Epistemic Injustice Expanded:  
A Feminist, Animal Studies Approach

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To my parents, for their constant support and generosity
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INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the New York Times ran a story on the role of dogs in enabling courtroom testimony:

Rosie, the first judicially approved courtroom dog in New York, was in the witness box here nuzzling a 15-year-old girl who was testifying that her father had raped and impregnated her. Rosie sat by the teenager’s feet. At particularly bad moments, she leaned in. … “When they start talking about difficult things,” Dr. Crenshaw said, “Rosie picks up on that and goes over and nudges them. I’ve seen it with my own eyes.”

This story raises many moral, legal and political questions. What are the moral implications of having a rape victim recount her trauma in front of a courtroom of people, including the perpetrator? What are the legal implications of allowing dogs to enter courtrooms, especially when dogs often make “the difference between a conviction and an acquittal”? What are the stakes of using dogs to serve human purposes, and how might the reliance on animals to enable human testimony challenge the traditional species hierarchy (Oliver 2011; Suen 2012)? Does the fact that dogs can play such a role in our society suggest they deserve political citizenship (Donaldson and Kymlikca 2011)?

Perhaps less obvious, though, are the various epistemic dimensions to this story. How might the girl’s gender, race, class, age or manner of speech impede her ability to testify, and to have that testimony receive uptake by the jury? What does it mean that an authoritative white, male lawyer may need to serve as a conduit to render the girl’s testimony intelligible? How might the unavailability of adequate hermeneutical resources

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2Ibid.
in the dominant social imaginary\(^3\) impede the girl’s ability to make sense of her experience (Fricker 2007, 7)? And what are the implications of saying that Rosie \textit{picks up on} a witness starting to discuss a difficult subject? Is Dr. Crenshaw engaged in mere anthropomorphic projection when she says this, the same way one might say that a thermostat “picks up” on the temperature? Or does the idea that Rosie “picks up” on things suggest she can recognize what is happening, and respond accordingly? What does Rosie know? Is she even an epistemic agent?

For the most part, mainstream Anglo-American epistemology has treated matters of power and knowledge as though they belong to two distinct spheres of philosophy. On traditional accounts of what Lorraine Code calls “S-knows-that-P” theories of knowledge, questions about the gender, race, class, ethnicity, ability, sexual difference etc. of the knower have seemed largely irrelevant, if not inappropriate (2006, ix). When it comes to knowledge, traditionally it has not been the \textit{who} but the \textit{what} that matters: What qualifies as knowledge? Is knowledge justified true belief? Is it justified true belief plus something else?

Although these questions are important for epistemic inquiry, they have remained problematically divorced from the messy social and political circumstances in which knowledge exists. As Linda Alcoff laments, “the issue of power has been striking in its absence from Anglo-American epistemology” (2013, 214). Standpoint theory, postmodernism, feminist empiricism, black feminist epistemology, epistemologies of

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\(^3\)I borrow the term “social imaginary” from Lorraine Code. For Code, the social imaginary encompasses “the normative social meanings, customs, expectations, assumptions, values, prohibitions, and permissions—the habitus and ethos—into which human beings are nurtured from childhood and which they internalize, affirm, challenge, or contest as they make sense of their place, options, responsibilities within a world, both social and physical, whose "nature" and meaning are also instituted in these imaginary significations” (2006, 30).
ignorance, strands of social epistemology and more have all intervened to change this situation for the better. With their acknowledgment that “social difference…makes for epistemic difference,” unsustainable assumptions about knowledge and knowers have been challenged (Fricker and Horsnby 2006, 7). Some have pointed out that knowledge is always situated – it bears traces of a knower’s community, class, gender, race or relevant dimension of social embodiment (Haraway 1988). Others have argued that knowledge is an inextricably communal activity – it is not something produced in isolation by individual knowers (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990). Still others have sought to construe ignorance not just as a gap in knowledge, but the result of a concerted effort to seek out certain types of knowledge and avoid others (Sullivan and Tuana 2007).\textsuperscript{4} And yet others have argued that epistemic responsibility involves not only epistemically sound inquiry, but ethically sound inquiry as well (Anderson 2004; Grasswick 2011).

In their effective recasting of traditional epistemology, these approaches jointly suggest that the question “Am I doing epistemology or ethics here?” is ill posed (Coady 2010, 105). Once vectors of power enter the picture, the divide between epistemology and social, political and moral philosophy is no longer clean. Consider, for instance, how the convergence of ethics, politics and epistemology has recently taken shape in matters of epistemic injustice – injustices done to individuals in their capacities as knowers (Fricker 2007). Both preceding and following Miranda Fricker’s influential work on the subject, critical race theorists, feminists, postcolonial critics and more have drawn attention to unjust epistemic exclusions and cultivated ignorance (Tuana 2004; Spivak 1999; Code 1991, 2006; Mills 1997; Sullivan and Tuana 2007 et al.). Others have

\textsuperscript{4}I pull my survey of these different approaches from Grasswick 2011.
expanded on, tweaked and politicized existing work on epistemic injustice toward greater complexity, and proposed additional concepts and frameworks to capture epistemic oppression’s further mutations (Dotson 2014; Medina 2013; Pohlhaus 2013; Dotson 2011; Lee 2011; Marsh 2011; Mason 2011; Hookway 2010). Yet although the idea of epistemic injustice has cropped up in feminist and critical race theory in various guises for some time, a dearth of attention to the power/knowledge nexus in epistemology has left matters of epistemic injustice still undertheorized. Hence Alison Wylie’s call for “a robust social epistemology [that is] centrally concerned with questions of epistemic injustice; it must provide an account of how inequitable social relations inflect what counts as knowledge and who is recognized as a credible knower” (2011, 233).

In this dissertation, I follow Wylie’s call for increased attention to matters of epistemic injustice. However, in so doing, I depart from the mainstream approach, presented most influentially by Miranda Fricker, by suggesting that an account of epistemic injustice sensitive to interlocking oppressions must take us beyond injustice to human knowers. Although several feminist epistemologists have argued for “liberatory epistemologies” that incorporate “any and all axes of oppression” into their analyses (Grasswick 2011, xv), feminist epistemology remains for the most part an anthropocentric enterprise. In my view, not only do we require an account of epistemic injustice against animals, but we also require an account of epistemic injustice sufficiently attentive to the way injustices to human knowers continue to rely on animal

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5There are important exceptions to this trend (Code 2006; Gruen 1994; Donovan 2006; Plumwood 2002a, 2002b). However, these accounts do not theorize distinctively epistemic injustices to animals as much as they employ ecological (Code 2006) or ecofeminist frameworks to analyze defective anthropocentric epistemologies.

6For simplicity’s sake, I distinguish humans from non-human animals by using the popular yet problematic distinction between “humans” and “animals.” When I use the term animals, I intend to denote non-human animals specifically, not to suggest that humans are not animals, or above the animal kingdom entirely.
The present inquiry thus involves both an application and expansion of epistemic injustice. As an application, my project focuses predominantly on epistemic injustice to women, although as we will see, axes of race, class and nationality come into view in addition to gender. “Gender” is thus not to be understood reductively in terms of an exclusive focus on women as an ostensibly unified group, but rather “as a power/status social division that intersects with other epistemically significant power/status divisions such as race and class” (Rooney 2012, 353). To suggest an exclusive focus on women’s epistemic injustice risks forgetting intersectional feminists’ insights on gender’s complex interaction with other axes of oppression, much of which feminist epistemology recognizes (Ibid.). Yet insofar as most feminist epistemology has yet to account for ecofeminist, post-humanist and feminist animal care ethicist insights on the oppression of both humans and animals, by way of expansion, I seek to theorize epistemic injustice against animals as well. Indeed, insofar as a reduction to “animal irrationality” has been central to the epistemic oppression of both humans and animals, I maintain it is in need of sustained critical attention. Accordingly, I propose that in addition to critical gender, sex and race theory, feminist and social epistemology must also register the animal-human dichotomy as a fundamental driving mechanism inherent in epistemic oppression, and therefore one that must be rigorously challenged if we wish to combat varying modes of oppression – including that of animals.

*   *   *   *
In chapter one, I analyze the Canadian legal system’s perpetration of testimonial injustices\(^7\) against the Vancouver Missing Women, a group of largely Native sex workers, many of whom were murdered by Robert Pickton. I show that the police routinely ignored crucial testimony in their investigations owing to systematic prejudice against the missing women. This includes the testimony of one sex worker who was stabbed by Pickton several times, yet ultimately deemed “not a sufficiently credible witness”\(^8\) by the police. In the recent criminal investigation into Vancouver’s missing women, many critics accuse the police of harboring credibility bias against the “type” of women who went missing, namely poor, drug-addicted Aboriginal prostitutes. I employ Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection to diagnose the underlying mechanism that motivated the missing women’s social, political and epistemic exclusions. On the epistemic level, I argue that the missing women were epistemically abjected - jettisoned to a realm of irrational animality that prevented effective uptake of their and their community/family members’ claims to knowledge. This analysis also puts pressure on Fricker’s attempt to construe the wrong of epistemic injustice as a wrong done to rational human knowers. According to Fricker, not only is “rationality…what lends humanity its distinctive value,” but it is likewise the condition upon which a subject is “insulted, undermined, or otherwise wronged in one’s capacity as a giver of knowledge” (2007, 44). I argue that construing epistemic wrongs as a wrong to rational humanity is overly restrictive for an account of epistemic injustice. It is overly restrictive because neither rationality nor

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\(^7\)Testimonial injustice takes place when a knower’s credibility is demoted due to prejudice (Fricker 2007, 1). It is “the injustice that a speaker suffers in receiving deflated credibility from the hearer owing to identity prejudice on the hearer’s part, as in the case where the police don’t believe someone because he is black” (Ibid., 4).

humanity is a prerequisite for knowledge. Suggesting otherwise risks repeating processes of epistemic abjection according to which both oppressed human and animal knowers are unjustly relegated to a realm of irrational abjects.

In my second chapter, I continue the argument that rational humanity is too restrictive for an account of epistemic injustice. Pulling from externalist accounts of knowledge and work in cognitive ethology, I suggest that animals are also knowers who can be epistemically harmed. I draw from Hilary Kornblith to argue against dominant efforts to deny animals knowledge. Here I also attempt to square Fricker’s own virtue epistemological account with the possibility for animal knowledge. The central epistemic injustice I identify in this chapter is what I call epistemic exemption. Epistemic exemption names the unjust exemption of a group of knowers from the epistemic community. I suggest that epistemic exemption is often committed against animals in accordance with a speciesist society’s effort to maintain active ignorance about the animals it consumes. Pulling from both Fricker and José Medina, I argue further that epistemic exemption paves the way toward testimonial injustices against and communicative breakdowns with animals. In short, when animals are not considered part of the epistemic community, humans tend not to listen to what they may be telling us. I end with a call to listen to animal tellings that dovetails with feminist arguments for a dialogical, interspecies ethics.

In the second half of my dissertation, I shift away from a call to include marginalized knowers who have been epistemically excluded. With my chapters on the Vancouver missing women and testimonial injustice against animals, it may seem that all solicitations for knowledge are welcome. In chapters three and four, I instead issue a
cautionary reminder that not all solicitations for and uses of knowledge tied to oppression are *ipso facto* positive. Rather, in light of the way marginalized humans and animals have been reduced to mere sources of information in their oppression, I argue that we ought to remain wary of solicitations for and uses of knowledge tied to oppression, and always to ensure that epistemic inquiry meets just standards.

In chapter three, I identify the risk of treating women as mere sources of information (what Fricker calls epistemic objectification) in climate change discourse. The increasing trend to mainstream gender in climate change discourse announces a need to solicit women’s ecological knowledge for climate change adaptation efforts. Yet I argue that although efforts to gain women’s knowledge may seem *prima facie* good from a feminist standpoint, solicitations for women’s knowledge are not coextensive with just epistemic relations. Rather, solicitations for women’s ecological knowledge now, when it is needed to combat climate change, are suspect for several reasons. These reasons include: 1) ongoing trends toward Third World women’s instrumentalization by First World actors, 2) the fact that many women’s ecological knowledge is gained under contexts of oppression, and 3) widespread assumptions that it is women’s job to “clean up the earth” (where women are conceived homogeneously). To conclude, I follow José Medina and Gayatri Spivak in their recommendations for ensuring epistemically just relations that avoid the epistemic objectification of women.

In my fourth and final chapter, I consider the ethics of using knowledge gained through the oppression of animals in experimentation. I pull from the work of Ann Cudd, Iris Marion Young and Lori Gruen to argue that animal experimentation involving the pain and death of animals qualifies as oppressive. This oppression raises questions about
whether it is ethically permissible to use knowledge that arises from animal experimentation. This worry is appreciated in debates over the use of Nazi data, where one meets the claim that Nazi data cannot be used because it is morally tainted. In conversation with these arguments, I forward the (perhaps controversial) claim that from the standpoint of a truly liberatory epistemology, we have at least a pro tanto moral and epistemic reason to reject the use of knowledge arising from animal experimentation. Although some would think this is an exclusively moral matter, I argue that the fact that we sometimes reject immoral evidence in the formation of our beliefs suggests there is an important epistemic dimension to this case as well.

In my last chapter, I discuss briefly the controversial comparison I draw between the holocaust and animal experimentation. In line with an anti-oppression framework, I suggest we cannot fully appreciate any one axis of epistemic oppression without appreciating others. This leads me to my conclusion, where I further announce the importance of understanding the intrinsic wrong of testimonial injustice – the reduction of knowers to mere epistemic objects – as a symptom of the larger oppressive worldview that reduces sentient feeling subjects like animals, subjugated women and more to mere resources.
CHAPTER I

VANCOUVER’S MISSING WOMEN:
TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE AND EPISTEMIC ABJECTION

Between the years of 1978 and 2002, over sixty women went missing from Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside (DTES). After years of unanswered questions and failed attempts to draw police and public attention to the missing women, in 2007, Robert Pickton was charged with the murder of nearly thirty\(^9\) of these women (although he boasted to an undercover officer that he killed forty-nine).\(^{10,11}\)

Despite the missing women’s families’ protest and repeated attempts to file missing person reports, the women’s disappearances - and especially the idea that they were being killed - were met with widespread apathy and skepticism. This may strike many as an unremarkable fact. After all, police investigations can be difficult. Yet when one considers that these women were street-level sex workers, many of them drug users and about a third of them Aboriginal, their story begins to take a different tone. One politician asked: “Do you think if 65 women went missing from Kerrisdale [an affluent


\(^{12}\)Pickton was convicted of just six murders – the remaining 20 outstanding murder charges were stayed. Neal Hall, “Police Blasted at Missing Women inquiry for failures to catch killer sooner,” October 11, 2011, Vancouver Sun, http://www.missingpeople.net/police__blasted__at_missing_women.html.
Vancouver neighborhood] we’d have ignored it so long?” (Hugill 2010, 10). Another writer queried: “Why did the disappearance of a single teenager in Toronto – a tragic but definitively isolated incident – marshal vigorous police and media campaigns while a far more expansive series of tragedies in Vancouver was for a long time met with state inaction and media silence?” (Ibid.). Further worries about state attitude arise when one considers that some police reportedly: 1) referred to the women as “just hookers,”¹³ 2) maintained a separate category on their missing persons form for sex workers,¹⁴ and 3) dismissed early evidence and testimony about the missing women. This includes the testimony of an anonymous tipster who called Vancouver Crime Stoppers in 1998 saying he knew there were "at least 10 purses and women’s identification’ in [Pickton’s] trailer,” that Pickton “picked up prostitutes from Burnaby, New Westminster and Vancouver,” and that he “made comments to other people that he can ‘easily dispose of bodies by putting them through a grinder which he uses to prepare food to feed his hogs.’”¹⁵

There have been several attempts to understand the circumstances that led to the

¹⁴One newspaper writer notes, “Critics say the form reflects the police view of prostitutes as disposable human beings, a prejudice which is reinforced by racism.” Julian Borger, “If the girls had been dogs the police would have done more,” The Guardian, February 27, 2002, http://www.missingpeople.net/if_the_girls_had Been_dogs.htm. To be sure, it is unclear whether the police harbored similar negative bias against white, educated, middle-class sex workers, thus complicating any simple analysis that would suggest police discriminated against sex workers in general. Vancouver sex work expert John Lowman remarked that “city officials, residents, and the courts had driven poverty-stricken, drug dependent, poorly educated Native sex trade workers into unsafe dimly lit commercial areas on the downtown eastside, where the police practiced a policy of “containment” and remained largely indifferent to the women’s plight, even as the women disappeared from the streets…[whereas] the city enabled and facilitated well-educated, well-off white female sex trade workers to actively ply their trade in much safer conditions....” Cameron Ward, “Family members to testify this week,” Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, October 23, 2011, http://www.cameronward.com/category/news/page/5/.
disappearances and concomitant disavowal of the missing women. Some argue that what happened is part and parcel of Canada’s ongoing colonization of Aboriginal peoples (Janzen et al. 2013, 145). The marginalization and disavowal of a disproportionately Aboriginal group of women is continuous, it is said, with White settler attempts to relegate Aboriginal peoples to the margins of society and to treat them as inherently violable, in need of no real protection (Ibid.). In addition to the belief that Aboriginals are inherently violable, others have added the perceived violability of Aboriginal prostitutes. Andrea Smith states that “prostitutes are almost never believed when they say they have been raped, because the dominant society considers the bodies of sex workers undeserving of integrity and violable at all times” (2005, 10). Aboriginal prostitutes are therefore seen as doubly violable, variously construed as mere “junkies,” “whores,” “nobodies,” the “walking dead” and “disposable human beings” (Jiwani and Young 2006, 904; Oppal 2012, 14).

Such analyses bring due attention to the broader patriarchal and colonial context that conditioned these women’s disappearances – something often overlooked in media accounts that turn to the women’s idiosyncratic histories in search for an explanation. They importantly situate the missing women’s stories in a wider context of state-

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16 I follow Amber Dean’s use of the term “disappearances.” She employs the term not to conjure a passive process of women who “go missing” but rather state processes that actively foster the conditions of disappearance, including colonialism and the criminalization of sex work. Dean writes: “…while the state was not directly responsible for these disappearances, the rhetoric used to explain them and to diminish the significance of the growing numbers of women being vanished (which became a kind of public secret, since many in the city were aware of what was happening even as officials continued to deny its extent) is eerily similar to rhetoric employed in state-sponsored systems of disappearance” (2009, 18).

17 Ibid.

18 Julian Borger, “If the girls had been dogs the police would have done more,” The Guardian, February 27, 2002, http://www.missingpeople.net/if_the_girls_had_been_dogs.htm.

19 For example, Janzen et al. refer to a Vancouver Sun article entitled “Danielle LaRue never had chance to succeed; A childhood full of pain and abuse led her to drug addiction, working the streets, and an unsolved death—a fate that’s been all too common among First Nations children in the city” (2013, 146).
systematized injustice. As Sherene Razack reminds us, “over-policed and incarcerated at one of the highest rates in the world, their [Indigenous people’s] encounters with white settlers have principally remained encounters in prostitution, policing and the criminal justice system” (2000, 95, in Janzen et al. 2013, 145).

While in full agreement with these accounts, my goal in this chapter is to draw attention to an under-theorized injustice suffered by the missing women and the community members who spoke on their behalf. Specifically, I seek to highlight an injustice done to them in their capacities as knowers - what Miranda Fricker calls an epistemic injustice. Since the most egregious forms of epistemic injustice are systematically tied to other forms of injustice, I situate my analysis in the wider social context. In so doing, my project continues in the spirit of a thoroughly social epistemology, namely one that appreciates the social embeddedness of all epistemic practice. This social embeddedness serves as a further reminder that the corrective against epistemic injustice cannot be merely epistemic, but must be necessarily social. As Fricker states, “Eradicating these injustices would take not just more virtuous hearers, but collective social political change” (2007, 8). Accordingly, although focused on epistemic injustice, this chapter flows between social, political and epistemic registers.

I proceed in three main sections. First, I forward the chapter’s central claim, namely that in addition to their gender, race and class oppression, the missing women also endured epistemic oppression –what Fricker calls testimonial injustices. I argue that because the women were seen as unreliable knowers, dozens more of them continued to

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20In referring to those who suffered testimonial injustices broadly as the “women” throughout the rest of this chapter, I intend to include some of the women themselves, who reported worries to the police and then went missing, as well as members in the DTES who spoke on their behalf after they went missing. Many of these were also Aboriginal women.
disappear and were neglected by the police. The epistemic form of injustice the missing women suffered, then, is as much in need of address as any other, although certainly not disconnected from the other forms of systematic injustice they suffered.

Next, in line with José Medina’s reminder that testimonial wrongs are always “derivative and impossible to understand outside the context of systematic political harms that precede and follow” them, I describe the broader socio-political structure that conditioned the women’s epistemic oppression (2013, 87). Here I discuss how the dominant society propped itself up by abjecting the missing women—relegating them to a zone of bodies socially inscribed as unlivable, degenerate and subhuman. I argue that the characterization of the women as abject paved the way toward their epistemic injustice; stereotypes of Aboriginal, drug addicted prostitutes seamlessly translated into stereotypes of untrustworthy and irrational abjects.21 As one support worker put it, “sex workers are non-citizens in so many ways” (Belak 2012, 38). With such oppressive constructs in place, the women were unable to communicate their knowledge successfully.

In my final section, I argue that although Fricker provides a useful framework for diagnosing epistemic injustice, her account’s underlying theoretical apparatus could be wielded to discount certain groups of knowers, even potentially some of the Vancouver missing women. More specifically, Fricker locates the wrong done in testimonial injustice as a wrong done to one’s capacity as a rational human. Yet I argue there is no compelling reason to cash out injustice to knowers in terms of injustice to rational humans. Rather, the prerequisite for rationality seems unduly restrictive. I conclude by

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21It bears noting that class and race also inflect stereotypes attaching to drug addiction. As Jiwani and Young note, “drug addiction also occurs among the rich and powerful…but [remains] private in the upper echelons of society, whereas it is rendered more visible and open to scrutiny in places like the Downtown Eastside” (Jiwani and Young 2006, 911).
arguing for a more inclusive pool of potential candidates of epistemic injustice – a pool I suggest in my next chapter should include animals. By expanding Fricker’s account in this way, I hope to offer a corrective against her account’s potential perpetuation of a binary that places rational humans in the category of credible knowers, and irrational subhumans in the category of non-credible knowers.

1. Testimonial Injustice

Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice gives name to an unfortunately familiar phenomenon. When you are not believed because you are black, or when your idea is dismissed because you are a woman, what is the wrong that is done to you? According to Fricker, when your word is accorded less credibility as a result of prejudice, you suffer a testimonial injustice (2007, 4). When you are harmed in this way, you are harmed specifically in your capacity as a knower. Racism and sexism can thus breed not only straightforwardly moral harms, as we well know, but specifically epistemic harms. Eventually, if your claims to knowledge are dismissed routinely enough, you can even come to believe you have no such knowledge, and that you are accordingly not the kind of person who is credible.

Consider Fricker’s example of testimonial injustice against Tom Robinson – the young black man in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird. Robinson is accused of raping a white girl named Mayella Ewell in 1935, Maycomb County, Alabama. As we know from lawyer Atticus Finch’s defense, Tom Robinson is clearly innocent. Yet the trial performs what Fricker describes as a “straightforward struggle between the power of evidence and the power of racial prejudice” (2007, 23). Who will be believed in 1935 Alabama: the
word of a white girl and her father, or the word of a black man? Ultimately, prejudice wins the day. Every word of Robinson’s is construed as the lie of a black man, since in the end the jurors believe at base “that all Negroes lie, that all Negroes are basically immoral beings, that all Negro men are not to be trusted around our women” (Lee 1960, 208 in Fricker 2007, 90). In such a racist climate, of course the jurors find Robinson guilty. And, as Fricker stresses, it is important to recognize that they “really do find him guilty” (25). As she explains, they do not secretly believe he is innocent, yet give a guilty verdict so not to appear crazy in the eyes of a racist society (25). Rather, the jurors’ racism goes much deeper than this, “all the way to the jurors’ very powers of judgement” (26).

What happens to Tom Robinson in the courtroom is not just an isolated, one-off instance of testimonial injustice. To use one of Fricker’s examples, it is unlike the case of someone submitting an article for publication that is immediately discarded because the referee panel has a dogmatic prejudice against the kind of research method used (2007, 27). Although the submitter’s credibility may have been reduced unfairly, it is of a completely different sort from that suffered by Tom Robinson. For the sort she suffers does not deeply affect her in any other area of her life, rendering her susceptible to a host of other injustices (Ibid.). Rather, Fricker is interested in the more distressing cases of systematic testimonial injustice. Systematic testimonial injustices are those that arise from prejudice that clings to the subject, negatively impacting her in various arenas of her life – legal, sexual, economic, professional and so forth. These “tracker” prejudices, as Fricker calls them, result in many different kinds of injustice, testimonial injustice just one among them (Ibid.). Tom Robinson’s testimonial injustice is of this sort. It is
systematic because racism breeds a host of injustices against him beyond just the testimonial kind (Ibid.). And as someone interested in how epistemic injustice colludes with other forms of injustice, it is these systematic cases that interest Fricker.

To turn now to the present case, similar forms of systematic testimonial injustice were perpetrated against the missing women. Like Tom Robinson, the missing women’s perceived lack of credibility was just one among the many racial, sexual, economic and professional injustices they suffered. Numerous reports reveal how seamlessly common prejudices against the missing women translated into their perceived lack of credibility, and accordingly into testimonial injustices. Consider the following reports from sex trade and support workers living or working in Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside (DTES):

- One way to make it easier for women to report is to take the women seriously. I’m sure that the police have heard that before. But how do you get at the deep racism in the VPD [Vancouver Police Department]? And the sexism and classism? Essentially they are not believing poor women (Support worker, Belak 2012, 29).
- There was another woman, a street involved woman, trying to intervene and they wouldn’t let her. It was interesting how I was able to be involved and she wasn’t and how the whole situation went down. I ended up reporting it. I imagine they took me more seriously because I am a white middle class woman (Support worker, Ibid., 17)
- Many participants who were in the sex trade said that when they had tried to report assaults, they were not believed, or the police response was delayed, by hours or even months, in some cases. There was a pervasive belief that those in the sex trade were not taken seriously by police (Ibid., 20)
- Women living down here still find their credibility is suspect because of addiction. This is something that has never changed. If a woman is an addict, she simply isn’t trusted to give accurate information (Support worker, Ibid., 28)
- They are always harassing us and running our names… And when we do give them our names and identification, they even imply that we are somehow stealing someone else’s identity. They will ask all these questions about what happened years ago… as if they want to trip you up and prove you’re not the person you say you are. We are guilty by our very existence (Ibid., 30)
• It’s not just cops, there is racism [against Aboriginal people] in the way you get treated by ambulance drivers and paramedics. My sister needed an ambulance and they didn’t believe she was hurt. They took a long time to come and then were very sarcastic, suggesting that she wasn’t sick and just wanted pills or something (Ibid., 24)

These reports provide examples of Aboriginal sex workers not being believed due to what Fricker calls identity prejudice. She defines identity prejudice as “a matter of one party or parties effectively controlling what another party does – preventing them, for instance, from conveying knowledge – in a way that depends upon collective conceptions of the social identities in play” (2007, 28). With explicit reference to racism, classism and sexism, the above passages betray a form of identity prejudice that crystallizes in media references to the women as “poor Aboriginal prostitutes.” In the dominant social imaginary, Aboriginal people are racially stereotyped “as lazy, unintelligent… immoral, uneducated and untrustworthy” (Behrendt 1995, 67). And “poor Aboriginal prostitutes” are further construed as “hookers and lazy addicts” who are “always on the move and hence culpable in their murders or disappearance” (Beniuk 2012, 87; Jiwani and Young 2006, 898, 897). Jiwani and Young elaborate,

In the realm of representations, prostitution and Aboriginality mark these women as missing, but as naturally so-the stereotypical attributes ascribed to both these positions feed into and reproduce common-sense notions of itinerant and irresponsible behavior, which is then seen as naturally inviting victimization (2006, 902).

With such narratives in place, a story about disorderly, immoral and guilty individuals emerges in direct conflict with a more complex narrative about the political neglect and social prejudice of a colonial nation. Inherently guilty from the start, “poor Aboriginal prostitutes” are the only ones responsible for what happens to them. Similar to Tom Robinson’s status as nothing “other than a guilty Negro,” the women’s construction as
“nothing other than guilty, drug addicted prostitutes” had profound silencing effects (Medina 2013, 69). Indeed, since the women’s silencing was so thoroughgoing (more on this below), I would venture that they suffered a particularly egregious form of testimonial injustice, what Fricker calls pre-emptive testimonial injustice (2007, 31). Pre-emptive testimonial injustices arise from identity prejudices so entrenched that they “silence you by prejudicially pre-empting your word” (131). In such a context of extreme oppression, knowers are rarely if ever solicited for their knowledge, let alone trusted on matters that directly concern them (130). Pre-emptive testimonial injustice certainly captures the epistemic status of the missing women – a group so excluded from mainstream society that their communicative exchanges with the dominant order are best described as those between a suspecting police state and its guilty criminals. Indeed, in this context, nearly all communication between police and Vancouver sex workers is colored by a “history of police-community conflict and distrust” (Oppal 2012, 111). Consider, for instance, one inspector’s report that a 1998 list of missing women was perceived as unreliable by the police in part because the “list reflected DTES community perceptions which therefore were not completely trustworthy” (Oppal 2012, 77, my emphasis).

To understand the missing women’s failed attempts to achieve credibility, then, we must situate our analysis in a context of operative identity prejudices against “Nobodies. Abandoned women. Marginalized women. Drug sick women. Sex trade workers. Poor women. Aboriginal women.”

