EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND MORAL THEORY:
A KANTIAN APPROACH

By

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INTRODUCTION

BEING JUDGMENTAL

This project examines the role that emotions can and should play in morality and moral theory. I examine the popular notion of emotional intelligence and argue that it converges on the moral notion of virtue. In some ways emotional intelligence and virtue are the same thing; in other ways, either can be shown to be a prerequisite for the other. Of course, the ultimate formulation of the relationship will depend on the definition we give to emotion. If we see all of our experiences as being emotional, then we will see emotional intelligence and virtue as the same thing; if we believe that only a subset of our experiences count as emotional, then only a part of virtue has to do with emotional intelligence. Either way, I show that the value of emotional intelligence is morally based, if we understand morality in its properly expansive sense.

Although Kantian moral theory is thought to be not so expansive, limited to a rights-based rather than virtue-based approach, I show that Kant’s theory of virtue illuminates the connections between morality and emotional intelligence. Most people are coming to accept that the standard interpretation of Kantian moral theory is mistaken. I give more evidence to tip the scales, showing that Kant goes some distance toward giving us a fruitful theory of emotional intelligence.

This dissertation explores the ways that being a good person overlaps with having psychological/mental health. Although most people immediately assent that there is such an overlap, the specificities of this relationship are not often discussed. Part of this neglect might
come from the distance between the two disciplines. When moral theory and psychology do overlap, as with moral psychology, the endeavor is assumed to be empirical rather than prescriptive. Still, I think that we must confront some degree of resistance when attempting to make psychology prescriptive. In fact, it might be the case that psychological normativity offers a cover for moral normativity because we often do not feel comfortable acknowledging our own moral judgments. Moral discourse, and the inevitable disagreements that it threatens, is necessarily challenging. Indeed, part of the goal of this project is to convince the reader that taking oneself and one’s moral judgments seriously, in a way that is respectful to oneself and to others, is necessary for one’s psychological well-being. We must have courage in challenging the status quo, whether it be calling attention to the feelings of an individual or attempting to convince people to make different choices. Courage is needed in our culture of polite relativism, where most moral judgments are offered cautiously, if at all, and peppered with qualifiers like “for me” and “I feel.” Courage, an emotionally intelligent behavior, is necessary for being judgmental in a way that affirms the worth of those judgments and ourselves.

I voice this call for courage early on because I suspect that this resistance to being judgmental has stunted the philosophy and psychology of emotion.¹ In discussing the relationship between morality and emotion, I go beyond the idea that emotions either simply inform or impede moral thinking. I consider both the moral evaluation of emotions and the role that emotions play in moral discourse, i.e., the emotionality of morality. Many theorists currently interested in the ways that emotions inform moral thinking (Damasio and Nussbaum, to name the two most high-profile examples) do not devote much consideration to the obvious ways that we should and do evaluate our emotions. Instead, philosophy and psychology are currently pre-

occupied by the simple idea that emotions are good. These projects are partly polemical, aiming at overcoming what they take to be the deficiencies of Western (and, I might add, Eastern) thought. Western philosophy is thought to pit reason against emotion, and to maintain that the former is good and the latter is bad. To argue that the emotions are good is thought to be a radical stance that requires gesturing back to a forgotten past (ancient Greece) or a censored philosopher (Spinoza). To be fair, Damasio and Nussbaum do not deny that some emotions have content that changes with reflection; but they choose not to focus on what they take to be only one type of emotions. I do not deny that some emotions are intelligent in the sense that they provide intuitive knowledge that surpasses explicit knowledge. Instead, I focus on the relationship between those experiences that are thought to be emotional and those experiences that are thought to be rational, and I show that neither is more likely to be “ready to use” on its own terms. Both reason and emotion call for moral reflection.

We must not only push our theories of emotion to engage with theories of reflective moral judgment; we must push our theories of reflective moral judgment to take up the topic of emotion in an emotionally sensitive way. Unfortunately, much of the philosophical discipline that goes by the term “ethics” has, ironically, become abstract and disconnected from the improvement of real lives. Ethics focuses too much on paradoxes and dilemmas rather than the moral presence of the everyday. The question “what should I do?” becomes “what should one do?” and the sense of urgency is lost. Even “applied ethics” is doomed from the start insofar as it assumes that ethics is something that either may or may not be “applied.” In order to get ethics off the ground, or to get it on the ground, we must assume that people have some kind of natural

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2 This evasion is evinced by the fact that there is thought to be such a thing as “meta-ethics” at all: questions about the questions of morality can only be construed as being on a different level if they are taken to be for some other purpose than answering the original questions, but if the original questions are already relaxed and hypothetical, then we can multiply levels of questions as many times as we like. Otherwise meta-ethical questions are simply more in-depth ethical questions.
ethical abilities. A moral sense need not be fixed and limiting, but rather the natural moral sense we bring to moral discourse is exactly the personal orientation and personal experience that is itself the content of the discussion. In other words, we must see that there is already, in principle, a unity between particularity and universality. (Both the method of reflective equilibrium and the theory of practical reason mean to express this fact.) Personal experience is not only an acceptable arena of ethical decision-making; it is the only arena of ethical decision-making.

In merging psychology and moral theory—making a normative moral psychology—I do not mean to follow the tradition of moral sense theory or emotivism. My project can be understood through a contrast with Prinz’s Humean tri-partite approach to philosophy, with what he takes to be an affective theory of emotion and its foundation for moral sense theory. In fact, as we shall see, Kant’s rejection of moral sense theory is at the heart of his theory of emotion and his ethics. In general, moral sense theory, which I (and Hume) take to be the reduction of moral theory to psychology, has regained popularity. No matter how hard we try, we seem to fall continually into the common prejudice that emotions are one type of thing and moral judgments are another. But we have emotions because we have certain thoughts, beliefs, theories, prejudices, and assumptions. Similarly, we have certain thoughts and theories because we have certain emotions and emotional habits. Both are revisable and yet natural. Both should be subject to evaluation.

The ideas that motivate this dissertation might be subsumed under the idea of character or virtue, as these concepts unite moral rectitude and psychological health. Yet previous theories of character and virtue have not seriously considered the extent to which the analysis and working

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through of emotions is necessary for the cultivation of virtue. A moral theory that does not engage in psychology and the analysis of emotion leaves us in the dark about the moral nature of the majority of our moral lives. For Aristotle the rational and the irrational parts of the soul should have the relationship of master and slave or parent and child. This project, on the contrary, is interested specifically in the ways that the emotions are themselves intelligent. Furthermore, the idea that a virtuous person comes about by being brought up in a good state is completely useless to us, not because we find ourselves in corrupt political environments but because it is simply not true. We no longer believe that the intellectuals must command the manual laborers and army or that the soul must control desire and appetite; even if we did, we do not believe that having good laws is sufficient to induce virtue, nor do we think they should be. Virtue ethics is a good start, but if virtue is taken to simply mean “the correct habits,” without telling us how we know they are correct or how we go about getting them, then virtue ethics does not rise the level of normative ethics at all.

Instead, I take the meeting point between an emotionally sensitive moral theory and a morally informed philosophy of emotion to be the notion of emotional intelligence. My argument is that emotional and moral experience are analytically united: a consideration of emotion leads to a theory of emotional intelligence, and an analysis of theories of emotional intelligence leads to moral theory.

In chapter 1, I argue that emotions are a part of subjective processes of reflection and learning. I seek to transcend the ossified debate in the philosophy of emotion that seeks to

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4 The point of the doctrine of the mean, according to Young, is that virtue should not be understood as being opposed to vice since there are two corresponding vices to every virtue. Charles M. Young, “The Doctrine of the Mean,” Topoi 15, no. 1 (1996): 89-99. Annas argues that, other than this point, there is very little content to this idea that is not tautological, i.e., to hit the mean is just to do the right amount, especially since sometimes, what appears to be an excessive amount, is proper. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61.
determine whether emotions are affects or judgments. The philosophy of emotion is largely preoccupied by the question “What is an emotion?” but has lost sight of the reasons that this questions matters, as well as the reasons that it does not. I argue that the affective-cognitive debate is itself largely illusory, but the implicit tendency to argue that the emotions should either be praised or blamed continues to motivate it. Emotions, and the breadth of emotional experiences, are more complex than either of these dichotomies allow. Emotions are an integral part of, not just the objects of, moral theory.

Any consideration of the nature of emotions inevitably leads to the idea of emotional intelligence, which is explored and defined in chapter 2. This chapter also serves to introduce those working in the philosophy of emotion to the literature on emotional intelligence, with which they are usually unfamiliar, to the effect that the question “What is an emotion?” might be rejoined with a consideration of its practical implications. After surveying existing theories of emotional intelligence, I provisionally define emotional intelligence as the analysis and better understanding of one’s own emotions for the sake of acting on and expressing them. These expressions and actions must also be tied to good outcomes and psychological well-being. Emotional intelligence also involves understanding and discussing the emotions of others in the same pursuit and, additionally, creating an emotionally open and healthy environment that promotes emotional intelligence for all, but we shall see that, contrary to appearances, the emotional health of others is not a separate component of emotional intelligence since, in this respect at least, there is a deep symmetry between the self and others, as Kantian moral theory helps to explain. Resisting the tradition of intelligence studies, my definition highlights behaviors, rather than purported latent abilities, that we can call emotionally intelligent. The notion of emotional intelligence provides a bridge between the philosophy of emotion and moral
theory, because emotional experience is itself self-evaluative and seeks advice about which ways of experiencing emotions are better than others. The notion of emotional intelligence provides this advice, but it must itself be grounded in moral theory, since emotional questions are often moral questions.

Chapter 3 begins the engagement with Kant that promises to fill the gaps left by current psychological consideration of emotional intelligence. In order to couple the philosophy of emotion with Kantianism—two topics that have been previously adversarial—I explicate Kant’s theory of emotion, which is often misunderstood due to a confusion of terms. Kant holds a cognitive theory of emotion; I argue that he goes some distance in articulating a successful theory of emotional intelligence, a fact that is often overlooked because consideration of Kant’s theory of emotion is often limited to his comments about affects.

There are a number of reasons that Kant has earned a bad reputation. First, scholars have failed to take seriously the *Metaphysics of Morals*, which provides a more mature and well-rounded version of Kant’s moral theory. (Surprisingly, even when people do read the *Metaphysics of Morals*, they give all of their attention to the “Doctrine of Right,” even though Kant specifically states that virtue is the realm of ethics proper and right is merely the sphere of legality.) Second, Kant’s comments about sympathy in the *Groundwork* are polemical and lead him into trouble. Still, most of the criticism he faces is not the product of a generous reading but instead part of the need to quickly dispense with opposing theories. Kant’s tendency to write architectonically and expound di- and tri-chotomies, especially in the first two *Critiques*, makes him an easy target. Third, Kant’s theory of emotion is amazingly complex, infused both with psychological insight and many latent psychological ideas; it is intricately connected to his moral theory as well. There has simply not been enough interpretive effort directed at providing
anything more than a stereotyped account of Kant’s theory of emotion. Ultimately, chapter 3 argues that Kant believes that we have a moral duty to reflect on our emotions for the sake of better understanding them and better fulfilling the emotional needs of ourselves and others.

Chapter 4 goes beyond mere injunction and uses Kantian moral theory to demonstrate the ways that this moral/emotional engagement should occur. The first section of the chapter considers the emphasis Kant places on self-scrutiny and shows that it is a pre-requisite for emotional intelligence: we must know our motivations in order to understand our emotions and to develop virtue. This discussion leads to an analysis of Kant’s theory of self-esteem, as I argue that self-scrutiny and moral concern do not amount to neurosis, as some might fear, but help us to be happier. Any theory of self-esteem that psychologists take up must, like Kant’s, be morally informed; otherwise it will be groundless. The second section contains a theory of emotional universalism, showing that we must morally evaluate our emotions but that doing so does not amount to eradicating particularity. The third section takes up the topic of respect as it applies both to morality and emotional experience. Respect is not just a negative constraint, but a part of the duty to promote the happiness of others. Empathy, which is a part of emotional intelligence, as well as learning to seriously engage difference, are necessary components of respect. The fourth section considers the ways that moral reason is subjectively integrating and hence therapeutic. Psychological benefit comes not just from rational reflection, but, more correctly, truly moral reflection.

Chapters 5 and 6 address Kant’s critics, including some of the mistaken interpretations that have precluded an understanding of the emotional dimension of his moral theory. I reject those interpretations that appear most natural (as in chapter 5, wherein I argue that it does not make sense to call Kant’s moral theory “formal” even though he does so himself). I argue that...
Kant’s notion of purity is based on a confused and unsuccessful application of an idea from his theoretical philosophy to his practical philosophy. I also argue that his notion of autonomy should be understood in terms of universality, and I criticize it for reinscribing a psychologically problematic model of subjectivity. These interpretive amputations are not only useful for my project; they help Kant’s theory itself to be more coherent. Although a possible objection is that “creative” interpretations are always less successful than the original itself, I show that in both cases Kant’s theory reaches a juncture at which we must privilege some parts of the text over others. The more faithfully we follow the text, the more we are forced to reject parts of it.

Within the legacy of Kantianism we have those who are working to show that morality amounts to psychological health. These types of theories—I am not sure whether to call them moral theories or theories about morality, i.e., moral psychology5—offer an answer to the question “Why be moral?” Unfortunately, in making the argument that morality simply is good reasoning, they fall prey not only to moral corruption (a problem that is always on Kant’s mind); they also overlook that which is particular about moral reasoning, viz. the categorical imperative. I provide a close reading of what I take to be some of the most important aspects of Kantian moral theory, not so that I can claim some kind of privileged historical lineage, but because I believe that Kant, for the most part, is right. Sadly, I have heard the history of philosophy compared to the history of science, which is to imply that both are largely obsolete. Such is a spurious parallel not only because the majority of Americans remain in the Medieval period, but also because the history of philosophy is not over. As we shall see, one very one-sided reading of Kant is at the heart of our culture’s current misunderstanding of emotional intelligence and the

relativistic denial of its moral importance. It is in returning to Kant—setting the record straight, as it were—that we can form a new model for virtue, one that does justice to emotion.
CHAPTER I

WHAT IS AN EMOTION?

Many who study emotion believe that they must first define it; yet defining “emotion” is not as necessary for productive discussion as one might think. Furthermore, defining “emotion” risks arbitrarily limiting and skewing our discussion, as well as taking emotions out of the mental and social contexts necessary to understand them. We shall see that more expansive discussions illuminate attempts to isolate and exclude a special class of phenomenon, even though the latter come off as more “scientific.” Currently the philosophical study of emotion is engaged in a debate over the definition of emotion, but this debate is more a product of differing goals of study rather than a real disagreement over subjective phenomena, which are themselves extremely varied. Rather the implication is that some things should or should not count as “emotions.” Should purely automatic, physical responses, such as the startle reflex, count as an emotion? Should relatively abstract preoccupations of thought count as emotions? I argue that the relative role that cognition and affect should play in the definition of “emotion” is not really what is at stake in this debate. Affective and cognitive theories should be seen as differing mostly in terms of the perspective they take, as cognitive theories tend to be more introspective, and affective theories take up a biological, third-person perspective for the sake of speculating about environmental adaptations rather than therapeutically altering the subject.

In the first section of this chapter I discuss the affective/cognitive debate in the hopes of overcoming it. I do this by situating each position in the practical context of the individual’s
response to his or her emotions and the implicit moral evaluation of emotion. This gestalt shift involved in employing the pragmatic maxim helps us to see what is at stake in adopting either approach and to sympathize with both sets of motivations. When we reframe the debate this way, it becomes evident that, if there is a real disagreement, it is between the more Romantic view that emotions should largely be heeded and a more Rationalist view that emotions are often flawed.

My insistence on connecting the philosophy of emotion to moral evaluation should not be surprising, since emotions have always been seen as somehow related to morality. Recent work in the philosophy of emotion largely sides with the Romantic view and expresses this relationship between emotion and morality with the idea that emotions are themselves moral evaluations. The second section of this chapter summarizes the most prevalent contemporary attempts to link emotion and moral theory, not only by means of the idea that emotions give us information about value, but also via moral subjectivism and moral sense theory. I argue that these attempts are insufficient because they fail to grasp that emotions are not fixed, pre-theoretical evaluations but are themselves informed by moral thinking.

The third section begins to develop the theory of emotion that motivates the rest of the dissertation. While I take up the cognitive approach’s focus on reflection and self-criticism, my goal is to overcome the cognitive legacy of Stoicism—the assertion that emotional judgments are always false—along with the idea that emotions are always true. Furthermore, calling emotions judgments, while partly illuminative, gives the false impression that emotions are fully self-transparent, with relatively fixed boundaries. That the majority of emotional judgments are largely unconscious—a thesis that most philosophers of emotion accept, although for different reasons—casts doubt on this assumption. Instead, it is necessary to view emotions as processes of feelings and thoughts working together toward the impossible goal of self-understanding. I
consider the ways that emotions are involved in subjective processes of expression and re-integration that aim at understanding and improving the whole self. If we are to truly understand the role that emotions play in our lives, we must account for the entire psychological context of the emotional experience. I tend toward inclusivity in my discussion of emotion, resisting the tendency to identify emotions with only a “part” of the self (cognition, affect, or desire)—indeed, resisting the tendency to think in terms of “parts” of the self at all. Emotions are interesting exactly because they reside at the intersection between the mind and the body, the space where the mind and the body overlap. They show the way that thoughts affect feeling and feeling affects thought. If we do continue to assume along with common parlance and folk psychology that emotion and reason are sufficiently different processes, approaching emotions in this holistic way demonstrates the ways that emotions and reasons are, nonetheless, integrally related. Given the integration between reason and emotion, and that emotions track the most important themes in our relationship to ourselves and our relationships with others, experiencing them calls on rationalist moral theory. This is one of the over-arching themes of this dissertation: that rationalist (Kantian) moral theory is internal to the experience of emotion.

I. Cognitive and Affective Theories

Beginning a work on the role that emotional intelligence should play in moral theory with an orientation in the history of the philosophy of emotion serves to remind us that the topic of psychological self-improvement has not always been relegated to the anti-academic realm of the self-help genre. Nor was the study of virtue (and the science of self-improvement) classically an exclusively theoretical affair; in classical ethical texts, the study of virtue is always connected directly to pedagogy and the concrete pursuit of improving real people. The pursuit of virtue is
central to the pursuit of philosophy, and virtue, regardless of the theory, is always described as some form of emotional comportment. Whether it is said to be unemotional reason or the ecstatic overflowing of positive emotions, the topic of virtue involves emotion. The way that one answers the question of the relationship between virtue and emotion depends on the definition that one gives to “emotion” and the correlative definition that one gives to reason.

A survey of the history of the philosophy of emotion usually results in its summary in terms of the division between cognitive and affective theories of emotion. Roughly speaking, cognitive theories hold that emotions are cognitions; affective theories hold that emotions are affects. We might also remark that there can be as many different types of theories of emotion as there are seen to be parts or faculties of the mind. So, for example, we can also say that there are conative theories of emotion, i.e., theories that hold that emotions are desires (or states of action readiness). This fact about classifying theories of emotion already demonstrates something fundamental about emotions: even though they may be related to one part of the mind more than others, they can be seen as related to all parts of the mind.¹

Aristotle and the Stoics are taken as forerunners of the cognitive theory of emotion because Aristotle held that the emotions are based on beliefs and the Stoics held that the emotions are (nothing but) judgments. The Stoic theory of emotion is simpler than Aristotle’s, and there is more reason for calling it a cognitive theory.²

An Aristotelian theory of emotion comes mostly from the Rhetoric and the Nichomachean Ethics. In the former, Aristotle outlines the situations (both subjective and

¹ Prinz cleverly constructs a table to illustrate this, putting the “emotion episode component” alongside the theory of emotion that takes it as its paradigm: conscious experiences; feeling theories, change in body and face; somatic theories, action tendencies; behavioral theories, modulations of cognitive processes; processing mode theories, thoughts; pure cognitive theories. Jesse J. Prinz, Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 10. One might argue that even this list is incomplete.
² For an argument that Aristotle’s theory does represent purely cognitive theory and that it is comprehensively constructed, see chapter 1 of W. W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1975).
objective) that tend to cause certain emotions. His emphasis is on teaching lawyers to sway jurors in ways conducive to their case. His discussion demonstrates that emotions are stirred by beliefs.\(^3\) Drawing from Aristotle’s discussion of emotion in the *Rhetoric*, Cooper argues that, for Aristotle, emotions involve three elements: a feeling that is either pleasurable or painful (or both); beliefs that arise “from ways events or conditions strike the one affected,” and a “desire for a specific range of reactive behaviors or other changes in the situation.”\(^4\) This definition of an emotion combines aspects from the affective, cognitive, and conative orientations of the mind.\(^5\) Still, it is not clear from the *Rhetoric* whether beliefs operate a force over emotions or whether emotions operate force over beliefs. Aristotle writes: “Emotions are things through which, being turned around, people change in their judgments” (1378a 24-27). Perhaps the mutual causality between belief and emotion indicates a deeper-level identity.

A quick review of Aristotle’s ethics will remind us that he believes that the emotions are in some ways susceptible to discursive reason and in some ways not.\(^6\) The *Nicomachen Ethics*

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\(^3\) The context in which we find the lion’s share of Aristotle’s discussion of emotion (pathos) is particularly significant and is mostly responsible for the fact that Aristotle is thought to have a cognitive theory of emotion. The goal of the *Rhetoric* is to teach lawyers how to sway jurors. It is no surprise that an “Aristotelian” theory of emotion holds that emotions are beliefs that are based on some kind of evidence: the giving of evidence is the only means a lawyer has of stirring emotions. Furthermore, jurors are in a position to judge a defendant, although not to actually interact with the defendant. It is no coincidence that Aristotle’s discussion of emotion portrays emotions as dispositions to actions, such as the disposition to help another with no benefit to oneself (*charis*), that are disconnected from the actions themselves: one can feel *charis* (or gratitude) toward a person without doing anything about it. See David Konstan, “The Emotion in Aristotle Rhetoric 2.7: Gratitude, not Kindness,” in *Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh*, ed. David C. Mirhady (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2007), for an argument that *charis* should be translated as gratitude.) It is possible that the problem in translating this term comes from exactly the point about context to which I refer, namely the fact that *charis* is an emotion that is normally connected to some action (as is grace, or *gratis*) but is disconnected from its action in this context.) The juror is in a position to act regarding the defendant, but in a way that is removed from a direct relationship.


\(^5\) Aristotle also considers one way that emotions relate to desires: anger is usually the result of a frustrated desire, and so one is “carried along by his own anger by the emotion [the desire] he is already feeling.” (1379a13).

\(^6\) Cooper argues that Aristotle’s account of a long list of emotions in the *Rhetoric* is merely a “dialectic investigation” meant to prepare the way for a “scientific” theory, and not such a theory itself. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion*, chapter 19.
paints virtue as a type of pre-rational emotional disposition. Aristotle states that the virtuous person feels pleasure and pain at the right things; this is the difference between virtue and mere continence that Annas has accused Kant of missing. Aristotles tripartite theory of the soul holds that emotions originate in the non-rational soul and must be educated by reason. This picture of the soul makes us question whether or not we should attribute a cognitive theory of emotion to Aristotle, since, on this model, emotions are usually non-rational desires. The very fact that Aristotle holds that emotions are susceptible to rational argumentation and evidence makes us wonder why he places them in the non-rational/animalistic soul in the first place. Nevertheless, his account of akrasia rejects Plato’s assumption that total rational convincing of the passions is possible. As with all Ancient and Hellenistic theories of virtue, Aristotle sees virtue as a process of self-training. Emotional training is direct in the cases wherein the emotions are susceptible to reason, and it is indirect in the cases wherein the emotions are not susceptible to reason.

Furthermore, the latter kind of training (behavioral training), which must occur continuously through proper influence and practice from infancy on, is the foundation for the former kind. In other words, the emotions can only become susceptible to reason if the person has already reached a certain level of intelligence and virtue, which are predicated on understanding through example.

Stoicism, which is arguably the most important historical source for our contemporary approach to emotions. The Stoics present the most extreme form of a cognitive theory of

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8 Sokolon’s argument that Aristotle believes that emotions can also sometimes be rational is based on a confusion between irrational and non-rational (19). Something that does not originate from reason (the non-rational) need not be opposed to reason (irrational).
9 It is important to note the Christian legacy of Stoicism as well as its parallels with Buddhism. Nevertheless, Sherman argues that Buddhism also holds that reason can itself be a dangerous object of attachment. Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 115. Therefore, Buddhism is more like Pyrrhonism than Stoicism, which also aims at ataraxia. Nevertheless, Stoicism and Pyrrhonism share similarities.
emotion: they held that emotions are simply beliefs and that our prejudice that emotions are more than beliefs is simply a mistake. Following Aristotle, Stoics maintain that when you change your beliefs you change your emotions. Emotional beliefs always ascribe value to some person or thing outside of the individual’s control; hence emotions are always false beliefs, for the Stoics, since the truth is that the transitory world is without value (neither good nor bad). The Stoics were convinced of the necessity of eliminating anger and its negative effects on society. They believed that accomplishing this would similarly require weakening all of the emotions, since each emotional tie is a bond over which someone might become angry. As we will see in the next chapter, our current cultural assumptions about emotion are still very much preoccupied with worries about anger. We can see that the conviction that emotions are judgments is necessary for the prescription of apathy. If emotions are not judgments, it is not clear how we can be said to have control over them and how we might go about ridding ourselves of them.

Nearly all contemporary cognitive theorists of emotion follow the Stoic line: that beliefs are necessary and sufficient for emotions while physical affects are neither necessary nor sufficient. Yet contemporary cognitive theorists do not agree with the Stoics that the emotions are necessarily mistaken judgments; they believe that they can inherit a Stoic account that is more friendly toward the emotions. For example, in Nussbaum’s Aristotelian/Stoic account, emotions are value judgments. Nussbaum uses the titular metaphor from her book *Upheavals of Thought* to describe emotions, holding that they are typically conscious mental preoccupations. She does not mean that we must constantly attend to them; rather she means that they have cognitive content. She identifies emotions with eudaimonistic judgments:

So we appear to have type-identities between emotions and judgments—or, to put the matter more elastically, looking ahead, between emotions and value laden cognitive states. Emotions can be defined in terms of these value laden

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recognitions alone, although we must recognize that some feelings of tumult or ‘arousal’ will often accompany them, and sometimes [affective] feelings of a more type-specific kind, and although we must recall that they are at every point embodied. If we want to add this very general stipulation to the definition, we may do so through the proviso that we are talking about only the likely case, in order to retain the possibility of recognizing nonconscious emotions.\textsuperscript{11}

Nussbaum agrees that emotions often involve affective states, but she rejects the idea that affective states should be given definitional necessity. In addition to her example of the unconscious fear of death, which she holds to be an emotion, she gives the example of anger at/after her mother’s death that lasted for days, sometimes presenting no physical manifestation yet at other times expressing itself through physical symptoms. This example highlights a salient difference between cognitive and affective approaches: affective approaches tend to hold that emotions follow stimuli extremely quickly and that they are rather short-lived (emotions that hang on for days are defined as moods or dismissed as emotional remnants). Nussbaum, on the other hand, identifies an emotion, the fear of death, that lasts a lifetime. Although we by no means frequently disassociate the cognitive content from the bodily feeling, cognitivism captures the insights that we would not deny that someone is sad in the absence of certain privileged bodily feelings—simply saying “I am sad” would presumably be enough—although we would deny that a person is sad in the absence of a reason or occasion for sadness. In such a case we would look harder for a reason, or we would deny that the person is really sad; perhaps he is just tired? (Depression, if it is taken to mean sadness for \textit{no reason}, is thought to be an emotional disorder.)

For Solomon, another contemporary follower of the Stoic (turned Sartrian) philosophy of emotion, “emotions are judgments” (“normative and often moral judgments”).\textsuperscript{12} But this does not

\textsuperscript{11} Martha Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought} (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 64.

mean that emotions are propositional attitudes; rather, he claims that “emotions are subjective engagements in the world.”\(^\text{13}\) Solomon slides between talk of “judgments” and talk of “engagement” because both are intentional.\(^\text{14}\) Solomon focuses on the notion of emotional engagement to suggest that emotions can be willful or something we can be “caught up in.” Trying to include their affective aspect, he calls emotions “judgments of the body.”\(^\text{15}\) Solomon argues that feelings often accompany emotions, but he argues that emotions should not be identified with affects because affects are not intentional and emotions are. As we can see, contemporary cognitive theorists have moved to include affect in their theories, but they hold that emotions are better understood in terms of their cognitive content.

For Nussbaum, the moral upshot is that emotions teach us about ourselves and our values. The idea is that we often rationally or unconsciously ignore our relational attachments, and we ought not do this because they are our moral attachments. For Solomon, following Sartre, the moral implication of cognitivism is that we are always responsible for our emotions. Sartre, taking some lead (and license) from Freud, posits that even the most seemingly involuntary gestures are the products of preconscious wishes—“magical” incantations—and should therefore be subject to ethical scrutiny as though they were voluntary. Solomon, being a bit more practical, focuses on the way that emotional displays often serve unconscious purposes and should be taken to task on this score too.

James is taken to be the forerunner of the affective theorists. In his “What Is an Emotion?” James argues that emotions are the conscious recognition of bodily responses that

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\(^{14}\) This is Sartre’s Heideggerian language, adopted by Sartre to respond to Heidegger’s criticism of (Cartesian) subjectivism. The idea of engagement is meant to imply that consciousness structures the subject and object at the same time. Note the parallel between this idea and James’s proto-Husserlian phenomenology. This continuity alone ought to be enough to obviate the cognitive-affective debate.

\(^{15}\) Solomon, “Emotions and Choice,” 87.
follow from certain stimuli. His definition gives primacy to physical responses, such as crying, and it is often believed that he means to reduce emotions to these symptoms. James famously quipped that we do not cry because we are sad, but we are sad because we cry. In other words, the emotion should be identified with the bodily event, not with the mental event that may accompany, follow, or even precede it. Following James, affective theorists hold that feelings are a necessary element of any emotion. Without affects, we have merely thoughts, not emotions. For James, perception comes first, and then affect, and then the self-conscious perception of the affect. His point is that the feeling must come before the self-conscious perception of it. (On the other hand, James believes that the self-conscious aspect of emotion happens “the moment it occurs.”)

Most recently Prinz has offered a thorough and spirited defense of the affective approach in his Gut Reactions. In it he defends the view that emotions are “embodied valent appraisals.” He adopts Lazarus’s notion of “core-relational themes” and argues that emotions are perceptions of our body’s affective response to the perception of a core-relational theme. Nevertheless, Prinz follows James in sometimes conflating the response with our awareness of it; hence he believes that we can have emotions (the bodily response) that are a part of phenomenal consciousness but still elude our current attention and thereby count as “unconscious.”

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19 Prinz’s survey of the affective and cognitive camps is much more complete than the brief one offered here and should be consulted by anyone pursuing further study.
20 Richard Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). Prinz argues that we directly “perceive” core-relational themes, but, far from being counter-intuitive, this borders on tautological. Saying that feeling of sadness is the perception of personal loss does little more than tell us the definition of sadness. “Perception” and “feeling” are being used as synonyms.
Although Prinz agrees that emotions can be triggered by judgments and that they are amenable to cultural influence, he rejects the cognitive approach. Following James, as we will see shortly, he finds the machinery of the concept too clunky to account for what goes on in an emotion. He writes: “Forming the judgment that there has been a demeaning offense [involved in feeling anger], it would seem [according to cognitive theories], requires possession of the concept of being demeaning and being offensive.” This objection paints the cognitive theorist as being committed to the idea that emotions are always preceded by explicit, conscious thoughts, which is a dubious inference. Prinz makes the important point that “emotions can represent core relational themes without describing them… the complexity of that which is represented need not be mirrored by the complexity of the representation.” Furthermore, Prinz argues that cognitive theorists are united in holding that the cognitive components of emotion are “disembodied” because they hold that:

the somatic concomitants of emotions must be distinguished from the concomitant propositional attitudes or appraisals. The cognitive components bound to our emotions are something above and beyond the bodily changes.

He points to the counterexamples of feelings outlasting their judgments as well as emotions being triggered somatically to show that emotions are not identical to judgments.

Prinz argues that the fact that “emotions are often contingent on having certain thoughts” should not be generalized to the claim that “thoughts or ‘cognitions’ are essential to emotions. One of the most convincing criticisms of the affective approach is the retort that affect is not enough; mere feelings are insufficient to tell us which emotion we are having or if we are having

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22 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 24.
23 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 25.
an emotion at all and not just some other physiological experience. Prinz argues that the affective theorist can take the cognitive context of the feeling into account, but that the feeling is still the core of the emotion. As we will see, Prinz would accuse my approach of falling prey to what he calls “the Problem of Plenty,” or identifying everything to which emotions are related with the emotions themselves. Instead, he takes a minimalist, essentialist approach that is predicated on a distinction between “state emotions” and “attitudinal emotions,” the latter being emotions that can go without affects but are instead dispositions to have certain affects. Prinz also makes use of Damasio’s idea of the “as-if loop” to explain instances where emotions “bypass the body.”

These two caveats explain away Nussbaum’s example of the anger at/about her mother’s death that sometimes went without an affective expression. This conciliatory version of an affect theory sees Nussbaum’s examples as merely not the best example of an emotion.

The best candidate for an emotion, on the affective view, would be something like the surge of adrenaline that one gets from being startled. For example, while spotting my toddler son as he climbs up and down the stairs, my heart will jump if I see him begin to fall. Prinz counts the fact that I may remain a little jumpy—or my adrenaline might be channeled into excitement—even after I see that he has caught himself as evidence that affects have a life of their own and should not, therefore, be linked to judgments.

In his textbook on emotion, *Emotion Explained*, Rolls devotes chapters to hunger, thirst, drug addiction, and sexual desire (as he assumes that sexual desire is a purely biological drive).26

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25 Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, 71. It is not clear whether this phrase is meant to refer to emotions that occur without affects or emotions that are triggered by judgments. Part of the confusion comes from Prinz’s tendency to use the term “disembodied” to refer to things that are merely in the brain.

The biological drives that Rolls includes with emotions are never given that classification in common discourse. We can also see this in the case of startle. Startle is physiologically identical to fear, but is not, for that reason, the same as fear.

Robinson, on the other hand, has defended the opposite position. She criticizes what she calls the “judgmentalist” philosophical theories of emotion for ignoring the “primitive side” of emotion. Following Ekman and the Darwinian tradition, she argues that startle should be considered an emotion because it involves a characteristic pattern of neural firing and a characteristic facial expression. She argues that it is a “developmentally early form” of fear and surprise. Although Robinson uses LeDoux to challenge the idea that emotions require conscious thought, she argues that the startle response is an implicit judgment and that, because of this, it should be taken as the prototypical emotion:

Emotional response should be thought of, on the model of the startle response, as a response that focuses our attention on (makes salient) and registers as significant to the goals (wants, motives) of the organism, something in the perceived (remembered, imagined environment); this response characteristically consists in motor and autonomic nervous system change…

This sounds like a possible definition of emotion but an unlikely definition of startle, since we are startled well before we know whether or not the event is relevant to our desires and for that reason the startle response is often mistaken. Ekman, on the other hand, holds that startle is not an emotion because it cannot be inhibited or simulated, and because it is reliably caused by a loud noise and emotions are not reliably caused by any one general thing. Robinson’s

\[\text{states that even the author does not call “emotions.” It is one thing to attempt to replace ordinary language with more precise theoretical definitions or make the case that people are often confused in their experience; it is quite another thing to simply swap one concept for another, perhaps while giving the explanation that one is rejecting “folk” theories of emotion, as LeDoux does (p. 16).}\]

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argument is motivated by supposedly anti-affective accounts of emotion, but she appears to be straw-manning her opposition, since it is not evident that “judgmentalist” theories of emotion would deny that startle is a “proto-emotional response.” Many emotions seem to involve physiological arousal, but that does not make startle an emotion, much less the prototypical emotion, as LeDoux seems to assume with his work on the fear response.

We have seen that affective and cognitive theories take two very different types of emotion as their models for emotion in general. Cognitive theorists hold that it makes sense to say that someone can be angry without feeling angry; affective theorists think it makes sense to say that someone can feel angry without having something to be angry about. Yet, I think that it is obvious that both cases, either emotional affects without intentionality or emotional intentionality without affects, are rare and occupy the margins of emotional phenomena. Even if emotions are a “natural kind,” there must be some good reason for counting some things as emotions and ruling out others; and it the reasons for privileging some emotions over others that we must examine.

This argument about the way we should define emotion, if it boils down merely to privileging some instances of emotion and excluding others, does not constitute an interesting debate. The first and simplest step we can take in overcoming the cognitive-affective debate involves refusing to squabble over which emotions should or should not count as an “emotion.” There can be no rational debate about how to cut the psychological cake. The only type of reason that can be offered in this debate comes from observations about the way we use the word “emotion,” but contradictory reasons about the way that we should use the word “emotion” count as well. It is common to point out that the current use of the word “emotion” is a relatively recent linguistic development and that the term “passion,” with its connection to passivity, is
historically more prevalent. “Emotion,” on the other hand, is formed from an active verb. These etymological musings are ultimately inconclusive; perhaps the recent linguistic development reflects progress in the latent theory of emotion.\(^{31}\) I think Prinz is right to argue that we usually use the term emotion to refer to the affect, rather than to the thoughts, but the point of the cognitive approach is to illuminate emotional experience, not to reflect on natural language. Furthermore, the criticism that affects alone cannot tell us which affects count as emotions—or which emotions they represent—still holds sway. If emotions are affects, they must be emotional affects, and if emotions are judgments, they must be emotional judgments. Hence, the first step of identifying emotions with one or the other does not yet tell us very much.

Cognitive and affective theorists are sometimes not even interested in the same kinds of emotional phenomena. Affective theorists, such as Rolls, often include hunger and sexual excitement among emotions (because they are focusing on physiological processes); whereas cognitive theorists tend to focus on those emotions that affective theorists would call moods or dispositions.\(^{32}\) These different definitions are a product of different approaches: one sees itself as more scientific, focusing on “observable” phenomena, while the other privileges introspection. Perhaps the most important aspect of James’s theory, from his own perspective, is that it follows in the footsteps of Darwinism. He writes that the “nervous system of every living thing is but a bundle of predispositions to react in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the environment.”\(^{33}\) Darwin observes physiological emotional responses, yielding a behavioral theory of emotion, and speculates about their original adaptive value. So, for example, he


\(^{32}\) In focusing on evolutionary explanations, affective theorists tend to resort to the idea that emotions are out-dated adaptations. This tendency yields the difference that affective theorists tend to hold that emotions are “wrong” because they are not appropriate to the situation, more than cognitive theorists do. A more complete discussion of this difference is found in chapter 2.

\(^{33}\) James, “What Is an Emotion?” 129.
hypothesizes that crying is a way to protect the eyes during violent expiration. The fact that James is a part of this general trend in philosophy might help explain why he is associated with more scientific approaches to emotion, such as neurobiology.\textsuperscript{34}

The full significance of the Darwinian influence on affective theories of emotion must be appreciated. Biologists have more interest in demonstrating the law-like fixity of universal emotional phenomena.\textsuperscript{35} They observe emotions from a third-person perspective, focusing on the relationship between the subject and the environment.\textsuperscript{36} This viewpoint is the product of different goals and yields different forms of study than the cognitive viewpoint, which is more subjective and introspective. A biological approach focuses on the way that the human is determined by, or adapted to, the environment. It holds a certain fascination with determinism, and so the affective theorist holds that affects are caused by the environment (even when the “environment” refers to subjective thoughts, as Prinz concedes). It is thought that in order to study something “scientifically” it is necessary to reduce it to this level of cause-and-effect determinism.

Most neurological approaches to emotion focus on the idea that emotions are out of our control and yet, controllable after the fact. Rolls, for example, makes a distinction between emotions, which are initiated by stimuli in the external environment, and affective states, which are caused by a change in the “internal milieu,” where hunger is an example of the latter and sadness is an example of the former. Furthermore, he believes that this difference is not

\textsuperscript{34} Were we to draw a line between psychology and biology, James himself would fall onto the former side, since in his \textit{The Principles of Psychology} he tells us that he follows the “psychological method of introspection.” In fact, this proclamation represents a criticism of and turn away from behaviorism, and so it is somewhat ironic that he is taken to be the father of the affective approach.

\textsuperscript{35} Affective theorists often object that if emotions are judgments then it would not be possible for animals to have emotions, and yet they do. We need not deny that there are universal emotions or that humans share some forms of emotional expression with other animals, or that emotions have their manifestation in the autonomic nervous system, in order to maintain that emotions also contain latent, useful (not irrational or simplistic) cognitive content. Nussbaum is sensitive to this point.

\textsuperscript{36} Ekman’s work is a particularly clear example of this tone. See, e.g., Ekman, “Expression and the Nature of Emotion.”
sufficiently alienating, making it reasonable to study one and draw conclusions about the other. Clearly, Rolls’s strategy for explaining emotions “scientifically” is to cut out their cognitive content in order to explain them biologically.

It is common to level the following criticism at neurology when it pretends to be able to ground the study of emotion: Neurology cannot do without or even come before psychology or ordinary language and their theoretical or folk theories of emotion because neurology must rely on first person reports in order to correlate neurological phenomena with emotions in the first place. The neurologist might counter that he can do without the term “fear” and can instead show that fear responses, which can be observed without subjective reports, reliably correlate to amygdalal activity. We might up the ante and demand that the neurologist demonstrate that these bodily fear responses actually occur in humans experiencing fear. It is likely that they do occur in a portion of the cases that would be self-reported as “fear” and do not occur in the others (the neurologist would likely state that he is not interested in those other cases, although some other neurologist might be); and that we must split the term “fear” into, at least, two types: physiological and non-physiological fear (such as Nussbaum’s example of the constant unconscious fear of death). So far the neurologist has made a pretty good case. Still, neurology is not likely to inform a theory of emotion if it is not mixed with introspection. As we have seen, LeDoux’s conclusion that fear responses are “unconscious” is belied by introspection. Neurology also demonstrates the unfortunate, “scientific” tendency to strip the human (and the animal for that matter) of her human properties. Introspection is an important part of human life and the experience of emotion, even if it is not a part of neurology.

Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the role that freedom and determinism play in both of these approaches is not a falsifiable hypothesis, but a set of discipline-specific

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assumptions set out for the sake of study. Affective theorists are interested in the causes of emotions and cognitive approaches are interested in the intentionality of emotion. The latter naturally leads to analysis—to the question, “what are you angry about?”

My argument is different than Rorty’s argument that biological and cognitive explanations figure differently in the explanations of different emotions. Aside from that fact, it is also the case that the best way to understand the difference between biological and psychological explanations is not necessarily in the type of explanation given, but in the general assumptions and direction of the endeavors. Gesturing back to Aristotle’s comment in De Anima, we must notice that one can study an emotion either from a biological or a psychological perspective. It is important to note that affective theorists focus on affects insofar as they are observable, attempting to image and measure the more elusive affects. Scientists focus on affect and desire, or behavior, because affects are thought to be more physical and objective than thoughts. A biological study of emotion takes the point of intercourse between the subject and the environment as its object of study, and so it focuses on the affects that most immediately occur as reactions to stimuli. While the biological approach is pressured to yield implications for therapy, its implicit emphasis does not lie in changing the phenomena it studies. (It is quite ironic that the biological approach is interested in classifying and categorizing normal emotional responses, when currently, in the case of neurology, its primary research objects are pathological

39 “Accordingly, a physicist and a dialectician would define each [attribute of the soul] in a different way. For instance, in stating what anger is, the dialectician would say that it is a desire to retaliate by causing pain, or something of this sort, whereas a physicist would say that it is the rise in temperature of the blood or heat round the heart” (403a25-33).
40 Affective theorists are not opposed to therapy, nor do they hold that changing emotional responses is impossible. Rather, they focus on behavioral training, which the cognitive approach will have to admit is sometimes necessary, as with the case of phobia. Aristotle’s notion of virtue, and, as we shall see in chapters 3 and 4, Kant’s as well, recognizes that emotional therapy must take the form of both theoretical understanding and habitualizing practices. One without the other would yield either coldness or mindlessness.
cases—not to mention animals—while the cognitive approach, being introspective, has the most access to prosaic emotions (Freud aside) and yet is more interested in therapy.)

Taking up either a biological or an introspective perspective leads to certain tendencies in the study of emotion. The biological approach, more so than the introspective approach, tends to yield lists of the discrete emotions, assuming that each emotion is a natural kind. It may seem surprising that Frijda’s book *The Laws of Emotion* is exactly such a list, since he follows Lewis in holding that emotions are “self-organizing cognitive appraisals.”

Yet Frijda holds that emotions are “states of action readiness,” underscoring the extent to which conative theories, even though they include both affective and cognitive aspects of emotion, are closely aligned with affective theories because of their third-person perspective of the relationship between the subject and environment. Neu, on the other hand, who represents a more cognitive approach, argues that the emotions do not qualify as natural kinds; they are determined by thoughts and hence are too numerous to classify in only but the most general groupings. Cognitive theorists tend to focus on individual and cultural variability instead of universality. Rorty concurs, and adds that emotions cannot be “sharply distinguished from moods, motives, attitudes, [and] character traits.”

Again, in this difference between the two approaches, we do not see a disagreement about the facts about emotion—Frijda’s “laws” of emotion are not wrong, they are simply very general and open to the criticism of tautology—but a difference in focus and goal. The goal of therapeutic self-analysis necessarily sees emotions as fluid and indistinct since it is familiar with the relationship between emotions and the ways that one emotion can turn into or reveal itself to contain another.

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II. A Synthesis

In order to discover whether or not there is a substantive disagreement between cognitive and affective theories of emotion, we must rule out those disputes that are merely verbal. Existing debate has relied on a good deal of straw-manning, the most obvious and prevalent example of which come from the cognitive side.

Most cognitive theorists dismiss the affective approach by reducing it to what Prinz calls a “feeling theory.” The affective position is often caricatured, with references to poetry or common idioms, as holding that emotions are mere feelings and that they are not about anything at all. Although the title of his book might suggest otherwise, Prinz distances himself from this position and is not able to provide a reference to anyone who does hold it.\textsuperscript{43} James’s position might be taken for a brute feeling theory, but, as we shall see, that would be a mistake.

According to the affective approach, emotions are not mere feelings; they are more like perceptions or immediate responses. The idea that the emotion is itself the evaluation is similar to Nussbaum’s theory, a connection she herself might have made had she bucked the tendency to misrepresent the affective approach.

Another unfair characterization comes with Prinz’s insistence that cognitive approaches hold that emotions are “disembodied.” Contra cognitive approaches, Prinz writes: “We should not feel compelled to supplement embodied states with meaningful thoughts: instead we should put meaning into our bodies.”\textsuperscript{44} We have already seen that both Nussbaum and Solomon characterize emotions as being “embodied.” Solomon’s label of “judgments of the body” seems identical to Prinz’s point, and yet it seems that Prinz would argue that judgments are \textit{necessarily}

\textsuperscript{43} Prinz, \textit{Gut Reactions}, 198.
\textsuperscript{44} Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 58.
“disembodied” because they involve concepts. Emotions, for Prinz, “represent” core-relational themes, but they do not count as “judgments.” The idea seems to be that conceptual thinking cannot be “embodied,” or it cannot have a feel to it, because concepts are abstracted from immediate experience.

Calhoun objects to the cognitive approach because, as she argues, emotions and beliefs and “logically and ontologically” distinct categories. This objection is not only question-begging for an affective approach, but it is far too strong and is not upheld by Calhoun’s analysis. Emotions are interesting precisely because, although we commonly assume a dichotomy between physical and mental experience—this dichotomy is a normal part of folk psychology—even an unsophisticated account of a simple emotion belies it. Most emotional affects are obviously psychosomatic: we commonly recognize that we are able to “worry ourselves sick” or “work ourselves into a fury.” Thoughts like these are obviously embodied. Regulating one’s affects by means of one’s thoughts is an everyday occurrence; so is regulating one’s thought by means of externally manipulating affects. Freud founded modern psychology on the idea that physical symptoms might contain latent thought content; Averill, adapting a psychoanalytic approach, argues that one source of the apparent passivity of affect is

45 Prinz, Gut Reactions, 198.
47 Calhoun details the difference between what she calls “intellectual” or “evidential” beliefs and “experiential” beliefs to help explain emotion-belief conflicts. Experiential beliefs, which come from some kind of biased history, can intrude on one’s intellectual beliefs like a kind of illusion. In this way, we can deny the intellectual validity of our emotions. Emotions, thereby, involve epistemic normativity: our emotions should match our intellectual beliefs. Calhoun concludes that emotions must be analyzed in terms of one’s elaborate system of beliefs, which include “interpretive ‘seeings as…’ and their background cognitive sets.” She concludes that emotions are not beliefs but interpretations; but this conclusion does not address her original criticism that emotions and beliefs, and now interpretations, are logically and ontologically distinct sets. Calhoun, “Cognitive Emotions?” 342. Sherman argues that Aristotle’s notion of phantasia offers this same insight about emotion; Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, 61.
dissociation. True, the relationship between beliefs and emotions does not entail an equation, as Calhoun points out, but such an equation is not “logically and ontologically” ruled out either.

Still, it is not clear what Solomon and Nussbaum mean by asserting that emotions are “embodied.” Even though Nussbaum and Solomon insist that affects should not have definitional priority in “emotion,” given examples of affect-less emotions, it seems that what they really mean to say is that, to the contrary, all thoughts are “embodied” and have concomitant affects simply because they are experienced. This is a Heideggerian idea—the idea that Dasein is always in a mood—and, as we shall see, it is at home in James’s proto-phenomenological philosophy. (Hume’s notion that experience is distinguishable from thought by the feeling of its liveliness presages James and suggests a way in which empiricism might lead necessarily to an affect-based phenomenology.)

It is also possible to argue that, not just present experience, but also memories are affective. Carruthers, in her study of medieval rhetoric, argues that:

Some traditions in ancient philosophy also recognized an emotional component in all memory. Memory images are composed of two elements: a ‘likeness’ (similitudo) that serves as a cognitive cue or token to the ‘matter’ or res being remembered, and intentio or the “inclination” or “attitude” we have to the remembered experience, which helps both to classify and retrieve it. Thus, memories are all images, and they are all and always emotionally ‘colored’. This is understandably not a popular position among those who seek to define emotion, since it seems to take us one step further away from coming up with that which is unique to emotions. Both the affective and cognitive sides would seem to agree that the specific thought-affect combinations that are termed “emotions” as opposed to “thoughts” are so because they fit certain

proto-typical response patterns. We might say that emotions are very lively, lively ideas, or that
they are not just hot, but burning hot, impressions. (Of course, this suggestion verges on parody
because I remain unconvinced that defining emotion is an interesting philosophical enterprise in
the first place.)

We might instead follow Calhoun and concede that affects and beliefs are different, or at
least at opposite ends of a spectrum. Still, we have seen that no one would willingly assent to the
proposition that emotions are “disembodied.” Nussbaum, at least, would agree with Prinz that we
need to “put meaning into our bodies.” Her emphasis on emotional insight demonstrates this
conviction: she might rather say that we need to become aware of the meanings that are in our
bodies already. Solomon’s focus, on the other hand, is critical; this is a significant difference to
which we shall return shortly. In the meantime, it is important to note that being critical of one’s
emotions —at least if one is skeptical that they are agents of existential denial—seems to entail
that they are more, not less, meaningful than previously thought. It is still an open question
whether or not said meaning would reside “in our bodies,” but this prolonged attempt to find the
line between the mind and the body begins to contradict the original spirit of “embodiment.”

Prinz’s epithet reveals itself to be really about the role that “concepts” play in emotions.
His point that “the complexity of that which is represented need not be mirrored by the
complexity of the representation” is an important one. It seems to be the case that calling
emotions “judgments” cannot shake the implication that the thoughts that underlie emotions must
be conscious; yet, they are often neither conscious nor explicit. Might the cognitive theorist
merely say that emotions “involve” or “imply” judgments in order to get out of this unfelicitous
connotation? Whatever strategy they take, no cognitive theorist is committed to the idea that

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emotional judgments must be explicit and conscious. If the problem with judgments is that they are thought to require slow, conscious mental acts for their deployment, then we cannot say that emotions involve judgments. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the reason that cognitive theorists latch onto the model of judgment in order to describe emotions. The majority of theorists agree that emotions can occur rather quickly, as if they were not connected to conscious thoughts, i.e., that there can be snap judgments.

Prinz agrees that emotions involve appraisals, but he aligns these appraisals with perception rather than judgment. Both James and Prinz take perception as the model for emotion, but we cannot conclude thereby that they take emotions to be any less conceptual. James would likely protest that emotions do not involve concepts, but this is due to his derogatory view of concepts, not of emotions. Throughout his life James became more skeptical of the legitimacy of explicit conceptual thought and more convinced that truth was conveyed immediately through practice. In his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, James’s discussion of truth borders on mysticism. He describes religious conversion, at least the more spontaneous type, as the achievement of a more harmonious integration of beliefs and feelings. In other words, conversion is the most important, although just one, example of a case for which feelings are a better guide than reason. For James, concepts refer to more abstract mental processes, not instruments that facilitate normal experience. James follows Pierce in understanding the beliefs that inform normal decision-making processes as mental habits; in “The Sentiment of Rationality,” he comes close to arguing that rationality itself is merely a sentiment. Toward the end of his life he became more suspicious of conceptual thought in general, suggesting in his “A Pluralistic Universe” that it has a tendency to distort reality.51

James’s theory of perception is based in his neutral monism, which holds that the “mind” and “body” are abstractions that refer to one underlying thing that is itself neither mental or physical. Similarly, his descriptions of experience combine what we would normally take to be both mental and physical aspects. Perception, for James, is nearly indistinguishable from conscious recognition because perception itself already represents a cognitively organized form of sensation. Emotions can only be so closely tied to perceptions because perceptions are not of the given, as Quine argues that empiricists would have it, but are already cognitively formed. Just as Kant takes his model for experience from judgment, James’s account of perception includes what we would normally refer to as conceptual recognition. If we follow Solomon in asserting that judgments need not be propositional attitudes but are rather ways of representing objects, then we can argue that James’s notion of perception similarly offers a theory of “engagement” with world.

In calling emotions “embodied appraisals,” Prinz sounds a lot like Solomon or Nussbaum, but in the affective camp. Prinz’s argument shows, perhaps inadvertently, the way that the affective position is cognitive, or conceptual, on its own terms. The affective account is conceptual: it relies on the complex meaning of the environmental or internal cue to cause the affect. It seems that a cognitive theorist should be willing to accept a robust revision of James’s theory of perception in place of the role that “judgment” or “belief” is intended to play in the theory. In response to the affective position that affects precede judgments, Solomon retorts,

54 Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” 57.
55 Here we might mention that in the Rhetoric Aristotle considers beliefs as they may be mere impressions (phantasia, or the way that things currently in her attention strike the person) (Cooper, John M. Reason and
“there is still cognition there,” referring obviously to the possibility of giving a rational account of the situation, not to the presence of conscious beliefs.  

Clearly, the difference between the cognitive and affective approaches must be characterized differently than in terms of conceptual context. Just as Prinz exposes with his discussion of the perception of core-relational themes, having an emotion involves the employment of concepts. It is not just that we see a box outside of the door; we see the box as a gift that we have been happily anticipating. It is the latter conceptual meaning, not the box itself, that is a necessary component of an emotion. Using the term “conceptual” instead of “cognitive” represents progress in overcoming the debate, because cognitive theorists are not committed to the idea that the content of emotions has already been explicitly cognized before the emotion occurs, but merely to the idea that it is there and can be made explicit, even if only after the fact. In the example of the gift, the person most likely does not explicitly think “There is the gift from my mom that will probably contain my grandmother’s necklace that I used to love trying on when I was a little girl,” and yet all of those thoughts (and more) are in some sense present.

This misunderstanding about the debate might be the reason that cognitive theories appear irksome to affective theorists. To the affect theorist, the cognitive theorist is obstinately asserting that people are somehow consciously and antecedently aware of the judgments that

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Prinz flatly denies this, (Gut Reactions, 50); he argues that emotions track concepts without being conceptual themselves. Nevertheless, this conclusion begs the question about what part of subjective experience, thoughts or affects, should count as an emotion while providing evidence against limiting the definition of emotion to affect.

