Rights, Religion, and Realities: Public Opinion Toward Same-Sex Marriage in Mexico

By

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Introduction

On a spring day in 2010, five couples stood together on the steps of a Mexico City courthouse. There were all the trimmings one would expect to see at a wedding—flowers, tuxedos, white dresses. The couples kissed and embraced, beaming with happiness. Everything one would expect to see at a wedding—except here, on this day, these couples were exceptional as they were the first to enjoy the benefits of a new law legalizing same-sex marriage in Mexico City (CNN 2010).

Mexico is a country with a long legacy of clearly defined gender roles, with machismo (whether real or perceived) as a strong focal point of contemporary society. In a country in which over 80 percent of the population reports being Catholic (Pew Research Center 2013), a religion that denounces same-sex marriage policies, how has gay marriage achieved such a victory and made Mexico a Latin American leader in same-sex rights? Although ideas related to sexuality and gender have been slowly shifting in Mexico and in much of Latin America (Gutmann 1996), initiatives such as the same-sex marriage law passed in Mexico City are testaments to the powerful changes that have occurred recently.

In this thesis, I address several key questions. First, has support for same sex marriage in Mexico changed over time, and if so, how? Second, what factors explain this change? To that end, my thesis begins by providing a historical context of same-sex marriage, highlighting the political and social changes that have occurred during the past half-century. In addition, I review prior studies about gender and sexuality in Latin America and Mexico; these help lay the groundwork for the analyses that follow. In the second half of the thesis, I utilize data from the Latin American
Popular Opinion Project (LAPOP) to examine patterns and trends in support for same-sex marriage. I describe the data and methods, and then present findings from my analysis of patterns and shifts in support for same sex marriage in Mexico.

**Gender and Sexuality: From Taboo to Table Talk**

There is no question that gender and sexuality are concepts that have been steadily evolving throughout Latin America and Mexico. As interpretations of gender and sexuality shift and expand, even conservatives who have strongly resisted that change acknowledge this reality (Real Truth 2007). In the past, gender was viewed as fixed—confined to a dualistic understanding of the biological male and female (Chant and Craske 2003:129). Over time, however, these perceptions have become more fluid.

Dore (1997) defines gender as “the social construction of sexual difference. It is the outcome of struggles over the ways societies define and regulate femininity and masculinity. By its nature gender is multidimensional. It is recreated and transformed through an inseparable mix of norms and behaviors...” (Dore 1997:10). As a social construct, binary constructions of male/female or masculine/feminine cannot fully encompass the concept of gender (French and Bliss 2007:2).

Chant and Craske (2003) describe the shift toward a more fluid conceptualization of gender in Latin America. They deconstruct the link between gender and sexuality and define the latter “in broad terms... as a spectrum of behavior that extends from the procreative to the erotic, and encompasses ideals,
desires, practices, preferences and identities” (Chant and Craske 2003:128). Yet only in the last two decades have gender and sexuality become regular subjects in scholarly discourse about Latin America (Bliss 2001).

Since then, Latin American scholarship has regularly focuses on sexuality and gender. In fact Balderston and Guy (1997: 1) ask whether scholars can “talk about any aspect of Latin America without including consideration of gender and sexuality?” Yet several years later, Bliss (2001: 247) noted that “as little as ten years ago, sexuality lurked in the shadows of largely quantitative studies of population growth and reproductive health.” These studies occurred after the population boom during the “so-called Mexican Miracle” of the mid 20th century when population stabilization became a national concern (Bliss 2001:248).

Recent studies about sexuality and gender in Mexico include works such as Carrier’s (1995) and Gutmann’s (1996). In addition, French and Bliss (2007) note recent special journal issues exclusively covering gender and sexuality in Mexico. But as López-Vicuña (2004: 252) points out, in contrast to the United States, “the construction and representation of sexual identities in Mexico and elsewhere is politicized differently than in the United States” and specific to “distinctive dilemmas about cultural self-definition.” Carillo’s (2007) study, for example, reveals how sexuality affected local debates about the future of the Mexican nation. Liberal approaches to sexuality were seen as modernizing, while conservative approaches preserved the mexicanidad or the Mexican national identity (Carrillo 2007).

Because the core of Mexican gender identity has been the traditional configuration of masculinity (Balderston and Guy 1997), new studies include
perspectives about masculinity in which the “the common image of Hispanic men as either conforming to or rejecting stereotypical machismo is being displaced by more nuanced discussions of how different models of masculinity are reproduced and disseminated in Latin American culture” (López-Vicuña 2004:243). For example, Gutmann’s (1996) study of masculinities and machismo in Mexico reveals that Mexican men are not defined solely by conformity to machismo stereotypes, and that men are embracing new, more expansive ideas about gender and sexuality.

A Rocky Road: The Push for Gay Rights in Mexico

Although social scientists began addressing gender shifts in Mexico in the last two decades, the gay rights movement in Mexico was established earlier, first entering in the socially tumultuous decade of the 1970s. The movement for gay rights began when the Homosexual Liberation Front (Frente de Liberación Mexico) was established in Mexico City in 1971. Spurred on “after a Sears Roebuck employee in the city was fired for his homosexuality” (de la Dehesa 2007:32), this small group of intellectuals kept a low public profile, slowly gaining momentum and organizing the first gay pride march in 1978. Thereafter, the movement expanded its public presence, linking itself with emerging leftist and feminist movements in Mexico and forming an alliance with the socialist Revolutionary Worker’s Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores, PRT). These alliances would ultimately determine the movement’s direction in Mexican politics (de la Dehesa 2007:29).
In 1982, gay and lesbian activists organized the Rosario Ibarra Lesbian and Homosexual Support Committee (CLHARI), which endorsed the PRT presidential candidate Rosario Ibarra, a human rights activist and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) ally (de la Dehesa 2011:2). Ibarra did not win the presidency, but this endorsement marked a high point of visibility for LGBT activism in Mexico. Because the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI) held power in Mexico for 70 years until 2000 with the election of Vicente Fox, a member of the National Action Party (PAN), supporting a non-PRI presidential candidate at that time was a substantial political move. This firmly cemented the gay rights movement’s position as part of the opposition movement emerging during Mexico’s semi-authoritarian regime (de la Dehesa 2010). Gay rights became incorporated into larger political movements for freedom from repression and the PRI’s one-party rule. Linking gay rights to the ideal of Mexico as a modern, democratic society would ultimately prove important and lay the groundwork for change to come.