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attempt to report her knowledge that her daughter Tanya\textsuperscript{23} was missing to the police. Purcell knew Tanya was missing because, contrary to dominant stereotypes of drug-addicted prostitutes, Tanya was “constantly in touch and actively involved in the life of her young son.”\textsuperscript{24} However, Purcell was told that a missing persons’ report would not be filed for Tanya since “the police didn’t look for missing drug addicts and hookers because they weren’t reliable” (Oppal 2012, 58-9). This perception prevailed despite the fact that the missing women were not highly mobile; their lives were deeply entrenched in the DTES, and their poverty also meant they could not afford to travel (Oppal 2012, 56). Notwithstanding this fact and Purcell’s report of Tanya’s general reliability, the perception of her as an itinerant drug addict who probably just ran away clearly informed police refusals to believe she was in any real danger. Indeed, Oppal reports that when it came to the missing women, the police oddly departed from the norm of missing persons investigations by including an additional step to confirm that the women were in fact missing (2012, 47). Oppal writes:

\begin{quote}
...the women were reported as missing; there was no reason to treat these investigations differently by adding the step of determining if they were indeed missing. It was based on false assumptions that the women were transient, had run away, were evading the police and so son. The added step was a critical error (2012, 47).
\end{quote}

Stereotypes that the missing women were transient runaways directly impacted their fate – because of police failures like these, the women continued to disappear. Such stereotypes also account for police failure to solicit potential testimony from the women’s families, thus revealing another form of pre-emptive testimonial injustice. Family members were rarely interviewed and mostly had to seek police out for themselves to

\textsuperscript{23}Tanya’s DNA was eventually found on Pickton’s property.

make statements. Several reported feeling that the lack of interest in what they had to say was due to prejudice against Aboriginal peoples and sex workers, leading some to file formal complaints (Oppal 2012, 53, 52). As Tanya’s aunt stated, “…I always wondered why nobody else in my family was ever interviewed, because I was very close to my sister at the time and Tanya was brought up like a daughter alongside my daughter. Nobody ever interviewed me” (Ibid.). Oppal further confirms that both the police and community at large betrayed a general lack of urgency and relative indifference to the missing women, and concludes that the investigations “fell short of the norm” (2012, 53).

In light of these broader trends, it is no wonder that when more women started to go missing, they were largely ignored. No wonder that when Carrie Kerr tried to file a missing person’s report for her sister in 1998, she was told “No, go down to the needle exchange and leave a message there” (Hugill 2010, 10). Or, when Angela Jardine’s daughter went missing that same year, she was told “not to worry and her daughter would likely turn up” (Ibid). No wonder also that Sarah De Vries – a woman later killed by Pickton – was ignored when she went to the police “terrified at the thought of disappearing as so many of her friends had,” as her family member put it.25 As Sandra Gagnon, a woman whose sister disappeared in 1997, states: “they never took the threat seriously…I can guarantee you that if it wasn’t the Downtown Eastside, and they weren’t hookers, something would have been done in an instant” (Ibid).

Finally, in addition to these personal accounts and failed attempts to convince police that their family members were in actual danger, in 1997 - a full five years before

25Sarah wrote an eerily foreboding poem in 1998: “will they remember me when im gone, or would their lives just carry on?” In her poem, she writes: “woman’s body found beaten beyond recognition, you sip your coffee, taking a drag of your smoke, turning the page, taking a bite of your toast, just another day, just another death, just … another hastings street whore, sentenced to death” (De Vries 2008, 233-4).
Pickton was arrested - he was charged with the attempted murder of a sex worker, referred to as Ms. Anderson, who managed to escape from his clutches.\textsuperscript{26} Pickton hired Anderson for sex and brought her to his farm, where he handcuffed her and stabbed her several times (Ibid). She barely survived the attack. Incredibly, despite Anderson’s testimony, the charges against Pickton were stayed due to the concern that “the woman was not a sufficiently credible witness” (Ibid.). This particular testimonial injustice reverberated beyond injustice to Anderson herself. As a result of ignoring Anderson’s testimony, the police lost out on crucial knowledge about Pickton that, if taken seriously at the time, would have “likely prevented the deaths of more than a dozen women.”\textsuperscript{27} The fact that no further information or follow-up was sought as a result of Anderson’s testimony led a later inquiry to conclude that there were “clear limitations to the investigation” that “completely ignored…crucial facts” (Oppal 2012, 35-6). This includes Anderson’s report that Pickton told her he picked up prostitutes once a week from the DTES as well her as comment that she knew there were “[dead] broads on that [Pickton’s] property.”\textsuperscript{28}

The missing women suffered epistemic injustice not only in life, but in death as well. In response to accusations that the Vancouver Police Department and Royal Canadian Mounted Police handled the missing women case poorly, the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry (MCWI) was established in 2010 in search for potential

misconduct surrounding the investigation. Commissioner Wally Oppal was designated the task of uncovering critical police failures and their underlying cause, which included exploring the role of systematic racism or prejudice in the case (Oppal 2012, 5). Yet, ironically, the Inquiry – a supposed effort to remedy the kinds of injustice that led to the women’s disavowal – has been guilty of committing its own testimonial exclusions. Most of the women’s families and sixteen advocacy and service groups withdrew from the commission, claiming that it perpetuated the very discrimination they hoped it would uncover (Collard 2013, 24). Women’s and First Nations groups both criticized the inquiry for appointing counsel to speak for them without any consultation. As the Women’s Equality and Security Coalition wrote: “[We] reject the implementation of these legal counsels over whom we have no control, cannot instruct, and yet have been granted authority to speak for us. We must speak for ourselves, choose our own counsel” (in Collard 2013, 26). The Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs likewise criticized the inquiry for appointing counsel “without any discussions or concurrence with Aboriginal or First Nations peoples” (Ibid).

Following this same trend, the Missing Women Inquiry has also been guilty of neglecting sex workers’ own narrative accounts in favor of prostitution “expert” testimony. Commissioner Oppal proclaimed that Dr. Lowman – a white, male University professor – was “an expert witness on prostitution, [who] may give opinion evidence based on the issues of prostitution” (cited in Collard 2013, 41). Yet without undermining John Lowman’s own expertise on the issue, it is worth asking: Who could be more of an expert on the issues faced by Canadian Aboriginal prostitutes, than Canadian Aboriginal prostitutes? Intended or not, appealing to a white man’s expertise on prostitution, while
many prostitutes stood outside with protest signs trying to get their voices heard, plainly suggests that the prostitutes themselves are not credible witnesses. In their own words, then: “This inquiry was supposed to be an opportunity for us to choose our own voices finally, and the suggestion that somebody else could do that for us, we take objection to.... Fundamentally it’s about us telling our story with our voice” (MWCI transcripts June 27, 2011 cited in Collard 2013, 40)

Entrenched prejudice against Aboriginal sex workers, coupled with the fact that many of them possessed crucial information that would have advanced knowledge of the case, suggests that the missing women and their families’ suffered systematic testimonial injustices. Yet the present analysis demands not only an account of the broader colonial and patriarchal context that conditioned the women’s epistemic injustices, but also an account that explains how entire social groups become socially, politically and epistemically excluded. More specifically, it will be important to interrogate the underlying psychic motivation of a society that perpetrates systematic group harm. Indeed, what is perhaps most alarming about the women’s testimonial injustices is that they are clear symptoms of systematic bias – bias that most often operates unconsciously and stems from broader patterns of social discrimination. Certainly, it would be naïve to think that this bias is unique to the legal system. Rather, as Oppal concluded in his report, police bias against the missing women is a “manifestation of broader patterns of systematic discrimination within Canadian society and [is] reinforced by the political and public indifference to the plight of marginalized female victims” (Oppal 2012, 94). The diagnosis of systematic bias in this case must therefore be analyzed in light of wider patterns of discrimination that prefigure and shape police bias.
In the following section, I pull from the work of Julia Kristeva to diagnose the psychic investments of a colonial society intent on maintaining a marginalized group of abjects like the missing women. Until we understand the way oppressive societies prop themselves up against a group of abjects who are made to absorb their negative projections, we will be unable to address the root cause behind stubborn efforts to keep groups like the missing women in an epistemic, social and political underclass.

2. Abjecting the Vancouver Missing Women

How come the missing women’s attempts to gain credibility were thwarted? In this section, I diagnose the women’s epistemic injustices as part of a wider social context that abjected the women. I argue that the women’s abject status pitted them as non-human and irrational. Without rational human status, the women were not perceived as the kind of people who had credible knowledge.

I proceed as follows. First I briefly explicate Kristeva’s concept of abjection. Second, I discuss the negative identity traits projected onto the women (mediated through their Aboriginality and prostitution). Here I describe how a white, “sexually civil” society abjected the women in compensation for its own ambiguous relationship to the maternal body. Third, I discuss what I call the epistemic abjection of the missing women. I argue that to establish itself as self-transparent, rational knowers, the Vancouver police (and colonial society more generally) projected irrationality onto the missing women.
**Kristeva’s Abject**

To grasp Kristeva’s concept of abjection, it will first be important to describe some general features of her psychoanalytic approach.

Kristeva revises Lacanian psychoanalysis by relocating the maternal body at the center of the child’s development. Kristeva suggests that before the Law of the father, there is a maternal authority that orders the child’s body. This presymbolic realm, what Kristeva calls the semiotic *chora*, is an undifferentiated maternal-child space, “a nonexpressive totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement as it is regulated” (Kristeva 1984, 25). In this choric, borderless space, there is no clean division between self and other, subject and object, one or two. Is the pregnant woman, for instance, properly understood as one, or two bodies (Oliver 2012, 123)?

Moreover, even after the umbilical cord is cut, the infant does not sever its dependence on the maternal body. Rather, the infant’s bodily needs and desires are still intimately wrapped up with maternal feeding acts, thus further complicating any clean and easy borderlines between self and other.

In order for the child to enter the symbolic realm (the realm of law and language one must enter to gain a sense of identity), the child must leave the maternal semiotic authority and its regulations of the child’s rhythms and fluids. As Kristeva famously puts it, “For man and for woman the loss of the mother is a biological and psychic necessity, the first step on the way to becoming autonomous. Matricide is our vital necessity, the sine-qua-non condition of our individuation…” (Kristeva 2002, 197). Matricide is

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29 Speaking of the maternal law, Kristeva asks, “Do we not find, sooner (chronologically and logically speaking), if not objects at least *pre*-objects, poles of attraction of a demand for air, food, and motion?” (1982, 32).

30 Oliver asks, “And what could be more challenging to the borders of self and of the human than a woman’s pregnant body gestating a developing fetus” (2012, 123)?
necessary because an undifferentiated space of bodies is not easily tolerated by the symbolic order, which requires a total “appearance of unity” (Oliver 1993, 45). Hence the maternal body becomes the symbolic law’s prohibited target *par excellence*. The child’s entry into the symbolic is thus accompanied by the primal repression of the maternal-child choric space, “the unstable territories where an “I” that is taking shape is ceaselessly straying” (Kristeva 1982, 11).

The maternal body thus becomes an ambivalent figure – a body to which the child clings but from which s/he must eventually depart. And yet, in being a constitutive part of the child’s identity, the maternal body cannot be fully rejected. This ambivalent relation triggers concomitant feelings of discomfort and disgust toward the not-yet-object, or *abject* maternal body. “Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from another body in order to be…” (1982, 10). Recalling the semiotic *chora*, the abject thus evokes that which threatens borders: “The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite” (4). It is what “disturbs identity, system, order” (Ibid.). In abjection, the border is experienced as a constant menace that is not entirely external, but that “menace[s]… from inside” (135-6?). This ambiguous realm somewhere between me and not-me terrifies (yet fascinates) the fully formed subject. For in witnessing the “breaking down of a world that has erased its borders,” the subject bears witness to the breakdown of its own subjectivity (4). For, as Kristeva puts it, “how can I be without border” (Ibid.)?

Importantly, then, the abject is not properly understood as akin to just any old *object* we try to exclude (1982, 1). Rather, having been integral to the subject’s very
emergence as a *corps propre*, the abject is not so easily discarded. It does not “allow me to be more or less detached and autonomous” (2-3). It is rather “what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These body fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death” (3). It is thus that we are both drawn to and repulsed by the abject. We want to turn away from the abject, but we are unable to do so; “like road kill on the side of the highway while driving, we look at it in spite of ourselves” (Oliver 2007, 25).

Before moving onto my next section, it will be important to note that if a society fails to successfully code the ambiguity of subjectivity through symbolic means (e.g. through art or literature), “abjection recoils on the subject and society” (Beardsworth 2004, 120). In such a situation, we risk projecting negative traits onto others in a constant effort to redefine the border between self and other. As Beardsworth puts it, “as a defense against symbolic collapse,” we attempt to turn the “abject into an object” (235). In oppressive societies, then, one must understand the projection of negative traits onto the oppressed as symptoms of the oppressors’ fear of ambigous borders. This commonly involves projecting inhumanity, disorder and irrationality – ineliminable parts of ourselves - onto the oppressed. As Oliver writes, “Certainly, imperialism rationalizes its right to colonize and dominate others through doctrines of manifest destiny dependent on distinctions between the civilized and barbarian, the rational and irrational, the human and subhuman” (2004, 24).

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31 I keep Kristeva’s original French here because it conveys a multiplicity of meanings that are lost in the English translation “one’s own clean and proper body” (1982, ix). In French, *propre* has the double meaning of proper (as in clean and appropriate) but also property (one’s own and proper body). *Corps* means not only body but also corpse, thus highlighting the abjection at the very heart of corporeal subjectivity, as any body that maintains itself in life also does so in the face of that body’s inevitable transfer into death. In this sense, one’s own body is always also one’s own “corpse,” and Kristeva’s abject is again understood as that which we try to reject yet which remains constitutive of very identities.
Predictably, for Kristeva, abject substances are any items that threaten the ambiguous boundaries between self and other, subject and object. “Excrement and its equivalents (decay, infection, disease, corpse, etc.),” for example, are abject reminders of the unstable boundaries of the self (1982, 71). “Fecal matter signifies, as it were, what never ceases to separate from a body in a state of permanent loss in order to become autonomous, distinct from the mixtures, alterations, and decay that run through it. That is the price the body must pay if it is to become clean and proper” (108). Since all forms of defilement ultimately recall the primary uncertain border between the maternal and infant body, Kristeva explains her primary examples of cultural food prohibitions (e.g. against milk and blood) as bans on maternal fluids (i.e. breast milk and menstrual blood) (105, 96). Indeed, menstrual blood, breast milk and excrement all recall the maternal body (the latter since, as Kristeva writes, “maternal authority is experienced first and above all...as sphincteral training”) (71).

Also pulling from Kristeva’s concept of abjection, Janzen et al. (2013) document media references to Vancouver sex workers that associate them with abject substances. They describe an article about DTES women that begins with the introduction of Cheryl Paul as a “friendly young face, dotted with sores” (Culbert 2008, B1 in Janzen et al. 2013, 154). Similarly, it is accentuated that Celynn Camelia Maria Cadieux “had scars all over her arms from the needles, and she knew it. ... At one point she noticed her skin was turning yellow and her liver was in pain. Still she thought little of it until she started to

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32 Although our diagnoses of the abject status of the missing women are similar, our accounts differ in several respects, including that Janzen et al. pull from Butler’s notion of abjection as well as Kristeva’s to highlight the discursive (as well as affective) dimensions of abjection, and also do not discuss the women’s specifically epistemic abjection.
spit up blood” (Peebles, 2007, A1 in Ibid.). They further note that sex workers continue to be “constructed as vessels of disease,” clearly evoking a threat to the clean and proper self (155). As Amber Dean notes, for many, Vancouver’s DTES in general readily “conjures…a space where drugs, prostitution, crime and violence flourish amid filth, decay, vermin, disease and ultimately death” (2009, 95). Indeed, many refer to the DTES’ central intersection of Main and Hastings (the poorest postal code in Canada) as “Pain and Wastings.”

As one writer describes, “No other slum or ghetto in the country matches the squalor of this 10-block urban wasteland, with its rundown hotels and pawn shops, stained and fractured sidewalks, gutters and alleyways littered with garbage, used condoms and discarded hypodermic needles” (Newton).

Prostitutes in general have historically served as abject bodies in the maintenance of sanitized society, often made to absorb whatever characteristics are deemed objectionable, dirty or unfitting for proper civil selves (Oliver 2001, 10). Becki Ross explains that during the mid-eighties in Vancouver, “sexual civility was contingent on the repeated avowal of sex workers’ uncivil, carnal disobedience and the repeated disavowal of sex workers’ substantive citizenship” (2010, 259). Indeed, the Vancouver sex worker exile to the DTES came in direct response to a crackdown on the city’s prostitution, largely instituted by the community group CROWE (Concerned Residents of the West End) (Ibid., 250). The general sentiment was that sex workers posed a threat to the safety, health and values of the West End community. British Columbia’s attorney general at the time accordingly announced a “war on hookers,” whose primary goal was to “purge prostitutes from the West End” (Ibid., 251). In Kristeva’s words, “It is as if dividing lines

were built up between society and a certain nature, as well as within the social aggregate, on the basis of the simple logic of excluding filth, which, promoted to the ritual level of defilement, found the “self and clean” of each social group if not of each subject” (1982, 65). It was not long before the British Columbia Supreme Court Justice came along with his final divisive act, physically sealing sex workers off to the East end of the city, and symbolically sealing in a civil and proper citizenry to the West (Ross 2010, 254).

In abjection, prostitutes are linked not only to the feminine body, but to the animal body as well. Kristeva writes, “…by way of abjection… societies have marked out a precise area of their culture in order to remove it from the world of animals or animalism, which were imagined as representatives of sex and murder” (1982, 12-3). In addition to various descriptions of the women as “urban pests” who were ultimately “slaughtered” and “butchered” by a “serial-killer pig-farmer,” the abject animalization of the women is also evident in a Vancouver Parliament Member’s label of the West End as a “sexual zoo” (Janzen et al. 2013, 157; Ross 2010, 251). A “sexual zoo,” dangerously feminine and animalistic, captures the centrality played by both the animal and woman in Kristeva’s abject. As Kristeva says, “… it is especially with prostitutes and nymphomaniacs, who are nevertheless tackled with fascination if not with a certain amount of sympathy, that we are presented with a wild, obscene, and threatening

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34More specifically, as Kelly Oliver notes, Kristeva “maintains that on the social level the abject and abjection are ways of negotiating our relationship to, or separation from, other animals and animality; on the personal individual level abjection is a way of negotiating separation from the maternal body” (2004, 53). According to Kristeva, the blood of animals, and certain animals such as “fish, birds and insects” threaten identity because they take part in both impure and pure sides of borderlines, such as the sky and the earth, and life and death. In this way, they “do not confine themselves to one but point to admixture and confusion” (1982, 98). Janzen et al. (2013) also discuss the animalization of the missing women.

35Indeed, prostitutes have figured prominently in connections to animality, as they have historically been apprehended as being more “bodily” than “cerebral.” Connections between prostitutes and animality have been well documented in American and European history. Charles Bernheimer describes “the cluster of associations surrounding nineteenth-century conceptions of prostitution and female sexuality, among them animality, decomposition, syphilitic contamination and hereditary degeneration” (in Anderson 1991, 108).
femininity” (1982, 164). Just like visitors to an animal zoo, one is curious to observe the threatening woman in her abjection - the possibly diseased, contaminated, “blatant, aggressive, disorderly prostitutes,” as the province’s attorney general called them - but from a safe distance (Ross 2010, 254). Red light districts are dangerous, one is told, yet they remain a major tourist attraction in cities around the globe. Proper to abjection’s simultaneous evocation of threat and fascination, then, although there may be something ominous and unsafe in these zones of supposed “disorder, crime, filth, and degeneracy,” there is something equally attractive (Ross 2010, 258). As Nicole McManus puts it, the “urban explorer risks contamination from the prostitute’s abject vagina, which is portrayed, like the prostitute’s [sic] themselves, as elusive, ‘secret,’ and threatening” (2008, 111).  

The missing women’s abject status is further compounded by the discriminatory portrayal of Aboriginal women that abounds on the Canadian cultural landscape. Since one-third of the missing women were Aboriginal, it is crucial to acknowledge the racially inflected portrayal of the women as a group. In her examination of newspapers discussing Canadian Aboriginal women, Yasmin Jiwani finds that tropes of violence, irresponsibility, poverty, drug addiction and disease are used to characterize Aboriginal women. “There is a constant theme in these stories, entrenching the victim status of Aboriginal women but in a way that suggests a causal link between intimate and structural forms of violence” (2009, 6). Such character portrayals serve the rhetorical  

36Perhaps this is because, as Anne McClintock argues, “Abject peoples are those whom industrial imperialism rejects but cannot do without: slaves, prostitutes, the colonized, domestic workers, the insane, the unemployed, and so on” (1995, 72).

37Although not all the missing women were Aboriginal, I am interested in the dominant social portrayal that construed the missing women as “poor Aboriginal prostitutes.” In the media, Aboriginality came to mark the missing women as a group, regardless of their heterogeneity. Of course, it bears noting that the Aboriginal women were also members of different Aboriginal tribes, something also overlooked in the dominant discourse.
function of pitting Aboriginal women as inferior, less than fully human subjects. Indeed, Jiwani further notes how Aboriginal women were also portrayed as fecund, and that such references “resonate with colonially entrenched stereotypes of the colonized as more animal-like, having less control and –through their excessive numbers – constituting a potentially threatening and invasive force” (7).38

Epistemic Abjection

The previous section provided a window onto the negative traits that cling to abjected Aboriginal prostitutes. To be sure, because such traits work to discard oppressed people in general, they will simultaneously work to silence them; to repeat, epistemic oppression cannot be divorced from social and political oppression. That being said, on the epistemic level, we are especially interested in attempts to project irrationality onto the bodies of those deemed abject. From an epistemic perspective, we must note that modern epistemes tend to posit juridical power in the position of rational knower and criminality, disorder and animality into the object position of the irrational known. This is especially true of colonial societies. As Charles Mills explains, colonial societies imagine that “whites, by appropriating and adding value to this natural world, exhibit their superior rationality”

38We can usefully parallel the discussion of Vancouver Aboriginal sex workers to that of Aboriginal Australians. Anna Hickey-Moody and Jane Kenway argue that “the various processes whereby the abject is expelled, restricted to ‘abject zones’ and returns to ‘haunt’ are all evident in the complex history of the abjection of Aboriginal Australians” (2009, 97). They note that narratives of exclusion, denial of custom, law, citizenship and land all color the Aboriginal Australians experience, as it does with Vancouver Aboriginals (98). But Australian Aboriginal culture is not fully expelled from the dominant cultural and tourist gaze. Rather, the “acceptable and commodifiable” aspects of the Aboriginal culture in Australia include “Aboriginal cultural knowledge, ancient art, connections to the land, and experiences of spirituality” (Ibid.). Hickey-Moody and Kenway claim, “such processes of commodification and exoticization can be understood as contemporary examples of Aboriginal abjection. They involve a stage-managed set of comfortable images that White populations want to see” (Ibid.). This could easily apply to the Vancouver Aboriginal scene as well, where Aboriginal artwork is sought after and revered, while stereotypes about Aboriginal ineptitude likewise prevail.
Colonized people resultantly become part of the newfound landscape to be epistemically (not to mention economically, socially, politically) mastered. Here power and knowledge are inextricably intertwined; as Foucault might say, “in knowing we control and in controlling we know” (Gutting 2013). By separating rational knowers from the irrational known, epistemic colonial domination attempts to render its own rational knowledge superior.

Feminists have long discussed the ways dualistic conceptions of rationality disavow a realm of embodied, irrational forces and their trenchant associations with disorder, femininity and animality— all of which were tied to the missing women. Throughout the history of philosophy, restrictive notions of human reason have served as the chief means to control the (feminine/animal) “wayward” body. From Plato to Descartes, rationalism has characterized the body varyingly as “animal, as appetite, as deceiver, as prisoner of the soul and confounder of its projects,” and thus in need of rational order and control (Bordo, 1993, 3). As Elizabeth Grosz writes, “it could be argued that philosophy as we know it has established itself as a form of knowing, a form of rationality, only through the disavowal of the body, specifically the male body, and the corresponding elevation of mind as a disembodied term” (1994, 4). And the imaginative conception of “disembodied, pure, and uncontaminated” rational human knowers has been forged only by relegating oppressed animals and humans to the realm of irrational embodiment – the disavowed underside of all rational knowledge (Grosz 1995, 39).

Several feminists (and, centrally, ecofeminists) have described how both women and animals have been excluded from the realm of reason, which feeds into their often linked oppression (more on this in chapter 4). Consider Catharine Mackinnon’s observation that “women are called animal names-bunny, beaver, bitch, chick, and cow-usually to mark their categorically lesser humanity” (2004, 266). Also consider that when Mary Wollstonecraft first published her Vindication of the Rights of Woman in 1792, Thomas Taylor, a Cambridge philosopher, pointed out that “if the argument for equality was sound when applied to women, why should it not be applied to dogs, cats and horses?” (in Singer 1990, 1).

Plato describes the body as exerting a “downward pull,” and Augustine calls it “an enemy” (Ibid., 144).
Returning now to the missing women, we can readily diagnose projections of the women as among the “irrational known.” Consider first the many media descriptions of the women as drug addicts. In the dominant social imaginary, drug addicts are often associated with irrationality, even insanity; they represent the unreflective part of Enlightenment rationality. Harry Frankfurt’s description of the addict captures the mainstream view: “the wanton addict cannot or does not care which of his conflict first-order desires wins out…. His lack of concern is…due either to his lack of the capacity for reflection or to his mindless indifference to the enterprise of evaluating his own desires and motives” (1988, 18-9). This echoes the zombie-like description of the missing women as mindless “peripatetic wanderers forever in search of the latest fix” (Jiwani and Young 2006, 898). Alongside a modern view of the subject that pits rationality (in the sense of the capacity for reflection) as a necessary condition for knowledge, if these drug addicts were not rational, they could not be expected to legitimately know anything.

With their superior claims to knowledge, however, the women pose a challenge to an ostensibly neat binary between “rational human knowers,” and “irrational animal known.” If a colonial episteme’s own constitution depends on the disavowal of a zone of irrational, known others, the discovery of superior knowledge within this zone pollutes the standards of both rational knowledge and who qualifies as a knower. How could a less-than-human, irrational drug addict have had superior knowledge to the police? How could rational knowers not know and the irrational known know better? In line with a process of epistemic abjection, these questions threaten to expose the ambiguous border between rational knower and irrational known. More specifically, they threaten to expose

41 Thanks to Kelly Oliver for this point.
the fact that there is no such thing as purely rational knowledge divorced from irrational, embodied, animal forces. They threaten to expose the fact that embodiment and irrationality are embedded in all supposedly pure rational knowledge - that “the irrational side of the human mind…forms the backcloth to our rationality” (Richmond 2000, 68). For disembodied, humanist norms of reason, to acknowledge reason’s embodiment, reason’s irrationality, is therefore to acknowledge too much, for embodied conceptions of rationality “utterly chang[e] our relation to other animals and…our conception of human beings as uniquely rational” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 4).

To better grasp the nature of the threat posed here, recall Kristeva’s distinction between the semiotic and symbolic realms. For Kristeva, despite efforts to imagine that the symbolic realm is free from semiotic forces (the realm of drives), the symbolic world of representation (including propositional knowledge) instead always bears semiotic traces. In fact, for Kristeva, the symbolic element only achieves referential meaning in the first place because of the drive to represent, because of the “bodily need to communicate,” that originally motivates signification in the symbolic realm (Oliver 2002, xv). The semiotic thus remains an integral part of the symbolic element. Yet although both are necessary for meaningful communication, the semiotic is constantly disavowed in line with processes of abjection. The symbolic function tries to forget its origins in the space of the irrational, bodily element, but the semiotic threatens with the constant reminder that all signification - and importantly all knowledge - has an irrational, bodily element. In so doing, the semiotic “disturbs [the] identity, system, order” of pure rational knowledge (Kristeva 1982, 4). And this is what the missing women’s contestation from the space of irrational, bodily knowledge is ultimately about – posing a threat to symbolic
rational knowledge that refuses to accept the semiotic elements that contaminate its claim to a clean binary between reason and unreason.

Kristeva’s analysis sheds further light on the primary way the missing women protestors were able to get their voices heard, namely through music. From a place of expulsion outside the courthouse, the missing women protestors beat drums and sang prayers loudly in an attempt to be heard beyond the courtroom’s closed doors (Collard 2013, 135). Since “semiotic functioning exists in vocalic, gestural or kinetic differences,” music’s rhythms, tones and movements recall the disavowed semiotic dimension to all representation (Beardsworth in Chanter and Ziarek 2005, 7). Despite efforts to refuse the women’s challenge from the disavowed semiotic realm, then, they made themselves heard through precisely that which is rejected from the symbolic element of all representation – the semiotic rhythms, tones, and sounds behind all reference. Through their music, the women thus posed a further threat to the signifying function of the Law. “The[ir] speaking [singing?] bodies…articulat[ed] the pain of living in worlds where symbols have been detached from affect, where the meaning of words has been detached from the meaning of life, from what matters” (Oliver 2002, xxiii).

I will now discuss how understanding the women’s testimonial injustices and epistemic exclusions in terms of epistemic abjection puts pressure on Fricker’s description of the wrong of epistemic injustice as a wrong to rational humans. In my view, locating the wrong here is misguided for at least three reasons: 1) it fails to acknowledge the fact that one does not have to be rational to know; 2) in excluding the “irrational animal” from the position of the knower, it risks repeating forms of epistemic exclusion associated with Enlightenment conceptions of rational knowledge, and,
relatedly; 3) it perpetuates epistemic abjection (the process whereby animals and
“irrational” humans come to absorb the negative traits of the rational knower).

3. Fricker’s Rational Knowers

According to Fricker, to be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is a wrong insofar as it
insults one’s rational humanity. I quote Fricker at length:

In all such injustices, “the subject is undermined in their capacity as a knower, and so as a rational being. The insult goes deep. If we accept that our rationality is part of the essence of human being’s distinctive value, then to be perceived and treated as lesser in one’s capacity as a knower is to be perceived and treated as a lesser human being” (2012, 294).

Elsewhere, she says: “We are long familiar with the idea, played out by the history of philosophy in many variations, that our rationality is what lends humanity its distinctive value. No wonder, then, that being insulted, undermined, or otherwise wronged in one’s capacity as a giver of knowledge is something that can cut deep…. for it provides a direct route to undermining [someone] in their very humanity” (2007, 44).