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Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.) He assumes that the jurors will be rather easily made to feel one emotion or another (and so having two strong but opposite emotional reactions to two opposing well-made arguments serve the search for truth). In terms of my choice to focus on Kant’s and not Aristotle’s theory of emotion, it is important to note that Aristotle does not ask whether or not it is good that people are emotionally volatile.

Solomon, “Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings,” 79.

In the attempt to bring together cognitive and affective approaches, Singer and Schachter have developed a “two components” approach arguing that emotions are physiological responses and their cognitive evaluations. Asserting that emotions involve both aspects oversimplifies what is really at stake in the debate, since, as we see, neither side is truly interested in denying that emotions involve both cognitive and affective aspects. Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer, “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State” in Psychological Review, 69, 1962, pp. 379-399.
contribute to an emotion. They are right to object that such a position could not allow for the quickness of emotions, nor does it ring true from experience. Thus, affective theorists often caricature the cognitive approach as arguing that all emotions are like false, affected emotion.\footnote{See Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More than IQ* (New York: Bantam Books, 1995), and the discussion in chapter 2.}

In reality, it is not at all an important feature of a cognitive theory that the subject be consciously aware of the beliefs and judgments that are related to an emotion. What is important to the cognitive theorist is that the emotion be cognitively analyzable. In this way, emotions can be shown to be related to beliefs and judgments after the fact, and their genesis can be constructed into an intelligible psychic narrative, even if their causes remain unconscious psychic mechanisms.

Here, in the discussion of the way that we represent emotions to ourselves after the fact, we are beginning to approach one real difference between cognitive and affective approaches. Prinz denies that emotions are cognitive because he takes cognition to involve an *act* that is within the subject’s *control*. I do not think that cognitive theorists would accept this definition of cognition, but it does seem to get at a peculiarity of the cognitive approach that is a hold-over from Stoicism, viz, the fact that it seems to suggest that we can change our emotions by changing our judgments. This difference can also be expressed in terms of the passivity or activity of the emotion or in terms of freedom and determinism, which, as we have already seen, is related to different disciplinary assumptions.

Prinz retreads some Aristotelian ground in briefly admitting that there is a sense in which emotions are under our control and a sense in which they are not under our control:

Emotions are voluntary in a double sense. Thinking about something in the right way can certainly influence our emotions, and calibration files can be modified through education and experience. We exert control over emotions by choosing what to think about, and by cultivating calibration files. But emotions are also
involuntary in a double sense. First, the thoughts and images contained in an established calibration file may set off emotions automatically. If one happens, by choice, to activate a representation in a calibration file, an emotion will ensue. Second, once an emotion has been initiated, we cannot alter it by direct intervention. Initiation pathways and response pathways both operate without the luxury of control.  

I hesitate to challenge Prinz’s last point because I do not want to spoil the spirit of honest reconciliation, but I feel compelled to point out that, if there is a difference between the initiation of an emotion and our response to it, it is surely in the fact that the latter is more under our control. Of course, it often feels like we are in the grip of an emotion, but that does not make it so. Rather, emotions are involuntary because, once they have begun, they feel involuntary, and are not changed as quickly as thoughts are. (Still, I think it is important to challenge the extent to which conscious thought is under our control. If cognition is an evolutionary adaptation, it is not radically open to variation in function. Nor do we often experience ourselves as directing cognition; it is rather the case that the topic or experiences at hand direct cognition.) Also, emotions are involuntary because the “calibration files” or past experiences that inform them were not in our control at the time, nor can we change the past. Still, as Prinz says, we can create new experiences to rival and trump the experiences that we have already been given.

Still, this fully refined point uncovers a further, and perhaps the most important difference between affective and cognitive approaches: a moral difference. A further possible difference between “perception” and “judgment” is the degree of subjective responsibility. We assume that perceptions are caused by objects and judgments are caused by subjects. Furthermore, perceptions are not thought to involve “truth-claims” because they tell us something about the subject, not about the object, and judgments can be wrong because they are about objects. Cognitive theorists have thought that they differed from affective theorists in

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60 Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, 236.
holding that emotions are “about” something, but, as we have seen, no one maintains that emotions are not “about” anything. Rather, the salient difference between perception and judgments is whether or not we focus on their truth. Perceptions can be mistaken, but those who study perception do not focus on this fact; instead they focus on what perceptions tell us about the subject. Everyone seems to agree that emotions are evaluations, but some theorists wish to go further and consider the ways that we do and should evaluate these evaluations.

For James and for Prinz, as well as for the more conciliatory, anti-Stoic, cognitive approaches, it is important that we not try to alter our emotions. If the emotions presents itself as absolute, it is perhaps with good reason. Just as Hume uses skepticism to advance empiricism, James can sometimes appear to be a biological reductionist, but this polemic is in the service of advancing a psychological monism and moral naturalism. Calling himself a radical empiricist, James is suspicious of those thought-processes which take themselves to be “pure.” Instead, the most important intellectual truths are intuitive, and they are products of our natural, psychological engagement with the world. It is not hard to see that James’s pragmatism represents a dissatisfaction with the primacy given to reason in the history of philosophy, and so one defense proffered for the “lower” faculties comes in the form of a Romantic inversion of value. James seems to want to defend emotion from the imperialist perversion of reason, and his strategy for doing so is to assert that emotions are more rational than reasons. This move is certainly not novel, and it is enjoying much current popularity. In fact, if we phrase the debate in these terms it seems that alliances are re-drawn and many more cognitive approaches, like Nussbaum’s, end up agreeing with James and Prinz. Prinz’s assertion that emotions are embodied must be understood as the idea that moral theory must be embodied, or that the body
must play a foundational role in moral theory, as we can see with the new moral sense theory of his *The Emotional Construction of Morals*.\(^{61}\)

It is becoming popular to defend the “rationality” of emotions, not by assimilating them into the rational mind but by arguing that they take precedence over the rational mind. Two related lines of argumentation have become common in linking emotionality to morality in this way; both are based on the idea that emotions help unemotional reason make decisions. The first is that emotions help us to act morally. Some versions of this argument hold that morality is grounded in natural moral feelings, like empathy, and it is therefore similar to the moral sense theory of Hume or Hutcheson. We have already seen that James and Prinz take this approach. The second is that emotions give us information about our values. This argument also tends towards moral sense theory, although less directly.

Neurobiologists who study emotion speculate that emotions are important for reasoning and moral behavior. Damasio’s work is the most well known in this regard.\(^{62}\) Damasio studies people with frontal-lobe brain damage who, although they behave normally in other ways, behave in an irresponsible way that is inconsistent with their pre-trauma personalities. They have trouble managing their finances, getting to work on time or going at all, and following through with required job tasks. They violate social conventions, sometimes breaking laws, and they show a lack of empathy with their spouses.\(^{63}\) Previously these behaviors had been explained as an impairment of reasoning or memory abilities, but Damasio argues that these explanations are not satisfactory and speculates that the problems are caused by a breakdown of emotional, not cognitive functioning. He argues that the patients fail to bring to mind the appropriate emotional

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\(^{63}\) Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza*, 141.
memory that would help them behave properly or make an effective decision. Damasio uses this idea to argue that feelings are “rational,” i.e., they are beneficial to good reasoning. His argument is similar to De Sousa’s defense of the “rationality” of emotion, which holds that emotions help us both to answer questions of salience and to break stalemates in rational decision-making.\textsuperscript{64}

Damasio’s view of emotion is based on what he calls the “somatic marker hypothesis” of decision-making.\textsuperscript{65} It holds that emotions are “integral to processes of reasoning and decision-making” because the “mechanisms of reasoning” are normally affected by “signals hailing from the neural machinery that underlies emotion.”\textsuperscript{66} Bechara’s work in conjunction with Damasio, especially the article “Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy,” helps to illuminate the full force of the idea that emotions are rational. This article describes an experiment in which people with prefrontal brain damage (and decision-making defects) and people without brain damage were asked to play a gambling game in which certain choices were riskier than others. The people without brain damage, after playing for a while, had a hunch that certain decks of cards were riskier. Many of them, after playing for even longer, could articulate the reason that those decks were riskier. The entire non-brain damaged group avoided the risky decks. The group with prefrontal brain damage did not report experiencing a hunch, even though later, almost half of them had conceptual knowledge of the reason certain decks were more and less advantageous. Surprisingly, no one from the brain-damaged group avoided the disadvantageous decks, even those who explicitly knew that they were disadvantageous. The experiment, like the patients discussed above, demonstrates a gap between conceptual


\textsuperscript{65} This theory is similar to what De Sousa calls the “New Biological Hypothesis” of emotion (The Rationality of Emotion, 195-201).

\textsuperscript{66} Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens, 41.
knowledge and behavior. From this experiment, Bechara and Damasio conclude that human decision-making involves two possible paths: affective and cognitive, the latter borrowing from the former. They speculate that the affective path makes use of nondeclarative knowledge that draws on memory of rewards and punishments. Damasio refers to this as a “gut feeling.”

Of course, this model that posits two levels of decision-making does not explain the reason that the brain-damaged subjects failed to choose advantageously even when they had the conceptual grasp of the situation. The explanation would have to be that they did not care in the same way that the subjects without brain damage did. Similarly, in their lives, the reason for causing trouble in their marriages and jobs would have to be that they did not care about these things. The fact that those people without a hunch, or, in other words, with a feeling impairment, were not able to act on explicit conceptual decision-making suggests that cognitive decision-making processes rely on affect, just as they rely on other types of information, not that there are two distinct processes. Furthermore, the fact that there can be a “hunch” that precedes cognition seems to demonstrate the ways that feelings are conceptual. Hence, there seems to be no evidence to posit a duality of reasoning systems. The hunch that the subjects displayed first may have been a precursor to conceptual knowledge, rather than an act of an essentially different kind of reasoning. Their recognition that somatic markers might be generated cerebrally acknowledges this possibility. Neurologists tend to argue that differing brain pathways count as evidence for differing faculties; they do not realize that this begs the question.

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67 Like other functionalists, Damasio ignores the obvious fact that emotions do not always appear functional. In fact, there is reason to think that we more readily associate the emotions that do not appear functional with the term “emotion” than we do the mere triggering of an “emotional memory,” as with remembering that we were punished the last time we engaged in a certain behavior.

Damasio believes that affective reasoning is distinctly based on memory of reward and punishment; yet his gambling experiment is entirely a task of achieving reward and avoiding punishment, so, in effect, the lack of a control group disallows such a conclusion. Furthermore, it is not clear why conceptual knowledge would be insensitive to considerations of reward and punishment (or even why all reasons cannot be construed as rewards and punishments) and why a separate decision-making process is necessary to accommodate these considerations. Those people who had the hunch did not stop behaving advantageously as soon as they understood the reason for it. There is, in fact, no evidence that nondeclarative knowledge draws from a different kind of evidence, such as opinion, prejudice, or personal memory, than does conceptual reasoning. “Emotional knowledge” is being construed in a strange way, again like an unthinking impulse to action, if it is to be the thing that can account for the fact that certain brain-damaged patients fail to act on their conceptual knowledge in certain situations.

Damasio studies the role that brain anatomy plays in the experience of certain moral sentiments, but his research has been taken further to draw conclusions for moral theory. In one experiment, brain-damaged people were more likely to make utilitarian hypothetical moral decisions than those without brain damage, who felt more beholden to the value of an individual’s life. Theorists like Kitcher and de Waal try to draw conclusions from this about the validity of Utilitarianism and Kantianism. Thankfully, they conclude that it is better not to have brain damage! Nevertheless, neurobiology is no basis for moral theory, and someone could easily draw the opposite conclusion. Ironically, many Kantian-inspired moral theories argue that moral reasoning is exactly that type of reasoning that is most rational.

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This account of morality is similar to that of moral sense theory; Damasio and others who support his research even use the term “moral sentiments.” Indeed, Damasio is vulnerable to the same criticisms as Hume—turning Hume’s Law against Hume himself—that we cannot derive “ought” statements from “is” statements. Still, this is a common confusion. Damasio does not attempt to divide cases in which we should follow natural sympathy or our instinct to follow rules from those wherein it would be immoral to do so. As a biologist, Damasio does not pretend to be a moral theorist, but he does seem vulnerable to the temptation to explain and justify morality through biology and evolution.

Other theorists pick up the suggestion that emotions are useful for reasoning and similarly attempt to draw conclusions about morality. Murdoch, Nussbaum, Blum, and Walker all advance the idea that emotions help us with the problem of salience, or, since they reveal values, they help us to know that some things are more valuable than others, and thus they aid us in decision-making, especially moral decision-making. Yet the fact that emotions express personal values does not mean that they express moral values. The “information claim,” assuming along with Damasio that there are separate rational and emotional decision-making processes, represents a confusion about what reason, as well as moral theory, is. Simply to know that someone values such and such does not tell us anything about what that person should value. It similarly involves a straw-manning of the champions of moral reasoning, including Kant.

Solomon might be taken as one of the only remaining critics of emotion because he continues to highlight the importance of making conscious choices of emotions, to have a “willingness to become self-aware, to search out, and challenge the normative judgments

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70 Damasio, Looking For Spinoza, 163.
embedded in every emotional response.” Following Sartre, he argues that, since “normative judgments can be changed through influence, argument, and evidence, and since I can go about on my own seeking influence, provoking argument and looking for evidence, I am as responsible for my emotions as I am for the judgments I make.” Nevertheless, he joins the Romantic camp when he argues that the insight that emotions are values “wreaks havoc on several long cherished philosophical theses” like the idea that morality must be based on reason.

Stocker examines the evaluative dimension of emotion in his book *Valuing Emotions*, proposing to go beyond what he calls “the information claim” that emotions are demonstrations of or give information about personal values. He argues that emotions are not merely instrumentally useful, because “emotions are also essential constituents of life and value.” On the one hand, he means no more by this condition than to assert that human life is essentially and necessarily emotional. On the other hand, Stocker flirts with emotivism, even though he eventually rejects the emotivist claim that emotions are “internal to value.” Stocker argues that emotions teach us three things: the value of having emotions, adeptness in being emotional and having emotions, and the content of other people’s emotions. This idea about learning from our emotions is very much like the notion of emotional intelligence that I develop in the next chapter. Stocker similarly suggests that there are correct and incorrect modes of emotional engagement. Drawing from a connection between the Aristotelian notions of phrenesis and habit,

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74 Solomon, “Emotions and Choice, 316. Solomon’s thesis might be better expressed with the more general idea that we are responsible for ourselves. There seems to be no reason for him to focus on emotions since he does not have an example of someone who argues that we are totally passive with regard to the passions; rather, he is inspired by Sartre’s general emphasis on personal responsibility.
77 Ibid., 85.
78 Ibid., 137.
79 Ibid., 188-89.
he argues that correct emotional engagement reveals the correct values.\textsuperscript{80} This seems to be (tautologically) true, but Stocker does not venture to tell us anything about the nature of correct emotional engagement or correct valuing—doing so should be acknowledged as a difficult task that would presumably take us out of the realm of a theory of emotion and into moral theory. Nevertheless, I believe that we can show that moral theory is internal to emotional experience without resting on the conviction that emotions simply are values.

III. Evaluating Emotions

We have seen a redrawing of the lines of the debate between cognitive and affective approaches: some theorists from both camps are united in the assumption that the emotions are valuable and should be heeded. Nevertheless, flipping the evaluation of emotion from “wrong” to “right” does not entail fully overcoming of the Stoic legacy. We must reject both the idea that emotions are privileged sites of information and the idea that emotions are problematic, unthinking impulses. Indeed, I do not believe that emotions are any more natural or irrational than reason itself. The idea that the emotions give us information about our values, that they are or reveal values, cannot explain the way that emotions can provide objective ethical insights on their own. This section strives to uncover many of the more complex ways that moral theory is internal to the experience of emotion.

Moral theory is internal to the experience of emotion to the extent that it is internal to experience in general. Most models of the subjective encounter with moral theory portray it as a form of rational deliberation. One question that is often asked is what role emotion should play in these thought-processes. It is thought that emotions are necessarily partial and hence resist the impartiality of moral reasoning. This concern continues to assume that emotion and reason are

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 202.
two fundamentally different mental faculties. If we can show that emotion and reason are internally related, then the role that emotions play in moral reasoning will come into clearer view.

Emotions are often thought to be irrational (not just foreign to rationality but actually opposed to rational thought) because, as with anger, they sometimes seem to cause us to act before we have a good plan of action. Imagine, for example, that a father is tending to his four-year-old daughter at a public play yard. The play yard is quite busy, and among the children are some older boys running around carelessly, playing tag. Among them is a particularly tall boy, wearing combat boots that are easily as large and at the same level as many of the younger children. The father becomes worried that the young children might get kicked, and when one of the older boys inadvertently hits one of the children the father leaps up, as if to attack, with the goal of making the older boys leave the play yard. A verbal fight ensues, but the boys eventually leave. The father then feels vindicated, but also regretful, and wonders whether his actions were justified and optimal.

Perhaps at this point he, or others, might blame the “emotion” of “anger” for causing him to act so attackingly instead of coolly addressing the boys and making them aware of the problem. Some affect theorists will point out that the action was a product of the “fight” response and an automatic result of the adrenaline coursing through his veins. On this model, the individual must find a way to control the feeling of anger. A functionalist account will adopt this same explanation but with a positive spin: were it not for the feeling of compulsion, the father might have done nothing, and someone might have gotten hurt. Perhaps the “fight” response was warranted, given the seeming prevalence of violent encounters in our society and the appearance of the boys. Greenspan argues that emotions are “rational” because they are quick and useful
impulses; but in this situation it is exactly the moral and pragmatic evaluation that is left undetermined.  

Again, and now from different theoretical perspectives, we are faced with the dichotomy of “emotion” as either bad or good. This dichotomy misses several facts pertinent to the situation. First, the father was worried before he was angry. It is not likely that the father saw the boys as a threat in the same way that a cave-man sees a mountain lion as a threat: if that were the case, he likely would not have let his daughter play there. The worry was more likely a result of internal strife and fear of confrontation. Understood this way, we see the altercation with the boys as a brief episode in the life of the emotion, which was, for a much longer time, preoccupied with the questions: What should I do? and What should I have done? These questions were encapsulated in and accompanied by a variety of different affects, and both the affects and the thoughts gradually changed into other experiences. Still, during this one slice of time, we can see that the father was asking himself pragmatic and moral questions. In other words, what started out as an example of an emotion revealed itself to be an example of moral deliberation.

I resist the tendency to call the emotion an impulse, or, rather, to call the impulse the emotion, because doing so causes us to ignore the broader and equally relevant situational context. There also seems to be no reason to assume that reason is inherently slow and that, therefore, the emotion must be the result of a substantially different faculty. If emotions are quick impulses that follow rational directives, what prevents us from saying that they are a manifestation of reason, an example of reason acting quickly? As we have seen from more fully considering Prinz’s theory of emotion, if an impulse is involved, it is the function of rational recognition.

In this one example of worry and anger about an interaction with another person, we can see that the emotion is itself an example of moral decision-making. The affects and the thoughts seem to go hand in hand. We can say that the thoughts caused the affects, but there is no evidence for that. It is just as likely, per Prinz’s theory, that the affects are what first spotted the trouble and the thoughts were scrambling to catch up. In other words, in this case we can see that the emotion is itself occupied with moral questions.

Might the moral decision-making have gotten on better if the emotions did not exist? Would someone without any emotions at all have acted differently and more effectively? Most people now answer this question negatively, but that is because they believe that without emotion the father would fail to see the moral and pragmatic urgency in the first place. I think that that is not necessarily true. I think that an unemotional person might have done a better job, depending on how much he knows about moral reasoning. If we ask the man now, after the emotions have subsided, “What should you have done in that situation?” He will most likely say, “I don’t know.” He might come up with some hypotheses, but nothing about which he feels sure enough to say that he will try to do next time. Reason is only a good guide if reason is well-versed in moral theory and human psychology, since the people involved did, in fact, have emotions.

Still, it is possible that someone with a feeling impairment, provided that he still had the “feeling” of his daughter’s worth and the innate value of the other children on the playground (including the older boys), would have handled this situation better. Imagine someone high on a serotonin-producing drug: this person would not have experienced the worry about his own ability to handle the situation and the fear that a fight would ensue. The drug-aided father might have had a much easier time talking to these boys (if only because he might have distracted the
boys for other reasons). The fact that drugs might have helped the father overcome these beliefs might show that the affects need to be prevented in the future, or it might show that they the product of beliefs that are not very deeply entrenched. Perhaps the father was just in a bad mood. In fact, internal oscillation over whether or not he does actually have these beliefs may have further added to the indecision and worry.

So, am I then conceding that the emotion, fear of conflict, is irrational? It is irrational in the sense that it is based on a false belief: the father is, in theory, capable of dealing with this situation. It is also irrational because it was dysfunctional, contributing to a less than optimal solution to the problem. Nevertheless, the emotion of fear is no less rational than the father’s belief about his own incapability. Both the belief and the affect are based on a very real lack of experience and knowledge. Perhaps they are even based on a number of experiences of past failures. Very few of us are any good at confronting and changing the behavior of strangers. We must not fall into the trap of thinking that “reason” is always perfectly rational. It is only prejudice that makes the question about the degree to which emotions are “up to us” look like it makes more sense than the degree to which thoughts are similarly “up to us.” In other words, it is not the affect that is at fault here—a computer might be similarly programmed to shut down in certain situations—but the complex, habituated thought-affect complexes. If the father did something morally blameworthy, the father is the one to blame. People, not faculties, are the objects of moral evaluation. (As Kant writes, we can act only under the assumption of free will.)

As De Sousa remarks, judging whether or not an emotion is “rational” is a “complicated process [that] is at the center of our moral life.”\textsuperscript{82} This one example has shown that emotional experiences can themselves be concerned with moral questions. It also reminds us that even the moral evaluation of emotions is similarly emotional. This is what I mean in saying that emotions

\textsuperscript{82} De Sousa, “The Rationality of Emotions,” 149.
are self-evaluative. Especially with negative emotions like anger, we often feel that we should not feel them (and hence feel some type of guilt or frustration) even as we are feeling them. Of course, this self-evaluation may or may not be morally correct.

Prinz tentatively attributes this “meta-cognitive” insight to Nussbaum, even though he eventually expresses it himself: “To assent to a value laden appearance, one must form another judgment, to the effect that this judgment is justified.” Therefore, “emotions are judgments about judgments.” In other words, emotions not only contain evaluations, they are self-evaluative. In my mind, this fact parallels the relationship between a theory of emotion and a theory of emotional intelligence, which is itself a moral endeavor. The latter asks and answers questions about which emotions we should feel, while emotions themselves prompt these questions and provisionally assume answers.

In the case of negative emotions, it is more often the case that we form the meta-judgment that the emotion is not justified. A good example of this comes from St. Augustine’s *Confessions*. After his conversion, Augustine judges the feeling of grief a sin, since it reveals an attachment to the created and transitory world. With the death of his mother, he wills himself not to feel sad, and succeeds in only crying a little bit. He then uses sleeping and bathing to change the emotion. Instead of sadness, he is overcome with anxiety over the fate of his mother’s soul, and pleads with God to save her, even though he admits having no reason to worry. In this case we can see that the evaluation of the emotion changed the emotion itself, even in a way that exceeded Augustine’s conscious control and awareness. I believe that Augustine’s Christian evaluation of and experience with death is the most common model for grief in our culture, especially among people dealing with death for the first time or with the death of someone with whom they were not particularly close. Moral theory is called on to evaluate the meta-cognitions

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that accompany and inform emotional experience and, in some cases, to therapeutically alter them.

On the other hand, there are certainly cases in which the emotions themselves seem to be morally blameworthy, whether we evaluate them as such or not. Solomon gives us the example of a husband who picks a fight with his wife, and who ends up feeling very angry, in order to get out of going to a party to which he did not want to go. There seems to be something blameworthy about this dishonesty, and the selfishness that motivates it; the husband is either unaware of this moral dimension to his emotion or denying it. Discussing the disagreement about going to the party directly would have been less selfish, even though it would have more honestly disclosed self-centered desires. In this case, we would hope that the moral insight would be enough to change the experience of the anger, although, as we shall see, it may not be enough to motivate a more honest exchange. Regardless, I think it is interesting to consider the extent to which unconscious moral self-condemnation is internal to the emotion, perhaps even fueling it through transference.

Sartre suggests that all emotions serve disavowed purposes. While this should be regarded as an empirical claim, we are nonetheless morally beholden to scrutinize our emotions on this score. The father’s anger did serve the purpose of scaring the boys away, after all. It is also possible that the assumption that anger and confrontation are socially unacceptable caused the expression of the emotion to take the form of an explosion that was calculated to override the internal censors. If that was his true goal, is he not somehow morally responsible for acknowledging it? In chapter 4 I argue that Kant’s theory of virtue suggests that one does have such a responsibility, and I agree.
The topic of evaluating and changing our emotions logically leads to a discussion of the appropriateness of emotion. Emotional appropriateness appears under the guise of the natural, but there is moral normativity built in to this notion of the natural; and so moral theory is related to the experience of emotion in the sense that we should and should not feel certain emotions. Let us take the example of sadness at death. If someone proclaimed herself to be not very upset (the word “sadness” is not even strong enough) about the recent death of her mother, that she neither had sad thoughts nor sad affects, we should be very worried. Experience teaches us that such cases of disavowed sadness surface in psychosomatic ailments or harmful behaviors such irresponsible drug use and sexual behavior, violence, addictions, or vehicular accidents. We would attest that, in some sense, she is actually sad. (This example shows us one way that the emotions transcend both affect and cognition.) Not only is it necessary for psychological health that she feel sadness, it is also a moral expectation, both to recognize honestly the importance of one’s relationships and the identity of oneself, but also to, as is often said, “pay one’s respects.” It is possible that the latter moral demand promotes the psychological health of the individual through cultural dictate, since there seems to be something inherently difficult in experiencing negative emotions as well as recognizing the negative emotions of others.

Western thought, being no stranger to the role of the commander, most frequently gives voice to this dimension of the relationship between emotion and morality, but we do not often see “natural” as itself a term of value. De Sousa defends this objective view of emotion: the idea that emotions perceive real (axiological) properties of the world.84 Adorno similarly develops an objective theory of emotion regarding aesthetic experience. My point here is to put the emphasis on what De Sousa calls the “paradigm scenarios” themselves, regardless of whether or not they elicit the paradigm emotions. Just as Aristotle tells us that the virtuous person feels happiness

84 De Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion.
and sadness at the correct things because he has been raised in a virtuous society, psychologically informed moral theory can tell us what these scenarios should be. The example of natural emotions does serve the point of the information claim: that emotions seem to ground values. Nevertheless, we can also say that natural values ground emotions. In both cases, it should be clear that the term “natural” is being used in a prescriptive, not an empirical, sense.

The example of natural emotions is also important for showing us one way that behavioral training and rational training overlap: both thinking and affective response are grounded in certain key evaluative experiences. I reject the line of thought, seen for example in De Sousa, that takes emotions to be “rational” because rationality in itself (being unemotional) would collapse for lack of direction without them. The example of natural emotions shows us that thoughts are often themselves inextricably connected to lived values.

In the event that we endeavor to alter our emotions therapeutically, it is likely that we will need to employ both rational insight and behavioral training. Returning to the experience of natural paradigm scenarios accomplishes both at once. So for example, the father might attempt to cultivate empathy or sympathy for the older boys by imagining himself in their position or the position of one of their fathers. Nevertheless, the possible difficulty of changing one’s emotional habits cannot be overstated. In this case if the father defers his own need to feel competent and safe in preference to the boys, the underlying problem-complex of the emotion will not be resolved.

The cognitive approach too often ignores the role of nature in our emotional lives, and for this reason it backslides too easily into Stoicism. It would be wrong to try to bar instincts or drives from playing a role in a theory of emotion. In the style of Freud’s libidinal theory, we
might grant that emotions bear a special relationship to instinctual drives.\textsuperscript{85} For Freud, the instincts are oriented toward love, which is itself a drive for self-overcoming.\textsuperscript{86} If we keep in mind that we must understand emotions within the context of natural needs, we will not fall into the Stoic trap of thinking that emotions are so easy to explain away. In other words, a theory of emotion must have a robust appreciation of social and emotional needs, of love, or else the emotions will necessarily appear mistaken or dim-witted. Emotions express both needs and, as we saw earlier, they are often disassociations. This might be the case because needs remind us of our finitude. In the language of psychoanalysis, they belie our wish (of the ego-ideal) to be whole and self-sufficient. Freud writes that repression comes from the ego-ideal, and that feelings of guilt and inferiority accompany negative emotions.\textsuperscript{87} The narrative we construct in coming to understand our emotions might refer to relatively fixed, or natural, psychic laws, but these are laws that the subject can work \textit{with} in coming to better understand herself, just as we do not create but work with the laws of logic and the facts of experience. What is important is the possibility of self-analysis, even if it is not, or even cannot in principle, be completed.

The case of natural emotions shows us that moral convictions are sometimes emotional convictions, but this insight transcends the case of natural emotions and is complicated by more complex examples. It might be the case that we experience our convictions emotionally, as with the case of sympathy; hence there are moral emotions. (In chapter 4, I discuss Kant’s important distinction between moral sympathy and the mere feeling of sympathy.) There are also cases in which our more theoretical moral convictions are repressed and become emotional, lest they be

\textsuperscript{85} I do not agree with Freud that some emotions must be repressed. Perhaps I can be criticized as Pollyanna-ish, but clearly my theory of emotion holds that repression is, for the large part, necessarily bad.


\textsuperscript{87} See, in particular, Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914), and \textit{Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego}, 81.
lost entirely. We might take the latter case as an example of emotions taking on the Sartrian “magical” functionality, accomplishing that which we do not feel consciously able to accomplish. One example of this might be my recent bout of self-inflicted hair traumas. I had a particular topic I needed to discuss with my stylist—a sort of apology I felt obliged to give—but I had been afraid to bring it up during the previous haircut. Cutting my own hair caused me (unconsciously) to have an excuse to see her again, and it gave me a further motivation to get the apology over with, lest I feel the unconscious need to cut my own hair again. Another example is a time when I fainted during a medical experiment in which I felt that the dignity of my body was being violated. I did not feel able to explicitly address the doctors running the experiment and rescind my consent, but fainting succeeded in rescuing me from the situation.

These examples show us at least two things. One, we have a real, psychological need to follow through on our moral convictions. It is only the portraying of moral experience as any less “embodied” that leads to the pseudo-questions about the relationship between morality and emotion. And, two, these examples show us that we are not transparent to ourselves, and yet some degree of transparency (honesty) is demanded by morality. This topic is discussed in more depth in chapter 4.

Both of these cases lead to fairly thorough resolutions. Unfortunately, there are also cases in which our moral/emotional convictions are repressed and transferred into different emotions entirely, such as sadness and anxiety. In this way emotional/psychological health is related to virtue. The notion of virtue itself entails courage, in my mind and in Kant’s, as he portrays it as a kind of strength or fortitude. Following through on our moral knowledge and conviction requires courage. This is not the courage to overcome emotions, but the courage to have emotions. Our
relationships with our closest loved ones provide countless examples of the necessity of this type of courage.

It would of course be fallacious to conclude that all emotions involve moral questions. We should notice that many of the previous examples involve negative emotions. Positive emotions sometimes involve moral commitments, but they do so in a different way: obviously in a happy, rather than a troubled, way. I am perhaps embarrassed to admit that cases of purely positive emotions (not, for example, the fear of being happy) seem less relevant to a discussion of moral self-improvement and hence less interesting to me. I am not alone in focusing on negative emotions, but I do take myself to be an exemplar in admitting this bias. Many theories of emotion seem to take negative emotions for their paradigm since they are so much more gripping and concentrated, as well as seemingly in need of help from theory.

After admitting that my insights about emotion do not necessarily apply to all emotions, I conclude this chapter by partially formalizing the theory of emotion assumed and developed in the rest of the dissertation. Mostly my approach is based on the conviction that emotions should not be identified with any one “part” of the self, and, to the extent that we can, we should stop thinking in terms of “parts” of the self entirely. Indeed, it is this compartmentalized way of thinking that leads to the simplistic idea that emotions can be judged wholesale. If an emotion represents just one part of the self, it makes sense to speak in terms of either “mastering” and “controlling” or “valuing” and “affirming” the emotions. If there are truly “parts” of the self, they might be afforded only such limited yes-or-no communication. Furthermore, one can only “master” and “control” something that is significantly different from himself. It is no doubt possible to believe just that, and to act as though there are two different selves; this schizophrenic or disassociating move is, I believe, part of the problem that needs to be overcome.
in cultivating emotional intelligence.\textsuperscript{88} Chapter 2 is largely concerned with the discourse of “mastering,” but now is the time to speculate about what a theory of emotion that is based on a unified theory of subjectivity might look like.

Different emotional experiences, positive and negative emotions, are significantly different. Even if we accept the idea that emotions form a natural kind, it would be more intellectually honest to begin with a survey of variety before we posit an exclusionary essence. It is sometimes the case that the affect comes first; other times the affect builds as if the thoughts themselves become more and more heated; sometimes the affects, if they are present at all, are not nearly as important as the thoughts. There is the still further possibility that both affect and thought are unconscious, although it means something different to say that affects are unconscious than it does to say that thoughts are unconscious, and manifesting themselves only indirectly. It is also the case that “affect” is not itself easy to pin down. To the question: “Am I now having an affect?” the answer must be “yes”; and even though there seems to be some distinction between emotional and other affects, I cannot begin to imagine how we could possibly make such a distinction in a way that relies only on the affects themselves.

Taking all of these caveats in stride, it is beneficial to gesture toward an understanding of emotion that respects its context in experience and protects a unified model of subjectivity. I like to think of emotions as involved in processes of subjective development (\textit{Bildung}), as processes involving immediacy, expression, and reflection.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{88} Note that I am using the term schizophrenia to refer to a different problem than that for which Stocker uses the term (one’s motives not matching up with one’s necessary values), a sense that implies that his theory of emotion still suffers this ailment. My use is not unlike Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s, in \textit{Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), but is perhaps closer to the phenomenon referred to by Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, in \textit{Dialectic of Enlightenment} (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1976).

\textsuperscript{89} Reflection should not be understood as stagnation. Emotions are usually calls to act, and simply “reflecting” rather than acting is to ignore the emotion, but so is action without an understanding of the reason for and the goal of the action, as well as, and most importantly, the best strategy for action.
A theoretical model of an emotion in general can put the affect first and then include its development into thoughts, but if we assume such a model, it is of the utmost importance to realize that the affect itself contains the germ of the discursive thoughts. It is this idea of latent content, favoring the move of analysis, that is at the heart of the cognitive approach.

Understanding the relationship between affect and cognition in terms of expression is illuminative because it reveals an emotional need to externalize, or emote in some fashion, and the preoccupation we have with some, especially negative, affects. This idea is helpful, both to explain the normal course that emotions seem to take and to aid in diagnosing emotional maladies. The affects might themselves be the externalization, in the form of laughter, a smile, or tears, for example. Or the affect might be a feeling that is itself a desire, to scream or hug someone—conative theories call this a “state of action-readiness.” It is important to understand that, if we take emotions to be merely affects, emotions are always a call to some kind of expression. If this is true, emotional experiences are always a crisis of practical reason: they demand: “what should I do?” “what can I do?” or perhaps “what is the meaning of this?” In the case of negative emotions, whose affects usually begin internally, the question is more “what should I do now?” In the case of positive emotions, whose affects are usually expressed externally automatically, the question “what should I do?” is a call for mental action: a call to recognize, to reevaluate one’s commitments and identity, to, in the future, plan accordingly.

Hence, emotions are taken to offer salience to certain situations. If a situation is “emotional” it is important, not because its meaning is given, but precisely because its meaning is contested.\textsuperscript{90} Emotions sometimes point to thoughts that we have not yet thought.

\textsuperscript{90} The argument that emotions are “modes of attention” that “track morally relevant news” strikes me as feeble (Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, 39). It is comparable to responding to skepticism by praising the wonders of sight. First, it talks past the criticism of emotion. Second, it inadvertently reinforces the assumption that
Neither the affect, nor its immediate expression or translation into discursive thought, are the end of the story. Emotional experiences carry deeper implications for our lives, and so the next step of an emotional experience is the call for some form of self-consciousness. We may reflect on the action that we decided to take in the hope of gaining insight into the original affect, or we might still be in a process of deciding what to do about our thoughts and feelings. The call for expression is a call for self-development, even if, or perhaps especially if, the understanding or expression defuses or alters the originating affect. Emotions do not burn themselves out; they are reabsorbed and transformed for the sake of themselves being transformative. Emotions may be privileged sites of experience in the development of self-understanding, but they are in no way different from the normal life process of learning, adapting, and striving for improvement. Of course, this process often becomes obstructed or stalled, and so emotions often become stuck at the level of affect or impulse, but a theory of emotion necessarily takes a wider perspective.

The upshot of this theory of emotion, partly inspired by German Idealism (a precedent for which can be found in Kant, as we shall see in chapter 3), is that emotions always call for expression and for reflection. They are a part of the human process of moral/psychological growth. Affect, thinking, and self-alteration are necessarily interconnected parts of a whole life: trying to understand one in isolation from the whole necessarily yields a distortion.

We have seen that the idea that emotions tell us about our values does not tell us very much, especially when we accept the claim that emotions are themselves wrapped up with and are the target of moral evaluation. Most of the theorists who subscribe to “the information claim” about emotion acknowledge that there can be bad, as well as good, emotions, but they do not

something like robot experience is possible. Third, it seems silly—like something out of Aristophanes’s *The Clouds*—to praise something that is so much a part of normal experience.
attempt to tell us how to judge between the two. Just as emotion helps with moral decision-making, moral decision-making must first help us to have good emotions. Therefore, we must let a phenomenology of emotion lead us to ethics, provided that ethics is already reasonably knowledgeable about emotions and open to learning more.

It is likely that these theories about subjective values do more than evade moral theory: they implicitly and sometimes explicitly promote moral subjectivism. They oppose thinking that something might be good or bad independently of subjective evaluation. In the case of emotions, which call out for an inquiry about the best mode of action, this turn yields nothing but a dead-end. Apparently, this is the consequence that moral theory’s perceived lack of attention to moral psychology has caused. Correspondingly, we have seen a flood of attention to “context” and “particularity,” and the relationship between the subjective and objective in ethics, along with practical wisdom, which is said to be necessary to bridge this supposed gulf. In the following chapters I argue that there is no such gulf, at least not in the guidance offered to our emotions from Kantian moral theory. My view is that emotional intelligence is based on morality, not that morality is based on emotion, and that moral subjectivism, even though it seems to affirm the emotions, talks down to them and fails to take up the inherent challenge of self-improvement posed by emotions. As we have seen, the study of emotion inevitably leads to the evaluation of emotions. Such is the job of emotional intelligence, and the evaluation of emotions must look to moral theory for help. This conclusion, I hope, is obvious, since it has long been recognized that proper emotional engagement is necessary for virtue. What is new is the idea that this sense of “proper” might be gestured toward by emotional experience itself, and that Kantian moral theory can pick up where a study of emotion leaves off. The first idea is the subject of the following chapter and a discussion of the second idea begins in chapter 3.
CHAPTER II

THE MORAL IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The goal of this chapter is to clarify the relationship between moral theory and the psychological construct of emotional intelligence. Since I assume that my readers will be better read in philosophy than in psychology, I first introduce my reader to the notion of emotional intelligence. No doubt my reader has already heard the term and has some associations brought to mind by it, largely due to the prevalence of media attention given to the idea in recent years. Some psychologists are positively giddy at the amount of popular attention their field is receiving; others are suspicious and denounce the whole notion as “pop psychology.” Since I believe that it is useful to employ the term, I must necessarily engage this debate, reviewing the work that is being done on emotional intelligence in order to clarify the concept. We shall see that there is a great deal of disagreement between psychologists over the meaning of the term. I argue that some theories that stand out for their accuracy, while others, like Daniel Goleman’s book *Emotional Intelligence* (which led to the popularity of the term itself), are clearly problematic.

I evaluate these approaches based on their theories of emotion and theories of intelligence. The word “intelligence” itself poses a trap, of course, suggesting that emotional intelligence might be innate and inalterable, since intelligence theories make similar claims for cognitive intelligence. This essentialism promotes a defeatist attitude about self-improvement as well as smugness for those who “make the grade.” There is
widespread consensus about the purpose of a theory of emotional intelligence: it ought to help individuals cultivate their own emotional intelligence, which should turn out to be a good thing for both the individual and the group. Definitions that focus on the unconscious and automatic nature of emotions prove unable to explain the means by which people might become more emotionally intelligent. In other words, cultivating emotional intelligence itself relies on having a good theory of emotional intelligence and a good theory of emotion, while a poor theory of emotional intelligence hinders its development. The idea that emotions must be “managed” and “controlled,” for example, risks promoting self-inflicted violence in the form of self-management and self-discipline.

After reviewing some of the ways that theories of emotional intelligence can go astray, I focus on some of the better models, which have made considerable progress in developing the notion of emotional intelligence. Ciarrochi’s idea of emotionally intelligent behavior, for example, resists positing a latent, innate ability and instead focuses on achieving psychological health. I understand “intelligence” in terms of “understanding” and “analysis”; thereby emotional intelligence is the analysis and understanding of emotions (including emotional thoughts, affects, and behaviors) that leads to their morally and pragmatically good expression and resolution. Emotional intelligence also involves empathy, i.e., intelligence not just about one’s own emotions but also about the emotions of others, as well as the ability to interact emotionally and about emotions with others. Again, the goal is to further pragmatic and morally good outcomes. Emotional intelligence is something like virtue—a stable character trait that we should develop—and it is thereby involved in promoting goodness, not just for
oneself and one’s close associates, but for all people, although of course, to a different extent and in different ways. When we see that emotional intelligence is like virtue, we see that it makes sense to focus on self-improvement. It is only by continually focusing on and seeking out the means by which we can improve that we will avoid associating emotional intelligence with IQ and will see instead that it is a need for all people: anyone who has emotions needs emotional intelligence. Also, a focus on improvement will bring out the true variety of ways in which people can have and can lack emotional intelligence.

The ultimate goal of this chapter is to show that emotional intelligence is inherently a moral concept. My definition posits it as such, but I defend this definition given the current work on the topic. Work on emotional intelligence dovetails with moral inquiry in many places, as with school programs that teach conflict resolution and prevent bullying. We shall see that moral inquiry lies at the heart of emotional intelligence. Without moral guidance, it is impossible to delineate emotionally intelligent behaviors from those that are emotionally coercive or sociopathic. In fact, any theory of emotional intelligence requires normative claims; but psychologists, being scientists, are often not comfortable navigating normative issues, and so they tend to emphasize the culturally relative nature of the expression of emotion. Yet intelligence is itself a normative idea, implying that having intelligence is better than lacking intelligence. In the absence of “experts” to decide on the value of an outcome or behavior, it is common for theorists, such as Goleman, to let the market, in the form of career success, decide the definition of intelligence. Obviously, the market is no more “objective” than are human theorists, even less so since it cannot give an account of its decision-making.
Instead, moral theory and a philosophical notion of well being can and must guide our search for emotional intelligence. It is the job of a philosopher to pick up where the psychologists leave off, uncovering and clarifying their moral assumptions and implications. Furthermore, the notion of emotional intelligence can inform moral theory. As we shall see, since emotional intelligence involves the health and happiness of the whole person and her ability to make good decisions, engage in healthy relationships, and prevent and resolve conflicts, it makes little sense to command moral behavior without commanding, and facilitating, emotional intelligence.

I: Heterogeneity Amongst Definitions of Emotional Intelligence

We begin with a survey of the current theories of emotional intelligence, remarking on the heterogeneity of the various definitions. There really is no way to give the current definition of emotional intelligence because there are so many definitions in use. Matthews et al. recommend that we consider emotional intelligence as an “umbrella term,” as it refers to a “variety of quite distinct constructs.”¹ There are over sixteen different tests used to measure emotional intelligence or something like it for the sake of research, education, or profit. There is so much variety under this rubric that some researches acknowledge the shared feeling for the need for a moratorium on new tests.² In addition, there is little to no evidence that the tests correlate: the MSCEIT (Mayor Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test) and the EQ-i (Emotional Quotient

Inventory) were shown to have a correlation of .20 in one study. Those critical of this new construct argue that there is so much heterogeneity within approaches to the topic that it is impossible to know the meaning of emotional intelligence at all, and that it is misleading to suggest that there is one thing corresponding to the term that these different tests measure. Because those working on emotional intelligence face these sorts of criticisms, there is a tendency to close ranks and not criticize definitions different from their own, even sometimes failing to acknowledge their lack of agreement. Nevertheless, there are three prominent definitions of emotional intelligence: those by Salovey and Mayer, Bar-On, and Goleman.

Salovey and Mayer originally defined emotional intelligence as "the subset of social intelligence that involves the ability to monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions." By "a subset of social intelligence," they mean to refer to Thorndike’s notion of social intelligence, "the ability to understand and manage people," and thereby they mean to tap into the history of work in intelligence studies. Salovey and Mayer’s definition is often broken up into its constituent parts, so that emotional intelligence is said to involve four distinct abilities: the ability to perceive and appraise emotion, the ability to use emotion to facilitate thought, the ability to understand and communicate

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4 See Matthews et al., “What Is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?”
emotion concepts, and the ability to manage emotions in oneself and others. These abilities are measured by the MSCEIT. Those who attempt to work with this definition usually do one of two things: they either separate one of the abilities and study it in isolation from the others, or they take the general idea suggested by this definition and apply it to another field of research or therapeutic endeavor.

When breaking the definition into its component parts, Mayer and Salovey define it as: “the ability to perceive accurately, appraise and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth.” Yet the four parts are conceptually and practically interrelated. The third ability, the ability to understand and analyze emotions, seems to be only a more complete form of the first. When we insist that they are two separate abilities, the first becomes a primitive ability, like the ability to read emotional significance in vocal acoustics or facial expression. It is hard to imagine the third ability, which is itself the better way of expressing the first, without the fourth: understanding and analyzing emotions requires some theory about the nature of the emotion, which includes implications about the value of specific emotions and the means by which they ought to be expressed.

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The second ability, the ability to “generate emotions,” could be more simply worded as the ability to empathize; it seems that the conceptual divide is between the second ability and the rest, between the ability to engage one’s own emotions and the ability to engage the emotions of others. Perhaps someone who is more even-handed and understanding of others, not being biased toward herself, ought to be also at an advantage in her relationship with herself and able to understand her emotions more objectively. Similarly, someone willing to engage her own emotions would be better equipped to engage the emotions of others. Regardless of the connection, most theorists agree that “emotional intelligence” should also refer to an understanding of the emotions of others, whether this understanding is more immediate, in the form of sympathy, or theoretical, in the form of empathy or merely a sensitive awareness.

On the other hand, the difference between generating and understanding emotion might imply one difference in the experience of emotion that we discovered when we considered cognitive and affective theories of emotion in chapter 1. Affective theories of emotion highlight the ways that affects affect thoughts. The ability to generate emotion might refer to the ability to self-consciously generate or regulate affects in order to promote one’s goals, such as exercising to treat depression, drinking coffee for intellectual focus, or breathing slowly to cope with stress. These cases are significantly different than those cases wherein one assumes that affects contain latent meaning.

Moving on to the two other prominent definitions of emotional intelligence, we have the “mixed” models. Those grappling with the heterogeneity among definitions divide them into “ability-based” and “mixed” models. This categorization is a veiled criticism of the “mixed” models, implying that they are nothing more than a grab bag of
imagined traits and that, since they are measured by self-report, they are vulnerable to self-report bias. Perhaps the idea is that they do not correspond to any actual “ability.” Also, mixed models have been shown to overlap with measures of personality.\(^\text{10}\)

The models of emotional intelligence developed by Bar-On and Goleman are both characterized as “mixed.” Bar-On developed the emotional quotient inventory (EQ-i), which is based on fifteen subscales and aims to predict the degree to which an individual interacts with her environment in such a way as to promote her own psychological well being. Bar-On defines emotional intelligence as “an array of noncognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures.”\(^\text{11}\) Describing each of his subscales proves tedious, so I will merely name them: self regard, self awareness, assertiveness, independence, self actualization, empathy, social responsibility, interpersonal responsibility, stress tolerance, impulse control, reality testing, flexibility, problem solving, optimism, and happiness.\(^\text{12}\) While I do not disagree that these qualities are all related to emotional intelligence, it seems counterproductive to give such an expansive and enumerative definition. Some of these traits are at the heart of the matter and others are merely symptoms that sometimes follow from emotional intelligence and sometimes do not. The idea of “emotional self-awareness”—“the ability to recognize and understand one’s emotions”—comes closest to the heart of the issue. I do agree, nonetheless, that, in these terms, emotional intelligence would promote successful coping with stress, especially as stress is often related to emotional “core-relational themes.”


Of course, if we want to equate emotional intelligence with emotional understanding, with which is almost synonymous, we would need to have a robust notion of understanding that includes everything that is meant by intelligence. Bar-On might object that someone might be aware of his emotions and still not be able to respect or express them and that we would not want to call that person emotionally intelligent. Such is conceptually possible, but premised only on a vitiated notion of understanding an emotion. Emotions contain layers of thoughts and information. To fully understand them, or to be committed to trying to understand them, is already a form of acceptance and expression, and involves analyzing the way that they should be further expressed. If we think that emotions are always so easily understood and expressed, then we have misunderstood the nature of emotion and the meaning of expression. For example, Pat hates his job—let’s say he feels that the company is complicit in immoral deeds—but he is not financially able to quit and knows that his family and friends would not support his decision. He is likely to be sad and angry at his situation. Actually, if Pat is sad and angry, he is relatively emotionally intelligent, since in this situation most people would be motivated by the unconscious desire to reduce cognitive dissonance and would deny or displace their sadness and anger, perhaps developing depression or an anxiety disorder or transferring these emotions to another person or situation. The important matter is that Pat remain confident in his understanding of his emotions, and that he not let external pressures make him lie to himself or ignore his emotional insights. Acting on the understanding of an emotion is not easy (What should Pat do?). Struggling to do so, while resisting the urge to lie to oneself about the content of the emotion in order to avoid addressing it, should be recognized as a genuinely difficult task.
Returning to the question of whether or not Bar-On’s definition of emotional intelligence is unnecessarily plentiful: Empathy, “the ability to be aware of, understand, and appreciate the feelings of others,” is also a necessary component of emotional intelligence, as Bar-On postulates. Nevertheless, it is possible that “the ability to establish and maintain mutually satisfying relationships” comes from those qualities of emotional confidence, such as not being afraid of one’s vulnerability, which may follow from self-awareness, and that there is a sort of natural parallelism between the self and others, as we shall explore more in chapter 4. Similarly flexibility, “the ability to adjust one’s feelings...to changing situations and conditions,” follows from understanding one’s feelings as well as knowing where one stands. Focusing on self-awareness and understanding takes the emphasis off of “control,” but that is exactly my intention; as well shall see, understandings of emotional intelligence that are based on cognitive theories of emotion, unlike Bar-On’s and Goleman’s, make this possible.

Goleman has also developed a “mixed” model. Most people outside the field of psychology associate the term “emotional intelligence” exclusively with Goleman’s book, or with media attention to his. For this reason, other theorists, like Salovey and Sluyter, use Goleman’s name to increase the popularity of their work while simultaneously rejecting his notion of emotional intelligence. Goleman is well known for his sweeping claims, such as the claim that emotional intelligence is more important than IQ in determining life success. Working with Boyatzis and Rhee, Goleman has developed a model that includes 25 different areas of competency. Clearly not aiming at

one coherent definition, he refers to emotional intelligence in a variety of different ways: “self-control, zeal, persistence…the ability to motivate oneself”; “to reign in emotional impulse; to read another’s innermost feelings; to handle relationships smoothly”; “to persist in the face of frustrations, to control impulse and delay gratification, to regulate one’s moods and keep distress from swamping the ability to think; to empathize and to hope.”

Goleman suggests that emotional intelligence might also be called “character.” He often relates it to life success, describing it as a “meta-ability, determining how well we can use whatever other skills we have, including raw intellect”; he sometimes calls it “people skills.” The benefits of emotional intelligence include being able to learn and communicate effectively. Goleman’s positive description of emotional intelligence centers on the increased learning potential that comes with something we might normally call “having a good attitude.” He paints the picture of the contagiously good mood of a bus driver as an example of emotions working to better our lives.

The bulk of Goleman’s discussion is dedicated to convincing his reader that emotional intelligence is an important quality; he does this by illustrating the problems that a lack of emotional intelligence may cause. Goleman describes those who lack emotional intelligence as “those who are at the mercy of impulse—who lack self-control.” Seemingly taking anger as the prime example of emotion, he posits that those without emotional intelligence are those who “lose it” or are subject to an “emotional

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15 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, xii, xii, 34.
16 Ibid., 36-37.
17 Ibid., xii.
hijacking.” His notion of a lack of emotional intelligence is even broader than his notion of emotional intelligence, and includes marital discord, insensitivity and general meanness, stress, abuse, trauma, and homicide. Given this laundry list of inarguably bad things, it is very easy for Goleman to convince his reader that people would be better off if they were schooled in emotional intelligence.

Goleman has worked with others to develop the “Emotional Competence Inventory” (ECI). This is a personality-based approach, as opposed to an ability-based measure, because it overlaps with traits measured by personality tests such as conscientiousness, emotional stability, extraversion, and openness. The ECI measures four dimensions of emotional competence: self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, and social skills. Conte and Dean report that “no empirical, peer-reviewed journal articles are presented to support the validity of the ECI.” They also conclude that there is little evidence that the ECI is able to discriminate reliably between people or to predict socially relevant outcomes.

Although there is disagreement over the definition of emotional intelligence, the idea itself is in many ways nothing new. As Murphy and Sideman note “EI is often seen as a new name for constructs that have been studied (sometimes with limited success) for decades.” This repetition is the reason that many researchers give for believing that emotional intelligence makes intuitive sense. It is also possible that the notion of emotional intelligence is intuitive to psychologists because, as emotional intelligence

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18 Ibid., 14.
21 Murphy, *A Critique*, p. xii.
presumably requires psychological insight—those who study emotion should hopefully be able to increase our emotional intelligence—it is in the business of keeping psychologists in business. Not only does emotional intelligence have a more recent ancestor in the study of intelligence, in many ways it refers to the basic idea behind clinical psychology: the idea that people can improve their lives by gaining insight into their behaviors and motivations. For this reason, it seems preferable to turn away from the construct of emotional intelligence in favor of terminology that is better situated within the history of psychology. Most new work on emotional intelligence realizes this need and attempts to connect emotional intelligence to traditional areas of research, such as stress, addiction, family and marriage relationships, child development, or personality development.

II: Evaluating Theories of Emotional Intelligence

In order to hone the notion of emotional intelligence that will be used in this project, I will consider a number of ways that theories of emotional intelligence can go astray. I would like to distinguish my work from the problems associated with emotional intelligence from the beginning, so that I will not be misunderstood. Singling out these problematic notions will also help us to understand the necessary features of a good working definition. By discussing the problems associated with some definitions we shall see that a good definition will include the following traits:

1. A good definition will not fall into the trap of thinking that emotional intelligence, like traditional notions of intelligence, is an innate and inalterable quality of a person. Instead it will focus on the teachable knowledge that allows for
emotionally intelligence behavior. It will acknowledge that all people, even—perhaps especially—the most intelligent have trouble behaving with emotional intelligence regarding certain intimate emotions and contexts, and that improvement comes from understanding the individual’s specific emotional history, rather than from knowing his or her score on a test for general emotional intelligence.

2. A good definition will not insist on a dichotomy between cognition and affect. Instead, it will seek to understand the ways that emotions are created by and reciprocally influence many different mental faculties.

3. A good definition will not insist that emotions are outside of conscious influence. Instead it will seek to understand the mental, as well as physical, dimension of emotion and the ways that individuals can understand, act on, and alter their emotions.