After 1982, however, the gay rights movement in Mexico moved retreated from the spotlight. As Gutmann (1996) points out, political movements during the 1990s became less visible, although they were not without progress. In the early 1990s, Mexico City established a Human Rights Commission, which included unprecedented language outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (de la Dehesa 2010). By the early 21st century, gay rights movements boldly re-entered the national scene and became active due to increased domestic and international attention. Thus, the Mexican gay rights movement evolved over the
decades, shifting its emphasis from “from homosexual liberation to homosexual rights...a transformation in activists’ goals and tactics entailing a greater prioritization of state-directed efforts and a narrowing of their agendas from transforming broader relations of power in society and gaining social acceptance to an emphasis on legally enforced tolerance” (de la Dehesa 2010: 5).

In Mexico, the capital city was the central hub for LGBT activism. Great legislative advances in same-sex rights (notably same-sex marriage and adoption rights) in Mexico City have had ripple effects across the country. In 2000, a lesbian activist and elected official first introduced progressive legislation for same-sex couples’ rights to the Mexico City legislature. Her bill was the basis for what would become the Sociedad de Convivencia, which created “cohabitation societies granting limited rights to same-sex couples” (de la Dehesa 2011:2). Despite strong opposition from the conservative National Action Party (PAN) party (de la Dehesa 2010), in November 2006 Mexico City adopted the legislation, legalizing civil unions for same-sex couples (Lozano 2010). LGBT activists welcomed these developments, but considered them only a “first step,” as they did not confer full rights to same-sex couples (Negroni 2004:217). Notably, the civil unions established through this bill lacked basic social security rights conferred on heterosexual couples (Lozano 2013:151). Supporters continued to advocate for equal rights, and in late 2009, Mexico City made headlines across the globe after passing a bill that legalized same-sex marriage in the capital city. This was not a mundane municipal policy decision, but a massive victory for the gay rights movement in Mexico.
In a vote of 39-20 in the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF), Mexico City became the first city in Latin America to approve same-sex marriage in 2009, when no other Latin American locale permitted same-sex marriages (Llana 2009:1). Mexico City’s Mayor Marcelo Ebrard and the capital’s legislative body, dominated by members of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), led the initiative for passage. Mayor Ebrard was known for his support of LGBT rights, having created the Program on Sexual Diversity in the city government in 2007 (de la Dehesa 2010). More generally, the PRD was known for its “broader platform of inclusion and tolerance, [which] favor[ed] respect for the rights of homosexuals” (United States 2008:2). The party was also home to Latin America’s first openly gay legislator, Patria Jiménez, who was elected to Congress in 1997 (Chant and Craske, 2003).

Under such progressive leadership, passage of the 2009 bill advanced the civil rights of homosexual citizens of Mexico. In addition to giving gay couples the right to adopt and participate in spousal insurance plans, the legislation altered the definition of marriage in the capital’s civic code from a union between a man and a woman to the “free uniting of two people” (Llana 2009:1). These changes combined to produce what one contributor to the Chicago Tribune calls “one of the most liberal visions of the family and sexuality in Latin America and beyond” (Avila 2009:1).

Clearly, LGBT rights have become part of Mexico’s social and political discourse. Yet, support for same-sex marriage is by no means universal. As de la Dehesa (2010) points out, the conservative National Action Party (PAN), with

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1 In the same year, Argentina was considering legalizing same-sex marriage in judicial hearings and ultimately did so in 2010 (Piatti-Crocker 2013).
support from President Calderón, opposed the 2009 same sex marriage legislation and challenged it in court. Opposition also took other forms. For example, the Mexican state of Yucatan changed its constitution in 2009, defining marriage “a union between a man and a woman” (Lozano 2013:152).

As current leader of the PAN party at the time, President Calderón was adamant in his position that Mexico City’s same-sex marriage legislation violated the constitutional definition of marriage between a man and a woman. He had Mexico’s attorney general bring the case to the attention of the Supreme Court hoping that it would strike down the law (Malkin 2010:2). Ultimately these efforts proved futile; the Mexican Supreme Court not only backed the law but also expanded its influence. In a 9 to 2 vote, the Court “upheld the constitutionality of the law, the right of same-sex couples to adopt, and [perhaps most importantly] the validity of marriages contracted in Mexico City in other states” (de la Dehesa 2011:2). However, as Wilkinson (2010) subsequently noted, “reaching this point left casualties along the way” (Wilkinson 2010:1).

Despite support by the PRD party and opposition from the PAN, the PRI had yet to develop a position on the issue. Following the presidency of Calderón, which ended in 2012, the PRI candidate Peña Nieto was elected as president. Although many have wondered what position the new leadership might take, so far President Peña Nieto has not yet offered resistance against the movement for same-sex rights. In fact, during his campaign, Pena Nieto helped to sponsor the 12th Annual Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender March and Fiesta held in Aguascalientes (Paterson 2012).

Opposition and the Catholic Church

As briefly noted above, social conservatives are typically opposed to same-sex marriage, especially members of the center-right PAN party, the Roman Catholic Church, and rising sects of Evangelical Christians. The Catholic Church has been quite vocal opposing homosexuality on moral grounds and arguing that policy developments such as same-sex marriage undermine the fabric of Mexican society. It contends that recent legislation places the “traditional family in crisis” (Avila 2009:1). The Catholic Church has strongly adhered to traditional gender roles and the repression of homosexuality. Under Catholic doctrine, “the primary purpose of sex is procreation,” thus sexual practices antithetical to this goal (such as homosexuality and sex without the intent of children) are condemned as sinful and wrong (Chant & Craske 2003:134). Green and Babb (2002) describe how stereotypes of effeminate men as passive and masculine women as aggressive are embodied in the rhetoric of the Catholic Church and are particularly evident in its discussion of same-sex marriage. In fact, the bishop of the archdiocese of Guadalajara was recently quoted as saying, “The position of the Church is never going to change. Marriage is between a man and a woman. Anything else cannot be called marriage” (Hadden-Leggett 2014).

