ETHNIC IDENTITY AND NATIONAL POLITICS:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIGENOUS IDENTITY
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN BOLIVIA AND GUATEMALA

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To Wara, my star

and

To the memory of my father
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, ethnic identities have played an increasingly important role in Latin American politics. This trend is part of a global phenomenon, in which ethnic identities, for many decades lying dormant, have become politically activated; political movements and parties have been forming along – and reinforcing – ethnic cleavages throughout the world. In the Latin American region, indigenous movements have emerged as relevant political actors, substantially altering the political arena in many countries. On some occasions, indigenous politics have challenged the institutional status quo, jeopardizing democratic stability (as in the cases of Ecuador in 2000 or Bolivia in 2003). In other cases, these movements have played alongside democratic rules, forming political parties and participating in local and national elections; the results of this participation have varied substantially from case to case. Viewed from any perspective, the emergence of indigenous movements is a central aspect of modern Latin American politics (Sieder 2002; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005).

Electoral participation of indigenous movements has taken place in the two countries with the largest share of indigenous population in Latin America, Bolivia and Guatemala. According to most accounts, at least 50% of the population could be coded as indigenous in these two nations. These two countries are also among the least developed and most unequal in the region.
The results produced by this participation have been as different as they could possibly be. In Bolivia, the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), an indigenous and neo-populist party, obtained 54% of the national vote in the presidential election of 2005, placing Evo Morales, a *Cocalero* leader, in the country’s presidency (Deheza 2007; Romero Ballivian 2007). Guatemala held national elections in 2007, and Rigoberta Menchú, a Nobel Prize recipient and a very conspicuous leader in Guatemala, obtained a meager 3% of the vote; Menchú was the only indigenous candidate running for national office in those elections.

What factors can explain this enormous difference in the political performance of indigenous people in two countries with noticeable similarities? Answering this question is one of the goals that this dissertation pursues.

But ethnic identities are not only a relevant explanatory factor of national politics in different countries; they can also be a product of political processes. Political scientists have recently made efforts to explain how political factors influence identities (Chandra and Laitin 2002; Hoddie 2006); however, the explanation of how ethnic identities are produced by politics is still a poorly understood within the discipline (Smith 2004).

The two cases studied here provide a valuable comparison for processes of identity change which appear to be related to national politics. Data available suggest that the proportion of people who identify as indigenous has been growing in Bolivia over the last decade; in Guatemala, the case seems to be the opposite: the proportion of citizens who claim to be indigenous appears to be in decline, though this evidence is not as clear as in the Bolivian case.
Is there a relationship between the success of indigenous politics and the evident changes in ethnic identification in the two countries? This dissertation asserts that there is, in fact, a direct relationship between the two processes.

Any study of ethnic identities, either at the left or the right side of the equation, requires that the concept of ethnic identity be clearly defined and that the measure employed to operationalize the concept be a valid and reliable variable. The conceptualization of ethnic identities has been an area of particular obscurity in comparative politics (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Chandra 2006; Fearon 1999). Likewise, the way of appropriately measuring ethnic identities has been contested in the discipline, and a common standard has yet to emerge (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Brady and Kaplan 2000; Brubaker 2004).

A crucial task for this research, then, is to clearly conceptualize and adequately measure its key concept: ethnic identity. This is the first challenge faced in this dissertation, in which a definition of ethnic identity is produced and different empirical measures are discussed in a multi-method research setting that highlights the importance of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches for the study of ethnic identity.

One of the implications of the constructivist definition of ethnic identity employed here is that ethnic identification would not necessarily be stronger than any other type of identity, such as the national one. In order to be accepted as valid, a theoretical definition requires empirical evidence backing it. The challenge of finding empirical evidence supporting the definition of ethnic identity is also assumed in this dissertation, and this theoretical assumption is put to test in a multi-level statistical
analysis which combines individual level data with the characteristics of 22 countries in the Americas.

The different pieces of this dissertation give an account of the way in which indigenous identities relate to the national political arena in Bolivia and Guatemala. These two cases are relevant examples of countries in which colonial histories of ethnic classification and segregation have put large portions of the population in a disadvantaged position, both in socioeconomic status as in the exercise of citizen rights. The fact that there are no large differences in the attachment of indigenous people to the national political community in the two countries with other ethnic minorities in the region, suggests that the learnings obtained from this study could apply to ethnic minorities in the Americas in general.