The second two points follow from the first. It may very well be the case that there is a species of emotional intelligence that is innate. I do not think that there is, but I am not concerned with disproving this idea. Instead, I argue that there is a kind of emotional intelligence that we can cultivate, and that people can come to act with more or less emotional intelligence and can go through experiences that can influence them either for the worse or for the better. It is certainly strange for me to argue that emotional intelligence is something corrigeible before I seek to define emotional intelligence, but, as we shall see, the definition rests on this point. Most theorists who are currently working with this construct agree that it should be thought of as something that is corrigeible, but many do not see that this conviction disallows certain other convictions, such as the idea.
that emotions are purely affective and caused automatically by certain objective stimuli (points 2 and 3).

The word “intelligence” connotes innateness. “Intelligence” is defined as an “ability”; even though an ability is not necessarily an innate quality, the field of intelligence studies has come to believe that intelligence is innate. Likewise, models of emotional intelligence that posit it as an “ability” similarly imply that it is innate. As we have seen, Salovey and Mayer’s model is “ability-based,” while Goleman and Bar-On’s theories mix an ability-based account with other measures that largely track personality.

Researchers who study intelligence refer to it as g (general intelligence), the element for which all tests of cognitive ability test, since there is a high correspondence between any two tests of cognitive ability. Although IQ tests were first designed by Spearman to measure educational achievement, intelligence has come to be thought of as an inherited trait.22 G has become an infamous concept, as it is notoriously accused of reductionism, determinism, racism, classism, and conservatism.23 Those who study intelligence largely agree that it is genetically determined: twin and adoptive sibling studies have demonstrated this.24

It is no surprise, then, that arguments against g and in favor of a broader, more egalitarian notion of intelligence are popular. Gardner, Sternberg, and Goleman all offer

23 Stephen J. Gould’s popular The Mismeasure of Man (W. W. Norton & Co: 1996) makes a number of these arguments.
such arguments. Gardner was the first to offer a model of multiple intelligences. He posits a variety of different types of intelligence—at least eight kinds: logical, linguistic, spatial, musical, kinesthetic, naturalistic, interpersonal, intrapersonal—rather than just the logical and linguistic intelligence that is represented by g. Part of the social goal of this theory is to change the educational system so that more children can succeed. Rather ironically, the idea is not that intelligence is corrigible, but that teachers need to do a better job drawing out the various innate forms of genius.

Goleman takes himself to be working in the tradition of Gardner, but he takes his notion of emotional intelligence to trump g. He attempts to steal the glory of the most problematic versions of g by arguing that emotional intelligence determines success, defined by health, interpersonal relationships, and job success. His later book, Working with Emotional Intelligence, is designed to parlay the idea of emotional intelligence into success for businesses. Like theories of traditional intelligence, Goleman’s notion of emotional intelligence claims to predict success in the traditional, economic sense of the term. Goleman argues that emotional intelligence is not innate, and he devotes a

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26 See Thomas Armstrong, Awakening Your Child’s Natural Genius (New York: Putnam, 1991). Not only is intelligence thought to constrain potential, discouraging educative effort, it ironically also dampens the effort spent on those thought to be intelligent. The accolade of “intelligent” logically serves to take attention away from students, and it may have this hidden deleterious effect (especially with parents). Although it is intended to secure them more attention, since intelligent students are more capable of learning on their own (even by Goleman’s definition), they would require less attention and one-on-one instruction. In reality, the idea of intelligence has no place in the classroom, where we must assume that all students need to be taught. See Nathan Brody, “Beyond g,” in A Critique of Emotional Intelligence: What are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?, ed. Kevin Murphy (New York: Psychology Press, 2006); See also Harold Stevenson and James Stigler, Learning Gap: Why Our Schools Are Failing And What We Can Learn From Japanese And Chinese Education (New York: Touchstone, 1992). For a contrary argument see L. Cronbach and R. Snow, Aptitudes and Instructional Methods: A Handbook for Research on Interactions (New York: Irvington, 1977).
27 Much of the success and popularity of Goleman’s work can be explained in this way: Americans want to believe that they are above average in some way, and parents, especially, want to believe that their children are above average; the more kinds of intelligence there are, the more kids that get to count as intelligent. Here we can see that the vagueness and broadness of Goleman’s notion is actually its selling point, like a horoscope, giving people more ways in which they can identify with the definition.
considerable amount of time to the current pedagogical attempts to inculcate it. Nevertheless, much of the research from which he draws suggests that the qualities he identifies with emotional intelligence are fixed throughout an individual’s life. Although he stresses that emotional intelligence depends on our upbringing, defining it by its relationship to IQ has the effect of inadvertently making it seem innate. Goleman falls into this trap himself, referring the emotional intelligence differences among four-year-olds, although surely a four-year-old is still learning how to understand and express her emotions. Goleman makes clear that he intends his notion of emotional intelligence to replace the traditional notion of intelligence when he writes:

At age four, how children do on this test of delayed gratification is twice as powerful a predictor of what their SAT scores will be as is IQ at age four… This suggests that the ability to delay gratification contributes powerfully to intellectual potential quite apart from IQ itself. (Poor impulse control in childhood is also a powerful predictor of later delinquency, again more so that IQ.)

Goleman clearly hopes to show that EIQ can replace IQ.

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28 Goleman identifies emotional intelligence with the ability to delay gratification and discusses an experiment designed to show that the degree of this ability is constant from age four on to late adolescence. This experiment tests four year-olds by asking them if they would rather have one marshmallow at the present time or wait fifteen to twenty minutes for two marshmallows. Reported in Yuichi Schoda, Walter Mischel, and Philip K. Peake, “Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and Self-Regulatory Competencies From Preschool Delay Gratification,” Developmental Psychology 26, no. 6 (1990). Those who choose to wait are labeled as possessing the ability to delay gratification. The researchers then correlated this ability with later traits, such as ability to cope with stress, concluding that those who exhibited the ability to delay gratification were better off later in life. Goleman uncritically accepts the methodology and conclusions of this study, writing: “which of these choices a child makes is a telling test; it offers a quick reading not just of character, but of the trajectory that child will probably take through life.” (P. 81.) Goleman goes further and suggests that this test illustrates the essence of emotional intelligence, which is self-control. Nowhere does Goleman suggest that instruction in marshmallow choice would be possible.

29 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, 82; citing Jack Block’s unpublished manuscript from research conducted at UC Berkeley.
Salovey and Mayer’s MSCEIT correlates modestly with g, as they believe it should. They write, in the tradition of intelligence studies, that a “new” intelligence ought to correlate with g to a moderate degree: “no correlation at all could suggest the new ‘intelligence’ is so different that it is not an intelligence at all,” and a high degree of correlation suggests that the new intelligence is not new at all. Salovey and Mayer seem to be conflicted: they want to make sense of the notion by drawing on intelligence models, but they insist that EI ought to be learnable, even when their intelligence-derived notions turn out not to support such conclusions. Caruso, Beinn, and Kornacki doubt that the MSCEIT model allows for corrigibility, yet Salovey and Mayer do not seem to recognize this consequence of their association with IQ. Furthermore, as an “ability” test, the MSCEIT supposedly measures latent ability. Salovey and Mayer have yet to prove that said “ability” actually translates into concrete behaviors.

Those who study general intelligence agree that it is highly stable over time and that attempts to inculcate it have little long-term effect; yet all who study emotional intelligence agree that it can and should be taught in public schools. If there is truly a connection between g and emotional intelligence, it is not clear what it is. There is no evidence that any definition of emotional intelligence is capable of replacing g as a measure of ability or rivaling IQ as a construct that refers to the separate mental system

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34 Murphy and Sideman (2006), 39.
35 Matthews et al., “What is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” 27.
of emotion, especially since there is no evidence that there is a separate mental system of emotional functioning in the first place. Damasio, as we saw in the previous chapter, would reject this idea, arguing instead that there are separate systems of emotional and cognitive processing. Those working within the field of emotional intelligence, on the other hand, do not understand it as merely the experience and memory of pleasure and pain.

If EIQ cannot replace IQ, as Goleman hopes that it can, and it cannot relate to emotion as IQ does to cognition, then perhaps there is an internal relationship between g and emotional intelligence, as Salovey and Mayer assume. Brody argues that it makes sense to think that spatial visualization aids in working with emotional information just as it has been shown to help in paragraph comprehension, and that “emotional intelligence is likely to be one component of g, not a substitute for g.” It is also possible that some minimal degree of intelligence is necessary for emotional intelligence. Another possibility is that general intelligence does aid in emotional intelligence, because emotions tend to be complex and understanding them can be just as difficult. On the other hand, it is also possible that less intelligent people have less complex emotions, and therefore have no more or less difficulty understanding them than intelligent people do. At any rate, it is not clear that there is any real similarity between the two notions aside from the term; models that are based on measurements for g have had trouble measuring anything other than g. Some believe that, when intelligence and personality are controlled

36 Matthews et al., “What is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence?” 28.
37 Brody, Beyond g, 178-179.
for, emotional intelligence, as it has henceforth been measured, cannot be shown to cause social outcomes.  

While I am cynical about the motivation behind the idea of multiple intelligences, I am not interested in whether or not such a thing as g, or its various replacements, exists. Still, the idea of general intelligence implies genetic heritability, while emotional intelligence is believed to be corrigible. We must go beyond ability-based and mixed models in order to account for this corrigibility.

Promising work is being done in this regard, often dropping the name of “emotional intelligence” and using terms such as “emotional literacy” and “emotionally intelligent behavior” instead. These theories of emotional intelligence excel in their careful self-distancing from the tradition of intelligence studies. For example, Ciarrochi et al. insist that we should be referring to “emotionally intelligent behavior,” not a latent ability. They describe emotional intelligence not as excelling, but rather as achieving normalcy or health in a world in which “33% of people have a diagnosable mental disorder and 50% of us seriously contemplate suicide at some point in our lives…[and in which] we have developed increasingly inventive ways to wage war and kill one another.” They define emotional intelligence in terms of peace and happiness, and the addressed emotional needs that make these possible. Although they do not deny the ability component of emotional intelligence, they choose to focus on emotionally intelligent behavior because they believe that such a focus is more productive:

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40 Ciarrochi et al., 89.
Simply put, emotionally unintelligent behavior occurs when emotions and thought impede effective action, and emotionally intelligent behavior occurs when emotions and thoughts do not impede effective action, or when they facilitate effective action.\textsuperscript{41}

I agree with this definition, as long as it is not taken to lead back to Goleman’s way of defining emotional intelligence as the rational mind’s control over the emotional mind. Emotionally intelligent behaviors occur when the emotions are present and addressed and thereby lead to a greater understanding of the people and the situation at hand.

Others prefer the word “competency” or “literacy” to “intelligence” in order to focus on learning. Brackett and Katulak discuss “emotional literacy” and argue that having an emotional vocabulary enhances one’s ability to think about emotions and engage in emotionally intelligent behavior.\textsuperscript{42} They also mean to call to mind something like “emotional fluency,” or a kind of comfort and ease with having emotions. Saarni and Buckley have developed the notion of “emotional competence” in order to focus on learnable skills: “The skills of emotional competence are learned; their acquisition is influenced by family, peers, school, media, societal scripts, and folk theories of how emotion ‘works’.”\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, they eschew the tendency to think in terms of rational mastery and stable dispositions by emphasizing the fact that emotions always take place in the context of a fluid relationship:

Emotional competence is not solely about cognitive understanding of emotional experience, but subsumes a set of affect-oriented behavioral, cognitive, and regulatory skills that emerge over time as a person develops in a social context. In other words, how our emotional functioning develops in a social context, how it is revealed in our everyday life

\textsuperscript{41} Ciarrochi et al., 90.
depends on the ongoing exchange between a person and her environment. Individual factors, such as a cognitive development and temperament, do indeed influence the development of emotional competencies. Yet, skills of emotional competence are also influenced by past social experiences, and learning, including an individual’s relationship history, as well as the system of beliefs and values in which the person lives. Thus, we actively create our emotion experience, through the combined influence of our cognitive developmental structures and our social exposure to emotion discourse. Through this process we learn what it means to feel something and to do something about it.44

This focus on one’s developmental history and ongoing relationships helps us to get at the heart of emotional intelligence, and to that which is involved and at stake in developing and maintaining it.45

Ciarrochi’s notion of emotionally intelligent behavior provides an interesting contrast to Goleman’s notion of emotional intelligence. Goleman believes that emotional intelligence causes life success; Ciarrochi does too, but he clearly means something different by success than Goleman does. It seems odd to suggest a relationship between emotional intelligence and job performance.46 There is, in fact, no support for this claim in its broadest form. There is some evidence that emotional intelligence, as it is measured by a short version of the MEIS, correlates with customer service skills, although perhaps at the expense of productivity.47 It is perhaps easy to confuse the idea of emotional intelligence with the idea of “people skills,” as does Goleman, and it is perhaps strange that his model of emotional intelligence demonstrates an overlap with the personality trait of extraversion. Furthermore, the dimension of EI related to “understanding emotions”

46 See Matthews et al., “What is This Thing Called Emotional Intelligence,” for a review of the literature.
has been shown to correlate with the tendency to fake positive emotions.\(^{48}\) It seems more intuitive to think that emotional intelligence should correlate with job success in jobs that require emotional labor, such as the helping professions. Emotional labor is defined as “managing emotion in the service of one’s job.”\(^{49}\) We would hope that emotional intelligence correlates with less job stress in the case of work that requires a considerable amount of emotional labor, such as those who work with children or adults who are not fully responsible. Clearly, there is a difference between faking positive emotions while suppressing negative emotions in order to coerce a customer, and consciously attempting to defer one’s own anger and frustration for the sake of helping others uncover the root cause of their emotions, in order to resolve a conflict. Basing a notion of emotional intelligence on traditional intelligence, conceived in terms of g, blurs this distinction. It is also quite likely that a morally informed notion of emotional intelligence will correlate negatively with job success in many careers, since many occupations demand immoral and psychologically unhealthy behavior from their employees. Only a morally informed notion of emotional intelligence can adequately discriminate between different notions of “success.”

Now that we have shown that those theories of emotional intelligence that are modeled on theories of g cannot allow for corrigibility, we can move on to the next characteristic of a good definition: that it be based on a theory of emotion that holds that emotions involve both affect and cognition. Theories of emotional intelligence that align


emotion exclusively with affect similarly posit emotions to be out of the subject’s control. Hence they inadvertently undermine corrigibility.

Beginning with the first point, Salovey and Mayer posit that emotions ought not to be held in distinction from cognition: “we view emotions as organized responses, crossing the boundaries of many psychological subsystems, including the physiological, cognitive, motivational, and experiential systems.” Later, they argue “definitions of emotional intelligence should in some way connect emotions with intelligence,” as the mind is divided into the cognitive, affective and conative subsystems. In this later work they describe their definition of emotional intelligence as a combination of “the ideas that emotion makes thinking more intelligent and that one thinks intelligently about emotions. Both connect intelligence and emotion.” It is unclear whether or not they wish to consistently maintain that the emotions in themselves ought to be conceived of as distinct from cognition and motivation, since their new definition remains vague on the key point of the theory of emotion. Emotions can make thinking more intelligent because they focus or facilitate thought, perhaps through emotional states of mind that are conducive to thinking, or because they provide useful, emotional information for thought. One can think intelligently about emotions by analyzing and better grasping the thought-content of emotions, or one can think intelligently about emotions by attempting to control them. Salovey and Mayor’s insight that the definition of emotional intelligence should connect the notion of emotion with the notion of intelligence is important, but that still does not tell us enough about what emotional intelligence entails.

52 Ibid., 5.
Considering the problems with Goleman’s non-cognitive account will help to illuminate the reasons that a good theory of emotional intelligence must be based on a cognitive theory of emotion in order to ensure that it provides for the possibility of rationally instructive content. If the emotions are purely affective reflexes, then there is no possibility of internally merging emotion and intelligence; we are left only with the possibility of “controlling” our emotions, which is theoretically and psychologically problematic. Still, Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence replays the popular stereotypes of and biases against emotionality; this is likely the very reason that it has achieved such widespread popularity.

Goleman believes that emotions come from and represent a distinctly different part of the mind than does rational thought. This view is what Jagger calls “The Dumb View” because it assumes that emotions are, in themselves, unintelligent. Goleman employs the popular clichés of “head” and “heart” to refer to “the rational mind” and “the emotional mind.” In an appendix devoted to explaining his theory of emotion, Goleman posits that there are two types of emotional responses: those in which thoughts come first and those in which physiological responses come first. He devotes the most attention to the latter and gives acting, as with the tears brought on by an actress on stage, as an example of the former. His main argument is that the rational mind can be “hijacked” by the emotional mind and that the rational mind must fight back to subdue these irrational forces. Tellingly, Goleman is not able to find any flaw in dealing with one’s emotions through repression.

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54 Goleman, Emotional Intelligence, 75-77.
Goleman argues that we can understand the dichotomy between “head” and “heart” scientifically, in conjunction with the fact the brain has different parts. This assumption is common in neurobiology, as we have seen from the last chapter’s discussion of Damasio and as we will see with Goleman’s reliance of the neurological theories of LeDoux. This dichotomy relies on an “evolutionary” argument; Goleman considers the brain stem to be the less evolved and more emotional part of the brain. Goleman writes that the brain stem and neocortex can be “at war” with each other. Following, LeDoux, Goleman believes that emotions evolved to give the organism a quick way to respond to danger by bypassing conscious thought. “Because it takes the rational mind a moment or two longer to register and respond than it does the emotional mind, the ‘first impulse’ in an emotional situation is the heart’s not the head’s.” This leaves to the “rational mind” the role of controlling emotions after they occur, as a kind of damage-control. The assumption is that, because we no longer live in the Pleistocene, emotions are no longer adaptive. After an “emotional hijacking,” the rational mind is left to make sense of what happened, and it usually attempts to rationalize the occurrence.

Goleman’s account not only portrays emotions as primitive and simplistic responses; it relies on the assumption that emotions are, in civilized society, often wrong about their object. Emotions need to be “controlled” because they should not be heeded. They should not be heeded because they are maladaptive and simplistic. So, for example, there might be an emotional impulse to kill someone who has threatened our child, but

55 Ibid., 10.
56 Ibid., 9. We will see that Goleman tends to translate LeDoux’s findings into a more extreme dichotomy than they suggest. For example, Goleman finds evidence for the fact that we have “two minds” from the fact that “emotional areas are intertwined via myriad connecting circuits to all parts of the neo-cortex.”
57 Ibid., 12.
58 Ibid., 293.
59 Ibid., 296.
since we no longer live in an environment of predators, this emotional impulse is mistaken, and so must be overridden.

Yet, one of Goleman’s examples of an “emotional hijackings” seems to be better described as a case of being startled. Goleman gives the example of “Matilda Crabtree,” who was shot by accident by her father because she jumped out from a closet and yelled “boo” while her parents had been expecting to see an intruder in the house. It would be odd to say that her father had intended to shoot a burglar but had been mistaken. It seems more likely that his startle response caused him to pull the trigger involuntarily, perhaps even jerking his finger on the trigger for him. Can we really say that the father should have or could have better controlled his emotions, that he should not have been afraid that there was an intruder in his house and should not have been startled by his daughter jumping out at him? We might say that he should not have intended to kill the burglar, had it been a burglar, and then he would not have been prepared to shoot, or that he should not have had a gun in the house at all; but those conclusions seem to be merely changing the subject. I think most of us would agree that it seems strange to say that “Mr. Crabtree’s” accidental killing of his daughter was an emotional act, exactly because it was not accompanied by any beliefs or intentions; it was an accident.

If we assume, against Goleman, that most emotions, which are usually very different than the case of being startled, are neither simplistic nor wrong-headed, i.e., if we assume that emotions contain an element of “cognition” even in an unconscious form, we have a different, more enlightening picture of the situation. First off, anger is not really an impulse to kill someone. If the person in question really thinks about killing, special therapeutic attention is necessary. Anger is an impulse to act based on a

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59 Ibid., 4.
perception of a need to act. Perhaps there is something to the argument that speed is needed, but as we saw from the last chapter’s discussion about the relationship between perception and cognition, there is no reason to conclude that cognition cannot have a quick-moving manifestation in impulse. Goleman would argue that it is the anger itself that is prone to irrationality, but a simple impulse cannot account for the kind of complicated perceptions, thoughts, and disagreements that usually accompany an anger. Ignoring the role that “cognition” plays in the impulse makes the impulse look less complex than it is. Anger should not be seen as an “emotional hijacking;” it is a healthy and important emotional response.

Salovey and Mayer similarly criticize the notion of an “emotional hijacking,” as it merely replays the simplistic stereotype of emotions as an “intrinsically irrational and disruptive force.” Instead, as we can see in the revised example of an “emotional hijacking” the disruption of thought that emotion entails may or may not be useful, but it is always meaningful, and is no more likely to be mistaken than is an explicit judgment.60

It is not surprising that this folk understanding of emotion as “hijacking” is so pervasive. I venture that negative emotions, since they call us to change something about the environment and are themselves painful experiences, are inherently prone to resistance, and that the easiest way to avoid expressing them is to deny their meaningfulness. The problem is that anti-cognitive views implicitly, although perhaps unintentionally, encourage this type of repression.

Goleman’s theory of the emotions as primitive responses is really more of a picture of a primitive emotional response, or of someone who lacks the ability to understand the meaning and importance of her emotions and feels overwhelmed by them.

The theory of the brain at war with itself is really a picture of a person at war with himself. In other words, Goleman’s theory of emotion serves us by offering a glimpse into the world of emotional un-intelligence. Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence is doubly wrong: wrong about the emotions and wrong because it cannot promote emotional intelligence. The sort of person who has an explosive temper and reacts by attempting to then hold his anger in because he is trying to practice Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence may be “controlling” the emotion, but he is not making progress in understanding it and is not demonstrating an emotionally intelligent behavior.

We should not follow Goleman in his talk of “controlling” and “mastering” emotions. In addition to overlooking the important and positive role that emotions play in our lives, this approach precludes the intuitive likelihood that emotions themselves contain rational directives, i.e., that they might themselves be intelligent. Instead, emotional intelligence should be cast as understanding, not controlling, emotions. Talk of “understanding” underscores the ways that reason and the emotions are related and on a continuum; talk of “mastering” reinforces the unfounded idea that they are two substantively different faculties. Ciarrochi et al. point out that it is exactly the strong repressive reactions that individuals have to their emotions that need to be overcome in striving for psychological health.\textsuperscript{61}

Goleman’s affective theory of emotion is largely based on LeDoux’s work on conditioned fear responses in rats, and, for this reason, it relies on the strange idea that emotional responses are largely “unconscious.” In his book, The Emotional Brain, LeDoux explains the brain pathways that allow for “unconscious” fear conditioning: the amygdala can transmit information from the visual or auditory systems to the thalamus

\textsuperscript{61} Ciarrochi et al., 2007.
and bypass the cortex, and, hence, consciousness. Studies have shown that people can become conditioned to respond to unconscious or subliminal stimuli. For example, by administering a puff of air into the eye, triggering a blink, at the same time that an image is presented for a fraction of a second (too quick to be registered in consciousness), the subject becomes conditioned to blink at the subliminal image even when the air puff is turned off. LeDoux concludes from these studies that the emotion of fear response, which includes freezing, increased blood pressure, release of stress hormones and the startle reflex, is based on an unconscious neurological process. LeDoux speculates about the relevance of the unconscious fear response to the psychological disorders of phobia, PTSD, and panic attacks, suggesting in each case the likelihood that a subcortical (unconscious) neural pathway is involved. He hypothesizes that “because of genetic predisposition or past experiences, phobic learning [might] involve the subcortical pathway to a greater extent than the cortical pathway.”

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62 We ought not to overlook the fact that LeDoux’s work shows that a slower, cortical response is necessary to judge whether or not there is a legitimate reason to be afraid. An unconscious process may cause the physical fear response, but there is no reason to privilege the physical fear response in our discussion of the nature of fear. Also, the fact that a process is subcortical, or unconscious, does not mean that it does not contain a latent judgment: we usually become afraid because we believe that there is some reason to be afraid, even though we might not know what that reason is as soon as we feel fear. LeDoux discusses these studies on pages 53-70, including work by Zyjonc (1980), Bornstein (1992), Bruner and Postman (1947), Erdelyi (1974, 1985, 1992), Greenwald (1992), McGinnies (1949), Dixon (1971), Lazarus and McCleary (1951), Packard (1957), Eagly and Chaiken (1993), Murphy and Zyjonc (1993), Ionescu and Erdeli (1992), Bowers (1994), Bowers and Meichenbaum (1984), Shervin et al (1992), Shervin (1992), Bargh (1990, 1992), Jocoby et al (1992), Merikle (1992), Kihlstrom, Barnhardt, and Tataryn (1992b).

63 Specifically the eye-blink conditioning: Warrington and Weiskrantz (1973).

64 LeDoux’s use of fear conditioning is out of place in the case of phobia and panic disorders, since it is not clear that in those cases an original fear conditioning event is necessary. Insofar as humans are not normally subjected to subliminal stimuli, much less subliminal conditioning, it is difficult to show that the results from tests about subliminal conditioning sufficiently generalize. Furthermore, we must question whether or not LeDoux is right to generalize from the fear response to fear-based emotions. We must not forget that LeDoux is hoping to apply a case of learning, where stimuli are repeated over and over thus strengthening the correlate neural pathways, to a case where the unconditioned stimulus was only experienced once, if at all.

We saw in the previous chapter that calling an emotion “unconscious” can refer to a number of different phenomenon, depending on the theoretical approach, but LeDoux’s conclusion that the conditioned fear response is “unconscious” rests on a confusion. Drawing from experiments involving subliminal stimuli and rats, he confuses the notion of self-consciousness, which we normally de facto deny to animals, with conscious awareness. The idea is that since animals have the fear response and animals are not “conscious” (meaning self-conscious, since, of course the animals experience their lives, at least for the first part of his experiments), then it follows that the fear response must be “unconscious.” Therefore, in humans, processes of the “animal brain,” which, operating “below” the neo-cortex (the special human brain part of self-consciousness), must similarly be “unconscious.” In likening the human brain to animal brain (the only kind of brain allowed in the laboratory for these kinds of experiments), and by assuming that animal brains lack “consciousness” because they lack language, neurological theories of emotion tend to focus on the animalistic, or purely physical, elements of emotion.

Taking the physiological fear response as his primary example of emotion, LeDoux hopes to generalize from fear to all emotions in arguing that emotions should be understood as bodily—not conscious—events. Yet it is a mistake to think that something is unconscious just because it is physical. Surely even conscious thoughts are bodily processes! LeDoux does not argue for the idea that most, or even some, human emotions are not registered in consciousness; instead this conclusion seems to follow from the assumption that emotions are best understood by identifying them with neurological processes. He defines consciousness as working memory and as activity in the cortex, but he does not prove that our awareness of bodily states correlates to either of these things.
We are obviously aware of the fear response, and so LeDoux must have another meaning of “unconscious” in mind. Instead, he equates consciousness with the ability to “control” an emotion. A general LeDouxian theory of emotion would draw from the idea of emotional memory: the emotional memory encompasses all of the automatic emotional responses that we have that are conditioned from past events.\(^{67}\)

We can see that Goleman obtains his assumption that emotions usually involve mistaken judgments from LeDoux. Insisting that an emotional response is unconscious also means, for LeDoux, that the emotion is not just non-rational, but irrational. When discussing the fact that emotions tend to preoccupy us (“are accompanied by intense cortical arousal”), LeDoux explains that this might have been useful for an animal in the Pleistocene, but is a nuisance for humans.\(^{68}\) Perhaps LeDoux would have it that, in the case where the fear trigger is conditioned, the emotion is also “irrational” since it is now divorced from its natural, unconditioned cause. It would then make sense, on LeDoux’s model, to call the response “unconscious” since it would not make it through the cortical fear circuit and would therefore need to rely entirely on the subcortical process.\(^{69}\) Yet, the mere fact that an emotion is irrational does not make it any less cognitive, since many thoughts are irrational. Ironically, in cases where people are not aware of the cause of (or reason for) a case of generalized anxiety of phobia we have even more reason to believe that there is an, albeit latent, cognitive content to the affect. Of course, if we think

\(^{67}\) In the effort to show that the emotional memory and declarative memory are distinct, LeDoux discusses studies done on amnesiacs, showing that they are still capable of fear conditioning though they are not capable or remembering the original unconditioned stimulus.

\(^{68}\) LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain*, 289.

\(^{69}\) Still there is not as much evidence that the cortical and subcortical pathways are distinct as LeDoux would like. Even LeDoux recognizes that rabbits cannot be trained to respond only to a certain tune and not another only when their cortexes have not been damaged; this fact suggests that conceptual discrimination plays a role in the “automatic” fear response even for animals, as we know that it does for humans from experience.
emotions are irrational or evolutionarily outdated, it is easier to ignore their cognitive content, making analysis look futile. Again, for this reason, a good theory of emotional intelligence holds open the possibility for emotions to become conscious. In this vein, Parrott argues that the view that takes negative emotions to be usefully analyzed allows for their greater functional utility and should therefore be more associated with emotional intelligence.\textsuperscript{70}

Goleman and LeDoux are not able to formulate the idea of latent cognitive content, and so do not consider more complex ways that emotions might be “unconscious.” In these theories, as we have seen, there is a clear distinction between the “heart” and the “head,” or the amygdala and the neocortex. Freud’s notion of the “preconscious,” or latent conscious thoughts (a sort of unconscious consciousness), which is popular in cognitive science as well as in the history of philosophy, may help us connect emotions to their cognitive content. Similarly, Freud’s notion of repression may help us make sense of emotions of which we are only partially or not at all conscious but which still affect behavior.\textsuperscript{71} It is ironic that LeDoux takes himself to be verifying Freud: Freud’s unconscious is bodily, but it is also cognitive.

There is some danger is moving directly from neurology to psychology. In some ways these two approaches are incommensurable. Neurology examines the material cause of emotions: the brain and limbic system. The brain contains and brings about the mechanisms “underlying emotion,” as Rolls phrases it. Psychology examines the formal


\textsuperscript{71} Many times people know cognitively that they are having a certain emotion, say nervousness, and will speculate calmly that they are having that emotion for a reason that makes perfect sense, and yet they will fail to connect that feeling to their everyday conscious decisions and behaviors, though an outside observer would clearly judge that they are connected. This behavior might come close to having an unconscious emotion, though the feeling is very much the purview of our conscious/mental lives.
causes of emotions, the conceptual content that informs the essence of an emotion. As we discussed in the previous chapter, neurology takes on a third-person, physicalist perspective. A person might take this perspective on herself, and she does in the case of physical processes such as pain; we want to know about the physical processes at work in our bodies so that we can manipulate them. An emotion does have a physical basis, as do thoughts, but that does not mean that we need to take a physicalist perspective in order to engage them. We often do manipulate our emotions in this indirect way, but as we have seen, the neurological approach, since it does not study the introspective, conscious dimension of emotion, has the tendency of not only overlooking it but denying its existence entirely. LeDoux takes an unnecessarily extreme stance against the idea that the emotions are “conscious” processes: he disparages introspection and argues that “introspective knowledge provides a highly inaccurate window into the mind.” To interact with one’s emotions, indeed, with oneself, in this purely one-sided way is very strange: this is surely the perspective of an outsider, not of the subject herself. Yet this approach is perhaps not so strange when we examine the history of philosophy and Christianity, which take the mind and the body to be two separate substances. (In this way, the theory of emotional intelligence might find itself up against a good part of the history of Western thought.)

A neurological foundation for the notion of emotional intelligence risks undermining one of the key aspects of the idea: the idea that people can become more or less emotionally intelligent. Even Goleman, whose attention is clearly directed toward developing emotional education programs, makes the mistake of summarizing emotional

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72 LeDoux attempts to redefine “talk-therapy” as a way to enact neurological cures: “These observations give us a different kind of understanding of therapy. Therapy is just another way of creating synaptic potentiation in brain pathways.” LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, 245, 265.
disorders in terms of neurological disorders. His discussion is peppered with “insights” from current pharmacology and neurology, treating the physical basis of the emotion as if it were the proximal cause.\textsuperscript{73} If differences in emotional intelligence are only explainable as differences in brain chemistry, little can be done to change individual abilities other than pharmacological or surgical intervention. In giving an example of the way that “continual emotions distress can create deficits in a child’s intellectual abilities,” he writes:

In one study, for example, primary school boys who had above-average IQ but nevertheless were doing poorly in school were found via these neuropsychological tests to have impaired frontal cortex functioning. They also were impulsive and anxious, often disruptive and in trouble—suggesting faulty prefrontal control over their limbic urges. Despite their intellectual potential, these are the children at highest risks for problems like academic failure, alcoholism, and criminality—not because their intellect is deficit but because their control over their emotional life is impaired.\textsuperscript{74}

The skeptical consumer asks “why is the frontal cortex of these boys impaired?” but it is more often the case that “impaired functioning,” which is a neurological basis of an emotional state, is taken to be the cause of the problem and that such a cause seems to require a neurological solution. Indeed, Goleman goes no further than this suggestion. It is especially difficult to pass beyond neurological bases in our culture because we often lack the resources for any other kind of intervention. Families are becoming more and more isolated from one another and so more and more responsibility falls on parents (or one parent) for modeling behavior. Schools lack resources and are not reliable sources of

\textsuperscript{73} We see the common flaw in the logic of neuroscience in the following: Goleman writes: “by the logic of neuroscience, if the absence of a neural circuit leads to a deficit in an ability, then the relative strength or weakness of that same circuit in people whose brains are intact should lead to comparable levels of competence in that same ability.” It is quite possible, on the other hand, that the brains of brain-damaged people do not work the same way that normal brains do.

\textsuperscript{74} Goleman, \textit{Emotional Intelligence}, 27.
traditional education, much less psychological education. Even if a pediatric neurologist were trained in child and parent psychology, which would be extremely rare, she would find it impossible to tell parents that their parenting styles have caused “impaired frontal cortex functioning” and that they ought to try be better models of healthy emotional behavior.\textsuperscript{75} Surely, it is easier to write a prescription. Similarly, Goleman does not compare the benefits of implementing emotional intelligence education programs over simply medicating the children.

LeDoux similarly suggests medical manipulation of brain chemistry in order to change one’s emotions. For example, since the fear response is facilitated by the body’s production of adrenaline, he suggests:

\[\text{[R]escue workers and soldiers in battle are often traumatized by the memories of the horrific scenes they witness. Perhaps, it may be possible, immediately after the experience, to block the effects of the adrenaline and spare them the effects of the anguish later.}\textsuperscript{76}\]

LeDoux does not consider the likely moral and social consequences of further emotionally numbing soldiers. He also does not consider the moral question of whether or not people who witness horrific events should feel horrified. Is it possible to lessen the emotional disturbance without lessening its moral significance? Is it possible to make a drug that makes it easier for people to kill other people and ensure that it is only used for morally necessary killing? These are the kinds of moral questions that demonstrate that a theory of emotional intelligence must be based in moral theory. We will return to this

\textsuperscript{75} Of course, it is much easier to blame the parents when the parent is the mother since women have the tendency to react with sadness rather than anger at an affront. Furthermore, when the responsible for child-rearing falls solely on the mother, she is the most obvious one to blame, even though it is not a reasonable expectation that one person could take on this responsibility herself.

\textsuperscript{76} LeDoux, \textit{The Emotional Brain}, 207.
connection after we reflect on the forgoing considerations and use them to make the
definition of emotional intelligence as clear and accurate as possible.

III: Summary of A Good, Working Definition of Emotional Intelligence

After this consideration of the ways that we can evaluate different theories of emotional intelligence, it is time for me to pledge my allegiance to a good, working definition. A preliminary definition of emotional intelligence might sound something like this: emotional intelligence is the analysis and better understanding of one’s own emotions for the sake of acting on and expressing those emotions for the sake of seeking good outcomes and psychological well-being, as well as understanding and discussing the emotions of others in the same pursuit and, additionally, creating an emotionally open and healthy environment that promotes emotional intelligence for all.77

Analysis, understanding, and expression are the meanings of “intelligence” that apply to emotional experience. These are behaviors that can be called “intelligent,” both in the honorific and in the cognitive sense; they are not latent abilities. This definition is based on the theory of emotion that was explored in the previous chapter: it does not take “intelligence,” vis a vis emotion, to be a function of only one mental subsystem, or “part” of the mind, but exactly the site of interaction between the mind and body, cognition and affect, abstract moral evaluation and concrete needs. It includes the ways that emotions can be intelligent and the ways that intelligence can be emotional, but it also strives to overcome a compartmentalized theory of subjectivity in the service of speaking to the quality of lived experience.

77 Please see chapter 1 for a discussion of everything that might be involved in the “expression” of an emotion.
Emotional intelligence can involve all of the various individual directions of causality. For example, Daus, who defends ability models of emotional intelligence, argues that emotional intelligence ought to be construed as cognition directed at emotion, or using emotions as information.\(^{78}\) This might be one part of emotional intelligence, as it is one way that the emotions and intelligence interact, but it does not capture the whole of the definition and is deficient if taken in isolation. In the previous chapter, I discussed what it known as “the information claim” about emotion. Focus on “using emotions” as information to enhance cognition reifies the dichotomy between emotion and cognition. Affective “information” has a shoddy meaning if it is used to refer to feelings that have not yet been translated into well-grounded reasons\(^ {79} \) or using emotional response categorization, which is little more than prejudice and bias. These “emotional” categorizations may be effective for making quick decisions, but they are morally problematic.\(^ {80} \) (We will see this argument again in Kant’s criticism of sympathy.) There are a plurality of ways that the emotions interact with intelligent understanding; each of them can and should play a part in emotional intelligence, as long as it is based on a sufficiently wide model of emotional life.

Those working within the field of psychology are, of course, not satisfied with simply giving a definition. A definition of a “psychological construct” should lead to a way to measure it. A construct is only sufficiently scientific if it can be measured with

\(^{78}\) She contrasts this to emotions aiding cognition, as with negative mood allowing for better information processing. C.S. Daus, “The case for the ability based model of emotional intelligence” in *A Critique of Emotional Intelligence: What are the Problems and How Can They Be Fixed?*, ed. Kevin Murphy (New York: Psychology Press, 2006), 308.


reliability, content validity, predictive validity, consequential validity, and construct validity.\textsuperscript{81} The fact that I am not working in the field of psychology means that I am afforded some leniency that those pushing to define and measure this new construct are not, and I can question whether or not emotional intelligence is the kind of thing that should be measured in this way. If a test is designed to measure emotional intelligence “reliably,” for example, it will give people a score that will remain constant across various situations and over time. To push for a “reliable” measure seems like the exact way that emotional intelligence should not be understood.

Following Saarni and Buckley’s notion of emotionally intelligent behavior, with its emphasis on the idiosyncrasies of one’s developmental history as well as the ways that we continually learn emotional scripts from our on-going relationships, it would be better to design a test that would seek out problem areas rather than posit a general score. Such a test might ask a person about his or her recent and past experiences with anger, or any other emotion, and whether or not he or she believes that she has handled these situations well, looking at the situation and others involved, as well as moral notions like self-respect and fairness. We can see that, for such a test, measuring and changing emotional intelligence would be internally related, as the subject reflects on her experiences and tests out different ways of understanding them. It is only by continually focusing on and seeking out the means by which people can improve that we will avoid associating emotional intelligence with IQ—indeed, I wonder if IQ can be explained as the result of the need to test it “reliably”—and that we will see instead that it is a need for all people: anyone who has emotions needs emotional intelligence. Also, a focus on improvement

will bring out the true *variety* of ways in which people can have and can lack emotional intelligence.

Approaching the topic from a philosophical perspective is not intended to replace psychological and educational psychometrics, but to show instead that there is also a need for a more subtle treatment. The overarching theme of this dissertation is one of psychological and moral self-improvement; conceiving of emotional intelligence as a personality trait, a disposition, or, worse, an innate ability such as g, emphasizes the way that emotional intelligence is fixed, not variable and corrigible. For this reason I am even resistant to use the term “emotional intelligence” as an abstract noun, but prefer to always use it in an adjectival form, describing certain behaviors. For example, someone might say “I’m just not very emotionally intelligent… that’s not my strength” in the way that someone else would say “I just *feel* disgusted when I see two men kiss.” Both of these, supposedly introspective, confessions are meant to be the final word and are meant to shut down, rather than occasion, discussion. The different ways that people lack emotional intelligence is as varying as different life circumstances. I do not doubt that there might be general trends, like difficulties standing up for oneself or expressing grief, but these types of commonalities do not seem to rise to the level of scientific-ness demanded by the psychometrics of the broad, umbrella term, “emotional intelligence.”

Ability-based measures tend to measure people at their best while self-report measures usually track typical functioning. Ability-based models of emotional intelligence ignore the fact that different people are likely to find different kinds of situations challenging and that all people have room for improvement. Since everyone has a different developmental history, everyone has learned different lessons about

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emotions; although it makes sense that some emotional situations are inherently challenging, it also makes sense that everyone will have different problem areas. We might even find that emotional intelligence is indirectly improved by studying conflict-resolution strategies, stress-coping techniques, or by improving decision making. If we focus too much on the affect of the emotion, or on emotions as they differ from other experiences, we ignore the fact that emotions are about something and that the majority of our experiences are emotional. Similarly, we cannot exclude the realm of desire and motivation when understanding an emotion. Similarly, the idea of emotional intelligence, if it is similarly taken out of the context of experience, might seem to imply that we can simply talk through and talk away all of our emotions. I seriously doubt that an ability-based model of emotional intelligence, which hopes to discover and measure the essence of “emotional intelligence,” can address the true variety of life’s emotional challenges.

The definition suggested here, simply because it retains the term “emotional intelligence,” can have the negative consequence of suggesting that emotional intelligence is something exotic or complex. It is important to keep in mind just how simple of an idea it really is. As Zeidner, Matthew, and Roberts point out, there is some overlap between the idea of emotional intelligence and successful coping with stress.\(^{83}\) Negative emotions are similar to stress; stress may be a less conscious or longer-lasting form of negative emotion. Similarly, Brackett and Katulak’s idea of an emotional blueprint underscores the inherent simplicity of the notion of emotional intelligence.\(^{84}\)

“Creating an emotional blueprint” for a situation is just asking oneself questions about

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the emotions involved in a situation, such as “how may each person feel?” and “how may I feel?”; “what may the person be thinking as a result of these feelings” and “how might I respond to my feelings?”; “what may be causing these emotions?” and “how might these feelings be addressed or managed?” The real difficulty of emotional intelligence is figuring out why it is so difficult to keep in mind this simple, enhanced perspective about emotions and emotional responses. We could blame the emotions and say that emotions are inherently disruptive, but it is often times the case that people do not know what to do about emotions even when they are not having them. It is instead the case that emotions often stand in for deep needs and desires, and, although these needs may be simple, failing to meet them is a significant threat, and so emotions stop us from simply turning our back on problems we do not know how to solve.

Still, there might be resistance to my decision to retain the term “emotional intelligence” for a philosophically, not to mention morally, inclined theory of emotion. Although I do largely agree with Salovey and Mayer’s definition, if not their method of testing, the most productive work on emotional intelligence chooses to leave this term behind. Goleman has been very successful in linking this term in common parlance with the idea of having a business sense, and, yet, I use the term to mean almost the exact opposite. The term itself—“emotional intelligence”—is important for three reasons that I note in defending my choice to retain it. First, in the context of the philosophy of emotion, it serves to signify that emotion should not be understand in a limited sense to refer to some part of subjective experience but should be seen as connected to many aspects of experience as a process of development. “Emotional intelligence” refers to this more expansive notion; it is, as Goleman suggests, related to character. Second, the
notion of intelligence further provides evaluative and teleological pull: intelligence is something for which we should strive.

Third, the term has the advantage of implying that the emotions are themselves intelligent. If we insist on continuing to oppose reason and emotion, as does Goleman, we miss the significance of the intelligence of the emotions entirely. The emotions are not “intuitions” from the “gut.” Nor are the emotions intelligent in a way that merely supplements reason, as recent philosophers of emotion like Greenspan, De Sousa, and Damasio, have argued. The emotions are not only values, latent beliefs for acting one way of another; they are a deep-seated form of reason that pulls us back to what is truly important while we are in the midst of attempting to evaluate it. Emotions speak for needs that might be denied, problems that must be solved, insights that must be had. To be emotionally intelligent means that we are adept in meeting the moral challenges of life.

IV: The Connection Between Emotional Intelligence and Morality

The idea of emotional intelligence is not new; it is also related to the idea of virtue. We have already seen moral considerations play a role in various parts of our discussion. The demand for emotional intelligence governs our relationship to ourselves and our relationship to others: self-understanding and empathy for the sake of promoting “good outcomes.” Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter, the evaluation of emotion that is an inherent part of emotional intelligence is not tied merely to social norms, but to moral notions of virtue, appropriateness, and responsibility.
Most theorists working to develop the construct of emotional intelligence agree that empathy should play some role in it. Empathy might be acceptable as a fully moral notion, or it might be seen as relating merely to moral psychology. Moral psychology can be defined either as the study of moral experiences as they are truly moral, such as with Kant’s discussion of the feeling of respect for the moral law, or as moral experiences as they are pre-moral or insufficiently moral, such as with Hume’s moral sense theory or studies that test the extent to which people are willing defy morality to obey authority figures. In the latter case the term “moral” would perhaps be better understood if it were to appear with quotation marks around it, since the psychologists studying it are bracketing the question of whether or not the behaviors actually are moral and whether or not there is such a thing as morality, it is rather the study of that which is called “morality” either by the subjects or by the researchers. Nevertheless, if those who study emotional intelligence hope to have it include empathy only in the latter amoral sense, they will run into the problem of lacking a good definition for empathy. Without a morally informed notion of empathy, nothing stops emotional intelligence from being the ability to effectively coerce people. In her article on emotional intelligence in marriage, Fitness writes:

It should be noted however that although this facet of emotional intelligence is potentially adaptive in marriage, someone who is skilled at reading other people’s emotions could just as well use this ability for destructive as for constructive purposes. For example, married partners could conceivably use their empathic awareness in a calculated way to identify their partner’s vulnerabilities and insecurities, and exploit these for their own purposes.  

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Yet it goes without saying that such should not count as emotional intelligence. Similarly, the definition of emotional competence developed by Boyantzis and Sala, in conjunction with Goleman’s model, which is “an ability to recognize, understand, and use emotional information about oneself or others that leads to or causes effective or superior performance,” lends itself just as easily to coercion and dishonesty as it would to honesty and fairness.

Empathy, and its correlate self-respect, are moral notions. By this, I mean that they are morally required, and that we need other moral guides to tell us when we have achieved them. For example, how do we know when we are sufficiently empathetic? We do not measure empathy by the number of tears that we cry, but by making reference to ideals like equality and respect, as well as by considering our duties to promote the happiness of other and our own self-perfection to the extent that we are able. We can also ask this question about emotional intelligence in general: how do we know when we have reached a good understanding of an emotion or of a situation? To answer these questions, we need both psychological and moral information.

It may be less controversial to argue that the notion of emotional intelligence is essentially tied to the normative notion of health. Many of the researchers I have surveyed rely on the normative notion of health to formulate or critique ideas of emotional intelligence. For example, there are a number of myths about emotionality and emotional intelligence, like the idea that working through one’s emotions is always helpful and necessary or that crying is always cathartic. In the event that a preoccupation with certain emotions diminishes physical and psychological health, it is easy for us to
conclude that such is not emotionally intelligent. Surely, a program aimed at inculcating emotional intelligence cannot simply adopt an “emotions are good” approach and hope to achieve psychological health. Emotions cannot themselves take the place of the good or the goal, but can only make sense in the context of understanding good goals. Health is easy to accept as one such goal because it often has inherent moral worth and does not frequently conflict with other moral goals. Nevertheless, unless we are packing an entire moral theory into the notion of “health,” there is more to emotional intelligence than health.

Many of the researchers suggest a connection between emotional intelligence and morality. Saarni draws a connection between wisdom and emotional intelligence. She defines emotional competence as “the demonstration of self-efficacy in emotion-eliciting social transactions.” Self-efficacy means that the “individual has the capacity and skills to achieve the desired outcome.” Although it often goes unsaid, it is clear that determining what “the desired outcome,” as with conflict resolution, comes under the purview of morality. Saarni further argues that moral character is a part of emotional competence, as she likens it to a virtue. She remarks that emotional skills, divorced from a moral sense, would not yield emotional competence because “emotional competence entails ‘doing the right thing’.” Fitness notes a connection between emotional intelligence and forgiveness.

91 Fitness, “The Emotionally Intelligent Marriage,” 133.
“is associated with higher quality interpersonal relationships among couples and friends.”

Furthermore,

positive emotions can produce increasing benefits over time… finding positive meaning amid stress can build personal resources, such as strengthened relationships and enhanced values (by inspiring more courage, tolerance, and wisdom).

Being morally cut off can lead to being emotionally cut off or to being emotionally off base. Emotions are based on values and emotional intelligence helps one pursue one’s values. Those who work on emotional intelligence seem to agree that part of the goal of their work is to help improve people and help people improve their lives. Mayer writes:

It is my hope that emotional knowledge will have a greater positive than negative impact. Societies that recognize the importance of their citizen’s feelings may help create a more humane environment for those who live within them. When this emotional humanity is balanced with the other rights and responsibilities of the individual and society, the world may be better for it.

Indeed, we need moral judgment to help us hammer out the very idea of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence must answer moral questions: Should I favor confrontation at any cost? Or emotional conformity? Should I express this emotion although it will hurt another person? Should I promote this relationship? Should people lie to themselves in order to protect their self-esteem, established beliefs, and reduce cognitive dissonance? Or should honesty be the highest virtue (as it appears to be for anxiously attached couples)? Emotionally intelligent behavior involves the evaluation of

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94 Ciarrochi, Applying Emotional Intelligence.

95 Mayer (2006). Salovey and Mayer acknowledge that conceiving of and measuring emotional intelligence requires that we have some “right answers” about emotional reactions. They choose to emphasize the extent to which these answers are not possible because of cultural relativity. Salovey and Mayer (1997), 9.
emotions: if emotions are not evaluated by moral standards, then any standards on which
they are evaluated will lack an ultimate foundation. An emotional intelligence program
that is not fused with moral theory often becomes too centered on the subjectivity of
emotions and fails to address the real problems that the specific emotional situations
present. In other words, a notion of emotional intelligence that ignores moral questions
risks being totally ineffective.

One might object that I have only shown that psychology needs moral theory, not
that moral theory needs psychology or a notion of emotional intelligence. I must go
further and argue that being emotionally intelligent is related to being a good person and
that inculcating or conceiving of virtue without emotional intelligence is impossible.
There is enough evidence to argue that a lack of emotional intelligence causes bad
behavior and that one must practice emotionally intelligent behavior in order to avoid
doing something morally wrong.96 I think we can take the argument even further and
argue that, in some situations, it is morally unacceptable to ignore emotional
communication and information.

Imagine a situation, for example, where we would normally believe that consent
is morally required; clearly, accepting merely verbal assent when there is emotional
information to the contrary would be morally unacceptable. This might seem like a
special situation, but it is necessary for us to take a step back and realize that all of our
interactions and relationships are emotional, even those between relative strangers. The
empathy referred to by the notion of emotional intelligence demands that we be aware of
this unspoken dimension: it does not take a mind-reader to know what someone else
might be thinking and feeling, and yet we are so often afraid to address it. We are morally

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96 See Ciarrochi et al. (2007).
called on to accept and validate the reality of the unspoken, but, again, emotions are not just the unspoken, we are also morally called on to act with courage, and stand by our convictions, in our explicit, verbal exchanges. Without an understanding of the moral importance of emotional intelligence, morality comes to refer to an abstract and impersonal domain, if it does indeed leave us with any duties at all.

Insofar as morality applies to relationships between people and human interaction, and emotions are a part of those relationships, it is morally necessary for us to cultivate emotional intelligence. We accept that the basic physical needs of food and shelter belong in a moral theory; the idea of emotional intelligence teaches us that people have psychological needs that are just as real and important as their physical needs. Emotional intelligence, then, must be provided for and included in any well-informed theory of the good life or right living.

Like virtue, we expect emotional intelligence to involve both reflective and a pre-reflective behaviors, as well as both behavioral and rational learning. It, as well as the philosophy of emotion, sheds light on moral theory when combined with it because considering all three topics together ensures that we see humans both as animals and as rational beings. We saw from the last chapter, and we know from the history of moral theory, that it is too easy to split up these qualities and view humans as only one or the other. The challenge is to retain both qualities and not collapse one into the other.

As we saw in the first chapter, the idea that morality commands certain attitudes about the emotions is not new, but the attitude in particular that I am advocating is relatively new. We might look to Spinoza as an example of the way that the history of philosophy has engaged with the idea of developing proper emotional engagement and
the correct frame of mind regarding emotion. Spinoza asserts that the task of ethics is to achieve a firm grasp of truth so that one can retain this understanding during an emotional disruption. For Spinoza, passions are inadequate or confused ideas, or, perhaps we would put the point clearer if we say they are states of confusion. Passivity, for Spinoza, is the result of this confusion. Spinoza holds that even our thoughts are determined and that, for this reason, we do not have absolute control over our emotions, but he held that we can eliminate a passion by replacing the confusion with clear reasoning. We might still be made to feel affects passively as a result of determination from external objects, but we can eradicate those further emotional agitations that originate from our evaluation of the object. The task, then, is to maintain this Stoic calmness of mind during emotional disturbances.

Discussing Spinoza sheds new light on the underlying problems with Goleman’s approach. Like Goleman, Spinoza holds that the task for emotional self-improvement is the overcoming of those emotions that “hinder the mind from understanding.”97 Although Spinoza is a determinist, his Ethics takes the goal of increasing the experience of freedom. Emotions, insofar as they are confused ideas, are out of our control and hence bad. In defining the terms of the inquiry, Spinoza writes, “I say that we suffer when anything is done within us, or when anything follows from our nature of which we are not the cause except partially.”98 Spinoza, like many in the history of philosophy, understands thinking as an activity and feeling as a passivity. The challenge for us now is to transform the prejudice that we have inherited from language and the history of philosophy and understand feeling as an activity. To call emotion a choice is too

98 Spinoza, Ethics, 128.
polemical; it is instead necessary to identify ourselves with our feelings the same way we identify ourselves with our thoughts. We do not choose our thoughts; we do not accept all of our thoughts wholesale as always correct or desirable. Nor need we accept all of our emotions. Still, we must overcome the impulse to reduplicate the disassociation of thought and repression of emotion in refusing theoretically to identify ourselves with our emotions. (We will revisit this problem in chapter 6 with Kant’s notion of autonomy.) As I have argued from the beginning of this chapter, our understanding of emotion is internal to emotional behavior and the theory of emotional intelligence. Emotional problems are writ large in the theoretical problems that then sustain them. A good theory of emotional intelligence is tied to the actual practice of emotional intelligence. My hope is that turning our attention to moral theory, and Kantian moral theory in particular, can promote that practice.
KANT’S THEORY OF EMOTION

Before I can proceed to my argument that Kantian moral theory works to promote emotional intelligence—Kant is aware of the moral importance of emotional intelligence, and Kantian moral theory can therefore support a theory of emotional intelligence—I must call into question the overwhelming prejudice against Kant and the received opinion of his theory of emotion. The majority of my readers will believe either that Kantian moral theory is incompatible with a theory of emotional intelligence, remarking that Kant would take the term “emotional intelligence” to be an oxymoron, or that Kant’s theory of “emotional intelligence” is essentially Stoic, holding that we become more emotionally intelligent the fewer emotions we have. It is true that Kant’s comments about emotion are often disparaging, but this appearance constitutes merely the outermost layer of his theory of emotion. Kant appears to accept the Stoic ideal of apathy, holding that emotions can be dangerous and that virtue requires their extirpation; yet this accepted understanding of his theory of emotion becomes more complicated when we realize that Kant’s starting point, his definition of emotion, is unnecessarily narrow and derogatory. When we limit Kant’s derogatory remarks about emotion to his limited notions of Affecten and Leidenschaften, we see that there are many aspects of emotionality, or phenomena that we normally associate with emotion, that Kant does not disparage. It becomes clear that Kant, like the Stoics, maintains a cognitive theory of emotion but that he, unlike the Stoics, does not hold that emotional judgments are necessarily false.
Neither does he hold that emotional judgments are likely to be wrong because of their lowly origins. The judgments that ground emotions can be integrated into the rational mind; this is exactly Kant’s recommendation. This fact opens up the possibility that emotions might be themselves helpful for discovering and choosing the most rational course of events. Furthermore, Kant would agree with the theory of emotional intelligence that I have set out: it is more rational to understand one’s emotions than to attempt to eliminate them or repress them with the “rational mind.”