We learn a few things from these passages. First, when you are wronged in testimonial
injustice, you are wronged in your capacity for knowledge. Furthermore, the capacity for
knowledge is inextricably tied to your rational capacity. Finally, this capacity, à la Kant, is the distinctive capacity that gives value to humanity. For Fricker, then, knowledge, rationality and humanity are inextricably linked; testimonial injustice undermines “a dimension of a person’s rationality, where that rational capacity is conceived as essential to human value” (2007, 44). With this understanding of the epistemic wrong in place, Fricker’s account can provide a ready solution: one must develop epistemic virtues that enable one to see knowers as the rational humans they are.
But it bears asking: why does Fricker link epistemic injustice to rationality? Why can’t one be wronged as a knower *simpliciter*? This is not to suggest that some forms of knowledge do not arise from the use of human reason, but importantly that not *all* forms of knowledge do. Tying knowledge to rational humanity is dangerous for a view of epistemic injustice, then, not only because there are forms of knowledge not linked to rationality, but also because not only humans are knowers. Moreover, I want to suggest that tying knowledge to rational humanity is risky given the way oppressive norms of rational humanity have been wielded throughout history to discount subjugated groups from the realm of epistemic agency.

Part of the problem in discerning Fricker’s apparently necessary link between rationality and knowledge is that she does not expand on exactly what she means by rationality. At times, she refers to what she calls the “cognitive counterpart” to Kant’s conception of practical rationality, which would involve the ability to set ends according to the dictates of reason, reason being the source of human value (2007, 136). At other times, she seems to understand rationality as “sensitivity to the balance of reasons for and against acceptance” (more on this in chapter two) (69). Fricker’s account thus seems

\[\text{Fricker would likely respond that testimonial injustice names a wrong done to one as a “giver of knowledge,” not as a knower per se. It is one’s capacity to give knowledge that is uniquely rational and human. (In my next chapter I will also challenge the idea that the ability to give knowledge requires rationality). However, her text enacts a slippage between wrongs done to “givers of knowledge” and wrongs done to “subjects of knowledge.” Consider the following passages: “In testimonial injustice, one person undermines another’s status as a subject of knowledge” (2007, 136, my emphasis), “The form that this intrinsic injustice takes specifically in cases of testimonial injustice is that the subject is wronged in her capacity as a giver of knowledge. The capacity to give knowledge to others is one side of that many-sided capacity so significant in human beings: namely, the capacity for reason” (44, my emphasis). Moreover, even when she describes injustice to epistemic subjects alone, she still ties the injustice to rationality and humanity: “Any epistemic injustice wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge, and thus in a capacity essential to human value” (5, my emphasis); “Knowledge and other rational input they have to offer are missed by others and sometimes literally lost by the subjects themselves; and they suffer a sustained assault in respect of a defining human capacity, an essential attribute of personhood” (59, my emphasis).}\]
to invite two plausible readings of rationality. I argue that on either reading, Fricker’s account remains overly restrictive for a view of epistemic injustice. On the first, Kantian reading, it is overly restrictive to suggest that one can only be a reliable knower if one can set ends according to the dictates of reason. And on the second, reason-responsivity reading, it is overly restrictive to suggest that one can only be a reliable knower if one’s beliefs are responsive to reasons.

**Kantian Rationality**

First, I will consider the Kantian reading of Fricker’s use of the term rationality. Fricker explains that the wrong of testimonial injustice relates to “Kant’s practical rationality conception of what constitutes immoral treatment of another person—treating them in a way that denies or undermines their status as a rational agent” (2007, 136). For Kant, immoral treatment involves denying someone’s status as a rational agent (Ibid.). She cites the racist’s remark in *To Kill a Mockingbird* that it was “typical” for a black man like Robinson to “have no plan, no thought for the future, just run blind first chance he saw,” thus insulting his practical reason (137). And although the insult in testimonial injustice is not the exact same as the insult to one’s practical reason, according to Fricker, both are “instance[s] of the undermining of a dimension of a person’s rationality” (136). For her, the two types of wrong are distinct yet closely related (Ibid.). In both Kant’s view of immorality and Fricker’s view of testimonial injustice, then, the “violation involved i[s] treating [someone] as if they were not (or not fully) a rational being, practically or cognitively conceived” (44).

However, if the insult to one’s practical reason and one’s status as a knower are
distinct, then what exactly is the relationship between rationality and knowledge? Put otherwise, what exactly is the “cognitive counterpart” to Kant’s practical rationality conception that conditions one’s capacity as a knower? It is a problem that Fricker does not elaborate on her precise meaning of rationality, because she runs the risk of reinstating the problematic assumption that one’s practical reason (ability to set ends according to reason) is tightly tied to one’s capacity for knowledge.

This point has important implications for the missing women. Let us imagine that some of the women could rightfully be said to “have no plan, no thought for the future,” practically conceived. In other words, we can imagine a drug addict who is a total failure in the Kantian sense, insofar as they don’t “devise means to arbitrary ends” nor “unite their ends into a comprehensive whole” (Wood 1998, 191). But my question is: What is at stake for the women’s testimony if they failed to set ends for themselves according to reason? Why exactly would this impugn their credibility? Accounts of knowledge that are too closely tied to practical rationality (or its cognitive counterpart) perpetuate the false idea that drug addicts cannot know things, such as the fact that one of them was attacked. Indeed, Anderson did not gain knowledge of her attack by employing her practical reason. Hers was a phenomenological sort of knowledge – the kind of bodily knowledge that Kristeva’s semiotic evokes. Accordingly, it is potentially harmful to tie one’s capacity as a knower to the ideals associated with the capacity for Kantian practical reason, not only because many of us fall short of such ideals in a moral sense, but mainly because they do not always seem relevant for whether one can actually have knowledge.

However, there is a further reason why it is dangerous to tie knowledge to rational humanity. The reason is that it does nothing to disrupt the logic according to which both
animal and human knowers are jettisoned from the realm of rational humanity in line with their oppression. In this sense, I worry that Fricker’s emphasis on rational humanity unwittingly plays into problematic efforts to retrieve the missing women’s humanity as a way to rectify the wrongs that were done to them. For if the women were pitted as inhuman, irrational, and deviant in life, then attempts to retrieve their humanity in death do nothing to disrupt the exclusionary logic that relegates epistemic abjects to the realm of irrationality and props epistemic agents up to the realm of rational humanity.

Consider, for instance, several memorial efforts that emphasized the women’s “acceptable” human traits. Laurie McNeill explains that missing women mourners had to create memorials heavily circumscribed by society’s expectations of who counts as a mournable subject, which I am suggesting includes norms of rational humanity (2008, 387-8). McNeill states, “In creating memorials…the Missing-Women mourners needed both to conform to generic expectations—what one can and should say in a memorial and how it should be said—and to resist social expectations about their loved ones” (Ibid). Instead of acknowledging these women’s social status as “‘junkies,’ ‘hookers,’ ‘the homeless’—categories of people who become the ‘abject dead,’” mourners were instead encouraged to highlight the women’s “normalcy and…domesticity” (Ibid). The following are two of McNeill’s examples of families’ efforts to render the women mournable:

Janet Henry’s family writes, “Janet was a caring individual who loved her family especially her daughter Debra... Janet enjoyed the outdoors and adored animals. Her favourite music artist was country western singer Vince Gill. She loved Chinese food and her hobby was embroidering cushions” (388).

Elaine has a family that loves her dearly. We came from a wonderful, loving, supportive family, with five girls and one boy. We were never abused or neglected, my parents loved each of us unconditionally. We traveled together, ate meals together, went to church together—we were all very close. Elaine did not
come from a broken home, my parents are still happily married and will be celebrating their 45th wedding anniversary this June (Ibid.)

McNeill claims that such eulogies reveal a concerted effort on the part of the missing women’s families to render their loved ones socially acceptable human victims. As she puts it, the “image of a close-knit, church-going, loving family acknowledges and resists popular expectations that people who end up dead on the Downtown Eastside must have come from broken and/or abusive homes…” (389). Missing Women Commissioner Wally Oppal repeats a similar gesture when he states “If there’s one thing this inquiry can do, it can show the community out there that the women who were on the Downtown Eastside who died tragically were real human beings. They were mothers, they were daughters, they were aunts, they had people who loved them.”

Although these quotes do not highlight an attempt to restore the women to a place of rational humanity exactly, I think we can read them in line with efforts to retain a realm of rational, civil, minded humanity over and against a realm of irrational, abject animality. Similar to efforts to instate the women’s rational humanity as a necessary condition for knowledge, such passages reify the very standards that represent women lacking so-called “normal” lives and careers as non-mournable in the first place. The implicit assumption at work here is that to gain a place in cultural memory, the women must first be purified of their less “respectable” features. They must be made mournable, meaning they previously lacked mournable features – including rationality and civility.

Such gestures thus reinforce the dominant societal view that women must first fit a mold of mournable humanity in order to count – a mold I have been suggesting codes as mournable rational humanity. In this way, many missing women mourners (and

possibly Fricker’s own account) risk conforming to the ideals likely responsible for their loved ones’ disavowal by the Canadian criminal justice system. In other words, there is nothing about the way missing women are being represented here that undercuts the problematic assumption that lives worth mourning could include the lives of non-rational knowers.

Fricker would likely suggest I am conflating an authoritative with an authoritarian conception of human reason (2006, 157). Elsewhere Fricker draws this distinction in response to what she calls the “postmodern rational malaise” (Ibid., 152). Here Fricker is critical of a feminist postmodern critique of reason that, according to her, is more faithful to “political inclusiveness rather than to empirical accuracy” (Ibid., 38). But this is an unmotivated critique, because feminist postmodernism is committed both to political inclusiveness and empirical accuracy. Fricker’s emphasis on the ties between rational humanity and knowledge is a case in point, and my argument throughout this section has been that it is precisely because it is empirically inaccurate to think all knowledge bottoms out in rational human knowledge that we are then faced with a problem of political inclusion.

Reason-Responsivity

But perhaps, in the end, Fricker does not intend her use of rationality in the sense of Kantian rationality. This brings me to the second reading of her use of rationality. On this reading, rationality has nothing to do with the capacity to set ends according to reason. Rather, elsewhere she appears to endorse a view of rationality that simply requires one to be “responsive to the rational force of surrounding reasons” (2007, 67). This means that
one must remain sensitive to the different reasons one has or not to accept a claim or belief as knowledge.

Yet on this reading it again remains unclear why this sort of rationality would be necessary for knowledge. It is true that on some views of knowledge, for instance, internalist views, the capacity for rationality is required for knowledge. This is because internalism demands access to one’s reasons for thinking one’s belief is true. A straightforward implication of this view, then, is that rationality and knowledge are tightly linked, in the sense that if pressed, one would have to be able to tell a story about the reasons for one’s beliefs.44 But this is a more stringent view of knowledge than Fricker cares to align herself with. In a reply to her critics, Fricker says she offers her account as an “alternative to internalism” (2010, 171). Her account accordingly invites a much wider, externalist conception of knowledge (where externalism is the denial of internalism).45 And on an externalist account of knowledge, one does not have to have access to the reasons one relied on to arrive at true belief.46

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44To illustrate, consider Laurence Bonjour’s example of Norman the psychic. On some subjects, Norman is an entirely reliable psychic. Yet he has no reasons or evidence to believe he has such a power nor that such a power is even possible. As happens often, one day Norman (accurately) comes to believe the President is in New York City. Although he has no reasons for his belief, the belief is true, as is always the case for Norman when he relies on his psychic powers, which have always proven reliable. The question is: Does Norman truly know the President is in New York City? For an internalist, the answer would be no; Norman does not truly know that the President is in New York City. Because, if pressed, Norman has no accessible reasons to believe the President is in New York, “nor is he aware of any possible way he could come to have a true belief on the topic, given everything of which he is aware” (1985, 41). Put otherwise, he has no access to the process by which he arrived at his belief, nor how his reasons operated to justify his belief.

45That being said, as a virtue epistemologist, Fricker favors an agent-based to a belief-based account of knowledge, thus sidestepping much of the internalism/externalism debate that troubles theorists of justification (Battaly 2008, 639). Still, as I discuss in the next chapter, several features of her account can plausibly be understood along externalist lines.

46Consider chicken sexers. Chicken sexers are people who are remarkably skilled at reliably sorting male from female chickens. Yet if one asks the chicken sexers how they know which chicken is male or female, they will respond that they have no idea how they know, and cannot offer any reasons for their true beliefs (in Pritchard 2005, 188). For the externalist, the chicken sexers would have knowledge, even though they lack awareness of how they arrived at their true belief. They have knowledge, even though they have no access to reasons.
Since I will elaborate on this point in my next chapter, I will briefly gesture toward its implications not only for humans who are deemed irrational, but for beings, who (as far as we know) do not possess the capacity for rational thought at all, namely many animals. I will take pigs as my example, since part of the overall point of expanding the category of knowers is to ensure we properly theorize epistemic justice for those who often fall out of the realm of moral consideration (and the pigs killed on Pickton’s farm are rarely, if ever, acknowledged as victims of injustice). Yet pigs are complex animals, who, rational or not, have, like many other animals, been reasonably said to possess knowledge. In a study on pairs of pigs, for example, one pig was shown the location of a food source, and the other pig remained uninformed. The research question was: Would the uninformed pig continue to search for the food source at random, or use the knowledge of the other pig to lead them to the food? The finding was that uninformed pigs abandoned searching for food themselves and learned to follow their informed partners to the baited bucket (Held et al. 2000, 570). The authors therefore accorded not only knowledge, but what they called “knowledge exploitation” to the pigs—namely “the ability to use to [their] own advantage the pertinent information held by another group member” (Ibid.).

Is there any compelling reason to deny animals knowledge in this story? Perhaps. But I think the better path for an account of epistemic injustice is to err on the side of caution when it comes to the question of who qualifies as a knower, and who could thus be epistemically harmed. If externalism is a plausible view, then we should not opt for a more restrictive view of knowledge when it comes to epistemic injustice. On an externalist view, many more candidates for knowledge enter the picture, including those
individuals who may lack the capacity for rationality, yet are still able to know things, including the pigs in this example.

From the standpoint of Fricker’s own project of theorizing epistemic injustice, then, I think it is crucial to keep open the possibility that animals too can be epistemically harmed. In fact, Fricker’s explicit goal is to identify and overcome those injustices that tend to go unnoticed. As she says, we must hone our “capacity for attention – the ability to see through prejudice” (2012, 296). Yet although the rest of her sentence is “to see through prejudice to real human individuals,” I think we should cut it off earlier. For prejudice and injustice – of the moral and epistemic kind – need not occur only to human beings. To assume that it does – that animals cannot know things, or be testimonially harmed – is to miss another prejudice that breeds potential injustice. It is a prejudice that assumes the all too quick denunciation of an entire group of individuals on the basis of an arbitrary and inconsistent generalization. Indeed, to speak only of humans as potential knowers is to cast off an incredibly wide group of other species, some of whom not only seem to know, but who are clearly rational, even in the Kantian sense. As Derrida writes, “confined within this catch-all concept [of the animal], within this vast encampment of the animal, in this general singular…are all the living things that man does not recognize as his fellows, his neighbors, or his brothers. And that is so in spite of the infinite space that separates the lizard from the dog, the protozoon from the dolphin, the shark from the lamb, the parrot from the chimpanzee….” (2008, 34). In the interest of epistemic justice, then, I think we would do well to exercise caution here, and keep the category of knowers and those who could be testimonially harmed as wide as possible.
CHAPTER II

EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AGAINST ANIMALS

In this chapter, I take seriously Fricker’s call to hone our “capacity for attention - the ability to see through prejudice” (2012, 296). Although Fricker is acutely aware of how prejudice works to unjustly discount knowers, her own account requires expansion if it is to capture further mutations of epistemic injustice. Specifically, by limiting the scope of who can be wronged as a knower to humans, Fricker cuts off the possibility of doing epistemic injustice to animals (2007, 5). To ensure that we do not leave animals out of the epistemic picture, then, I argue for an expansion of Fricker’s account to include animal knowers.

I proceed in four main sections. First, I draw from the work of Hilary Kornblith to provide the argument for animal knowledge. Kornblith reveals drawbacks to the two dominant efforts to deny animals knowledge: 1) the argument that knowledge demands access to one’s reasons for belief (epistemic internalism) and, 2) the argument that knowledge requires the capacity for language or the ability to exchange reasons (social practice accounts). In my view, Kornblith provides convincing reasons to favor an externalist versus internalist account of knowledge. And this account allows for both human and animal knowledge.

Second, I turn to Fricker. Pace Fricker’s claim that knowers are wronged “qua humans,” I tentatively suggest that with some tweaking, her own account of the advent of

47Fricker writes, “any epistemic injustice wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge, and thus in a capacity essential to human value” (2007, 5).
human knowledge (inspired by Edward Craig) could potentially accommodate animal knowers (2007, 44). According to Craig’s genealogical account, knowledge develops out of the more fundamental need for good informants. Craig explains that primeval humans require good informants to satisfy their basic epistemic needs, i.e. they require individuals who can tell them if a predator is nearby, where a food source is, etc. Over time, the concept of the good informant crystallizes into our concept of knowledge. However, I will argue that the need for good informants is not a uniquely human phenomenon. Animals also rely on each other to convey information, and could have plausibly developed knowledge along similar lines.48

Third, I theorize epistemic injustice to animals. I begin with a discussion of the epistemic injustice I call epistemic exemption. Epistemic exemption names the unjust exemption of a group of knowers from the epistemic community. This is an injustice routinely committed against animal knowers – indeed, a common defense of speciesist practice maintains that because animals do not know what is happening to them, their treatment is justified.49 Since epistemic exemption resonates with Fricker’s account of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, I will try to clarify the wrong of epistemic exemption by placing it in dialogue with Fricker’s related concepts.

Finally, in conversation with both Fricker’s and José Medina’s accounts of silencing, I discuss how epistemic exemption is a breeding ground for testimonial injustice. When animals are assumed incapable of knowledge, their efforts to tell humans...

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48 Note here that my argument for animal knowledge does not hinge on proving that Fricker’s account can accommodate animals’ epistemic agency. To the contrary, I think both Fricker and Craig likely overstate the case for the idea that knowledge develops out of the need for good informants. Still, I think it is worth considering whether Fricker’s own account can accommodate animal knowledge.

49 Let me make it clear at the outset that I am not endorsing an appeal to animal knowledge as a legitimate marker of animals’ moral status. I agree with the dominant consensus in animal ethics that the relevant marker for moral status is not rationality or knowledge, but rather the capacity (or, what Kelly Oliver notes is more appropriately considered the incapacity to suffer (or inability to avoid suffering) (2009, 312).
what they know are thwarted. I end by offering some suggestions for a reconceptualization of human-animal communication that can pave the way toward better communicative and epistemic relations with animals.

1. A Defense of Animal Knowledge

In the absence of knowledge attribution to animals, it turns out we cannot make sense of a great deal of animal behavior. Unlike plants, whose behavior we can account for in terms of lower-order explanation, animal behavior resists such efforts. Consider the way animals move about in their environments: “Birds build nests which they leave for feeding but to which they later return; bees leave the hive only to return; beavers leave their lodges and later return” (Kornblith 2002, 34). According to Kornblith, a purely mechanistic explanation about the movement of body parts is inadequate to capture the complexity of such behavior (34). Rather, only an account of belief-desire psychology can provide the requisite explanation. Here is Kornblith:

The elaborate behavior of ravens in distracting a hawk so as to steal her egg is not a simple response triggered by some environmental condition. While the behavior is straightforwardly explained by appealing to beliefs and desires, no one has ever offered an explanation of such complex behaviors in terms that obviate the need for representational states. Nor is the case of stealing the egg an unusual one in the animal behavior literature. What we see is a wide range of animal behavior, in a wide range of different species, that has straightforward explanations in terms of beliefs and desires, and no competing alternative explanations. In circumstances such as these, a reluctance to endorse the available explanatory scheme does not

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50That being said, plants are known to communicate information to one another (Falik et al., 2011), thus sparking increasing interest in the field of plant ethics (see Marder 2013). However, there remains a difference between plant behavior, which can be accounted for in terms of stimulus-response explanations, and much animal behavior, which cannot. Of course, there are some animals whose behavior can also be accounted for in terms of stimulus-response connections (e.g. frogs who will repeatedly suck up a piece of birdshot as if it were a fly, and not learn from their past experience) (Kornblith 2012, 50-1). In contrast to the frog and other “mechanical devices, plants, and such animals as paramecia,” however, consider the piping plover, who will pretend it has a broken wing when a predator approaches (Ibid., 51). This behavior cannot be purely stimulus-bound because it adjusts based on the individual approaching it. Many more animal behaviors evade stimulus-response explanation in this way.
seem cautious; rather, it seems unmotivated (42).

For Kornblith, references to animals who “know” are not mere anthropomorphic projections; rather, animal knowledge exists (28). Indeed, many cognitive ethologists now recognize not only that animals know things, but that many animals engage in complex cognitive endeavors. But despite a wealth of evidence for animal knowledge, many remain skeptical. Kornblith takes on two main objections to animal knowledge: 1) the idea that animals lack the capacity for reflective access to their reasons for belief, which is required for knowledge (epistemic internalism) and 2) the idea that animals lack the requisite social practices necessary for knowledge, i.e. language or the exchange of reasons (social practice accounts). I will take each in turn, pulling from Kornblith throughout to discuss their drawbacks.

The Pitfalls of Epistemic Internalism

Recall that the difference between internalism and externalism hinges on access to justification for one’s beliefs. Lex Newman provides a succinct description: “a theory of epistemic justification is internalist insofar as it requires that the justifying factors are accessible to the knower’s conscious awareness; it is externalist insofar as it does not

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Sara Waller further argues: “On the one hand, as cognitive ethologists and comparative psychologists, we are intrigued by the potential to discover exactly what types of inferences nonhuman animals make. On the other hand, we make every attempt to stay away from anthropomorphisms such as attributing “thought” or “deduction” to nonhuman animals. We can’t have it both ways. If animals make inferences, then they participate in some form of thought, even though we suspect that they do not think in sentences or make word-based deductions” (2012, 202).

I do not mean to suggest that Kornblith provides a definitive rejection of internalism. Scholars have discussed drawbacks to both views, and entire books have been devoted to dismantling internalism. Therefore, my argument in this chapter will likely be more persuasive to those who already have externalist leanings. Still, in pointing to the problems with internalism, I hope to provide some reasons in favor of externalism.
impose this requirement” (2010). Conscious awareness here denotes processes like introspection and reflection.

Descartes is perhaps the prototypical epistemic internalist. So skeptical about his ability to know anything with confidence, Descartes razes the epistemic ground out beneath him. What can he know for certain? Can he know he is sitting in front of the fire in his nightgown, or might he be dreaming? After entertaining a series of thoughts about evil deceivers and the like, Descartes ends his first Meditation with the bleak conclusion that he may know nothing with certainty after all. Importantly for Descartes’ internalism, “all of this is revealed by way of introspection or reflection” (Kornblith 2002, 107). Similarly, Descartes’ process of rebuilding his belief also involves a robust introspective process. Descartes assents to belief by looking inwards and confirming that his ideas are “clear and distinct” (Ibid.). Only with this introspective assurance-process in place is Descartes able to “lay down, as a general rule, that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true” (Descartes 1996, 24). Kornblith wryly remarks, “Any agent who seeks to arrive at all of his beliefs in this way will have very few beliefs” (108).

Although nearly no one demands certainty for knowledge anymore, there are important contemporary proponents of epistemic internalism in its two main guises: coherentism and foundationalism. Kornblith takes Laurence Bonjour and Roderick

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54 Part of Descartes’ problem is that he posited certainty as a necessary condition for knowledge, a view nearly no one holds anymore (Kornblith 2002, 17). As Kornblith explains, Descartes’ thinking was a product of his time; he thought certainty was necessary to establish anything “firm and lasting” in the sciences (17). Yet, as Kornblith elaborates, “in ways Descartes could never have anticipated, the sciences have gone on to achieve levels of ever-increasing explanatory and predictive success coupled with technological applications crucially dependent upon the approximate truth of their theoretical claims” (17).

55 According to Descartes, “[K]nowledge is conviction based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason.” That is “a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty” (1996, 104).
Chisholm as his respective interlocutors.

Briefly, although Chisholm and Bonjour both loosen the Cartesian grips on knowledge *qua* infallible justification, they both still consider access to one’s reasons for belief necessary for knowledge. For Bonjour, introspection is less about foundations and more about coherence. Bonjour’s conception of knowledge requires that we check whether our beliefs cohere with our other beliefs such that a given proposition is not inconsistent with our other propositions (Kornblith 2002, 110). If a belief fails to cohere with one’s deeply held set of beliefs, we should reject it (110). For Chisholm’s foundationalist conception of knowledge, however, knowledge requires that belief be grounded on a stable foundation of evidence that I must be able to invoke for justification. Although Chisholm does not begin by razing the foundation of beliefs out from under him, like Descartes, he also requires that we subject our beliefs to introspective scrutiny to discover whether they rely on a solid foundation. For Chisholm, only once I dig through the layers of my belief to arrive at a foundational “proposition that is directly evident” do I have justified true belief, and hence knowledge (109).

Kornblith sees pitfalls to both views. In my estimation, and with positive upshots for animal knowledge, Kornblith provides convincing reasons to favor externalism, which is more consonant with the way we already speak about knowledge. He shows not only that introspection can fail to reveal the reasons for belief, but that introspection often further misleads us to think our beliefs are justified. Contra Bonjour and Chisholm then, introspection turns out to be a very weak guarantor of knowledge indeed.

Kornblith describes a number of studies on cognitive bias and faulty assessment

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As Kornblith writes, for Chisholm, “If I want to know whether my belief that \( p \) is justified, I must ask myself, ‘What justification do I have for counting this as something that is evident?’ or ‘What justification do I have for thinking that this is true?’” (2002, 109, my emphasis).
to reveal the frailty of introspection. He claims that, contrary to revealing the reasons for belief, introspection instead sends us further down the rabbit hole of false confidence. Kornblith describes a study on the anchoring effect - the tendency to base one’s judgments too heavily on an initial bit of information provided (an “anchor”). The study asked subjects to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United Nations. A wheel of fortune was spun in the subject’s presence that landed on a number between 0 and 100. Subjects were then asked to indicate whether their estimate was higher or lower than the randomly landed number, and to estimate further percentages in relation to that number. In the end, the numbers were shown to significantly affect subjects’ estimates: “For example, the median estimates of the percentage of African countries in the United Nations were 25 and 45 for groups that received 10 and 65, respectively, as starting points” (Tversky and Kahneman 1982, 14).

As Kornblith notes, not only were the subjects entirely oblivious to the influence of the roulette wheel, but it is strange to think introspection could reveal its influence to them (2002, 113-4). After all, cognitive biases are not transparent. To the contrary, far from uncovering the reasons for belief, further introspection tends to invite the illusion that our beliefs are based entirely on the reasons we imagine. When 93% of Americans rate themselves as better than average drivers, for instance, introspective assessment of their belief will likely only spur a list of “facts” in support of their superior driving skills (e.g. impressive parallel parking and texting-while-driving abilities). Introspection will not lead them to conclude their beliefs are a result of the widespread cognitive bias known as illusory superiority. As Kornblith remarks, “Far from helping in the process of self-correction, introspection here merely results in a more confident, though no less
misguided, agent” (112).

Given the “wealth of implicit or tactic nonpropositional knowledge carried in the body,” as Linda Alcoff puts it, introspection is thus an unlikely candidate for revealing the true reasons for one’s beliefs (Alcoff 2006, 104). Indeed, entire fields are devoted to exposing just how feeble the ability to gain access to the reasons for belief truly is. In addition to cognitive bias studies and the like, psychoanalysis’ pioneering contribution here is the notion of the unconscious. As Kelly Oliver writes, “Once psychoanalysis enters the scene, the distinction between truth and deception becomes mired in the murky mess of the unconscious. Insofar as unconscious forces drive us beyond our control and even beyond our knowledge, we all are, and always have been, a bunch of liars” (2009, 175). With unconscious reasons operating in the background, psychoanalysis reveals that perhaps the real “internalist” fear is that Descartes’ evil deceiver lurks within.

Unconscious processes therefore pose a challenge to the internalist hope for transparency. Try as we might to unearth our reasons for belief, in the end even the most reflective among us will be no “less susceptible to…illusion” (Kornblith 2002, 112). Not only does introspection fail to reveal to epistemic agents the reasons for their beliefs, but it can cause more confusion (115). The introspection requirement for knowledge thus provides at least a presumptive argument against internalism.

Perhaps, however, none of this shows that knowledge does not require introspection; instead, it only shows how difficult it is to achieve knowledge. Maybe so,

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57 Alcoff cites Mark Johnson and George Lakoff’s work on cognition, which they take to reveal the need for a “radically different view of what reason is,” namely one that acknowledges that “our bodies, brains, and interactions with our environment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics…” (in Alcoff 2006, 104). Alcoff’s attention to unconscious processes and cognitive bias studies also informs her critique of Fricker’s virtue approach. As she writes, “developing a virtue approach that operates in the volitional, conscious sphere will only be able to provide a very partial antidote to testimonial injustice” (in Fricker 2010, 166). Rae Langton (2010) and José Medina (2013) have forwarded similar critiques.
but the difficulty is so pronounced that it seems to empty us of all knowledge entirely (Kornblith 2002, 122). To see this, notice that on Bonjour’s coherentist account, unless the belief in question coheres with my entire system of beliefs, it cannot be justified (124). This means that even if I could call up a subset of my beliefs, and diagnose its coherence with the belief in question, the fact that I entertained a mere subset means my belief would still be unjustified (124). Kornblith remarks that this requirement is not only difficult, it is impossible (129). As he says, “Grasping one’s total body of beliefs is something that simply cannot be done. And if it is nevertheless insisted that it is a requirement for knowledge, then knowledge is something that no one ever has” (124). Moreover, Kornblith notes that even if one were able to grasp the entirety of one’s beliefs, it would still remain difficult (impossible?) for an agent to assess their coherence (124). How am I able not only to summon my system of beliefs, but then magisterially assess whether they are consistent with one another? Am I truly able to assess the logical relations among all my beliefs in this manner (128)? Not only are humans incapable of such feats, so are complex computational systems (129).58

Bonjour’s coherentist version of epistemic internalism is thus overly strict; on this view, no actual epistemic agent can have knowledge.59 But what about foundationalist theories? Do they fare any better? Although at first glance foundationalism does not seem to impose as thoroughgoing a requirement for justification as coherentism (i.e. it does not require access to all of one’s beliefs), Kornblith shows that foundationalism’s

58Kornblith concludes, “The objective difficulty of determining coherence is simply undeniable” (2002, 128).
59Perhaps Bonjour would simply concede that no one really has knowledge after all, or minimally, that very few people do. But this only renders the argument more dubious. Kornblith asks, “…why should we be willing to endorse the conclusion to which this inevitably leads, that the distinction we ordinarily draw, and which does so much work for us, between those who know something and those who do not, is entirely misguided, since no one ever knows anything at all” (2002, 132)?
requirement for access to the “totality of [an] agent’s evidence” is just as stringent (134).