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2 Further discussion of Peña Nieto’s evolving stance on same-sex rights will be presented below.
Following the 2010 Supreme Court ruling upholding Mexico City’s redefinition of marriage to include same-sex partners, one Cardinal in the Church went so far as to accuse Supreme Justices of accepting bribes from Mexico City’s mayor (Wilkinson 2010:1). The Court swiftly issued a unanimous censure of the Cardinal, whereby even members who dissented against the legislation joined in the censure. Yet the Cardinal and other Church representatives seemed undeterred by the censure, as these claims received endorsement from the federal archdiocese.

The Church’s vehement insertion of itself into Mexican politics is particularly controversial in a country with a “long history of anticlericalism, dating back to laws in the 19th century” (Malkin 2010:2). Early in the 19th century, fear over the Church’s power and its link with the Spanish empire and conservative ideals led liberal leaders to distance Mexico from the Catholic Church. This anticlerical attitude continued into the 20th century and was embodied in the Constitution of 1917, which limits the Church’s rights and establishes a clear separation between church and state (Krauze 1997). Even though President Salinas restored relations with the Church and returned its full rights in the 1990s, the Church remained careful about asserting its political leanings (Krauze 1997). More recently, after the PAN party took control over the Mexican presidency early in the 21st century, the Church has become more vocal (Malkin 2010).

Interestingly, despite the Church’s opposition to change, public support for same-sex rights, particularly for same-sex marriage, continues to increase. Several factors contribute to this shift: changing gender roles in Mexican society, the importance of separation of Church and State in Mexico, the unique nature of the
religion in Latin America, and increased discourse of alternative sexualities associated with the global movement for human rights. While idealized ‘hegemonic norms’ are reinforced by the Catholic Church (Green and Babb 2002:6), the reality is that they are no longer supported in Mexican society. The traditional image of the nuclear family has “been fractured by migration, teenage pregnancy, divorce and abandonment” (Malkin 2010). Particularly over the past several decades, increasing outmigration and economic crises have led to shifting gender roles in families, leading to growing rates of married women’s labor force participation beginning in the 1980s. Other changes in families are characterized by “growing incidence of lone motherhood and female household headship…falling levels of legal marriage, rising numbers of out-of-wedlock births, greater rates of divorce and separation, and mounting involvement of women in the historically male preserve of family breadwinning” (Chant 2003:177). According to Chant, “these tendencies…have fed into a general consensus that the ‘patriarchal family model’ is on the wane” (Chant 2003:177).

As patriarchal and traditional norms in families have shifted, this change has directly affected the fight for LGBT rights. In fact, the feminist movement in Mexico was a catalyst for LGBT successes over the past half-century. Progressive discourse and legislation on gender led the way for the same on alternative sexualities. In fact, changing family structures based on women’s increased independence “were routinely cited by advocates of same-sex partnership rights to displace the idealized notion of the traditional nuclear family with an acknowledgment of this much more heterogeneous terrain” (de la Dehesa 2011:3). Feminist thought in Mexico has
continually been rooted in a more secular view of society, undermining the patriarchal and male-dominated standards promoted by more conservative sectors of society, particularly the Catholic Church and in more recent years, the Evangelical churches. As Green and Babb (2002:4) note, “Throughout Latin America, the feminist movement has forced the left to rethink issues of gender and address the problems of rape, domestic violence, and gender-based discrimination.” The feminist movement advocated for women’s rights in marriage—i.e. more liberal divorce laws, and rights to education, contraception, and even abortion, and this type of advocacy created the opportunity for promotion of rights regarding sexual orientation. Therefore, a secular view of Mexican society began to take hold (de la Dehesa 2011:3).

Considering sexuality outside the bounds of family and motherhood opened doors for both heterosexual women and LGBT Mexicans (male and female). For women, one major change was “greater accessibility and widespread use of modern methods of birth control in the past twenty years in Mexico City” (Gutmann 1996:112). Undoubtedly, access was linked to greater secularization in both government policies and social practices, but it was also related to the increasingly popular practice of cohabitation. As Ojeda (2011: 439) points out, “social change has also made some conjugal arrangements such as ‘living together without being married’ more attractive to the younger generations of Mexicans transitioning to adulthood and family formation.” Such new configurations of the family reflect progressive attitudes in Mexico, suggesting weaker control of the Church over social practices. In fact, Chant and Craske (2003: 135) point out “the influence of religion
on the normative contours of sexual behavior in Western societies has waned in the
wake of secularization, medicalization and the rise of the modern state, in the
particular context of contemporary Latin America.”

In addition to the Catholic Church, there is another conservative element on
the rise in Latin America. Evangelical churches are steadily gaining ground in the
region, and by reaching out to people in rural areas they are swaying many Catholics
into their pews (Jordan 2005):

“Without Vatican-like requirements for priesthood or control over individual
churches, Evangelicalism has allowed charismatic leaders to amass
mammoth followings by employing new media and targeted messaging. The
evangelical movement has grown phenomenally over the past 30 years in
Latin America and is much less hospitable to LGBT people” (Combs 2013).

Conservatism among Evangelicals represents a more tangible presence of
leadership, the literal teachings of Christian Scripture, and the promotion of a clean
and sober lifestyle. While the numbers of Evangelicals remain relatively small in
comparison to the Catholic population, explanations for their rise may shed light on
why Mexican Catholics espouse more liberal viewpoints than Evangelicals.

