for Consolidatory Genocide and Counter-guerrilla Mass Violence spells as reported in Table 4 in the paper. Columns I-IV of Table A.1 repeat the analyses with Civil Conflict instead of Irregular Conflict. Again, none of the substantive results change. Moreover, the analyses in Columns V-VIII of Table A.1 show that results are robust to a correction for unobserved heterogeneity using random effects.
Table A.1: Probit on Elite Purges for Consolidatory and Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>With Civil Conflict</th>
<th>Random Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Purges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Indiscriminate Violence (_{t-1})</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidatory Genocide (_{t-1})</td>
<td>1.08**</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidatory Genocide</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.64**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence (_{t-1})</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-Guerrilla Mass Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.11†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
<td>-.28†</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irregular Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.12‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-.13**</td>
<td>-.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader Tenure</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Leader (incl. transition year)</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militias</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R²</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>.221</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cols I-IV: Probit analysis with robust country clustered standard errors in parentheses. Reported Pseudo $R^2$ for is McKelvey & Zavoina’s. Cols V-VIII: Random Effects Probit analysis clustered by country with standard errors in parentheses. †significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. +Reported Pseudo $R^2$ is Nagelkerke (Cragg-Uhler) calculated by author. ‡First year of consolidatory genocide omitted for each consolidatory genocide spell.
Bibliography


Von Clausewitz, Carl. 1909. *On War*.