Relevance of Indigenous Participation for the Quality of Democracy

The importance of this research is linked to the quality of democracy. Indigenous people in Bolivia and Guatemala have occupied a disadvantaged position in terms of socioeconomic development and in the exercise of citizenship rights. Most indigenous people in the two countries live below the poverty line, and their access to education and other public services is significantly lower than the one registered for mestizo and ladino populations (Adams and Bastos 2003; Pascharopoulos 1993; Pascharopoulos and Patrinos 1994; PNUD 2004).

It is in the political sphere where differences between indigenous people and mestizos, ladinos, and ‘whites’ are most relevant for the quality of democracy.
Indigenous people have traditionally been excluded from direct political participation as a consequence of the Spanish colonial domination reproduced in the post-colonial Republican states. Until the mid 20th century, voting was restricted for indigenous people in the two countries\(^1\), and until the last decade of the century, only a few indigenous individuals had participated as candidates for public office in the two countries.

The problem of systematic under-participation of a particular social group in democracy, is fundamentally a problem of justice (Young 1997; Young 2000); the quality of democracy suffers under these conditions, producing first and second class citizens. The systematic under-participation of a particular segment of society feeds a vicious circle in which their disadvantaged position is reinforced and becomes a pervasive feature of society.

Multiculturalism is an answer given to these unjust conditions of democracy. The basic multicultural precept is the recognition of differences based on ethnic and cultural identities (Taylor and Gutmann 1994); the recognition of these difference is the basis for policies which give some special faculties to minority communities and groups oriented to solve their disadvantaged societal position (Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka 2001); these faculties range from some level of autonomy and self-determination, to consociational government, to special taxation status, to the adequation of citizenship rules.

In Latin America, most countries introduced at least some multicultural reforms during the last two decades of the past century (Van Cott 2000a). These reforms,\(^1\)

\(^1\) Voting was restricted to literate male owning some property; which excluded de facto most indigenous individuals, largely illiterate. Universal suffrage was not approved in Guatemala until 1946 during the Government of the military Junta led by Arbenz (Yashar 1997); in Bolivia, universal suffrage was adopted in 1952, after the national revolution of the same year (Campero 1999).
produced with the influence of international actors (Brysk 2000), seem to have had, in
general, a positive effect on the level of participation of indigenous peoples in the region,
particularly with the organization of several ethnic parties in countries as diverse as
Colombia, Bolivia, and Argentina (Van Cott 2005).

By having their bases on the recognition of the difference, identity claims (which
are the origins for multiculturalism) reinforce the idea of ‘sameness’, of continuity of a
subject, of a particular identity across time (Booth 1999); in our case, the idea of
indigenous people refers to the descendents of those people who inhabited the Americas
before the Spanish conquest. But as part of this research shows, ethnic identities can also
be shaped by political processes; the availability of particular categories, and the
identification of individuals with these categories, are contingent upon the sociopolitical
context.

Does this mean that justice claims based on identities are invalidated by the
politically constructed character of identities? I believe that this line of argument is
incorrect. Ethnic identities are part of a socially constructed system of classification; but
this classification also represents some order, a hierarchical organization of society. All
individuals live the implications of having the repertoire of ethnic identities that they
have, and the implications of identifying with one or more of these categories. In other
words, the fact that ethnic identities are socially constructed does not mean that they are
not objective realities with concrete implications for people.
Multiculturalism and indigenous politics in Bolivia and Guatemala

Bolivia is among the countries in the Americas to have experienced the most abundant state reforms during the 1990’s; the Constitution was amended in 1994, and multicultural reforms included an explicit recognition of the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural feature of Bolivian society (Komadina 2001). This symbolic recognition is part of a series of achievements of indigenous politicians and activists, which culminated with the election of Evo Morales in 2005.

However, it would be inaccurate to claim that the political success of Evo Morales was a result of the Constitutional reforms of 1994; in fact, the causal arrow might be going in the opposite direction. Indigenous movements and organizations in Bolivia began producing a distinctive ethnicist discourse in the 1970s; before that, class-based cleavages were hegemonic in the country (Rivera C. 2003). This ethnic emergence coincides with the decline of military dictatorships which ruled the country until 1982, but started showing signs of caducity in 1978. During the 1980s and early 1990s, an increasing number of indigenous political organizations appeared in Bolivia (Strobele-Gregor, Hoffman and Holmes 1994).