One of the main criticisms of the Catholic Church in Mexico has been the
separation of the Church from the peoples’ reality and daily needs in part due to a
low ratio of priests to followers (Jordan 2005). While Evangelical churches are in
some cases recruiting such disaffected individuals, those who remain nominally
under the Catholic faith (even in the rural areas) are increasingly shaping their own
opinions about social issues and Church policies. A Chiapas Priest, Raul Orlando
Lomeli, noted how many are questioning restrictions on gender and sexuality even
within the Church hierarchy, and advocating for increased involvement of lay
society, particularly women (Jordan 2005). Thus, in spite of strict and very clearly communicated doctrine, many Catholic Mexicans (and Latin Americans) have begun to raise alternative points of view. Combs (2013) discusses what he calls the “paradox” of Latin American Catholicism and the “disconnect between the Pope and his flock” (Combs 2013). This disconnect is why some Catholics have begun to develop their own interpretations of Church doctrine (Combs 2013). Interestingly, while both the Catholic and Evangelical Churches take a firm stance against same-sex marriage and other controversial social issues, Evangelical members are more likely than Catholics to adopt the official position of their church which condemns same-sex relations.

Of course, the Catholic Church influences Mexican public opinion but its level of influence varies by region. In fact, it has “a much stronger influence outside of the District Federal” [Mexico City] (Malkin 2009:2). Known as “more liberal than Mexico as a whole” (Avila 2009:1), Mexico City residents are known for their progressive attitudes. As Gutmann (1996: 127) describes, “people in Mexico City have great access and exposure to people of different cultural orientations, including people of different sexual preferences. Such cross-cultural, and cross-sexual, intermingling is one feature...that makes the capital stand out from most other parts of the country.” However, although this suggests that attitudes toward sexuality are more progressive in the capital than in the rest of Mexico, the data I present below suggest this pattern has begun to change.
Support for Same Sex Marriage

As Mexico City began to grapple with same-sex marriage legislation, many polls assessed attitudes about homosexuality and gay rights. One poll in 2007 revealed some interesting findings (Consulta Mitofsky 2007); 46 percent of respondents agreed that a homosexual couple should enjoy the same rights as a heterosexual couple. However, there was a fairly large gap between those who supported equal rights and those who supported same sex marriage, with support declining on the issue of adoption. While 33 percent of respondents agreed that rights to marry should be extended to homosexual couples, only 23 percent of respondents agreed that two men should have the right to adopt children. Interestingly, however, 34 percent of respondents agreed that lesbian couples should have the right to adopt, illustrating slightly more support than the right to same-sex marriage (Consulta Mitofsky 2007).

Also interesting were breakdowns by gender and age (Consulta 2007). These findings show significantly more support for same-sex rights among young people compared to respondents 50 years and older, who were consistently the least supportive. Notably, women were more supportive than men, except for the measure about rights of lesbian couples to adopt a child. This may suggest a level of discomfort with breaking away from the traditional gender role image of women as mothers. Herek (2002) found that ideas toward homosexuality are inextricably linked to ideas about socially accepted gender roles.

A 2009 poll conducted by El Universal reveals the progressive environment of the capital city. Conducted among voting age residents of Mexico City, the poll asked
if citizens support legislation granting marriage rights to same-sex couples. Half of the residents in this sample expressed support for same-sex marriage, while only 38 percent disapproved. Interestingly, here, men were slightly more likely than women to approve. In addition, the age breakdowns show a very large share (67 percent) of young people in favor of the policy (El Universal 2009). This far surpasses the 40 percent approval for Mexico as a whole (reported from the 2007 poll). The findings suggest increasing support over time, which reflects (and is reflected in) the evolving discourses on gender and sexuality occurring in Mexico and throughout Latin America.

Although Mexico is moving toward a more inclusive society, homophobia remains throughout the nation, with continued violence against LGBT, particularly transgendered citizens (Global Rights 2010). Discrimination is a part of the cultural landscape, although steps are being taken to combat the problem. A major step was the 2003 creation of the National Council to Prevent Discrimination (CONAPRED) (El Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminación), which is responsible for “for receiving and resolving complaints of discrimination in both the public and private sector...and creating proactive antidiscrimination programs” (Global Rights 2010:4).

While CONAPRED is a product of federal law, Mexico City offers more protection against discrimination than the federal government. In the capital city, the penal code criminalizes discrimination based on sexual orientation (Faculty 2013). Yet changes are occurring rapidly at the national level. In 2011, the Mexican Constitution was revised to include sexual orientation as an illegal form of discrimination in Clause 2 of Article 1; it reads:
“Any form of discrimination, based on ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disabilities, social status, medical conditions, religious opinions, sexual orientation, marital status, or any other form, which violates the human dignity or seeks to annul or diminish the rights and freedoms of the people, is prohibited” (ICJ 2012).

Since this revision, LGBT activists and government actors have referred to the revised clause to justify changes in outdated and discriminatory policies. For example, until 2012, openly gay and bisexual men were legally prohibited to donate blood. Newly enacted regulations now evaluate donors based on sexual history rather than sexual orientation so that these men are no longer subject to the discrimination that existed in the past (Huffington 2012). This type of argument emphasizing equality with respect to sexual preference is steadily becoming the norm across Mexico and it is consistent in all of Latin America, where “...most...nations have...[recently] introduced new constitutions or wholly revamped old ones” facilitating the interpretation gay rights as human rights (Encarnación 2014).

As Mexico experienced its democratic opening in the latter part of the 20th and into the 21st century, human rights became an integral part of its development, both regionally and nationally. As Friedman (2014:1) notes, throughout Latin America, “movements for sexual and gender rights have capitalized on the historical legitimacy of human rights in a region where repression was common.” Mexico has been no exception. The movement for same-sex rights has changed its course during the past two decades, with the judiciary playing a salient role in the battle for same-sex rights. The courts’ attention to same-sex rights has been called “nothing short of audacious” (Encarnación 2014), relying on the newly revised Mexican
Constitution, international treatises on human rights, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions as foundations for their rulings. In fact, Ecarnación (2014) noted that “the unanimous 2012 ruling by the Mexican Supreme Court that supported same-sex marriage pointedly drew upon Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down laws banning interracial marriage.”