The first half of this chapter focuses on Kant’s criticisms of emotion and passion, as well as his well-known criticism of sympathy, showing that Kant’s evaluations are not unwarranted when we understand them according to his original limited definitions. The second half of this chapter focuses on those Kantian “feelings” (Gefühle) that rise above being emotions because of their rational nature, such as the moral feeling (the feeling of respect for the moral law) and moral feelings (such as properly grounded sympathy). These feelings play an important role in Kant’s moral theory. I then argue that Kant holds a cognitive theory of emotion, and I discuss various aperçus that gesture toward a Kantian theory of emotional intelligence.

I. The Problem with Emotion

In preparing his English version of Kant’s *Anthropology for the Pragmatic Point of View*, Dowdell chose to translate the German word Affect as “emotion.” Kant contrasts Affect and Leidenschaft, or what is translated as passion. He defines both Affect

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1 It is useful to realize that, by “anthropology,” Kant means something much closer to what we mean by “psychology,” i.e., a study of human mental capacities and behaviors as they are common among humans. Kant defines psychology as the study of inner experiences as they fall under natural laws (A§7). Examples of such natural laws are the categories of the first Critique. This definition of psychology is closer to what we call philosophy of mind and what Kant calls transcendental psychology.
and Leidenschaft in terms of their irrationality. Both are a part of the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen):

The inclination which can hardly, or not at all, be controlled by reason is passion. On the other hand, emotion is the feeling (Gefühl) of pleasure or displeasure at a particular moment, which does not give rise to reflection (namely the process of reason whether one should submit to it or reject it). (A §73)

Already we have hit a snag in Kant’s attempt to define emotions entirely derisively: elsewhere Kant asserts that we always implicitly judge a pleasure to be good or bad as we experience it (A §64). Nevertheless, we see that Kant is clearly attempting to define Affecten and Leidenschaften in opposition to reason. Emotion (Affect) is feeling before it has been consciously reflected on and evaluated; passions are more conscious and deliberate, but they are, for that reason, even less rational.

Gregor similarly recognizes that Kant’s use of Affect and Leidenschaft are different than the English terms emotion and passion because he deliberately means Affect to refer to “a feeling (e.g., anger) which precedes deliberation and makes this difficult or impossible” and Leidenschaft to be closely associated with vice. ² We might consider translating Affect with the English cognate, “affect” because we tend to think of affects as more immediate, but the English term “affect” is less charged and more vague than Kant’s notion of Affect. Altering the term would also not help in case of “passion” even though we only rarely use “passion” in this purely negative sense. We talk about being in the “throes of passion,” but even this is not exactly what Kant means by passion, since Kantian passion never negates culpability and Kant’s description of passion is of a longer-term, habituated state. In English it is much more common for us to use the term

“passion” to refer to a constructive desire, or set of desires, such as having a passion for music or pursuing one’s cause passionately. Changing the term would have little effect of normalizing Kant’s definitions, so we should follow the accepted translation but keep in mind that these words mean something very specific for Kant. The further specificity of their meaning will become clearer when we consider the role they play in Kant’s moral theory, as the notion of passion is closely related to the notions of both vice and inclination (a term that also has a special meaning for Kant).

Kant often opts for different terms for things that we would consider to be emotions but that do not fit his purely derogatory meaning. In cases where emotions originate in reason, as when a sermon stirs up moral emotions, these emotions do not count as “emotions.” In the case of intellectual vigor, Kant calls it “enthusiasm” (Enthusiasm). Kant makes the same point about courage, which becomes genuine bravery or moral courage, and hence outgrows its inferior status as an emotion, when it is instigated by reason. Kant clearly believes that the defining feature of emotion is the lack of rational reflection: “it is not the intensity of a certain feeling which creates the emotional state, but the want of reflection in the comparison of this feeling with the sum of all feelings (the pleasure or displeasure) in one’s own condition” (A §75). We shall see that when emotions play a positive role in Kant’s philosophy, they are usually referred to as “feelings” rather than “emotions.”

Most people would agree that some emotions start out as vague feelings that are either pleasant or unpleasant; but it seems to be the case that usually, sometimes with great effort, we reflect on and make rational sense out of our emotions. Kant’s definition of emotion, then, limits it to the first, pre-reflective stage of an emotion. The initial vague
feeling of pleasure or displeasure could turn out to be good or bad, worth having or not worth having, but insofar as it has not been evaluated and reflectively understood, it is problematic. The emotion could easily remain in its pre-reflective state and instigate pre-reflective action, and this is Kant’s main concern:

> Emotion is surprise through sensation, whereby composure of mind (*animus sui compos*) is suspended. Emotion therefore is precipitate, that is, it quickly grows to a degree of feeling which makes reflection impossible (it is thoughtless). (A §74)

Kant uses the emotion of anger to illustrate, as he believes that anger is quick to strike and quick to pass: “What the emotion of anger does not accomplish quickly will not be accomplished at all. The emotion of anger easily forgets” (A §74). This does not sound like a very accurate description of anger, but it is useful to illustrate the type of psychological response Kant has in mind when he refers to emotions. Most of us have in mind something more like Kant’s notion of hate, which we will discuss shortly, when we think of anger, as we often are preoccupied by our anger.³

> Even if an angry action did not end up causing harm or being immoral—even if it were beneficial to those involved—it would still be morally dangerous for Kant, because, as pre-reflective, it is still unthinking and not the product of rational choice.

Such a behavior is unprincipled and cannot be a recommended course of action since

³ Somewhat contradictorily, since Kant believes that emotions lead to rash and harmful behaviors, Kant suggests that the best way to respond to emotions like anger and shame is to express them immediately so that they do not turn into resentment. Resentment must then be vented by people “verbalizing their concerns” (A §78). Kant rightly points out that such verbalization is difficult and that the emotions themselves seem to make it difficult. He concludes “for this reason these emotions present themselves in a disadvantageous light” (A §78). It is true that the negative emotions are difficult and unpleasant to experience for reasons over and above their content. They do, in fact, seem to frustrate the very purposes that they inspire. For example, if someone’s actions upset me, the most straightforward response is to tell that person that they are upsetting me and to perhaps ask them to stop. To be upset, though, is a negative emotion and difficult to express. The most unemotional person could simply state “I do not like to be teased; it upsets me; please stop,” or make a similar request, but the true-to-life emotional person simply becomes upset and stymied by her anger. Hence, it does seem that the negative emotion frustrates its own goal, but, as we discussed in the first chapter, such difficulty is probably not truly the fault of the emotion, but of the whole situation and of one’s subjective proclivities.
there is no guarantee it is morally acceptable. Furthermore, in being pre-reflective and automatic, there is a sense in which the behavior is degrading to our humanity. Although there are those who will speak in favor of spontaneity for its own sake, commonsense surely shows that it is better to think through one’s actions before one acts. In the case in which we decide to follow the original emotional impulse, taking the time to rationally evaluate the impulse need not water down the affect; it is only when we are compelled to pursue an action that is rationally unwise that we need to set about changing the impulse in some way or deferring it.

Kant agrees with the Stoics that “the prudent man must at no time be in a state of emotion.” Not only are emotions irrational in the sense of being pre-reflective, they are irrational in the sense that they “make [a person] incapable of pursuing [his] own purposes” (A §75). Emotions are at cross-purposes with purposiveness. Kant argues that emotions, such as anger and shame, are “incapacitating because of their intensity” (A §78). If emotions do have an inchoate purpose, then, they cannot effectively serve it, at least not as emotions. To sum up, Kant lodges at least three criticisms against emotions: they are pre-reflective; they are internally conflicted; and they are imprudent and might be immoral.

Kant writes: “to be subject to emotions and passions is probably always an illness of mind because both emotion and passion exclude the sovereignty of reason” (A §73). There are certainly a number of examples of cases in which people appear to act irrationally because they are in the throes of an emotion. Our language itself adopts this theory of emotion and takes the term “emotional” as a synonym for “irrational.” If we say that someone is behaving “emotionally,” we usually mean that he is giving a knee-jerk
response that is the product of intense feeling and not reasoning carefully. Nevertheless, as I have suggested, there is no reason to think that this way of speaking is anything more than sedimented prejudice against emotion, rather than an accurate psychological theory. There is no reason to think that a bad decision-making process is any more the fault of the emotion than it is the fault of reason and an individual’s poor judgment or learned and habituated means of experiencing emotions. It seems likely that someone who is prejudiced against experiencing emotion is more likely to respond to an emotion hastily, and someone who is open to feeling an emotion and exploring its meaning is better able to discover the best course of action, which may itself be suggested by the emotion. If it can be shown that Kant accepts a cognitive theory of emotion, and that there is no reason to think that the judgment that grounds an emotion is essentially more fallacious than any other kind of judgment, then we have opened the door to showing that emotions can be reasoned with and can even be a part of good reasoning. Indeed, as we shall see, Kant holds this to be true. The Kantian quest for rationality involves self-analysis and evaluation, which requires understanding and thinking through one’s emotions before acting. It may turn out that, for whatever reason, the judgments that ground emotions are more difficult to evaluate than impersonal judgments, but that does not mean that such evaluation is any less necessary or possible. As we shall see, Kant agrees with this conclusion.

II. The Problem with Passion

Kant is even more condemnatory of passion. Kant holds that emotions strike us and fizzle out quickly, whereas passions last longer and become habitual inclinations
toward certain actions. “Emotion works like water that breaks through a dam; passion works like a river digging itself deeper and deeper into the bed” (A §74). Kant gives the example of the difference between anger and hate: anger is an emotion and is relatively short-lived, while hate is an inclination that can last for years and is therefore a passion. The fact that many of us are aware of the fact of being preoccupied by our anger only underscores the relationship between emotion and passion about which Kant is worried: emotions turn into passions if they are effectively dealt with or integrated into the (moral) rational mind. A passion is an emotion that has been integrated into the rational mind but in a way that is incompatible with our higher nature and human worth.

Kant’s comments on passion are more difficult to understand than his comments on emotion. Kant offers two distinct criticisms of passion, yet he fails to clearly distinguish between them: the first is that passion is necessarily an irrational preoccupation with and favoring of one inclination over all others motives; the second is that passion, even if an expression of clear-headed reasoning,4 is necessarily immoral. In the first case, Kant’s criticism of passion is the same as his criticism of emotion but Kant takes passions to be more recalcitrant to reflection: “inclination, which hinders the use of reason to compare, at a particular moment of choice, a specific inclination against the sum of all inclinations, is passion” (A §80). In other words, passions preoccupy us and continually lead to irrational decisions. Fridja lodges this criticism at “emotions” with his “law of closure”:

Emotions tend to be closed to considerations that its aims may be of relative and passing importance. They are closed to the requirements of interests other than those of their own aims. They claim top priority and

4 Kant gives a variety of names to the reasoning power that does not take up explicitly moral ends, which are all synonyms: prudential reasoning, pragmatic reasoning, techno-practical reason, etc. In contemporary terms, we would call this calculative or instrumental rationality.
are absolute with regard to appraisals of urgency and necessity of action, and to control over action.\(^5\)

Fridja writes that emotions similarly shirk a consideration of consequences. A passion, for Kant, is something like a drug addition; we can very effectively strategize ways to get the next fix, but the fact that this goal takes precedence over all, or many, of our other goals, is irrational. In using hate, as opposed to anger, to illustrate passion, Kant must be thinking of an experience closer to all-consuming hate, like Iago’s hate for Othello (if hate—rather than repressed erotic desire—is really the best description of Iago’s psychic state), rather than the simple evaluation that someone is contemptuous or even the disposition to avoid him and to speak spitefully to him. Unless we assume that all forms of hate are essentially irrational and/or immoral, we must assume that Kant is referring to a particularly all-consuming variety.

Passions involve more reflection and choice than do emotions, and for this reason they are more blameworthy for Kant. When considering Socrates’s argument that it might sometimes be good to experience the *emotion* of anger, Kant writes: “passion, on the other hand, no man wishes for himself. Who wants to be put in chains when he can be free?” Kant suggests that the type of reason allowed by passion is still necessarily perverted or immoral: “passion always presupposes a maxim of the subject, namely, to act according to a purpose prescribed for him by his inclination” (A §80). Passion causes the privileging of one inclination over other concerns, and for this reason passion is essentially immoral. The moral meta-maxim, as we know from the *Religion* essay, is to always choose to follow the moral law over inclination whenever the two conflict; the immoral meta-maxim is to follow inclination always regardless of whether or not it

conflicts with the moral law. Passion, being preoccupied with itself, forces the subject to choose on its behalf over the moral law, should the two conflict, and it therefore sets up the subject for immoral behavior.

Kant seems to conflate his two criticisms of passion. He describes passion’s tendency to promote the fulfillment of one inclination over a measured consideration of the sum total of inclinations (or “making one’s partial purpose the whole of one’s purpose”) as harmful for pure practical reason (A §81). Surely, pure practical reason, insofar as it is pure, does not allow for any determination by inclination. Kant’s two criticisms of passion are united: “The delusion consists in equalizing the mere opinion of someone regarding the value of a thing with the actual value of the thing” (A §82). A flaw of prudential reasoning (a sort of calculative myopia) may also become a flaw of moral reasoning (the inability to value correctly). In holding the fulfillment of one particular inclination up above all our other inclinations, we are failing to value correctly. A moral failing, involved in choosing to fulfill an inclination over following the moral law, is also an act of failing to value correctly. Although both are failures to value correctly, these two types of failure are nonetheless qualitatively very different. The elision of these two criticisms highlights the fact that Kant believes that there cannot be moral passions, as we shall see in our upcoming discussion of sympathy. The way that Kant defines passion negatively parallels his use of the term “inclination” (Neigung), which has a purely negative or selfish meaning (as we will discuss in chapter 5). Passions are desires, and “habitual sensuous desire is called inclination” (A §73). Often “passion” is synonymous with vice, for Kant; and the opposite of certain passions are virtues.
It should be noted that Kant’s remarks about emotion and passion in his explicitly moral works adopt this theory from the *Anthropology*. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant writes:

*Affects* and *passions* are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to *feeling* insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult. Hence an affect is called *precipitate* or *rash* (*animus praeceps*), and reason says, through the concept of virtue, that one should *get hold of oneself*. Yet this weakness in the use of one’s understanding coupled with the strength of one’s emotion is only a *lack of virtue* [as opposed to a vice], as it were, something childish and weak, which can indeed coexist with the best will. It even has one good thing about it: that this tempest quickly subsides. Accordingly, a propensity to an affect (e.g., *anger*) does not enter into kinship with vice so readily as does a passion. A *passion* is a sensible *desire* that has become a lasting inclination (e.g., *hatred* as opposed to anger). The calm with which one gives oneself up to it permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles upon it and so, if inclination lights upon something contrary to the law, to brood upon it, to get it rooted deeply, and so to take up what is evil (as something premeditated) into its maxim. And the evil is then *properly* evil, that is, true vice. (MM 166)

Putting Kant’s theory of emotion into the context of his moral theory, we can see that passions bear a striking resemblance to vices. Kant’s list of the passions—ambition, lust for power, and avarice—is a list of vices (A §82). (Although, strangely, Kant includes the natural passion for freedom in his discussion of passion, and he does not criticize this natural passion in any way, describing its natural, moral development.⁶) The insight that passions are vices sheds new light on recurrent attempts to explain and defend Kant’s criticism of sympathy.

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⁶ Kant believes that moral thinking helps the natural inclination for external freedom develop into the concept of justice. He describes this transition as a strengthening, not a sublimating, of the passion. In the case of freedom, reason and passion work together: “reason alone establishes the concept of freedom and passion collides with it” (A §82).
III. The Problem with Sympathy

Kant’s elision of his two criticisms of passion prevents him from considering moral passion; yet his discussion of one moral feeling in the *Groundwork*, viz. sympathy, has been chiefly responsible for the bad reputation of his philosophy of emotion. (Note that the fact that sympathy is a feeling (*Gefühl*), and not a passion, allows for its resolution with reason, of which we shall see Kant is very much in favor.) Since any mention of Kant’s theory of emotion most commonly calls to mind Kant’s criticism of the moral motivation of sympathy, it is best that we devote some time to elucidating his position.

Henson and Herman have debated the correct reading of Kant’s take on those inclinations, such as sympathy, which cooperate with a respect for duty and jointly bring about moral action. Henson argues that Kant would allow that moral actions can be determined by both respect for the moral law and inclinations at the same time—a thesis referred to as “overdetermination.” The idea of overdetermination holds that any one of the motives acting alone must be strong enough to cause the action by itself. Henson suggests that Kant did not see the possibility of overdetermination and that when we bring up this possibility it helps to make sense of the difference between an action having moral worth and an action conforming to duty, since an action can conform to duty and yet not have moral worth. Given the assumption that moral worth only accrues to actions that are done *only* out of respect for duty, with no cooperating motivations, Henson argues that it is clear, based on the *Groundwork*, that an action without moral worth can

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still be moral and, thereby, praiseworthy. On the other hand, Henson downplays the importance of moral worth for Kantian moral theory, since it seems to require dire situations in which one has lost all moral feeling.

Herman argues that Henson’s notion of overdetermination is simplistic and that respect for duty should be seen as a meta-motivation or a “limiting condition” on motivation, i.e., a motivation that checks our other motivations. She holds that Kant would grant moral worth to an overdetermined action if the moral motive were the motive upon which the agent acted. This discussion is further complicated by the fact that Kant believed that it is nearly impossible to be sure that one has not unconsciously chosen out of inclination instead of out of respect for duty.

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8 Note that Henson conflates act and agent evaluations. I do not think that this in itself constitutes a major flaw with his thesis.


10 Guyer, in Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, rejects both these solutions because he argues that inclinations are not “potentially independently motivating factors in the first place” (293). Guyer argues that, for Kant, reason is always involved in acting and we choose to act on an inclination and can even choose to have or not have inclinations. He cites Allison’s “Incorporation Thesis” interpretation as evidence for this reading. Therefore, if there are cooperating inclinations contributing to a moral action, they should be seen as products of the respect for duty. Guyer is mistaken to think that the “Incorporation Thesis” relates to this issue. It may be the case that Kant believes that an agent must always choose to make an inclination a reason for his action, as Guyer argues. That does not tell us anything about whether or not we can choose based on two reasons, or if an action only has moral worth for Kant when we choose to have only one reason for doing it, viz., respect for the moral law. Guyer argues that, like Herman’s idea of a “limiting condition,” people always employ one out of two meta-maxims: “the maxim always to do, out of respect for duty, all and only what duty requires or permits, and thus to act as an inclination would suggest only if so doing in compatible with or conducive to doing what duty requires; or the maxim always to do, out of self-love, what inclination suggests, even when so doing is incompatible with doing what duty requires”(295). Guyer bases this conclusion on Kant’s discussion of moral dispositions from Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. This focus on an agent’s fundamental character (good or evil) makes it so that inclinations themselves can never cooperate or conflict with duty and makes the agent (“to some extent”) responsible for his inclinations. To support this interpretation, Guyer draws on the discussion of the moral need to cultivate moral feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals. Although Guyer emphasizes his distance from Herman here, in other chapters of Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness he emphasizes her point that applying the categorical imperative, as it is a limiting condition, requires other motives in order to make it effective. Guyer uses the terminology of form and content. Either way, the point is that we cannot read Kant’s theory of moral action as a rejection of the moral worth of determination through inclination because an action requires a motivation and all such really motivating motivations come from inclination. Guyer does not square this argument with the Groundwork, and that seems to be necessary at this point, since we seem to have gone astray from the original goal of making sense of Kant’s claims about moral worth that appear to pit it against determination through inclination.
It is clear from the text that Kant intends to make a distinction between actions that are done for the sake of duty and actions that merely conform to duty. Henson’s conclusion is that the latter have more value for Kant. That is obviously false. Acting from duty alone may be difficult to do, comprehend, and recognize, but we can conceive of it through the thought experiments that Kant offers and be edified. Perhaps that is one point often overlooked: the thought of acting out of the pure respect for duty ought to inspire respect. Although an occasion to act out of respect for pure duty would definitely be the product of a bad situation, as Henson notes, the action would still be praiseworthy and edifying because it demonstrates the human potential to elevate morality and rationality over personal benefit and instrumental rationality. Kant makes the distinction between behaviors that merely accord with duty and those that are done for the sake of duty in order to elaborate that which is special about acting from duty: it is categorically different than acting from inclination. (I argue in chapter 5 that Kant often assumes that inclinations are inherently selfish.) This distinction explains the most important concept in the philosophical understanding of morality: pure respect for duty, which turns out to require the pure thought of lawfulness and, therefore, comprehension of the moral law. Without the latter, one has not understood the essence of morality at all and merely remains at the level of a pre-philosophical intuition of morality, lacking true moral worth and being constantly vulnerable to corruption since one’s behavior and convictions lack grounding in true moral principle.

Herman is right that actions motivated by inclination have no moral content. Inclination does not track morality and inclination is therefore an inconsistent guide to
moral action. Herman gives the example of feeling sympathy for someone carrying a heavy load: according to Kant’s analysis, the mere feeling of sympathy is not mixed with a rational reflection about the principles and circumstances involved, such as being a hooded figure at the back door of an art museum struggling to bring out a large rectangular object at night. Sympathy is an unacceptable ground of moral action not because it does not sometimes lead to the right end, but exactly because it must only do so sometimes.

Annaas criticizes modern ethical theory, of which Kant is her main example, for holding that virtue must always correct emotions, and she argues that Ancient ethics is superior because it accepts that sometimes feelings can lead independently to the right result. Annaas argues, against Sidgwick’s argument that we are not responsible for our feelings and so they do not belong to ethical theory, that we are responsible for our feelings, although not in the moment. She gives the example of working to break a bad habit. As we can see, this is not a very accurate criticism of Kant. The problem with pre-reflective feelings is not that they are vicious but that they are pre-reflective. As we shall see, Kant does not deny the importance of natural moral feelings as well as their proper cultivation, but he does define moral worth in terms of correct understanding.

Sympathy, according to Kant’s defined usage, is not based on reasoned reflection and does not attain the level of principled moral action necessary for what Kant believes is the essential component of morality. Furthermore, respect for the moral law is itself

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necessary for moral worth. Even if one’s sympathetic actions miraculously always matched the moral requirements of the situation, which is not likely unless the feeling of sympathy had itself already been produced by rational reflection, such a person would still lack genuine moral feeling (respect for the moral law) and, therefore, genuine moral worth on Kant’s account. In the “Preface” to the “Doctrine of Virtue,” Kant calls following moral feeling instead of moral reason “blindness.” We are reminded of his remark in the first *Critique* that intuitions without concepts are blind. It is not that moral feelings are bad, wrong, or unnecessary; they simply cannot be the whole story of moral understanding and decision-making.

Kant begins the *Groundwork* discussion in question by stating that an examination of the concept of duty will help him and the reader reach a better understanding of the concept of a good will. In order to form a clear idea of the essence of duty, he uses a process of elimination. He first excludes from considerations all actions “which are recognized as opposed to duty,” since that is the most obvious first step. Next he draws on a distinction between actions that are in accord with duty yet not done from a “direct” inclination (only “another” inclination) and those actions, similarly in accord with duty, but done from a “direct” inclination. The merchant example serves as an example of the former, while the normal care we give to the preservation of life is an example of the latter. Kant seems to rank the latter as better than the former and calls the merchant “selfish,” but he does not use this epithet for the natural preservation of life. (Kant does refer to the natural preservation of life as selfish in other texts, which is not to say that it is evil, but possibly morally dangerous.) Kant states that it is easy to see that a behavior done for selfish reasons is not done out of duty, but “it is far more difficult to
note this difference when the action is in accord with duty and, in addition, the subject has a direct inclination to do it” (G 397). We might ask: why is it difficult? One answer is that Kant is aware of the possibility of overdetermination. He might be stating that such actions could be determined both by respect for the moral law and by direct inclination. That does not seem to be his meaning. Instead, when we take into consideration the fact that he sees the argument as progressing from the commonly held conception of the good will to the more-difficult-to-ascertain principles of philosophy, it is clear that Kant recognizes a difficulty here because it is likely that we would normally, in our everyday apprehension of moral goodness, fail to make a distinction between the inclination to be kind, or the feeling of sympathy, for example, and the estimation of genuine moral worth. We normally think that the sympathetic inclination does confer genuine moral worth. Kant’s main point here is that it does not. Inclinations as such do not have moral worth.  

Nevertheless, it is a mistake to jump from that conclusion to the idea that a moral action cannot be done with inclination. As Kant continues with his discussion of moral worth, he almost explicitly protects himself from this reading by referring to the moral requirements to cultivate certain inclinations. The next paragraph begins: “To secure one’s own happiness is at least indirectly a duty,” and in it Kant argues that reason and respect for the duty to secure happiness is a better and more noble means to this end than by following inclination (G 399). The point of these paragraphs is to argue that reason is a better guide to morality than is inclination and that, following the insight that the only thing that is good without condition is a good will, morality bears a special relationship to reasoning.

Next, Kant discusses the commandment to love our neighbor, although he makes a distinction between love as an inclination (pathological love), which he claims cannot be commanded because it is merely an immediate feeling, and practical love, which is under our control and is commanded. Those who would accuse Kant of believing that moral actions must be devoid of supporting inclinations must assume that Kant would interpret this biblical passage as a command to practically love our neighbors and, at the same time, as a command not to pathologically love them. Such is absurd. (Note that pathological love of one’s neighbor should be classed as a feeling, not an emotion or a passion.) Clearly, the common-sense reading is that it is perfectly acceptable and admirable to love your neighbors pathologically, yet it is not, and cannot be, a moral command, because moral commands only have to do with reason. (We shall further discuss the relationship between command and the immediacy of feeling shortly.)

Inclination is amoral, not immoral. Already, the exclusion of inclination from moral worth has consequences for our discussion of emotional intelligence, but it is not the last word in the story.

This discussion of sympathy shows that Kant’s criticism of emotional impulse is consistent between his works. Sympathy, insofar as it is not informed by moral principle, is a bad guide to moral action, just as emotion is a bad guide to action because it is pre-reflective. It does not follow from this that Kant believes that we must extirpate all moral feelings; in fact, quite the opposite is the case.
IV. Kant’s Theory of Emotion, Take Two: The Virtuous Feelings

Hursthouse expresses the common prejudiced understanding of Kant’s theory of emotion: Kant does not allow that emotions can be part of our rational nature, nor can they be morally significant.\(^\text{16}\) Perhaps, if we limited our understanding of Kant’s theory of emotion to only that which has already been said, we would agree with this reading. Yet I have already shown that Kant’s limited definitions of Affect and Leidenshaft preclude accepting his comments about them as the whole of a theory of emotion. It is not surprising to see Kant criticize pre-reflective impulses and vicious pre-occupations. Affecten are merely the first and most immediate level of emotional experience. A consideration of Kant’s positive theory of emotion offers two points in opposition to the common, prejudiced reading of Kant. First, a consideration of the feeling of respect and other intellectual feelings shows that feeling is an essential part of Kant’s moral theory. Second, this discussion will lead to a discussion of moral feelings considered more broadly, and it will become clear, as it has already begun to, that feelings can and should become integrated into the rational mind and that they are an essential component of virtue.

Even though Kant argues that natural sympathy cannot be the foundation of moral theory, he does hold that some natural moral feelings do track proper moral comprehension. The moral law naturally inspires the feeling of respect. Of course, in the Groundwork, Kant attempts to defend his move to “seek refuge…in an obscure feeling” with the retort that this feeling is different in kind from all other feelings (G 4:401n).\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{17}\) There is some reason to think that it is Kant’s own dualism that makes him believe that reference to a feeling is necessary because his notion of “pure” reason cannot itself be practical. Regardless, Kant’s notion of respect definitively shows us that he believes that feelings can be based on reason. In the
more considered examination of the role that intellectual feelings play in Kant’s texts demonstrates that respect is in no way singularly special. Even though Kant explicitly denies that “intellectual feeling” is possible at all (because, he argues, something cannot be both intellectual and a feeling at the same time), it is clear that he believes that there are feelings that follow from rational comprehension. I am not sure what to call these if not “intellectual feelings.” It is to a discussion of this supposedly different kind of feeling that we now turn, demonstrating that a feeling does not lack moral worth for Kant because it is natural, but because it is not well grounded in reason. Certain natural feelings, like respect for the moral law, play a necessary role in Kant’s moral theory as they help him to demonstrate that humans are naturally called to develop their moral and rational faculties.

In explaining the cultivation of virtue, in the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant argues that some aspects of morality cannot be described as virtues, for they are simply natural:

There are certain [natural] moral endowments such that anyone lacking them could have no duty to acquire them—They are moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem). There is no obligation to have these because they lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty, not as objective conditions of morality. All of them are natural predispositions of the mind (praedispositio) for being affected by concepts of duty, antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling. To have these predispositions cannot be considered a duty, rather, every human being has them, and it is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation.—Consciousness of them is not of empirical origin; it can, instead, only follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on the mind. (MM 6:399)

Groundwork’s discussion of the feeling of respect, Kant hesitates precisely because he considers the objection that feelings are not based on rational concepts and are reducible to inclination and fear. Here, even though the concept of feeling (Gefühl) seems to be the larger class of which emotions are only a smaller part, his criticisms of emotions apply to feelings. Gefühl and Affect can both be translated as emotion. As in English, the words feeling and emotion are not clearly differentiated. See Mark Packer, “Kant on Desire and Moral Pleasure,” Journal of the History of Ideas 50, no. 3 (1989): 429-442, for the argument that Kant’s emphasis on respect shows that emotions must play a role his theory or autonomy.
As “subjective conditions of receptiveness,” these feelings do not constitute a “moral sense” as theorized by the moral sense theorists, because they are subjective affectations of objective rational comprehension. The moral feeling of respect is inspired by comprehension of the moral law; therefore, it is beholden to the moral law, not the other way around, and it is based in intellectual comprehension. MacBeath argues that the feeling of respect is felt as an imperative and not just an inclination because it presupposes reason.\(^\text{18}\) Kant writes:

> But though respect is a feeling, it is not one received through any influence but is self-wrought by a rational concept… What I recognize as a law for myself I recognize with respect, which means merely the consciousness of the submission of my will to a law without the intervention of other influences on my mind. (G 400)

Respect is a worth that “thwarts my self-love” (G 401). Note that respect is not here described as itself morally motivating, as it might be construed, but rather the accompaniment to moral motivation.

The importance of the feeling of respect is a well-discussed aspect of Kant’s ethics, as it plays a central role in Kant’s account of moral motivation, but commentators

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\(^{18}\) A. Murray MacBeath, “Kant on Moral Feeling,” *Kant-Studien* 64 (1973): 289. MacBeath calls Kant’s theory of moral feeling “breathtakingly absurd” because he believes that it is a “fiction conjured up out of a defective view of rational action.” Kant’s view is supposedly defective because reasons do not need feelings in order to be effective; ibid., 313-314. MacBeath only re-asserts the dichotomy between reason and emotion by arguing this. In reality, the idea of an a priori, universal feeling that is based on a sense of shared humanity, is sublime, not absurd. Reasons do not need feelings in order to be effective, hence, moral feeling is not commanded, but a natural, human response. Kant’s theory of moral feeling sits at the edge between moral psychology and moral theory: it is a part of his theory of human nature on which his moral theory is partly based. Kant does give the feeling of respect as part of the answer to the question, “how is pure reason practical?” Nevertheless, this question was poised for an answer from moral psychology. The question should not to be understood as pointing to the castrated nature of reason, but only to its weakness relative to pragmatic incentives. The questions asks about our freedom from the standpoint of the worry about determinism. The question asks: how is it that people would ever choose to follow the moral law when there is always a strong inclination pulling us in the direction of selfish benefit? The answer is: because we have moral feeling. We are psychologically convinced of the necessity of the moral imperative. MacBeath’s interpretation is clearly mistaken, as it implies, as he himself remarks, that all reasons need feelings in order to be effective and Kant clearly does not hold this. Furthermore, MacBeath’s reasoning is unnecessarily dualistic: reasons and feelings can and do operate together, with reasons shifting into feelings and vice versa. We need not define feelings as irrational impulses; that is altogether an unacceptably narrow definition and cannot capture the phenomena of decision-making.
do not often point out the similarities between respect and the other Kantian intellectual feelings.\textsuperscript{19} In defining the feeling of respect as a feeling that mixes fear and attraction, Kant draws a connection between the feeling of respect and the feeling of sublimity.\textsuperscript{20} This is an important connection for us to grasp in order to see the true character of Kantian morality, because, as with a subject’s relationship to the sublime, when confronted with the moral law, the subject feels both a loss of his own subjectivity and a strengthening of his rational power. A commitment to the moral law is a commitment to sacrifice oneself if it is necessary, a commitment to act without regard to consequences, whether they be to oneself or others. For example, one must not lie even to save one’s own life. Therefore, proper comprehension of the moral law rightly inspires fear for our own survival, but also freedom from slavishly serving the goal of survival. Instead, we feel a sense of our higher, moral purpose.

Kant mentions that we feel a sense of the sublime in the face of the moral law in both the \textit{Critique of Judgment} and in \textit{Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime}, and so we might argue that the feeling of respect for the moral law is only an instance of the feeling of the sublime. Kant remarks that contemplating a noble character is an occasion for feeling the sublime:

The noble ground remains and is not so much subject to the inconsistency of external things. Of such a nature are principles in comparison to impulses, which simply well up upon isolated occasions; and thus the man of principles is in counteraction with him who is seized opportunely by a


\textsuperscript{20} The feeling of the sublime is similarly morally instructive because it reinforces the worth of human dignity. Unlike with beauty, sublimity can be connected to moral interest. Objects arouse the feeling of sublimity when the make us aware of our own limitless worth and rational vocation. Guyer argues that the feeling of sublimity is very much like the feeling of respect, but the feeling of the sublime involves a subreption, so that we project sublimity in the object. Guyer, \textit{Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality}, 221.
goodhearted and loving motive. But what if the secret tongue of his heart speaks in this manner: ‘I must come to the aid of that man, for he suffers, not that he were perhaps my friend or companion, nor that I hold him amenable to repaying the good deed with gratitude later on. There is now no time to reason and delay with questions; he is man, and whatever befalls men, that also concerns me.’ Then his conduct sustains itself on the highest ground of benevolence in human nature, and is extremely sublime, because of its unchangeability as well as of the universality of its application.  

Kant often calls the notion and the feeling of freedom sublime. The notion of freedom is closely related to the moral law because autonomy is the expression of the highest form of freedom for Kant. In the third *Critique* Kant makes the connection between the sublime and the feeling of respect for the moral law, as well as the feeling of freedom, more explicitly. Kant defines the dynamic sublime as “an aesthetic judgment [in which] we consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us” (CJ §28). The feeling of respect for the moral law, which is akin to a mixture of fear and inclination, makes us feel that nature, specifically physiological determination, holds no power over us. The feeling of the sublime allows us to feel our independence from nature, an independence that keeps “the humanity in our person from being degraded” (CJ §28). If we consider relegating the feeling of respect to merely an instance of the feeling of the sublime, we should also consider the possibility that autonomy and the moral law are paradigmatically sublime:

Hence, if in judging nature aesthetically we call it sublime, we do so not because nature arouses fear, but because it calls forth our strength… to regard as small the objects of our natural concerns: property, health, and life, and because of this we regard nature’s might (to which we are indeed subject in these natural concerns) as yet not having such dominance over

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21 In the second *Critique*, Kant warns against merely imitating noble and sublime actions because then the performance of such acts would not be based on principle, but here we see that the feeling of the sublime is a recognition of virtue based on principle (CprR 84-85).

us, as persons, that we should have to bow to it if our principles were at
stake and we had to choose between upholding or abandoning them. (CJ
§28)

The fact that we can choose to obey the categorical imperative over a competing
hypothetical imperative is the condition for the possibility of the feeling of the sublime.

The feeling of respect follows naturally from a comprehension of the sublimity of
the moral law; we do not need to try to make ourselves feel it.\textsuperscript{23} Kant’s ethics relies on
this degree of natural moral sensibility. Kant calls the feeling of respect “self-wrought,”
but this does not mean that the bond between the cause of moral comprehension and the
effect of the feeling of respect is any less strong. It is brought about by the self in the
same sense as moral actions are autonomous: they conform to rationality and are not
instinctual responses. We naturally feel respect when we conceive of the moral law, even
though the moral law is not a product of nature, but of reason. Is it paradoxical that we
have a natural feeling of our independence from nature? Answering that question would
take us too far afield and, most likely, into an examination of Kant’s political writings
and his theory of teleology. Still, it is this seeming contradiction that makes Kant’s notion
of the sublime a continually interesting notion. Sokoloff argues that,

\begin{quote}
respect is neither completely sensible nor completely intelligible but both
and neither at the same time. It is a transient that eludes both poles of the
binary opposition reason/feeling that inaugurates Western metaphysics.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{quote}

For this reason Sokoloff maintains that Kantian respect is a paradox and reading it as
such can help us suspend the tendency of “cognitive domination.”\textsuperscript{25} If the feeling of
respect is truly successful in eluding the reason/feeling dichotomy, why is it a paradox? It

\textsuperscript{23} Guyer gives the compelling argument that Kant’s moral theory relies on and is open to psychological
insight. For example, the fact that the moral law inspires respect is a psychological fact, not a metaphysical
\textsuperscript{24} Sokoloff, “Kant and the Paradox of Respect,” 769.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 777.
seems to me that this conclusion itself fails to truly challenge dichotomous thinking. If reason can itself be naturally linked to feelings, then the feeling of respect does not constitute a “paradox” but an occasion for us to realize that it is only a deficiently understood brand of cognition that threatens domination.

Aesthetic feeling is another example of a feeling that is occasioned by intellectual activity. As such, it is neither irrational nor tends toward immorality. In the Critique of Judgment Kant discusses the means by which the natural aesthetic response can help one develop a sense of shared humanity and thereby a comprehension of the importance of mutual respect and the moral law. Furthermore, aesthetic feeling is based on disinterested observation; it cannot be determined by natural impulses, such as Kant’s passions. Kant calls the beautiful the “symbol of the morally good” because both require pure intelligibility, the experience of freedom, the unity of the theoretical and practical powers, as well as the idea of the supersensible substratum of nature that allows for its harmony with freedom (CJ §59). Lest one disparage aesthetic judgment for being merely a symbol of moral judgment, we must note that aesthetic judgments exemplify many of the key features of moral judgments. For example, aesthetic taste is morally instructive because it teaches us to have a purely intellectual liking (CJ § IX).

Thus we have examples of a number of feelings that naturally follow from reason. (In the next chapter I discuss the feelings of proper self-esteem and morally worthy happiness.) We may be thrown off by Kant’s continued insistence in the “Doctrine of Virtue” that feelings cannot be commanded. Kant argues, for examples, that it is nonsensical to proscribe a duty to have a conscience: “To be under obligation to have a conscience would be tantamount to having a duty to recognize duties”(MM 6:400).
Nevertheless, this is the case only because Kant believes that we all already do have a conscience. If moral feeling is wanting, we can attempt to cultivate it “through wonder at its inscrutable source” (MM 6:400). In other words, the presence of moral feeling is natural, but we can enhance it through rational contemplation, which is also its source. The fact that Kant holds that feeling cannot be commanded shows that natural feelings are very important for Kant’s theory and are the starting point of sound reasoning. It also opens up the possibility that feelings, like the feeling of conscience, that play a role in the development of rational comprehension might also have an unconscious rational basis.

The defender of passion will probably object that these intellectual feelings all pale when compared to real feeling. If we believe, contra Beck, that the feeling of respect is not meant to supplement Kant’s account of moral motivation, then this criticism seems appropriate. The intellectual feelings may seem like feelings that arise without much commotion and subside without causing much of a stir. Real emotions are motivating, the objection might run: Can feeling also play an active role in Kant’s account of rational and moral behavior? One might further object that, even though these feelings are supposedly inspired by rational comprehension, there is no discussion of the possibility that rational comprehension might be wrong. Is the feeling of respect meant to obscure this possibility, making it more akin to hubristic might than a vulnerable and sensitive

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26 The reference to an inscrutable source here is akin to Kant’s use of the argument from design in his discussion of beauty, in the third Critique, as evidence nature and reason are compatible and, indeed have the same underlying cause, guaranteeing that our actions are effective and that there is reason to hope that moral behavior will not go unrewarded.

27 From the Metaphysics of Morals, the Religion essay, and the Lectures on Ethics, Beck concludes that “all determination of the will proceeds (a) from the representation of the possible action (b) through the feeling of pleasure or pain (through taking an interest in the action or its effect) (c) to the act. The aesthetic condition, the feeling, is either pathological or moral: the former if the pleasure precedes the representation of the law, the latter if it follows it an is, as it were, pleasure in the law.” Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 224.
recognition? If the feeling of respect exists only as an effect of rational activity, like a switch that is turned on or off, then we have reason to worry that it is blind in the same way that natural sympathy turned out to be blind. On the other hand, if we take seriously Kant’s decision to integrate a feeling into the highest level of rational deliberation, we can trust that the feeling of respect is not like the passions that we discussed earlier; the feeling of respect is conducive to reason and need not be “trusted” or blindly followed anymore than reason itself needs to be “trusted.” “In fact,” Kant writes,

no moral principle is based, as people sometimes suppose, on any feeling whatsoever. Any such principle is really an obscurely thought metaphysics that is inherent in every human being because of his rational predisposition. (MM 6:376)

Kant does not advocate taking any feeling at face value, but instead that we understand the thoughts that are contained therein. Kant’s integration of feeling and reason follows from his need to show that practical and theoretical reason function cooperatively, and, in the spirit of this integration, he develops his theory of the virtuous moral feelings and the necessity of their cultivation in both his Lectures on Ethics and the “Doctrine of Virtue” in the Metaphysics of Morals.

Although Kant continues in his insistence on the immediacy of feeling, writing that we cannot be commanded to feel something, Kant acknowledges that we can be commanded to cultivate certain feelings. It is necessary to cultivate moral feelings because, as Kant recognizes, feeling can be a powerful instigator of moral action and, as he therefore argues, we have a duty to increase our ability to behave morally. This fact combines with the evidence that, unlike the Stoics, Kant believes that there are healthy

28 Kant writes that we cannot speak of erring in judgments of conscience, not because practical reason cannot be wrong, but because a judgment of conscience only refers to whether or not the act has been submitted to internal judgment (MM 6:401).
emotions, in demonstrating that Kant does not reject the importance of emotion for rationality and morality; he simply holds that some emotional responses are better than others.\textsuperscript{29} In fact, Kant recognizes the moral importance of emotional intelligence.

The “Doctrine of Virtue,” being based on the rational humanity formulation of the categorical imperative, explains the necessary ends of morality: one’s own perfection and the happiness of others.\textsuperscript{30} Kant addresses the cultivation of moral feeling when he discusses our duty to perfect ourselves.\textsuperscript{31} In the duty to promote self-perfection, we have the duty to cultivate our faculties or “natural predispositions,” such as moral feeling. In striving for our natural perfection, we must cultivate “any capacities whatever for furthering ends set forth by reason” (MM 6: 392). Cultivating these “crude dispositions of … nature” enables one to use them as means to realize the ends that one sets for oneself (MM 6: 392).

\textsuperscript{29} In his guidebook to Kant’s philosophy, Guyer enumerates six connections between aesthetics and ethics, some of which overlap with our discussion here: one, “aesthetic experience can present morally significant ideas in an imaginative and pleasing way;” two, “the experience of the dynamical sublime so centrally involves the intimation of our capacity to be moral;” three, “there are significant parallels between our experience of beauty and the structure of morality;” four, “in the experience of beauty we can actually feel that the world is consistent with our aims, including our ultimate moral aim;” five, quoting Kant, “the beautiful prepares us to love something… without interest” (CJ, general remark following §29); six, “the cultivation and realization of common standards of taste in a society can be conducive to the realization of… ‘lawful sociability’.” Guyer, \textit{Kant}, 324-328.

\textsuperscript{30} Kant argues that we do not have a duty to promote our own happiness because we naturally seek it and because we ought not value our happiness over morality. Such a duty may be construed if our own prosperity is for the sake of securing our moral compliance, since poverty occasions temptations to violate one’s duty (MM 6:388). We do not have a duty to promote the perfection of others because that would entail paternalism and we must treat others as rational beings capable of making their own moral choices. This is tricky distinction to make, and Kant holds that we can refrain from helping others in their purposes that we judge to be immoral. Furthermore, we have a negative duty to promote the “moral well-being” of others in that we must refrain from setting a bad example and “giving scandal.”

\textsuperscript{31} Guyer examines the Metaphysics of Morals for evidence that Kant believes that we have a duty to cultivate moral feeling. He argues that, first, the duty to outwardly conform to duty may require feelings to perform. Second, we have a duty to know ourselves and know whether or not we are motivated by duty. This requires psychological knowledge. Third, duty for duty’s sake should usher in moral feelings. Fourth, duties of respect require we refrain from emotionally injuring others. Guyer, \textit{Kant and the Experience of Freedom}, 382-384.
“Moral feeling,” in a narrow sense, refers to respect for the moral law, as we have already seen, but in a broader sense it refers to a general sensitivity to the demands of morality, and, in the broadest sense, it refers to the feelings, like properly grounded sympathy, that these demands require. So, in the narrow sense, moral feeling refers just to a proper grasp of duty:

A human being has the duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection. Since it is a feeling of the effect that the lawgiving will within the human being exercises on his capacity to act in accordance with his will, it is called moral feeling, a special sense (sensus moralis), as it were. It is true that moral sense is often misused in a visionary way, as if (like Socrates’s daimon) it could precede reason or even dispense with reason’s judgment. Yet it is a moral perfection, by which one makes one’s object every particular end that is also a duty. (MM 6:387)

In its widest sense, the feeling of respect for the moral law and other moral feelings, such as sympathy, collide. In the case of virtue, we respect and take up the ends that are also duties: self-perfection and the happiness of others. So when we promote someone else’s happiness we are pleased with ourselves both because we know we have done what is right and because we share in her happiness. Kant writes that “sweet merit” is the feeling of pleasure at having promoted another person’s happiness in a way that directly makes the other person happy, “for consciousness of [the other’s happiness] produces a moral enjoyment in which human beings are inclined by sympathy to revel.” If the situation is such that beneficiary of one’s efforts is not grateful, one’s moral contentment can only be a “bitter merit” (MM 6:391). So, in its widest sense, a moral feeling is any feeling that follows, however indirectly, from the representation of the moral law, just as love and respect are “the feelings that accompany the carrying out” of our duties to others (MM 6:399, 448). Furthermore, since the impulse to virtue relies so much on natural moral
feeling, Kant explains that virtue itself is a find of aesthetic orientation, which includes also the feelings that accompany negative moral judgments like disgust and horror (MM 6:405).

Kant defines virtue as strength in overcoming those inclinations that oppose the moral law. We gain this strength both by contemplating the moral law and by acting virtuously (MM 6:397). So, for example, even though we cannot have a duty to feel benevolently, we have a duty to act benevolently, and it is likely that benevolent feelings will follow:

*Beneficence* is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. So the saying “you ought to love your neighbor as yourself” does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do good to your fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to be beneficent in general). (MM 6:402)

Although Kant thinks that duties to sympathy and compassion should not really ask us to *suffer* for the other person and that they should not turn into pity, he clearly believes that the feelings of compassion and sympathy are important for virtue, as is their cultivation. Kant famously remarks that we have a duty not to avoid places where poor and sick people are likely to be, “sickrooms and debtor’s prisons,” because the feelings that these places naturally inspire are good and instrumental for spurring virtuous actions (MM 6:457).

Kant addresses our duties to cultivate moral feeling when he discusses our duties to others because, contra Schiller’s worry, we owe people not just proper behaviors, but proper feelings, such as due concern and gratitude. Kant argues that we have a duty not only to respect, but to love others: to joy in their joy and sorrow in their sorrow.
Furthermore, we must consider the probable feelings of others, e.g., if we must make them the beneficiary of our generosity, we must not make them feel servile and try to spare them humiliation by acting as though it is only a slight service and freely given.

In the *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant argues that active obligations (obligatione activa) include the obligation to have a certain disposition, or character (Gesinnung). Of course, the notion of having a good character is very close to the notion of virtue. Here we see that reason and sensibility cannot be cut off from one another since reason must play a role in sculpting proper sensibility. Selfish feelings often oppose moral motivation, and it is therefore our duty to bring our feelings in line with duty in order to secure the consistent adherence to duty. Although the Kant of the *Lectures* is steadfast in his distinction between pathological causes and intellectual causes, these two causes must nevertheless work in cooperation to bring about a moral action:

There are actions for which moral motives are not sufficient to produce moral goodness and for which pragmatic, or even pathological *causae impulsivae* are wanted in addition; but when considering the goodness of an action we are not concerned with that which moves us to that goodness, but merely with what constitutes the goodness in and of itself. (L18)

Here Kant seems to be preempting Schiller’s later criticism, viz., that Kant’s moral theory requires that we extirpate natural moral feeling. Instead, Kant suggests that we sometimes have a duty to have moral feelings.\(^{32}\) Morally legitimate moral feeling comes when understanding determines sensibility (L 46). Once an understanding of moral worth has been established by reason, moral feeling naturally does and should follow.

In the *Lectures* Kant remarks that pure practical reason cannot in itself be sufficiently motivating.\(^{33}\) In other words, the Kant of the *Lectures* holds that

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\(^{32}\) The Kant of the Groundwork agrees: “to be kind where one can is a duty” (G 398).

\(^{33}\) Guyer believes that this is Kant’s considered opinion on the topic.
overdetermination is necessary. Kant did not yet entertain a possible connection between pure motivation and transcendent/transcendental freedom. He calls the possibility of pure practical reason acting on its own accord “the philosopher’s stone”:

The understanding, obviously, can judge, but to give to this judgment a compelling force, to make it an incentive that can move the will to perform the action—this is the philosopher’s stone! (L 45).

Although the Lectures do not seem to hold that pure reason can of itself be practical, they do make a distinction between motivation and stimulation (per motiva and per stimulos) and hold that the moral law is the only proper moral motivation although there may be other stimuli prompting moral actions. The Lectures hold that pathological motivation is a psychologically necessary cause of moral actions, but we must guard against it perverting our notion of morality, which must always be based on the thought of pure principle:

The lessons of morality must be learnt: it ought not to be mixed with solicitations and sensuous incentives; it must be taught apart and free from these; but when the rules of morality in their absolute purity have been firmly grasped, when we have learnt to respect and value them, then, and only then, may such motives be brought into play. They ought not, however, to be adduced as reasons for actions, for they are not moral and the action loses in morality on their account; they ought to serve only as subsidia motiva calculated to overcome the inertia of our nature in the face of purely intellectual conceptions. (L 76)

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34 It is interesting to note that, far from being a moral theory more sensitive to moral psychology, as many commentators believe, the theory of the Lectures presupposes more of a dichotomy between reason and sensibility than the later version of Kant’s moral theory. We see Kant speaking in terms of the head and the heart: “The supreme principle of all moral judgment lies in the understanding: that of the moral incentive to action lies in the heart. This motive is moral feeling. We must guard against confusing the principle of the judgment with the principle of the motive. The first is the norm; the second the incentive. The motive cannot take the place of the rule. Where the motive is wanting, the error is practical; but when the judgment fails the error is theoretical”(L 37). In holding that “purely intellectual conceptions” cannot in themselves overcome the influence of inclination, Kant pits these two faculties at odds with each other. His later writings, which holds that pure practical reason is a kind of practical reason and that reason, paint it as physical faculty.

35 It may appear that Kant is confusing Reason and the Understanding, but the fact that these judgments of the understanding refer to intentions to act shows that they are the work of practical reason.
In other words, the efficient cause of an action is not the same as the principle that makes it morally worthy, which may be likened to the formal cause, in Aristotelian terms. He writes “grounds for decision are, therefore, objective, but grounds for execution can also be subjective” (L 23).

Some commentators have argued that there is a salient difference between the account of the Lectures and the Metaphysics of Morals and that the earlier theory is preferable. Even though in his later moral writings, Kant believes that moral freedom involves freedom from determination by sensibility, this new position is less of a contradiction with the Lectures than it at first appears. In the second Critique Kant holds that humans can be determined to act directly by the pure law of reason, but we can see continuity with his earlier position in the belief that the feeling of respect follows from proper cognition of the law and a sense of our obligation, and that the notion of the Highest Good, which is happiness proportionate to morality, can serve as the goal of morality. Both texts extol both a proper, rational grasp of morality and the feelings that naturally accompany it.

36 Guyer argues that Kant maintains this theory of pathological determination into his later works and that it develops into the conviction that moral feeling is necessary for morality. Guyer, Kant and the Experience of Freedom, 30, 337. Guyer argues that the prize essay Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime suggest that feeling may be the basis of morality and that the first Critique also seems to say that an “operative cause” is necessary for morality—the idea of happiness. Then, he points out that the Duisburg Fragment 6, written after the first Critique, gives happiness a moral definition: happiness is “well-ordered freedom.” The operative cause then becomes the worthiness to be happy. “This fragment constitutes a transition from a dualistic to a monistic theory of moral motive.” (p. 215) Previously the cognitive and the conative factors had been kept separate. After this though, autonomy and not moral happiness is the moral incentive (Triebfeder). Kant abandons the distinction between incentive and motive. All incentives are subjective, but they need not be sensuous; there is a higher and lower faculty of desire. Therefore, the rational principle itself is the moral motive. Guyer argues that Kant initially believed that, in moral actions, reason is applied to desire, as a form is to content, but later Kant developed the idea that reason is applied to freedom. The idea that moral judgments require both form and matter comes from Kant’s early essay An Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality. Guyer believes that Kant maintained the requirement of subjective determination throughout his mature philosophy and that the feeling of respect takes over this role from other moral feelings. Guyer’s more general thesis is that the goal of morality is universal happiness though universal freedom. Guyer argues that, for Kant, freedom is the essential value of morality and that freedom promotes happiness.
Now that we understand the important role moral feelings play in Kantian moral theory, we can address a common, contemporary criticism of Kantianism, viz., in holding that virtue is a kind of strength and fortitude, Kant mistook mere continence for virtue. Annas gives this a reason for preferring Ancient ethics over modern moral theory. First, we must note that Kant characterizes virtue as a kind of fortitude against the continued resistance from inclination, not as an emotion or feeling. Virtue necessarily opposes “that which opposes the moral disposition within us” (MM 6:380). Emotions, as we have seen, are pre-reflective impulses for Kant, and are neither essentially selfish, nor do they make reflection impossible, although they might make it difficult. Virtue necessarily opposes the passions because, as we have seen, Kant defines “passion” very closely to “vice.” Even though passions and selfish inclinations are related in Kant’s mind, feeling, and to a lesser extent, emotion is not. When we confuse “inclination,” which does connote immorality for Kant, and “feeling,” which does not, we are tempted to similarly oppose feeling and reason. Doing so leads to the defense that highlights the role of impurity, as opposed to the holy will, in Kant’s ethics. In this way, we might argue that Kant championed pure reason, but that he made concessions for the human case because we do not have divine wills and are thus a mixture of pure reason and inclination/emotion/feeling. This defense paints an overly austere picture of “pure reason,” which need not and does not exclude feeling, as we have seen. (It is this mistake, confusing feeling with inclination, that leads Gregor to think that Kant would prefer holiness, which she describes as the lack of feeling, over virtue. There is no reason to

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think that holiness equates with the lack of feeling instead of with the lack of temptations. In other words, there is no reason to think that Kant mistook angels for robots.\textsuperscript{39}

Still, Kant calls virtue fortitude—later, he calls virtue a “strength of resolution” (MM 6:390).\textsuperscript{39} In my mind, the jury is still out over whether it is better and more accurate to think of immoral inclinations as relatively intractable or as easily overcome. (This discussion is taken up again in chapter 5.) Perhaps it is better to conceive of virtue as a struggle in order to emphasize that we are constantly pursuing virtue, unlike Aristotle’s assumption citizens of a good state are already virtuous, resting on their laurels, as it were. Kant writes:

> But virtue is not to be defined and valued merely as a aptitude and … a long-standing habit of morally good actions acquired by practice. For unless this aptitude results from considered, firm, and continually purified principles, then, like any other mechanism of technically practical reason, it is neither armed for all situations nor adequately secured against the changes that new temptations could bring about. (MM 6:383-4)

And: “Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning” (MM 6:409). Aristotle puts the emphasis on proper upbringing and taking one’s lead from virtuous institutions, Kant emphasizes reform; but Annas argues that Aristotle is also concerned about reform, and we know that Kant is also dearly worried about proper upbringing. In arguing that Aristotle recognizes that good habits must be based in proper moral understanding, as Annas does, the sharp contrast between Kant and Aristotle on this score seems to fade.\textsuperscript{40} Annas takes it to be a point in favor of an Aristotelian moral theory that it holds that the emotions can naturally lead to moral outcomes. This clearly overlooks the role that natural moral feelings play in morality for Kant. Annas’s

\textsuperscript{39} The Laws of Freedom, p. 175. This assertion also comes from the worry that Kant’s emphasis on moral feeling represents a back sliding away from duty to heteronomy as the moral motivation.