Not unlike the totality of my beliefs, to what degree is my total amount of evidence readily accessible to me? In this way, Kornblith notes that foundationalism too involves coherence; it simply replaces coherence among all of one’s beliefs with coherence among all of one’s relevant propositions. Like coherentists, then, “foundationalists…make requirements on justification that make a reflective grasp of the justificatory ground of a proposition fundamentally out of reach” (134).

With this, Kornblith provides a probable argument against epistemic internalism. Not only does epistemic internalism’s stringent requirement for justification close off the possibility for animal knowledge, but it results in “a conception of knowledge that even humans cannot come close to meeting” (2002, 135). Kornblith’s critique of internalism thus opens the way for animal knowledge. On an externalist account, one does not need access to reasons for one’s belief. Instead, one’s true belief can find justification in a source external to oneself, such as a reliable belief-forming process. And reliable belief-forming processes are not outside the scope of animal knowledge. To take an example, Kornblith discusses pigeons’ ability to discriminate between reliable and unreliable indicators of food (83). He notes that even though pigeons may not internally reflect on the mechanisms by which they arrive at true beliefs about reliable and unreliable food sources, their ability to discriminate is sufficient to establish that they know (83). And

Fred Dretske writes, “Those who think knowledge requires something other than, or at least more than, reliably produced true belief, something (usually) in the way of justification for the belief that one's reliably produced beliefs are being reliably produced, have, it seems to me, an obligation to say what benefits this justification is supposed to confer…. Who needs it, and why? If an animal inherits a perfectly reliable belief-generating mechanism, and it also inherits a disposition, everything being equal, to act on the basis of the beliefs so generated, what additional benefits are conferred by a justification that the beliefs are being produced in some reliable way? If there are no additional benefits, what good is this justification? Why should we insist that no one can have knowledge without it” (Dretske 1981, p. 95).
when animals form beliefs according to reliable processes in this way, on an externalist account of knowledge, it is no different in kind from what humans do. Fred Dretske nicely captures the point:

Cats can see. Dogs know things. Fido remembers where he buried his bone. That is why he is digging near the bush. Kitty knows where the mouse ran. That is why she waits patiently in front of the hole…Think about Kitty as she stalks a bird or pursues a mouse. And this, whatever it is, is exactly what we’ve got when we know that the universe is over ten billion years old and that water is the ash of hydrogen. It is true that in its grander manifestations (in science, for example) knowledge may appear to be totally beyond Fido’s and Kitty’s modest capacities, but this is simply a confusion of what is known (recondite and well beyond their grasp) with knowledge itself - something they have (albeit about more humble topics) in great profusion (2000, 80).61

Language and The Exchange of Reasons

Two other attempts to reject the idea that animals have knowledge are worth briefly considering. These views argue that particular social practices are required for knowledge, and that these practices are restricted to humans. Kornblith discusses Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom’s versions of this view. Davidson believes that the social practice of language is necessary for belief (and hence knowledge). And Brandom believes that the ability to exchange reasons for one’s beliefs is the requisite capacity. On both accounts, not only animals, but even children and some adults are excluded from the realm of knowledge (Kornblith 2002, 70). I take each in turn.

The view that animals cannot know because they cannot speak has had many proponents. Aristotle and Descartes, among others, both posited a tight link between language, reason and knowledge - a link that watered the ground of human knowledge.

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61 As Dretske notes, this is not to suggest that animals have the exact same knowledge as humans, or to claim that animal and human cognition are identical. Of course, different animal species, different animals and different humans have widely varying cognitive lives. My main point is rather that we have very good reasons (both epistemic and moral) to think animals have knowledge, even if it is not the exact same kind as human knowledge.
exceptionalism. Descartes famously thought that animals were mere automata, incapable of language, reason, thought or consciousness. For Descartes, animals possessed neither “rational soul[s]” nor the ability to “put together other signs, as we do in order to declare our thoughts to others” (Descartes 1985, 140). Here, logos’ twinned denotation of reason and language implies the impossibility of animal thought (let alone knowledge). This leads Derrida to observe that “philosophical ‘logocentrism’…is in the first instance a thesis regarding the animal, the animal deprived of the logos, deprived of the can-have-the-logos: this is the thesis, position or presupposition maintained from Aristotle to Heidegger, from Descartes to Kant, Levinas and Lacan” (in Derrida 2008, x).⁶²

On the contemporary stage, Donald Davidson most famously defends the idea that animals require the capacity for language to have belief. According to Davidson, only linguistic beings have thoughts (Kornblith 2002, 83). So although it might be tempting to “credit the dog with the belief that the squirrel is in that tree,” for Davidson, such tendencies are nothing more than anthropomorphic projections (Ibid., 84). This is because the inter-translatability of all language proves there is only one conceptual scheme (one common way of mapping the world in mental representation). For if there is no underlying shared form of mapping the world, how else could we translate all human languages into one another so successfully across the board?

But Davidson’s claim that one can only be a believer if one is a language user is unconvincing. Davidson argues that without language, we cannot settle the matter as to whether someone has beliefs. Kornblith responds that although this might be true, it does not follow from this observation that belief attribution is erroneous (2002, 85). The

⁶²Alison Suen (2012) discusses the problematic association between reason and language throughout the history of philosophy, and its concomitant effects for the human-animal divide.
empirical difficulty of establishing a theory does not yet impugn the theory (85). Besides, adding language to the mix does nothing to improve the theoretical accuracy of belief attribution to humans. After all, people say many things about their beliefs that do not always square with the facts, such that “attributions of belief and desire are underdetermined by all the speech behavior we will ever see” (85). In the end, one wonders whether there is any significant difference between attributing beliefs to non-linguistic animals and attributing them to language users. As Dan Dennett notes: “heterophenomenology [cognitive ethology] without a text is not impossible, just difficult” (Dennett 1991, 144 in Bekoff 1994, 88).63

Moreover, literature in cognitive ethology increasingly suggests that many animals do in fact have language. Even though these animals may not employ speech, they still communicate linguistically through signs (Gruen 2011, 10).64 Lori Gruen reminds us about Washoe and Nim Chimpsky, two famous chimps who have been taught sign language. Not only did Washoe master an impressive 200 words, but she “combined the signs she learned in novel ways to communicate new ideas” (10). Also in response to Davidson, Gruen describes several studies in which animals are able to connect words with objects, thus suggesting they may possess a conceptual scheme (146). This includes an experiment in which pigeons were trained to peck only at photographs that had trees; when later shown new photographs with different trees, the pigeons again pecked only at the images with trees (146). As Gruen writes, “This might suggest that they understand

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63 I follow Mark Bekoff’s definition of cognitive ethology as “the comparative, evolutionary, and ecological study of animal minds and mental experiences including how they think, what they think about, their beliefs, how information is processed, whether or not they are consciousness, and the nature of their emotions” (2002, 86-7).

64 Mark Bekoff writes: “Of course, other animals do not use human languages to communicate, but many animals use their own complex language to tell others what kinds of food are around, where they are traveling, how they are feeling, or what they need” (2002, 138).
the concept of “tree”” (146). On either a rejection or endorsement of Davidson’s view that language is required for belief, then, many animals emerge as decent contenders for knowledge.

Kornblith also casts doubt on Robert Brandom’s argument that since animals do not participate in a social practice, animals cannot have beliefs. The relevant social practice this time is not language, however, but the practice of exchanging reasons. Brandom thinks this practice is necessary for knowledge because, “The possibility of extracting information from the remarks of others is one of the main points of the practice of assertion, and of attributing beliefs to others” (in Kornblith 2002, 79). But the problem with this view is that the exchange of reasons for one’s beliefs varies widely both individually and culturally (76). Some people may engage rigorously in this practice, exchanging reasons with one another until they feel their belief is secure, but others may not engage in the practice at all (77). The problem for Brandom’s view is that he “would clearly regard those who are highly Socratic as, without a doubt, genuine believers. And those who fail to engage in the practice at all, by his criterion, simply fail to have beliefs” (77). Again, we face a situation in which the standards for belief are so strict that few individuals can meet them.

With this, Kornblith casts doubt on the dominant efforts to deny animals knowledge. Epistemic internalism and social practice accounts do not stand up to the test of human knowledge, let alone animal knowledge. Cognitive ethologists can therefore continue to make sense of animal behavior by referring to animal knowledge (2002, 29). In the final analysis, in fact, it may turn out instead that we have “gravely overstated our human capacities while obscuring genuinely mind-bending powers that cross species
barriers” (Willett 2014, 103).

In my next section, I will explore whether Fricker’s account can make room for animal knowledge. I argue that her broadly externalist leanings, coupled with a tweaked and updated version of Edward Craig’s genealogical account of knowledge, might render her account amenable to animal knowledge. However, she would have to allow for a broader conception of testimony, and drop her requirement for the exercise of one’s critical reflection (although she waffles on the latter).

2. Fricker’s Account of Knowledge

What is Fricker’s account of knowledge? As a virtue epistemologist, Fricker is largely untroubled by the internalist-externalist debate over justification. Developed in part as a reaction to what is seen as a misguided focus on justification in mainstream epistemology, virtue epistemologists turn to other resources for their accounts of knowledge (Fairweather and Zagzebski 2001, 3). For virtue epistemologists, knowledge is belief that results from the exercise of one’s intellectual virtues (Battaly 2008, 640). The virtue epistemologist’s hope is that, with the epistemic virtues, he can both sidestep the internalist-externalist debate and get the best of both worlds - the externalist desire to track truth and the internalist desire to track responsibility. That being said, the strong emphasis on the social (i.e. not internal) dimensions of knowledge acquisition in many virtue epistemological accounts suggests that at least some are best understood as forwarding versions of epistemic externalism. Indeed, in defending her view of testimony, Fricker states “internalism…should be avoided if possible” (2010, 171). But even if Fricker seeks to avoid internalism, she still demands that knowers be able to
develop epistemic virtues. So, the relevant question for the present inquiry will be: can animals possess epistemic virtues?

To answer this question, let us now turn to Fricker’s genealogical story of the advent of knowledge. Here we see that Fricker’s focus on testimony is no peripheral matter; rather, Fricker places testimony at the very “heart of what it is to know” (2010, 256). Alongside Bernard Williams’ and Edward Craig’s epistemic State of Nature stories, Fricker argues that the fundamental need to share information translates into the need to identify good informants, which then crystallizes over time into our concept of knowledge (2007, 144; 2011, 176). For a picture of the State of Nature so described, I quote Fricker at length:

The basic epistemic needs that define the State of nature are, first, the need for enough truths (and not too many falsehoods) for other sorts of basic needs - principally survival needs - to be met. A community that survives in the State of Nature must operate with sufficient truths to hunt and/or forage for food, take care of the young, avoid predators, deal with the dead, and so on. That first epistemic need immediately gives rise to a second: the need to realize the epistemic and practical advantages of pooling information. Why rely only on one’s own eyes and ears when you can benefit from the eyes and ears of others? From where you’re standing you may not be able to see if the predator is coming, but that person up in the tree might, and this exemplifies the fundamental practical pressure to stand in cooperative epistemic relations with fellow enquirers. Finally, this second epistemic need spontaneous gives rise to a third: the need to distinguish good from bad informants, so that it is indeed information that gets shared and not misinformation or disinformation (2011, 59-60).

Fricker takes this story to depict the epistemic needs that necessarily arise in “any human society” (2007, 129). What I find striking about the State of Nature so conceived, though, is how well it applies to animals. Do not many animal societies also evolve with basic epistemic needs, such that they too might develop the need to share information? Much work in animal cognition suggests that the answer is yes. As Dan Sperber notes, “unlike argumentation, which is specifically human, testimony (in the sense of the “transmission
of observed information”)… is also found in other species” (2006, 180). These studies suggest that perhaps informant-status is not uniquely human after all. Consider the bee dance:

One worker bee, having found a source of food, communicates to other worker bees the direction and distance at which it is to be found. At the end of the process, the receiver bees are, presumably, in the same cognitive state with respect to the source of food as they would have been had they found it themselves. This indeed can be described as cognition by proxy” (Sperber 2006, 180).

Several studies confirm similar behavior, describing animals who convey information to one another in terms of “animal signaling” (see Searcy and Nowicki 2005; Bekoff 2002). Moreover, animal signaling has not only been observed among animal pairs, but within “signaling networks,” which suggests they might be best understood as information-sharing communities. As Cynthia Willett explains, “Social signaling is vital for a creature to develop bonds in clustered networks and to flourish” (2014, 139). Vervet monkeys, for instance, are known to warn colony members with information that includes which appropriate behavior to take (i.e. a cough warns of an aerial predator and conspecifics take to the ground) (Seyfarth et al. 2010, 4). In short, despite restricting the story to human knowers, it is unlikely that the State of Nature story Fricker borrows describes a uniquely human affair. Indeed, on this note, several epistemologists have criticized Craig for offering a genealogical account so inconsonant with the evolutionary facts. By discounting “real, explanatory accounts of the emergence of our cognitive practices in favour of a quasi-transcendental argument from the conditions of the

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65Searcy and Nowicki write, “The idea that individuals of other species can listen in on and exploit signaling exchanges among conspecifics is long established (Marler 1955; Otte 1974; Myrberg 1981)” (Searcy and Nowicki 2005, 182).

66Searcy and Nowicki further state: “It is apparent that animals often, perhaps usually, communicate in networks of signalers and receivers, not simply in dyadic pairs” (2005, 206).
possibility of social life,” Axel Gelfert argues that Craig’s State of Nature story fails to reflect the fact that “human cognitive and communicative capacities are in important ways continuous with communication and cognition in non-human animals” (2011, 70, 76). And although Gelfert does note that human communication is relevantly different from animal signaling (and, I would add, internally diversified across both), the crucial point is that animals do communicate information in their own ways to one another.

Approaching his critique from a different direction, Kornblith also claims that Craig’s State of Nature story is confused. Kornblith argues that Craig errs in grounding the origin of knowledge in the primary need for informants, since animals have knowledge but do not rely on each other as informants (2011, 45). Specifically, Kornblith claims that “non-human animals have no need to identify reliable sources of testimony, since they do not speak a language, [so] we cannot locate the central feature of knowledge in these creatures in any such social role” (Ibid.). Rather, for Kornblith, the important point is that animals develop beliefs out of the need to satisfy basic biological demands. He doubts that animals develop beliefs out of an original need for good informants because, as far as we know, animals “do not have the conceptual capacity to form beliefs about mental states” (Ibid., 46).

But why do we need to show either that animals have language, or that they can form beliefs about the mental states of others to qualify as informants? One might instead suggest that it is the concept of “informant” that requires expansion here. To the first point, Kornblith should recall his own critique of Davidson. If, as Kornblith argues, we do not need to establish that animals have language in order to have beliefs, why do we need to establish they have language to convey information or “testify”? Only a
particularly narrow conception of testimony demands linguistic capacity in this sense. The dominant construal of testimony is, however, rather broad. As Elizabeth Fricker defines it, testimony includes “tellings generally” (1995, 396-7 in Lackey and Sosa 2006, 2). So although tellings would have to include animal gestures to accommodate animal testimony, insofar as it still conveys information, why should animal signaling not qualify? An expanded concept of telling to include “putting knowledge out there for others” not only seems to better capture both animal and human forms of non-speech-laden telling, but it also obviates the need to suggest that animals must form beliefs about the mental states of others to act as informants.

On this note, what is interesting about animal cognition studies is that it refers to animal testimony in much the same terms as human testimony, i.e. as reliable or unreliable, honest or deceptive. As Searcy and Nowicki explain, animal cognition work explores whether “animal signals are honest, in the sense of conveying reliable information from signaler to receiver, or deceitful, in the sense of conveying unreliable information, the falsity of which somehow benefits the signaler” (2005, 1). Indeed, studies have found that horses and dogs both use deception in play, thus suggesting that the concepts of “reliable” and “deceptive” are well suited to animals (Argent 2012, 259). Consider also Kourken Michaelian’s argument that testimony is a natural kind. Michaelian provides an evolutionary story to assess whether animal signaling is generally reliable. He finds that unless animal signaling is generally “beneficial to both senders and recipients,” it will not become evolutionarily stable (2008, 187). On this score, it seems entirely appropriate to think of animals as conveying information that is reliable or unreliable, and thus as providing a form of testimony.
At this point it is worth asking how far have we departed from Fricker’s account of testimony. In some ways, this is a difficult question because Fricker waffles between the inferentialist and non-inferentialist components of her account, and has been criticized for doing so (Goldberg 2010, discussed below). However, I will argue that we are not too far off from her account if we push slightly further in the direction of non-inferentialism.

Fricker argues that hearers gain testimonial knowledge by the exercise of a “perceptual faculty” that can detect epistemic virtues, such as competence and sincerity, in a speaker (2007, 86). This perceptual faculty amounts to a “well-trained testimonial sensibility” (71). As her account progresses, we see that this testimonial sensibility proves increasingly robust. It is defined, for instance, as a “rational capacity” that “permits ongoing correction and adjustments in the light of experience and critical reflection” (84). Now, although it is not entirely difficult to imagine that animals might develop well-trained “testimonial sensibilities” to judge indicators of reliability or deception, it is likely a stretch to suggest that animals pick up on cues “relating to the speaker’s moral attitude towards” them (76). Still, whether we can accommodate animal informants on Fricker’s view will depend on how deeply internalist her version of testimonial knowledge actually is, for it is one thing to suggest animals could have a perceptual faculty that helps them discern reliable from unreliable indicators, and quite another to require that they be capable of citing this capacity as a reason for their true knowledge.

67That being said, there is mounting evidence for moral cognition in animals. Lori Gruen provides the example of Blackie the dog who attempted to pull an infant he lived with from a fire and a gorilla who, in response to a child falling into his enclosure, brought the unconscious child to the door for the zoo staff to retrieve (2002, 437, 438). She writes, “Studying animal cognition reveals that their mental capacities are far more complicated, and that moral belief-like states … are much less homogenous then [sic] one might think…” (2002, 441).
belief.

Fricker tries to tow a middle line between an inferentialist and non-inferentialist account of testimony. In true externalist style, non-inferentialism respects the fact that most of our testimonial knowledge is unreflective, that most of the time we are “open to the word of others” (2007, 68). Non-inferentialism presents the hearer as absorbing knowledge in an unreflective manner, and allows the hearer to take in knowledge from a speaker sans critical assessment (62). In this way, non-inferentialist views of testimony “render the epistemology consonant with the phenomenology” (62). On the one hand, Fricker’s favored non-inferentialist feature is its honest picture of testimonial knowledge. On the other hand, inferentialism appeals to Fricker because it does not picture the hearer in “snooze mode” when it comes to her acceptance of knowledge via testimony (66). Rather, if asked to do so, inferentialism requires that the speaker be able to cite her reasons for justified testimonial belief (Goldberg 2010, 141).

Fricker presents her account as a model of testimony that achieves both favored features. Like non-inferentialism, Fricker’s account accommodates the fact that hearers tend to make automatic, uncritical judgments of speaker credibility (2007, 172). However, like inferentialism, Fricker’s account also includes the capacity for critical assessment of the word of others. This critical assessment, however, does not require a speaker to rehearse the inferences by which they arrived at belief. Rather, hers is a “testimonial sensibilit[y] [that] will respond (sometimes consciously, often unconsciously) to the plethora of epistemically relevant cues supplied by a speaker’s testimonial performance” (2010, 172). In this way, Fricker offers a testimonial sensibility.

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68 As she says, “Inferentialism’s standing commitment to internalism is the problem here, and it should be avoided if possible (2010, 171).
that is “rational yet unreflective, critical yet non-inferential,” and thus “unlike anything commonly entertained in epistemology per se” (2007, 85).

So described, can Fricker’s account accommodate animal testifiers? I think the answer is yes and no. On the one hand, the non-inferentialist (and hence externalist) aspect of her account could allow animal testifiers. On externalism, animals do not need to cite their reasons (or rehearse an inference) for knowledge. Rather, all that is required is that they possess a cognitive system that dependably discerns reliable from unreliable animal knowers (recall the pigs discussed in chapter one).

On the other hand, even if she does not require individuals to be consciously aware of their ability to discern reliable from unreliable knowers, Fricker’s requirement that knowers have the capacity for critical reflection introduces an internalist element into her account (2007, 84-5).69 So although the non-inferentialist element to her account would suggest that knowers should not have to cite their reasons for belief, she also claims that “it is close to conceptually impossible that a human being who lacks the general capacity to come out with reasons for her beliefs could count as a knower (or even a believer)” (2008, 62). Moreover, Fricker elsewhere restricts the broad class of tellings to “illocutionary speech acts” (2010, 253). Here, Fricker effectively strips animals of the possibility for testimony, since if animals do engage in telling, it is not through illocution (understood as speech). In this latter way, Fricker’s account as it stands would thus seem to foreclose animal knowledge.

69Sandford Goldberg argues that, despite her saying otherwise, Fricker’s account is closer to inferentialism than non-inferentialism. He first accuses Fricker of overstating the inferentialist position. Fricker claims that inferentialism requires that speakers rehearse the inferences for belief (as she says, inferentialism presents the hearer “as gaining knowledge only if he rehearse an appropriate inference” (2010, 62, my italics). But according to Goldberg, this does not pose a threat to any “plausible version of inferentialism,” which, to repeat, only requires that a hearer be able to cite reasons for their belief if necessary (2010, 141). On this more faithful depiction of inferentialism, Goldberg argues that Fricker’s account likely qualifies.
In this section, I tried to see how far we could square the possibility for animal testimony with Fricker’s own account. I conclude that a plausible genealogical story (consonant with evolution) could make room for animal informant status, and thus animal knowledge. However, this requires abandoning certain features of Fricker’s account. Specifically, we would need to construe tellings beyond illocution, and not restrict the class of knowers to those who can cite reasons for their belief. In any case, it bears noting that we do not need Fricker’s account of knowledge to demonstrate that animals have knowledge; we have independent reasons for thinking this is the case.

3. Epistemic Injustice Against Animals

Having presented the argument for animal knowledge, I now identify two forms of epistemic injustice against animals, the first of which often yields the second. I call the first injustice epistemic exemption. Epistemic exemption identifies a case where a subordinated group is unjustly exempt from the community of knowers. I will show that epistemic exemption is routinely committed against animals and commonly so in efforts to justify speciesist uses of animals.\textsuperscript{70} Second, I argue that epistemic exemption paves the way toward pre-emptive testimonial injustices against animals. Because we do not see animals as beings who could legitimately know anything, we end up thwarting their efforts to tell us anything, including what they may know.

\textsuperscript{70}Although many animals are epistemically exempt under speciesism, including animals in zoos, laboratories, factory farms and even pets in our homes, my discussion focuses predominantly on farm animals since this is the most widespread form of animal abuse, and thus what I found discussed most online.
Epistemic Exemption

The primary way we commit epistemic injustice to animals is through what I call epistemic exemption: the tendency to exempt a subordinated group from the realm of knowers. Of course, not all forms of epistemic exemption are unjust. When we exclude plants and objects from the realm of knowers, we do not do so unjustly.\(^{71}\) Rather, that we can explain plant and thermostat behavior in terms of lower-order explanations vitiates the need for the ascription of belief-desire psychology to them.

As discussed above, however, although we may reasonably deny animals certain forms of knowledge (e.g. going back to Kornblith, we do not reasonably suggest that the dog knows that the “President of the Bank is home”), it is unreasonable to deny animals knowledge across the board, especially basic forms of knowledge that their behavior readily manifests.\(^{72}\) Indeed, many animals, including farm animals like chickens, pigs and cows, are known to possess complex cognitive abilities (not to mention basic cognitive abilities). As Gruen notes, according to recent studies, “pigs have a high degree of intelligence and social cognition…they have been shown to be able to recognize mirrors and use reflected images to solve environmental problems” (2011, 85). And another study recently reported that “chickens are smarter than young children.”\(^{73}\) In sum, it is “now generally believed that a number of highly intelligent social animals, from apes to scrub jays, are capable of attributing simple perceptual states, such as seeing and hearing, as well as goals and intentional actions” (Lurz 2012, 572). It follows that animals’ outright

\(^{71}\)See footnote 50.

\(^{72}\)Moreover, to repeat my point in chapter 1, even if one is not entirely convinced by the argument for animal knowledge, there is enough of an open question as to their cognitive abilities that ethics demands erring on the side of caution.

exemption from the epistemic community is unwarranted, and unjust.

To turn now to my example of epistemic exemption, it turns out that despite mounting evidence for complex animal cognition, a common defense of speciesist practice is that animals do not know what is happening to them.\textsuperscript{74} Indeed, one article cites this reason among the top ten arguments in defense of meat eating, and PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) includes it in their list of the most common “things vegans hear.”\textsuperscript{75} One thus often finds that painful “treatment is tolerated because the allegedly dumb animals don’t know what’s happening to them or suffer psychologically.”\textsuperscript{76} Consider the following comments from blogs (employed in defense of the idea that it is acceptable to kill or confine animals):

Animals don’t know what’s happening to them when they are raised and slaughtered.\textsuperscript{77}

I HATE that aspect of raising animals for food or for scientific experiments…But the truth is, animals don't know what's happening to them, and, when things go according to plan, when it's time for them to die, it's done in a way that's humane.\textsuperscript{78}

I learned that hogs are as dumb as I remember them…I had a hard time

\textsuperscript{74}It is important to note that not all animals suffer epistemic exemption. Several animals, most centrally those animals closest to humans evolutionarily, tend not to be epistemically exempt. Few people would likely suggest that chimps and apes, for instance, do not have basic knowledge. To the contrary, study after study is trotted out to show just how complex (and similar to humans) our ape cousins are. The latest discovery is that monkeys can do math (interestingly, however, one article on this finding begins by assuring readers that, still, “no monkey is close to the next Descartes…”). Although this is an empirical question, my hunch is that a meat-eating society would be less willing to grant that farm animals are complex knowers. Kiyoshi Ota, “Study: Monkeys Can Do Math,” \textit{TheDailyBeast.com}, April 23, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2014/04/23/study-monkeys-can-do-math.html.


\textsuperscript{78}“A Human Supremacy Paradox?,” \textit{Answers.yahoo.com}, https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20111219175237AAE5ILC.
reconciling the notion that pigs were as smart as dogs, which is something I’ve heard from numerous sources…. A hog gets killed about six feet away from a dozen others, all of which snuffle along totally unconcerned.⁷⁹

No it's okay since they don't know they're in captivity.⁸⁰

I find these comments interesting from a moral and epistemic perspective. They clearly ride on the idea that because animals are exempt from the community of knowers, we can deny them moral standing (hence the need to link the moral and epistemic in this case). But when a cow screams out each time her calf is taken away, can we honestly suggest she does not know what is happening? Or when an animal on its way to slaughter violently kicks and tries to run away because it can smell blood or see what is happening to other cows, can we sincerely suggest he does not know what is happening? Consider Pliny’s report of Pompey’s staged combat between humans and elephants in 55 B.C. (Patterson 2002, 124). According to Pliny, upon realizing their impending death, the confined elephants turned to the crowd in a plea for mercy. As Pliny describes it, the elephants “entreated the crowd, trying to win their compassion with indescribable gestures, bewailing their plight with a sort of lamentation” (124).³¹ How can one make sense of the elephants’ pleas in Pliny’s story in the absence of knowledge about their situation?³² In so many ways, animal behavior readily confirms that, at minimum, animals know basic facts about what is happening to them. Clearly, as demonstrated above,

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⁷⁹“How do animals feel in a slaughter house, when they see their own tribe being killed in front of them?,” Answers.yahoo.com, https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20110414105100AAk660K.
³¹On a happy note, the elephants were successful; the audience felt compassion for the elephants and cursed Pompey’s actions as cruel (Patterson 2002, 124). Since the elephants received uptake, perhaps this example represents a case of testimonial justice for animals.
³²Moreover, we know that elephants are incredibly complex animals. As Catherine Doyle notes, there is a “growing body of scientific evidence of elephants’ great intelligence, emotional natures, and profound social ties” (2014, 38). Doyle further notes, “They are known to use and even manufacture tools…and have passed the mirror recognition test which indicates recognition of self” (39).
attempts to account for animal behavior like this outside belief-desire psychology require a feat of mental gymnastics. As Josephine Donovan notes, although “there are those…who still raise the epistemological question of how one can know what an animal is…thinking. The answer would seem to be that we use much the same mental and emotional activities in reading an animal as we do in reading a human” (2006, 321).

Having established in my first section that animals have knowledge, however, I will not dwell on this point further. Rather, I turn to the nature of the injustice I’m calling epistemic exemption. To do so, I will discuss Fricker’s concepts of pre-emptive testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice as these are instructive for parsing out the concept.

First, in pre-emptive testimonial injustice, not only do knowers’ claims receive less credibility, but their perceived lack of credibility is so entrenched in the social imaginary that knowers’ testimony is rarely, if ever, even solicited (2007, 130). In pre-emptive testimonial injustice, prejudice is so rooted that knowers “tend simply not to be asked to share their thoughts, their judgements, their opinions” (130). Recall Tom Robinson. Racism in Maycomb County is so entrenched that Robinson’s testimony is not merely demoted in the courtroom. Rather, Robinson’s systematic testimonial injustice is such that he fails to be seen as a competent epistemic agent in general. The injustice he suffers is appropriately deemed pre-emptive; his word is shut out in advance, his testimony rejected before he even gives it. When animals are denied the status of knowers as in the passages above, one might suggest that they too suffer pre-emptive testimonial injustice. After all, they are certainly not solicited for their “thoughts, their judgements, their opinions.”
However, epistemic exemption is importantly different from pre-emptive testimonial injustice, for although the pre-emptive case certainly names a deeper, more damaging form of testimonial injustice, it is not the case that Robinson fails to be seen as a knower at all. He is not entirely exempt from the community of knowers (where exempt means that he is never included in the first place). It might be said that insofar as he is deemed incapable of achieving so-called “higher” forms of knowledge (like rational inquiry), Robinson is exempt from the epistemic community. But although this may be, one is hard-pressed to suggest that folks thought Robinson incapable of all forms of knowing, including even the formation of beliefs. Robinson’s epistemic exclusion is certainly significant, but it is not this extreme. To the contrary, although those who suffer pre-emptive testimonial injustice are rarely solicited for their knowledge, Fricker acknowledges that “it would be stretching the pessimistic social imagination too far to imagine a society (original or historical) that contained social groups whose members’ knowledge or opinions were never solicited on” (2007, 130-1). On this point, Fricker notes that Tom Robinson was surely seen as epistemically reliable on many matters, especially “matters relating to his daily work” (131). Robinson could thus be trusted for knowledge as long as it was a certain type of knowledge—namely the type that is “appropriate” to Robinson, and that does not suggest a “Negro…getting above himself” (131). Since epistemic exemption denies that a group of individuals can know at all, then, it names a more originary form of injustice: a pre-emptive pre-emptive epistemic injustice. What about hermeneutical injustice? Is it better able to capture epistemic

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83 However, this is not to suggest that humans have not been subject to epistemic exemption. Indeed, portions of the disability community are a likely example.
exemption? Unlike testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice does occur at a prior stage, and in this way comes closer to epistemic exemption. Nevertheless, for Fricker, hermeneutical injustice describes a case in which a “gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (2007, 1). Fricker’s central example is of a woman who suffers sexual harassment before the concept exists (6). The woman suffers a two-step epistemic harm: not only is she unable to pull from shared conceptual resources to understand what is happening to her, she is thereby unable to render her experience intelligible to others (6).