I argue in this research that if a single factor had to be pointed out as the cause for the success of Morales’ Movimiento Al Socialismo, this would have to be the process of municipal decentralization adopted by the country in 1994 under the Law of Popular Participation. The Law of Popular Participation was particularly important for promoting the participation of indigenous and peasant organizations in local politics (Albó 2002a; Calla and Molina B. 2003), and transformed the political scenario of the country injecting in it the massive participation of grassroots organizations.
In Guatemala, on the other side, a clear ethnic discourse was absent from popular organizations until the 1990s. It is possible that the identity debate was present in the political organizations of the 70s, but this debate was not settled, leaving behind different and sometimes contradictory positions; during the high polarization environment of the civil war, the ethnicist position always fell behind class based cleavages (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997).

Guatemala’s move to democracy, which concluded with the election of 1986, was in part a consequence of global forces acting in national politics, not necessarily because democratic forces had emerged in the country (Booth 2000; Seligson and Booth 1995). Decades of armed conflict and state-sponsored violence had decimated civil society, particularly indigenous organizations and communities, and civil and political organizations were generally weak.

After the peace accords were signed on December 28, 1996, a referendum was called in 1999 in Guatemala to approve a series of constitutional amendments, which would implement a series of multicultural reforms and were seen as highly beneficial for indigenous communities and organizations; but the referendum was defeated and the reforms did not pass (Cojti and Fabian 2005; Warren 2002).

In fact, the quality of democracy seems to have improved in Latin America with the emergence of indigenous actors in national political systems. In Bolivia, legitimacy of the democratic system has increased significantly after the triumph of the Movimiento Al Socialismo in the 2005 elections (Seligson, et al. 2006), and voter turnout has also seen an increase from previous elections (Romero Ballivian 2007). The political system seems
now to be more accountable to the majority of the population, and exclusion based on ethnic lines is receding (Albro 2006; Van Cott 2006). Despite any flaws that the Morales government might have in its administering of the Bolivian government— and the potentially negative effects it has on the country’s democratic institutions, the political inclusion of marginalized sectors of the population can only be seen as a positive change for democratic systems.

Besides its positive effect in the Latin American case, ethnic politics also has a potentially negative side for democracy. The combination of politically activated ethnic identities and democratic government has been signaled as a cause of political instability and violence, particularly in less consolidated democracies (Chua 2003; Snyder 2000). The formation of ethnic parties can exacerbate ethnic conflict (Horowitz 1985), but ethnic parties are also likely to produce democratic stability in the long run (Chandra 2005). The potentially harmful consequences of ethnic politics on democratic institutions is another reason pointing to the relevance of this research.

Research Strategy

This research is based on the study of public opinion, explicitly survey data, to advance the understanding of the relationship between indigenous identities and national politics in Latin America; however, different methodological approaches are combined with the analysis of survey data in order to gain explanatory capacity of the phenomena under study. The methods employed here are selected and designed accordingly to their possibilities of contributing to the understanding of the research question. This relative methodological eclecticism places the goals of the study before methodological loyalties.
Design type and case selection

The project is based on a most similar system design (Lijphart 1975; Przeworski and Teune 1970), selecting the two countries with the largest share of indigenous population in the Americas, Bolivia and Guatemala, as the units of a focused comparison. The national census offices estimate that 62% of the approximately 9 million Bolivians is indigenous, and in Guatemala this figure is estimated at 40% of its 13 million citizens. However, these estimations are greatly contested in the two countries (as chapter II of this dissertation shows), and the indicators seem to be highly unreliable.

These two countries are not only similar in terms of ethnic composition of the population, but also in reference to socioeconomic factors. Bolivia is placed at number 115 in the Human Development Index\textsuperscript{2} rank done by the United Nations Development Program, in which Guatemala ranks as number 118 out of 177 nations in the world (Bolivia’s Human Development Index is .692, while Guatemala’s is .673). Guatemala’s gross domestic product (GDP) is higher than Bolivia’s ($4,313 per capita, PPP, vs. $2,720 respectively), but the adult literacy rate is higher in the South American nation than in the Central American one (86.7 vs. 69.1%). Income inequality is also similarly high in the two countries, with the Gini index at 55.1 in Guatemala and 60.1 in Bolivia (UNDP 2006).