\textsuperscript{40} Lest we find the constant threat of back sliding into mere self-control or the assumption that emotions have a miraculous parallel with virtue; Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 67.
characterization of Aristotle’s theory seems to include the idea that it would be desirable to try to use feeling *exclusively* as a guide, attempting to cut it off from all rational reflection, as if such a thing were even possible.

Furthermore, we must appreciate the context of Kant’s characterization of virtue: he is explaining the way that the “Doctrine of Virtue” similarly involves constraint, as does the “Doctrine of Right” since “all duties involve a concept of constraint through a law” (MM 6:394). So, “what essentially distinguishes a duty of virtue from a duty of right is that external constraint to the latter kind of duty is morally possible, whereas the former is based only on free self-constraint” (MM 6:387). If it is in fact the case that Kant believes that “rational natural” beings are always tempted by pleasure, and that the moral law is not simply technically a constraint but also always felt as a constraint (because he draws attention to constraint in this context), he nevertheless emphasizes that it is a self-constraint, and therefore simultaneously voluntary and affirmed (MM 6:379).  

Cheerfulness, not continence, is the ideal of Kantian virtue. Kant argues that we will not be successful in achieving morality if we merely forbid ourselves to follow our immoral inclinations. Instead we must find a way to reduce the strength of these inclinations by confronting them on their own turf, as it were. If reason simply tries to overpower feeling, it will lose because feelings and immoral inclinations are too strong. The duty to “rule oneself” goes beyond “forbidding [one] to let [oneself] be governed by [one’s] feelings and inclinations” (MM 6:408). We must find ways to make our feelings

41 The relationship between duty and constraint is a topic that requires further inquiry. Kant writes that we do not have the duty to promote our own happiness only because we do so naturally and not “reluctantly” and so it is not a constraint (MM 6:386). It remains to be seen whether or not he means anything more than the idea that the notion of “duty” or “command” seems to require as content a behavior that we were not, necessarily, going to do already, just as we can only have as a duty something that is possible. If it is not merely a semantic point, it seems to have strange and unsettling consequences, such as something no longer being a duty when we want to do it. If it is merely a semantic point, the degree of argumentative weight it carries is unjustified.
follow reason. Kant criticizes “monkish ascetics,” which aim merely to dominate and repress sensual inclinations.\footnote{See Gregor, \textit{Laws of Freedom}, 171.} He argues that if we do not find pleasure in moral behavior we will shirk from our duties:

> The rules for practicing virtue (\textit{exercitiorum virtutis}) aim at a frame of mind that is both valiant and cheerful in fulfilling its duties (\textit{animus strenuous et hilaris}). … what is not done with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worth for one who attends to his duty in this way and such service is not loved by him; instead he shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue (MM 6: 484).

In this discussion, Kant sides with Epicurus over the Stoics: it is not enough to merely put up with misfortune, one must enjoy life. Furthermore not having conflicting motivations makes us happy. This kind of happiness is surely an expression of the Highest Good.

We have considered the ways that Kant relies on the naturalness of many feelings in his moral theory. Furthermore, it is clear that we can enhance these feelings and cultivate other, properly grounded, moral feelings through correct understanding and virtuous behavior. Being necessary for virtue, feelings play this direct role in Kant’s moral theory, but they also play a more indirect role, as the previous discussion began to insinuate. In focusing on the explanations that Kant gives for the importance of cheerfulness and social interaction for the cultivation of morality, we must not overlook that Kant’s discussions of these topics are not entirely focused on instrumentality. In the \textit{Anthropology}, as with many of his more light-hearted discussions, Kant discusses some of the more prosaic aspects of life. Having died a bachelor, Kant did not often write about the joys of family life, but he was no stranger to the joys of friendship, specifically in the form of the dinner party. Although Kant lived alone, he was not a loner: he enjoyed the
company of his friends and acquaintances. He clearly saw social enjoyment as an important part of life.

Kant discusses the dinner party in the *Anthropology* as the highest ethicophysical good: “The good living which still seems to harmonize best with virtue is a good meal in good company (and if possible with alternating companions)” (A§88). Obviously, this idea is not as important as the Highest Good of the second *Critique*, but it is still surprising to see him give such high praise to dinner parties. He discusses the ways that dinner party conversation complements and promotes philosophical thought: “Eating alone (*solipsimus convictorii*) is unhealthy for a philosophizing man of learning, it does not restore his powers but exhausts him… it turns into exhausting work and not the refreshing play of thoughts” (A§88). Kant values dinner parties so highly that he engages in many Emily Post-type recommendations for their success, concerning, e.g., the proper number of guests and rules for successful conversation (A§88).° Kant believes that many simple pleasures add to the value of life and promote psychological well-being:

The cynic’s purism and the hermit’s mortification of the flesh, without social good-living, are distorted interpretations of virtue and do not make virtue attractive; rather being forsaken by the Graces [whom Kant has already suggested represent the proper number of guests at a dinner party], they can make no claim on humanity. (A§88)

In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant also explains that enjoying social interaction itself constitutes a virtue. There he makes a connection between social intercourse and his moral notion of cosmopolitanism: “while making oneself a fixed center of one’s

43 It is interesting to observe Kant’s discussion of conversation and keeping polite society come into conflict with his moral theory. It is important to treat those with whom one disagrees respectively, but it is okay to refuse to keep company with those whom one finds immoral. One gets the impression that Kant was not fond of having moral debates at dinner parties (see, e.g. A§88). In addition, Kant refers to the “sanctity and secrecy” of the dinner party environment that requires that people not gossip about things that were said there (A§88). Of course, Kant does not advocate lying about what was said, but he surely does not advocate the total transparency that seems to be at the base of his other discussions of lying.
principles, one ought to regard this circle drawn around one as also forming part of an all-
inclusive circle of those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world” (MM 6:473).
He explains that the social virtues lead indirectly to an ideal world, or, we might say, the
Kingdom of Ends. It is a duty of virtue to cultivate “a disposition of reciprocity—
agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect (affability and propriety, *humanitas
aesthetica et decorum*)” (MM 6:473). He is careful to distinguish between merely having
good manners and having true social virtue. Being a member of a Kingdom of Ends
involves conceiving of oneself and others both as legislator and subject. It is a vision of
equality founded on respect; it is similarly toward this type of relationship that the social
virtues strive.

Kant often refers to the ideal of true friendship. True friendship is one that is not
based on a passing appreciation of someone’s pleasant company, but one that has
weathered the test of time and is a moral expression of mutual respect and aide. Kant
calls it “moral friendship.” Kant calls true friendship “the most intimate union of love and
respect” (MM 6:469). Kant calls true friendship “unattainable in practice,” but to strive
for it is a “duty set by reason” nonetheless (MM 6:469). Concerning Schiller’s criticism,
it is very important to note that friendship requires the “equal balance” of feeling and
duty, and that one must be very careful to strive for this balance lest one err on the side of
coldness or on the side of disrespect: “for love can be regarded as attraction and respect
as repulsion, and if the principle of love bids friends to draw closer, the principle of
respect requires them to stay at a proper distance from each other” (MM 6:470).
Friendship is manifested in helping one’s friend, and this help is an expression of “inner
heartfelt benevolence” (MM 6:471). Friendship also involves two people sharing their
feelings with each other: “moral friendship (as distinguished from friendship based on
feeling) [zum Unterschiede von der ästhetischen] is the complete confidence of two
persons in revealing their secret judgments and feelings [Empfindungen] to each
other”(MM 6:471).

Of course, Kant would not use the words Affecten or Leidenschaften to explain the
enjoyments one gets from pleasant conversation or a close friendship because, as we have
already seen, these words bear a largely derogatory sense for Kant. He argues that the
“love” of friendship cannot be an Affect because Affecten are blind and transitory (MM
6:471). Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that friendly affection and spirited intellectual
engagement do involve emotions in the normal sense of term, and necessarily so.
Even in his discussion of Affect proper, Kant occasionally wavers in his condemnation.
For example, even though Kant argues that emotions are necessarily rash and
experienced as a hindrance, Kant states that some expressions of emotion seem to
promote physical health. Laughter, weeping, and anger all seem to facilitate a release.
Laughter exercises the diaphragm, aids digestion, and promotes society. Surely Kant
recognizes that emotions, even in their pre-reflective state, are human and a valuable part
of life.

V. Kant’s Cognitive Theory of Emotion

In the second Critique, as well as in other places, Kant calls an intellectual feeling
a contradiction in terms.44 Hopefully, the preceding discussion succeeded in convincing
the reader that Kant’s moral theory relies on and references at least eight intellectual
feelings: moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, respect for oneself (self-

44 CPrR 117.
esteem), the feeling of freedom, the feeling of respect for the moral law, the feeling of the sublime, and the feeling of aesthetic enjoyment. In these cases, it is clear that feeling follows from and is a product of reason. Now I am going to take the argument further and consider evidence that Kant’s discussion of emotion assumes that all emotions are intellectual feelings; in other words, I believe that Kant holds a cognitive theory of emotion.

Even though the majority of Kant’s comments about *Affecten* and *Leidenschaften* are disparaging, his assumptions about emotions lead one to believe that he holds a cognitive theory of emotion. As we saw in chapter 1, a cognitive theory of emotion holds that emotions should be explained primarily in terms of their cognitive content. Merely maintaining this, however, does not rule out also believing that the emotions are necessarily irrational. The Stoics, for example, believed that emotions are judgments, but necessarily false judgments. A judgment such as “it matters that my child died,”

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45 Gayer points out that in the Critique of Judgment Kant remarks that respect is the only feeling that “we cognize fully a priori” (CPR 5:73). This does not mean that respect is the only feeling that is determined by reason, as Guyer worries, only that respect is the only feeling caused by pure reason. Guyer, *Kant and the Experience of Freedom*, 361.

46 The difference, perhaps, between cognitive emotions and intellectual emotions is that the latter implies conscious awareness of the thoughts that form the intentionality of the emotion. As we have seen from chapter 1, the former does not.

47 For example, Kant discusses the role of imagination and empathy and in heightening emotional experiences, even if only to criticize it. For the most part he takes these experiences to be silly. He considers the case in which someone, staying up late, becomes excited about various emotional ideas, only to find that they have faded from memory in the morning: “therefore, the taming of one’s imagination, by going to sleep early in order to rise early, is a very useful rule for the psychological diet” (A §33).

48 Sherman argues that Kant “did not avail himself of the shared ancient view that emotions are not brute sensations, but states that have evaluative content. This might have made it easier for him to let go of certain rhetoric against the emotions and appreciate even more fully just how reason’s project can work through the emotions.” Sherman, *Making a Necessity of Virtue*, 120. This constitutes a significant difference between our projects. I think that it is only possible to maintain this if one limits one’s understanding of Kant’s theory of emotion to a very limited consideration of his comments about *Affecten*. If you take his statement that *Affecten* make reflection “difficult or impossible” to mean that they literally make reflection fully impossible, then you have some support for denying him a cognitive theory of emotion. Even still, the case would not be closed since *Affecten* might still have cognitive content from which we are necessarily cut off from. Nevertheless, the most commonsensical interpretation of this passage is that emotions make reflection difficult and are often not reflected on at all.
which grounds the emotion of grief, is false for the Stoics and the product of an unhealthy attachment to the transient world. A cognitive theory of emotion denies that emotions are arational, not that they are irrational. Nevertheless, as we have already begun to understand, Kant does not go as far as the Stoics and does not believe that all emotional judgments are false; instead he believes that many emotions, i.e., *Affecten*, tend to cause poor reasoning.

Cognitive theories of emotion oppose the tendency of affective theories to define emotions primarily in terms of physical feelings. As we saw in chapter 1, this disagreement is partly the result of a false dichotomy and partly hinges on the definition of “emotion,” as it does with Kant. Those who hold cognitive theories of emotion do not wish to deny that emotions are by and large a special type of thought that occurs with/in bodily feelings; and those who hold affective theories of emotion, by and large, cannot deny that emotions are usually the result of a perception—in the robust sense—of important content. Kant, on the other hand, takes a position that is rather far on the cognitive end of the spectrum: he does not identify emotions (*die Affecten*) with physical, bodily feelings at all: “certain interior physical feelings are related to the emotions, but they are not identical with them since they are only momentary and transitory, leaving no trace behind”(A §79). Surprisingly, given the modern debate between cognitive theories and affective theories, Kant has no problem defining emotions in abstraction from their physical states. Of course, he does not deny that emotions and physical feelings are related. It is simply rather the case that these physical feelings do not tell us about the essence of the emotion, which can only be understood in terms of an intellectual evaluation.
Although very few current theories of emotion deny that some animals can have emotions and that some emotional responses are common to all humans, affective theorists follow the biological-functionalist tradition of Darwin more closely, while cognitive theorists believe that the subjective response has more to do with creating the subjective response than the objective situation. Kant, again taking up a position that is farthest on the cognitive extreme, focuses on the passions that are uniquely human (and their relationship to vice, as we have seen) (A §82). Furthermore, Kant focuses on the relationship between being in a state of emotion or passion and the capacity for reflection. His definition, which includes hindering reflection, cannot possibly apply to an animal. Kant divided passions into those that are innate and those that are acquired. The acquired passions, ambition, lust of power and avarice, have objects that are unique to human beings. Even the innate passion for freedom has a complex cognitive structure (A §82).

Kant describes emotions and passions as aspects of the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), not as a part of our capacity for “pleasure and displeasure” (Lust and Unlust). Emotions and passions involve the desire to either promote or hinder their own existence, as pleasures and displeasures do, but they are significantly more complex. Emotions are reactions we have to socially meaningful situations, but unlike mere reactions they contain an implicit directive for action. “Begehren” is often used to mean “to seek after something,” which implies a more conscious and active plan of action than the verb “to desire,” which to our ears sounds more like the passivity implied

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Note: Even pain and pleasure are always mediated by the understanding, for Kant, since they include an evaluation of the pain or pleasure and a consequent submission, but Kant does call taste and smell the senses of pleasure (A § 21). This fact is important to keep in mind when evaluating Kant’s “incorporation thesis.” See chapter 5.
by the German “Lust.” We must keep in mind that Kant, in classifying both emotions and passions with the conative faculty, aligns them with practical reason. Kant’s analysis suggests that emotions and passions include either latent or explicit thoughts, desires, and evaluations, not merely sensations.

In his description of emotion, Kant argues that an emotion thwarts its own purpose. In objecting that emotions do not effectively serve their own purposes, Kant, perhaps unwittingly, acknowledges that they do have a purpose. It might be the case that Kant wishes to argue that their purpose may be misguided; yet he implies that the purpose in the case of anger, at least—to avert the perceived evil—is constructive (A §78). If an emotion did not have a worthy purpose, it would be of no consequence that it did not effectively promote it. Many affective theorists define emotions in terms of states of action readiness, such as that being angry makes one likely to yell. This model suggests that emotions have evolved to serve their purposes, but that the emotions of civilized people are often triggered by non-natural stimuli and are therefore ineffective and inappropriate. Kant’s notion of an emotion’s purpose is not the same as this idea of action-readiness. The fact that Kant believes that a reasoned response could better serve the purpose, even the purpose of self-preservation, than an emotional response shows that he believes that emotions cannot be best understood as biological adaptations. Instead, emotions are latent thoughts. Surely, though, emotions can be quite complex, and even the person who experiences them may not be aware of their cognitive content. In other words, an emotion might be experienced as an affective upheaval, but Kant’s discussion of them suggests that, at their core, emotions are not only compatible with the rational
mind, as we can rationally weigh all of our desires, but they are also inherently rational, and seem to contain a best, most rational directive, even if they are not able to pursue it.

One possibility is that emotions make reflection difficult because they are occasioned by thoughts of which we are not entirely aware in the first place. In the section “On the Ideas We Have Without Being Aware of Them” Kant argues that “it is as if just a few places on the vast map of our mind were illuminated.” He goes on to write: “This can inspire wonder at our own being, for a higher power would need only cry “Let there be light” and then without further action… there would be laid open before the eyes half a universe” (A 135). The examples Kant gives in this section are of perceptions that we do not fully perceive or beliefs we do not fully affirm. Also, unconscious ideas can be repressed thoughts since “we have an interest in removing objects that are liked or disliked by the imagination” (A 137). Since “emotion is surprise through sensation whereby the composure of mind is suspended” it is plausible that negative emotions are difficult to reflect on precisely because they involve pain (A 252). It may be the case that we are unaware of the ideas in the first place because we have tried to push them out of consciousness.

Such an account would be a significant improvement on Aristotle’s theory of emotion since it can explain the reason that emotions do not always match up with their corollary situations. Aristotle and Kant both discuss the emotion of anger. Aristotle holds that it is a response to the judgment that one has been slighted. Kant agrees, but he qualifies it by explaining that the surprise comes from “embarrassment at finding oneself in an unexpected situation” (A 261). I think that Kant is right to suggest that negative emotions are accompanied by some degree of embarrassment and that this furthers the
disruption of thought. The causes of the embarrassment are necessarily personal, but
without this suggestion that we have become aware of something we would prefer to
hide, such as our own feeling of insecurity, we cannot explain why some slights are
angering while others leave us unscathed.

Passions are cognitive states, in a way that is more explicit than for emotions.
Emotions are pre-reflective, for Kant, but passions necessarily require reflection and
explicit cognitive involvement and commitment, and for that reason they are more
blameworthy. Kant defines passion as a kind of mental preoccupation:

since the passions can be coupled with the calmest reflection, one can
easily see that they must neither be rash like the emotions, nor stormy and
transitory; instead, they must take roots gradually and even be able to
coexist with reason. (A §80)

Here, however, we must make a distinction between emotions and passions. The main
problem with emotions, for Kant, is that they thwart their own purposes. The main
problem with passions, on the other hand, is that they cause the subject to focus
obsessively on them to the detriment of other pursuits, both pragmatic and moral. It is not
the case, then, that a passion ought to be handled by discovering its inchoate purpose and
better serving it, but by eliminating it, or perhaps by pursuing it in a way that is consistent
with reason and morality.

Our discussion of intellectual feeling and the relationship between feeling and
reason opens up the possibility that Kant sees emotion on a spectrum with reason. Many
of Kant’s comments, especially his distinction between autonomy and heteronomy,
suggest a hard and fast dichotomy between causality from inclination and causality from
reason. (Fully addressing this aspect of Kant’s moral theory and its consequences for our
understanding of his theory of emotion is the main topic of chapter 6.) Nevertheless, there
are reasons for thinking that Kant believes that sensibility, understanding, and reason must cooperatively work together. Their interdependence suggests that Kant cannot insist on a dichotomy between reason and emotion.

Kant’s discussion of the role of sensibility in the construction of speculative knowledge in the first Critique shows that there is no functional trichotomy between reason, the understanding, and sensibility. Although Kant is concerned about leaving himself open to the criticism of idealism, and continually asserts that sensibility is passive and receptive, a careful reading of the “Schematism” shows that the forms of sensibility, space and time, are interconnected with the categories. In other words, we cannot have an experience of space and time that is not also a product of the concepts of the understanding. Their mutual implication goes deeper still, as we realize that categories become objective precisely by being represented in space. Even in the Anthropology, we see that Kant does not favor a dichotomy between the “rational” capacity of reason and the “irrational” capacity of sensibility. Kant does not embrace the typical ruse of skepticism, the worry that the senses are deceptive and deleterious for knowledge (A §10 &11). Instead, it is clear that sensibility is a part of the rational capacity: Kant holds sense to be the lowest level of the cognitive faculty, and, as such, it is a necessary part of

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50 There is no guarantee that Kant’s theory of sensibility from the first Critique remains consistent in his other works. Furthermore, the term “sensibility” does not have the same meaning throughout Kant’s philosophy since in the first Critique it is examined in its role in the construction of speculative knowledge, and in the second Critique, it is examined in its role in the construction of practical knowledge. In all cases though, it bears the weight of Kant’s worry about determinism since it is receptive to natural causes, either determination by experience of the external world or determination through the natural causes of natural desires.

51 My reading of the first Critique takes Kant at his word when he says that he is outlining the conditions for the possibility of experience (Erfahrung). Already this prejudices me toward a more idealist reading, and sets me against many interpreters who believe that Erfahrung only refers to propositional judgments. They take the “subject” and the “object” to refer to linguistic entities, not also to epistemological entities. I disclose my approach since my reading of Kantian sensibility is likely dependent on it.
cognition (A§ 28).\textsuperscript{52} This developmental model of the relationship between sensation and reason parallels the way that emotions can contain latent, unconscious thoughts.

Upon first reading Kant, one is struck both by his tendency to taxonomize and make distinctions, categories, and faculties. Nietzsche’s joke about Kant is that whenever he runs up against a difficult philosophical problem he creates a new faculty. If we take Kant at his word, he is surely a very rigid thinker, and his philosophy is rife with dichotomies and trichotomies. When diving deeper into his thought, however, we realize that he does not, and can hardly be expected to, consistently adhere to his own strict distinctions. Sensibility plays a role in the understanding; feeling plays a role in reason, happiness plays a role in morality, and, as I have tried to show here, cognition plays a role in emotion. Please do not misunderstand me: Kant’s distinctions are important and cannot be overlooked, but they should not be taken out of context or as the final word on the subject. The goal of the next section is to move on from the insight that Kant does not reject the importance of emotion for happiness and morality wholesale and consider Kant’s insights about emotion and his recommendations for better understanding and responding to one’s emotions. In other words, we will consider Kant as a theorist of emotional intelligence.

VI. Kant’s Theory of Emotional Intelligence

In Baron’s \textit{Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology}, the lone apology is offered for Kant’s deficient treatment of moral affect.\textsuperscript{53} Even though Baron, to my mind

\textsuperscript{52} To offer further evidence of this tendency we might point out that the third Critique argues that a judgment can be either theoretical, practical, or aesthetic. In its preface the third \textit{Critique} is presented as the link between the first two \textit{Critiques} because judgment has the power to “give the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure,” which is “the mediating link between the cognitive power and the power of desire” (CJ 5).

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successfully, defends Kant from the charge of moral coldness, as I have also done here, she argues that Kant still sides with the Stoic against compassion, since “there cannot possibly be a duty to increase the ills in the world” as the sharing the feeling of another’s suffering would suggest (MM 6:457). To continue to fault Kant on this score, after everything we have seen, is, I think, a failure of philosophical flexibility, especially since, directly after this remark, Kant writes:

But while it is not in itself a duty to share the sufferings (as well the joys of others), it is duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it is therefore an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them. (MM 6:457)

It is clear that Kant is struggling with his Stoic heritage. It is plainly wrong to call Kant a Stoic, as his point here, about the proper, principled counter-part of feeling, since it is his consistent refrain, should be clear enough.

Now that we have see the great importance that Kant places on natural feeling, we are in a position to better understand his comprehensive position on emotion: affects are kinds of feelings, but it is only a lack of virtue that fails to advance them to a state of better understanding (MM 6:408). On the other hand, passions and inclinations—two very similar notions—are usually assumed to be opposed to the moral maxim. Kant argues that the person who is caught up in a passion cannot be happy because he naturally feels the inclination toward freedom and yet feels controlled by the passion and so feels torn by his inconsistent behavior (A §81). In other words, Kant recognizes that virtue is related to emotional health.

When we compare Kant’s comments about emotion to Goleman’s theory of emotional intelligence, we can easily make the argument that Kant has a theory of

emotional intelligence. In fact, at first blush, Kant and Goleman look surprisingly similar. Kant continually states that the rational mind must control or dominate the emotions in order to cultivate virtue. In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant defines virtue as the strength to overcome the obstacles posed by natural inclination. Kant calls it being one’s own master and ruling oneself (MM 6:407) (*Meister und Herr zu sein*). Just as Goleman speculates a division between “heart” and “head” (or the amygdala and the hypothalamus, to put it in official terms), Kant seemingly postulates a division amongst the faculties to allow for the existence of pure practical reason. Plus, we are reminded that Goleman calls emotional intelligence “character,” making his theory of emotional intelligence appear remarkably similar to Kant’s discussion, in the *Religion* essay, of the conversion experience that leads a person to choose principled moral action over following inclination and therefore to have a good character.

Of course, my discussion in the second chapter of Goleman’s *Emotional Intelligence* was largely critical, even to the point of denying that Goleman’s theory refers to something that deserves to be called emotional intelligence. We must ask whether Kant can do better. The goal of this dissertation is not to show that he can, since Kantian moral theory can still offer direction for the cultivation of emotional intelligence even if Kant himself did not have an adequate theory of emotional intelligence, but, still, I believe that Kant’s offers an improvement over Goleman. My main complaint with Goleman is that he represents the emotions as though they are in themselves irrational and emotional intelligence as though it is primarily a matter of restraint and rational domination. Kant clearly believes that the emotions are powerful, but he does not believe
that they are immune to reason. In his discussion of the struggle between virtue and inclination, in the *Anthropology*, Kant writes:

> force accomplishes nothing in the struggle against sensuality and the inclinations; instead we must outwit these inclinations and, as Swift says, in order to save the ship, we must fling an empty tub to a whale so that he can play with it. (A§ 14)

This is a funny image. It suggests that the emotions are both powerful and stupid, threatening to capsize the ship. (The metaphor of the ship and the ocean is a common one in Western thought to emphasize the opposition between the steady control of reason and the chaos of the emotions through which reason must navigate.) The emotions are so powerful that, even though Kant sometimes uses metaphors that imply that they might be overpowered, he does not believe that the emotions can be dominated into rational submission: they must be met on their own terms. Even if it is possible, Kant, unlike Goleman, does not believe that repression is desirable (as we see in his example of unexpressed anger turning in to hate). Dealing with one’s emotions requires knowledge of psychology, or animal psychology, as, like the whale, they sometimes must be out-smarted. In this twist, Kant differs from Goleman, and this difference is productive in that it makes room for us to wonder about the ways that the emotions might be tricked, or trained, most effectively. Elaborating Kant’s theory of emotional intelligence requires discovering means of behavioral training, but, as we shall see, it is not limited to this direction of causality.

The metaphor of the whale, or of the master and slave, takes us straight to the heart of our worry about Kant’s theory of emotion: within the framework of reason and moral decision making, does Kant respect emotion and the other natural needs of humans or does he deal with them harshly, as though they were, in fact, inimical to morality and
psychological health? Answering this question requires that we examine Kant’s moral theory on its own terms and not just through his comments on emotion. I will take up this task in chapter 5, after having further explained the reasons that I believe that Kantian moral theory can help promote emotional intelligence, even if only in spite of itself (in chapter 4). Kant defines emotions as irrational and passions as immoral, but I have shown that there are other emotions—things we, not Kant, would call emotions—that are neither irrational nor immoral. Furthermore, Kant does not give us any reason to think that emotions, even though they begin in a pre-reflective state, might not easily become rational by having our conscious thought directed at them. By defining the pre-reflective state of an emotion as problematic, Kant seems to be implying that we ought to reflect on our emotions and integrate them into the rational mind. A sailor cannot reason with a whale, so we should not hastily conclude that Kant holds the emotions to be animalistic. In fact, we have already seen that he believes that affects and passions are uniquely human.

Kant defines intelligence as the faculty of discovering the universal from the particular (A §44). We might express this as learning from experience. He later defines it as the uniting of “heterogeneous ideas, which often … lie apart from each other” (A §54). Were we to formulate a Kantian theory of emotional intelligence, then, it might involve rationally processing emotional impulses and gathering emotional knowledge about ourselves so that we might learn from our emotional experiences and respond more rationally in the future.

Guyer concludes, in examining the discussion of freedom and inclination in the “Doctrine of Right” that,
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with inclinations, but inclinations are just a part of the ordinary ebb and flow of nature, and there is therefore nothing uniquely valuable about them either. Human beings achieve their unique moral value by elevating themselves above their inclinations, which is not to say by eradicating their inclinations but by ruling them through reason.  

Perhaps a Kantian theory of emotional intelligence would involve precisely this rational comprehension and control of one’s emotions, with the “free” cultivation of morally and intellectually important emotions thrown in (MM 6:456-7). (In exploring the idea that we have a duty to rationally instruct feeling, Guyer revisits Williams’s drowning wife example. (Williams famously argues against moral theory in general that rationally considering whether or not one should save one’s wife over some other person introduces “one thought too many” into the moral decision-making process.) Guyer humorously introduces the possibility that one may not want to save one’s wife at all. Perhaps there is the inclination to save a younger woman on the ship with whom this imaginary cruise-goer has been flirting. Clearly, then, following one’s inclination involves having “one thought too few,” and rationally evaluating one’s feelings is preferable both morally and pragmatically.)

Guyer’s interpretation is plausible, but I suggest that there might be even more reason to think that feeling and reason are not inimical: again, there may be an internal, developmental connection between them. My argument that Kant holds a cognitive theory of emotion, and my speculations about Kant’s theory of the unconscious—an unconscious in which pre-reflective thoughts reside—open up a further dimension of a Kantian theory of emotional intelligence. Kant believes in an unconscious, and many

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aspects of his philosophy reinforce this belief, counting everything we see and yet are not aware of as unconscious perception (A §5).\(^57\) His notion is not far removed from Freud’s notion of latent or pre-consciousness. Furthermore, Kant does not believe that those things of which we are unaware are any more animalistic than those of which we are aware.\(^58\) In other words, he does not posit any particular difficulty in making unconscious thoughts conscious, except for the possibility that we might not want them to be.

Remarkably, Freud is similarly aware that the unconscious may be the playground for underdeveloped or confused intellectual ideas, as his theory of dream interpretation makes clear. Kant’s point is that these obscure ideas can still affect our behavior. This is an important insight to keep in mind when seeking to understand the ways that we work through our emotions: an emotion can also be a product of a confused idea or false assumption.

In concluding, I will point to some of, what we might call, Kant’s recommendations for cultivating emotional intelligence. For example, if one avoided the “passions” that Kant describes as vices, then one would, it seems, be more emotionally intelligent. Furthermore, emotional intelligence does seem to require the well-ordered value scheme that Kant praises along with overcoming of selfishness. For example, one should work to transform one’s selfish desire for vengeance—a vicious passion—into a universal concern for justice. One could do this by discovering that the natural and rational sense of justice sits at the root of the passion for vengeance, as Kant speculates,

\(^{57}\) For example, the argument from the first Critique that all phenomena have a thing-in-itself that we do not experience, which applies also to the self and internal perception. There is a thing-in-itself that underlies inner sense. This idea is clearly similar to the notion of an unconscious.

\(^{58}\) Surprisingly, in his section “On the Ideas We Have Without Being Aware of Them,” Kant considers the cultural dissembling involved in obscuring the purpose of having sex unconscious since they are obscure and confused ideas compared to their real intent.
and by striving to bring the emotion of vengeance more closely in line with its latent
cognitive origin. The benefits of such work would not be merely moral, but also
psychological.

One should not try to put oneself above others by controlling them with honor,
authority, or money—as one does in the case of ambition, lust for authority, and
avarice—but rather one should value other people as highly as one values oneself and
have a sense of self-worth that is based on the mutual worth, not the deprecation of
others. It is difficult to say whether these vices are caused by a lack of emotional
intelligence or are themselves the manifestations of such a lack, but it seems that, in
either case, working to overcome these vices—although, to be effective, such work may
require other forms of psychological therapy—would promote both emotional
intelligence and morality.

Kant speaks out against emotional delusion. By “delusion” he understands “the
internal practical deception of taking subjective reasons for objective ones” (A §86). Kant
gives over-valuing past-times and superstition as examples of delusions. It seems that
many contemporary behaviors fit under this characterization. Indeed, there are probably
more examples of this now than in Kant’s time. Certain common behaviors in our culture,
like shopping for recreation, are not only mistaken for important activities, but also come
to be associated with psychological maladies. The, perhaps joking, term “retail therapy”
indicates that consumerism is believed to be a treatment for sadness and other negative
emotions. Kant’s analysis seems to be closer to the truth, that these frivolous compulsions
are more often an emotional expression gone awry or the harmful perpetuation of
emotional consternation rather than any form of therapy.
Kant discusses “mental ailments,” like “melancholia” and “mania,” as well as many other habits of thought in the first section of the *Anthropology*, “On the Cognitive Faculty,” and many of his observations are relevant to our discussion of emotional intelligence. Although he believes that emotions and passions are a part of the conative faculty, not the cognitive faculty, the discussion of these emotional ailments of the cognitive faculty shows that emotions are cognitive. In his section “On Self-Observation,” Kant warns against self-indulgent, or narcissistic, introspection:

> To scrutinize the various acts of the imagination within me, when I call them forth, is indeed worth reflection, as well as necessary and useful for logic and metaphysics. But to wish to play the spy upon one’s self, when those acts come to mind unsummoned and of their own accord (which happens through the play of the unpremeditatedly creative imagination), is to reverse the natural order of the cognitive powers, since then the rational elements do not take the lead (as they should) but instead follow behind. (A §4)

Kant’s description of melancholy is similar to his description of hypochondria (A §50). Melancholics allow their moods to hold court instead of rationally evaluating them. This theory might serve therapists who find that introspection seems to be making their patients more solipsistic. It also applies to those who might believe that pre-reflective emotions are more authentic. For example, it is a common belief that many forms of “letting it out,” such as “journaling,” help one work through emotions. Kant’s observation, on the other hand, suggests that simply expressing or observing our emotions is not sufficient to work through them and enact positive behavioral changes.

Of course, self-observation is a necessary part of self-discovery, which Kant counts as a talent of the cognitive faculty. He defines “sagacity” as discovering “something (that lies hidden either in ourselves or somewhere else)”(A §56). In order to achieve successful self-discovery, he advises that one start with a hypothesis and test it,
playing the scientist to oneself. Of course, self-discovery is also a moral duty since Kant places such supreme importance on being aware of one’s motivation. The first command of duties to oneself is to know oneself (MM 6:441).

The *Anthropology* suggests that the practice that leads to habituation is the best means of educating one’s negative emotions. There Kant equates freedom and habit in a way that strictly opposes the criticisms of Aristotle offered in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. He writes “such a habit [achieved in overcoming shyness] produces freedom of mind” (A §78). He supports Hume’s advice for the fear of public speaking: begin with groups in which one feels totally comfortable and gradually increase the level of discomfort until one feels confident in front of strangers (A §78). Nevertheless, contra Aristotle, virtue must be based on a rational comprehension of the moral law, not unthinking habit.\(^{59}\)

Kant states that the “greatest sensuous pleasure (*Sinnengenuß*), which is not accompanied by any loathing at all, is found under healthy conditions of resting after work” (A §87). This statement deserves assent if we assume that he refers to work that is taken to be worthy by the worker. Doing work that one deems pointless, demeaning, or coerced, leaves one feeling annoyed and resentful. This characterization of the “highest physical good” parallels the “Highest Good” or “highest ethicophysical good” because each describes a pleasure that is predicated on self-satisfaction. The “highest ethicophysical good” is “good living that is curbed [or regulated] by virtue” (A§ 88).

When taken as an expression of emotional intelligence, Kant highest physical good and

\(^{59}\) Kant also criticizes the practice of cultivating virtue by instilling good habits in the first section of the *Anthropology*, § 12. This does not seem to be a contradiction, because Kant’s recommendation that we form good habits does take them to be based on reason. Furthermore, not all action is moral action and so not all action need to be based on a rational comprehension of the moral law. There is no reason to think that the majority of our behaviors should not be based on habit. In the *Lectures* Kant does recommend developing good moral habits (p. 46), which does contradict his criticisms of Aristotle in the “Doctrine of Virtue.”
highest ethicophysical good show us that psychological health and happiness can be achieved when the expression of emotion matches the subjective, moral evaluation of the emotion and both match up to an honest representation of the situation.

Of course, even with all of these psychologically astute comments from the *Anthropology*, it may still seem like a stretch to grant that Kant has a theory of emotional intelligence. One goal of this dissertation is to show that Kantian moral theory promotes emotional intelligence, even if only in spite of Kant’s explicitly negative evaluation of emotion. This chapter has shown that even Kant’s explicit theory of emotion is not as bad as it looks and goes some distance in itself informing a theory of emotional intelligence.
CHAPTER IV

KANTIAN MORAL THEORY AND EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

In this chapter I argue that Kantian moral theory helps us to better understand the nature of emotional intelligence. This chapter offers the crux of the dissertation’s argument: moral concern, as Kant describes it, helps one to be emotionally intelligent. Indeed, virtue, i.e., Kantian virtue, and emotional intelligence are closely intertwined concepts. This argument will strike many as clearly wrong, since Kant is most often criticized for failing to grasp the moral importance of emotion. Although I do not find every aspect of Kantianism acceptable, we will see that most of the common criticisms of his account of emotions are wrong-headed and based on the dualistic prejudice that the emotions cannot be intelligent. Nevertheless, my argument here calls for a considerable amount of interpretative work, as I defend Kant against common misunderstandings and criticisms, as well as separate off those of Kant’s statements that are unacceptable and show that Kantian moral theory can function coherently without them.

In order to give my reader a sense of what is to be gained by my argument, I begin this chapter as if the interpretive work had already been accomplished, explaining the ways that Kantianism promotes emotional intelligence and postponing the lion’s share of my defense of Kantian moral theory until the next two chapters. Kantian moral theory has been described as cognitivist, universalist, and formalist.¹ Kant’s formalism is seen by many to be most disagreeable; along with his notion of autonomy, it is taken to

imply that the emotions should not play a role in moral decision-making. I delay my discussion of formalism and autonomy until the fifth and sixth chapters, respectively, and focus here on moral cognitivism and moral universalism. My reader will, therefore, have to combine the ideas presented in this chapter with the interpretive work contained in the next two. This may require some amount of patience; nevertheless it seems more interesting to begin with the positive.

Overall, this chapter discusses the benefits Kantian moral theory stands to offer both to a theory of emotional intelligence and to the practical task of developing emotional intelligence. This chapter is overflowing with ideas and could be a project by itself; so as a chapter it is necessarily limited and schematic, filled with starting points for further discussion. In the first section I explain Kantian cognitivism, and I show that it facilitates self-analysis and self-improvement; furthermore, it yields self-esteem. I argue that Kant’s notion of self-esteem is the most productive one for a theory of emotional intelligence. Acknowledging and prioritizing moral value in our lives puts us on the right path for developing true self-esteem, as well as better understanding our emotions. In the second section I explain Kantian universalism, and I argue that it entails a process of both moral and psychological therapy, moving from the unconscious and possibly selfish to the well-understood and inclusive perspective. I liken the emphasis Kant places on truthfulness to the psychological virtue of transparency. The third section further develops this discussion of respect by exploring the interrelatedness of respecting oneself and respecting others, as well as the psychological reasons for selfishness that undermine respect. I argue that Kantian respect must have a positive as well as a negative meaning and that respect is an integral part of developing close relationships as well as navigating
all varieties of conflict. In the fourth section I explore the ways that moral self-
development creates a more harmoniously integrated self, and the ways that Kantian
moral theory in particular is able to provide an account of the way that moral worth is
teleologically organizing. In conclusion, I reflect on the Kantian value of consistency,
especially in the face of the many unachievable, yet virtuous, ideals. Morality is a
function of reason for Kant, and we must remember that reason is a process. Total
consistency is stagnancy, and it is the inevitable fluidity of life for which moral and
psychological health equip us.

I. Cognitivism: Self-Scrutiny and Self-Esteem

Kantian moral theory is cognitivist, i.e., it holds that moral statements have truth
conditions. Non-cognitivists hold that moral judgments are forms of non-cognitive self-
expression, such as desires or statements of approval or disapproval. We can see
immediately that moral non-cognitivism assumes a non-cognitive theory of emotion;
Kant, as we have already seen, has a cognitive theory of emotion. Statements of approval
or disapproval are taken to be non-cognitive by the non-cognitivists because they cannot
be rationally justified. Morality is grounded in subjective attitudes or prescriptions, for
the non-cognitivist, not the other way around. In other words, emotions and other
subjective states are taken to be the ground floor of subjectivity, below which one cannot
get. Kant, on the other hand, is a moral realist: he believes that behaviors and intentions
really are good or bad, they are not merely subjectively thought or felt to be good or bad.

The idea that moral judgments express facts about the world does not quite
capture the full force of cognitivism. Cognitivist moral theories imply that moral
judgments are things about which we should *do* something. If a moral judgment is not really a judgment at all, but merely an expression of my own personal taste, as the expressivist holds, then my judgment that dog-fighting is wrong, for example, does not compel me to enter into a discussion with you about dog-fighting if you disagree with me. I can simply say: to each his own. If I see dogs being fought then, even though I *feel* that it is wrong, I need not be compelled to stop it. I would just think: “Oh, they might not think it’s wrong; I should just leave so I will not have to be confronted with my feeling of its wrongness.” It is this moral denial, or moral weakness or cowardliness—you will support these strong terms if you agree with moral realism—that is a genuine moral, and, as I will argue, psychological problem.

It is my contention that cognitivism, with its encouragement to seriously engage in moral discourse and enquiry, promotes the development of emotional intelligence. The means by which I will make this argument is clearly question-begging: There really are moral truths and so taking them seriously requires that we express and promote our

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2 I do not believe that Stevenson’s theory of emotivism is recognizable as emotivism; see C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944). In Stevenson’s own words, his theory is an “analytic or methodological study” of normative ethics and not itself normative (p. 1.) Although emotivism is also clearly a metaethical theory, it is also normative, as it implies that moral argumentation is irrational insofar as it entails attempting to change people’s values, not just their beliefs about facts. Stevenson’s emotivism has no such implication, as he agrees with the Rachels’ account of moral reasoning (See, for example, 27, 36, 139; see 173 for a discussion of the logical-like validity of ethical judgments). Stevenson’s emotivism is more of an empirical study of ethical discourse and does not tell us anything that runs counter to common sense. Nor is it particularly interested in emotion as a key concept. Still, Stevenson argues that his own theory has much in common with Ayer’s, except for that it does not intend to disparage ethical argument and inquiry as unscientific. We can see that that which it shares with Ayer falls to the same criticisms as Ayer, and his differences, as he strays from non-cognitivism, make him unrecognizable as an emotivist. In addition, Stevenson seems to be even less equipped to maintain a distinction between the expression, or what he calls “giving vent” to (37-38), and assertion of emotion. It is unclear whether he intends to uphold Ayer’s distinction, since he translates ethical statements into statements about subjective approval. One might argue that his distinction between descriptive and emotive meaning, or the disposition of words to affect cognition and the disposition of words to affect feeling (71), equaling roughly a distinction between denotation and connotation, does this job. Although, for Ayer, the assertion of emotion counts as a factual statement, and therefore has descriptive meaning in Stevenson’s sense, Stevenson’s notion of emotive meaning is a property of the sign, not of the speaker, making it more like a connotation, and is therefore unrelated to Ayer’s distinction.
convictions, helping us to forge a harmonious relationship between our internal and external lives. This argument will do nothing to win over the non-cognitivist. He, in fact, holds the opposite to be true: those who believe that there are moral truths tend to be stubborn and judgmental; they have difficulty being sensitive to differences of opinion and situation, and they usually cling to their belief-system at the expense of their happiness and psychological well-being, not to mention their relationships. In fact, the desire to dampen destructive moral argumentation seems to be one of the main motivations behind non-cognitivism. It is this idea that we must keep clearly in focus as the main objection. Still, in order to prevent this criticism from winning over the reader from the beginning, we must ask whether or not we usually mount this kind of assault against those with whom we agree or if it is not rather the case that people mount an attack against those who are stubborn and self-righteous only when they disagree with them, and yet cheer on people who have equally strong convictions, but whom they take to be right. Still, the moral non-cognitivist will always be uncomfortable with this absolutist talk of “wrong” and “right,” and I do not think that I can come up with an argument that might convince a non-cognitivist that there are moral truths. My argument will retain this question-begging aspect, but I do think that I can shed some light on the psychological element of the debate.

To a certain extent, cognitivism expresses pre-reflective moral experience. We normally take moral judgments to be objective, and we normally believe that we must adjudicate moral disagreements with reasons. On the other hand, how often do we make decisions based on moral reasons as opposed to pragmatic reasons or preferences? How often do we endeavor to defend our beliefs in the face of opposition? Or risk something
in order to do that which we know to be right? Of course, some people do these things more often than others, but for all people the demands of morality are experienced as compulsions, yet following though on these demands poses a challenge. Hence moral relativism, or backing down from defending one’s beliefs, is an equally natural stance. Additionally, part of the non-cognitivist’s objection to moral realism and argumentation is that zealous attempts to convert another person are often insensitive to the validity of the opposite position. Perhaps if we change the focus away from moral argument toward seeking and pursuing the truth, both in communication and alone, part of this objection will fall away.

Kant sees morality as a challenge. He exhorts that we must fulfill our moral duties not because they happen to suit some other agenda we may have, but because we respect them as moral duties. For Kant, the supreme condition of moral goodness is a good will; yet a good will is something toward which we must continually strive. He is skeptical that anyone can simply know that he or she has a good will; instead, Kant believes that it is always likely that we choose to conform to the demands of morality merely because it is easy for us or because we have some other cooperating motivation. For this reason, morality requires both self-scrutiny and self-improvement. It is difficult to see how one can be motivated to morally improve oneself if one does not seriously believe that there are moral truths.³

³ One might object that we can strive to improve relative to subjective goals. This is true, but I am not sure how satisfied we can be with these goals if we do not perceive them to transcendent. For example, take the goal of being a good mother. If I believe that my idea of being a good mother is purely relative to me (which is not the same thing as believing that different families and different children have different needs) why would I think that my idea is worth pursuing? Perhaps my child might have another idea of what I should have done when he grows up, or perhaps my own mother keeps telling me that I have the wrong idea. Why would I pursue my idea unless I thought it were the right idea?
Kantian cognitivism inspires, and requires, self-improvement, which is based on self-understanding. In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant argues that “the first command of all duties to oneself” is “to ‘know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself’” (MM, 6:441).

That is, know your heart—whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the *substance* of human being or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral *condition*. (MM, 6:441).

Here Kant makes use of a dichotomy between nature and morality in order to recommend categories for judging ourselves: either a motivation is derived from our nature as a human being or it is pure and moral. Still, morality must be developed from nature. Kant continues:

Moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. For in the case of a human being, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a human being’s will with its final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to a good will within him, which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness.)” (MM, 6:441)

Self-knowledge is the foundation of all wisdom. Of course, we have the Delphic Oracle and not Kant to thank for this gem, but it remains as persuasive an idea—even more so in the Modern era where knowledge becomes more completely based in the subject rather than the polis. Kant similarly conceives of virtue subjectively, in terms of one’s intentions, and writes that self-scrutiny is the first step to “the ultimate wisdom” because it makes personal change possible. We must uncover our motivations so that we can make sure that they accord with our “final end,” which is the Highest Good, or morally worthy happiness. Oftentimes our motivations are hidden. Especially if we have selfish motivations or feelings that we unconsciously judge to be unacceptable, we try to hide
them from ourselves. The “evil will” that Kant refers to is one that resolves to seek personal interests over fulfilling one’s moral duties. We often fight against learning that we harbor selfish desires, and being forced to realize that we have them can be painful. This is why Kant calls self-cognition a “hell.”

In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant outlines the duties one owes to oneself and the duties one owes to others: to ourselves we owe the duty of seeking our own perfection; to others we owe the duty of promoting happiness. Pursuing one’s own perfection requires the development of one’s understanding and the cultivation of one’s will. The goal of this cultivation is a good will:

(1) A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality (quoad actum), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors. And it is not merely that technically practical reason counsels him to do this as a means to his further purposes (or art); morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this end his duty, so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him. (2) A human being has a duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, in which the law becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection. Since it is a feeling of the effect that the lawgiving will which the human being exercises on his capacity to act in accordance with his will, it is called moral feeling, a special sense (sensus moralis), as it were… it is a moral perfection, by which one makes one’s object every particular end that is also a duty. (MM, 6:387)

As we can see, there are two levels of self-cultivation. First, we must cultivate our ability to think rationally in general: we must become more self-conscious in our setting of ends for ourselves, and we must strive to overcome our mistaken judgments. This level might be seen as being purely pragmatic, but Kant argues that there is a moral dimension to it since we owe it to ourselves to treat ourselves with this degree of self-respect. Here

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4 Here Kant is obviously referring to a “sense” as in a mental ability, not the “sense,” or meaning, of the term, as he does in Groundwork 442.
we are reminded of the discussion in the *Groundwork* about the duty to cultivate one’s talents.

Second, setting ends for oneself requires—recalling the duty to scrutinize oneself—that one be aware of one’s ends as they stand so that one can know if one truly affirms them. In the quote above we see the opposite side of the coin: only when one is truly capable of self-consciously setting ends for oneself, can one strive to take on the fulfillment of duty as one’s end. It may seem redundant to argue that one has a moral duty to make oneself able and willing to perform moral duties, but drawing this connection between moral action and intention and the entirety of one’s personality shows us the special, yet natural and teleological, role that moral reason plays in human consciousness.

In reflecting on Kant’s requirement that we scrutinize ourselves and try to morally improve ourselves, might the non-cognitivist object that Kant takes morality too seriously, demanding far too much of us and prompting neurosis? That would be a good criticism if Kant held that morality commands us to actually achieve perfection. Instead, we are only commanded to take perfection as our end. Following Aristotle, not the Stoics, Kant takes virtue to be a stochastic skill.⁵ (Kant’s conviction that we cannot achieve perfection is a premise in his—admittedly strange—argument for an afterlife.) Even understanding this, many moral theorists still allege that Kant places the bar for morality too high, arguing that a moral theory should have a category of the supererogatory (those actions that are good but not required by duty, and, hence, optional).⁶

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⁵ I am swayed by Jakob Klein’s argument, in his “The Stoic Archer,” that Aristotle, and not the Stoics, takes virtue to be a stochastic skill, (paper presented at Colgate University, February 2009).

⁶ Supererogationists include J.O. Urmson, David Heyd, and Roderick Chisolm.
There is a genuine disagreement between Kant and the supererogationists, who believe that duty is something with which we should sometimes be finished and that morality is a constraint on our lives that is at the same level as other constraints, such as needing to work or complete other chores, and must be negotiated accordingly. Although it is the legacy of liberal Kantianism that inspires the supererogationist view of morality, as we have seen, Kant understands morality and moral duty in terms of virtue and character, which involves the orientation and development of all of our human abilities, and the purity of the good will. Character is something that underlies all of our choices; it is not a task among others, but the way that we approach all tasks, indeed, our lives in general. To ask that we might sometimes be able to leave off with moral duties is simply to misunderstand the nature of virtue. Morality is the condition for the worth of happiness, and our lives in general; it is always in effect.

One might think that the meaning of “wide” and “imperfect” duties is that they are more lax. The opposite is closer to the truth. The duties to oneself and others corresponds to needs that are unending. Virtues are imperfect duties because it is impossible for a moral theory to tell us which people we should help when or exactly what needs to be done in order to perfect ourselves. Not only is it unfeasible for morality to give such specific advice, it is undesirable. Applying to our inner lives, virtues necessarily involve practical reason, in other words, being virtuous is a product of thinking for oneself. Of course, the importance of thinking for oneself does not mean that anything goes, but every situation will be different and negotiating those differences day

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7 Hill argues that Kant’s notion of imperfect duties takes the place of the category of the supererogatory because it involves the choice of when one is to fulfill them. As Baron suggests, this is not entirely true, because, we are always required to take them on as our maxims. In other words, we cannot choose to sometimes have a virtuous character and sometimes not.
by day is a necessary part of living and having relationships. Also the very idea of having an answer to the question of “how much?” should appear strange when we consider our normal, moral engagements. I cannot imagine a life wherein there is such an answer. It seems as though having an answer would entail that one stops feeling the unending need. Not feeling this need would undermine moral feeling altogether. We feel the needs of other people and ourselves, we are morally commanded to feel these needs, and, yet, we cannot address them completely, nor are we morally commanded to address them completely. Understandably, this is a hard reality for people to live with, and so having a good moral attitude is also necessary, and actually feeling that one is progressing and succeeding in helping other people helps to secure this good attitude.

Kant does not offer guidance for deciding how much of our lives we should devote to others: in the Religion essay he states that we should do as much good as we can. Still, the fact that moral duty is always in effect does not mean that we must devote all of our time to cultivating self-perfection and promoting the happiness of others. Instead, it means that we must always be the kind of people who cultivate self-perfection and promote the happiness of others. Roughly speaking, we engage in the specific actions that contribute to fulfilling these wide duties when there is a need (in the case of self-perfection) or (in the case of promoting the happiness of others) whenever we can. Again, I cannot possibly even begin to give a more specific answer to the question of “how much?” Still, even when we are not doing something that is easily recognizable as perfecting ourselves or helping others, the maxims to do so are still active in our lives, informing all other actions and values. A maxim is a guiding principle, and moral principles are the ones that should guide one’s entire character. Baron argues that Kant is
a rigorist when it comes to perfecting ourselves, i.e., that we should always strive to be as good as we possibly can, but that we are allowed more latitude when it comes to helping others.\textsuperscript{8} The duties that we owe to ourselves are more fundamental since a good character is a condition for carrying out the duty to help others, since it facilitates feeling the moral need and judging when and whom to help.\textsuperscript{9}

Does Kant’s statement that it is our duty to scrutinize ourselves in the effort to cultivate a morally good character lead to neurosis? Does it lead to a person who thinks about morality too much? Kant does not think that this is the case. First of all, as Baron points out, Kant criticizes the moral fanatic, i.e., the person who makes amoral choices, such as what color of shirt to wear, into moral choices. Clearly, some things require moral deliberation and others do not. The problem is that, in this age of global trade wherein our choices implicate us in thousands of relationships of which we are mostly unaware, we are confronted with legitimate moral questions everywhere we turn and we cannot possibly address all of them. The supererogationist would have us ignore these moral demands that are beyond our realm of reasonable achievement. This strikes me as hailing insensitivity and ignorance. Not only must we think for ourselves, but, more importantly, hammering on the question “but how much do I have to do!?” betrays a stingy character that is only interested in doing the bare minimum. It seems that we will always feel that there is more to do, and that we will always feel regret for not being able

\textsuperscript{8} Baron, \textit{Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology}, especially chapter 1, “Kantian Ethics and the Supererogatory” and chapter 2, “Minimal Morality, Moral Excellence, and the Supererogatory.”

\textsuperscript{9} See Baron, “Latitude in Kant’s Imperfect Duties” in \textit{Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology}.
This feeling goes along with the earnest attempt to do all that we can and causes us to continue to ask ourselves whether or not we could possibly do more.

It is important that we not think that the person who is overfull with moral demands will necessarily lose hope. Continually questioning whether we could do more does not preclude some degree of moral self-satisfaction. While he may look neurotic to those who are morally apathetic, the Kantian moral agent will not be given to despair: indeed, it seems that working for progress is the only way to overcome despair. Making this point highlights the extreme difference between the moral notion of self-esteem and the popular, almost empty notion of self-esteem. True self-esteem is not only compatible with, but dependent on, self-scrutiny and self-criticism. Self-esteem is based on self-respect, and self-respect, for Kant, is based on respect for the moral law.