Although like epistemic exemption, hermeneutical injustice points to an interpretive failure to grasp oppressed subjects’ experience, so defined it does not capture epistemic exemption. This is because Fricker’s hermeneutical injustice concerns a gap in the collective understanding as it affects the knower’s ability to understand her own experience. In epistemic exemption, there is an interpretive gap (a failure to heed animal knowledge), but whether this gap directly affects animals’ ability to understand their own experience is not at issue.84 Moreover, Fricker claims that “hermeneutical injustice is not perpetrated by individuals” (2007, 8). Since epistemic exemption is not a purely structural affair – epistemically speciesist individuals are responsible for perpetrating it – Fricker’s hermeneutical injustice thus departs from epistemic exemption.

Medina’s enlarged understanding of hermeneutical injustice fares better on

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84 It is interesting to consider whether hermeneutical injustice so defined might give name to a kind of psychological oppression animals suffer under oppressive circumstances (depression and anxiety have, for instance, been documented among several animals in captivity). However, to establish that animals are unable to understand their own experience due to gaps in the collective understanding would require a deal of theoretical heavy lifting. Minimally, we would have to establish not only that animals have beliefs, but that they possess self-concepts, which can (and are) distorted under oppression. I do not think this is an impossible task, however, since several animals have been shown to have self-awareness and self-concepts, including most famously great apes and dolphins. However, this is beyond the scope of my current project.
this front, and I believe it can help us grasp the underlying mechanism that prefigures epistemic exemption. Unlike Fricker, Medina argues that hermeneutical injustice should encapsulate more than knowers’ own sense of their social experience. It must also account for privileged individuals’ inability or refusal to understand the experience of others (2013, 109). Medina’s version of hermeneutical injustice also reflects the fact that, whether consciously or unconsciously, individuals can and do perpetrate hermeneutical injustice (Ibid.). Pulling from Robert Bernasconi’s work, Medina points out that interpretive gaps in the collective understanding often result from a “stubborn refusal to understand certain things that can destabilize one’s life and identity” (108). Such stubborn refusals to see beyond stereotypes convenient to oppressor logic for fear of the destabilization of one’s identity are found throughout history (and the present). As Lorraine Code notes, countless “presuppositions about some people’s—blacks’, women’s, slaves’, the workers’—incapacity for rational self-governance have been enlisted to naturalize hierarchical social arrangements” (2006, 77).

The origins of the epistemic exemption of animals can be better understood along these lines; it arises when privileged subjects - who clearly benefit from the oppression of animals (e.g. through meat-eating, animal experimentation, entertainment at zoos and circuses etc.) - betray a “stubborn refusal” to understand animal experience. Their reaction is to exempt animals from the epistemic community. In a society that sees animals primarily as resources, epistemic exemption names not just any old kind of ignorance, then. Rather, the above-cited

85As Nancy Tuana reminds us, “the question of whose interests are being served sheds light not only on how values impact what we know, but also how they impact what we do not know and why” (2006, 6).
comments reveal that ignorance about animal minds is more likely an *active* form of ignorance, “the kind of ignorance that is capable of protecting itself, with a whole battery of defense mechanisms (psychological and political) that can make individuals and groups…numbed to certain phenomena and bodies of evidence and unable to learn in those domains” (Medina 2013, 58). In such forms of active ignorance, the acknowledgment that farm animals do know what is happening might threaten to destabilize many a meat-eater’s worldview, even core values. Hence the foreboding question posed by the writer of an article entitled “Was your meat smarter than your pet?”: “If farm animals are intelligent creatures, should we all be vegetarians?”

When it comes to meat eating (or any form of animal exploitation), then, one expects to find dogged efforts to actively ignore information that threatens a speciesist ideology (these efforts might be especially pronounced in patriarchal societies that equate “real” masculinity with meat-eating (see Adams 1990)). One predicts that a speciesist society will be more likely to accept facts about animal minds that do not disrupt the species hierarchy (as long as animals are not “getting above themselves”, to recall Fricker’s words). Consider in this framework a sarcastic commenter’s reaction to the chicken intelligence study cited above: “As if peer review actually even means anything anymore these days…Anyway, I am awaiting...”

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86 Brian Luke writes that when he turned vegan, he realized that because he “no longer ha[d] an interest in the continuation of animal exploitation,” “the idea of nonhuman animals as inferiors seemed not so much false as meaningless” (2007, 137).

87 Appropriately for a consideration of the mass killing of animals in speciesist society, Medina writes that “Another area that is also sometimes put out of the cognitive reach of the powerful elite is the domain of the mechanisms of oppression that create marginalization, subjugation, and social death – including physical extermination, as in the case of genocide” (Medina 2013, 33).

88 The article tells readers that “pigs are smarter than dogs”, “chickens can be taught to run the thermostat” and “cows show excitement when they’ve been taught something new.” “Was your Meat Smarter than Your Pet?,” Abcnews.com, May 22, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Science/story?id=771414.
[sic] for the mass escape those clever chickens are planning."^89 And one journalist skeptically remarks, “Nothing wrong with promoting ethical treatment of farm animals, but when you're funding scientific studies to support your business model, it's hard to not suspect there will be a hint of bias in the results."^90^91 One wonders whether similar attempts to decry scientific findings are found in reaction to peer-reviewed studies on apes.92

The epistemic exemption of many animals is thus best understood as a result of active refusals to know, because the knowledge in question threatens fundamental beliefs and values. It is part and parcel of anthropocentric efforts to keep animals in an inferiorized epistemic position, a place from which they cannot pose a genuine challenge to human exceptionalism and speciesist worldviews. In my next section, I will describe how epistemic exemption feeds into communicative breakdowns with animals. I argue that Medina’s account of silencing can help us understand how epistemic exemption readily translates into testimonial injustice to animals. In short, if we think animals do not have anything to tell us, they won’t. To show this, I pull from Fricker’s discussion of what she calls the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice in addition to Medina’s critique of Fricker’s lack of attention to the communicative dimensions of testimonial injustice.

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^89 Ibid.
^91 In addition, Marc Bekoff describes the well-known tendency for scientists experimenting on animals to “name and praise the cognitive abilities” of their pets, but to deny similar cognitive complexity to laboratory animals” (2002, 47).
^92 Although ape intelligence can disrupt some speciesist (especially religious) worldviews in many ways, I venture that because we do not see apes as food, one is more likely to hear amused or even delighted rather than hostile reactions to ape intelligence studies. See footnote 74.

Indeed, neurologist Keith Kendrick notes: "If it was a monkey, no one would have any problems, possibly even if it was a dog," said Keith Kendrick, a neurologist at Babraham. "They would say, 'Yeah, yeah, that's expected.' But a sheep, no one really believes." “Was your Meat Smarter than Your Pet?,” Abcnews.com, May 22, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Science/story?id=771414.
Testimonial Injustice and Animal Silencing

When animals’ eroded epistemic status sparks a concomitant refusal on the part of humans to attempt meaningful communicative exchange with animals, epistemic exemption causes testimonial injustice.\textsuperscript{93} Because humans perceive that there is nothing to be exchanged, so to speak, no exchange takes place.\textsuperscript{94} In the human-animal interaction, the perceived lack of animal knowledge stops the conversation before it starts. Animals’ efforts to convey information are foiled.

Fricker’s discussion of the intrinsic wrong of testimonial injustice is instructive to understand how the wrong of testimonial injustice arises out of epistemic exemption. For a precise understanding of the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice, Fricker offers the concept of epistemic objectification. Epistemic objectification names the tendency to treat a knower as a mere source of information, rather than a genuine informant, and thus demotes the speaker “from subject to object” status (2007, 132).\textsuperscript{95} The injustice here is the familiar Kantian wrong of being treated as a mere means as opposed to an end (although again we’ll have to drop the baggage of rational humanity to accommodate animals) (133). Pulling from Catharine MacKinnon, Fricker describes the example of a sexist society in which women are “given so little credibility in sexual discursive contexts that their word is as noise” (137). In such a society, women’s sexual objectification tends

\textsuperscript{93}An importantly related question is how might testimonial injustice cause epistemic exemption? Although I do not explore the way testimonial injustice yields epistemic exemption, I do not mean to suggest that epistemic exemption is necessarily primary. Rather, as Medina notes, communicate dysfunctions can cause epistemic injustices just as much as epistemic injustices can cause communicative dysfunctions. It is a two-way street: “When communicative negotiations are impaired, epistemic negotiations become limited and defective, and vice versa” (2013, 95).

\textsuperscript{94}Of course, this excludes forms of communication humans think they can have with animals that have nothing to do with animals “telling” us what they know (such as forms of embodied or loving communication with our pets). Although I am interested in the ways animals’ eroded epistemic status affects even these communicative dynamics, I do not have space to explore them here.

\textsuperscript{95}My fourth chapter discusses how animals are treated as mere sources of information in animal experimentation, and are thus epistemically objectified.
to accompany credibility deficits so severe that women are rendered silent (139).

Although this is similar to pre-emptive testimonial injustice, the case of epistemic objectification is importantly different. Here, “women’s testimony is not quite pre-empted (they do say things to men), but it might as well be, since it is not heard as genuine testimony at all” (139).

Although importantly different, like in a sexist society, in a speciesist society animals’ epistemic exemption also tends toward their epistemic objectification. Like a sexist society’s inability to construe women’s tellings as even making sense, a speciesist society is also unable to make sense of animal tellings. Even if animal tellings do take place, then, animals’ lack of epistemic status is so pronounced that, like the woman who yells “No,” it is as if animals did not try to convey anything at all. As Fricker puts it, the “dehumanizing sexual ideology is such that the man never really hears the woman at all—her utterance simply fails to register with his testimonial sensibility” (2007, 140).

For present purposes, we might say that the ‘deanimalizing speciesist ideology is such that the human never really hears the animal at all – her utterance simply fails to register with his testimonial sensibility.’ Like epistemic objectification, epistemic exemption’s “massive advance credibility deficit” to animals also prevents any effective testimonial exchange.

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96 As Josephine Donovan notes, in situations of oppression, “marginalized groups—including animals—have trouble getting their viewpoints heard” (2006, 306, my emphasis).

97 Cynthia Willett compares animals’ inability to receive uptake with Spivak’s subaltern. She writes: “So, what if the animal other can speak? Or, given that speaking seems to always involve the use of human language, let’s rephrase the question in less speciesist terms: what if the nonhuman subaltern can communicate? After all, what is speech but an address to the other? Recall that Gayatri Spivak’s pivotal essay on the communicative capacities of the subaltern suggests that the servants of the British Empire could not speak at least in part because the colonialist frequencies were not tuned in to hear them. In a similar vein, ontological gaps between the human and its others, or within the rest of the animal world, have been grossly exaggerated by a human failure to pick up on animal social cues, community formations, and possibilities of solidarity” (2014, 44).
Before I turn to a case of testimonial injustice to animals, it will be important to consider Fricker’s stress on the importantly epistemic character of epistemic objectification. In contrast to her view, Fricker discusses Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornby’s interpretation of the woman’s failure to convey successfully her meaning. Pulling from speech act theory, Langton and Hornsby do not construe the wrong in question in terms of a man treating the woman’s word as so worthless that he doesn’t even hear her, but rather in terms of her inability to perform the “illocutionary act of refusal in the first place” (2007, 141). In a severe situation of silencing like this, the oppressive context is such that the women’s word does not even receive uptake, where uptake involves “grasping that the speaker is indeed communicating the content of her locution” (141). Fricker argues that, although Langton and Hornsby do not mischaracterize the situation, Fricker’s emphasis on the primacy of the epistemic dimension is likely more true to reality (141). So described, it seems we are faced with having to understand animal silencing qua epistemic objectification as primarily either an epistemic or a communicative issue.98 This presents a worry because animal silencing clearly involves both a refusal to see animals as epistemic subjects (Fricker) and an inability to see that the animal is communicating (Hornsby and Langton).

But following Medina, we can object to Fricker’s attempt to explain the silencing of a woman’s attempt to say “No” to a sexual predator only in epistemic terms. According to Medina, Fricker posits a false dilemma between the communicative and the epistemic dimensions of the silencing in question (Medina 2013, 95). Medina claims that cases of women’s downgraded credibility cannot be divorced from the deformed

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98Fricker does suggest that a purely epistemic account is better than a communicative account because “it requires less erosion of women’s human status,” which of course is irrelevant for the animal case (94).
communicative dynamics Hornsby and Langton highlight (94). As he says, “when epistemic subjectivity and agency are seriously compromised, the subject’s communicative capacities cannot be recovered and she will enjoy, at best, an inferior voice in the interaction” (95). In this way, we can understand testimonial injustice resulting from animals’ epistemic exemption as a complex intertwining of both a denial of animal’s epistemic status and the inability of animal tellings to receive uptake.

Vicki Hearne provides a helpful example of how our assumptions about what animals do or do not know can spur dysfunctional communicative dynamics resulting in animals’ inability to tell us anything. Hearne discusses the case of the animal behaviorist who enters the lab with his own set of interpretations about the dog (2007, 58). Hearne states:

…the story the behaviorist brings into the laboratory affects not only his or her interpretation of what goes on but also what actually does goes on. To the extent that the behaviorist manages to deny any belief in the dog’s potential for believing, intending, meaning, etc., there will be no flow of intention, meaning, believing, hoping going on. …The behaviorist’s dog will not only seem stupid, she will be stupid (58).\(^9\)

Hearne characterizes individuals like the behaviorist as “natural bitees” (2007, 59). These people are consumed by the knowledge they think they have about animals. Their attempts to infer facts about animal behavior based on prior assumptions come to color the communicative dynamics that ensue. Hearne says that such people’s tendency to “cast about for premises” results in epistemological conjecture about the animal without any knowledge of the animal itself (59). Speaking about canines in particular, Hearne argues

\(^9\)As Stephen Laycock states, “To advance toward the Other with our own concepts and theories, to impose our interpretations upon the experience of animate otherness, is a cheap magician’s trick: we draw from the hat the very rabbit that we have previously concealed within it. The trick delights the eye to the extent that the concealment is forgotten or obscured, to the extent, that is, that an answer appears as a discovery (1999, 277).
that dogs react to such treatment “with the same uneasiness we feel when we walk into a room and find that our spouse, or a friend, has plainly been sitting around inferring something about us” (60). When it comes to our relationships to animals, the question whether animals can communicate is rarely answered with “I don’t know, I haven’t met her” (33). Rather, we tend to think we know in advance that animals have nothing to communicate. “Instead of going to take a look and having a chat,” we assume that our animals cannot talk back, and so they don’t (33).100 In short, the animal behaviorist not only denies the dog epistemic status; in so doing, the dog is also blocked from communication.

**Imaginative Reorientations**

Quoting primatologist Barbara Smuts, Cynthia Willett reminds us that with modernization, humans have forgotten “that reciprocal understandings ... between people and at least some of our nonhuman neighbors were common during our time as hunter-gatherers, which constituted 99% of our history as a species” (2014, 5). In modern, speciesist society, the possibility for meaningful trans-species communication in which humans can learn from animals is foreclosed. To restore the communicative and epistemic agency of animals, we are thus in need of an imaginative reorientation. This requires what Medina calls an “enlarged conception of epistemic agency” and “hermeneutical heroes” (2013, 95, 111). Hermeneutical heroes do not assume in advance what potential communicative dynamics might obtain. Rather, they are open to surprise.

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100 As Grey Owl (a former trapper turned conservationist upon seeing beavers as intelligent beings) believed, “if there has been no interchange between humans and other animals, it is because humans have not made a sustained effort to study the latter’s speech” (Braz 2012, 140).
and the possibility that communicative efforts might lurk where we least expect them. Hermeneutical heroes are “extremely courageous speakers and listeners who defy well-entrenched communicative expectations and dominant hermeneutical perspectives” (111). Far from assuming which communities do or do not have epistemic agency, hermeneutical heroes keep their open ears.

Indeed, it is striking what animals can tell us once we stop assuming they have nothing to tell (because they do not know anything) and once we open ourselves up to “nonstandard” forms of communication (Medina 2013, 114). The stories of humans who interact with animals as epistemic subjects are particularly “telling” in this regard. Karen Davis says her chickens communicate with her predominantly “because I just don’t feed them…I also talk to them and look at them in the eye and express my feelings for them” (69). According to Davis, it is in light of her empathetic stance toward her chickens that one of them, Miss Gertrude, was able to inform Davis through “her agitated voice and body movements that a fox was lurking on the edge of the woods” (65). Traci Warkentin describes such forms of empathetic engagement as follows:

For most adults encountering other animals in this way—as individuals capable of reciprocity who learn and make things happen, that is, as subjects with agency—demands an exercise of imaginative generosity. It involves an attempt at imagining what the worlds of others might look like from their own embodied standpoints and a keen attentiveness to expressions of their agency as both enhanced and limited by social others and by material surroundings. It requires an effort to grasp continuities and negotiate boundaries of otherness, while at the same time appreciating uniqueness and even radical difference (2012, 138-9).

Hearne also discusses the importance of reciprocity in animal-human interactions by noting the etymology of the verb “to obey.” She notes that the term “‘obey’ itself comes from a word meaning ‘to hear.’ We covertly recognize that this may not be an irrelevant etymology by using expressions like ‘I don’t follow you’ or ‘I’ll go along with that’”
(2007, 56). Hearne discusses the importance of hearing on both sides of the conversation. Not only do animals need to listen to humans, but humans need to listen to what animals are conveying to us so we can provide a meaningful response or command in return (20). As Hearne says, “speaking well elicits trust” (20). In our interactions with pets, we rarely assume that we may need to gain the right to command, “Joe, sit” (44). We do, however, and we can gain this right by learning the dog’s vocabulary so that we can listen to each other responsibly, or, what is the same here, responsively (21).101 “The better trained a dog - which is to say, the greater his ‘vocabulary’- the more mutual trust there is, the more dog and human can rely on each other to behave responsibly” (21). Hearne provides the example of the police dog. If a tracking dog turns down a road to follow a man, the trainer respects “the dog’s superior knowledge” and here respect happens to mean “respecting their nervousness” (24).

Although different contexts (and different individual animals) call for different responses, an important corrective against testimonial injustice is to become attuned to the animals we are already in relationship with. This requires developing practices of what Gruen calls “engaged empathy,” in which we practice an ethos of “reflection and openness,” such that we can better hear what animals are telling us (Gruen 2011, 206). It requires acknowledging that “through a vast repertoire of vocalizations, gestures, movements, and signals, domesticated animals tell us what they want and need from us” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011,109). In discussing the importance of embodied attunement to animals, Traci Warkentin calls for a somatic and phenomenological

101 As Hearne states, “The ability to exact obedience doesn’t give you the right to do so. It’s the willingness to obey that confers the right to command” (2007, 66).
approach (what Elizabeth Behnke calls “interkinaesthetic comportment”) (2012, 288). This means that, in her interactions with whales, Warkentin carefully observes body movements and the whale’s surrounding environment so she can better “interpret what it is doing” (289). For humans interacting with horses, this might mean learning that horses’ “Pinned ears…mean ‘Don’t push me further,’ but one ear cocked, ‘I’m listening.’ Nostrils wrinkle in disgust and flare with excitement, and eyes convey pain, exhaustion, fear, anxiety, apprehension, relaxation, submission, and anger” (Argent 2012, 253). Or, it might mean learning that rabbits use their “ears, their noses, their tails, their bodies” to communicate their needs (Demello 2014, 86); and that smiles indicate subordination in rhesus monkeys, and stress in chimpanzees (Willett 2014, 16).

Instead of requiring more animal training, then, learning how to hear what animals may be telling us requires first and foremost human training. Humans require training because although animals convey information like humans, it should come as no surprise that they do not convey it the same way. Accordingly, Josephine Donovan describes the need for an animal standpoint theory in which humans do not impose their own constructs on animals but instead develop a “dialogical mode of ethical reasoning” in conversation with animals (2006, 305). For Donovan, caring here does not involve only caring about their suffering but “caring about what they are telling us” (310). In

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102 Willett writes, “If there is a common path for ethical and spiritual enlightenment, as an alternative to humanism’s rational enlightenment, it does not seem to originate in any cross-species capacity for high-level reason but in an affect-laden intelligence instead” (2014, 103).

103 Sensitive to rabbits’ own ways of communicating, Demello tries “as much as possible, to reach out to them on their own terms...[such as] lying on the rug...to soothe her” (2014, 86).

104 Of course, this is not to suggest that all humans convey information in the same way either. I would venture that there is just as much variation among human efforts to convey information as there is among animals. But instead of fretting over whether we are asserting similarities or differences among the animal and human ability to convey information, as Kelly Oliver suggests, perhaps “we need to move from an ethics of sameness, through an ethics of difference, toward an ethics of relationality and responsivity” (2009, 21), for both humans and animals.
sum, it is only once we open ourselves to hearing animals that a flurry of animal tellings can emerge, thus paving the way toward more just communicative and relations with animals. Like Medina’s hermeneutical heroes, we must remain open to animals’ “nonstandard” ways of communicating (2013, 114).

What about a corrective against epistemic exemption? I think the antidote to epistemic exemption is also a matter of openness. However, here the openness is less immediately about openness to animal tellings, since epistemic exemption often (though not exclusively) takes place prior to our interactions with animals. Indeed, most of the animals we epistemically exempt are those most shut out from mainstream society, hidden away as they are in slaughterhouses and laboratories. The call when it comes to epistemic exemption, then, is for humans to remain open to the possibility that animals are much more epistemically complex than we have traditionally thought. This kind of openness will also involve the recognition that our current efforts to “discover” animal cognition in all its complexity are necessarily incomplete. This is not to say that humans cannot learn anything about animal minds through cognitive ethology and the like, but rather that humans should recognize that animals know things in ways far beyond our grasp. In short, we need to remain open both to further human discovery about the cognitive abilities of animals and to the fact that the lack of such discovery does not tell against animal knowledge.

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The need to remain open-minded echoes my call in chapter one to err on the side of caution when it comes to matters of epistemic injustice. When serious moral stakes are at issue and when one has good evidence in favor of multiple possibilities, I think it is
important to treat questions about epistemic status cautiously. Since to deny that animals can be done an epistemic injustice has harmful effects that rebound on them, it is advisable to err on the side of caution and favor the idea that animals are knowers who can be epistemically wronged, even if one doubts otherwise. When we do not know what possibilities are forthcoming, we must keep the question alive, and be open to challenge, surprise and contestation from wherever it issues.
CHAPTER III

SOURCING WOMEN’S ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE:
THE WORRY OF EPISTEMIC OBJECTIFICATION

Feminist epistemologists have repeatedly diagnosed widespread tendencies to ignore and exclude women’s knowledge. This is so even (and sometimes especially) when women’s own bodies are the objects of investigation (Tuana 2004). Given the systematic exclusion of women’s knowledge, it is perhaps unsurprising that feminists have less often problematized cases in which women’s knowledge is directly sought.

In this chapter, I argue that although it is important to attend to injustices surrounding women’s epistemic exclusions, it is equally important to attend to injustices surrounding women’s epistemic inclusions. Partly in response to the historical exclusion of women’s knowledge, there has been increasing effort among NGOs and First World actors to seek out women’s knowledge. This trend is apparent in efforts to mainstream gender in climate change negotiation. Here, one is told that women’s superior knowledge about how to adapt to climate change makes them “poised to help solve and overcome

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105 See Code 1991; Braidotti 1993; Tuana 2004; Fricker 2007, among others. By “women’s knowledge,” I mean knowledge women have gained by virtue of being ideologically positioned as a “woman” or part of a community of women in a particular place, time and circumstance. Throughout the paper, I employ “women’s knowledge” to capture this specified formulation.

106 In a related vein, Heidi Grasswick argues that a liberatory epistemology must not assume that it is always good to share knowledge (2011, 241). Grasswick argues that sharing knowledge can heighten the vulnerability of oppressed populations, while withholding knowledge can sometimes serve liberatory aims (253). Like Grasswick, I too critique assumptions that an enlarged pool of knowledge is necessarily good. However, our foci differ in that I am interested specifically in the responsibilities that befall inquirers, and not as much on the (equally important analysis of) knowledge-sharers themselves.
this daunting challenge." Pulling again from Fricker, I argue that such claims risk epistemically objectifying women. To illuminate the risk of women’s epistemic objectification in climate change discourse, I offer a feminist analysis of current efforts to seek women’s environmental knowledge, arguing that efforts to seek women’s knowledge must reflect just epistemic relations.

My chapter proceeds in three main sections. First, I elaborate on Fricker’s concept of epistemic objectification. With this concept in hand, I next describe the trend to seek women’s environmental knowledge in climate change discourse. Third, I situate pleas for women’s ecological knowledge within the wider global context. In so doing, it becomes clear that the risk of women’s epistemic objectification in this case is higher because they are instrumentalized globally. Finally, I turn to arguments for how to ensure just epistemic relations in a global context.

1. Epistemic Objectification

To home in on the precise nature of the wrong of testimonial injustice, Fricker offers the concept of epistemic objectification. As discussed earlier, epistemic objectification takes place when someone is treated as a mere source of information as opposed to an informant (2007, 6). Fricker explains this as the difference between an object, which can only ever serve as a source of information, and a person, who can alternatively serve as an informant or a source of information (132). For example, I operate as an informant if I

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108Fricker has been criticized for misconstruing the intrinsic wrong of testimonial injustice as the wrong of epistemic objectification, as opposed to the wrong of “derivatization” which treats its victim as a partial subject, not an object (see Pohlhaus 2013).
tell you that I am writing a paper, and I operate as a source of information if you infer that I am writing a paper from observing me typing on the computer.

Clearly, not all instances of treating someone as a source of information are wrong. Indeed, there are many instances in which it is perfectly acceptable to infer bits of information from someone, such as, to use Fricker’s example, to infer from someone’s being drenched in water that it must be raining (2007, 132). To ascertain whether a bad kind of epistemic objectification is taking place, Fricker’s crucial determinant is context:

The morally crucial distinction is perhaps best captured in terms of the difference between, on the one hand, someone’s being treated as an object in a context or a manner that does not deny that they are also a subject and, on the other hand, someone’s being treated as a mere object—where the ‘mere’ signifies a more general denial of their subjectivity” (133).

Fricker cites Nussbaum’s example of the difference between using one’s lover’s stomach as a pillow “in the context of a relationship in which he is generally treated as more than a pillow,” versus treating him as an instrument in general (2007, 134). Similarly, we might consider the difference between a negligent professor who fails to read his student’s work but routinely employs the student to practice his French versus a responsible professor who does the same but reads the student’s work and treats her with respect. Employing the student to practice French seems relevantly less problematic (perhaps not problematic at all) in the latter rather than the former instance. Presumably in the latter instance we have a situation “in which human beings treat each other as subjects with a common purpose” (132). In short, context matters.

Epistemic objectification is helpful to assess the epistemic status of women: Are women being treated as participants in the conversation, or merely “passive states of affairs” (2007, 132)? Do they generally serve as “trusted informants”, or are they called
upon only selectively when their particular knowledge is desired (132)? With Fricker’s concept, we gain important criteria for determining whether particular groups of women are treated as mere sources of information or active informants.

However, following Kristie Dotson, I would also suggest that the language of “source of information” and “informant” is somewhat misleading, because sources of information can masquerade as informants. Put otherwise, we must remain wary of instances in which individuals are actively sharing their knowledge, yet still being treated as mere sources of information. To see this, consider Dotson’s response to Lorraine Code’s analysis of the broken Tanzanian health care system. Dotson’s response is instructive because it alerts us to the ease with which one can assume that touting knowledge entails genuine informant treatment. In my view, Dotson effectively argues that although perhaps the Tanzanians were being treated in an epistemically just manner, Code’s account “fail[s] to rule out the possibility that Tanzanian peoples are not used as mere sources of information” (Dotson 2008, 58).

In her paper, Code analyzes the case of an IRDC (International Development Research Center) and its role in revolutionizing the broken Tanzanian health system (Code 2008). Code describes how a shift took place from a top-down approach to knowledge production about Tanzanian people’s diseases to one that engaged their own knowledge about the diseases affecting them (Code 2008, 44). With this shift in epistemic inquiry, researchers turned to Tanzanians’ local knowledge about illness to gather medical evidence more effectively. According to Code, in facilitating the Tanzanians’ own epistemic contributions to the broken health care system, the IRDC worked in harmony with local people to generate “an epistemological reversal in
power/knowledge structures” (Code 2008, 35):

Working toward a solution had to involve engaging with local villagers and clinicians as credible informants, in sensitive, open-minded, and respectful evidence-gathering negotiations, perhaps less objectively “accurate” by first-world standards than statistical analysis is held to be, but capable all the same of withstanding serious epistemic and practical-political scrutiny (Code 2008, 39).

Tracking Fricker, Code explains this as a shift from treating the Tanzanians as mere sources of information who are “objectif[ied] and observ[ed]” to informants who are “active and presumptively credible” (Code 2008, 37). Importantly, Code argues that the IRDC’s move to award epistemic authority to the Tanzanian people paved the way toward removing the epistemic injustices they had so long suffered. With this shift, the Tanzanians became epistemic agents whose knowledge was explicitly sought by the IRDC. But, we might ask, does including the Tanzanians’ local knowledge about disease entail they were being treated as genuine informants?