A potential problem for comparison between the two countries is the issue of ethnocultural fragmentation, which is larger in Guatemala than in Bolivia (Alesina, et al.

\textsuperscript{2} The Human Development Index is a measure of socioeconomic development that combines gross domestic product with education and life expectancy indicators (UNDP 2006).
The fact that a very large proportion (43%) of those individuals who identify as indigenous are Mayan-language monolingual\textsuperscript{3} seems to reinforce the idea of a large ethno-linguistic fragmentation of the indigenous population of Guatemala. Alternatively, Bolivia shows an indigenous population much more integrated in cultural and linguistic terms; despite the existence of at least 36 different indigenous languages, most indigenous people in Bolivia speak Spanish, and the proportion of people who are monolingual in one of the native tongues is rather small (Molina B. and Albó 2006)\textsuperscript{4}.

Despite the appropriate setting for comparative analysis that they offer, the comparisons between the two countries are scarce. Among the few examples, Andersson, Gibson and Lehoucq studied the effect of municipal decentralization on sustainable management of natural resources (2006); Moreno studied the relationship between ethnicity and attachment to the national political community (Moreno 2008); Pascharopoulos looked at the relationship between ethnicity and education (Pascharopoulos 1993); and Thorp, Caumartin and Gray-Molina looked at the relationship between ethnicity, inequality and violence (2006).

Level of analysis

What is the best level of analysis for understanding the political success or failure of indigenous participation in national politics? To me, this is not an \textit{either-or} problem;

\textsuperscript{3} In the 2002 Census, 68.3\% of indigenous people lived in rural areas; 43.6\% of them were Mayan monolingual. 1 in every 3 women and 1 in every 4 men were illiterate.

\textsuperscript{4} For the effects of this research, the main point is the polarization between indigenous and non-indigenous in the two countries, as chapter II discusses. Even though fragmentation is higher in Guatemala, indigenous, as the category grouping the distinctive particular identities is a relevant category in both countries. That means that we can speak of a single indigenous category in both countries. This is a way of getting around the issue of differences in fragmentation at the linguistic level.
considered separately, neither the aggregate nor the individual levels of analysis can provide us with an adequate explanation of such a complex phenomenon. This research requires that both the individual and the national level of analysis be considered. By focusing on the relationship between ethnic identification and national politics, the research question itself combines the two levels of analysis. The individual level, where ethnic identification takes place, allows us to observe the relationship between ethnic identification and political factors independently from other socioeconomic factors. The national level is the scenario of success or failure of indigenous politics, and is useful in finding general patterns in the relationship between ethnic minority identities and the national political community.

This research transits from the individual to the national level of analysis and back to individuals as a strategy for making cross-level inferences. This strategy allows for the consideration of individual’s characteristics which might also assist in explaining phenomena at the national level. I also employ multi-level statistical analysis, which combines individual and country level characteristics in a single model.

Data

Survey data employed here come from Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). LAPOP has an amazingly rich database with survey studies conducted in Bolivia since 1998 and in Guatemala since 1994\(^5\). Decades of

\(^5\) For more information on the Bolivian studies see (Ames, et al. 2004; Seligson 1999; Seligson 2003; Seligson, et al. 2006; Seligson and Moreno 2006; Seligson, Moreno and Schwarz 2005); on the Guatemalan surveys see (Azpuru and Pira 2006; Seligson, Joel Jutkowitz and Lucas 1995; Seligson, et al.)
experience designing and conducting surveys are involved in the production of these data, guaranteeing the quality of the product. Data are comparable cross-nationally (a total of 22 different countries were included in the project in 2006-7) and also are comparable across time, providing a useful instrument for studying political processes diachronically and across different contexts.

Aside from survey data, I employ qualitative information gathered during fieldwork activities in Bolivia and Guatemala between 2006 and 2007. This information was obtained through interviews and focus groups meetings held with different types of respondents. The complementation of survey data treated quantitatively, and qualitative information gathered in the field allows for the development of explanations that without losing their scientific appeal through generalizability, are also ‘thick’ enough as to account for contextual particularities.