In the last 12 months, advocates for same-sex rights have continued filing court cases in efforts to achieve full equality using transnational human rights principles. Recently, on February 28, 2014, a District judge in Oaxaca “admitted a case against the President Enrique Peña Nieto, the governors and Congresses of the 31 states of the country, for violating the obligations established in the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, specifically for not promoting reforms to recognize marriage between persons of the same-sex in the entire country” (La Gazzeta 2014). As I noted earlier, Peña Nieto supported a gay pride event during his campaign, but he has been fairly quiet on the issue of same-sex marriage. In 2011, CNN (2011) quoted him as saying: “I believe we have evolved as a society into an openness to sexual diversity.” Once he became president, he continued to support this rhetoric but dismissed the legal issue as a matter for states to handle.

Therefore, although the future is not certain, there is strong momentum in support of same-sex marriage in Mexico. Following a ruling that permitted several same-sex couples in Jalisco to receive licenses, one newly married woman said: “This is a wave. Soon it will be unstoppable. All we’re asking for is equal rights and this is going to happen in all of Mexico. Jalisco was considered one of the states where it would be most difficult to achieve this—well, now we’ve done it. This
should inspire all the couples in other states who are fighting for equality” (Hadden-Leggett 2014).

**Determinants of Support for Same-Sex Marriage**

My thesis asks three questions. First, has support for same sex marriage in Mexico changed over time, and if so, how? Second, what factors explain this change? In the first half of the thesis, I have reviewed the political and social changes that have occurred during the past half-century and help to explain growth in support for same-sex marriage. In this last section of the literature review, I review prior studies that identify specific determinants of such support. Several studies shed light on factors that influence support for same-sex marriage. Although most are studies conducted in the United States, I review them below to apply their lessons learned to my analysis that follows.

Not surprisingly, many studies have documented a strong effect of religion on support for same-sex marriage. For example, results from a 2012 U.S. Gallup poll indicate that religion is a major factor for those who opposed same-sex marriage (Newport 2012). Other studies echo these findings. Olson, Cadge, and Harrison (2006) directly address the role of religion on public opinion toward same sex marriage. Using data gathered from a 2004 nationally representative survey of 1,610 individuals, they examine how religious affiliation and religiosity affect attitudes toward same-sex marriage, same-sex civil unions, and a federal amendment that would ban gay marriage (Olson et al. 2006). They find that
religions with traditional attitudes toward morality and secularism were correlated with disapproval of same sex marriage. Furthermore, those who are more closely connected with their churches, i.e. have more close friends that are members, are more likely to oppose gay rights (Olson et al. 2006).

These findings, together with the cultural significance of the Catholic Church in Mexico, suggest that the Church’s influence may be a powerful determinant of public opinion toward same-sex marriage. Yet, despite its formal opposition to homosexuality, the Catholic world is characterized by great heterogeneity regarding sexuality (Vaggione 2011:944). Notably, several studies show that Catholics are more supportive of same-sex marriages than other Christians in the United States (Jones and Cox 2011). Compiling findings from six surveys of Catholic U.S. citizens conducted in 2010 about public opinion of gay and lesbian issues, the authors find that Catholics’ views are comparable to Protestants, and that both groups are more supportive than white Evangelicals and black Protestants. This is true despite the fact that “nearly two thirds of Catholics who hear about the issue of homosexuality in church are getting negative messages from their clergy” (Jones and Cox 2011:11).

A Pew Hispanic study, focusing specifically on Latinos in the United States, yields similar findings. Using data from a nationally representative and bilingual survey conducted among 1,765 U.S. Latino adults in the fall of 2012, the report finds that support for same-sex marriage has grown among Latinos, “mirroring growing support among the general public, [where] half of Latinos now favor gay and lesbian couples to marry legally, while one third are opposed” and in addition that, “Latino
evangelicals remain strongly opposed to same-sex marriage, with only 25 percent supporting” (Pew 2012:7).

Several studies address other determinants of support including sex, marital status, and age. Herek (2002) reported that men were more likely to strongly oppose homosexuality than women. Brumbaugh, Sanchez, Nock and Wright (2008) also show that women were more likely to support same-sex marriage than men, but they also found an important effect for cohabitation; those never married, without children, and those who have cohabitated “were significantly more favorable in attitudes toward gay marriage than those with greater structural ties to marriage” (Brumbaugh et al. 2008:351). These authors suggest that cohabitation means embracing alternative non-institutionalized relationships, which are likely related to more support for gay marriage. This is particularly important in Latin America where common law unions have historically been a part of the cultural landscape and are increasing in popularity among young people. For Mexicans, consensual unions “have been seen as an alternative to legal marriage rather than a fundamentally different type of relationship” (Heaton and Forste 2007:55). These unions are more common at younger ages and may be, as a result, less stable.

Additional research indicates that age also plays a strong role in attitudes toward same-sex marriage; a 2012 Gallup poll shows levels of support are highest among youth ages 18 to 29 and lowest among those 65 or older (Newport 2012). Even in conservative sectors of society, support for same-sex marriage among youth continues to grow. A 2014 study released by the Pew Center found that in the United States, “61% of Republicans and Republican leaners under 30 favor same-sex
marriage while just 35% oppose it. By contrast, just 27% of Republicans ages 50 and older favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry” (Kiley 2014:1). The same study shows that education is strongly related to support for same-sex marriage, with higher levels of education correlated with higher support. Moreover, a 2010 study by the Latin American Popular Opinion Project indicates that both education and urbanicity affect support for same-sex marriage. Specifically, those with more years of schooling and those living in urban areas are more supportive than those with less schooling and residents of rural areas (Corral and Lodola 2010).