The term “self-esteem” has recently fallen out of favor in popular discourse because it has proven itself to express a hollow idea. Public psychologists used to argue that adolescents needed positive self-esteem, and now they argue that adolescents are full of themselves for having been praised without warrant. Aside from the fact that it is unhealthy for one to irrationally hate oneself, there is little content to the idea that one

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10 In my mind Oskar Schindler is shown to be a truly good person only at the end of the Holocaust when he emotionally regretted not having done more. This feeling is not a sign of neurosis; it is the pain of loss and vulnerability that is a necessary part of any love, in this case, the love of humanity.

11 Urmson argues that if a moral code is not simple to understand and fulfill, people will give up on being moral entirely. Kant, on the other hand, holds that it is not the job of a moral theory to make decisions for people. Kantian moral theory provides guidance for moral reasoning, not the answers. If it is the case that our duties can be prescribed in their detailed specificity without us having to think about them, then it would be possible for people to only feel the call of duty when they should and will fulfill it. On the other hand, in the real world, where the fulfilling of our imperfect duties requires practical reason, it makes sense that one’s feelings of moral compulsion will not always equate with one’s decision to act, both because good characters will feel a call to help others before they adjudicate whether or not such is the proper time, and because it is not possible to say when it is objectively morally required that we fulfill our imperfect duties. Kant does not let us off the hook easily: if everyone does not feel that fixing the problems of the world is her responsibility, then there is no chance that moral progress will ever be made. Thomas Auxter, *Kant’s Moral Teleology* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1982). I am indebted to Marcia Baron for this reference.
should like oneself: What is there to like? Kant, on the other hand, gives this notion its proper content, as he spends a considerable amount of time discussing its proper meaning and, since it must be conditioned by moral worth, its means of achievement.\textsuperscript{12}

Positive self-esteem has two meanings, or perhaps we might say, two levels of ascending meaning for Kant. First, positive self-esteem comes from self-respect, or dignity, that one owes to oneself simply because one is human.\textsuperscript{13} Kant argues that we have a duty to respect ourselves, just as we have a duty to respect humanity in general. This general duty translates into our behaviors in a variety of concrete ways: “Be no man’s lacky.—Do not let others tread with impunity with your rights.—…Do not be a parasite or a flatterer” etc… (MM, 6:436).\textsuperscript{14} In addition, we should treat our bodies with respect, never as a mere means. This idea of self-respect is not just a feeling, but a command to treat oneself in certain ways: to stand up for oneself and not to harm oneself, for example. We owe this to ourselves no matter what. Humans, as persons, have value and deserve respect because they are capable of morally practical reason. It does not matter that a person may have behaved badly in the past, she is still capable of morally practical reason and has inherent value because of it.

This orientation for self-esteem is important because it rescues us from trying to base our worth on comparisons with other people, on acquiring material goods, or the satisfaction of other inclinations. Judging that one is better than someone else in some respect, or accomplishing a certain goal, may make one feel good, but this feeling is

\textsuperscript{12} Robert Gressis discusses two false notions of self-esteem that lead to the justification of evil: the idea that one is as good as or better than one’s peers, and the idea that one deserves a break from moral rules sometimes. Robert Gressis, “How to Be Evil: The Moral Psychology of Immorality,” in The New Kant, ed. Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008).

\textsuperscript{13} When discussing gratitude in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant refers to “real self esteem” as “pride in the dignity of humanity of one’s own person”(6:459).

\textsuperscript{14} In his discussion of lust, Kant argues that “complete abandonment of oneself to animal inclination… deprives him of all respect for himself”(6:425).
destined to be fleeting since we must necessarily question the worth of this other person or of the goal. Unless we tie our self-regard to inherent moral worth, we will discover that it is flimsy. Self-respect is not something that we owe to ourselves because we are special, nor is our respect for other people contingent on their past behaviors or achievements. Kant argues that recognizing that all people have a moral nature and respecting them because of it will “dispel fanatical contempt for oneself” and make us realize that humanity can never be held contemptible (MM, 6:441). For example, Kant believes in the death-penalty because he holds that this punishment best respects the humanity of the criminal, not because he takes her to be contemptible. We might disagree about whether or not attempts at criminal reform can better demonstrate respect for humanity, but the point is that the punishment is addressed to the rational nature of the criminal, not his past deeds. We must always see ourselves in this light: in terms of our inner worth and potential, not in terms of performance or a comparison with other people.\textsuperscript{15}

The first level of self-esteem is a duty we owe to ourselves.\textsuperscript{16} The second is something that we achieve: we can feel good about ourselves when we have done something good. The second level of positive self-esteem follows from our duty to know and judge ourselves: when we succeed in behaving morally we feel our moral worth and esteem ourselves positively. To morally evaluate oneself is a duty:

Impartiality in appraising oneself in comparison with the law, and sincerity in acknowledging to oneself one’s inner moral worth or lack of

\textsuperscript{15}This suggests that children do not need activities at which to succeed in order to have self-esteem; it is failures, not successes, which offer the best opportunity for teaching real self-esteem.

\textsuperscript{16}Kant seems to be self-contradictory on this point, arguing first that self-esteem is a member of the class of natural feelings that we cannot be said to have a duty to acquire (6:399) and then that “self-esteem is a duty of man to himself” (6:435). Furthermore, if we did not naturally respect the moral law, we would have no basis for self-respect (6:402).
worth are duties that follow directly from this first command to cognize oneself. (find this citation.)

Kant argues that the concept of virtue contains the idea that the moral disposition is itself “sublime” (MM, 6:435). When we conceive of self-esteem in this way, it makes it clear that it is subordinate to morality; indeed, Kant argues that self-esteem contains the feeling of humility within it because it implies a comparison of ourselves with the moral law, in comparison to which one always feels subordinate.\textsuperscript{17} Self-esteem is closely related to that form of self-respect we feel for ourselves, not just because we are human, but because we, in fulfilling our duties, feel our own freedom, which makes us feel that we have worth.\textsuperscript{18}

Proper self-esteem is the ability to be satisfied with oneself and be at peace because one believes that one has accomplished that which is most important. It is like resting after a hard day’s work.\textsuperscript{19} Of course, this does not mean that we can ever be finished with the demands of morality, rather cultivating a good will ensures that we will be vigilant in pursuing virtue. Without this commitment we are plagued by thoughts of our inadequacy:

\begin{quote}
[A] righteous person cannot think himself happy if he is not first conscious of his righteousness; for, with that attitude, the reprimands—which his own way of thinking would compel him to cast upon himself in the case of transgressions—and the moral self-condemnation would rob him of all enjoyment of the agreeableness that his state might otherwise contain. (CPr R, 116)
\end{quote}

Even for those without the virtuous attunement between happiness and morality, all people experience compulsion by the moral law, and therefore fulfilling it carries some

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} See the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, 161. The second \textit{Critique} is, in general, more focused on the dichotomy between inclination and duty, and so it casts self-esteem in terms of the special status that humans achieve through being aware of their ability to transcend, and so transcending, all inclinations.
\textsuperscript{19} In the Anthropology, Kant describes resting after work as the “highest physical good” (§87).
amount of satisfaction for most people. In other words, even those people who irrationally hate themselves can hopefully gain the second level of self-esteem, although it will perhaps have a shaky foundation.\textsuperscript{20}

Kant’s contrast between happiness, a term that is not necessarily positive for him, and morally worthy happiness can help us to further understand the true meaning of self-esteem.\textsuperscript{21} Self-satisfaction is distinct from happiness, the latter of which he believes is only a product of the fulfillment of the inclinations, if this is even possible.\textsuperscript{22} Kant argues that inclinations vary and the pursuit of their total satisfaction always only creates “an even greater void than one had meant to fill” (CPrR 118). Self-satisfaction, on the other hand, is a true respite, as it is based on proper moral understanding and estimation—the understanding that inclination is not as important as morality. Self-esteem is the feeling of being happy and deserving it; or, we might say that, self-esteem is the feeling of desert.\textsuperscript{23} It requires that we distinguish between the pleasing and the disagreeable, on the one hand, and good and evil, on the other.\textsuperscript{24} The second is an objective, moral evaluation that is not dependent on the amount of pleasure something promises to give. Kant argues

\textsuperscript{20} Rather than facilitating activities at which children can succeed, then, it would be more conducive to positive self-esteem to have them practice doing good deeds.
\textsuperscript{21} § 83 of the third \textit{Critique} shines some particularly helpful light on Kant’s meaning of the word happiness: happiness is a “mere idea” to which we attempt to make ourselves “adequate under merely empirical conditions (which is impossible.” It is a deficient idea that is necessarily tied to the short-sightedness of passion/inclination and those things to which one is naturally/automatically directed. Even the term “true happiness” for Kant still involves the exclusion of moral reason. Why does Kant insist on defining happiness derogatorily? It seems as though it is merely a polemical device aimed at sharpening our attention to the sublimity of morality, as well as separating himself from other moral theories he deems flawed.
\textsuperscript{22} Morally worthy happiness may be a strange idea. What value is left for the fulfillment of inclination if one recognizes that the inclinations must be subordinate to morality? It seems that morally worthy happiness must assume some higher definition of happiness, not just the synthetic idea of happiness conditioned on prior moral goodness. Kant does consider the ways in which virtue is its own reward, and hence its own brand of happiness, as we shall see shortly.
\textsuperscript{23} It may seem strange that someone deserves to be happy, and Kant more properly means that if one happens to be happy, then one can feel good about it. Nevertheless, there is little difference between this and the idea that someone deserves to be happy. It may seem strange, but it is also empowering.
\textsuperscript{24} See Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 57-67.
that it is easy to get caught up in seeking our own happiness, as it often seems that “everything hinges on our happiness.” He agrees that we cannot fail to attend to our happiness, but that it is morally necessary that we also judge as moral beings and make moral worth the supreme condition of our happiness. This conditionality means three things: 1) that we limit our practical maxims when they conflict with the moral law, making it our meta-maxim to always follow the moral law above all others; 2) that we cultivate morally worthy practical maxims as our indirect duties require; and 3) that we judge happiness to be morally good only when we have also achieved moral worth. This last meaning is the highest definition of self-esteem: we can and should be pleased with ourselves only when we have achieved moral worth. Moral worth comes from having a good will; a good will is one that is determined above all by the moral law.

Happiness and virtue are linked in the idea of the Highest Good, which is the object of pure practical reason. Virtue is the condition of the worth of happiness, but if we have virtue without happiness, our goodness is still incomplete. “The highest good of a possible world” consists in “happiness distributed quite exactly in proportion to morality” (CP 110). By “happiness” Kant means physical prosperity, not self-satisfaction, and so he argues that the concepts of happiness and virtue are not analytically connected. In other words, there is absolutely no guarantee that good things will happen to good people. Kant faults the Ancients (the Epicureans and the Stoics) for linking the concepts of goodness and happiness, believing either that goodness makes one happy or that happiness is the good. Kant remarks that, unfortunately, neither is the case.

25 Ibid.
26 The Highest Good is the object of pure practical reason, but it is not the determining basis since pure practical reason must be determined by the form of the will alone, universality, and no object at all. This means that, when we have a good will, we do not act because we want to achieve self-esteem, but because we know that our action is the right thing to do, and self-esteem follows.
In solving the antinomy occasioned by the necessity of a synthetic connection between the two concepts, Kant argues that virtue cannot produce happiness in the world of sense, but it can produce happiness in the noumenal, rational world whereby we are pleased by our moral actions. Therefore, we see that, Kant describes the satisfaction that one receives from moral behavior in a number of different ways. Not only does one feel above the caprice of inclination and deserving of happiness, but moral behavior is, in a more direct sense, its own reward.\textsuperscript{27} We experience joy in acting morally because, as Beck puts it, “reason’s interest is being furthered.”\textsuperscript{28} It is difficult to explain the reason that we feel good when doing good, even if doing so is extremely difficult for us, but Kant holds that this is the case. If such is in fact the case, it would evince an underlying unity between reason and sensibility that Kant rediscovers in the third \textit{Critique} under the name of aesthetic feeling and he, perhaps mistakenly, theorized in the first \textit{Critique}, by making the categories of the Understanding dependent on the forms of intuition (as we discussed in chapter 3).

Instead of causing stubbornness and neurosis, moral cognitivism facilitates self-esteem. In taking morality seriously, one is inspired to scrutinize oneself in order to better perfect oneself and promote the happiness of others. Self-understanding, self-respect, and self-satisfaction are, perhaps, general pre-requisites for emotional intelligence as they stand in for general psychological well-being. Next we shall consider the ways that moral theory informs our emotional experience more specifically.

\textsuperscript{27} Drawing an analogy with the Stoics, Beck calls this loftiness “equanimity”; Beck, \textit{A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason}, 230.  
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 229.
II. Moral and Emotional Transparency; Moral and Emotional Universalism

Self-scrutiny implies some degree of self-transparency, and Kantian moral theory places a great deal of emphasis on transparency, but this fact is often missed because attention is diverted by the too fine of a point Kant puts on the injunction not to lie. The notion of personal and political transparency is used to explain universalism: capable of being seen and understood by all and capable of being acceptable to all are, in practice, related since things are kept hidden oftentimes because they are, or are feared to be, unacceptable. In the realm of emotion, pre-conscious ideas can be repressed either because they are unacceptable or because they are not fully understood. In both cases, making them conscious can help to promote the subject’s explicit goals and promote psychological harmony. Our need to make our emotions conscience parallels and is informed by the moral command to make sure that one’s intentions are publicizable.

As is well known, the first formulation of the categorical imperative states that one must never act in such a way that one could not also will that the maxim of the action be a universal law (G 402). Kant explains this maxim test both through the notion of contradiction in willing (as with the refusal of charity example) and through the notion of contradiction in conception (as with the lying example). He unites these two different methods by identifying a universal law with a law of nature. Many of Kant’s critics have tried to punch holes in the categorical imperative, arguing that it is too vacuous to track morality’s requirements or that it cannot guide action at all. There are other means of expressing Kant’s notion of universalism if this one is not successful.29 In the end, the

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29 I agree that the many formulations of the categorical imperative are all intended to elaborate the same idea, but for the purposes of this section I focus on the first since it is most closely tied to Kant’s universalism. Nevertheless, we shall see that starting with any one articulation of the categorical imperative
notion of universality is best treated generally, not as a fool-proof method of directing specific actions, but as a general guide for moving from an amoral to a moral perspective.

Habermas explains universalism thusly: universalism holds that moral justifications must be, in principle, acceptable to all rational beings. Habermas means to exclude reasons that cannot, in principle, be acceptable to all rational beings because they are based on something essentially particular to one person or group, such as faith or other shared practices. A stronger reading of this notion of “acceptability” posits that all rational beings would find the same thing acceptable, since they are all rational, and there is presumably a most rational answer, if it can be found. Arendt interprets Kantian universalism in the spirit of pluralism, arguing that universality is achieved by taking on many different perspectives. Arendt’s formulation expresses Kant’s emphasis on the importance of overcoming selfishness.

Arendt draws a connection between the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative and, what she calls the “transcendental principle of publicness” from Perpetual Peace. Therein Kant states:

All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust if their maxim is not consistent with publicity … [for a] maxim which I cannot divulge publicly without defeating my own purpose must be kept secret if it is to succeed; and, if I cannot publicly avow it without inevitably exciting general opposition to my project… the opposition which can be foreseen a priori is due only to the injustice with which the maxim threatens everyone. (PP 129-130)

leads to the others and if we attempt to exclude the insights of the others, then the one becomes nonsensical.

30 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 120.
31 Also see Robert Kane’s Through the Moral Maze for such an interpretation.
Publicly communicating an unjust maxim would arouse opposition and would therefore cause others to prevent the action. Kant believes that people have an innate sense of justice. Arendt quotes from *The Strife of the Faculties*:

> Why has a ruler never dared openly to declare that he recognizes absolutely no right of the people opposed to him? The reason is that such a public declaration would rouse all of his subjects against him; although, as docile sheep, led by a benevolent and sensible master, well-fed and powerfully protected, they would have nothing wanting in their welfare for which to lament. (SF 145)

Describing Kantian morality as the “coincidence of the private and the public,” she goes on to demonstrate that Kant’s aesthetic philosophy also expresses this value of publicity.\(^\text{32}\)

Can we say that the “transcendental formula of public right” is a formulation of the categorical imperative? We can preliminarily note that the mere fact that it is political principle does not prevent it from also being a moral principle since true politics and morality cannot be in conflict for Kant: “for true politics must bend the knee before right” (PP 125). Kant calls the transcendental principle of publicness an ethical and juridical principle,\(^\text{33}\) and the categorical imperative, as we see from the *Metaphysics of Morals*, is also both an ethical and juridical principle.

Kant’s “deduction” of the transcendental principle of publicness (TPP) is incredibly similar to his deduction of the first formulation of the categorical imperative: he abstracts from all the material aspects of “public right” and is “left with the formal attribute of publicness” (PP 125). Recall section One of the *Groundwork*, in which Kant

\(^{32}\) Arendt, *Lectures*, 49.
\(^{33}\) We have a moral duty to promote perpetual peace; yet this end is co-guaranteed by Nature or Providence. As with Kant’s regulatory notion of the afterlife offered in support of our moral duty to promote the Highest Good, he seeks to show the ways that progress towards Perpetual Peace is naturally attained in order to demonstrate to his reader that it is not a hopeless goal.
begins with the formal idea of lawfulness as such in order to derive the moral idea of lawfulness. There we have the mere idea of lawfulness and here we have the mere idea of publicness. A law is essentially public, just as morality is essentially the government of all people, or individuals as they are rational beings. The TPP seems closer to Habermas’s description of universalism than to Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative since one would keep something a secret because it is not, in principle, acceptable to all rational beings, while, on an ungenerous reading of the universal law formulation, we can universalize something that might not be explicitly acceptable to all and vice versa. The TPP may be seen as more stringent than the universal law formulation since it gives the capacity to dissent to others, and the universal law formulation allows the individual actor to decide herself, in conducting a thought experiment, on behalf of others. One would hope that the moral decision-maker would decide in the same way that the other person would if the latter were given a chance to speak for herself, but such is not necessarily the case, and so we might conclude that the TPP formulation actually does a better job of respecting autonomy than the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative because it requires real, not imagined consent. Nevertheless, both require a transition from the judgment of acceptability made by one person to the judgment of acceptability made by all.

The TPP does seem to express the same sentiment as the categorical imperative, and it helps us to gain a more intuitive grasp of Kantian universalism. Universalism is best understood as requiring impartiality and the overcoming of selfish motives. Arendt argues that the “bad man,” for Kant, is the one who “makes an exception for himself.”

\[\text{Ibid, 17. Arendt does not consider that we might hold ourselves to a higher, not a lower, moral standard. In theory there would be nothing wrong with this, but, as we shall see with out discussion of the equation}\]
Universalism also implies an expanded perspective of one’s goals and motivations: they must be evaluated not merely as they relate to oneself but as they relate to everyone.

To come to see one’s motivations from an expanded perspective is also the goal one takes up in understanding and evaluating one’s emotional experience. Hence, emotional intelligence involves something like emotional universalism. Both the process of achieving moral universalism and the process of achieving emotional universalism, if it can be called that, encourage us to take on other people’s points of view and to look at ourselves from the outside in, as happens in many forms of therapy. Moral universalism is itself a form of therapy: in striving for universalism we achieve a better understanding of our standpoint, and, in some cases, overcome it.

Often emotions themselves harbor selfishness. Reflections on emotional selfishness are, perhaps, necessarily personal and idiosyncratic. Emotions are not specifically prone to selfishness because they are feelings and self-oriented (such an assumption would involve a confusion between “selfish” and “self-regarding” or “self-referential,” since we often have feelings about our emotions), but they may be specifically prone to selfishness in that they are pre-reflective and, hence, selfishness may be more easily able to sneak by in them under the radar of conscience. Emotions such as angry resolve and vindictive bitterness, i.e., emotions that resolve to remain in the form of emotion and actively resist change and the calming force of reflection, may be the most likely vehicle for hidden selfishness. The reasons behind our emotions may be

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between self-respect and other-respect, there is something psychologically dangerous about it. Holding ourselves to a higher standard may imply either that we think we are better than others or that we think we are worse than others and must pay a penance. It may also imply that we are afraid to engage in moral discourse, not wanting to share or attempt to discover the inner moral life; such is a fear of intimacy.
repressed, as Averill suggests, for the very same reason that the despot will not announce publicly that he holds his subjects in sheer contempt.

The phrase “emotional universalism” may be misleading because it sounds as though it implies that everyone should have the same emotions. There is reason not to adopt the term in the fact that Kant faults feeling for not being universal:

The capacity for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation is called feeling because both of them involve what is merely subjective in the relation of our representation and contain no relation at all to an object for possible cognition of it (or even cognition of our condition). While even sensations, apart from the quality they have (of, e.g., red, sweet, and so forth) because of the nature of the subject, are still referred to an object as elements in our cognition of it, pleasure and displeasure (in what is red or sweet) express nothing at all in the object but simply a relation to the subject.”

Pleasure may not be a quality of a peach, just as respect is not a quality of the moral law, but there is still an objective, law-like connection between some experiences and some feelings or emotions. We might even say that a peach has the quality of being able to cause a certain taste when paired with human taste buds. The fact that the feeling is “in us” need not mean that it is disconnected from the object. (Kant, of all people, certainly understand this.) Adam Smith argues that proper emotions are those that would be had by a detached observer. This suggests that there is much that is common amongst emotional responses (within a culture) and that these commonalities ought to be seen as

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35 MM, 12. We might agree that emotions do not tell us anything about objects, but does that mean that they cannot be universal, or that they do not tell us anything about the “cognition of our condition.” It seems patently false that emotions and/or feelings do not tell us about ourselves and our nature. Therefore, we ought not interpret this clause in that way. Instead, it seems that by arguing that feelings cannot be connected to the “cognition of our condition” he means to contrast them to feelings that claim universality because they refer to the human condition, or cognition in general, such as aesthetic feeling. In the MM Kant also accepts that moral behavior yields moral feeling. Such a feeling should also claim universality, as the moral law is itself universal (see CJ, 125).

36 Theory of Moral Sentiments: I.1.5 and II.1.5
normative. Nevertheless, Smith’s account is backwards: it is not the commonality that grounds morality, but morality that grounds the affirmation of the commonality.

Focusing on the way in which emotions are subjective, private experiences also runs the risk of thwarting the call to universalism. In the last chapter we saw Kant warn against the desire to “play the spy upon one’s self,” which “is to reverse the natural order of the cognitive powers.”\textsuperscript{37} We can imagine someone who is protective of her emotions, someone who insists on her “right” to have them, since in the fact that she is having the experience she cannot be mistaken. Of course, feelings are subjective experiences, just as thoughts are, but feelings, just like empirical and cognitive experience, are imbued with inter-subjective content and reference to objective states of affairs. In many ways, another person may be able to understand our feelings better than we do or even can. For the most part, emotions are natural reactions to certain perceptions and events. There are a vast array of possible situations and events, but, for the most part, all people understand the law-like connection between them and emotions. In most cases, the person having the emotion is in the worst position to understand its causes, because emotions often involve their simultaneous denial. “Emotional universalism,” then, would just refer to coming to an understanding of the connections between one’s emotion and the universal laws that connect it to its causes. This understanding entails making the emotion transparent and grasping its cognitive content. If we have a “right to our feelings,” it is only in the sense that we have a “right” to think freely, but all to often such a “right” is understood as a license not to think at all.

Still, universalism, in the case of emotion, is predicated on comprehension, not similarity. Emotions are not judged in a vacuum, but must be judged on their fit to the

\textsuperscript{37} Anthropology, §4.
situation and by their intentions. The idea of emotional universalism should not imply that we must ask ourselves how another person would feel in our situation and take on that person’s imagined emotions instead of our own. A therapist should never instructively remark: “I would feel such and such” or “you should feel such and such,” even though he may suspect that the person does in fact feel such and such and refuses to admit it. Instead, therapy is a process of making one’s thoughts and feelings public for the purpose of gaining a more comprehensive, rational perspective on them. Again, the more rational perspective is not necessarily transcendent: often the goal of therapy is to better feel one’s emotions and to better serve their objectives or to resolve internal contradictions and forces of repression. Emotional universalism, then, should be seen as gaining greater perspective on one’s emotions, but not another person’s external perspective, but a perspective others might have if they were in the same situation. In other words, we should try to imagine, not a detached, but a very affected, spectator. Differing perspectives may bring to light a number of things: ways that we are limiting our experience of emotions, an understanding of the reasons that we have the emotions that we do or of the unconscious purposes our emotional habits serve, facts or feelings that our emotions imply, ideas in responding to our emotions, etc.

So far is it from needing to control the emotions with reason that we might even say that it is the voice of the emotion that must be included in order to achieve universalism. Simply making our emotions self-transparent, or public, as if we were to explain them to someone, sets off the chain reaction of better understanding and evaluation. One of the most important psychological aspects of the progression toward emotional universalism is that, in taking on an external point of view, we are forced to
articulate and face our emotions in the first place. Many emotions are too painful to acknowledge. Acknowledging them makes us feel “needy,” childish, vulnerable, defective, etc. Some people feel as though they are hurting someone else by having a negative emotion. Acknowledging and accepting an emotion is often the most important step.

Kant’s moral theory is often associated with the injunction not to lie, even for “philanthropic” purposes. This aspect of Kantian moral theory is often seen as one of the more extreme and less defensible propositions. Less often is it seen as a part of Kant’s general emphasis on transparency, as by Arendt. Kant’s insistence on truthfulness needs to be understood in the context of achieving self-knowledge and a transparent, democratic political community. In his discussion of moral character in the *Anthropology*, he argues that truthfulness is a necessary prerequisite to character:

Briefly, as the highest maxim, uninhibited internal truthfulness toward oneself, as well as in the behavior toward everyone else, is the only proof of a person’s consciousness of having character. (A 295)

What does it mean to have “uninhibited internal truthfulness toward oneself”? This sounds rather intense, not to mention naïve after we have accepted the insights of Freud. Furthermore, Kant’s belief that we can never be fully aware of whether or not we have a purely good will seems to suggest that total internal truthfulness is impossible.

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39 It would be a mistake to conclude that Kant believes that we should share all of our thoughts with others. In the last paragraph of the *Anthropology*, Kant considers a hypothetical species in which there was no difference between thought and language. He concludes that humans could not live in peace under such conditions, “hence, it is part of the original composition of a human creature, and it belongs to the concept of the species, to explore the thoughts of others, but to conceal one’s own” (A 332). Kant suffers no shortage of tips for polite dinner party conversation that confirm this requirement that we limit the disclosure of thought. Nonetheless, in the *Anthropology*, Kant goes on to write that this natural tendency to conceal leads to lying and that we must, as rational beings, combat this consequence. Therefore, it seems that Kant leaves the distinction between polite concealment and lying up to the rational subject.
Nevertheless, the duty of self-knowledge requires that we strive for it. If we can never fully be aware of our intentions, then the effort to be truthful with oneself, or not to lie to oneself, needs to be constant. We need not be paranoid, but it is simply the case that self-lies undermine morality, which, for Kant, is based on rational self-understanding. An intention of which we are unaware cannot be tested for its universality. Lying to oneself is just as immoral as lying to others because, not only do we not consent to our behavior, we are not fully responsible for it, because we have not completely chosen it. Furthermore, lying to oneself threatens the possibility of communication just as lying to others does. The goal of communication is community, and a community of rational beings is achieved through rational transparency; no communion can be reached if that which has been shared and understood is false. Self-transparency obviously helps in the ability to analyze emotion: we cannot come to understand emotions and thoughts unless we are first aware of them.

Critics of Kant may be aghast at this point, objecting that moral universalism and emotional universalism are not correlates, but are mutually exclusive: moral universalism requires that we overcome all particularity, which includes all emotion. This criticism is based on a confusion about what it means to overcome particularity. Moral universalism requires that our action be, in principle, acceptable to all rational people, not that all of our actions become uniform. Similarly, emotional universalism does not mean that everyone must have the same emotions, but rather that I check to see if my emotions

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In taking up this Kantian idea, Habermas is often criticized for his naïveté, and I am opening myself up to this same set of criticisms. Of course, the goal of any given speech act can be a number of different things, especially the achievement of power over the other person, situation, or vis-à-vis the institution. I sympathize with Habermas and his political/psychological idealism, and I am here speaking normatively about our psychological/epistemological need for recognition on which other types of communication depend. Hopefully, I will be able to continue this topic and better defend these assertions in the future.
would be judged acceptable by all rational/emotional beings. Nevertheless, it is necessary to formulate the precise meaning of this “rational acceptability” in the case of emotion, especially since emotional intelligence has been misunderstood, and taken to mean rational repression.

Consider the following example of evaluating whether or not an emotion is universalizable: Suppose the maxim of my action is to refuse to make time to visit and comfort a grieving friend. The emotions at work here may be a sort of anxiety, guilt, or a transferred arrogance and defensiveness about the importance of whatever it is I happen to be doing instead. The goal of emotional transparency would be to understand the maxim that occasions the emotions, and the goal of emotional universalism is to evaluate it. This maxim is immoral because people need comfort in certain situations and my refusal to provide it makes an exception of myself: I cannot deny that people sometimes need comfort, nor that I will sometimes need it, but instead I want to opt out of being the one who must provide it, hoping that someone else will do the work for me. My maxim would necessarily be that everyone should provide comfort for grieving friends, except for me. The right thing to do, then, is to comfort my grieving friend. In this case, I will need to judge some of my emotions as defective, and I will need to judge some other emotions, such as fear about facing sadness, and sadness itself, as important and requiring expression and, in this case, behavioral therapy (the behavioral therapy involved in facing one’s fears so as to become more comfortable in certain situations). In this situation universalism is not blind to particularity: It does not matter that someone else, who is not friends with my friend, does not have the duty to comfort him. What does matter is that
anyone can see that I, being the particular person that I am and in the particular situation that I am in, do have a duty to behave thusly in this situation.

Emotions can be very idiosyncratic, and a product of very particular facts about oneself, such as the particular personalities of one’s parents. Therefore, there is reason to think, at first blush, that universalism conflicts with emotionality. Nevertheless, concern for oneself and idiosyncrasy are not inherently immoral; they are a problem only when they trump moral concerns. In other words, when we gain a more universal perspective on our principles and beliefs, we may decide not to overcome them or we might instead be strengthened in them. Emotions are a feature of individual experience, it is true, but so are beliefs, convictions, and principles. Universalism does not mean that all individual experiences must be traded in for some kind of universal experience, whatever that could possibly mean. Our particular experience must be evaluated from a universal perspective, but the universal perspective remains a view of our very individual and particular life. (This defense of Kantian impartiality will be re-addressed in the next chapter’s discussion of formalism.)

Emotional universalism requires acceptance of the fact and demands of emotionality, just as moral universalism requires acceptance of the fact and demands of morality. There is an easy transition to be made from becoming more aware of one’s own emotional needs and the moral requirement of respect: self-denial often takes a moral toll. In other words, people often deny the needs of others because they deny their own needs; they also deny harms caused to others because they deny harm caused to themselves.⁴¹ In other words, recognizing our own emotions teaches us something about emotions

⁴¹ Adorno and Horkheimer discuss this parallel in Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1976).
(although a proper theory of emotions also plays a role), and accepting our own emotionality promotes a feeling of equality. We become more emotionally literate in general and more comfortable with the fact that emotions are a part of humanity, as well as more sensitive to them.

Moral sensitivity and emotional sensitivity, a component of emotional intelligence, merge at this juncture: one simply cannot promote the happiness of others if one cannot recognize emotional harm, and one cannot recognize emotional harm and health in others if one is closed off to this part of herself. We do sometimes, of course, help others in a more distanced way, by giving money, for example. We can imagine someone who only helps others in this way: this person would have no close relationships, since closeness necessarily entails emotional involvement. Although Kant had many close friends, his own life may have tended in this direction, falling short of virtue. We can see that having close, emotional relationships and sufficiently caring for the people with whom one is involved is morally necessary, and even the best way to direct the majority of one’s efforts in promoting the happiness of others. Kant’s argument for the reciprocal need to promote the happiness of others shows us that we similarly need to have and take care of close relationships since we all need them. Historically much of the moral work of caring for the psychological and physical health of people has fallen to women, but such an arrangement is not psychologically optimal and, in any case, no longer sustainable in our culture. Instead of having the cultural collapse of close relationships, all adults must take up the slack of providing the physical and psychological care that we all need. In this way we can see that emotionality is a
necessary dimension of universalizability, and a theory of emotional intelligence must be a part of moral theory.

The duty to promote the happiness of others through caring emotionally is intimately connected to the duty to perfect ourselves. Kant’s illustration of universality, the Kingdom of Ends, posits a systematic unity of people who are treated both as means and as ends, and emotional universalism teaches us that our emotions are often the counterparts of other people’s emotions. When we are angry at someone, that person is perhaps angry at us too. When we are hurt by someone, it is sometimes the case that that person was previously hurt by something we did or that he or she is need of sympathy in another respect. This realization does not in any way diminish the importance of our personal emotional needs, but it helps us to see them as a part of a relationship and a community of reciprocal caring. When we become aware of the ways that our emotions are a part of relationships, we are forced to address other people’s emotions in order to fully understand and address our own. The result of this expanded, relational perspective is equality and shared respect. The same thing happens with moral judgments: in achieving a universal perspective we come to see others as equal to us, and we come to see harms as equally bad, no matter to whom they occur. In both cases, this expanded viewpoint makes us more mature. In ceasing to demand special status for our moral judgments, or for our emotions, we put ourselves in a position of equality with other people. It is this mutual recognition that makes us citizens of a common state. We realize that we are no more valuable, and, what is sometimes more important, yet related psychologically, no less valuable.
III. Overcoming Selfishness; Achieving Emotional Egalitarianism and Respect

As we have seen, universalism requires that we recognize the equality between ourselves and others. The second formulation of the categorical imperative is better known for expressing this sentiment: act so as to always treat people (rational beings) as ends in themselves, never as merely a means (G 429). All of the formulations of the categorical imperative are meant to express different facets of the same idea, and, we can see that, overcoming selfishness plays as big of a role in respecting others and oneself as it does in achieving universality. Respecting other people requires that we grant them a right to govern themselves as much as we are able to govern oneself. Here more explicitly we see the inter-relation of self- and other- respect. Furthermore, respecting others requires that we engage them emotionally; in other words, it requires and is a part of emotional intelligence.

The notion of selfishness plays a major role in Kant’s thought, an even bigger role than it should because he often assumes that selfishness and hedonism are at the heart of all immorality. We can follow Kant in recognizing the importance of overcoming selfishness in the cultivation of morality as long as we do not let it hinder the pursuit of self-respect, as Kant’s derogatory view of our “animal nature” sometimes seems to. Selfishness is by definition immoral. Kant often uses the term “self-love” (Eigenliebe) as a synonym for selfishness, and this is unfortunate. In our culture, “self-love” sounds more like the antidote to “self-hate” and akin to self-respect, which is a moral duty, not a temptation. Nevertheless, selfishness, for Kant, entails taking up the immoral maxim, privileging inclination over the moral law. As we have seen, all self-worth and self-respect are premised on respect for morality.
To value the fulfillment of one’s inclinations over the moral law means that one is willing to trample another person’s (or one’s own) dignity in order to fulfill a personal goal. Disrespect might take the form of lying, coercion, or simply a failure to communicate with another person and gain consent. Selfishness can be understood as valuing one’s own goals too highly or as a failure to empathize and recognize the equal worth of other people’s goals. Selfishness can also result from a lack of skill, that which is informally referred to as “social skills.” Such skill is required for recognizing a person as a person in the first place. Without this recognition it is possible to live in an artificially de-populated moral world, caring about a few people perhaps, but ignoring many others. When others do impinge on the consciousness, they are seen as obstacles, not as people. Insensitivity to the demands of morality is then a kind of mental self-centeredness.42

Paradoxically, the antidote to selfishness may be proper self-esteem since it is often not the result of a puffed up sense of self, but of feelings of hurt and vulnerability that makes us justify selfishness as a fulfillment of the need for self-protection. As with the previous reflection on false notions of self-esteem, these thoughts may contribute to a moral psychology of evil.43 Indeed, a good part of the development of emotional intelligence may involve hammering out the difference between self respect and selfishness. Attempting to understand one’s emotions at all may strike some as selfish because it requires the devotion of time and attention to oneself. Nevertheless, this kind of self-centeredness is required by the duty to perfect oneself. Others may think that the fact that we have a privileged relationship to ourselves—because we have the

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43 See Gressis, op. cit.
aforementioned duty to ourselves and not to others—means that Kantian universalism is flawed. Kant nowhere insinuates that having a privileged location, being one self and not another, is problematic. Kant does think that we have a tendency to take our self-favoritism to an immoral length, but this does not mean that the mere fact that we have a different relationship to ourselves than we do to others is problematic. Indeed, it is the choice and responsibility that is enable by the first person perspective that makes morality possible. To know oneself and to be aware of one’s own special needs does not constitute selfishness. Again, it is all too often the case that not being able to recognize and vocalize her opinions, preferences, and needs causes a person to feel threatened by and shut out the opinions, preferences, and needs of others or to blame other people for the fact that she has failed to respect herself. In such a case, respecting others is clearly not even a possibility, even though the person might act very giving, even self-abnegating.

Kant’s distinction between promoting the happiness of others and promoting the perfection of others offers an interesting parallel here. We might be working very hard for others—indeed, devoting our entire lives to them—and still be failing to respect them. Kant argues that we have a duty to promote the welfare of others and a negative duty to promote their moral well-being. In other words, we must refrain from corrupting people but need not be their moral teachers:

For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do”(MM 6:386).

In other words, it is practically impossible to promote the perfection of another person.

Virtue is a function of moral awareness and individual choice. You might think that you
are promoting his perfection, as a parent might force a child to apologize to someone, but perfection is a function of the free will, and so such a parent is only precluding the possibility of virtue in this case (if the child is old enough to be virtuous). At this point, we might think that it is very strange for Kant to make such a distinction: if we cannot possibly promote another person’s virtue, then why should we worry about overstepping our boundaries? Is Kant himself going too far in writing about moral theory and giving lectures on ethics? As long as people are free to make their own decisions, giving rational arguments to sway them, should not be construed as over-stepping the boundaries of respect. The point is: What do we need to do in order to make sure that others are free to make their own decisions? The answer is: respect, and the psychological pre-requisite for this is self-respect. When we are sure about our individual worth and have are aware that we have tried and will continue to try to do that which we perceive to be the best thing, the thing that we have critically determined and continue to examine, then we do not need others to agree with us in order to prop up our convictions. Of course, everyone longs for the perpetual peace of the whole world agreeing with them, but we know that the only taste we will get of this is in the cemetery.

Nevertheless, we must not fall into the trap of thinking that the duty to respect others amounts to a duty to leave them alone. The idea that all people have an inviolable

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44 Up to a certain point, since we obviously would not let someone freely choose to kill another person if we could prevent them.
45 The question of how far to go in trying to affect people’s decision-making is one of primary importance for the cultivation of intellectual virtue, treating people as rational beings, and promoting the happiness of others. In striving to navigate the path between the paternalism of trying too hard to sway someone and the patronization of silently judging someone else’s reasoning to be flawed, we must take into consideration our relationship to the person and the role that we tend to play in it. Bowen family systems theory teaches us that we might be continually “overfunctioning” or “underfunctioning” in our reasoning capacity vis-à-vis another person. In many ways, the task of negotiating the need to respect our own reasoning and the need to respect another person’s reasoning, while being in communication with each other through weathering conflicts, is the primary struggle involved in forging and maintaining relationships.
value is most commonly interpreted as yielding a theory of rights, less often is it analyzed in terms of the requirement to respect another person him or herself. Still, the “Doctrine of Virtue” takes the second formulation of the categorical imperative as its principle; there we see that the second formulation has positive implications for action. On the other hand, the first half of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the “Doctrine of Right” is not based on the idea of respect, but the idea of universality. Interpersonal respect is an extremely difficult notion to hash out, especially because different relationships call for different forms of respect. Nevertheless, Kant goes a considerable distance in helping us comprehend what is morally required of us and a morally informed theory of emotional intelligence should take us even further.

Treating people as equals, and overcoming selfishness, is a necessary prerequisite for respect. Kant sees respect as a keeping of one’s distance, not literally, but in the sense of remembering that someone else is different and separate from oneself. It is contrasted with love, the feeling that one is united with another, even though respect is also necessary for love.\(^{46}\) Kant argues that lack of respect takes the forms of arrogance, defamation, and ridicule.\(^{47}\) Even though Kant makes a strict distinction between moral rationality and pragmatic rationality, assigning moral worth only to the former, he believes that we must respect human rationality in general and the human ability to rationally direct one’s personal conduct. The moral requirement to respect the free choice of others has been called “the priority of the right over the good” in Kant’s ethics, meaning that it is more important to accord individuals with rights than it is to dictate the fulfillment of some notion of goodness. As recent interpreters have argued, this is an

\(^{46}\) See MM, §46, 6:469-470.
\(^{47}\) MM, 6:465.
overstatement, but the truth in this reading is that Kant cautions self-criticism and egalitarianism.

Still, moral egalitarianism requires the we engage in moral inquiry, not just privately, but publicly, respecting the innate ability of all people to be rational. Kantian moral theory assigns significant moral importance to the equal ability of all people to be moral, and it is not good enough simply to leave others alone in order to treat people as ends in themselves. One must not simply refrain from coercing others while seeking one’s own goals, but one must work towards creating a moral community, a Kingdom of Ends, or cosmopolis, wherein everyone’s necessary ends are fulfilled. It is important to consider the ways that promoting the happiness of others and respecting others are two sides of the same coin: we cannot promote the happiness of others without doing so respectfully, and we cannot respect others without also taking their ends as our own.

The second and third formulations of the categorical imperative establish positive moral ideals that are meant to guide relationships. These ideals are often simplified into negative constraints, but in order to be moral we must also engage in the moral inquiry of discovering how to respect rational nature, not just in ourselves, but in all people. Respect is not a given: we are not born knowing how to respect ourselves and others: we discover the needs that are universal as well as idiosyncratic. Along with the positive ends of promoting our own perfection and the happiness of others, the Kingdom of Ends formulation of the categorical imperative, contrary to the way that it is normally interpreted, lays bare the fact that communities are interrelated wholes. The idea that we might all pursue our own goals independently and respect others by leaving them alone

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48 This rights-based way of thinking about moral respect also has the consequence of making caring relationships (and the “private sphere”) amoral.
betrays a very psychologically and morally bankrupt notion of humanity. Of course, we often get caught up in pursuing fame or wealth (although even those goals do not allow for leaving others alone, although they most obviously involve using others as means), but cultivating virtue requires that we take morality seriously, improving ourselves, helping others, and promoting good relationships.

A community of rational beings requires intellectual communication, which requires the ability to negotiate disagreement. Respecting people’s rational ability to make their own decisions cannot mean that we ignore their rational decision-making processes, treating rationality as though it were fundamentally private.\textsuperscript{49} Kant argues that the duty to respect the humanity of every person entails

\[ ... \text{a duty to respect a human being even in the logical use of his reason, a duty not to censure his errors by calling them absurdities, poor judgment and so forth, but rather to suppose that his judgment must yet contain some truth and to seek this out, uncovering at the same time the deceptive illusion } \ldots \text{ The same thing applies to the censure of vice, which must never break out into complete contempt and denial of any moral worth to a vicious human being; for on this supposition he could never be improved, and this is not consistent with the idea of a human being, who as such (as a moral being) can never lose entirely his predisposition to the good. (MM, 6:463-464.)} \]

This is great advice for teachers, friends, lovers, parents, and political pundits: when you think that someone else is wrong, do not jump to character assassinations; try to figure out where they are coming from. As easy as this sounds, the psychological reality of engaging our intellectual opponents is intellectually and emotionally challenging, even exhausting. Nevertheless, accepting this challenge builds emotional intelligence, as some psychologists believe that emotional intelligence is itself akin to coping with stress and

\textsuperscript{49} See Habermas’s argument for the priority of dialogical over monadological reason.
negotiating conflict.\textsuperscript{50} Emotional intelligence is a component of rational discussion and moral discourse itself. Rational discussion does not mean that the emotions are excluded from the discussion. On the contrary, it means that the emotions are included and discussed in a healthy and enlightening way. Emotional egalitarianism dovetails with moral egalitarianism in the sense that both require an openness to the emotions of others. Such is the highest form of emotional intelligence: who could possibly project emotional health and intelligence more than someone who can speak respectfully and intimately with her intellectual opponents without becoming unnecessarily upset or causing offense? Such a person seems like a moral and psychological hero. Conflict is a crucible of both virtue and emotional intelligence, and, in this case, virtue and emotional intelligence seem to be the same thing.

IV. Pure Practical Reason: The Integration of Emotion and Reason

As we have seen, Kantian moral theory encourages self-scrutiny, which is the basis of self-esteem, emotional universalism, and openness to the emotions of others. Kant’s notion of practical reason also includes the idea that scrutinizing one’s motivations better creates a harmoniously integrated self, one in which one’s conscious motivations and one’s unconscious motivations and preconscious thoughts match up. In this way, virtue causes or occasions emotional intelligence. A cognitivist moral theory, like Kant’s, requires that morality be based on reasons; a cognitive theory of emotion holds that emotions are grounded in reasons. When we put the two together, as they are in Kant’s philosophy, we see that morality requires that we uncover the reasons implicit in

\textsuperscript{50} See Zeidner, Matthew, and Roberts, \textit{What We Know About Emotional Intelligence} (2006); and J. Ciarrochi and J. Mayer, eds., \textit{Applying Emotional Intelligence} (2007).
our emotions and morally evaluate them. Furthermore, moral cognition, or thinking about the content of the good, is naturally linked to emotional cognition, since emotions are essentially evaluative. This joint emotional-rational cognition and evaluation creates a more harmoniously unified self, the result of which is, again, self-satisfaction as well as psychological ease.  

For Kant, morality requires that we fulfill our moral duties, but in order to be moral, we must fulfill them not begrudgingly or accidentally, but because we actually want to, because we respect and value the demands of morality and value morality itself and want to do the right thing. Many of us will admit that we often find ourselves conforming to moral requirements because those requirements happen to be easy or beneficial at a particular time. Although we likely pat ourselves on the back anyway, this is not the expression of a genuinely good will. Virtue must instead be the achievement and expression of reflective reason. This requirement for reflection extends to emotional experience.

Many moral theorists believe that Kantian moral theory entails that reason and emotion be pitted in opposition to each other when it comes to morality. It is definitely the case that with the term “inclination” (Neigung) Kant is usually thinking about a selfish inclination, and hence something opposed to morality. As we saw in the previous chapter, the term emotion (Affect) has a negative connotation for Kant, as does passion (Leidung). When Kant talks about emotions he assumes that they are pre-reflective, much less the product of rational reflection, as the feeling (Gefühl) of self-esteem is.

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51 Calhoun discusses possible conflicts between intellectual and experiential beliefs in her “Cognitive Emotions?” My discussion here about knowing oneself and acting consistently parallels her discussion about working towards aligning experiential beliefs with intellectual beliefs, thereby overcoming emotion-belief conflicts.
Nevertheless, when emotions have been reflected on or are the product of rationality, they are praiseworthy. Kantian cognitivism calls for reflection and the production of rational emotions. Moral deliberation requires that we reflect on our moral feelings to discover and evaluate the reasons that are at their base. There is no reason to think that emotional reasons are more likely to be immoral or irrational than our more explicit inclinations. In fact, if the moral sense theorists are right, uncovering the reasons beneath our emotions, and more effectively acting on them, would help us to be better people.

In order to fully illustrate the role that moral reasoning plays in harmonizing inclination and emotion with reason, we can contrast cognitivism with a moral theory that, to my knowledge, no one espouses, but many behaviors reflect, that we can call “affectivism” or “inclinationism.” Most often people base their moral decisions on their moods or on convenience. For example, I personally believe that I should offer people without means of transportation, e.g., hitchhikers and poor people, a ride in my car, provided I do not believe that doing so will endanger me. Although, I have fairly well-developed reasons for this conviction, I hardly ever act on it. My actions in this case, either to offer a ride or not to offer a ride, are usually based on mood and inclination. To be fair, I have reasons for my failures in every case, e.g., I think that my husband might disapprove, I do not want to interact with a stranger, I want to do something else instead and without delay, etc… Still, I do not honestly believe that any of these feelings or reasons outweigh the importance of helping others. When I do give a needy person a ride, it is because my affects support that outcome, e.g., I am feeling particularly leisurely because it is a sunny day and I am not in a rush, or I am feeling particularly loving and confident because some of the circumstances in my life support this mood. Hence my
moral decision, in this case, is based on my mood, not on my considered moral convictions.

(This example sheds light on the interpretive debate concerning Kant’s examples of acting out of duty as opposed to acting in conformity with duty. Many who defend Kant argue that, with his example of the person continuing his life against all inclination, Kant only means to say that it is in the cases where duty and inclination conflict that we can be sure that we are acting from duty. When they are not in conflict, we might still be acting from duty, it is just difficult to tell. My example suggests that it is likely the case that when inclination and duty coincide we are acting out of duty less often than we would like to think.)

It may seem that someone who unapologetically embraces affectivism is more “in touch” with her emotions. My argument is the opposite: that if I were in fact to act on principle more often, or all the time, my behavior would be more emotionally intelligent. I implicitly value my cognitive (and moral) reasons more than my affective (or amoral or, in some cases, immoral) reasons for acting. I feel that the cognitive reasons better represent my ideal (or true) self and that affective causes merely represent a fleeting whim and a failure to live up to my ideal. When I act on principle, I am pleased with myself, and I perceive my failure to so act as a personal flaw, such as cowardice.52

A cognitivist moral theory promotes emotional intelligence by encouraging us to formulate and reevaluate our intellectual principles. Inclinations, even though Kant

52 Of course, it is possible that I have merely held this moral ideal unthinkingly for quite some time and that it is not really well thought-out and does not really include all of the considerations I would like it to include. In that case, I should test my belief by evaluating the reasons that I have for it. Even if my principles are wrong, acting on them helps me to evaluate them. Perhaps, in perpetually offering rides to people, I begin to feel taken advantage of. I therefore begin to doubt whether or not it is good to be charitable in this way all the time, and perhaps I decide to qualify, and thereby alter, the principle.
defines them as habituated desires (which is close to the definition of passion, as we saw in chapter 3), are often more mutable than our more considered principles. When we act on these unstable inclination, we do not learn anything about ourselves, or, rather, anything about our beliefs. We may discover that we are much more likely to listen to an upset friend after we have had a cup of coffee in the morning, but we cannot discover if we should have the coffee in the future, if listening to the friend is something good to do. We may discover that we like pleasing people by giving them compliments, but without an understanding of the principle, or moral reasoning, behind this action, we cannot test whether or not this pleasure is something we value, something we should strive for, and if it is better or worse than any other kind of pleasure. On the other hand, when we assert a conviction and act on it, we are then in a position to learn from our action. If we do not feel like following through, we can scrutinize this feeling. Is it because we are having trouble seeing ourselves as strong and happy? Or is it because we have some real misgivings about the act that might cause us to revise our principles? Either way, we learn about ourselves and are pushed to improve.

Taking morality seriously is, in a sense then, taking ourselves seriously. Emotional intelligence appears to require that we act with conviction, which is a part of having a strengthened sense of self. We can see this in the fact that the failures to know what one wants and to act on this knowledge are related to co-dependent relationships and general malaise. The ability to make choices and stand by those choices, because we believe them to be better than the opposite, is a large part of the ability to engage in emotional commitments, respecting ourselves and others. These commitments are
necessary for and expressions of psychological health but are also themselves, in turn, often morally required.

The Aristotelian picture of virtue paints it as something that should become habit. Kant rejects this description of virtue because he believes that virtue always requires reason. Virtue is not something that we can achieve once and for all; our principles must be “continually purified” (MM, 6:383). Virtue is “always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning” (MM, 6:409). Since Kant describes inclination as habituated desire, basing virtue on habit is akin to basing it on inclination, for Kant, which is practically a contradiction. Of course, Kant does not believe that we must only act begrudgingly in order for our actions to count as virtuous. Critics of Kant object that he describes mere continence not virtue, but Kant’s statement that virtue requires constant thought, or practical reason, does not mean that he believes that virtuous actions will always be difficult for the virtuous person.

Kant’s rejection of virtue as habit demonstrates the importance he places on rational reflection for virtue. To make virtue unthinking, or automatic, is to rob it both of its integrative function and of the merit of rational comprehension of the moral law. Making virtue based on habit is like leaving it to the immediacy of sympathy, or another “moral sense,” as moral sense theory does, leaving it in the untrustworthy sphere of

53 See MM, 6:212.
54 For the articulation of this criticism, see Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 53. As Baron notes, in English, both the words “duty” and “obligation” carry a negative connotation. Baron speculates that for many Americans the term duty is associated with military duty. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, 16. It is hard to imagine a use of the word “duty” that is associated with something we actually want to do. Kant is well-known for contrasting duty and inclination, and it is this contrast that calls into suspicion his insistence that the notion of duty must be at the heart of moral theory. As Paton points out, “in the very idea of duty there is the thought of desires and inclinations to be overcome.” (Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 46.) Kant’s definition of virtue similarly implies this kind of internal conflict. Yet, Auxter points out that the German Verbindlichkeit (obligation), carries a more positive sense of boundedness, as “moral … activity is the basis for the tie we feel with others.” Auxter, Kant's Moral Teleology, 163-164.
impulse. The pursuit of self-perfection involves the cultivation of the powers of the understanding and will “so as to satisfy the requirement of duty”:

A human being has a duty to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition, in which the law become also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. (MM 6:387.)

In short, the very ideas of the good will and of virtue imply that one wants to be good. Does Kant believe that, even though we want to be good, it will always be difficult because we will always harbor selfish inclinations? Although Kant’s language sometimes seems to suggest this, there is no real reason to believe that it is true. Our discussion of the original predisposition to good and evil in human nature in chapter 6 should dispel this idea. Still, virtue, as an expression of the good will, is essentially a project of reason, and the idea that we might one day fully achieve virtue and not have to think about it any more is, again, a suspicious wish.

Virtue is a process of continual rational analysis and decision-making. Pure reason is necessary for grasping the moral law, but, because they are wide duties, duties of virtue must admit empirical information. Nevertheless, there is no reason to understand the word “rational” to mean without emotion. Reasons can be emotionally charged, just as emotions presuppose reasons. We must think with emotion, about emotion, through emotions, and let our emotions have a say in reason. Any thing less than this is irrational. Just as it is obvious that we will always have emotions that we need to experience and

55 Many defenders of Kantian ethics argue that moral goodness need not, and indeed should not, be a conflict between reason and desire, because a truly good person will achieve a kind of total discipline in which desires no longer conflict with morality (See Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 46). I think that there is also merit in not overlooking Kant’s language of struggle.

56 This wish is then easily retro-projected onto Ancient Greece, with its supposedly pre-reflective version of virtue, as a kind of paradise lost. It is, of course, ironic that we have the Germans to thank for this variety of myth making. See George S. Williamson, The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
think through, Kant is convinced that we will always have inclinations that practical reason will need to evaluate and adjust. Kant portrays this process as one of struggle, but we will not see this as offensive, if we keep in mind that it is often in fact the case that confronting one’s selfish tendencies or resistance to acknowledging certain emotions is, in fact, a struggle. It is necessary to recognize the emotional reactions and difficulties that are an intimate part of the human condition. Of course, our inclinations are not always selfish, as Kant would sometimes have us think, and our emotions are, of course, not always based on flawed thinking, but still inclinations and emotions need to be evaluated and integrated with conscious reason and conscience. Without this integration, our emotions are blind and our cognition empty, or, at least, deficient.

Allison discusses a sense in which the work of practical reason is psychologically integrating: he likens practical reason’s ability to unify inclinations under a maxim to speculative reason’s transcendental unity of apperception which unifies all experiences under one consciousness (the “I think”). Practical reason decides which inclinations it will take as motivating forces (see the discussion in chapter 6 of the “Incorporation Thesis”). As Sullivan describes it:

To allow oneself to be ruled by freedom-destroying inclinations is the essence of vice. Pure practical reason thereby requires that we test our maxims to make sure that they are permissible. Freedom requires us to bring all our capacities and inclinations under the rule of reason, but to do so calmly so as not to rely unwittingly on inclinations for motivation.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between mere psychological coherence and moral rectitude. Many recent moral theorists argue that immorality is the same as psychological

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incoherence: for example, Velleman makes such an argument.\textsuperscript{59} Gewirth argues that to deny others the right to freedom and well-being is to deny our own such rights and hence ultimately threatening to the self.\textsuperscript{60} The idea of squaring reason and inclination is common in moral theory, as is the idea that morality and psychological health are related.