According to Dotson, not necessarily. Dotson cautions that Code’s analysis does not yet show that the “effective epistemic practices” instituted by the IRDC in conjunction with the Tanzanians entail the presence of “just epistemic practices” (Dotson 2008 52, my emphasis). Dotson casts doubt on the fact that Tanzanian people become epistemic informants (as opposed to mere sources of information) once they are asked to provide information about their knowledge (Dotson 2008, 59). Dotson notes that in order for mere information giving to grant one status as an epistemic informant, Code would also need to demonstrate that “sources of information…have to be silent sources,” for how come the Tanzanian people cannot act as sources of information who happen to speak (Dotson 2008, 59)? As Dotson writes: “highlighting this [epistemic] dependence alone does not, itself, demonstrate the type of epistemic cooperation that epistemic justice
appears to call for in practice” (Dotson 2008, 61).

With this cautionary note, Dotson alerts us to the sometimes-insidious manners in which solicitations for knowledge can appear to be coextensive with full informant status, where this is understood as a form of full epistemic agency.\(^{109}\) I turn now to my discussion of gender mainstreaming to see whether it risks treating women as mere sources of information rather than full informants.

2. Gender Mainstreaming

Gender mainstreaming is a development strategy that seeks to incorporate a gender equality perspective into “all policies at all levels and all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making” (Dankelman 2010, 12).\(^{110}\) The view developed in opposition to the notion that women’s equality should be promoted by specific women’s organizations that exist outside mainstream policy development and advocacy (Kerr 2004, 1). Formally originating at the 1995 UN Beijing World Conference on Women, gender mainstreaming has since gained a growing stronghold in national and international policy discussions, where efforts to include a gender perspective can be readily adduced (Woodford-Berger 2004, 66). The trend toward gender mainstreaming is particularly apparent in climate change discourse, which will be my focus.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{109}\) Medina argues that although granting one informant status is not itself epistemically unethical, treating someone “only as an informant” may very well be (2013, 92). On this view, even if Code showed that the Tanzanians were treated as informants, it may still not follow that the epistemic exchanges were just. More on this below.

\(^{110}\) The Group of Specialists on Gender Mainstreaming at the Council of Europe defines gender mainstreaming as follows: “Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making” (quoted in Dankelman, 2010, 12).

\(^{111}\) Several entities have announced commitments to gender mainstreaming, including the UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme), the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), the
Gender mainstreaming has undergone heavy criticism from feminist scholars. Among other things, feminists have objected that institutional resistance often undercuts gender mainstreaming’s intended outcomes, that the development of gender mainstreaming policy leaves out women’s movements, and that organizations have appropriated the gender mainstreaming agenda toward their own ends (True and Parisi 2013, 40). Others have suggested that gender mainstreaming amounts to a palatable form of neoliberal feminism that skirts the issue of women’s oppression by opting for a discourse of gender that effectively denies women’s particular subordination (Tolhurst et al. 2012, 1826).

For present purposes it is important to note that organizations that gender mainstream often attempt to accomplish their goals by seeking women’s knowledge. As evidence of how women’s environmental knowledge is being solicited, consider the following statements from various women’s and environmental organizations:

Women, especially indigenous women, can have particular knowledge of ecological linkages and fragile ecosystem management, information that can be crucial when formulating effective environmental policies. Women use this knowledge in managing local resources, but importantly, this knowledge can also be used for the development of pharmaceutical and other products with

United Nations Development Programme (UNEP), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the International Food and Agricultural Development Organization (IFAD) (Hannan 2009, 48).

See Behning and Pascual 2001; Seager and Hartmann 2005; Rao and Kelleher 2005; Dankelman 2010; Daly 2005; Jacquot 2010; Meier and Celis 2011; True and Parisi 2013. True and Parisi summarize the five most common criticisms of gender mainstreaming as follows: “1) that resistance to gender mainstreaming by institutional actors…undermines its intended effects; 2) that gender mainstreaming is often based on a single normative perspective on gender as a synonym for women thus reinforcing gender stereotypes…3) that the gender equality impacts and outcomes of mainstreaming are at best challenging to monitor and evaluate; 4) that women’s movements and civil society have been largely excluded from the development of mainstreaming policy; and finally, 5) that the gender mainstreaming agenda has been variously co-opted as a means to other institutional ends such as those of state security and economic growth” (2013, 40).

By women’s environmental knowledge, I designate broadly women’s knowledge of various aspects of the environment, especially those relevant to sustainability efforts. This includes women’s knowledge of environmentally sustainable practices in relation to “managing plants and animals in forests, drylands, wetlands and agriculture; in collecting water, fuel and fodder for domestic use and income generation; and in overseeing land and water resources” (United Nations Environment Programme: Women and the Environment 2004, 11).
commercial value (Clay 2003, A37, citing Chouchena-Rojas of the World Conservation Union).

It is also important to take into account women’s … traditional knowledge and practices in the development of new technology to address climate change (Lane and McNaught 2009, 67, citing Kiribati’s Minister for Internal and Social Affairs).

Women's networks are a largely untapped resource for spreading solutions to climate change such as solar, wind, and geothermal technologies; sustainable agriculture and permaculture; and new cultural narratives and economic structures.114

The programme aims to recover indigenous environmental knowledge – especially that of women – which, when blended with modern techniques and technology, could contribute to a more effective adaptation response (International Fund for Agricultural Development 2014, 8).

Because women often play the role of “carer” or “healer” in the community, they may possess knowledge of environmentally sustainable practices, such as benefits derived from medicinal plants and other non-timber forestry products (United Nations Development Programme, in Neimanis 2001, 163).

Women’s extensive experience makes them an invaluable source of knowledge and expertise on environmental management and appropriate actions (United Nations Environment Programme: Women and the Environment 2004, 11)

These passages highlight women’s knowledge as a desirable asset in sustainability and adaptation efforts. Certainly, drawing attention to women’s ecological knowledge as an asset is not in itself wrong. Indeed, more often than not, the acknowledgment that individuals have important knowledge to share is a sign of respect. However, since context is a crucial determinant to help assess whether knowers are being treated as objects rather than subjects of knowledge, I turn now to the wider context to assess the true risk of epistemic objectification.

3. Situating Epistemic Objectification in Context

To assess the risk of epistemic objectification in the case at hand, I follow Fricker’s call for attention to the broader context surrounding solicitations for women’s knowledge. I argue that trends toward the instrumentalization of Third World women suggest that solicitations for their knowledge are at higher risk of epistemic objectification. As in the case of the lover whose stomach is treated as a pillow in a context of instrumentalization versus one of respect, I will ask: do First World relations toward Third World women generally bear relations of instrumentalization, or respect?

Before moving on, I should note that I am not suggesting the above-cited organizations are in fact guilty of epistemic objectification. To know whether any given NGO or individual is guilty of epistemic objectification requires knowledge of the particular epistemic exchange that takes place, among other things, including “this woman, this contestable practice, this social intervention, this place, this problem of knowledge, this injustice, this locality” etc. (Code 2006, 18). My, perhaps modest, goal is rather to alert feminists to the risk of epistemic objectification, and to consider how it can be avoided, not to indict particular actors.

I proceed as follows. First, I pull from Spivak’s argument that development agencies are often complicit with colonialist and imperialist trends to reduce Third World subjects to objects to be “known.” Second, I show that Third World women have often been used as cheap sources of labor for the First World. These facts suggest that solicitations for women’s environmental knowledge might instantiate another way they

115 Although problematic for its implicit suggestion of First World superiority, I employ the language of Third and First World throughout this chapter. In my opinion, the language of developed versus developing and global North versus global South do not fare any better (the language of the “global South” would appear to suggest there are not pockets of poverty in the North, and pockets of wealth in the South).
are treated as sources of unpaid labor (the labor in this instance being women’s role as “vanguard[s] of the forthcoming ecological revolution to clean up the earth” (Sandilands, 1999, xi)). Third, I will note that many women’s ecological knowledge is acquired under contexts of oppression. Since oppressive contexts tend to advance the likelihood of a marginalized group’s instrumentalization, they will also tend to advance the likelihood of that group’s epistemic objectification. Finally, continuous with these concerns about women’s instrumentalization, I will briefly discuss arguments that instead of helping to improve gender equality, gender mainstreaming is predominantly employed to meet policy exigencies. In light of all this, I think the risk of women’s epistemic objectification in climate change discourse is real.

First, consider Spivak’s cautionary argument that efforts to gain Third World peoples’ perspectives or to “hear their voices” often serve the imperialist and globalizing projects of First World nations. Skeptical of how First World actors approach and represent Third World women, Spivak maintains that enabling subaltern women’s speech does not always entail their agency. For Spivak, it is never “as simple as empowering the ‘native,’ for the act of ‘empowerment’ itself has a silencing effect” (Maggio 2007, 427). Under the guise of empowerment, Spivak is particularly critical of the way Western academics seek knowledge from the Third World that is then catalogued and reframed for Western institutional purposes (Kapoor 2008, 46-7). For Spivak, information retrieval from the Third World always advances some First World agenda (Spivak 1999, 47). Such efforts typically rely on the use of what Spivak calls the Native Informant, or a chosen representative who speaks “for” the relevant Third World group or country, yet in a manner almost always staged for the Western investigator’s benefit (Ibid., 44). What is
more, as in solicitations for women’s environmental knowledge, Spivak stresses that the “typecase” of today’s Native Informant “is the poorest woman of the South” (Spivak 1999, 6). Not only are native informants mobilized as generic representatives of their home countries (i.e., as instantiations of the generic category ‘oppressed third world woman’), but notably for present purposes, they are also upheld as sources of “esoteric ‘ethnic’ or subaltern knowledge” (Kapoor 2008, 44). Hence Spivak’s claim that, “in the age of informatics, the Native Informant…is being reconstituted for (epistemic) exploitation” (Spivak 1999, 370).

Spivak argues that one way epistemic exploitation is accomplished is through the mobilization of gender and development programs.116 Even though development actors may understand themselves to be aiding those in need, cast in terms of the ongoing colonialis and imperialist implications of globalization projects more generally, Spivak’s point, in the words of Ilan Kapoor, is that “such noble and altruistic claims are never just that; knowledge is always imbricated with power, so that getting to know (or ‘discursively framing’) the Third World is also about getting to discipline and monitor it, to have a more manageable Other” (Kapoor 632). Indeed, this insight motivates Spivak’s claim that the UN’s very existence is premised on the assumption that the “‘rest of the world’ is unable to govern itself” (Spivak 1996, 2). The worry that First World nations are after their own imperialist desires to “know” and control the Third World thus

116Spivak writes: “…we are interested in this global theatre, staged to show participation between the North and the South, the latter constituted by Northern discursive mechanisms - a Platform of Action and certain power lines between the UN, the donor consortium, governments and the elite Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). In fact, the North organizes a South. People going to these conferences may be struck by the global radical aura. But if you hang out at the other end, participating day-to-day in the (largely imposed) politics of how delegations and NGO groups are put together - in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Central Asia, say, to name only the places this writer knows - you would attest that what is left out is the poorest women of the South as self-conscious critical agents…” (1996, 2).
increases the likelihood that women are being treated as mere sources of information to be “known” rather than genuine subjects of knowledge who could actually direct the conversation.

Second, in the midst of efforts to “aid” the South, many feminists are also critical of the First World economic order’s foreclosed reliance on Third World women’s cheap domestic labor. Indeed, although actors may uncritically discuss the sexual division of labor as a biological “fact” about men and women’s divergent roles, feminists have challenged this concept for its role in mystifying oppressive relations, including the mystified international division of labor covered over by First World self-aggrandizing gestures to “aid” poor women. According to Maria Mies, the concept of the sexual division of labor:

…obscures the fact that the relationship between male (that is, ‘human’), and female (‘natural’) labourers or workers is a relationship of dominance and even of exploitation. …Exploitative social relations exist when non-producers are able to appropriate and consume (or invest) products and services of actual producers…This concept of exploitation can be used to characterize the man-woman relationship over large periods of history, including our own (1986, 46).

Mies employs a Marxist framework to analyze the wider conditions of oppression that characterize the production of many women’s environmental knowledge. Through an analysis sensitive not only to gender, but to race and class dynamics as well, she asks “why, all of a sudden, women, and poor Third World women…have been rediscovered by international capital” (1986, 116)? She claims that defining women not as workers, but as ‘housewives’ under the so-called natural sexual division of labor is central to maintaining their subjugated role as the structural base that upholds capitalism. For both Mies and Spivak, then, we must keep in mind that “as the North continues ostensibly to ‘aid’ the South – as formerly imperialism ‘civilized’ the New World- the South’s [and
especially Southern women’s] crucial assistance to the North in keeping up its resource-hungry lifestyle is forever foreclosed” (Spivak 1999, 6).

I would argue that, in the case of gender mainstreaming in climate change discourse, what is further foreclosed is richer nations’ disproportionate complicity in anthropogenic climate change. As Chris Cuomo observes, “climate change was manufactured in a crucible of inequality” (2011, 693). It is the result of the world’s most powerful, industrialized nations relentlessly consuming the earth’s resources in a bid toward insatiable expansion, and exploiting Third World labor in the process. Indeed, rich nations are responsible for the vast majority of all carbon emissions — the United States being one of the worst offenders, contributing over 25 percent of all emissions while housing a mere 4.5 percent of the global population (Cuomo 2011, 697). As Spivak writes, “one Euro-American child consumes 183 times what one Third World child consumes” (Spivak 2007, 194 in Dogra 2011, 336). Additionally, since rich countries are better able to pour funds into prevention and adaptation (e.g. $50 billion to Hurricane Sandy relief), it follows that those most responsible for global warming have a much easier time coping with it.

It is within this unjust context – a context in which the First World is disproportionately responsible for climate change and continues to rely on women’s cheap or unpaid labor - that we must understand pleas for women’s ecological knowledge. In this context and perhaps especially in light of their disproportionate responsibility for climate change, First World nations’ solicitations for women’s knowledge risk sounding like calls for women to clean up the earth (note here that women’s environmental labor is also largely unpaid (Glazebrook 2011, 768; Dankelman
As Bernadette Resurreccion argues, upholding women’s environmental knowledge as the cure for climate change tends to “…naturalise and reinforce inequitable gender divisions of labour, thus inadvertently increasing women’s workloads in programmes aimed at empowering them. In short, they add ‘environment’ and ‘climate adaptation/mitigation’ to women’s already long list of caring roles” (2011, 5). Indeed, one finds that in both the First and Third Worlds, women tend to be regarded as caretakers of the earth in accordance with dominant patriarchal assumptions about women’s “natural” role in the reproductive sphere. This “natural” role is often used as justification for women’s unpaid domestic labor (Sandilands, 1999, xi). Consider the following quote from an Ontario Women and Environment document:

Women’s concern for the natural environment is rooted in our concern for the health and well being of our family and community […] Because we have traditionally been mother, nurse, and guardian for the home and community, women have been quick to perceive the threat to the health and lives of our families and neighbours that is posed by nuclear power proliferation, polluted waters, and toxic chemicals (Sandilands 1999, xiii).

Catriona Sandilands dubs the idea that women’s purportedly natural role as mothers in the home segues seamlessly into their “natural” role as mothers of the earth “motherhood environmentalism” (1999, xiii). Feminists have long been critical of the way patriarchy employs “motherhood environmentalism” rhetoric in the domestic sphere to

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117Resurreccion also notes that the rhetoric of women-as-caretakers is usually introduced as the flipside to an equally homogenizing women-as-victim narrative, resulting in a master narrative that pits women as “chief victim-and-caretaker” (2011, 3). Feminists are wary of the construal of Third World women as victims not only because claims about women’s heightened vulnerability are rarely challenged or complicated, but because this discourse associates the “Global North” with agency and the “Global South” with victimhood (Tuana 2013, 25). In Nancy Tuana’s words: “The recurring trope of conceptualizing the “Global South” as vulnerable and less able to act in the face of climate impacts, repeats and is informed by centuries of discourses regarding these countries as lessor-less developed, less modern, less technologically advances, less stable, less capable of self-governance. The problem is that while the rhetoric reflects certain truths, it plays into and perpetuates systematic prejudices about these countries embedded in the ontology of Western modernity” (Ibid., 26).

118Seema Arora-Jonsson also notes that, accompanied by an “uncritical consideration of power,” such a rhetoric is likely only to contribute to the “feminization of responsibility” (2014, 7).

119From the Ontario Advisory Council on Women’s Issues document.
instrumentalize women. (Indeed, the phrase “mother earth” readily conjures an essential association between women and nature.) Without receiving due compensation for their domestic labor, women throughout the world continue to do jobs thought to be proper to them and therefore not to be counted as “real” work. This presents another form of women’s instrumentalization that also increases the likelihood of women’s epistemic objectification.

Third, it is also important to consider the context of oppression in which many women’s ecological knowledge is acquired. As Fricker discusses, since oppression tends to involve a reduction of subjects to objects, and being treated like an object in general increases the chance of being treated like an object of knowledge, contexts of oppression make epistemic objectification more likely. In the present case, consider the straightforward injustices associated with many women’s environmental work. As noted earlier, it is widely known that many of the world’s women receive little to no pay for subsistence labor that provides basic material necessities, and that remains seriously underrepresented in employment statistics (UNEP 2004, 14; Mohanty 2003, 514; Ferguson 1998, 90). Moreover, in places where women work in direct connection to the land, there remains palpable inequality between men and women’s access to and ownership of land; in some places, less than 1 in 10 female farmers own land (UNEP 2004 28, 15). This work, particularly in cash crops, is also more laborious and difficult than men’s work (Glazebrook 2011, 768; Dankelman and Davidson 1991, 10). Further, many women tend to work longer days than men, have less access to education, are

\[120^1\] Sandilands observes, “The neoconservative aroma of this discourse should be quite noticeable: a return to patriarchal and heterosexual “family values” will restore not only a healthy (natural) family but a healthy (natural) planet” (1999, xiii).

\[121^1\] Recall here Fricker’s analysis of the way sexual objectification bleeds into epistemic objectification discussed in my previous chapter.
excluded from profit-bearing industries such as agroforestry and possess little access to “credit, machinery, labor, fertilizer, and agricultural extension services” (Glazebrook 2011, 766). In sum, women’s provision of water, fuel, and other agricultural services remains “informal, unacknowledged, badly paid and carried out under harsh conditions” (UNEP 2004, 17). Such injustices point to local and global inequalities too often ignored in development projects (Ferguson 1998, 100; Hennessy 2003, 26).

Arun Agrawal also describes how a context of oppression can increase the likelihood of being instrumentalized as a knower. Speaking specifically about indigenous people’s knowledge, he states, “once the knowledge systems of indigenous peoples are separated from them and saved, there is little reason to pay much attention to indigenous peoples themselves” (2002, 290). Agrawal worries that because of historically asymmetric power relations between indigenous peoples and knowledge seekers, solicitations for indigenous people’s knowledge are more likely to be exploitative than just. In his words, “the history of colonialism, replete with examples of unequal exchanges, should warn against any easy consolation that the strong, when coming in contact with weaker groups who have valuable possessions, will bolster the interests of the weak” (2002, 294)

Indeed, in considering the reasons why women’s knowledge is sought, many feminists have voiced concern that organizations that gender mainstream often seek knowledge not to further the goal of gender equality but to meet policy exigencies. Echoing the concerns discussed throughout this section, True and Parisi, among others, have noted that “the gender mainstreaming agenda has been variously co-opted as a means to other institutional ends such as those of state security and economic growth”
And Emmeline Skinner expresses the concern thus: “The need for a more gender-aware response to climate change is too often framed in terms of women’s potential role in enabling more effective interventions and in protecting natural resources such as forests” (2011, 20). Relatedly, other critics have noted that while gender mainstreaming has been “less vague about the instruments to be used in implementing gender mainstreaming—e.g., data gathering” it has been quite vague about articulating what gender equality actually demands (Meier and Celis 2011, 417). The result has been that policy actors have near-unregulated power to define the aim and implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies (Ibid.). Moreover, these concerns are further legitimated when one considers that some actors gender mainstream not for gender equity, but because of “policy-making exigencies or current styles or fashion” or, even more troubling, because European Union funding often hinges on whether a country has gender mainstreaming policies (Daly 2005, 440). With such a financial incentive in place, actors are predictably less concerned about the gender equity that actually arises from enacted policies.

This brief survey of trends toward women’s instrumentalization suggests that the risk of First World actors’ epistemic objectification of Third World women is real. It is within a context of women’s oppression, their general treatment as cheap (or often unpaid) sources of labor, and organizational interests to meet policy exigencies that we must read solicitations for women’s environmental knowledge. In this context, women’s knowledge is less likely to be shared in participatory epistemic exchanges. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the language in the passages above refers more to acquiring women’s knowledge and less to including women knowers in participatory discussions; it refers to
tapping women’s knowledge as a “resource,” instead of referring to women’s “voices and perspectives.”

4. Toward Epistemic Justice
At this point, it is worth considering what organizations, governments, institutions and individuals can do to avoid epistemic objectification. Pulling from Spivak, Medina and Dotson, I argue there are at least three commitments we must embrace to ensure appropriate solicitations for women’s knowledge. First, we must remain sensitive to conditions of oppression, especially ones that contribute to the knowledge one is soliciting. Since the risk of instrumentalization increases in a context of oppression, we must follow Medina’s call to learn about the social world of others. Second, inquirers must remain alert to their own motivations for seeking knowledge, and persistently analyze their potential complicity in oppressive structures. This means that inquirers must turn a critical lens on their own practices, and examine the disciplinary structures and institutions they inhabit, and especially how these shape continued inquiry into subaltern women. Finally and perhaps most critically, the epistemic exchanges themselves must be cooperative and just. The more informants themselves are active participants in conversations and determinants about how their knowledge is taken up, the more we can be confident that solicitations for their knowledge are just.

Many feminists emphasize seeking women’s voices and perspectives, rather than their knowledge full stop. Although she too highlights the importance of including women’s knowledge, Trish Glazebrook, for instance, situates her claims in a feminist call for women’s ethical inclusion. Notably, she writes that it “is counterproductive not to include women’s perspectives in climate change adaptation discussions” because of the “contributions they can make to the climate struggle as resilient and expert actors” (Glazebrook 2011, 769, my emphasis). Calls for women’s voices and perspectives are more in line with feminist epistemology’s goal to recognize women as epistemic agents. This is not to say, however, that feminists do not also speak about including women’s “knowledge,” but that they often do so in a manner geared explicitly toward feminist goals of increasing women’s agency and participation in general.
First, to avoid epistemic objectification, we should be aware of contexts of oppression that contribute to knowledge production (especially those First World actors are complicit in). But can we really expect inquirers to know whether the knowledge they seek exists in a context of oppression? Here I follow Medina in his call for epistemic vigilance. To remain sensitive to varying forms of oppression, Medina urges us to hone the epistemic virtue of “knowledge of others” (2013, 37). For him, “responsible agency requires…minimal social knowledge of others and minimal empirical knowledge of the world” (127). Medina describes a case of active ignorance in which a student attempted to absolve himself from placing a pig’s head on the doorstep of Vanderbilt University’s Jewish Life Center during Rosh Hashanah, one of the holiest days of the Jewish year (135). In his defense, the student claimed ignorance of the relationship between pig parts and the oppression of Jews (136). Yet, Medina claims, this student is still responsible. In short, failure to inquire and learn about others, especially oppressed others, can also amount to complicity in wrongdoing (Medina 2013, 140). As much as possible, then, we must learn about the world of others, especially oppressed others, in conversation with them. This requires the further development of what Medina calls “beneficial epistemic friction,” which obligates inquirers to listen to contrasting perspectives and viewpoints (2013, 176). In learning about the social world of others, epistemic friction is especially important because it enables those whose viewpoints are not sufficiently heard (i.e. Third World women) to speak and alert others to their ignorance (176).

But the work of alerting inquirers to their own ignorance cannot fall to informants alone. Rather, to the second commitment, inquirers have a duty to gain not only “minimal social knowledge of others” but also “knowledge of ourselves” (Medina 2013, 127).
Spivak explains the injunction to self-knowledge in terms of Western intellectuals’ need first and foremost to analyze their own complicity in producing narratives that represent Native Informants in homogenizing and self-interested manners. This involves what Spivak calls “unlearning one’s privilege” so one can “learn to learn from” others (Andreotti 2007, 75). Spivak emphasizes learning to learn because she thinks we first need to turn a critical lens on our own practices (Andreotti 2007, 76). As Ilan Kapoor explains, learning to learn from below is “a suspension of belief that one is indispensable, better or culturally superior; it is refraining from thinking that the Third World is in trouble and that one has the solutions; it is resisting the temptation of projecting oneself or one’s world onto the Other” (2008, 56). Learning to learn first obligates inquirers to query relentlessly the motivations and presuppositions that inform their development work, and to examine the disciplinary structures and institutions they inhabit.

Finally, we must attend to the epistemic interactions with those whose knowledge is being solicited. This means ensuring that just epistemic exchanges obtain between informants and inquirers. And this involves not only treating others as epistemic informants, à la Fricker, but as actors involved in “full and equal epistemic cooperation” (Medina 2013, 92). We can usefully think of epistemic cooperation in terms of Kristie Dotson’s difference between “knowing better” and actually “being better,” the latter of which recognizes not merely that people can be sources of desired information, but “epistemic informants that can inform epistemic practices at every level” (Dotson 2008, 62). This means that informants do not simply enter the picture when their knowledge is needed for some First World benefit, whether it is to meet a policy exigency or to confirm serviceable representations of the Third World. Rather, epistemically just
relations involve epistemic agents who are in principle committed to what Medina calls norms of “reversibility” (Medina 2013, 93). That is, epistemic agents should never be pigeonholed into one epistemic role (93). Rather, their roles as inquirer, informant, interpreter, communicator and so on should always remain “potentially reversible” (93).

5. Collective and Individual Responsibility

Organizations combating climate change that are sensitive to oppression must remain vigilantly aware of epistemic injustice in all its forms. Although seeking women’s ecological knowledge does present the worry of epistemic objectification, I have also gestured toward ways to ensure epistemically just relations with the women whose knowledge one seeks. Specifically, with efforts to meet each of the three considerations outlined above, inquirers can gradually take measures to avoid epistemic objectification.

Thus far I have spoken predominantly of organizations, but the obligation to ensure epistemically just relations falls not only to organizations, but to governments, institutions, groups and, importantly, individuals themselves. Speaking about climate change, Chris Cuomo writes:

…nations and international bodies are not the only relevant parties with moral responsibilities related to climate change. Mitigation also involves policies, practices, and decisions at other “levels” of ethical agency, carried out by corporations, state and local governments, communities, households, and individuals. Climate change is a global issue that is also always local, as impacts occur and responses are implemented in specific locations (2011, 692).

Similarly, in the present case, NGOs and state actors that employ gender mainstreaming

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123Medina stresses this point because epistemic agency is not adequately captured by the “role” one currently inhabits, e.g. informant versus source of information versus knowledge-seeker (2013, 95). Indeed, insofar as we all inhabit these diverse roles at various times, it is unhelpful to limit considerations of epistemic agency to one’s (forever varying) “role” (93). Instead, Medina claims that one must consider the “communicative dynamics in which these roles are entangled” (95).
strategies are not the only relevant parties with obligations to ensure the ethical solicitation of women’s knowledge. Following Cuomo, corporations, state and local governments, communities, households and individuals must also take responsibility to ensure they are seeking knowledge ethically. Indeed, the urgency of our environmental problems, and the understandably panicked response we may have to them, increase the likelihood that we will all miss ways in which our proposed solutions are complicit in historical or ongoing forms of oppression.
CHAPTER IV

POLLUTED KNOWLEDGE AND ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION

While there has been considerable debate over the use of animals in experimentation, there has been less debate over the ethics of using knowledge gained from animal experimentation. In this chapter, I explore the ethics of using knowledge gained through animal experimentation. Although feminist epistemologists have attended to the politics surrounding the production of knowledge, they have paid somewhat less attention to the ethics surrounding the use of that knowledge. I here argue that we have at least a pro tanto moral and epistemic reason not to use knowledge acquired through oppression. This point is appreciated in debates over the use of Nazi data, where one meets the argument that the use of Nazi data is unethical because it was gained through oppression. I claim that similar concerns apply in the case of animal experimentation. If this is right, then it turns out that not only is animal experimentation wrong, it is also wrong to benefit epistemically from it.

First, I describe why animal experimentation qualifies as oppressive. Next I present the argument against the use of morally polluted knowledge. Although the use of morally polluted knowledge may strike many as an exclusively moral matter, I will argue that we have reason to withhold the use of morally polluted evidence in the formation of our beliefs. The use of knowledge acquired through animal experimentation thus proves to be a significant moral and epistemic problem, and one that blurs the boundaries between the two.
1. Oppression in Animal Experimentation

Despite heavy opposition from animal activists, not only is animal experimentation\footnote{When I use the term animal experimentation throughout this chapter, I intend to denote experimentation that involves pain to or the death of animals.} still widely permitted in the US, but it remains mandatory for most biomedical research (Bekoff 2010, 236; Lafolette 2011, 802). Although scientists are obligated to use the least sentient animals still suitable for their research, other considerations such as the importance of genetic closeness often trump this obligation (Bekoff 2010, 237). The resulting reality is that over one million dogs, cats, primates and other species undergo experimentation annually in the US (Ibid.). Marc Bekoff estimates that between 80 and 100 million additional mice and rats are used for experimentation annually, not to mention the fish and frogs unaccounted for in these numbers (Ibid., 236).

To show that animal experimentation qualifies as oppressive, I draw from Ann Cudd and Iris Marion Young’s accounts of oppression. Since Young aims to “systematize the meaning of the concept of oppression,”\footnote{Unlike Cudd, Young does not seek to provide a set of criteria for oppression because she worries that such attempts frequently result in “fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more fundamental or more grave” (1990, 40). Although I agree that this may be the case, I do not think it precludes the possibility of outlining criteria for oppression as Cudd does. We can both outline criteria and refrain from qualifying whose oppression is graver.} while Cudd ambitiously seeks to identify criteria that will “pick out all and only the oppressed groups,” both accounts will prove useful for the present analysis (1990, 40; 2006, 26). Moreover, I hope the evaluation of animal experimentation on two accounts of oppression will allay specific worries over the inadequacies of either account (see Allen 2008; Varden 2009; Sample 2007).