**Hypotheses**

My thesis contains three key research questions. First, to what extent do Mexicans support same-sex marriage (SSM)? Second, what factors explain that support? Third, how has support for SSM changed over time? Based on prior research and recent policy reforms, I expect that support for same-sex marriage will increase between 2010 and 2012. In addition, I expect that religion and marital status will be important predictors of support for SSM. Specifically, I posit that: a) Catholics will be more supportive of same-sex marriage than Evangelicals and Catholics’ support will grow disproportionately between 2010 and 2012; b) respondents who consider religion less important will register higher levels of support; and c) cohabitators will be more supportive than those ever married and support from cohabitators will grow disproportionately between 2010 and 2012.
**Data & Methods**

To obtain a picture of overall support for same-sex marriage in Mexico, I use the 2010 and 2012 cross-sectional data sets from the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) Mexico Questionnaires (see www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop). LAPOP regularly conducts public opinion surveys throughout the Western Hemisphere as part of the AmericasBarometer program, each year expanding its data pool to include more areas. LAPOP uses “sophisticated probability samples designed and employed to ensure representative samples at the national and subnational levels” (www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop LAPOP 2013). The 2010 data set has a sample size of 1,562 respondents; in 2012, although the total sample is 1560, some questions were given to only half the sample. In addition, there is some missing data. Therefore, for this analysis, our working sample for 2010 is 1515 individuals, and for 2012, 743 persons.

Using data from these detailed surveys, I assess support for same-sex marriage (SSM) and use the following question as my dependent variable: “How strongly do you approve or disapprove of the right to marry for same-sex couples?”

Responses range from 1 to 10, where 1 equals strongly disapprove, and 10 equals strongly approve. I recoded this variable into two categories: approve and disapprove, by categorizing responses 1-5 as disapproval and responses 6-10 as approval.

The key independent variables are religious affiliation, importance of religion, importance of church attendance, and political ideology.

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3 There is another indicator of support for gay rights available in the LAPOP data for 2010 and 2012. It asks respondents whether they approve of homosexuals holding political office. As described below, we only report descriptive results for this variable.
and marital status, all of which I recoded for the analysis. For religious affiliation, I condense responses into three categories: no religion, Catholic, and Evangelical. Because most respondents self-identify as Catholic (see Appendix Table 1), the sample sizes of the other categories are relatively small. Those reporting no religion include agnostics, atheists, and those who do not claim an organized religion. I recoded respondents as Evangelicals if they reported being Evangelical or Pentecostal, Protestant, of eastern religions (including Islam), Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, and Jewish. Even though some of these denominations are non-Christian, there are very few in the data set. Note that Christians in this group represent the majority of respondents. In the analysis below, I include the three categories of religious affiliation (Catholic, no religion, and Evangelical) as a set of dummy variables, where 1 = that category and 0 = otherwise; Evangelical is the reference.

For importance of religion, I recode the original categories (not at all, not very important, rather important, and very important) into a 0,1 dummy variable, more and less important (where less important is the reference category). In addition, I recoded marital status into three categories: single, cohabiters, and ever married. Cohabiting respondents are those currently united in a common law union (whether formal or informal). Those ever married include widows/widowers, divorced or separated, and currently married. In the analysis that follows, I include these three categories (single, cohabiters, and ever married) as dummy variables, where 1 = the category and 0 = otherwise; ever married is the reference.

I also include several control variables: sex, urbanicity, age, and education. Sex and urbanicity are binary variables, where 1= female, 0 = male, and 1= urban, 0
= rural. I expect women are more likely to support same-sex marriage than men, and that there will be more support among residents in urban than rural areas. Note that Mexico defines an urban area as a population of 2000 or more residents. I recoded age into three categories: youth (18-29 yrs), middle-age (30-49 yrs), and fifty plus (50+yrs is the referent), and expect that support for SSM decreases with age. I also recoded education into four dummy variables: no education (reference category), primary, secondary, and post-secondary, which includes university and beyond. I expect that education will positively correlate with support for SSM.

**Analytic Strategy**

For the data analysis, I examine variation in support for SSM. I use a statistical software program (STATA) to examine overall support, changing levels of support, and how support varies with other variables. I test whether support for SSM increases significantly between 2010 and 2012, combining the data sets and applying significance tests to assess change over time. Additionally, I examine variation in same-sex marriage support within categories of several important independent variables, also performing significance tests. I then estimate logistic regression models to examine how my key independent variables affect support for SSM, separately for 2010 and 2012, net of relevant controls such as sex, age, and urbanicity. Finally, I pool the two data cross-sections and predict support for SSM in 2012, controlling for the same independent variables plus a dummy variable for
2010. Using interaction terms, I examine how the effects of religion and marital status vary by year.

Findings

Figure 1 illustrates levels of SSM support in Mexico in 2010 and 2012. In 2010, approximately 35 percent of respondents support SSM. Just two years later, that share increases to 44 percent. Note that this increase is statistically significant (p < .05). Figure 2 shows levels of support for homosexuals holding political office. In 2010, approximately 45 percent of the sample supported homosexuals holding such offices, but that share did not significantly change by 2012. Because the change in support for same-sex marriage is statistically significant, I only use this measure for the remainder of the analysis.

Table 2 examines support for same-sex marriage within categories of the key independent variables. As expected, religious affiliation has a strong effect on levels of support for SSM. Evangelicals are less likely than Catholics to approve. In 2010, 19.6 percent of Evangelicals support same-sex marriage and in 2012, this barely rises to 20.6 percent, which is not a statistically significant shift. In addition there was no significant shift in support for those with no religion. However, support from Catholics grows significantly between 2010 and 2012, from 36.1 to 46.8 percent.

4 I also examine the rise in support for same-sex marriage by coding support more conservatively as equal to 7 or higher. Results show a significant increase across the two years.
Table 2 also shows religious importance is related to support for same sex marriage. Respondents reporting that religion is more important became more supportive between 2010 and 2012, rising from 32.4 to 43.6 percent. However, although overall levels of support were higher for those viewing religion as less important, their support did not change significantly across the two years. In 2010, 52.1 percent supported SSM vs. 45.0 percent in 2012. In addition, cohabitation has a strong positive effect on support levels, with almost 60 percent of cohabiters expressing approval. Among those ever married, support also rises from 29.5 to 39.8 percent between 2010 and 2012. While both groups experience an increase in levels of support, as predicted cohabiters are more likely than ever married to support SSM.