Working in the Kantian tradition, some theorists interested in the notion of autonomy have developed it into the more robust idea of reflectively endorsing one’s volitions, in the sense of discovering and acting on one’s “true” desires. Frankfurt has an “authenticity” interpretation of autonomy, holding that autonomy requires that one’s second-order desires identify with one’s first-order desires.\textsuperscript{61} Wolf characterizes Frankfurt’s theory of freedom as a “Real Self Theory” because he believes, along the same lines as Kant’s notion of autonomy, that an action is free if it issues from the true self.\textsuperscript{62} The self of pure reason is our most true self, for Kant, but for Frankfurt the true self is more immanent to our desires. We may or may not identify with our desires, but those desires that best express the self are those with which we are most involved, to the point of having, what he calls “volitional necessity.”\textsuperscript{63}

Both the means of and motivation for these types of arguments are strange to me. A fuller discussion of Kantian autonomy will follow in chapter 6, wherein we will see that this tendency to break Kant’s equation between autonomy, pure reason, and the categorical imperative is common. Whether or not these attempts to prove that self-coherence and moral worth are the same thing are successful, they overlook the necessary

\textsuperscript{59} Vellman (1989), 306.
\textsuperscript{60} Gewirth (1991), 74.
\textsuperscript{61} Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in \textit{The Importance of What We Care About} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
\textsuperscript{63} Frankfurt, \textit{The Importance of What We Care About}, 86.
content of moral reasoning, i.e., the categorical imperative. At the level of morality, reason unifies inclination according to the thought of pure lawfulness, or universality. Virtue also requires that we adopt virtuous maxims, viz., to perfect ourselves and promote the happiness of others. Morality, therefore, requires a higher level of reflection. Not only do we consciously decide what we are going to do, as Allison suggests, but we question whether or not it is really the right thing to do. Moral deliberation requires that we reflect on our emotions, discover their cognitive bases, and then try to square those cognitions with comprehension of the moral law, and process of moral deliberation has the effect of promoting psychological health.

It is true that desires and emotions often contain or accompany self-referential evaluations, but it seems mistaken to suggest that goals are important because we care about them. They are important to us because we care about them, but that conclusion is tautological and we need to ask the question “should this be important to me?” Herman argues that we ought to be critical of our desires and ends, especially in our intimate relationships, but we should not think that moral deliberation must take us away from these ends. Instead, it is a part of them, and enhances them. On the other hand, sympathy and caring can sometimes be false moral impulses: we also need to evaluate our emotions with an eye to their effectiveness in promoting good outcomes. In some ways, as Solomon polemically argues, emotions are acts, and as such, they themselves should be morally evaluated. Our feelings about our emotions (or higher-level beliefs) are a good place to start when seeking to evaluate our emotions, but moral evaluation must

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64 Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment, 197-198.
go farther. It is sometimes necessary to bring in transcendent standards, e.g., universality and respect, in order to more fully scrutinize and evaluate ourselves.

Someone might object that in refusing certain inclinations, we are not unifying inclination and reason at all, but repressing one, yielding nothing but internal strife. Someone might also object that what I am describing is not really a moral phenomenon, but simply the product of conscious reflection, and Frankfurt’s notion of second-order identification is a kinder and gentler, as well as more truly integrating account of the integration of reason and emotion. The retort to both of these suspicions is linked to this conviction that consciousness of duty, or compulsion under the moral law, is a “fact of reason” and that morality is a natural human calling. Kant calls the moral law a “fact of reason.” In other words, we are conscious of moral constraint. At the most foundational level of his argument Kant appeals to common sentiment. People do, in fact, feel the authority of morality (a psychological examination of the problems associated with denying one’s moral feelings demonstrates this). We might amorally reflect on our emotions and integrate them with pragmatic reason, but there is no guarantee that we will feel any real identity to this integrated consciousness. On the other hand, there is a sense in which Kant’s notion of duty promises to uncover our true selves. The “purity” of moral reason refers not merely to the exclusion of empirical determination, but also to its superlativeness. Our moral/rational consciousness is also the truth of our emotions.

While we cannot simply assume that our inclinations gracefully bow out as soon as we

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66 Baier argues that to recognize a reason as a moral reason and yet not act on it is to act irrationally. Baier (1978), 249.
67 Although Kant does try to justify the possible purity of practical reason by arguing that the solution to the third Antinomy relies on it See Beck, *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason*, 170-175.
choose not to follow them, there is no reason to think that they are insensitive to reason or essentially stubborn and fixed.69

We need not think of the struggle between reason and inclination as a violent one. Just as one meaning of discipline implies force and punishment, there are also other means of discipline that are loving. When we talk of disciplining children we often think of spanking—perhaps this the reason so many parents are afraid to discipline—but instead of beating down our inclinations we might just as easily talk of helping them ascend to the level of principle through reason. Munzel argues that, since Kant believes that we have a natural consciousness of our moral capacity and that his theory of human nature shows that it is responsive to moral direction; it does not need to be dominated.70 Indeed, Kant discusses reason much more frequently than he discusses struggle, and yet it is often easy for us to overlook the normal means by which reason relates to inclination, namely by reasoning. Instead, the notion of discipline that most of us tend to have in mind is decidedly irrational.

In the “Critique of Teleological Judgment,” when referring to man as the ultimate purpose of nature, Kant discusses discipline first as the ability to deny oneself, “the liberation of the will from the despotism of desire” and then as the ability critically reflect on one’s connection to the pursuit of pleasure:

[W]e allow ourselves to be fettered by the impulses that nature gave us only as guides so that we would not neglect or even injure our animal characteristics; whereas in fact we are free enough to tighten or to slacken them, to lengthen or to shorten them, as the purposes of reason require. (CJ §83)

69 Nevertheless, admitting that the emotions are not irrational means that they too must play a role in moral deliberation, although not as blind intuitions, but as the markers of well-reflected reasons. We might liken this kind of back and forth characteristic of moral deliberation to Rawls’s notion of the reflective equilibrium between moral theory and experience.
70 Felicitas G. Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 305.
Next Kant discusses the disciplines of art and science for their role in initiating man into the realm of his higher purpose. In true Aristotelian fashion, Kant then argues that the final purpose of existence “is a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of its possibility” (CJ §84). Making use of his notion of purity, which will be further discussed in the next chapter, Kant implies that moral “unconditioned legislation regarding purposes” constitutes the purpose without a purpose or the unconditioned condition. Although discipline is at first defined only negatively, in the end it looks to moral ends to give it content and inform whether or not we must “tighten or slacken” our pursuit of pleasure.

Grounding morality in a fact of reason has important consequences for our discussion of emotional intelligence: it entails that the moral law will always be that principle to which we subjectively give the most credence, and if it turns out that we are following false moral principles, our confusion should be reflected in a lack of endorsement by our own internal moral sense. Kantian moral theory offers us guidance, but it cannot think or feel for us. Instead, it acknowledges the real, subjective moral situation in which we find ourselves. Kant’s notion of conscience should not be understood as an immediately transparent internal knowledge, but, again, something that requires self-scrutiny and moral deliberation.

The previous section, and this chapter overall, helps us to see that we should not always understand moral psychology in opposition to moral theory, as though one is

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71 Moral theory often errs in transcending this reality, which is also an exigency. In taking over the question of “what should be done?” from the subject, it removes itself from the feeling that something needs to be done. Allowing itself to get lost in theoretical debate, it forgets that moral consciousness is not only conative, but also a consciousness of compulsion.
empirical and the other is normative. The notion of emotional intelligence shows us that psychology relies on normativity, and moral behavior must itself be understood psychologically. Along these same lines, one might notice in this chapter a lack of discussion about specific moral dictates prescribed by the categorical imperative and consider it strange, since it is thought that moral theory is supposed to tell us what to do. Perhaps, on the other hand, the common criticism that the categorical imperative cannot truly guide action is not a criticism at all, but one of the merits of Kantian moral theory. I do think that the categorical imperative is sufficient as a principle for guiding reflection; nevertheless, guiding reflection should not be misunderstood a prescribing action. Kant makes this clear in a number of places, most notably with his inclusion of “casuistical questions” in the “Doctrine of Virtue” that conspicuously leave out the answers. By making morality a function of reason, Kant ensures that moral reasoners will always feel the responsibility to think for themselves and will not accept the conclusions of others second-hand or be side-tracked from moral action by moral theory.

In the beginning of this chapter I stated that I agree with the contention of moral cognitivism that there really are moral truths. Even the reader who thinks of herself as taking morality seriously may wince at the thought that people will inevitably disagree on moral matters and these conflicts are only worsened by stubbornness. Moral cognitivism must maintain space for people to admit that they are wrong and learn from their mistakes. I have perhaps strayed from the spirit of Kantianism by suggesting that one’s moral principles are and should be open to revision. Kant never suggests that one can be mistaken in her consciousness of the moral law, and he follows the traditional

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interpretation of conscience, viz., that it is right. This is where I part company with Kant. Nevertheless, after our long discussion of self-struggle and self-scrutiny, we cannot see this as a serious disagreement. If we agree that there is a moral law, the addendum that we must continually work to find it might be considered minor. It is likely that my approach is related to my conviction that the emotions and reason are more enmeshed and his is related to his assumption that they are the product of different faculties: if emotion and reason are merely different modes of that which is essentially the same consciousness, reason cannot be viewed as a pure and unchanging grasp of lawfulness. In order to achieve universalism, we must take on another person’s, or many other people’s, perspectives, using the same reason that may have been clouded in the first place. In theory, universalism yields the most rational and correct viewpoint. In practice, the goal of truth is reached only circuitously, if at all, but this does not tarnish the goal itself.

In the *Anthology*, Kant gives three guidelines for achieving wisdom: “1) Think for yourself; 2) (in communication with other people) Put yourself in the place of the other person; 3) Always think by remaining faithful to your own self” (A §43). He reiterates these rules a while later and phrases the third one thusly: “Always think in harmony with your own self”(A §59). Here we have a nice summary of the points that have been covered in this chapter: scrutinizing oneself is akin to thinking independently, albeit in a way that is directed toward oneself; universalizing one’s emotions and maxims involves putting oneself in the place of the other person, or, more generally, scrutinizing oneself further requires thinking in communication with other people; lastly, practical reason involves thinking in harmony with oneself.
Although the emphasis in Kant’s philosophy and within Kant scholarship on principle and consistency may sometimes overshadow the importance of constantly striving toward moral ideals, this chapter has hopefully painted a picture of practical reason that is more comfortable with flux and revision. Indeed, in a world where “ought” only implies “can try,” we must sacrifice having our actions match up with our principles in order to ensure that we can have some grasp on correct principles in the first place. The idea of being in harmony with oneself is more hermeneutically helpful than the monotonous consistency with which Kantian deonotology is most often associated. This is the Pythagorean definition of the healthy soul, which is the goal of both Kantian moral theory and the psychology of emotional intelligence.

In concluding her study of the Metaphysics of Morals, Gregor remarks that “even a cursory reading of [it] reveals that Kant’s systematic application of the categorical imperative is a far different procedure from that usually attributed to him.” She argues that logical consistency is not the criterion of permissibility; instead “a teleological consistency between our maxim and our objective, rational ends” is morally required.\(^73\) In other words, having a virtuous disposition is half the battle. We must have an intellectual grasp of moral duty, and we must act on it. As with our discussion of the mistake involved in comparing emotional intelligence with the innateness of cognitive intelligence, Kant defines virtue in terms of disposition and then precludes the possibility of knowing whether or not one does in fact have a virtuous disposition. Virtue, like emotional intelligence, must be understood in terms of behavior. It is perhaps the abstraction of intention from behavior, as well as neglect of Kant’s theory of virtue, that has led moral theory to detach itself from personal relationships and the understanding of

\(^{73}\) Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 203.
psychology that is required for having them. Reconciling moral theory and moral psychology through the moral notion of emotional intelligence will hopefully make moral theory more useful and psychology more healthful.
CHAPTER V

THE CONTENT OF KANTIAN “FORMALISM”

My discussion, in chapter 4, of the emotionally enlightening aspects of Kant’s moral theory may have left some readers bewildered. Kant is seldom praised for his moral psychology. Quite to the contrary: he has become contemporary moral theory’s favorite whipping boy. Even while the Stoics are respected for their theory of emotion, while Kant is criticized as ascetic, un-self-aware, even schizophrenic.¹ Of course, critics of Kant are not without textual ammunition. Kant, like most philosophers, tends to think in dichotomies and prefers distinctions to analogies. One dichotomy in particular pervades Kant’s opus and seems to preclude a cognitive theory of emotion, making my argument that Kant’s moral theory can aid in cultivating emotional intelligence appear paradoxical at best: namely his dichotomy between reason, which is often described as “pure”; and “sensibility,” which pertains to the empirical, or a posteriori, elements of experience. In the context of Kant’s moral theory, this opposition makes its appearance, and draws the most criticism, as what is referred to as “Kantian formalism.” Kantian formalism has a long history of both critics and defenders. My strategy is different: I argue that Kant’s ethics should not be understood as a “formalism” at all and that Kant’s remarks about the form of the will and formal principles are better interpreted as a restatement of his universalism. To insist on calling Kant’s ethics “formal” is to reify a dichotomy that his moral theory can better do without.

¹ For example: Nussbaum’s *Upheavals of Thought* and Stocker’s “The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theory.”
Kant’s moral theory is often called a “formalism,” but the explanation for this label is just as often confusing. According to Habermas, formalism requires that moral judgments take the “form of unconditionally universal ought statements.”\(^2\) This explanation fails to differentiate formalism from universalism, i.e., the requirement that moral judgments hold for all people. Indeed, when we look closely at Kant’s references to form in his practical philosophy,\(^3\) we see that his formalism boils down to nothing more than a restatement, or attempted deduction, of his universalism. In this chapter I examine the variety of ways that Kant attempts to account for the formalism of moral decision-making. I argue that the many attempted distinctions between form and matter—or content, or ends, consequences, incentives, purposes, effects—all fail. Furthermore, Kant’s language of form, or the exclusion of the ends from the determination of the will, becomes unsustainably conflicted when he introduces his idea of the necessary ends of morality.

Kant’s ethics is, in fact, weaker because of its attempt to explain morality in terms of formalism. Not only does Kant make himself vulnerable to the criticism of coldness; the argument for formalism also leads him to overlook the distinction between moral and pragmatic principles, since both can be formal (a point taken up in the next chapter).\(^4\) After my consideration of the many possible ways of explaining formalism, I discuss the connection between the attempted formalism and the tendency to construe the good will as merely a gatekeeper of desires that prevents certain desires from being effective.

Instead, the good will should be seen as itself a desire and the creator of an aggregate of

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\(^2\) Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, 64.

\(^3\) It is possible that Kant introduces the term “form” in his moral theory either partly or wholly as a result of his desire to establish parallels between his theoretical and practical philosophy.

\(^4\) This problem would similarly follow from employing the idea of form from the first *Critique* for a disanalogous role in the second *Critique*. 
morally informed desires: it is itself productive, not just the inhibitor of immoral actions. The gatekeeper reading is perhaps responsible for the criticism that Kant lacks an adequate moral psychology, a criticism that is misplaced. Focusing instead on Kant’s theory of virtue shows us that reason can and must inform the choice of ends; only then is emotional intelligence, indeed, virtue itself, even possible.\(^5\)

I. What Does “Formalism” Mean?

Kant’s use of the notion of form, and his alleged formalism, are remarkably difficult to pin down. He begin with the insistence that form must be separated from content, and the form of universalism is supposedly derived in this way, but as his argument progresses, he explains that form and content are necessarily interrelated. Kant first introduces the notion of form in the *Groundwork* when trying to explain the way that the good will is unconditionally good irrespective of its “usefulness or fruitfulness” (*Nützlichkeit oder Fruchtlosigkeit*) (G 394). Kant makes use of the notion of form after he has given his argument for the special purpose of reason, which has not ended terribly successfully (showing only that reason is not very good at seeking happiness, not that instinct or any other faculty is better). He writes:

From the preceding discussion it is clear that the purposes we may have for our actions and their effects as ends and incentives of the will cannot give the actions any unconditional and moral worth. Wherein, then, can this worth lie, if not in the will in its relation to its hoped for effect? It can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will irrespective of the ends which can be realized by such action. For the will stands, as it were, at the crossroads halfway between its a priori principle which is formal and its a posteriori incentive which is material. Since it must be determined by something, if it is done from duty it must be determined by the formal

\(^5\) In this way, my interpretation of Kant has much in common with Barbara Herman’s emphasis of practical reason.
principle of volition as such, since every material principle has been withdrawn from it. (G 400)

This picture of the will at a crossroads is quite intriguing. It could be interpreted to mean that the will requires both formal and material elements, as Kant seems to argue later, but that is not the typical meaning of “being at a crossroads” (auf einem Scheidewege), and the following sentence makes it clear that Kant means that we must choose between formal (a priori) and material (a posteriori) determination. Still, the fact that the divergence of the two roads is simultaneously a coming together foreshadows Kant’s later inclusivity.

For those familiar with the first Critique, wherein Kant insists on the necessary unity of the form and content (both in the case of intuition and understanding, as the two sets of forms turn out to be interrelated), this use of the notion of form in order to contrast form and content, and even rid the latter from the former, is surprising. Drawing on the first Critique, Beck’s interpretation of Kantian formalism focuses on the necessary interdependence between form and matter, which can be gleaned from pieces of text we will consider shortly, especially the second Critique’s presentation of the argument. Beck writes:

[Kant’s] theorem disqualifies only those maxims which are chosen to guide conduct because of the content, i.e., because of their reference to an object of desire (material) as the determining factor. All maxims have material, but only the latter are material maxims. Content (object of desire) without form is blind impulse; form without object of desire is practically ineffective—this is as true of Kant’s ethics as the corresponding sentence in the first Critique is of his theory of knowledge.⁶

This mutual dependence is not the relationship Kant has in mind when he first brings up the notion of form in the Groundwork; the only parallel between the Groundwork’s use of

⁶ Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 96.
the notion of form, as we have just seen it, and the first *Critique* is that for both the notion of form bears a special affinity to the notion of the a priori.

Kant uses a number of different terms to characterize a posteriori motivation. “Material” is given as synonymous with “intended result” (“was aus ihr erfolgen soll”), “result” (*Erfolg*), and the ends or purpose (*Zwecke* or *Absicht*) of an action. He quickly hones in on the term “effect,” (*Wirkung* or *Wirkungen*, which is also translated as “consequences”) contrasting those actions that are done to bring about some effect with those actions that are done because they conform to a formal principle, which, he argues, must be “the conception of law itself” (*G* 401). This implies that the motive of universalism is the only possible a priori determination of the will; yet in the previous quote, Kant implies that all principles are formal by defining the formal aspect of the will as its principle. Kant later distinguishes between formal and material principles, but here this looseness serves his purposes. Indeed, the phrase “the form of the will” is singular.

The will is essentially the faculty of acting on maxims; the form of the will is a maxim, which is a principle or a universal. Therefore, *the* form of the will is universality.

The notion of the form of the will is instrumental for introducing the idea of universalism and the first formulation of the categorical imperative. The word “form” is given as synonymous with the word “principle.” Kant’s argument for, or presentation of, the first version of the categorical imperative runs as follows:

1. A “good will” is something good regardless of consequences.
2. Motivation by intended consequences constitutes all the possible *content* of a will.
3. If we remove all of the possible content from the idea of a will, we are left with the form of a will.

4. The form of a will is universality, or lawfulness, since a will is the faculty of acting according to the understanding of laws.

5. Therefore, a good will is determined not by its content, but by its form, universality.

6. Therefore a good will is a will that conforms to universality.\(^7\)

As we see, here Kant’s use of the notion of form is tied to the introduction of the first formulation of the categorical imperative and the notion of universality: it refers to the form of the will, or universality.\(^8\) Furthermore, it is important to note that this use of the notion of form specifically requires its opposition to content, regardless of whether we call this content the “ends,” “effects,” or “results” of an action.\(^9\)

In order to derive universality as the form of the will in this way, Kant must conflate a principle with an intention, i.e., he must assume that every intention is

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\(^7\) There are obviously a number of problems with this argument, but we should not feel the need to defend it or to criticize Kant on this score. Kant does not even present it as an argument, much less is it a deduction of the categorical imperative, as Kant believes the moral law needs no “justification.” Nor is this the only formulation of the moral law, so Kant has other means of convincing us, should this one fail.

\(^8\) It is difficult to state Kant’s formalism at all without resorting to his universalism: in his Introduction to the Groundwork, Beck writes, “Since we have, in the examples, taken away the contents of the maxim (the wants and desires of the persons), nothing is left to be determined by the law except the form of the maxim; its form must be such as to exclude any contents that would prevent the maxim from itself being universal, i.e., valid for all persons as rational beings regardless of their specific desires. The maxim must, in effect, be capable of being a universal law for all rational beings.” Beck, *A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, xiii. The point seems to be that it is a method of subtraction that leads to universalism, following Kant’s presentation of the idea of the form of the will, or universality.

\(^9\) Kant’s third use of the notion of form in the *Groundwork* is rather different than the preceding. The second expression of the first version of the categorical imperative is the “Law of Nature” formulation. Therein, Kant states that “nature” refers to “the existence of things so far as it is determined by universals laws;” nature, in this sense, is the form of phenomena (G 421). This use of the term is clearly distinct from the previous because it implies correlation between form and matter much more than contrast. As we shall see, many attempt to defend Kant’s notion of formalism precisely by means of the fact that the notion of form seems to require the inclusion of content. Nevertheless, as we have seen, this is not the meaning of “form” of which Kant has heretofore made use, even if it turns out that empirical content is necessary for moral decision-making. Kant uses the word again in this sense on G 438.
universal or law-like in some way. Here the argument really runs: wills are formed by their intentions; intentions are law-like; hence the form of the will is universality. As we shall see, if the form of a will is simply its principle, then the distinction between “content” and “form” becomes the rather flimsy idea that one comes before and the other after action. Since a principle contains reference to the effects of the action, the difference between it and its “content” cannot be anything more than modal.

The fourth use of the term “form” in the *Groundwork* introduces the idea of formal and material principles: “practical principles are formal when they disregard all subjective purposes; they are material when they have subjective purposes and thus certain incentives as their basis” (G 427). For those familiar with Kant’s moral philosophy, it is clear that Kant never means to imply that there is ultimately more than one formal principle, the moral law; referring to formal principles highlights all of the many actions that can possibly conform to the moral law.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, wherein Kant devotes even more time to the notion of formalism, Kant’s discussion of form is largely focused on the ideas of formal and material principles. In the beginning of the “Analytic” Kant lays out three theorems. The first theorem states that empirical principles (or principles that presuppose an object/matter) lack objective necessity. The second theorem is that “all material principles… belong under the general principle of self-love or one’s own happiness” (CPrR 22).

In general, the second *Critique*’s explanation of formalism is tied much more closely to the notions of subjectivity and objectivity. Kant makes use of these notions in the *Groundwork*, but later they come to the forefront. Kant tries to explain the ways that
actions undertaken for the sake of some physical objects are subjective, and hence cannot be commanded by (objective) practical laws. In his “Comment” on this “Explication” of the principles of pure practical reason, Kant argues that the idea of a practical law and the idea of validity regardless of consequences are reciprocal concepts. A practical law yields exactly that imperative that is not relative to the ends to be achieved by the action and the desirability of those ends. Content is a problem because it is subjective, and subjectivity evades universality.

The third theorem follows the presentation of formalism in the *Groundwork* more closely, drawing an equation between a universal law and the form of a principle. Here Kant explicitly states that all practical principles have matter, but that only in the case of material principles does this matter actually determine the principle. Again, Kant writes that if we subtract all of the matter as a possible determining basis of the will, then only the form of the will is left, which is “the mere form of a universal legislation” (CPrR 27). Therefore, if form and matter are opposed, they are not opposed in competition for a place in the will, but merely a place determining the will. The will being at a crossroads is therefore a good image since in one sense form and content are united in the will, and in another sense they diverge.

Kant’s distinction between the matter of the will, which is a necessary component of the will, and material determination of the will is tricky. It amounts to a distinction between the action itself (or the physical goal of the action, that which the action aims to bring about materially) and the reason or rational purpose for the action. We might say that this is roughly a distinction between the intention and effects of an action. The problem is that it seems impossible to formulate an intention for action without reference
to an intended effect. Indeed, Kant sometimes attempts to distinguish between purposes or ends (Zwecke) and effects or consequences (Wirkungen) in order to help articulate the difference between the material of the will, which is a necessary component, and material determination, which is morally problematic. After introducing the idea in the *Groundwork* that rational being is a necessary end, Kant makes a distinction between the taking up of a purpose or an end (Zweck) that is given by reason alone, which still allows the ground/motive of the action to be objective, and an end that aims at an effect (Wirkung):

That which serves the will as its objective ground of its self-determination is a purpose (Zweck), and if it is given by reason alone it must hold alike for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which contains the ground of the possibility of the action, whose result is an end, is called the means.” (G 427)

It seems as though Kant hopes to make the “purpose” of an action appear as something more internal and more closely related to the meaning of “motive.” Kant seems to think that he can make the distinction between actions that are the product of a good will and those that are not by means of the distinction between “purposes” that are in the mind and “effects” that are physical. Instead, the only source for objectivity of the will that Kant gives is the universality of the principle of the action. Every physical goal will first be mentally comprehended: it will first find a place in the motive and then, when it is enacted, it will have physical reality. Of course, some motives are good and some are evil, but the distinction between “purposes” and motives that aim at “effects” does not do a very good job expressing the content of a good will.

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10 Herman makes this point in Barbara Herman, *Morality as Rationality: A Study of Kant’s Ethics* (New York: Garland, 1990).
The very nature of intentional action involves a motive, which is a mental entity, that aims at a physical effect, which is then brought about. (We must not be confused into thinking that the fact that actions can have unintended or indirect consequences does not change the fact that the purpose of the action must include a reference to the intended effects of the action. The idea of intentional action includes only that content that is intentional.) If I aim at buying a coat for a homeless person, my object is both phenomenal (the coat itself) and noumenal (the idea of the coat as something that can help). If the end of my action is another person’s happiness, then my goal must be to bring about the objects that are a part of my plan to promote this happiness.\footnote{For this reason Herman holds that hypothetical imperatives are just as important for moral reasoning and categorical imperatives. I think that it is unnecessary to bring in the term “hypothetical imperative” here to describe a part of practical reasoning and that doing so risks taking the term out of context of Kant’s distinction, wherein it refers to actions that are undertaken myopically, as it were, only to achieve a particular end, not because of a consideration of the universality of the end.}

Examples of negative duties, whereby we refrain from some action, help us illustrate the possibility of making a distinction between choice based on the (rational) “purposes” (or motive) and the effects of an action more than positive duties do. When we refrain from lying, even though the lie would bring benefit, we are not choosing in favor of the consequence of benefit, but we are choosing not to lie because doing so is wrong (this is a purely intangible reason, seemingly disconnected from a physical effect). On the other hand, when we help someone in need, it appears that we do act for the sake of a certain consequence, viz., the benefit of the person in need. Still, it is possible to shift our way of thinking and argue that negative duties still bring about ends, such as the demonstration of a good will, truthfulness in the world, or even the simple act of keeping our mouth shut.
Failing to grasp the necessary connection between purpose and effect, taking Kant’s formalism at face value, may be the cause for the unnecessarily strong emphasis placed on negative duties in accounts of Kant’s ethics. Instead, when we fully understand that “purpose” and “effect” are related, we can better understand Kant’s discussion of a good will. A good will is something on which we must follow through. If, for example, our end is to not overcharge our customers, we cannot rightly boast a good will, unless this end is related to further goal to bring about goodness of character and having our actions conform to the universal law of morality. Of course, normally we focus much more attention on our immediate goals, and this leads us to forget about the role of moral principles in our lives. Nevertheless, moral goodness is essentially the adoption of a good, pure will, and, in order to test our moral goodness, we must shift our focus away from our immediate goals and onto the more distant end of moral goodness. This end, even though it is moral-psychological, still requires that we do certain things and bring about real effects. Thus, as we have previously discussed, there is the duty to take the moral law as one’s end and the duty to self-scrutinize.

Do we help someone in need in order to bring about the effect of his happiness or do we do it because it is the right thing to do? If we understand the necessary relationship between motivation and end, this question, as well as Stocker’s example of visiting a friend in the hospital purely out of duty, does not make sense.\textsuperscript{12} It does not make sense because the right thing to do is to promote the happiness of others. We promote the happiness of others because we care about the happiness of others; we care about the happiness of others because we really do care about the happiness of others. We really do

care about the happiness of others because it is the right thing to do. Nevertheless, it is the right thing to do because it is the happiness of others. Imagine someone asking you while you are getting clothes together to donate to the needy: Are you doing that because you care about the people who need clothes or are you doing it because it is the right thing to do? You will most likely answer “both.” They are the same because we have a moral compass that informs and guides our feelings and concerns. Such moral direction has been operative in our upbringing, and is an inseparable part of our intuition, psychology, and development of emotional intelligence.

Kant continues on to develop the notion of formalism in terms of the distinction between motive and incentive. He offers us another distinction: Some purposes are purely rational and they offer us motives (Bewegungsgrund) (since the idea of an action without any purpose seems self-contradictory), but other purposes, which are empirical and the objects of inclination, stand as incentives (Triebfedern).\(^{13}\) Obviously the term “incentive” connotes some kind of selfish benefit for Kant. The German, Treibfedern, is related to the word for drive or desire, Trieb, and so it is conceptually connected to what Kant considers the “lower” or animalistic faculties. In his Lectures on Moral Philosophy, Kant distinguished between objective and subjective motives (motivum subjecte movens and motivum objecte movens) as those reasons for action that only refer to subjective benefit and those reasons that can hold universally. Similarly, in the Preface to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant distinguishes between moral and pathological principles with a reference to personal happiness:

\(^{13}\) We might also try to make a distinction with the term “interest,” but Kant clearly states that both moral and immoral actions are the product of interests: “an interest is that in virtue of which reason becomes practical” (G 460).
For on the one hand he ought to fulfill his duty without first asking what effect this will have on his happiness, and so on moral grounds; but on the other hand he can recognize that something is his duty only by whether he can count on gaining happiness by doing it, and so in accordance with a pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the moral principle. (MM 6:378)

Kant argues that the “consequences” of an action are irrelevant to moral decision-making because they are only of interest to the particular actor, not objectively, or universally valuable (G 427-428).\(^\text{14}\) It seems that Kant conflates consequences that benefit the subject in a merely selfish way, as he takes personal happiness to, with all consequences. (Kant often conflates selfishness and sensuousness because he thinks of sensibility as based on instincts for survival.\(^\text{15}\))

Even if it were possible to make a distinction between the will having matter and the will being determined by that matter, this explanation runs up against even more trouble when we consider Kant’s notion of necessary moral ends. Moral worth was to be measured without reference to the “ends”(Zwecke) of the action (G 400), or at least these ends were not to determine the will, but the idea that rational being is a necessary end for the good will calls for a revision of this restriction.

II. The Formalism of Necessary Ends

Even though the Groundwork and second Critique both contain a discussion of necessary ends (since Kant defines virtue as having a good will and a good will is one that has pure intentions), Kant most fully develops the idea of the necessary moral ends in

\(^{14}\) Beck makes a distinction between the term motive and the term intention. I believe his point is that motives can be abstract, e.g., one can have the moral law as a motive. An intention, on the other hand, is concrete and to bring about some end. In a moral act, you desire some end only because you have already judged it to be moral; hence the judgment guides the intention.

\(^{15}\) Beck follows Kant in this elision. Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, 216-217.
his “Doctrine of Virtue.” It is strange that the “Doctrine of Right” has received more attention than Kant’s “Doctrine of Virtue” with its discussion of the necessary, moral ends of the will. The “Doctrine of Right” treats only those laws that can be legislated externally and so does not truly belong to ethics proper. Nevertheless, there has been a strong liberal pull in Kant interpretation.

In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant directly contradicts his previous “formalism” by asserting that

ethics goes beyond [the formal condition of outer freedom dealt with by the doctrine of right] and provides a matter (an object of free choice), an end of pure reason, which it represents as an end that is also objectively necessary, that is, an end that, as far as human beings are concerned, it is a duty to have. (MM 6: 381)

Kant argues that if there were no such thing as morally necessary ends, the categorical imperative and morality itself would be impossible (MM 6:385). Kant makes this same argument in the *Groundwork*, stating that the idea of a necessary end is required in order to be the source of absolute moral value, but there his discussion of formalism overshadows it (G 428). Still, he writes that the necessary end of rational being is the difference between a hypothetical and categorical imperative. In the “Doctrine of Virtue” Kant seems to have given up his connection between formalism and morality entirely, as he continues to call the doctrine of right a “formal” discipline while ethics is “material”:

Those duties that have to do not so much with a certain end (matter, object of choice) as merely with what is formal in the moral determination of the will (e.g., that an action in conformity with duty must also be done from duty) are not duties of virtue. Only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue. For this reason there are several duties of virtue (and also

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16 Contrariwise, Kant argues that hypothetical imperatives necessarily miss their mark as foundations for moral worth because, in order to make them into categorical imperatives we must have another law that makes their end necessary (G 444).
various virtues), whereas for the first kind of duty one (virtuous
disposition) is thought, which however holds for all actions. (MM 6:
383)\(^{17}\)

Nevertheless, Kant does not consistently attempt to distinguish right from virtue in terms
of form and matter; the essential distinction is that rights are the object of external
coercion and virtues can only be the result of “free self-constraint” (MM 6:383). Instead,
the notion of formalism seems to have fallen away from his moral and political theory.

In the *Groundwork*, after describing the rational being and the kingdom of ends
formulations of the categorical imperative, Kant makes use of the notion of form once
again in order to explain the relationship between the three formulations of the
categorical imperative:

> All maxims have:
> 1. A form, which consists in universality, and in this
>     respect the formula of the moral imperative requires that
>     maxims be chosen as though they should hold as
>     universal laws of nature.
> 2. A material (*Maxime*) (i.e., an end), and in this respect the
>     formula says that the rational being, has by its nature an
>     end and thus an end in itself, must serve in every maxim
>     as the condition restricting all merely relative and
>     arbitrary ends.
> 3. A complete determination of all maxims by the formula
>     that all maxims which stem from autonomous legislation
>     ought to harmonize with a possible realm of ends as with
>     a realm of nature.\(^ {18}\)  (G 436)

\(^{17}\) Here Kant writes that the duty of right, insofar as the external demands of right are command morally at
all, is to have the moral disposition. Later Kant writes that this is a duty of virtue. It would seem that having
duty as one’s action be done from the intention to do one’s duty is an end, although not an external end.
Nevertheless, the “Doctrine of Virtue shows that ends are both external and internal (or states of mind and
states of the world). I believe that Kant’s distinction between form and matter still continues to confuse him
here: now that he is clear that there are necessary moral ends, he has trouble describing the doctrine of right
without them.

\(^{18}\) It is interesting to note that Kant uses the word “form” after this, and even once before this as a verb, but
always in different contexts, not in the service of describing unconditional moral worth. It is as though
Kant feels the need to carry through with the introduction of the term, but is no longer committed to its
original sense.
Not only are form and matter mutually implicated, but the tripartite organization implies that they are only fully complete when united. Here Kant explains that all maxims have an end and that the categorical imperative regulates the choice of end.\(^1\) Ends can be relative and contingent or morally necessary. The categorical imperative regulates the choice of ends, sometimes negatively, forbidding some ends, and sometimes positively, guiding the adoption of others.

In the second *Critique*’s presentation of formalism, Kant seems to be aware of the problem to which I have pointed, namely the contradiction caused for his notion of formalism by the idea of necessary ends. He again makes reference to the distinction between formal and material principles, but it has become impossible to articulate what it means to determine the will without reference to objects or ends once we have accepted that the happiness of others is a necessary end. He has no choice but to reframe his argument in terms of his criticism of sympathy:

Now it is indeed undeniable that any volition must also have an object and hence a matter. But the matter is not, just because of this, the determining basis and condition of the maxim. For if it is, then the maxim cannot be exhibited in universally legislative form, since then the expectation of the object’s existence would be the determining cause of the power of choice, and the dependence of the power of desire on some thing’s existence would have to be laid at the basis of volition—a dependence which can always be sought only in empirical conditions and hence can never provide the basis for a necessary and universal rule. Thus presumably the happiness of other beings can be the object of a rational being’s will. But if it were the maxim’s determining basis, then one would have to presuppose that we find not only a natural gratification in the well-being

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\(^1\) Herman attempts to maintain a distinction between consequences and ends: “a good will does not ignore consequences: good willing is with respect to an end,” but consequences “are not the point at which either rationality or moral goodness are assessed;” yet, later she writes: “Consequences do count as morally relevant in two ways, then: the consequences we intend count as they appear in our maxims of action, and we are required to take sufficient means to promote our ends.” Herman, *Morality as Rationality*, 288-289. Furthermore, in the first chapter of this work she argues that the end of an action is necessary for specifying the content of the action. I totally agree, as does Kant. This early study ignores the doctrine of necessary ends, but she takes it up in her more recent work. Barbara Herman, “Reasoning to Obligation,” *Inquiry* 49, no. 1 (2006): 44-61.
of others but also a need, such as the sympathetic mentality brings with it in human beings. But this need I cannot presuppose in every rational being (and in God not at all). Hence the mater of the maxim can indeed remain, but it must not be the maxim’s condition, for otherwise the maxim would not be suitable for a law.” (CPrR 34)

Taking the happiness of others as the determining basis of a maxim now means to be pathologically gratified by their happiness and taking it as a rational object of the will means that one is intellectually gratified by it (because one cognizes it as a morally necessary end). Thereby, formalism develops into the dichotomy between pathological and intellectual pleasure, which is itself only comprehensible as the dichotomy between selfishness and universalism. Without reference to the idea of universalism, there is nothing to specify the reason that one pleasure is lower and the other higher because, of course, pathological pleasure is no more pathological than intellectual pleasure is.

Kant’s argumentative moves in this step of the presentation of formalism are winding, so it is necessary for us to examine them slowly and carefully. First, we see his objection that materially determined actions cannot be the subject of universal laws. Material determination of the will supposedly prevents it from being “exhibited in universally legislative form.” For example, if my goal is to get up and make a bottle in order to feed my baby for the sake of feeling satisfied that he is happy, the fact that my goal is feeling satisfied counts as material determination of the will because it makes the action relative to me. We can see that this idea overlaps with Kant’s criticism of sympathy: let’s say that I were depressed and knew that I would feel no better after feeding him than before. If my goal were only to feel happy, in this superficial sense, then I would have no reason to feed him. As we saw from chapter 3, Kant’s criticism of sympathy refers to only a totally unthinking version of sympathy. In practice, most
people would feel the intellectual/moral feeling of sympathy in this case; in other words, they feel happy because they recognize that caring is the right thing to do; feeling happy naturally goes along with this. In that case, the parent would still do the right thing even if he were depressed, because he is doing it out of proper moral comprehension.

Still, Kant’s argument that the feeling should not be the thing that determines the will is strange. The thinking that happens in a intention takes up the idea of the object; feeling pleasure takes up the real object itself—but action also aims at the real object itself and brings it into existence. Nor can we class an action as subjective just because it refers to the self since the self as a rational being is a necessary moral end. If an action evades universality just because it is conditioned by empirical existence, then no action could possibly be universal. Again, we must point to a necessary connection between purpose and effect. If the parent were making a bottle not to promote the baby’s happiness but in order to simply get the kid to shut up, the action clearly loses any moral worth it may have had, but not because the “matter” has now determined the will more than it did before; instead, it lacks moral worth because the principle has changed and it is no longer universalizable. Furthermore, the parent in this case fails to take up the necessary end of promoting the happiness of others, specifically his dependents.20 Again, we see that Kant’s formalism can be nothing other than universalism.

Kant’s criticism of sympathy is the same as his criticism of happiness. Laws, in order to be laws, must contain the same content for everyone, or the same “determining basis of the will in all cases”(CpR 25). Even though Kant believes that it is natural for all people to be pleased with themselves in similar circumstances, such as when they realize

20 See Diane M. Williamson, “Familial Duties and Emotional Intelligence,” (forthcoming) for an argument that we have the duty to direct our duties toward others in this way.
they are morally good, he argues that each person’s idea of happiness is different and tied to his or her particular experience of pleasure and gratification. Indeed, we see that Kant brings up the notion of sympathy because he takes the sympathetic person to act for the *pleasure* of helping. We are already familiar with Kant’s criticism of sympathy, namely that, as a pre-rational impulse, it is not reliable and not a trustworthy guide of action. In short, it is simply unrelated to moral goodness. Here Kant adds that it cannot be the subject of a moral imperative because, being based on the *subjective* sense of pleasure, it cannot be presupposed in every rational being. Rationality, on the other hand, can be presupposed in every rational being, and if sympathy were the product of rationality, such as with the rational/moral directive to cultivate sympathy, it could be commanded. As we have seen from our discussion of Kant’s philosophy of emotion, Kant understands emotions, such as sympathy, to be pre-reflective impulses, and it is impossible to rationally command a pre-reflective impulse.

If we accept his assumption that feelings are pre-reflective impulses, his argument for the subjectivity of sympathy is convincing enough, but it is little more than a *non sequitur* for his argument for formalism. Instead, Kant changes the terms of the debate, from the existence of ends of the action to the pathological gratification or pleasure taken in this end, in order to provide some justification for his previous argument that moral decision-making must exclude a consideration of the objects of the action. Instead, the “purity” of the principle of volition can and should be defined in terms of its fitness for a universal law, not its relationship to its “material.”

Wood argues that

the teleology of the *Doctrine of Virtue* is based not on a *material* end—an end the desire for which grounds our choice of actions, which are valued
simply as a means to it— but is rather derived from a formal principle, which tells us which ends are objectively worth pursuing and hence gives rise to the rational desire for them.\textsuperscript{21}

We can see that Wood reformulates the distinction between material and formal determination, whereby the former was determination based on ends, into a distinction between material and formal \textit{ends} in order to preserve Kant’s formalism in the face of the necessary ends of the \textit{Doctrine of Virtue}. Kant does argue that the necessary ends of virtue are “set against the end arising from sensible impulses,” but he does not reintroduce the language of formalism into his characterization of necessary ends (MM 6:381). Nevertheless, Wood’s distinction is helpful if it reminds us to trace Kantian formalism back to universalism, since formal ends as those that are universalizable.

Wood’s new distinction, between formal and material ends, seems to be the expression of different Kantian themes: his worry over determinism by “sensible impulses.” If we adopt certain ends we are not free; instead those ends \textit{determine} the will, not just in the sense of giving content to the will, but in the sense of forcing the will to act a certain way. It is no surprise that these ends are said to be the product of the “lower” faculty of desire, corresponding to Kant’s notion of heteronomy, whereby some aspects of the self that are less properly identified with the self can exercise control over other parts of the self, making the whole self not free. On the other hand, the latter parts of the self, those which are properly identified with the whole self, can control the “lower” parts of self and make the whole self free, even though half of the self is still being controlled. We see that, in Wood’s distinction, “formal” and “principle” are functionally synonymous, making the issue one of rationality. When a “rational desire” gives rise to

the ends of action, they are acceptable. Of course, the notion of universalizability must be
built it, but Wood, as well as Kant, means for there to be something more behind the idea
of formalism: a bifurcation of the self into rational and irrational parts and the assertion
that the latter rob the self of its freedom. In other words, Kantian formalism leads to
Kant’s notion of autonomy (which will be discussed in the next chapter).

In order to understand Kant’s attempted formalism we must focus on the
“heteronomy” half of his autonomy/heteronomy distinction. Material determination
entails determination by the “lower” faculty of desire. The essential point of morality
often seems to be, as Kant writes, “that [man] should not follow his inclinations (LE 122,
C 27:345). We must examine why this might be the case and what its implications are for
the relationship between Kantian moral theory and the cultivation of emotional
intelligence.

III. “Man Should Not Follow His Inclinations”

As we have seen, Kant turns to the idea of pleasure to make the connection
between formalism and the lower faculty of desire. Kant writes

if the desire for this object precedes the practical rule, and is the condition
for making the rule one’s principle, then… the principle is always
empirical … Such a relation to the subject is called pleasure in the
actuality of the object. (CPrR 21)

The principled choice of ends is contrasted to those ends that are chosen because of their
pleasure. This distinction has been mistakenly interpreted as the injunction that moral
action cannot be pleasurable, but we can see that such is not what is at stake here. Instead,
the idea of pleasure is used to refer to an immediate, irrational, and idiosyncratic
relationship to the object. It is strange to see Kant assume that pleasure must be irrational,
as it is well-known that his aesthetic theory discusses not only the intellectual pleasure of
the aesthetic experience, but also similar intellectual pleasures, such as moral pleasure.
Perhaps that theory was born to rectify the breach caused by this definition of pleasure.

Pleasure is morally permissible when it does not conflict with duty, but it is not
itself universally commanded. (Such a universal law would be differently worded, not
“Everyone should have an ice-cream cone now,” but “It’s okay for people to have an ice-
cream cone, if there is no reason not to.”). Still, morally worthy happiness is a necessary
end of morality, and so any pleasure that it might require can be the subject of a universal
law, if we assume that certain aspects of the experience of pleasure are universal.

Unfortunately, this is not Kant’s line of thinking in his derision of pleasure.
Instead, his discussion of pleasure relies on a confused parallel between the first and
second Critiques. Kant writes that pleasure requires the existence of the object. Kant
always opposes form to matter, not content, because matter calls to mind empiricism.
This description makes sense if we take physical pleasure, or pleasure that requires
physical, bodily contact with the object (like touch or taste) for all pleasure. It is thereby a
receptive faculty, and as such it is meant to gesture toward Kant’s theory of sensibility
from the first Critique (CpR 22). As receptive, it is transitively both unfree and empirical,
which, in Kant’s sense, means that it is not law-governed. The first Critique offers an
attempt to explain the possibility and origin of scientific laws by means of the a priori
structure of experience (the categories of the understanding). Kant assumes that those
aspects of experience that are externally derived cannot ground lawfulness and those that
are derived from the universal structures of experience can. Kant’s use of the notion of
pleasure in his practical philosophy, then, draws from his theoretical philosophy’s
definition of sensibility: making pleasure both receptive and unlawful.

This parallel between sensibility and pleasure (which is standing in for the lower
faculty of desire) breaks down both because desire is not receptive and because Kant’s
theoretical and practical philosophies necessarily make use of different notions of
lawfulness. There is not very much in common between desire for the existence of an
object and the receptiveness to sensation—that is, if we buy Kant’s argument that
necessity cannot be grounded a posteriori in the first place. We sometimes use the word
“feeling” in this ambiguous way to refer to sensations that are both internally and
externally generated, but the two different senses of feeling are, in fact, very different. An
internally generated desire for an object does not involve receptivity; it is, of course, an
active drive. In Kant’s practical philosophy, reason takes the place of the understanding
in transforming the subjective into the objective. Reason must educate the inclinations,
sometimes merely acting as a gate-keeper, denying or permitting them, but more often
reason must mold the inclinations so that they conform to the necessary ends of morality.
The Understanding of Kant’s theoretical philosophy does not create physical objects, it
merely represents them. Furthermore, it does not give actual content to sensibility; reason
does give content to the inclinations—this is the essential definition of practical
philosophy.22

Kant’s argument got started on the wrong foot by assuming that desire for the
existence of an object can be relegated to the “lower” faculty of desire and thereby
represented as desire for a physical pleasure. Still, “pleasure” is meant to describe the

22 See Herman’s discussion of the fact that we are active in regard to our desires. Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, 194-195.
problem with material determination because pleasures are taken to be subjective. In one sense of “subjectivity,” pleasures are subjective because they are internal experiences, but this sense fails to differentiate pleasure from reasoning. Pleasure, as physical pleasure, is subjective in another sense, one that is problematic for moral decision-making, because it concerned with the self not just in being a property of the self but because it threatens to value the self above everything else. In other words, it is selfish. It often seems that selfishness is all that is behind Kant’s notion of subjectivity.

Kant’s “second theorem of practical philosophy” defines all material principles as principles aimed at “self-love or happiness.” Subjectivity, in this case, is opposed to objectivity, because it is connected to aims that are particular to the subject, aims that ultimately lead back to the subject himself, his survival and happiness. As we have already seen from the connection between Kant’s theory of emotion and his theory of inclination, the agent may or may not end up valuing his survival and happiness above morality, but in so far as these subjective ends are disconnected from the thought of morality, and not synthetically united with it by means of the idea of morally worthy happiness, they always threaten to supplant morality.

In this way, it sometimes seems that “happiness” and “inclination” are terms, associated with the “lower” faculty of desire, that are defined by their selfishness and short-sightedness. They are meant to refer to someone who is limited to the pursuit of immediate goals and physical pleasures, rather than someone who takes the time to

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23 Nevertheless, the problem with subjective principles cannot simply be that they are selfish. Kant, at least occasionally, makes a distinction between purely selfish motives and effects in general. Here is what he writes that it does not matter whether the sought after effects are one’s own happiness or the happiness of others: neither can be the source of moral goodness (G 401). It is surprising to see Kant stating that taking up the end of happiness of others cannot be the source of moral goodness. The notion of morally necessary ends, namely, the happiness of others and the perfection of oneself, is not unique to the *Metaphysics of Morals*. Even the *Groundwork* goes on to explain the necessary end of human dignity as the material of the moral law.
reflect and form rational principles, much less the rational, moral principle. Just as with Kant’s theory of emotion, it is as though there are two levels of happiness and two levels of motivation, the first of which must be refined into the second.

Paton explains Kant’s distinction between the moral motive and the motives of inclination as a struggle against “unruly impulses and desires.” This seems like a strange way to put the point. Of course, Kant defines inclination as opposed to morality, but to call inclinations unruly makes it sound as though we have already achieved a good will or that inclinations can all be summed up as animal instincts over which we have little control. This is not only a false account of badness, it externalizes the source of the evil impulse, making it out to be rare and foreign, rather than commonplace. This understanding of desire precludes self-criticism. Gregor, on the other hand, recognizes that Kant’s definition of virtue as a struggle refers to a struggle of self-improvement:

As Kant works out the implications of the command to master our feelings and inclination, it means that the sensuous appetitive side of our nature is not to be suppressed altogether, but rather to be brought under the control of pure practical reason. He distinguishes, in general, between feelings and inclinations which precede our deliberation about duty and tend to confuse it, and those which follow upon our determination of what constitutes our duty and can help us to act more effectively in fulfilling it. As our moral attitude gathers strength, we gradually free ourselves from the uncontrolled uprising of the former, while at the same time we develop and put to use such affective capacities as can assist us in carrying out our moral purposes. Feelings and inclinations of the second type, cultivated and controlled by pure practical reason, are entirely consistent with inner freedom.

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25 Gregor, Laws of Freedom, 74. To Gregor’s characterization of the positive role that emotion plays in Kant’s moral theory, my argument’s emphasis on emotional intelligence contributes a discussion of the means by which the first kind of emotions, those that seem unruly, can be understood and translated into important psychological insights that aid in cultivating moral emotions.
In order to eschew Kant’s seemingly troubling comments on pleasure, inclination, and the “lower” faculty of desire, recent interpreters have played up the importance of happiness and “freedom” (although not the specifically Kantian sense of freedom, as we shall see in the next chapter) in Kant’s philosophy. When reading Kant, it sometimes seems as though different texts are the product of very different moods. Sometimes Kant chooses to emphasize the corrosive and wayward nature of inclinations, as they compel us always toward our selfish and irrational notions of “happiness;” other times Kant focuses on true happiness, or morally worthy happiness, and the person whose rational desires cheerfully seek the good. Anyone who studies Kant is well acquainted with his sunnier disposition as well as with his deprecatory dualisms.

The Kingdom of Ends formulation of the categorical imperative, as a synthesis of the first and second formulations, does a particularly good job of expressing a harmony between happiness and morality, as well as the confluence of justice and morality. Kant’s notion of the Kingdom of Ends is a vision of the coordination of ends, both moral and amoral. In the Kingdom of Ends, people need to use others as means to subjective happiness, but they also always treat others as ends-in-themselves. The Kingdom of Ends is the vision of the Highest Good instantiated: people are able to achieve happiness—each in her own individual pursuit—and each person’s happiness is compatible with everyone else’s happiness and dignity. Everyone’s happiness is morally worthy because it is conditioned upon universal happiness. The Kingdom of Ends ideal should not be confused with the “race of devils,” that Kant discusses in “Perpetual Peace,” who are made to look as though they are morally good because they are externally constrained by well-formed laws (PP 112). Treating someone as an end-in-herself is not a merely
negative goal, as we might construe respect as a kind of leaving someone alone, an end is a positive determination of the will, and it requires that we follow through with it by promoting the happiness of others (as well as our own personal self-perfection).

Recent interpretive focus on happiness has lead to yet a different version of Kantian formalism: one that asserts that inclination plays a necessary role in determining the will. Engstrom and Guyer, among others, portray Kant’s formalism as entailing a necessary relationship between form and content, the form being universalism and the content being any particular inclination (so long as it is sufficiently universalizable). Engstrom argues that “Kant locates the form of practical knowledge in the idea of a practical law (or what he calls ‘the mere form of universal legislation’), and he identifies the matter with the objects to be produced through that knowledge, such as objects of sensible desire, the things we find pleasing or agreeable.”

Guyer agrees with my analysis that Kant holds that ends are necessary parts of maxims, but he also agrees with Engstrom, that inclinations necessarily make up the material element of the will. This argument is not faithful to Kant’s use of the term “inclination” (Neigung), which is essentially derisive. Guyer, following Korsgaard, argues that the ultimate end is freedom, or the ability of rational beings to set their own ends.

Does the material aspect of the will always include an end set by sensible desire or inclination, making the form of universality the only characteristic of a good will? This interpretation implies that the end of an action is conceptually disconnected from its moral worth, as though our ends were set independently of any consideration of our maxims and their moral fitness, and we, only after the fact, checked to make sure those ends were acceptable. Kant writes:

One can think of the relation of end to duty in two ways: one can begin with the end and seek out the maxim of actions in conformity with duty or, on the other hand, one can begin with the maxim of actions in conformity with duty and seek out the end that is also a duty. –The *doctrine of right* takes the first way. … But *ethics* takes the opposite way. (MM 6: 382)

This distinction makes perfect sense. Furthermore, in his discussion of the difference between ethics and the doctrine of right, Kant clarifies his previously held formalism:

[Ethics] cannot begin with ends that a human being may set for himself and in accordance with them prescribe the maxims he is to adopt, that is, his duty; for that would be to adopt maxims on empirical grounds, and such grounds yield no concept of duty…(MM 6:382)

If I am reading Kant correctly, the idea is that if we simply pursue an end that arises from amoral inclination and merely check it with our internal moral censor to make sure it is okay, we are not really acting virtuously at all. Our action is permissible, but it has no genuine moral worth, and the will is not a good will, because we are not motivated by our thought of moral goodness.27

Nevertheless, there is textual support in the second *Critique* for the Engstrom reading, and so we are put in the position, when hoping to formulate a characterization of Kantian moral theory as a whole, of choosing between two (or more) interpretations of Kant on grounds other than textual fidelity. I offer a further reasons for my reading, which is one that leaves off with calling Kantian moral theory a “formalism:” it does not lead to treating the good will as merely an internal censor but allows the good will the power to form ends and act on its own.

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27 Herman refers to this distinction in her “Reasoning to Obligation,” 46.
IV. The Good Will Wills The Good

Liberals have used the notion of formalism to argue that Kant’s ethics excludes a substantive notion of the good and that the categorical imperative should be seen as merely a gate-keeper, only letting out permissible inclinations. Instead, people may act however they like, as long as their actions are constrained by the thought of their possible universality, or the respect of the freedom of others. This reading of Kant reads his notion of political freedom into the moral notion of autonomy. Even if we ignore everything Kant has to say about virtue and the necessary ends of morality, it still seems as though this is not a good reading of Kant and not a good moral theory, but a legal theory. Kant’s distinction between right and virtue belies this approach.