**Description of chapters**

The second chapter of this dissertation proposes a working definition of ethnic identity and compares and discusses different empirical measures of ethnic identity employed in the LAPOP surveys. Ethnic identities are conceptualized as social constructs which are fluid and malleable, and are not necessarily stable across time. The focus of the empirical comparison of this chapter is identification with the indigenous category in Bolivia and Guatemala. Ethnic identities seem more stable and consistent across measures in Guatemala, while in Bolivia different measures produce large differences in

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the results. The necessity of adding a qualitative component to quantitative survey studies is highlighted in this chapter as a strategy for understanding identity contents, or what identity categories mean for people. A methodological tool developed as part of this project and tested in the field is proposed as an alternative for bridging quantitative and qualitative methods in the field. Appendix A of this dissertation presents a detail of the instrument employed and the results obtained.

The third chapter focuses on patterns of ethnic identification across time in the two countries; data show that the proportion of people who identify as indigenous has been growing consistently in Bolivia during the last decade, while the relative number of indigenous in Guatemala seems to be decreasing. The hypothesis discussed in this chapter is that it is the political success of the indigenous movement in Bolivia which makes the indigenous category appealing for individuals, and that people enter and leave the mestizo category depending on the sociopolitical context. Case selection offers a quasi-experimental design, which allows for the minimization of variance in the independent variables while the dependent variable, identification as indigenous, varies across countries and across time. Data from LAPOP’s surveys are used to show that there is, in fact, a correlation between political engagement variables and indigenous identification in present time Bolivia which is absent in Guatemala and was much weaker in previous studies in the Andean nation.

The causes for the success of indigenous politics in Bolivia and its failure in Guatemala are discussed in chapter four of this dissertation. Two historical factors are hypothesized to be behind this difference in political performance: First, the armed conflict in Guatemala which negatively affected civil society in that country, and had a
particularly pernicious effect on indigenous organizations and their leaders; second, the municipal decentralization process in Bolivia, which opened the opportunity for landslide participation from grassroots organizations into local politics, and finally contributed to the political consolidation of the Movimiento Al Socialismo. Qualitative data gathered in the field in the two countries, and survey data from LAPOP’s databank, suggest that this explanation is at least plausible.

The fifth and final chapter takes on the complete 22 country database of LAPOP’s 2006 AmericasBarometer, exploring the relationship between ethnic minority status and the national political community. Different hypotheses are tested at the individual and the national level, and the findings suggest that, with the exception of a very few countries, individuals who identify as part of an ethnic minority do not have a weaker attachment to the nation than do other individuals. This finding supports the constructivist definition of ethnic identity employed in this research. A multi-level analysis is employed to test for interaction terms between national and individual level variables. Results suggest that the effect of ethnic minority status on attachment to the national political community is conditioned by the level of ethnocultural fractionalization existent in each country.
CHAPTER II

THE MEASUREMENT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY IN SURVEY RESEARCH

What is the best way of measuring ethnic identity? A critical step for this dissertation is to adequately conceptualize and measure its central variable: ethnic identity. This chapter explores different measures of ethnic identity employed in survey studies, focusing on their empirical correlations in the case of indigenous identity in Bolivia and Guatemala. A methodology that combines survey data and focus groups is presented as an alternative which combines quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches.

The theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement of ethnic identities is a subject of much debate and argumentation in the social sciences. The lack of clarity in this crucial methodological issue has significant implications, binging along confusion and contradicting evidence resulting in policy decisions and academic conclusions likewise faulty and contradicting. An initial primordial understanding of ethnicity as a basic and thus more profound loyalty between individuals is currently being challenged by a conception of ethnicity as a social construct, with much more nuanced relationships within the political sphere. However, virtually all sources of quantitative information (e.g. census data) still use simple ‘labels’ as ethnic categories; this limitation adds to the confusion and makes the development of an empirical measure of ethnicity coterminous with the theoretical concept a cry-out need for the advance of knowledge in the field.
This section tries to contribute to this problem by analyzing the meanings and implications that different measures of ethnicity have for people. This is done by combining high quality quantitative information (i.e.: survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University) with qualitative data produced by the researcher in focus groups conducted with people of different ethnic identities in Latin America.