Table 3 presents support for SSM within categories of variables for sex, urbanicity, age, and education. Here, my findings indicate that sex is related to support for same-sex marriage, with women expressing more support than men. In addition, both men and women became more supportive between 2010 and 2012, rising from 34.7 to 41.5 for men and from 36.3 to 46.8 percent for women. For urbanicity, the 2010 data demonstrate a positive association between urbanicity and support for SSM, with respondents in urban areas expressing more support. However, by 2012, both rural and urban residents increase their support so that the shares of urban and rural respondents supporting SSM are comparable across the two groups (44 percent). The increases in both rural and urban places suggest a universal shift in attitudes toward SSM, even in small rural places that I assumed to be more socially conservative.
As expected, age affects levels of support, with older persons expressing less approval. Support grew significantly for both age groups of respondents, 29-49 yrs and 50+ yrs, rising to 44.4 from 32 percent and to 31.5 from 20 percent, respectively. Interestingly, levels of support among the 18-29 year olds remain roughly the same across the two years (50 percent). Education, especially higher levels of education, is positively related to support for SSM. Notably, all respondents with at least some formal education experienced a statistically significant increase in levels of support. Those with at least some level of post-secondary education experienced a slight but significant increase in support from 49.5 to 50.8 percent.

**Moving Forward**

To see if the above differences remain net of all other relevant factors, I estimate logistic regression models that include all independent variables. This permits me to examine the determinants of support for SSM controlling for sex, urbanicity, age, and education. My emphasis in the text below is on effects of religious affiliation, religious importance, and marital status, which are my key independent variables.

Table 4 presents three multivariate models, one for 2010, one for 2012, and a pooled model with data from both years. In 2010, we see that religion affects support for SSM. Compared to Evangelicals, Catholics and those with no religion are significantly more likely to support SSM (p < .05). In addition, those who classify religion as less important are more likely to support SSM than those for whom
religion is more important; this difference is statistically significant at p<.05. However, in this model, cohabitation does not affect support for SSM. Compared to those ever married, singles and cohabiting respondents are comparable in their support for SSM, e.g. there are no statistically significant differences between these groups.

Table 4 also shows that, in 2010, women are more likely than men to support SSM, although the coefficient is marginally significant at the p < .10 level. In addition, urban residents are more likely than rural residents to support SSM. As expected, both youth and middle-aged respondents are more likely to support SSM than those over 50 years of age. Note that youth have the highest levels of support and a coefficient that is twice the size of that for middle-aged respondents. With respect to effects for education, only the coefficient for post-secondary education is positive and significant. This suggests that respondents with at least some post-secondary education express significantly more support for SSM than those with no years of schooling.

In 2012, once again religion matters. Relative to respondents who are Evangelicals, Catholics and those with no religion are more likely to support SSM. However, in contrast to findings for 2010, there is no significant relationship between those who classify religion as less vs. more important. Interestingly, although no marital status effects appear in the 2010 model, in 2012 an effect for cohabiting respondents emerges. Compared to those ever married, cohabiting adults are significantly more likely to support SSM (p<.05). In addition, women are more likely than men, and youth and middle-aged respondents are more likely than
those older than 50, to support SSM. In 2012, there are no significant effects for urbanicity or education.

The final column of Table 4 presents the pooled model, which contains data for both years, to consider whether the increase in support for SSM observed earlier remains after controlling for key explanatory and other independent variables. I begin by interpreting the year coefficient, which is in the last/bottom row of Table 4. The coefficient of .380 tells us that support for SSM was significantly higher in 2012 than in 2010, net of other variables. In addition, the effects for religious affiliation observed in earlier models appear in the pooled model. In fact, in all three models, these effects are statistically significant (p < .05) and suggest that Catholics and those not reporting a denomination are more supportive than Evangelicals. The effect for religious importance also still holds, although the p value is approaching non-significance (p < .10). For marital status in the pooled model, both cohabiters and singles are more likely than those ever married to support, although – once again – the difference is only marginally significant (p < .10).

In this model, sex has a statistically significant effect on support for SSM with females more likely than males to support. The urbanicity effect also appears, with urban respondents significantly more likely than rural residents to support (p < .05). Age affects support for SSM as expected, with youth and middle age statistically more likely to support than those fifty-plus. Surprisingly, however, with respect to education, only those reporting at least some post-secondary education are significantly more likely than those with no education to support SSM but here again the effect is marginal.
Table 5 presents the final results from my analysis. To examine whether and how the effects for religious affiliation and marital status change over time, I estimate interaction effects in the two models that appear in Table 5. The first column presents selected coefficients from a model that includes interactions between marital status and year. The coefficients related to this interaction term appear in one of the last rows of Table 5; they describe the effects for marital status in 2012. Specifically, the significant coefficient of .555 is for cohabiters in 2012 and suggests they became more supportive of SSM in 2012 compared to 2010. In contrast, the coefficient for being single in 2012 is not significant. What is significant, however, is the effect the coefficient for being single (in the row above the interaction terms). Under the marital status heading, the coefficient of .335 is positive and significant effect, suggesting that respondents who were single in 2010 supported SSM. The only other significant effect is for the year 2012; the coefficient of .418 suggests that, net of other variables including the marital status*year interactions, that support for SSM grew between 2010 and 2012.

The second column of Table 5 presents coefficients from a model that includes an interaction between religious affiliation and year. Here we see that the coefficients for being Catholic and having no religion in 2012 are not significant. However, the coefficients for being Catholic (.835) and having no religion (1.152) in 2010 are both positive and significant. These coefficients suggest Catholics and those having no religion were supportive of SSM in 2010.
Conclusion

The motivation for this study comes from a desire to quantitatively measure the evolution of public opinion toward same-sex marriage in Mexico. Using 2010 and 2012 LAPOP data from Mexico, I used nationally representative samples from two years to examine changes in support for same-sex marriage and how certain factors affect such support. This study fills a substantial gap in empirical research on public opinion toward same sex marriage in Mexico, given existing research has typically been limited to United States based on studies of Latinos (Pew 2012; Jones and Cox 2011).