Young offers what she takes to be a comprehensive list of varying forms of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. With these five faces of oppression, Young’s account points us away from
oppression crudely understood as tyrannical rule or “evil perpetrated by Others” (1990, 41). Oppression does not require an ill-intended agent who directly harms others. Rather, it is most centrally a structural affair. It is better understood in terms of systematic constraint that does not disappear with the eradication of specific rulers (41). Insidiously, then, and especially apt in the case of a speciesist society, oppression often exists simply “because of the everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society” (41).

Lori Gruen pulls from Young’s criteria to shed light on how myriad human-animal interactions qualify as oppressive. Consider first exploitation. For Young, exploitation takes place when one group benefits systematically from the labor of another (1990, 49). Exploitative relations “are produced and reproduced through a systematic process in which the energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves” (50). Labor politics under capitalism are a prime example. While Gruen applies Young’s analysis of exploitation to characterize the lives of confined dairy cows, hens and sows whose reproductive capacities are labored for human food to the point of exhaustion or death, experimented animals likewise labor as research subjects for human purposes, often to the point of exhaustion or death (Gruen 2009, 162; Knight 2011, 21; Haraway 2008, 58). This insight leads Jonathan L. Clark to note that if human “guinea-pigging” is considered an “onerous form of clinical labour” (understood as a process where one lends one’s body to potentially harmful research) why not the guinea pigs themselves (2014, 154)? Guinea

126 More specifically, for Young, oppression names “the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and marker mechanisms – in short, the normal processes of everyday life” (Young 1990, 41).
pigs, in addition to so many other laboratory animals, also “give” their bodies to harmful research. As Donna Haraway observes, in so many ways, “animals work in labs, but not under conditions of their own design” (Haraway 2008, 73). They labor as sources of value for capitalist industry. Even an etymology of the term “laboratory” reminds us of the centrality of labor in the laboratory. From the Latin laborare, the laboratory was defined originally as a “place to labor or work”. And this definition should include not only the laboring scientists, but also the subjects who labor under their control.

Second, consider powerlessness. For Young, powerlessness defines a group that is almost entirely unable to change their situation, exercise autonomy, develop their capacities, express themselves intelligibly to others, or garner respect; “the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them” (56-7). Laboratory animals (and most all animals under human control) are powerless to make decisions, choose their own life paths and exercise their capacities (Gruen 2009, 163). If they are not brought into the world for the explicit purpose of laboratory study, laboratory animals are stolen from their natural habitats and thus prevented from defining their own lives (2009, 163). As Gruen writes: “From zoos to feedlots, pet shops to laboratories, factory to fur farms, nonhuman animals are denied the most basic control over their lives. If they are allowed to reproduce, their infants are usually taken from them; they rarely have choices about when to eat, what to eat, or how much to eat; and very few have choices about basic movement…” (2009, 163). Indeed, animals who attempt to escape from their enclosures are often found and returned immediately to the laboratory.

127Although guinea pigs do not “give” their bodies in the sense of lend, since as I discuss in the section on Cudd, their participation is clearly non-consensual.
Therefore, even if they attempt to exercise some power, their efforts to resist are quickly thwarted.

Third, consider how human values are imposed on animals through cultural imperialism. Cultural imperialism takes place when “the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (Young 1990, 58-9). In cultural imperialism, what the dominant group says, thinks and does goes (59). Their values are what matter, and what will become infused as “universal” values. The idea that human values matter whereas animals’ values do not is what underlies nearly all justifications for the use of animals. That humans value medical experiments, meat-eating, animal entertainment in zoos and pet-keeping are all seen as more important than any value animals may have for themselves. In addition to the way pets are forced to live by human cultural standards (including that we “keep them indoors or put bells around cats’ necks to impact their success at hunting or forbid dogs from digging or otherwise scavenging for food”), laboratory animals are also evidently forced to live by human standards (Gruen 2009, 164). Laboratory animals are also kept indoors, fed specific amounts of foods at certain times (or starved in some cases), and forbidden from hunting, reproducing or performing species-typical behavior all in the name of human value.128

128Gruen also notes that cultural arguments are often invoked as justifications for the oppression of animals, thus seeing another form of cultural imperialism. She discusses the Makah tribe whose practice of hunting whales is considered essential to their cultural identity (2009, 164). “While some Makah have suggested that the cultural values and the value of the whales can be simultaneously promoted in the hunt, it might also be claimed that the Makah are imposing their culture on the whales, much the way white Americans are imposing their cultural values on the Makah and other Native Nations. These impositions represent a form of cultural imperialism and in the case of the whales, it denies the very possibility that a whale’s life may be valuable to her and her family independent of the dominant cultures conception of that value” (164). Importantly, however, Gruen also acknowledges that the Makah are only culturally dominant in relation to the whales. Outside of this relation, it is the Makah who are most often subject to the cultural imperialism of dominant U.S. society (164).
Animals are also subject to extreme violence. For Young, violence names a systematic process whereby subjugated groups constantly fear attack (1990, 61). Attack here includes physical as well as psychological violence (61). It is difficult to think of animals’ lives in laboratories as anything but systematically subject to violence; when they are not isolated in confinement, they are undergoing torturous and painful experiments (more on this in my discussion of Cudd’s harm criterion). Moreover, like prisoners, animals in confinement are known to suffer psychologically. Lisa Guenther describes a disturbing sensory and maternal deprivation experiment on kittens in which “stereotypies such as rocking, pacing, repetitive grooming, biting, and so forth emerge as if to compensate for the loss of complex, intercorporeal relations to another being” (2013). Such atypical psychological behaviors characterize the plight of many laboratory animals (Novek 2005; Reinhardt 2004 in Guenther 2013).

Finally, animals in laboratories are also clearly marginalized. Possibly the most dangerous form of oppression according to Young, marginalization precludes an entire group of individuals from active social participation by denying them equal citizenship, depriving them of material resources and subjecting some to eventual extermination (1990, 53-4). Although the great apes are gradually being granted the status of personhood in several countries, the vast majority of animals – especially laboratory animals - are far from being granted similar forms of recognition (Donaldson and

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129 This insight leads Guenther to further argue that “the hierarchical opposition of humans to animals that humanist discourse presupposes ultimately works against prisoners, who share vital interests in common with nonhuman animals held in prolonged, intensive confinement in factory farms, laboratories, zoos, and other sites” (2013).

130 Invoking a comparison between prisoners and lab animals, one scientist makes the following observation: “The standard lab cage is deadly boring: for the rat it’s like being in solitary confinement” (Linden 2007, 77 in Marks 2011, 7).

131 However, the Great Ape Project, which seeks to grant legal rights to non-human apes, has also been criticized on the grounds that it seeks to grant robust forms of recognition only to those animals most
Moreover, once animals in laboratories are no longer deemed “useful [for] participation in social life,” they are often subject to extermination, immediately killed once the experiment is over (Young 1990, 53; Clark 2014, 159).

Animal experimentation thus satisfies all of Young’s five faces of oppression. On this account of oppression, animals in laboratories are clearly oppressed. I will now consider Ann Cudd’s account of oppression. Although there is some overlap between Young and Cudd’s accounts, Cudd’s criteria will enable us to consider further ways animals are oppressed in experimentation.

Cudd lays out four jointly sufficient conditions for oppression: the group condition, the harm condition, the coercion condition and the privilege condition (2006, 21-3). The group condition states that members of a group are subject to unfair treatment because of their membership in a specific group (21). The harm condition specifies that members of this group will also be subject to routine and unfair harm (21). The coercion condition says that the group members are subject to harmful and unfair treatment through unjustified coercion (22). Finally, the privilege condition states that for every group subject to unfair/harmful treatment, some other group directly benefits (or gains some privilege) from that treatment (23). Animal experimentation meets all four conditions.

Gary Francione, for instance, argues that the Great Ape Project is guilty of a “‘similar-minds’ position that links the moral status of nonhumans to their possession of humanlike cognitive characteristics.” Gary Francione, “The Great Ape Project: Not so Great,” 2006, http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/the-great-ape-project-not-so-great/#.U2lJqF60Zg0. Similarly, Kelly Oliver argues that “Just as feminists ask why women have to be like men in order to be equal, we can ask why animals have to be like us to have inherent value. The notion that man is the measure of all things is precisely the kind of thinking that justifies exploiting animals, along with women and the earth, for his purposes” (2009, 30).
First, it is obvious that animals are experimented on because they belong to a specific group, namely the (socially constructed) group of non-human animals.\textsuperscript{132} Consider here Carl Cohen’s defense of animal experimentation on the basis of animals’ membership in the group of non-humans. Cohen responds to Peter Singer’s argument that it is pure speciesism\textsuperscript{133} to support the killing of animals because they lack the requisite capacities, but to decry the killing of humans who lack the same capacities (e.g. the capacity for reason, language or the ability to make moral claims, to name a few popular contenders). Cohen argues that it is acceptable to use animals but not humans in experimentation because humans are of a different “kind” from animals. Yet despite Cohen’s acknowledgment that not all humans possess his requisite capacity for moral judgment (in his case, the capacity for moral judgment) - thus challenging the idea that all humans are of the morally relevant “kind” - Cohen insists that humans are of such a kind that “rights pertain to them as humans” whereas “animals are of such a kind that rights never pertain to them” (2001, 37). But since his requisite capacity names the supposed condition upon which one enters into the morally relevant “kind,” Cohen is at pains to say why humans and animals are of a morally different kind. Cohen is thus a good example of the stubborn insistence to suggest that the group of non-human animals deserves to be experimented upon simply because they belong to the group of non-human

\textsuperscript{132}Some would object to the idea that the group non-human animals qualifies as a group. But, as Gruen explains, “However diverse the group nonhumans actually is, and despite the importance in most contexts to attend to the diversity of interests and needs that the variety of species within the group nonhuman have, the larger category serves a central symbolic role in human social lives and in our self-understanding…” (2009, 167). Since the group has a “social reality,” as she puts it, it is appropriately considered one (Ibid.). Maneesha Deckha similarly notes that the group “non-human animals” has perhaps nothing but a social reality, since there is nothing all “non-human animals” share in common that would exclude humans aside from the way we oppress them (2006).

\textsuperscript{133}Where speciesists “allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species” (Singer in Cohen and Regan 2001, 61).
animals. As justified on Cohen-style grounds, animal experimentation meets Cudd’s group condition.

Second, as discussed under Young’s definition of violence, animals in experimentation are also subject to routine and systematic harm. Animals almost always undergo severe pain, and usually death, in experimentation. Indeed, insofar as most experiments’ express purpose is to discover when a particular drug or product becomes toxic, animal experimentation involves a near duty to inflict pain on animals (Cochrane 2012, 54). This experimentation includes: eye research that burns, removes or sews shut the eyes of monkeys, rabbits, dogs and cats; burn research that burns animals with chemicals or immerses them into boiling water; radiation research that subjects animals to radiation poisoning; electric shock research and aggression research in which animals are isolated, sleep-deprived, malnourished or immobilized; and maternal deprivation research that causes severe emotional and psychological harm to animals (Regan 2004, 171; Monamy 2009, 62).

Consider carcinogenicity studies. In such studies, animals are forced to absorb or, in the case of tobacco, inhale carcinogenic substances. It has been estimated that one carcinogenetic study alone uses over 1200 animals (Knight 2011, 63). These procedures have been said to cause the highest levels of pain and suffering in animals (Ibid.). One paper describes the process: “…in order to simulate human smoking patterns, a 2-s puff from a burning cigarette is diluted with air and forced into a chamber for a short period, followed by an air purge. However, animals that are being forced involuntarily to inhale the smoke suffer avoidance reactions and change their breathing patterns to shallow,
hesitant inspirations…” (International Agency for Research on Cancer 2004, 973). The pain animals undergo in carcinogenicity studies is also long-term; rodents are initially dosed when they are 6-8 weeks old and continue to be dosed for 90-110 weeks, at the end of which (if they survive) they are killed (Knight 2011, 63). Or, consider the infamous Draize Eye Irritancy Test that restrains animals, often rabbits, and drops a toxic substance such as a household cleaner fluid into the animal’s eye (Gruen 1993, 70). Over a few weeks, the animal is monitored for harmful effects such as infection before being killed (Ibid.). To make matters worse, although these procedures are highly painful and invasive (toxicity studies often involve running a tube into the oesophagus for easy administration), many of them do not use any anaesthetic (Monamy 2009, 29, 31).

Third, animal experimentation also involves coercion, understood here as the use of force in the absence of consent. Certainly, when primates are captured in the wild and brought to foreign laboratories to live out their existence in cages, when rodents and rabbits are deprived of their natural desire to reproduce, socialize and explore, and when the majority of experiments do not use anesthetic of any kind, one is hard-pressed to suggest that animals consent to their treatment (Knight 2011, 29). If the treatment animals undergo is not sufficient to establish their coercion, however, consider instead the many confined animals who attempt to escape laboratories, thus indicating their lack of willful participation. In 2009, nine snow monkeys managed to escape from an Oregon animal testing lab after a cleaner forgot to lock a cage door (all were found and returned

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134 The study itself even notes that comparisons between humans and animals are dubious: “Cigarette smoke has been tested for carcinogenicity by inhalation studies in rodents, rabbits and dogs. The model systems for animal exposure to tobacco smoke do not fully simulate human exposure to tobacco smoke, and the tumours that develop in animals are not completely representative of human cancer. Nevertheless, the animal data provide valuable insights regarding the carcinogenic potential of tobacco smoke” (International Agency for Research on Cancer 2004, 1185).
to the lab three days later). Mice are also “known escape artists,” and will readily flee if a cage door is left unfastened. That captive animals resist and flee whenever possible suggests they do not consent to their treatment. And although some may deny that animals can consent, it is surely harder to deny they can dissent. As Catharine MacKinnon writes, animals “vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in alarm, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim off” (2004, 270).

Finally, animal experimentation clearly meets the privilege condition, brought about as it is for the express benefit of humans. Animals have been used in efforts to find cures for nearly all human diseases, including cancer, AIDS, diabetes, Lou Gehrig’s disease and Alzheimer’s (Francione 2000, 32), to name just a few. Often, animals are also used for their organs and to test the effects and safety of certain vaccines (Monamy 2009, 60). Animals have also been used to better understand phenomena affecting human minds, including “depression, drug addiction, aggressive behaviour, communication, learning and problem solving, normal and abnormal social behaviour, reproduction and parental care” (Ibid., 61).

This section was intended to show that on at least two working accounts of oppression, animal experimentation qualifies as oppressive. Before moving onto the argument that knowledge gained through severe oppression is morally tainted, however, I want to discuss the implicit comparison I am drawing between the use of Nazi data and knowledge gained from animal experimentation. Since many object to such comparisons

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on the grounds that they are offensive to the memory of Holocaust victims, it will be important to respond briefly to their concerns.137

In my view, we can address the moral permissibility of comparing distinct forms of oppression in a roundabout way. Instead of arguing over whether it is immoral to invoke such comparisons, I want to suggest instead that we cannot fully appreciate how any one form of oppression is structured in the absence of such comparisons.138 This is because, as Maneesha Deckha explains, “the commodification and exploitation of women, racialized peoples, and animals are indelibly linked and mutually sustaining” (2008, 38-9).

Consider first that animals perhaps more than any other group have come to “stand in for what we cannot think and what we cannot accept about ourselves” (Oliver 2010, 279). Animals are equated with mindlessness, savagery, embodiment, disorder, beastliness, and irrationality, to name just a few. Indeed, animals are made to absorb “undesirable” traits so much so that comparing humans to animals has proven to be an incredibly effective strategy in human oppression. In the relevant context, consider how the treatment of holocaust victims was justified with the idea that it is acceptable to kill

137Consider the uproar that ensued following PETA’s 2003 campaign entitled “Holocaust on your plate,” which placed images of concentration camp inmates alongside images of caged animals. One tagline read: “To animals, all humans are Nazis” (invoking a similar line by Jewish writer Isaac Bashevis Singer) (Sztybel 2006, 98). In response, several Jewish groups and individuals called the exhibit “outrageous, offensive... abhorrent,” and a “reprehensible misuse of Holocaust materials.” James D. Besser, “Museum demands end to PETA’s use of Holocaust photos,” JWeekly, March 7, 2003, http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/19449/museum-demands-end-to-peta-s-use-of-holocaust-photos/.
138Of course, such comparisons must always be made with the utmost caution (for instance, they should not be made as claims to identical oppressions see Sztybel 2006, Painter 2014). However, we should also remain critical of objections to such comparisons on speciesist grounds. One should object, that is, to claims that the comparison is offensive because holocaust victims matter morally whereas animals matter less or not at all. Consider the idea that holocaust victims matter morally whereas enslaved blacks matter less or not at all. Once speciesist objections are pushed aside, and the analogy is understood not as a claim to identical oppressions, I think the comparison becomes instructive not only for its ability to shed light on the gravity of the human use of animals, but also to understand better human oppression.
those who are “subhuman” or “mere ‘animals’” (Szytbel 2006, 117). Hitler variously described Jews as “the spider that slowly sucks the people’s blood, a band of rats that fight each other until they draw blood, the parasite in the body of other peoples, the eternal leech” (Patterson 2002, 45). And Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels said they were “no longer human beings. They are animals,” leading to propaganda that described Jews as “parasites, vermin, beasts of prey –in a word, subhuman” (Ibid., 46). Moreover, women at Ravensbruck concentration camp were called “rabbit girls”, and an Auschwitz prisoner doctor recounted that Josef Mengele treated Jews like “laboratory animals [since] we were really biologically inferior in his eyes” (Ibid., 47). This barely scratches the surface of the myriad comparisons between Holocaust victims and animals.

What to make of the fact that the oppression of Holocaust victims (as well as so many other oppressed groups) took place in large part by comparing humans to animals? There are many responses one could have to humans being compared to animals in their oppression. The most common response would likely be to restore oppressed humans to the sphere of humanity by acknowledging that they possess whatever requisite human capacity is fashionable, usually rationality. But this response is inadequate because it fails to interrogate the underlying mechanism by which both humans and animals become oppressed. And this mechanism, as ecofeminists and others have widely observed, is a binary logic that privileges the rational-minded-civilized over the irrational-embodied-natural (Wyckoff 2014, 4; Oliver 2009; Gruen 2009, 1993; Gaard 2011, 2010; Adams 1990; Plumwood 1991, 1993, 2002a, 2002b; Warren 1987, 1990; Bordo 2003; Grosz 1994; Haraway 1991; Griffin 1978; Merchant 1980; Daly 1978 et al.). According to this logic and as discussed in chapter one, many oppressed groups are first denied the
requisite human capacity (rationality, language, thought etc.) and then relegated to the latter side of the divide. We thus miss a crucial feature of how oppression as a system operates if we fail to recognize that marginalized women, blacks, Jews, indigenous people and so many more oppressed groups have all been essentialized as irrational, embodied and dumb in their oppression. (Recall here the Vancouver Missing Women’s denial of rational human status and their concomitant relegation to a sphere of embodied, irrational, animality). Steve Best explains:

…humanism, speciesism and animal domestication provide the conceptual template and social practice whereby humans begin to clearly distinguish between “human rationality” and “animal irrationality.” Animals – defined as “brute beasts” lacking “rationality” – thereby provided the moral basement into which one could eject women, people of color, and other humans deemed to be subhuman or deficient in (Western male) “humanity.”

Since varying forms of oppression operate according to a similar logic whereby animals, marginalized women, holocaust victims, people of color and more are all exploited, objectified and instrumentalized, failure to interrogate them together means we will miss the ways they employ fundamentally similar justifications and mutually fortify one another (Gruen 1993; Oliver 2009). In short, it is crucial to acknowledge that the denial of rational humanity results in both humans and animals’ reduction to the status of mere resources to be used. Tellingly for the present context, this logic is particularly characteristic of a scientific mentality of detachment and dispassion. Gruen explains,

Reducing animals to objects devoid of feelings, desires, and interests is a common consequence of the scientific mindset by which those engaged in experimentation distance themselves from their subjects. Ordered from companies that exist to provide “tools” for the research business, animals’ bodies are currently bought and sold in ways that are reminiscent of slave trading in the United States or,

more recently, Nazi experiments on women (1993, 66).

Given that both humans and animals are oppressed in similar (yet not identical) manners in line with an overall structure of oppression, then, I think it is not only morally permissible but morally instructive from an anti-oppression standpoint to extrapolate from arguments against the use of Nazi data to arguments against the use of knowledge gained through animal experimentation. And, to repeat, this is because, as Deckha puts the point, “the social meanings ascribed to abjected animal bodies were and are generated from the same discourses which produce(d) abjected human bodies” (2006). It is with the sensitivity toward similar underlying forms of oppression in mind that I now turn to my discussion of morally polluted knowledge.

2. Morally Polluted Knowledge

To understand the idea of morally polluted knowledge, it will first be important to discuss the concept of moral taint. Moral taint arises when one is associated with some moral wrongdoing simply by virtue of being implicated in a causal chain of historical or ongoing wrong. Consider Anthony Appiah’s example of the knife-seller, whom I’ll call Joe. Joe, whose store is next to another knife-seller, one day overhears a gang member saying he will buy a knife for use in the murder of another gang member (1991, 226). Joe knows that the gang member means what he says, that the police cannot come in time to stop him, and that the gang member will purchase the knife from the other seller if Joe

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140Elsewhere Gruen cautions against too much focus on the similarities among different types of oppression at the expense of the differences (2007, 336). As she writes, “If a moral or political commitment is spelled out in terms of similarities that miss difference, then many will find such commitments alienating” (337). In drawing comparisons between different forms of oppression, I agree it is important not to suggest they are without relevant differences.
Appiah asks us to consider whether Joe has any reason to refrain from selling the knife. Even if the outcome remains the same, many still believe it is morally right for Joe to refrain from selling the knife. The reason is that Joe will be “morally tainted” by association with the act of moral wrongdoing. One sometimes hears these concerns over purchasing cheap products created in sweatshops or conditions of forced labor. The idea here is that such associations with moral wrongdoing can alone count as a reason (although likely not the only reason) against performing the act in question.

To turn to an example of morally tainted knowledge, consider the debates in bioethics over the use of Nazi data. As the Nuremberg trials revealed, the Nazis performed and documented a series of horrific human experiments at several concentration camps (Cohen 1990, 103). Like in animal experimentation, victims were subject to torture for tests that were in most cases expressly intended to end in death. These include hypothermia experiments that submerged victims into ice water until they froze to death, high altitude experiments that dissected victims’ brains while they were still alive, experiments to test intravenous poison injections, and forced artificial insemination and sterilization. Hitler’s biographer, Allan Bullock, describes the experiments as follows:

Among the other uses to which concentration-camp prisoners were put was to serve as the raw material for medical experiments by S.S. doctors. None of the post-war trials produced more macabre evidence than at the so-called ‘Doctors’ Trial. All the experiments were conducted without anaesthetics or the slightest attention to the victims’ sufferings. Amongst the ordeals to which they were subjected were intense air pressure and intense cold until the ‘patient’s’ lungs

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141 However, it is worth noting that Appiah himself finds the argument from moral taint of only “marginal relevance to the real issues” (1991, 236).

142 In relation to the debate over morally tainted Nazi data discussed below, see Moe 1984; Martin 1986; Schafer 1986; Post 1991; Ridley 1995; Godlovitch 1997; Zion 1998; Cohen 1990; Plaisted 2007, et al.
burst or he froze to death; the infliction of gas gangrene wounds; injection with typhus and jaundice; experiments with bone grafting; and a large number of investigations of sterilization (for ‘racial hygiene’), including castration and abortion. According to a Czech doctor who was a prisoner at Dachau and who personally performed some seven thousand autopsies, the usual results of such experiments were death, permanent crippling, and mental derangement (in Sztybel 2006, 108).

It goes without saying that Nazi experimentation constitutes an egregious instance of oppression. Yet, given that these experiments also gave rise to data that could be useful today, a moral dilemma presents itself. However, given the severity of the oppression involved, many have objected to the use of these data. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for one, considered using Nazi data in the development of air pollution regulations on phosgene, an industrial chemical used in pesticides and plastics in the United States (Cohen 1990, 109). Whereas the EPA had no viable means of testing the effects of phosgene on human populations, the Nazis ran such experiments on over fifty prisoners in preparation for a possible phosgene attack on Germany by the Allies (Ibid., 110). These experiments resulted in relevant data on the effects of phosgene – data that could be instrumental in saving lives today. Despite the potential utility of these data, the EPA decided against using them. Similarly, the New England Journal of Medicine declined to publish Nazi data that could have been useful for hypothermia research (Ibid., 108).

What best accounts for the decision to forgo the use of Nazi research? The most plausible explanation is a product of seeing the information gathered as “morally

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143 This includes, for example, data derived from hypothermia experiments regarding tolerance to cold and ways to revive people gone unconscious from hypothermia (Godlovitch 1997, 2). Interestingly, Godlovitch also invokes, but does not develop, a comparison to animal experimentation: “I must add — though this will play no role in the discussion — that I can find no interesting moral difference between these research cases, so graphic to us now, and the current daily routine use of other animals by researchers worldwide” (Ibid.).
polluted.” The idea here is that information acquired through unethical research is, by virtue of being produced under immoral circumstances, corrupt. This pollution accordingly gives us reasons to be wary of appeals to its use. The arguments in favor of this view most often track concerns that by employing Nazi data, users 1) disrespect the victims of the experiments, 2) effectively participate in past wrongdoing, 3) become corrupt because they begin to view the research positively and, 4) implicitly or explicitly encourage others to perpetrate evil in the future (Plaisted 2007, 2; Zion 1998, 233). As Cox and Levine put the general idea, “Acquiring and using results from Nazi experimentation for ‘scientific’ purposes is wrong… because it exploits the work of the Nazi doctors and the torture of their victims: it amounts to retrospective complicity in Nazi crimes” (2004, 223).

In their explanation for why they refuse to publish data arising from immoral research, the New England Journal of Medicine echoes the first and fourth conditions, and also adds an expressive argument against the use of morally tainted data. The journal said it would not publish immorally acquired data because 1) publishing unethical work violates the principle of respecting the research subject (the first condition), 2) could encourage others to do the same in the future (the fourth condition) and, 3) refusing to publish the work sends the important message that knowledge, “though important, may be less important to a decent society than the way it is obtained” (in Godlovitch 1997, 8).

In sum, the general thought is that by using immorally acquired data, inquirers do not distance themselves adequately from oppression, and thereby potentially encourage unethical experimentation in the future.

Against this argument, it might be objected that it is immoral to refrain from using
Nazi data. Consider Kristen Moe’s point that even though Nazi experimentation was egregiously unethical, we should not “let the inhumanity of such experiments blind us to the possibility that some ‘good’ may be salvaged from the ashes” (Moe 1984, 41 quoted in Cohen 1990). Indeed, on a standard utilitarian argument, it would be immoral to deny benefits that might accrue from the use of morally polluted knowledge. This parallels thoughts that a refusal to use knowledge from animal experimentation means the animal died in vain, and resonates with the popular idea that it is more respectful to an animal that we use all its parts than to “waste” it.  

On this view, morality is commensurate with use.

I am not convinced by the oft-heard suggestion that respect for either the human or animal dead means benefiting from their death. The fact that a victim is already dead does not mean it is acceptable to strip his or her body for parts, or to use knowledge that only exists because of his or her torture (Godlovitch 1997, 4). And the fact that utilitarianism cannot easily countenance the wrong this “retrospective disrespect” to victims invokes presents a problem, not an advantage, for the view (Ibid.). The moral worry of retrospective disrespect to victims who were severely oppressed is intuitive to many, at least in the human case. Consider here the anger that ensued over EBay’s trade in Holocaust memorabilia, including victims’ clothing, shoes, Yellow Star of David armbands, a suitcase and a toothbrush. The trade caused international outrage, leading one survivor to remark that such profiting from oppression was “so disrespectful to the victims.”

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144 As an example of this, Chloë Taylor describes a hunter colleague of hers who claimed he was a fellow animal activist because he makes sure to use every part of the animal he kills, making “household items of their fat, fur, skin and bones” (2013, 88).
145 Marc Nicol and Simon Murphy. “Ebay's sick trade in Holocaust souvenirs: Outrage over auctions of
Indeed, as Chloë Taylor explains, far from profiting without consent from human death (not to mention torture), respectful attitudes toward dead humans typically involve mourning rituals and efforts to grant humans dignity by fulfilling their wishes (Taylor 2013, 97). But Taylor notes that the near opposite characterizes supposedly respectful attitudes toward dead animals (99). She observes that the things we do to animals once dead would never be considered respectful to humans, including using animal parts and eating their meat (86). These acts are instead considered signs of utmost depravity and disrespect toward humanity. If we were to witness someone digging up humans to put their bodies to use, say, for a newfound energy resource, moral outrage (rather than moral approbation) would ensue.146 Taylor concludes that the speciesist Western worldview “is deontological with respect to dead humans and utilitarian with respect to dead animals of other species” (94).147 To avoid speciesism, then, if the argument from moral taint convinces in the case of Nazi data on the grounds that the knowledge arose through severe oppression, then the argument from moral taint should likewise convince in the case of knowledge gained through animal experimentation.148 I will now discuss how

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146Taylor makes, but does not develop in detail, my same point with respect to laboratory animals: “We see this in the case of laboratory experimentation: while animal ethicists lament that much experimentation on nonhuman animals does not even result in any useful information, and millions of animals are thus tortured and killed for scientific experiments that are frivolous, inconclusive, redundant, and that do not result in any publications, it is debated whether it is moral to make use of knowledge that was derived from Nazi experiments on human beings” (2013, 99).

147Opposite Robert Nozick, who made a similar line famous when he prescribed utilitarianism for animals and deontology for humans, Taylor is problematizing the inherently speciesist nature of such a claim (Taylor 2013, 99).

148Clare Palmer argues that the lack of attention to “reparation-like responsibilities” to animals (perhaps including whether we should use knowledge gained from animal experimentation) is explained by the fact that the harm to animals is ongoing (2010, 12 in Taylor 2013 96). I agree that it seems premature to discuss the ethics of using knowledge gained through animal experimentation when the dominant society refuses to even acknowledge that animal experimentation is immoral. However, I agree with Taylor that the two are mutually reinforcing. If we start to see dead laboratory “objects” as subjects whose lives count for more than pure resource, this is continuous with refusals to see live laboratory animals the same way. We can
morally polluted knowledge presents not only a moral, but an epistemic problem as well.