I have shown the ways that Kantian moral theory helps to promote emotional intelligence. This connection between Kantian moral theory and emotional intelligence exists because Kant spent an immense amount of time thinking about psychology and pedagogy, giving his lectures on anthropology cotermiously with his lectures on moral philosophy. If my theory of emotional intelligence has been convincing, we also have it as reason to reject the liberal reading of Kantian moral theory. As a moral theory, the liberal reading of Kant represents a lack of emotional intelligence. If the conscience is merely a censor or gate-keeper of the inclinations and does not actively inform them, we are stuck with a dichotomous theory of reason and emotion and no direction for cultivating rational and moral emotions. Furthermore, emotional intelligence and emotionally intelligent societies are themselves goods that should be furthered by individuals. A moral theory that cannot promote any end over any other end cannot
recognize this and cannot advocate for psychological health any more than for mental disorder.

It is incomprehensible to me that Kant is faulted for not having an adequate moral psychology. Kant’s moral theory is closely intertwined with his moral psychology, but it is perhaps the case that Kant’s message is one that is difficult to hear, which is exactly his point. Kant’s moral psychology focuses on the difficulty involved in choosing goodness over selfishness. It proclaims that we should not be satisfied with our moral worth: we are not good enough, we must keep striving. Kant’s emphasis on the difficulty in being good is what leads him to consider inclination and passion in an exclusively negative light. Kant defines virtue as a (free) self-constraint that is the result of a struggle with immoral motivation (see MM 6: 379-382). It is not that Kant believes that humans are innately evil, it is just that they are constantly tempted.

Kant’s primary motive for insisting that the principles of morality be pure is that the correct reasons for them will then be grasped and they will be less subject to corruption (G 6). He cordons off all thought of possible benefit in his establishment of the basis of moral goodness because he believes that the consideration of personal benefit is likely to corrupt the moral principle. The moral motive is essentially distinct from other inclinations, whether they are selfish or not, and, being distinct, these two types of motivation can and do come into conflict. Furthermore, being pure, the moral motive is always weaker than any other benefit-based inclination that it comes up against it. In other words, there is always some advantage on the side of the immoral motive. The moral motive, on the other hand, stands alone: there is no reason to follow the moral law.

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28 Kant’s multiple examples of the contrast between duty and inclination help to show us the difference between these two motivations, but they do not give us a very good picture of the motive of duty or its content, and so they have been misunderstood as arguing that duty can only act when inclination is absent.
except for the fact that it is the moral law.\textsuperscript{29} The harms and benefit alluded to by moral reasoning are abstract: it does not matter what I stand to gain from the action now, but what might happen if everyone acted this way. Really, it is not a question of benefit at all: it is a question of principle. Being disconnected from benefit makes the moral motive vulnerable to all sorts of rationalizations: we might object, “Oh, who really knows what’s right and wrong anyway?” or “I’m not really hurting anybody,” and these rationalizations will probably quiet the conscience. Most of the time, because we have been brought up in lawful societies, our inclinations coincide with morality. This helps us to justify small moral holidays when our inclinations pull us in the immoral direction.\textsuperscript{30} Kant writes that it is this human tendency of rationalization that makes moral theory (the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, in particular) necessary (G 405).

We have seen that Kant’s use of the notion of form is conflicted. First, he uses the term to refer to \textit{the} form of the will, namely universality. This meaning is never far from his mind, but he also introduces the distinction between formal and material principles, which is based on the argument that determination by the thought of universality is different from determination by means of a consideration of the matter of the will. If we

\textsuperscript{29} Galvin addresses Brandt’s criticism that Kant has no account of moral motivation, or that Kant requires that morality have \textit{no} motivation. (This is also the criticism Hegel’s voices by associated Kant with the “beautiful soul” of the \textit{Phenomenology of Spirit}.) Aside from pointing to the “feeling” of respect, as Galvin does, we must not be confused into thinking, perhaps with Kant, that Kant needs an account of moral motivation, except as a remark about moral psychology. Excluding “inclination” from the ground of the moral law does not entail that there is no “inclination” or “motive” or “reason” to act morally or even that the moral motive is necessarily weaker than other motives, although Kant worries that the latter is the case. Translating his theory into contemporary psychology and philosophy of action confuses the topic further because Kant was not interested in the question “how is action possible?” (although it may seem like his discussion of freedom should take such an interest, in fact, his arguments often hinge on the assumption that it is) but in the question “what is special about moral motivation?” and “what is the content of moral imperatives?”

are to insist on making use of the notion of “formalism” when we describe Kant’s ethics, we must remember that it cannot exclude a consideration of “ends” in ethics, since Kant most certainly prescribes the necessary end of rational being. My argument has been that, if we accept that the ends, whether morally necessary or not, determine the action because they give it its content, there is no possible definition of formalism left that leaves it distinct from universalism. Since Kantian formalism seems to be nothing more than a restatement of universalism, can we not dispense with calling Kantian ethics a “formalism” altogether?

In order to make sense of the references to form in Kant’s practical philosophy, we must shift our attention away from the definition of form and toward the definition of matter. The idea of “matter” is closely aligned with Kant’s understanding of the “lower” faculties of desire, such as inclination. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the dichotomy between lower and higher faculties does not make as much sense in the context of practical philosophy as it does in theoretical philosophy because desire is not empirically receptive in the way that sensibility is in theoretical philosophy. Furthermore, this dichotomy seems to misstate the role that happiness plays in Kant’s moral philosophy.

The best way to read Kant’s comments on the “lower” faculty of desire are as an expression of his worry about the seemingly endless ability of human psychology to rationalize away moral requirements.

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31 Beck writes, “‘Material’ here seems to be equated with ‘object of the lower faculty of desire,’ but the connotations of the two words are distinct, and the distinction is of great importance. ‘Material’ is also contrasted with ‘form’ and ‘formal,’ and Kant means here: All practical principles which figure as the cognitive component in volition because of their content, i.e., there reference to an object of desire, and not because of their form, are empirical…” Beck, Commentary, 96. I maintain that it is not possible to make any sense out of Kant’s notion of “material” other than to refer to “object of the lower faculty of desire” with the emphasis being on “lower.”
The very first page of the *Groundwork* explains that moral theory is a material, not a formal, science because its subject matter is the human will, which is “affected by nature.” Louden discusses Kant’s division of moral theory into its pure and impure parts, but also argues that Kant’s impure ethics are a necessary and important counterpart to that which is most commonly associated with Kant.\(^{32}\) Taking stock of the necessary moral ends and Kant’s comments about moral psychology that are aimed at helping us to take up these ends may seem to blur the traditional Kantian distinction between the pure and the impure, but since both halves are now recognized as vital, the distinction itself is becoming less important.

\(^{32}\) Louden, *Kant’s Impure Ethics*. 

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Kant wrote that autonomy is the “supreme principle of ethics” (G 440). Following in step, Kant scholars place much emphasis, both interpretive and creative, on the notion of autonomy. Like his notion of purity and what is taken to be his “formalism,” Kant’s notion of autonomy is thought to involve the exclusion of emotion from morality. Yet the notion of autonomy is more popular and is taken to be one of the most important ideas in all of Kant’s thought. Beck argues for the importance of the notion of autonomy in the first Critique, even though the word “Autonomie” did not come into Kant’s vocabulary until after 1781; Beck holds that “autonomy is a fundamental condition of both cognitive and practical activity.”\(^2\) Brandom draws a similar parallel between alethic and deontic responsibility.\(^3\)

Personally, I am in favor of a “back to basics” interpretation of autonomy. When Kant first introduces the notion, in the end of the second section of the Groundwork, he defines it in terms of universality. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see that Kant broaches the topic in the first place in order to forge a connection between his moral theory and his theory of freedom, and thus to effect a transition from the second to the third section of the Groundwork and to the second Critique. It would seem that an interpretation of Kant’s notion of autonomy must necessarily provide an interpretation of Kant’s theory of freedom; yet the reciprocity of the

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1. The part of this chapter that discusses the Incorporation Thesis is taken, in part, from my article “The Merits and Deficiencies of Kant’s Incorporation Thesis as an Interpretation and Revision,” in Rethinking Kant: Volume 1, ed. Pablo Muchnik (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008).
concepts of freedom and morality need not imply a mutual dependence. In this chapter, I provide an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that is open to a variety of interpretations of Kantian freedom—in fact, I am open to both compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations—as long as said interpretation does not overlook the fact that autonomy is first and foremost a moral notion.

The third section of the *Groundwork* is notoriously difficult to understand. Kant brings up the question of the existence of human freedom, but then tells us that we must assume it. He then again uses the specter of determinism to attempt to prove the validity of the categorical imperative, but then concludes that such a proof is impossible. There are a number of logical and philosophical problems with this series of argumentation, but in this chapter I focus on the psychological problems with the version of autonomy it develops. Kant insinuates that everything that lies outside of pure reason cannot be viewed as properly a part of the self at all. Such a view of the self is psychologically unhealthy, and it erects a dangerous moral psychology. It is best that we eschew these flights of argumentation and stick to the idea that autonomy can be understood in terms of the other formulations of the categorical imperative.

I. The Principle of Autonomy and the Categorical Imperative

Kant introduces the idea of autonomy in the *Groundwork* after he has already given (at least) three formulations of the categorical imperative. The idea of autonomy is related to the third formulation (the Kingdom of Ends formula) because the latter introduces the idea of the will as legislative and the former as self-legislative, i.e., both a sovereign and a subject. Kant more fully discusses this new term, calling “the autonomy of the will” “the supreme principle of ethics” (G440). It may seem strange that he gives us yet another principle of ethics, but if we pay close attention to the text, we see that Kant is careful to introduce this new idea only as a
restatement of the equivalence of the former three. While discussing the Kingdom of Ends, Kant highlights the equation between the universal law formulation and the rational being formulation. In affirming a law as valid for all rational beings, we affirm it as valid for ourselves as well as for others, and in ensuring that we follow laws to which others, as rational beings, would assent, we ensure that we are not treating them as a mere means, but also as ends in themselves (G 438). The fullest expression of this idea then comes with the vision of a Kingdom of Ends, wherein everyone is both a subject and a law-giver. From the confluence of these ideas, we can derive the idea of autonomy, which is, at first, defined in terms of universality: “morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, i.e., to the possible legislation of universal law by means of the maxims of the will” (G 339).

It is strange that at this point Kant takes himself to be, once again, giving definitional features of moral theory itself, defining terms like “duty” and “obligation” in terms of “autonomy,” and he defines the “holy will” as one that is necessarily in accord with the laws of autonomy. This way of explaining autonomy, as it refers to “the laws of autonomy” may strike Kant interpreters as unusual because we normally think of autonomy as giving the law to oneself, and so forget that it is not meant to refer to just any laws, but only universal, objective laws. Kantian autonomy is often explained as the ability of the will to give a/the law to itself; perhaps it is more textually accurate to explain it as the quality of the will whereby it is a law in itself. Kant writes:

Autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law to itself [dadurch derselbe… ihm selbst ein Gesetz ist] (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is this: always choose in such as way that in the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law. (G 440)
Kant goes on to define heteronomy as determination from “anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, [such as in] the character of any of its objects” (G 441).

As we discussed in the previous chapter, thinking of universality in terms of the exclusion of a consideration of the effect of the action, or, in this case, “the character” of the object, runs the risk of vacuity. Nevertheless, Kant does not make that same mistake here; he writes,

for example, I ought to endeavor to promote the happiness of others, not as though its realization were any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but merely because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and the same volition. (G 441)

This passage also allows us to quickly summarize Kant’s theory of emotion and the point of chapter 3: feelings can be rational, and rational feelings play an important role in morality, but feeling rational feelings should not be the goal of moral action. Proper moral motivation is always the comprehension of the moral law and the action’s objective necessity. A moral feeling is not problematic as an efficient cause of moral action, as respect is, since the feeling itself, being rational, presupposes proper moral comprehension, but if a moral feeling is the final cause of moral action, such as with the desire to do a good deed in order to feel good about oneself, the moral action is cheapened and loses its moral worth. Of course, we do feel good about ourselves when we do a good deed (this is moral self-esteem and a part of morally worthy happiness) but that is not the reason that we do the good deed. That would be strange and would even undermine the feeling itself.

As we have seen, in the second section of the *Groundwork*, autonomy refers to universalism: “an absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, will
therefore be indeterminate as regards all objects, and will contain merely the form of willing; and indeed that form is autonomy”(G 444). In the third section of the *Groundwork*, Kant attempts to use the notion of autonomy to address metaphysical freedom, which he apparently takes to be in limbo, even after the first *Critique*’s hopeful agnosticism. He then uses the idea of freedom to provide an argument for the reality of the categorical imperative. Since freedom and morality are set up as “reciprocal concepts” it is unclear whether one is to be more basic and play a supporting role or if the suggestion is that they are both equally uncertain. If both notions are shaky, perhaps Kant hopes to prop them up against each other.

The general line of argument, which might be taken either as giving support for the reality of freedom or the reality of the categorical imperative, runs thusly:

1. We think that we are free because we experience ourselves freely making choices.
2. To be free is to exercise pure reason because all other decisions are determined by incentives.
3. So, if our choices are determined by incentives, and our natural tendency to pursue them, they are not free.
4. The categorical imperative commands that we choose without reference to incentive; therefore to be free is to follow the categorical imperative.
5. Therefore, we affirm the categorical imperative when we affirm the reality of our freedom. Likewise, we affirm our freedom when we act morally.

Obviously, the term “freedom” is used differently in the first premise than in the second. In eliding these two senses of freedom (and their corresponding notions of determinism), Kant is also eliding between a general, prudential form of decision-making and pure reason. The first

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4 We see this meaning of autonomy echoed in the preface to the Doctrine of Virtue: “If this distinction is not observed, if *eudaimonism* (the principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle instead of *eleutheronomy* (the principle of the freedom of eternal lawgiving), the result is *euthanasia* (easy death) of all morals”(MM 6:378).
premise refers to reason in general, or, perhaps, it does not refer to reason at all, but any kind of relatively uncoerced choice; the second refers to pure reason. It is unclear whether or not we normally assume that we are capable of making a choice without an incentive and, so, whether the argument could work without an equivocation. Kant himself recognizes that the idea of choosing without incentives is vacuous, and so he qualifies this idea by adding that there is a special, moral incentive— respect for the moral law—that is different than other incentives because it does not compromise our freedom. Hence it is unclear whether or not even Kant thinks that we take ourselves to be capable of making a choice without any incentive.5

A weaker and, perhaps, better version of this argument runs: thinking of ourselves as free makes us realize that we are autonomous and hence bound by the laws of morality (G 453). This argument would be successful if we shared Kant’s view of natural determinism and did not take freedom to refer to metaphysical freedom, but just relatively uncoerced choices. Another possible argument here is that we have an interest in affirming the categorical imperative and acting as it prescribes because in doing so we are affirming, or proving, our freedom, or independence from selfish incentives. Of course, Kant states that “all the laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom are valid just as much as if the will of such a being could be declared to be free in itself for reasons that are valid for theoretical philosophy”(G 448). “Such a being” refers to us: rational beings with a will, “who cannot act in any way other than under the idea of freedom.” This statement lends credence to the latter possibility, i.e., that we have an interest in

5 If, by “incentive” we mean a kind of payment, then the moral law cannot be an incentive, but if we mean a reason for doing something, then it surely is an incentive. It is relevant to note that Spinoza thought that clear and distinct ideas command assent, as well as corollary behaviors. In other words, having a reason for doing something was a mark of determinism for Spinoza, but here Kant assumes that there are some kinds are reasons that are non-deterministic. Nevertheless, Kant’s notion of autonomy certainly represents a heritage from Spinoza’s definition of freedom.
using morality to prove freedom, although indirectly since this “idea of freedom” formulation of the argument suggests a type of compatibilism whereby all of our actions are free, because we must assume that they are, whether they are really determined or not.

Kant first expresses autonomy in terms of the unity of the different formulations of the categorical imperative, but he would not introduce a new term for this unity if it were not motivated by his need to re-address his theory of freedom. Autonomy is the link that establishes the reciprocity between morality and freedom, as Kant remarks that they are “reciprocal concepts” (G 450). In other words, it has one hand in Kant’s moral theory and is defined in terms of the categorical imperatives, but it has the other hand in Kant’s theory of freedom. This hand gestures toward a Spinozist idea of freedom as accordance with one’s true, rational nature.

II. Autonomy and the “True Self”

Whatever the status of freedom, the argument of the third section does attempt to connect impure reason, whether that means prudential reason or decision-making that is coerced in some other way, and “alien causes” (fremder Ursachen). In other words, Kant brings in the psychological distinction those things that are foreign (fremde) and those things that are properly a part of one’s identity as a rational being. The very idea of autonomy, of giving or being a law to oneself, implies a division within the self between laws/impulses that are better suited to the self because the better express its true nature and laws/impulses that are constraining, not freeing, because they do not express the true nature of the self.
In other words, Kant’s autonomy/heteronomy distinction runs along the lines of the distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperatives, but deeming action according to hypothetical imperatives tantamount to determination by “foreign influences” (G 448). Our interests, no matter how “rational” in the normal sense of the term, are painted as foreign causes. My point in this chapter is simply that this characterization is not true: our interests are a part of ourselves, and moral improvement requires that we make this realization. Furthermore, rational self-legislation requires that the process of reasoning be conscious. I do believe that such is Kant’s final word on the subject, but it seems entirely too harsh to conclude that, if we are determined by unconscious influences, that they are irrational and immoral. Rather, as I argued in chapter 3, it seems that Kant would say that the unconscious can contain rational directives that would become moral were they made explicit, but as unconscious they remain amoral.

Kant’s notion of autonomy finds a philosophical predecessor in Spinoza’s definition of freedom as that which follows from the nature of the self, i.e., reason, but for Spinoza those things that appear not to follow from the nature of the self, viz., passive emotions, really are a part of the self, just perceived inadequately. The goal for Spinoza is to transform passive emotions into active emotions, or to realize the way that they are “self-caused.” There is no such option for Kant, and the adoption of the idea that freedom is the causality of reason leaves a rift between the rational and irrational parts of the self that cannot be repaired.

It would certainly be worrisome if someone really did see herself in this way, believing that her most refined reasoning capacities were under her control and the rest to
be externally determined. It is one thing to regret one’s actions, it is quite another to not see them as freely chosen actions at all. As we will discuss shortly, Kant scholars wish to save Kant from this troubling picture of subjectivity by insisting that pragmatic reason is a necessary part of healthy and even moral reason. There is definite merit to this line of interpretation. Nevertheless, even if we were to redefine the limits of the autonomous self and move the boundary further out so that it now includes both moral and pragmatic reason, we would still be left with an unhealthy self-schismsing. If we believe that all natural instinct is an external force that acts on us, taking away our freedom, we have a picture of the self in which there is an ineliminable, although compartmentalizable, problem. Perhaps some people do, in fact feel this way about their bodies or about their emotions. In fact, this picture of the self comes close to being the one assumed by Goleman and LeDoux, with their assumption that emotions are innate limbic responses that cannot be gotten rid of and can only be controlled. Others like Damasio and Greenspan then rush in to defend emotions, arguing that they can be useful, all the while still assuming that emotions are “responses,” and thereby more closely relating them to the external world than to the subject’s proper self. Whether or not the thing that is to be excluded from the self, that which causes heteronomous determination, is taken to be necessarily a problem is not as psychologically relevant as the fact that some part of the self is viewed as being alien in the first place. Of course, drawing the lines of the self has and always will be in contention, but as long as the lines attempt to exclude “the physical” or “the unconscious” they risk severing the self in two.

Of course, dichotomous theories of subjectivity are much more prevalent in the history of philosophy than monisms. Allow me to briefly canvass some of the
psychological problems of this way of thinking about the self. We might first approach this topic through the lens of culpability since this is the issues about which Kant is ostensibly most worried. Kant has constructed an interesting, and many would say unsuccessful, narrative about moral blame. By creating the space of rational causality he means to disallow the excuse that people can never be blamed for their actions because there is always an efficient cause operative. Many have argued that this move leads him to the conclusion that we are only free when we act morally and so still determined and beyond blame when we act immorally.6 Many interpreters turn to what they call Kant’s “incorporation thesis,” which will be more fully discussed shortly, to argue that Kant believes that we always choose all of our actions and therefore can always be held responsible for them. Aside from having other problematic philosophical implications, the idea that we choose to follow our inclinations (in the normal sense of making a choice, not in the Kantian sense of the noumenal choice of one’s character) does not seem related to legal debates about culpability. Yet, the discourse of subjectivity that follows from the notion of autonomy has the result of blaming parts of the self for immoral choices while all the while letting “the true self” off the hook. If we are “heteronomously” determined, we are left with the task of moral “damage control.” If one simply tries to control one’s inclinations, it becomes difficult to reflect on one’s actions, considering the relationship between pure and impure motivation.

We are reminded of a situation in which a friend apologizes for an offense, but then argues that this way of acting is, for example, just part of her personality and that she cannot do anything about it. An apology can only really be acceptable if it contains a promise to change in the future—anything less seems like lip-service—and change is

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6 See, for example, Henry Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 511-16.
really only effected through understanding the internal causes that lead to the incident and finding a way to alter them. For this reason apologies that promise too much are also unacceptable. If the person says, “I’m sorry, I will never hurt your feelings again, I’m just going to keep my big mouth shut from now on,” we know that this promise is not a realistic consideration of the cause of the problem and hence does nothing to solve it. In order to effect moral improvement, we must be able to come to understand the causes of our actions. The idea that we are “heteronomously determined” precludes this possibility. We are able to understand heteronomous causes, using the laws of cause and effect, but the point is to change them. Of course, if we were not free to act differently, there would be no point of doing moral theory to begin with, but the theory of autonomy covers over the fact the choice to follow an incentive is still a choice, and hence not qualitatively different from the autonomy of moral reason. In other words, moral deliberation must concern itself intimately with heteronomy: these are not two parts of the self, or two different faculties, but only two different choices.

The previous example points to another problem with the idea of autonomy: it seems related to low self-esteem. As we discussed in chapter 4, it is not healthy to like oneself regardless of the way that one acts. The opposite extreme, and one that similarly Kant warns against as immoral, is irrational self-hatred. Yet, the theory of autonomy developed in the third section of the *Groundwork* is a version of irrational self-hatred. Even if one achieves a state of perfect control over one’s natural desires, a person who ascribes to a Kantian notion of autonomy must still see these desires as problematic, and,  

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7 Another way to phrase this objection is in terms of what has been called Kant’s psychological hedonism: if Kant takes us to be naturally selfish and obsessed with the pursuit of pleasure, he should hold that moral improvement is impossible, and a moral theory that rules out the possibility of moral improvement seems to be caught in a performative contradiction.
as Kant frequently writes, must wish to be free of them.\textsuperscript{8} Accepting that one’s natural desires are an essential part of the self does not mean that we cannot believe that these desires are never problematic or wrong. As we have discussed, healthy self-esteem should be based on healthy self-criticism. Still, the idea of emotional intelligence, with its suggestion that the emotions are themselves intelligent, encourages us to assume that our inclinations are useful and important until proven otherwise. It does not encourage us to act precipitously, but to devote careful attention to our desires, assuming that they contain important, although perhaps hidden, information. Kant’s theory of autonomy, with its implications of repression and control, encourages the opposite: to assume that the desires are guilty of selfishness and immorality. Furthermore, the chance for them to be proven innocent is not often explored. This unnecessary harshness toward our own desires then encourages us to react with harshness to the emotional expressions of others as well as the biological finitude of nature.\textsuperscript{9}

III. Autonomy as Practical Reason

Although these criticisms of Kant’s theory of autonomy are new, the worry that Kant has not given inclination and natural desire a fair shake is certainly not new. Recent interpreters have tried to defend or revise Kantianism in light of this worry by playing up the importance of prudential reasoning and hypothetical imperatives. In short, they defend Kantian autonomy by embracing its elision between moral and prudential

\textsuperscript{8} On the other hand, see \textit{Religion}, VI, 58, on the vanity and sin of wishing to be free from all inclination.\textsuperscript{9} Kristeva makes this suggestion as it regards the unconscious in her \textit{Strangers to Ourselves}. Julia Kristeva, \textit{Strangers to Ourselves} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
reason.\textsuperscript{10} The problem with this line of interpretation is that it necessarily downplays the importance of that which is specifically moral, the categorical imperative.

Herman’s recent article, “Reasoning to Obligation,” offers the most explicit statement of the interpretation that fully embraces the elision between moral and prudential reason.\textsuperscript{11} Herman argues that moral choices are the most rational choices and that immoral choices represent an immature and incomplete form of reasoning. Herman has always been interested in showing that moral decision-making is a more down-to-earth experience than people usually accuse Kant of making it. Her first book, *Morality as Rationality* (in 1990) argues that the categorical imperative and the idea of a hypothetical imperative both offer rules for good reasoning. Her later *The Practice of Moral Judgment* gains considerable ground in moving away from a deontological, rights-based understanding of Kantian moral theory and toward accepting that Kant has a theory of good willing and virtue.\textsuperscript{12} Nevertheless, collapsing moral and prudential reasoning is not the right interpretative strategy. First, it risks sending us back to a libertarian reading of Kant whereby moral reasoning is a process of justifying the abrogation of one person’s freedom for the sake of another through a calculus of weighing freedoms. Second, it perhaps confuses a phenomenological relationship, to which it is valuable to gesture, with a logical relationship. Third, and most importantly, it sucks the life breath out of Kantian moral theory.\textsuperscript{13} It necessarily leads to the attempt to translate that which is good in itself into that which is good \textit{for} something or somebody. It threatens to make Kant over as a Utilitarian. We have already seen that the third section of the *Groundwork* opens the door to such an interpretation because Kant himself relies

\textsuperscript{10} Please see my “Kant’s Occasional—and the Ever-Popular—Elision Between Moral and Practical Reason” (under revision).
on such an elision in his argument for the validity of the categorical imperative, but I see no reason for following Kant in his confusion.

The move to subtly (or explicitly, in the case of Herman) ignore Kant’s distinction between moral and prudential reasoning, as well as the tendency to interpret Kantian freedom in a more prosaic sense is rather popular. Along with this comes the most permissive interpretation of Kantian autonomy, as giving a law, any law, to oneself. Frequently, such an interpretation draws from, what Allison, in his *Kant’s Theory of Freedom* (also published in 1990), calls, Kant’s “Incorporation Thesis.” This name refers to a passage from the *Religion* essay, wherein Kant argues that “an incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim” (R 6:24, emphasis mine). The idea is that inclinations in themselves cannot determine the will, but we must first choose to act on them. Therefore, immoral acts are not caused by natural inclinations: they are caused by our choice to follow those inclinations. Allison argues that inclinations should be seen as motives, not causes, because they do not, as he puts it, “motivate by themselves… but rather [only] as being taken as reasons and incorporated into maxims.” Allison rightly points out that “among the major consequences of the Incorporation Thesis … is the recognition that even heteronomous or non-morally based actions are free for Kant in an incompatibilist sense.” This consequence is surprising because the opposite is often assumed: Kantian freedom is thought to apply only to autonomous acts, i.e.,

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15 Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*, 40. The German text uses the verb *aufnehmen*, which is translated as “to incorporate,” but could easily be translated by a verb such as “to accept,” which goes further in overcoming dualism.

16 Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*, 51. This terminology is Allison’s, not Kant’s: in the *Lectures on Ethics* Kant distinguishes between objective and subjective motives (motivum subjecte movens and motivum objecte movens) and uses the term *Motiv* to refer generally to all kinds of grounds of action. See J. MacMurray’s introduction to Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper and Row, 1963). Kant also uses the term “Motiv” in a way contrary to this distinction at G 450.

ones that conform to the categorical imperative. Instead, Allison argues that “both moral and pragmatic or prudential imperatives indicate a causality of reason.”18

The Incorporation Thesis points to a partial willingness on Kant’s part to do exactly what the name describes: to incorporate inclination with rationality by hypothesizing a unified decision-maker who must experience all parts of the self. It functions in contemporary scholarship to shift interpretive focus away from Kant’s formalism and the corollary understanding of freedom in terms of autonomy, with all of the psychological problems that I have suggested, toward a redefinition of freedom that takes all actions to be free. The move toward a more prosaic understanding of freedom is becoming popular in Kant scholarship. Many wish to downplay the idea that freedom is a special property of certain actions that can be assumed from our capacity to choose against or without incentives. Guyer makes use of the Incorporation Thesis in his Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, in which he argues that Kant’s notion of the Highest Good ought to be seen as the goal of moral action and that Kant believes that freedom, in the general political sense, is necessary for the happiness prescribed by the notion of the Highest Good. Guyer argues that Kant assigns absolute value to freedom, understood in this familiar way, and that the value of personal freedom grounds the legitimacy of the categorical imperative. In addition to adopting the more general notion of freedom implied by the Incorporation Thesis, Guyer makes use of Allison’s formulation of the Incorporation Thesis explicitly to support his idea that, for Kant, morality is meant to serve morally worthy happiness. The Incorporation Thesis is necessary for this end because it extricates Guyer from the objection that Kant believes that happiness, the object of inclination, is inimical to morality, the object of freedom. Instead, he holds that inclinations are not immoral per se, just as happiness

18 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 35.
is not in conflict with morality, but that the natural goal of happiness is very much compatible with morality, especially since both require the proper use of reason for their attainment.

Korsgaard also expands the scope of freedom to include all choices. One overriding theme of her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* is the idea that humans “confer value on the objects of” their “rational choice” and that this fact about the origin of value grounds the status of humans as “ends in themselves.”¹⁹ She similarly draws from the *Religion* essay to argue that all choices are free actions.²⁰ Guyer and Korsgaard both hope to show that, for Kant, morality requires harmonizing inclination with moral ends, instead of totally extirpating inclination from decision-making, as some critics fear. The Incorporation Thesis helps in this regard by relieving inclination from being the cause of immorality, as the account of heteronomy suggests, and by showing that reason always adjudicates the inclinations and therefore can do so in a way that is both conducive to morality and conducive to happiness.

This elision has the effect of downplaying the importance of the categorical imperative for Kantian morality. In his attempt to show that the *Groundwork* demonstrates the Incorporation Thesis’s notion of practical agency, Allison agrees with Sidgwick’s interpretation of universalizability as a test for rationality.²¹ Allison then identifies the idea of a universal law with the idea of a practical law, and finally conjoins the notion of the categorical imperative with the idea of a practical law in general.²² This conclusion follows from the substitution of rational agency for moral agency. Allison appears to recognize the distinction between rationality and

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¹⁹ Korsgaard, *Kingdom*, ix.
²⁰ In her chapter 6, Korsgaard develops her argument that theoretical knowledge of freedom is neither necessary for action nor for culpability by pointing out that freedom does not make an action moral, but that morality makes us free. This acknowledgement would seem to work against her general emphasis on freedom as the origin of value, but she does not consider this point in that context (176-183).
²¹ Henry Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*.
²² Allison, *Kant’s Theory of Freedom*, 212.
morality, but he then collapses it again by defining transcendental freedom as the capacity to choose based on a higher-level maxim, not the higher-level moral maxim.\textsuperscript{23}

In order to understand this interpretive strategy, it is important to be familiar with the relevant discussion from the Religion essay and the reason that it lends itself to such an interpretation. Only in the Religion essay does normal rational choice become an example of moral choice, because Kant is there trying to show that humans can freely choose to be either evil or good. Still, the very specific type of choice described therein, which is something like religious predetermination or a conversion experience made possible by Grace, is not analogous to all choices, nor analogous to choosing autonomously, and therefore cannot be used to support the model of normal decision-making the Incorporation Thesis wishes to erect.

The title of the Religion essay leads one to believe that it will offer an elaboration of Kant’s argument that morality leads to a very specific type of religion and a description of such a purely moral or rational religion. We are familiar with this idea from the second Critique, wherein Kant argues that belief in the Christian god is a necessary part of morality. In a sense, then, the title of the Religion essay is misleading: in fact, since Kant had already described rational religion in a couple of his other works, the argument that morality requires rational religion is largely assumed and relegated to footnotes. Instead, as Kant mentions in the preface to the second edition, the goal of the work is to unify reason and scripture: Kant analyzes particular ideas from Christian scripture and shows that they lead back to common sense. This explains the troubling fact that Kant begins his discussion with many religious assumptions that we do not see in his other writings, and it warns us to take the theological ideas Kant eventually reaches with a grain of salt. For example, the first section begins with the idea that humans are innately evil, but then, while keeping to the expression, Kant explains that this trait only amounts to the potential

\textsuperscript{23} Allison, \textit{Kant’s Theory of Freedom}, 208.
for evil, though he continues to assume that humans are in some sense born evil and must undergo a conversion. In this work Kant address many religious ideas, such as heaven and hell, the fall, a conversion experience, grace, and church participation.

In the first section, in the context of discussing whether or not humans are innately evil, Kant argues that immorality is caused by the subject’s free choice, “for otherwise the use or abuse of the human being’s power of choice with respect to the moral law could not be imputed to him, nor could the good or evil in him be called ‘moral’” (R 6:21). Kant specifically states that inclinations and natural impulses cannot be seen as the ground of evil. According to this argument, evil is not caused by natural inclination; rather, evil is a result of the choice to value the satisfaction of inclination over compliance with the moral law. He explains the difference between good and evil characters with reference to the choice of a meta-maxim: the maxim either to follow the moral law in everything, or to follow inclination in everything. The main goal of this part of the essay is to show that evil is not the result of nature, nor is good the result of divine dispensation, but that humans are individually responsible for their moral worth. Therefore, the proper truth issuing from the idea that humans are innately evil must involve the

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24 We can see Kant distancing himself from the original scriptural idea of innate evil with his attribution of the idea to the “rigorists.” Allison’s statement that Kant identifies himself as a rigorist is wrong. Instead, Kant argues that one must be a rigorist when considering morality as a pure idea and one must be a “latitudinarian,” or one who affirms that humans are neither all good or all bad, when one considers morality from the point of view of human behavior (Rel. 6:25).

25 There is no reason to think that Kant is straightforwardly advancing any of these religious positions. In the case of a religious conversion experience, which implies, as does the choice of a meta-maxim that we shall examine shortly, that people are either all good or all bad, we know from Kant’s other works that he explicitly rejects this essentialism along with the idea that the task of morality could be completed in one fell swoop, or at all. On the contrary, G. Felicitas Munzel accepts this account of a singular, resolute choice in his account of Kantian moral character, in G. Felicitas Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character: The “Critical” Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

26 Allison elaborates on the idea of choosing a meta-maxim and assimilates it to the idea that the practical agent subsumes inclinations under practical rules or maxims just as the understanding subsumes sensibility under the categories of the understanding. Therefore, he makes the free practical agent is an analog to the subject of the transcendental unity of apperception: “just as it must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations in order for them to be ‘mine’… it must be possible for the ‘I take’ to accompany all my inclinations if they are to be mine qua rational agent, that is, if they are to provide motives or reasons for acting.”
possibility for choice of the impure maxim, so that, when we accept theological notions, we grant humans the capacity to choose the pure and good maxim (in a conversion experience) and thus hold them responsible for their moral behaviors.

The choice of a good or evil character described in the Religion essay is in no way analogous to normal decision-making. It involves the choice whether or not to follow the moral law in everything; it is a meta-choice that happens once or twice in a person’s life. Kant insinuates that it happens at or before birth and then during a conversion. Also, this choice is not based on reasons. It is a choice about the relative value of reasons, and, for that reason, Kant assumes that it cannot itself be based on reasons. Nor can we be aware of the choice: we can never know for sure whether we are of the pure or impure character type. Kant states that, although the conversion is a spontaneous revolution, the individual experiences it as a gradual change and a result of his constant striving (Rel. 6:48).

There is clearly interpretive merit to warding off the conclusion that all immoral choices are determined. Nevertheless, even within the Religion essay, Kant distances himself from the idea that all actions are freely chosen. After the introduction, Kant turns to a discussion of the “original predisposition to good in human nature” and argues that we are subject to a three-fold determination: as animals, as humans, and as persons (Rel. 6:26). Kant describes the first as determination without reason; the second requires rationality, but it is still rationality based on inclination, or prudential reasoning; and the third is determination by respect for the moral law. Kant continues to describe our inclinational or animalistic nature as arational. Here again Kant makes a distinction between rational and prudential reason, as well as animalistic determination, and does no re-assert that the ways that we are determined because we are human presuppose a rational choice. Contrary to the Incorporation Thesis, he does not here argue that inclination
needs the motivating force of reason in order to cause behavior. Then, in a move that also works against the Incorporation Thesis, Kant reassigns the ability to motivate to purely moral, not broadly practical reason: in a footnote, Kant defends the separation between the second and the third form of determination (prudential and moral) by stating that “from the fact that a being has reason does not at all follow that … this reason contains a faculty of determining the power of choice unconditionally, and hence to be ‘practical’ on its own” (Rel. 6:26, 120). This sentence implies that the second kind of determination uses reason but is ultimately caused by inclination and does not reach the level of autonomous moral choice, which is the only kind of cause for action that operates independently of inclination. Kant writes “Every propensity is either physical, i.e. it pertains to a human’s power of choice as a natural being; or moral, i.e., it pertains to a human’s power of choice as a moral being,” and he goes on to explain that only the latter is free (Rel. 6:31).

Kant’s *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, which was published after the *Religion* essay, contains a similar discussion of innate evil. There Kant argues that humans are innately good in so far as they have a natural sense of the moral law, but innately evil as they naturally desire to choose the satisfaction of their selfish inclinations above following the moral law. He writes:

Here the question is whether man is good by nature or bad by nature, or whether by nature he is equally susceptible to one or the other, depending upon which guiding hand he happens to fall into (*cereus in vitium flecti etc.*); in this last instance the species itself would have no character. But this last instance is contradictory in itself because a being endowed with the faculty of practical reason and with consciousness of free-will (a person) sees himself in this consciousness, even in the midst of the darkest imaginings, subject to a moral law and to the feeling (which is then called moral feeling) that he is treated justly or unjustly and that he is treating others justly or unjustly. This is the intelligible character of humanity as such, and thus far man is good (by nature) according to his inborn gift. But experience also shows that in man there is an inclination to desire actively what is unlawful. This is the inclination to evil which arises
unavoidably and as soon as man begins to make use of his freedom. Consequently
the inclination to evil can be regarded as innate. Hence, according to his sensible
character, man must be judged as being evil (by nature). This is not contradictory
when we are talking about the character of the species because it can be assumed
that the species’ natural destiny consists in continual progress toward the better (A
324).

Note that here, Kant uses the term “freedom” to refer to the freedom to choose evil. Kant goes on
to write that man is destined to overcome his animalistic selfishness so that the species can
achieve universalism:

no matter how great his animalistic inclination may be to abandon himself
passively to the enticements of ease and comfort, which he calls happiness, he is
still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by actively struggling with the
obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature. (A 325)

As with many of Kant’s works, the *Anthropology* gives us evidence in support of the
Incorporation Thesis, as when Kant remarks that the experience of pleasure always involves the
simultaneous evaluation of that pleasure (A §64), and evidence to deny it, as when Kant writes,
in direct contradiction to the *Religion* essay’s account of choosing a meta-maxim, “man never
sanctions the evil in himself, and so there is actually no evil coming from principles, but only
from the forsaking of them” (A 293).

Although the *Religion* essay has gained a privileged status as evidence that Kant changed
his mind and improved his moral theory late in his career, this special status is entirely
unwarranted. The *Religion* essay is not unique as a location for this kind of back and forth
between the idea that humans are free by virtue of their humanity and the idea that inclination is
a cause that usurps true freedom. The published version of Kant’s lectures on ethics, which is
based on lectures given earlier in his career, displays this same conflict. Even in Kant’s early
thought we can see the tension between his desire to say that all human action is free and his
need to argue that only those actions that express moral necessity are truly free.\textsuperscript{27} Kant makes the same argument in the \textit{Lectures} as he does in the \textit{Religion} essay: “because his will is free no man can be pathologically compelled. The human will is an \textit{arbitrium liberum} in that it is not determined by stimuli, but the animal will is an \textit{arbitrium brutum}, and not \textit{liberum}, because it can be determined \textit{per stimulos}”(L 28).\textsuperscript{28} Furthermore, “all moral evil springs from freedom; otherwise it would not be moral evil. However prone by nature we may be to evil actions, the latter have their source in our freedom”(L 67). Then, only a short while later, we see Kant offer the same formulation, but this time substituting the \textit{Groundwork}’s theory of freedom. When Kant begins, “man alone is free; his actions are not regulated by any such subjectively necessitating principle; if they were he would not be free,” it looks as though he is articulating the Incorporation Thesis again, but he continues:

And what then? If the freedom of man were not kept within bounds by objective rules, the result would be the completest savage disorder. There would be no certainty that man would not use his powers to destroy himself, his fellows and the whole of nature”(L 122).

This is not a picture of man as unfree, but of man as immoral. Kant contrasts freedom understood as the absence of lawfulness, which he describes above as the height of immorality and de facto lack of freedom, with the understanding of freedom as moral lawfulness. He advances an early version of the categorical imperative that expresses this identification: “Let thy procedure be such that in all thine actions regularity prevails. What does this restraint imply when applied to the individual? That he should not follow his inclinations.” To follow one’s inclinations is not only immoral but unfree: “he who subjects his person to his inclinations, acts contrary to the

\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{Lectures on Ethics} are unique because they do not display the same insistence on incompatibilism that we see in the first and second \textit{Critiques} and the \textit{Groundwork}. Instead, Kant argues that all actions are determined, but some are determined in a way that makes us free: “in the case of a free being an action can be necessary—and necessary in the highest possible degree—and yet it need not conflict with freedom”(L 28). Kant states “every obligation is either one of duty or one of compulsion”(L 15).

\textsuperscript{28} Even this distinction is not unequivocal since, in the previous sentence, Kant states that prudential necessitation is determination \textit{per stimulos}. 
ends of humanity, for as a free being he must not be subjected to inclinations, but ought to
determine them in the exercise of his freedom” (L 122). Therefore, for Kant, in at least one sense,
humans can be and are determined by their inclinations and this determination yields both
immorality and the lack of the freedom. In the terminology of the Lectures, sensibility can and
does overpower the understanding (L 45), and the more a man is compelled pathologically the
less he is free (L 29).

Contrary to the Incorporation Thesis, Kant’s texts do not unequivocally support the
conclusion that Kantian moral theory does not take inclination to be in itself corrosive to
morality and freedom. “Inclination” (Neigung) remains the bad guy of Kantian moral theory, but
as we saw from chapter 3, Kant’s condemnation of inclination need not spill over into a
condemnation of feeling, and, from chapter 5, a consideration of the ends of morality, such as the
happiness of others and our own self-perfection.

Still, Kant’s ambiguity and ambivalence about freedom runs deep. Just as in the third
section of the Groundwork, Kant often conflates two senses of freedom: they are, what in the
Lectures he calls the arbitrium liberum, which, as we just saw, can be dangerous, and the
freedom we gain from subjecting our wills to the moral law.

This distinction is what many commentators refer to as the Wille/Willkür distinction.
Many believe that Kant introduced this distinction late in his writings, with the Religion essay
and the Metaphysics of Morals, specifically to account for the freedom of evil action.29 As we
have just seen, however, Kant was aware of this problem from his first professional engagement
with ethics. Kant uses the term Willkür to refer to the capacity of the subject for free choice, in
the prosaic sense of freedom (willkürlich means “arbitrary” and so the Willkür, or free will, is

29 Allison discusses this mode of interpretation and rejects it. He does not need to take this route of deflating the
importance of autonomy for Kantian philosophy because he has already defined autonomy as “self-determination”
in the more general sense entailed by the Incorporation Thesis; Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 95-96.
analogous to the *arbitrium liberum*). *Wille* denotes freedom in the robust, noumenal sense.\(^{30}\) *Willkür* is often referred to as “practical freedom” by commentators, but this may be confusing because it is not the freedom of *pure* practical reason, rather freedom in a prosaic, practical sense, as opposed to a metaphysical or noumenal sense. *Wille*, on the other hand, can be called “moral freedom.”

When Kant describes the choice of a meta-maxim in the *Religion* essay he usually uses the term *Wille*, but he occasionally refers to *Willkür*, for example in the statement: “a propensity to evil can only attach to the moral faculty of choice (*Willkür*)” (Rel. 6:31). Kant must refer to *Willkür* here because he describes moral choice with an analogy to normal decision-making in order to account for its freedom. This overlap demonstrates exactly the reason that *Religion* essay can be used by those who wish to highlight the role of *Willkür* in Kant’s moral philosophy and downplay the role of the *Wille*.

V. Autonomy Without Freedom

Perhaps it is preferable not to call moral freedom “freedom” at all and to just say that moral decisions are better than merely prudential decisions. The term “freedom” seems to be operating only as an honorific in this sense anyway. In this way, the Kantian notion of autonomy is like Aristotle’s notion of human flourishing: it is a vision of that which is most properly and excellently human. Moral reasoning is “free,” for Kant, and the highest expression of freedom, because it expresses our essence as rational beings, through which we are united in a group with all people; it is that through which we really *feel* free. When Kant is worried about pure reason’s ability to be practical, he is not so much worried about the possibility of action in general, but

about disproving Hume’s statement that reason is and should be the slave of the passions. Heteronomy is a problem not because it entails that we are metaphysically determined, but because it is without intrinsic value. Kant’s goal is to show that happiness cannot have value without morality. Kant’s argument that nothing is good in itself except for a good will is like Aristotle’s argument that the good life is not the life devoted to money-making or fame: our lives can only have the mere semblance of worth if they are not based on morality.

To achieve an emotionally intelligent version of Kantian autonomy, we would merely need to free it from the question of freedom. If we take away the idea of heteronomy as the contrary to autonomy, the opposite of autonomy would not be external determination; it would simply be that one cannot fully affirm one’s choice. We can retain the idea of conscious and moral affirmation without denying that selfishness and the unconscious are truly a part of the self, and necessarily so. Recognizing our inclinations, or emotions, or desires, or whatever seems to be giving us trouble, as still a very real part of the self makes room for intimately and sensitively examining this part of the self with the assumption that it contains the possibility for reconciliation as well as genuine insight.

As we have seen, the Incorporation Thesis implies that the extra step of using autonomy to define freedom is unnecessary, since we can already state that all of our actions are free on separate grounds, by virtue of being caused by prudential reason and not directly by inclination. Kant says as much in the Groundwork: “[Man] does not even hold himself responsible for these inclinations and impulses and attribute them to him proper self (i.e., his will), though he does impute to his will the indulgence which he may grant them when he permits them to influence his maxims to the detriment of the rational laws of the will”(G 457-458). In my mind, the most important thing about Kant’s discussion of freedom in his practical philosophy is the
performance of praising morality: autonomy must be seen as necessarily referring to universality as well as subordinating one’s subjective ends to morality. As long as we keep the categorical imperative clear, it does not really matter how we sort out Kant’s confusing remarks about freedom. Yet, as we saw from the discussion of the Incorporation Thesis, many are interested in using what they take to be Kant’s theory of freedom in order to subtly make over his moral theory.

Other than praising moral decision-making as that which is most excellently human, interpretations of Kantian freedom seem to merely involve extricating him from it. Even noting the existence of the Willkür, it does not seem that Kant has solved his own problem of determinism. We must not forget that Kant sets up two different problems of determinism: the first comes from his theory of temporality; the second comes from his psychological hedonism. Both problems can be solved by means of the Religion essay’s account of predetermining one’s life Gesinnung, but this “solution” cannot expand to fit any account of phenomenological decision-making. Neither worry should affect the ability to hold people morally responsible, since, as Kant notes in the Groundwork, such is an assumption that we make and will continue to make whether or not we have consulted philosophy.

Kant never gives us a good argument that either moral or practical freedom is metaphysically free.31 (By “metaphysical freedom” I mean the spontaneous, i.e., uncaused, starting of a causal chain.) The third section of the Groundwork seems to suggest that Kant believes that autonomy is the cure to determinism. Nevertheless, maybe physical determinism is

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31 Allison describes the typical problem involved in accepting Kant’s notion of freedom thusly: “either freedom is located in some timeless noumenal realm, in which case it may be reconciled with the causality of nature, but only at the cost of making the concept both virtually unintelligible and irrelevant to the understanding of human agency, or, alternatively, freedom is thought to make a difference in the world, in which case both the notion of its timeless, noumenal status and the unrestricted scope within nature of the causal principle must be abandoned” (Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 2).
not the worry on Kant’s mind. In the first *Critique*, Kant explains that all experience is subject to the laws of cause and effect, or, in other words, determined. Of course, internal and external experience are determined in different ways. In arguing against the reality of the will, Spinoza gives an argument for rational determinism that makes use of the premise that clear and distinct ideas command our assent. In commanding assent, they determine our subsequent thinking and behavior. Ideas, not the free will, determine our behavior, he argues. In the first *Critique* Kant is concerned about protecting the possible existence of the free will, and he posits a “noumenon” beyond experience. He is sure to note that this “thing-in-itself” underlies both external and internal experience,” opening up the possibility that we might be freed from both physical and rational determinism.

Nevertheless, Kant never explicitly voices the worry about rational determinism. His theory of autonomy would not entail a solution to this problem since it asserts that it is exactly through determination by pure reason that we become free. It might be correct to say that Kant abandons the Spinozist notion of rational determinism. Although, if this is the case, it is only through a theory of freedom that closely resembles compatibilist Spinoza’s theory of freedom, as that which is self-caused and promotes self-preservation, which for Spinoza, is closely aligned with pure intuition/reason. If it is true that Kant exchanges his worry about rational determinism for a theory of rational freedom, then his only worries left would concern physical determinism and a Spinozist psychological hedonism.

Support for this line of interpretation might come from the post-first *Critique* attempts at solving the problem of physical determinism. Kant twice suggests Spinozist solutions. In the first *Critique*, the “thing-in-itself” is called a “noumenon” because it is not, in principle, an object of experience, but can only be thought. Yet, in his practical philosophy, Kant employs the term
“noumenon” in conjunction with his idea of the noumenal, or purely rational, self. Kant later suggests that there might be an underlying unity between phenomena and noumena. Of course, Spinoza suggests exactly this: that the order of ideas matches the order of events in the world. Suggesting that there might be a deeper unity between phenomena and noumena undermines the original intention behind postulating the *noumenon* in the first place, but it does offer a competing solution to physical determinism. If Nature is in sympathy with our purposes, and we can determine ourselves rationally, than physical determinism loses its sting. Kant’s arguments that we can see design in Nature and History similarly suggest that he moves closer to monism. Nevertheless, with this monism we would be physically determined and yet rationally free because we are free to promote our own rational nature. As Wood notes, this amounts to compatibilism, and, for these additional reasons, Kant seems to be fine with it.\(^3\)

Of course, Kant is not fine with Spinoza. One problem with speculating about Spinozist philosophical heritage is that it cannot be proved. Because he was a heretic, scholars in Christian Europe would not acknowledge his influence. Furthermore, Spinoza believes that reason is always life-promoting; Kant rejects this naturalism and holds that pragmatic reason is hedonistic, but pure reason is not. Maintaining a more Christian notion of God as moral and spiritual being, it would have been easy for Kant to accept that pure reason enjoys the same pre-established harmony with nature as pragmatic reason does.

Of course, arguing that Kant is part-Spinozist in a dissertation about emotion certainly yields the requirement of comment on possible Spinozist influence on Kant’s theory of emotion. Recalling chapter 3: it does not seem that there is much. Kant’s theory of emotion was likely formed pre-critically, and therefore long before his theory of autonomy and his flights of

monism. A Spinozist influence might explain this theory of the unconscious, as well as, more importantly, his psychological hedonism and motivate his response to it. Of course, a cognitive theory of emotion has monist leanings, and so we might argue that Kant had early sympathies in this regard. Nevertheless, his theory of emotion seems to have more in common with the Stoics and seems to be more caused by his own vehement rejection of moral sense theory and Hume’s assertion that reason is and should be always the slave of the passions.

On the other hand, we might also read Kant as an incompatibilist. Allison, in his Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, argues that the fact that all experience is subject to the category of causality does not force us to conclude that Nature really is fully determined. Allison calls the thought of “the complete explicability and predictability of humans actions” “merely a regulative Idea.” This distinction is similar to the distinction between Science assuming that it can find the causal laws for everything and Science actually finding causal laws for everything (or everything that it covers, as with Newtonian mechanics). This might be helpful for us, but I nevertheless think there is plenty of reason to assume that Kant was taking the mechanical model as his model for Nature. In the third section of the Groundwork, Kant makes a connection between the formality of the moral will (as it is without content) and the rarified source of pure reason that transcends empirical experience:

This thought [of oneself as free from sensible determination] certainly involves the idea of an order and legislation different from that of the mechanism of nature which applies to the world of sense; and it makes necessary the concept of an intelligible world (i.e., the whole of rational beings as things in themselves). But it makes not the slightest claim to anything more than to think of such a world as regards merely its formal condition… (G 458)

33 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 326. One should consult this chapter, “Between Cosmology and Autonomy,” for more of discussion about the relationship between determinism and autonomy as Kant portrays it in the first Critique.
This interpretation also helps explain Kant’s constant reminder that we can never know for sure whether or not our motives were pure: we cannot have this knowledge because we cannot be (or can barely be) conscious of pure motives.

As we can see, there are compelling reasons for a variety of different interpretations of Kantian freedom. Returning to my main argument, the best possible revision to Kant’s theory of autonomy is to completely divorce it from the question of metaphysical freedom. For some reason, when this tie remains un-severed it continually leads to ignoring the fact that autonomy is first and foremost a moral notion. Irwin’s Greenian interpretation is a good example of this tendency: he starts out by making the distinction between moral and metaphysical freedom, arguing that the former is itself sufficient as an account of freedom, and, yet again, moral freedom is made over into an amoral notion. Green’s account of morality in terms of rational self-satisfaction is nevertheless very attractive because it postulates an internal, developmental connection between rational self-realization and impartiality. His account overlaps in an interesting way with our earlier discussion of emotional intelligence, which was shown to involve impartiality and self-awareness. Revisiting this topic prompts us to revisit the relationship between emotional intelligence and morality. Just as emotional intelligence expresses psychological well-being, or a unified and higher notion of happiness, Green hopes to show that Kant is interested in the intersection between morality and self-satisfaction. If we take self-satisfaction to be an essentially normative notion, then it is very much like Kant’s notion of autonomy. Still, bringing “self-satisfaction” into morality should not entail overturning the distinction between the moral and the prudential, as Green believes that it does.34

34 Green argues that Kantian freedom should be understood in terms of long-term goals and rational self-consciousness. T. H. Green, Collected Works, ed. R. L. Nettleship (London, 1885-88), 117. Irwin restates this sentiment in terms of choice that favors one’s “fairly stable desires and aims”; Irwin, “Morality and Personality,” 35.
At this point, it is most important that we hold onto the fact that autonomy is a moral notion. Should we care about others because they are a means for gaining “self-realization”? No. We should care about others because it is the right thing to do. More cautious consideration of the link between self-realization and impartiality is necessary to prevent collapsing Kantianism into a sophisticated Utilitarianism.

Does this cautious consideration require some degree of mysticism, or a retreat into naturalism? It is difficult to say why or how morality and psychological health are related, why morality expresses our “best self,” but it still seems to be the case. Similarly, literature on the practical application of emotional intelligence is largely indistinguishable from a commentary of the moral and social ills of violence, abuse, disrespect, and addiction. Kant is a good enough psychologist (or, as he would say, anthropologist) to see the obvious, but we contemporary moral theorists fall into the trap of ignoring psychology and denying that this connection exists just because we do not know how to explain it. Kant holds that the moral law is a (natural) “fact of reason.” This assertion may strike us as horribly unphilosophical, and so it is often ignored, and then Kant’s moral theory is ripped from the psychological context in which it belongs.

In the same vein as those who promote the Incorporation Thesis, Irwin takes as a point for Green’s interpretation that it revises Kant’s distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Meerbote makes this point in his commentary on Irwin’s article; Meerbote, “Kant on Freedom,” 72.
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