Overall, my findings suggest that support for same sex marriage increased significantly from 2010 to 2012. Consistent with previous research, religion has a significant effect on determining levels of support (Newport 2012; Olson et al. 2006). Notably, despite extremely conservative rhetoric from both the Catholic and Evangelical Churches, Catholics were significantly more supportive of same-sex marriage than Evangelicals, although their support did not increase significantly between 2010 and 2012. As expected, marital status also has an effect on support for same-sex marriage, although not as strongly as predicted (Brumbaugh et al. 2008). In 2010, singles were more likely than the married to support SSM but their support did not grow disproportionately by 2012. However, support among cohabitors increased over time; in 2012 they were more likely than the married to support SSM.

Additionally, basic demographics such as sex, age, urbanicity and education also affect support (Herek 2002; Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Kiley 2014; Gutmann 1996;
Corral and Lodola 2010). Results regarding age and support for SSM mirror U.S. based research (Newport 2012; Kiley, 2014). Young adults aged 18-29 are substantially more likely to support SSM than those over 50 and slightly more so than the middle aged (29-49). The elevated support among young people suggests that progress will continue in Mexico as this generation comes of age. In addition, however, support from both the middle aged and fifty plus groups also grew, suggesting growing support among all age segments of Mexican society. I also found substantial support for SSM among rural respondents, such that an urban-rural difference no longer exists. This change also suggests that progressive ideas are beginning to take hold across all Mexico, including rural areas. Finally, the study finds that higher levels of education in Mexico correlate with higher support for same-sex marriage.

Overall, this study provides concrete support to scholarly assertions that ideas of gender and sexuality in Mexico are evolving at a rapid pace. Such a substantial increase in support in a short period of time is evidence alone, but it is not the only indicator of a changing Mexican society. The increasing visibility of the LGBT movement, particularly in the Mexican Court system, is incredible. Mexico is a leader in same-sex rights, not only in Latin America, but globally as well (notably, legalization of same-sex marriage in Mexico has consistently been a step ahead of its northern neighbor, the United States).

However, the work is not complete yet. LGBT advocates in Mexico continue to face an uphill battle. The next several years will prove significant in the course of LGBT history in Mexico. As the youth of Mexico continue the quest for their
country’s modernization, issues of human rights and equality may be at the forefront of their agenda. Remarkably, in a predominantly Catholic country, LGBT rights are a major part of this discourse. After decades of struggle, LGBT Mexicans may finally have the rights they have so fervently sought, as the country rides the wave to marriage equality.


Lavers, Michael K. 2012. “Mexican Supreme Court Rules Against Same-sex Marriage Ban.”
(http://www.washingtonblade.com/2012/12/06/mexican-supreme-court-rules-against.same-sex-marriage-ban/).

(http://www.washingtonblade.com/2013/02/19/mexican-supreme-court-finds-gay-marriage-ban-unconstitutional/).

(http://search.proquest.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/docview/405577881/13AE09C33606F1934E0/10?accountid=14816).


APPENDICES

Figure 1: Support for Same-Sex Marriage, Mexico 2010-12

Figure 2: Support for Homosexuals Holding Public Office, Mexico 2010-12

Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations

Table 2: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Key Independent Variables, Mexico 2010-12

Table 3: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Sex, Urbanicity, Age, and Education

Table 4: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Models, Mexico 2010-12

Table 5: Selected Coefficients from Logistic Regression Models with Interactions between Year and Marital Status and Year and Religious Affiliation
Figure 1: Support for Same-Sex Marriage
Mexico: 2010-12
Figure 2: Approval of Homosexuals Holding Political Office Mexico: 2010-12
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010 Mean</th>
<th>2010 Std. D</th>
<th>2012 Mean</th>
<th>2012 Std. D</th>
<th>Pooled Model Mean</th>
<th>Pooled Model Std. D</th>
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<td>.096</td>
<td>.294</td>
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<td>.373</td>
<td>.832</td>
<td>.374</td>
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<td>.070</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.367</td>
<td>.780</td>
<td>.415</td>
<td>.809</td>
<td>.393</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less Important</td>
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<td>.220</td>
<td>.415</td>
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<td>.393</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.640</td>
<td>.480</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>.484</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.303</td>
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<td>.311</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.446</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td>.438</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.441</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.500</td>
<td>.490</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.494</td>
<td>.500</td>
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<td>.500</td>
<td>.510</td>
<td>.500</td>
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<td>.431</td>
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<td>.420</td>
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<td>.431</td>
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<td>.420</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
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<td>.330</td>
<td>.470</td>
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<td>Middle Age</td>
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Table 2: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Key Independent Variables
Mexico 2010-2012

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<th>2012</th>
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<td><strong>Religious Affiliation</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.6%</td>
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<td>46.8%*</td>
</tr>
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<td>41.5%</td>
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<td>32.4%</td>
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<td>45.0%</td>
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<td>Cohabitation</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>56.9%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>49.4%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*p < .05
### Table 3: Support for Same-Sex Marriage by Sex, Urbanicity, Age, Education

**Mexico 2010-2012**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>41.5%*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>46.8%*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Urbanicity</strong></td>
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<td>Urban</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>44.1%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
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<td>44.4%*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>19-29 yrs</td>
<td>51.5%</td>
<td>52.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>29-49 yrs</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>44.4%*</td>
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<td>50+ yrs</td>
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<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post Secondary</td>
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<td>50.8%*</td>
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*p < .05
Table 4: Coefficients from Logistic Regression Models, Mexico 2010-2012

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<th>2012 b</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Pooled Model b</th>
<th>SE</th>
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<td>1.051**</td>
<td>0.456</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>1.326**</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.992**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less Important</td>
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<td>0.177</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>0.229*</td>
<td>0.134</td>
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<td>Cohabitors</td>
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<td>0.763**</td>
<td>0.273</td>
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<td>0.161</td>
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<td>0.410**</td>
<td>0.135</td>
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<td>709</td>
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*p < .10
** p < .05
Table 5: Selected Coefficients from Logistic Regression Models with Interactions between Year and Marital Status and Year and Religious Affiliation

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<td>S.E</td>
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*p < .10  
**p < .05  
NA = Not Applicable