3. Epistemic Pollution

The use of morally polluted knowledge may strike many as an exclusively moral issue. What matters morally is the use of something that has strong ties to oppression— that this something is knowledge is not sufficient to render it an epistemic issue. Put otherwise, we may object to the immoral context under which knowledge develops, but this context cannot impugn knowledge itself; knowledge remains distinct from its origins. This view is sometimes expressed in terms of a need to avoid the genetic fallacy, and to keep the context of discovery (“questions concerning the material, historical, and cultural circumstances of cognitive agents and their interests”) distinct from the context of justification (“questions concerning evidence, justification and warrantability”) (Nelson 1995, 42).

Others are more sympathetic to the ways context can affect what becomes knowledge (although in a manner quite different from moral taint, as I discuss in the next paragraph). Feminist epistemologists, for one, have widely discussed how non-epistemic values (moral, political, social) enter into scientific inquiry, inflecting the development of hypotheses and justificatory procedures (Longino 1990; Harding 1986; Anderson 1995). They have mostly been interested in how non-epistemic values bear directly on the quality of our epistemic practices. Some are interested, for instance, in how gender bias

work from multiple directions to restore animal dignity. In fact, I would go further and suggest that perhaps it is best to start thinking from the place where we are confronted with the benefits of animal use head on. Surely the interruption is most called for here, where the justification for animal death lies.

149Margaret Crouch notes that there are important philosophical approaches that challenge the underlying assumptions of the genetic fallacy, such as Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis and feminist philosophy, which hold that “the source of a claim can be relevant to its evaluation” (1983, 229).
becomes infused in knowledge, such that the knowledge produced is distorted and rendered less objective by failing to account for the effects of bias on knowledge. For these feminist epistemologists, acknowledging the role of gender values in the production of knowledge is not “simply a matter of justice”; rather, “sex discrimination… demonstrably retard[s] the growth of knowledge” (Anderson 1995, 194).

However, one would be hard-pressed to see how information about toxicity levels could be distorted by failing to account for anthropocentric bias. My approach to considering how context impacts knowledge here is accordingly different.\(^{150}\) I want to suggest that moral pollution can affect animal experimentation’s epistemic value not insofar as it distorts the knowledge gained (the epistemic process itself might be perfectly “reliable” in this sense), but rather because we can have reasons to reject immorally acquired evidence in the formation of our beliefs. Contrary to standard accounts of epistemic responsibility that suggest inquirers should consider all the relevant evidence in the formation of their beliefs (Code 1987, 90),\(^{151}\) then, I instead forward the perhaps counter-intuitive claim that epistemic responsibility sometimes demands inquirers to reject certain bits of evidence in the formation of their beliefs.

How might morally polluted evidence affect the formation of beliefs? Consider the difference between your belief in the following two scenarios: 1) It is a non-emergency situation. You recall there are seven cans of food in your basement because your partner told you so. You believe this to be true and act accordingly; 2) It is an

\(^{150}\)That being said, I will address how anthropocentric values can sometimes impugn scientific findings in my conclusion.

\(^{151}\)As Code writes: “In a neutral context, where the “ethics of belief” considerations mentioned previously are not relevant, the highest degree of epistemic irresponsibility attaches to acts that lead to unwarranted and unjustifiable beliefs. I have in mind people who are wont to believe things for which the evidence is scanty or who systematically dwell upon evidence that supports a proposition, avoiding exposure to evidence that might put in doubt” (1987, 90).
emergency situation and you will have to lock your family in the basement for an indeterminate period of time. You recall your partner telling you there are seven cans of food in the basement. You withhold belief and go to check for yourself. In the second scenario, the emergency pragmatically encroaches: you have the same evidence for belief in both scenarios; nevertheless, the emergency provides you with a non-evidential yet epistemically relevant reason to withhold belief. The reason is that the moral stakes of holding your belief are higher in the second rather than the first scenario; the moral stakes, that is, “encroach” on your belief-forming process.

This scenario reveals that the standard argument that it is “epistemically rational for someone to believe p… just in case p is adequately supported by her evidence” is missing something (Schroeder 2012, 268, my emphasis). Specifically, it misses the fact that there are reasons to withhold belief that are not evidence-based, yet still epistemic.

Consider the second scenario. The reason it is not epistemically rational for you to believe there are seven cans of food in the basement in this scenario is not a matter of insufficient evidence – after all, you possess the same amount of evidence in both scenarios, and assent to belief in the first yet not the second. In the second scenario, however, you instead have a reason to withhold your beliefs because the practical stakes of your error are high. Schroeder explains:

… as long as we cling to the idea that only evidence can be an epistemic reason, it is easy to dismiss pragmatic factors out of hand as being the wrong kind of thing entirely to bear on epistemic rationality. But reasons to withhold can’t be evidence. Consequently, once we allow for epistemic reasons to withhold, we must allow that epistemic reasons are not exhausted by the evidence. And this is how reasons to withhold that are practical in nature can get their foot in the door (276).

The pragmatic encroacher’s suggestion, then, is that practical considerations can affect

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152See Fantl and McGrath 2002; Cox and Levine 2004; Schroeder 2012
belief formation in a direct manner. Although the application to the context of morally polluted knowledge is not perfect, I think pragmatic encroachment helps us see that we can have reason to withhold the use of morally polluted evidence in the formation of our knowledge as well.

I return to the case of animal experimentation. Imagine that a scientist recently-turned-animal-activist has been running tests to check the toxicity levels of a household cleaner. As an animal activist, this scientist comes to consider evidence gained through Draize eye irritancy tests on rabbits morally tainted. She decides that although she already possesses the relevant evidence in her mind, the morally tainted evidence should not be made public and transferred to the larger pool of evidence to be used in the formation of knowledge about toxicity levels of the cleaner. Her reasons are similar to those offered against the use of Nazi data – maybe she worries she insults the memory of the dead animals by sanctioning the data’s use, or maybe she thinks using immorally acquired data will send the wrong message to other scientists and society at large. Whatever her reasons, the moral costs of employing immorally acquired evidence have risen. Accordingly, she chooses to withhold immorally acquired evidence in the larger pool about toxicity levels of the household cleaner. This evidence does not get to feature in the knowledge formation process. The scientist thus has a non-evidential epistemic reason that encroaches on the formation of beliefs, and eventually the knowledge about toxicity levels.

In short, since not all reasons for belief are evidence-based, we see in this example a direct way in which the moral and epistemic converge. Here ethics and epistemology converge not insofar as moral, social and political contexts affect whose
knowledge is included in epistemic inquiry or who gets to participate in the shaping of knowledge (although these dimensions are important as well), but because we can sometimes choose to reject immorally acquired evidence in the formation of our beliefs.

The Scope of Epistemic Pollution

It will be said that, as I have defined it, epistemic pollution captures too much. One could object: Does this mean we cannot use any evidence acquired through oppression? In relation to the previous chapter, would it follow for instance that we cannot employ women’s ecological knowledge because it too was acquired through oppression?

Although I think the answer to this question is largely context-specific, I think there are at least three non-exhaustive considerations we can use to help assess whether the pro tanto reason can be outweighed, and thus whether it is morally permissible to employ knowledge acquired through oppression: 1) Is the oppression that gives rise to the knowledge acknowledged by the knowledge user? 2) Is the reason for the knowledge use morally good (e.g., used to educate people about oppression), and somehow beneficial to the research subjects themselves? 3) Is the oppression that gives rise to the knowledge tightly linked to the knowledge (e.g. it couldn’t have existed in the absence of oppression), or only linked to it (e.g. acquired under oppressive circumstances)?

Taking the experimenter as one relevant knowledge user, I think the answer to most questions suggests it will be difficult to outweigh the pro tanto reason against using knowledge acquired through animal experimentation. First, in the case of animal testing, the experimenter is directly complicit in the pain and death animals undergo; it is accordingly unlikely (although not impossible) that the experimenter acknowledges
animals as subjects who are oppressed. Typically, when one is directly involved in putting animals to death or subjecting them to pain, it is easier to deny that animals are the kinds of beings who can be oppressed.\textsuperscript{153} Consider, for instance, the apparent lack of sympathy in the following experimental reports: “First, we’ll consider a mutant mouse created in the laboratory…it turns out that, ultimately, this mouse \textit{is} a disaster: it dies at birth because it cannot control the muscles used for breathing”; “Most interestingly, subjecting a mother rat during pregnancy to moderate stress (confinement in a clear plastic tube under bright lights) can reduce the levels of testosterone in the developing fetus”; “…there was a determined effort to reproduce…a complete anterograde amnesia for facts and events, in an animal model (preferably an inexpensive animal like a rat)” (Linden 2007, 70, 181, 132 in Marks 2011, 7). These passages reveal that at least some scientists use rather dispassionate language in describing animal subjects (“most interestingly,” “an inexpensive animal,” “this mouse \textit{is} a disaster”), thus suggesting a lack of sympathy for their plight.\textsuperscript{154}

Second, although animal testing often serves morally good aims (consider its role in medicine versus consumer products), the vast majority of experimentation still benefits humans, not animals, as in the case of scientific research aimed at human health, or the development of products for human consumption. Moreover, a decent amount of animal experimentation serves seemingly trivial purposes (Francione 2000, 33; Gruen 1993, 65; Slicer 1991, 117; Donovan 2006, 311; Taylor 2013). Gruen describes several experiments like this, including an experiment that tested the effects of LSD on 71 kittens (1993, 65).

\textsuperscript{153}I think this is especially likely in the case of experiments intended to satisfy scientific curiosity.

\textsuperscript{154}Consider here Joel Marks’ call for scientists to formally acknowledge the debt owed to animals in their experimental research (2011, 6). But although formal acknowledgment may constitute a step forward in the cause against animal oppression, if it is thought to eradicate all immorality from the situation, it could also easily constitute a step back.
She writes, “While the experimenters noted that ‘the behavioral effects of LSD in animals have received monumental attention and literally thousands of studies have dealt with the issue,’ they decided to go ahead and subject the kittens to the experiments in order to compare the effects on young animals with those on adults” (Ibid.). Indeed, it is difficult to fathom a crucial scientific need for such an experiment.

Third, the knowledge gained through animal experimentation is tightly linked to animal oppression. By tightly linked to oppression, I mean that the knowledge in question relied heavily on severe oppression in order to even exist. Contrast this to the case of women’s ecological knowledge. Here, although the knowledge may have been acquired under oppressive circumstances, the oppression can be reasonably detached from the knowledge in a different way from that acquired through animal experimentation. That is, we can imagine women gaining the same ecological knowledge under non-oppressive circumstances. Moreover, the oppression is not as severe in the case of women’s ecological knowledge as it is in animal experimentation (i.e. it does not involve the systematic torture and killing of sentient subjects).\footnote{In making this claim, I in no way intend to minimize Third World women’s oppression. As mentioned earlier, we can acknowledge different kinds of oppression or levels of severity among them without thereby minimizing different forms of oppression.}

The distinction between these two cases is useful for determining whether it is possible to outweigh the \textit{pro tanto} worry of pollution in either case. Cases of tight links to severe oppression will understandably make it more difficult to offset pollution than cases of knowledge that is less tightly linked to less severe, although still significant, oppression. In the case of women’s ecological knowledge, for instance, it will not be impossible to begin to offset the worry of moral pollution by, say, engaging in just epistemic exchanges with the women whose knowledge one seeks. However, given the
nature of animal experimentation, it is impossible to engage in similarly just epistemic exchanges with animals undergoing experimentation.

In light of these considerations, I conclude that although there may be benefits to the use of knowledge gained in animal testing, most knowledge gained from animal experimentation cannot be justly used.

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In this chapter, I have argued that the insight that knowledge evolves in particular contexts, and with particular histories, affects the ethics of using that knowledge. Not unlike rejections of the use of Nazi data, respect for animals can be expressed in more ways than one. I have suggested that one way we can respect dead animals is to refuse to use evidence gained through their oppression in the formation of knowledge. In my view, refusing to see animals as mere sources of information should accompany refusals to employ the knowledge gained from practices that treated them as such. This is part of what it means to do both moral and epistemic justice to animals.

Somewhat parallel to this call for taking pragmatic/moral factors into account in the formation of our knowledge, Lisa Heldke argues that inquiry must be responsible inquiry in every sense of the word. Heldke offers an admittedly odd, “even paradoxical” notion of objectivity as responsibility (2001, 81). She argues that objective inquiry takes place when one is responsive to all participants in inquiry, including non-human participants (87). In suggesting that objectivity in this sense is a feature of good inquiry, Heldke welcomes the moral and epistemic sense of “good” (87). For her, inquiry is an inherently epistemic and moral matter. This means that “pure” epistemic goals are not the only goals relevant to inquiry; the scientist’s aims in the laboratory are not all that matter
(92). Indeed, if a scientist’s methodology was not morally sound, on Heldke’s view, it might not even qualify as objective - the less objective one’s knowledge pursuit is in the dominant sense of value-free knowledge immune from the possibility of moral or pragmatic encroachment, the more objective it may be in the sense of responsible. As she states: “Such an account throws into relief the inherently moral nature of inquiry; agents, whose locations in the world are highly interactive and interactively constituted, are morally responsible for how they/we interact in that world. We cannot sharply separate self from other, or the interests of one agent from the interests of another” (95).

Considered in this way, inquiry disrupts the binary between subject and object of knowledge seen in what Adorno and Horkheimer call the “mathematisation of the world” (in Donovan 2006, 367). Rather, inquiry comes to reflect a particularly robust notion of epistemic responsibility, one that suggests we must consider “the complex effects of knowledge projects on the lives of other men and women as well as on the more than human world” (Tuana 2001, 16). Understood in this way, epistemic responsibility involves inquiry that is responsive to all “objects” involved. It is inquiry that recognizes oppressed humans and animals are not “blank screens” or “prediscursive bodies”; rather, “animals are active participants in the constitution of what may count as scientific knowledge” (Haraway 1989, 310). In other words, to recall chapter two, it is inquiry that is responsive and responsible to dissenting voices and protest, even ones that may be inconvenient to the epistemic pursuit. Scientific inquiry must listen to what animals are telling us in the laboratory perhaps more than anywhere else. And as I have argued, the reason is not purely moral; it is also epistemic.
CONCLUSION: FROM EPISTEMIC OBJECTS TO EPISTEMIC SUBJECTS

Throughout this dissertation, I have presented several ways marginalized women and animals are treated as epistemic objects instead of epistemic subjects. In chapters two and four, we saw that animals are often treated as mere sources of information who themselves have nothing to tell. They are variously subjected to epistemic objectification, testimonial injustice, and what I have called epistemic exemption. In the case of marginalized women, chapters one and three provided case studies to show that women in contexts of oppression are subject to epistemic objectification, testimonial injustice and epistemic exclusion. To conclude, I wish to reiterate how the treatment of oppressed humans and animals as epistemic subjects has significant epistemic and ethicopolitical import.

From an epistemic perspective, feminist epistemologists have severally discussed how taking account of gender (and, increasingly, race and class) makes for better epistemology (Anderson 2004, Longino 1990, Nelson 1990). Consider, for instance, how Barbara McClintock’s work on genetic transposition was ignored over thirty years owing to gender discrimination (Anderson 1995, 60). Clearly, the testimonial injustice McClintock suffered had negative impacts on the scientific knowledge that was (or, rather, was not) produced and disseminated. And to return to the case of women’s ecological knowledge, we can also appreciate how treating women as full epistemic subjects would entail not only more respectful relations between inquirers and informants, but likely better knowledge (Anderson 2011). For many feminist epistemologists, such examples stress the importance of developing “knowledge practices
[that] actively seek gender diversity and balance among inquirers” (Anderson 1995, 60). But the idea that failing to account for the ways not only gender, race and class but anthropocentric bias can distort our knowledge pursuits may seem far-fetched. For unlike the case of gender bias, it is difficult to imagine how listening to animals could improve epistemic pursuits the way listening to women could (indeed, I made a similar claim in chapter four). Yet there are many ways in which failing to listen to animals can have damaging epistemic effects. Consider, for instance, how some researchers have doubted their ability to gain important data on animal behavior and emotions upon realizing that captive laboratory animals are stressed (Bekoff 2002, 51). Here the acknowledgment that animals are feeling beings who exhibit stress directly impugns the knowledge one hopes to gain about their behavior in the laboratory. Or, consider Cora Diamond’s discussion of Hearne’s analysis of the philosopher Ray Frey’s disconnected and unfeeling approach to understanding his dog, an approach that prevented him from achieving accurate knowledge:

When, in order to see how the dog would rank desires, [Frey] threw a stick for his dog (who liked to chase sticks and was used to Frey throwing them for him) and at the same time put food before the dog, the dog stood looking at him. Frey could not see that the dog wanted to know what Frey wanted him to do. Frey’s

156 Of course, this is also a moral and epistemic imperative.
157 As Lori Gruen notes, “just as it is better to talk with women from other cultures about their lives rather than guess at what their lives might be like, so too is it better to directly experience nature, rather than guess at what such an experience might be like” (1994, 131). However, in this piece Gruen also suggests, “it is not possible for the nonhuman world to engage in a discussion,” whereas I have argued that on a broad enough understanding of “discussion,” perhaps they can (Ibid.)
158 It is of course possible that failing to listen to animals in the laboratory could have also distorted the knowledge achieved about, say, toxicity levels of a household cleaner as discussed in chapter four. However, precisely how it could do so in this case is far from immediately obvious. In fact, it is because much Nazi data and animal experimentation knowledge is considered good knowledge in the sense of reliably acquired that people desire it. However, where the knowledge in question is about the animals themselves, such as their behaviors, we can see a direct way in which failing to listen to one’s research objects negatively affects the epistemic outcome, as in the below example.
159 I pull this case from Elizabeth Anderson (1995).
conception of the dog as part of an experimental set-up (taken to include two possible desired activities but not taken to include queer behavior by the dog’s master), with Frey as the observer, blocked his understanding. Frey’s past experience with his dog did not feed an understanding of how the dog saw him; he could not grasp his own failure, as the dog’s master, to make coherent sense, so could not see the dog as responding to that failure to make sense. Here the…model of scientific investigation contributes to Frey’s failure of understanding both of what he is doing and of how the dog is responding (Diamond 1991, 1014-15, my emphasis).

In this example, we see how failing to respect an animal’s epistemic subjectivity can both do an epistemic injustice to the animal and negatively affect the pursuit of objective knowledge. To the first point, because Frey did not consider the possibility that his dog “wanted to know what Frey wanted him to do,” Frey’s dog was unable to enter into meaningful testimonial exchange. Frey’s dog suffered an epistemic injustice – the dog was denied status as an epistemic subject who can understand, make sense of Frey’s claims on him and respond accordingly.

In addition to registering the epistemic injustice done to Frey’s dog, to the second point, this story also alerts us to the dangers of assuming that disengagement from one’s “object” of analysis, rather than testimonial engagement with him/her is most appropriate to the pursuit of objective knowledge. Because Frey was after knowledge of the dog’s behavior in this case, his failure to see and treat the dog as an epistemic subject impeded his ability to gain the behavioral knowledge he sought. Especially when one is trying to learn about one’s object of inquiry, then, engagement with them as a subject, including listening to what they may be telling us, can have important epistemic benefits. Also discussing this case, Elizabeth Anderson observes, “One of the reasons why behaviorists tend to elicit such boring behavior from animals and humans is that they don’t give them the opportunities to exhibit a more impressive repertoire of behaviors that respect for
them would require them to offer” (1995, 64-5, my emphasis). Of course, respect for animals here can take different forms, but I am pressing the importance of epistemic respect for them - of due recognition of their epistemic subjectivity.

However, the importance of doing epistemic justice to those who have been reduced to epistemic objects goes well beyond the importance of improving either their epistemic standing or the pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, epistemic justice must instead be understood as an inherently epistemic, ethical and political matter. Medina explains:

In a case of testimonial injustice in which an identity prejudice is operating, a hearer does an epistemic and an ethical wrong, but also and even more importantly, a political wrong is also committed…For note that the object of the unfair treatment – who is being “undermined in his/her capacity as a knower,” as Fricker puts it – is not just the speaker – not the speaker simpliciter, but the speaker as a member of a group – of a hermeneutically marginalized, disadvantaged, group…The unfair treatment occurs as it does in the exchange because of existing pernicious political habits that inform people’s (epistemic and ethical) lives; and the unjust exchange thus becomes an event in a whole array of incidents that in turn feed those pernicious political habits and contribute to their perpetuation (2013, 88).

We have already seen how political marginalization and disadvantage can poison a group’s epistemic standing. For present purposes, the relevant point is that the battle against epistemic injustice is intimately tied to the battle against moral and political injustice more broadly. And although different oppressed groups can be differently marginalized, since the wrong of epistemic injustice is often linked to the wrong of objectification, I think we should attend to the latter as a key mechanism of oppression. Recall, for instance, the links between epistemic objectification and objectification in general elucidated in Fricker’s argument about the twinned sexual and epistemic objectification of women in a sexist society. The Vancouver missing women’s epistemic injustices are also helpfully understood as part of systematic denials of their subjectivity.
more broadly. In short, typically when one is seen as an object, one will also be seen as an epistemic object, and vice versa. Accordingly, justice requires that we apprehend the way myriad oppressed groups are objectified in general, and how systematic forms of objectification feed into epistemic objectification.\(^{160}\)

If it is true that the more fundamental wrong at stake in epistemic objectification is a worldview that sees sentient, feeling beings, including women, animals, holocaust victims, slaves etc., not only as mere epistemic resources, but mere resources in general,\(^{161}\) then the critique of epistemic injustice must mirror this fact. Specifically, the critique of processes of objectification must involve both an interrogation of the underlying mechanisms by which oppressor societies cordon oppressed subjects off to the realm of abject, irrational, embodied, animal resources and a critique of the political structures that help to uphold the binary. It necessitates an interrogation of the “person/property dualism of capitalism and the associated subject/object dualism of its knowledge systems, in science” (Plumwood 2002b, 9). Maneesha Deckha captures well the relationship between property status and the denial of rationality discussed in chapter one:

\(^{160}\)One could object that objectification is not coextensive with epistemic objectification (noting that, for instance, many advisors to the pharaoh in Egypt were still slaves). But there are two things to say in response. First, that objectification often breeds epistemic objectification is not a necessary claim – one will not ipso facto entail the other in theory. The point is rather that in practice, they often do. Second, with respect to the slaves in Egypt, recall my argument in chapter three and Medina’s point that epistemic subjectivity is not attained simply when one achieves mere informant status – even if their informant status involves claims to superior knowledge. Epistemic subjects have to be “full and equal” participants in knowledge endeavors to qualify as subjects. I would venture, then, that slave advisors are still more likely to be epistemic objects than subjects.

\(^{161}\)As Julian Young notes, “while beings show up in every age as resources, the way they show up that is unique to modernity is as pure resource, nothing but resource” (2002, 49, my emphasis). Indeed, under the Third Reich, victims were certainly seen as nothing more than pure resource, as “having body fat...needed to make soap” and “hair to stuff mattresses with” (Coetzee 1999, 22). Heidegger also acknowledges the similarities between human and animal reduction to “nothing but resource” in a deleted line of his 1949 lecture later published as “The Question Concerning Technology: “Agriculture is now motorized food industry – in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps...” (cited in Bernstein, 1992, 130).
A primary justificatory strategy in support of the property status of animals is the perception of animals as bodies with defective capacities to reason … a perceived defective capacity to reason has [also] figured decisively in excluding humans along lines of gender, racial, ability and age. When Aristotle, followed by Descartes centuries later, theorized that animals were to be put in the service of humans because of their irrationality, the arguments were extended to women and to inferior men (2006, 22-3).

Considered thus, we can appreciate not only how exclusionary norms of rational humanity jettison oppressed subjects to an abject space of irrational embodiment, but moreover that they do so in accordance with resourcist (or, global capitalist) logics. Of course, this is not to suggest that the abolition of the property status of slaves or women, for instance, would immediately eradicate their epistemic injustice. However, it is to note that their epistemic objectification is much more likely in a context where they are already viewed as objects to be used. Moreover, it bears noting that the treatment of sentient individuals as resource is often insidious, and can take place in the absence of formal denials of personhood, as in the case of women’s systematic sexual objectification or the instrumentalization of Third World women’s labor, discussed in chapter three.

The way animals function as mere resource, however, is not insidious. Indeed, even the animals we grant the most moral status to, namely our pets, still only have property standing under the law. As Gary Francione laments, “In virtually all modern political and economic systems, animals are explicitly regarded as economic commodities that possess no value apart from that which is accorded to them by their owners” (2000, 50). If the foregoing analysis is correct, the fact that animals retain the status of property in a speciesist society presents a major roadblock to their achievement of both political and epistemic subjectivity. Accordingly, this suggests that one of the

\[^{162}\text{And, to return to my argument in chapter one, nor is it to suggest that restoring rationality will do the trick.}\]
first steps to correcting epistemic injustice against animals will involve reconceiving their place on the social and political landscape. Medina argues:

We need forms of activism that in changing the social standing of subjects can change epistemic attitudes and habits of social perception, for indeed in addressing issues of exclusion and marginalization that distort the social perceptions of a community, we need to resist not only hegemonic ideologies, but also hegemonic sociopolitical structures and institutions that mediate social interactions and sustain the injustices in question. This requires political resistance and deeply transformative forms of activism (2013, 234)

As a form of political resistance that could help pave the way toward animals’ epistemic subjectivity, consider Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s groundbreaking Zoopolis, which envisions a state that recognizes some animals as citizens, others as migrants or denizens, and still others as having discrete sovereign territories (2011, 14). Donaldson and Kymlicka begin their text with the dismal observation that, at least from a global perspective, the animal liberation movement has been a huge failure (2). They note that, since the 1960’s, where the human population has doubled, the wild animal population has shrunk by a third (Ibid.). Moreover, meat production has tripled since 1980; approximately 56 billion land animals are killed annually, and this number is expected to double by 2050 (Ibid.). They argue that part of the reason animal exploitation continues unfettered is due to impoverished moral frameworks like welfarism and ecological holism that continue to view animals as mere resources (3). Instead, they argue for a framework that acknowledges that “animals, as much as humans, are individual beings with the right not to be tortured, imprisoned, subjected to medical experimentation…” (4). For Donaldson and Kymlickca, an account that acknowledges animal subjectivity

163Continuous with the spirit of my project, here I follow Thomas Kelch’s move to conceive of animals as having rights not as “rational citizen[s], but rather as conceived in the feminist ethic-of-care tradition...where it is held that rights are owed to those creatures who have moral status as living subjects, who have feelings and emotions, a telos of their own, and with whom one can communicate reciprocally” (2007, 230).
must be a political account that recognizes animals’ “variable relationships to political institutions and practices of state sovereignty, territory, colonization, migration, and membership…” (12).

If the history of politically and epistemically oppressed groups like subjugated women, black people, Aboriginal peoples, holocaust victims and more are any indication, perhaps a zoopolis like that envisioned by Donaldson and Kymlicka could complement efforts to achieve epistemic justice for animals. In fact, I would suggest that a truly liberatory epistemology for both humans and animals must include such a thoroughly politicized anti-oppression project. Contrary to the idea that epistemology should be sharply divorced from ethics and politics, then, I agree with Phyllis Rooney that epistemology must be committed to identifying the many ways in which “politics’ in the form of assumptions derived from broader social, cultural, and political arenas regularly

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164 Some would object to granting citizenship status to animals on the grounds that it is complicit with binary logics that maintain a class of morally relevant sentient beings over and against the rest, still construed as resource, including most centrally the earth. Mick Smith’s Against Ecological Sovereignty, for one, argues against forms of sovereignty that threaten to reduce the natural world to mere resource, and that “presum[e] human dominion and assum[e] that the natural world is, already, before any decision is even made, fundamentally a human resource” (2011, xii). Fusing Levinasian ethics with Arendtian politics, Smith advocates an anarchic ethicopolitical ecology that rejects sovereignty in all its guises, and that is also critical of the “political paradigm of (human) citizenship” (xviii). Although I am very sensitive to Smith’s project, I think we can envision forms of citizenship that complement Smith’s call for an ethicopolitical ecology; not all forms of citizenship must involve resourcist views of the earth. Indeed, something as radical as granting citizenship status to animals could work against the logic of resourcism in general. Moreover, although Smith’s call for an anarchic ethicopolitical ecology is exciting, his desire for an anti-sovereign ethics and politics also leads him to refrain almost entirely from forwarding any concrete suggestions for political action, which remain important for ethics to get off the ground (for more on this, see my review of Smith’s text, 2013).

165 Speaking of the need to listen to animal voices, Josephine Donovan argues that “a feminist animal care ethic must be political in its perspective and dialogical in its method” (2006, 324). Being “political” in its perspective means extending analysis beyond the immediate human-animal relation to the broader “political and economic context” (323).

166 Indeed, to return to my argument in chapter two, I worry that many humans are still awarded epistemic subjectivity at the cost of denying it to animals - by being restored to a realm of disembodied “rational human” knowers, for instance, that is set up against a realm of epistemic abjects. For the sake of both, it will therefore be important to supplement an account of epistemic justice to humans with one of epistemic justice to animals.
wor[k] their (subtle or not-so-subtle) way into epistemological understandings, questions, and the theories resulting from those understandings and questions” (2012, 353).

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With the foregoing analysis of how various forms of human and animal epistemic subordination are maintained (often by attributing undeserved power to human reason as the ultimate source of knowledge), I hope to have continued in the spirit of a thoroughly sociopolitical and ethical approach to epistemic justice. Further, by centralizing the axis of animal oppression, I hope to have also rendered feminist epistemology more sensitive to an interlocking analysis of oppression. Where Rooney notes that, in addition to gender, feminist analyses of epistemic exclusion “also draw attention to its race and class configurations, to the racist and classist assumptions involved in distancing “savage,” “primitive,” or “feeble-minded” peoples from philosophical idealizations of reasoning and knowing,” I suggested that we must add animal oppression to the list (Rooney 2012, 35). And I argued that this is necessary for the eradication of both human and animal epistemic oppression. So long as animals remain the abjected Others par excellence, politically restrictive and empirically inaccurate wieldings of the knower/known and rational/irrational binaries will persevere. And in so doing, they will do nothing to challenge the notion that only rational humans (typically white, affluent males) can be knowers.
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