**Measuring Ethnic Identity**

*Measuring What? On the Concept of Ethnic Identity*

By definition, any valid measure requires that the concept which is being measured be defined previously in a clear way; no measure can be established without the existence of at least a basic theoretical construct. Even nominal categories require the assumption of some underlying concept (Graham 1971; Peters 1998). In fact, the existence and use of measures without clear concepts was one of the most relevant problems that the sub-field of comparative politics had three or four decades ago (Sartori 1970), and conceptual definition was, more generally, problematic throughout the social sciences (Sartori, Riggs and Teune 1975). While there are still ‘gray areas’ of conceptual obscurity, major improvements have been made since then, and the capacities of social scientists for building concepts that are consistent and coherent have developed greatly.6

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6 On the process of concept construction see, among others, (Goertz 2006; Sartori 1984).
One of these remaining obscure areas is the study of identity. There is a multiplicity of meanings attributed to the word ‘identity’, resulting in notorious confusion (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Fearon 1999). Correspondingly, the number of ways of empirically registering phenomena that are characterized as ‘identity’ is also abundant; in the social sciences identity is usually related to categories (or ‘labels’) in which individuals are grouped (so in the social sciences we almost invariably refer to social or collective identities).

Adjectivizing identity, adding ‘ethnic’ to identity, restricts the scope of the concept to identity categories related to ethnicity, simplifying things greatly. The concept of ethnicity evolved from an initial understanding of ethnicity as natural and primordial characteristic of people, to an almost generalized constructivist consensus. Primordialism implies identities in which people are born into and which define stronger loyalties than other potential identities, such as the national one (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Stack 1986; Van Evera 2001); this theoretical approach derives initially from the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1963; Geertz 1973), but gained wide popularity in the social sciences, and particularly in political science. Also, ‘common knowledge’, or the way in which common people usually think of ethnic identities, is basically primordialist, as certain behaviors are usually expected from people according to their visible ethnic markers.

7 A third alternative, ethno-symbolism, as it is usually termed, is the theoretical perspective developed by Anthony Smith, is sometimes considered as a mid-point between primordialism and constructivism (Malesevic 2004; Smith 1986; Smith 1991). However, this perspective also departs from traditional primordialist positions and contains at least some element of constructivism in it, so I also consider it as a rejection of the primordial understanding of ethnic identity.
Primordial understandings of ethnic identities have been increasingly discredited in the social sciences, and the way in which we now understand these identities is as social constructs. Identities are not ‘natural’, but socially constructed; relatively arbitrary markers or attributes are employed by people as identification criteria, and this identification is contingent to the historical context (Abdelal, et al. 2006; Chandra 2001; Chandra 2006; Laitin 1998). As chapter III of this dissertation shows, the constructed nature of ethnic identity results in that identities are not necessarily stable over time, and that political factors also play a relevant role in defining identification with a particular characteristic.

Accordingly to the evolution of the concept in the field of comparative politics, the definition of ethnic identity refers to identity categories in which membership is defined on the basis of descent. Chandra analyzes the way in which the term is used in comparative politics, and her definition aims at seeking disciplinary consensus; in her own words, ethnic identities are:

“a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent” (Chandra 2006:398).

This wording reflects the basic definition of ethnic identity that I employ in this chapter. The emphasis added (by me) to the fact that there are attributes relevant to the formation of ethnic identities that are not necessarily associated with descent but believed to be associated with descent is particularly relevant by adding an explicit socially constructed element to the definition. A particular attribute (such as regional origins,

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8 For a good review of the idea of construction of identities see (Cerulo 1997).
9 On how identities change over time see also (Chandra and Laitin 2002; Hoddie 2006).
religion, language, physical appearance, or culture) does not necessarily need to be linked to descent (in which case the concept would resemble a primordialist definition), but has to be thought of by people as linked to descent.

The problem with this definition is that *eligibility* for membership does not necessarily mean *membership*; we are talking about ethnic categories, not about social groups (as in the old class-for-itself vs. class-by-itself in Marxian theory) (Brubaker 2004), but in order to make categories operationalizable, we need to transform them into groups.

This definition seems more useful for the aggregate-level analysis (in the study of categories themselves) than for individual level analysis (in which membership to groups is a characteristic of individuals). Adding complexity, ethnic identity of any given individual can be subjective, i.e.: assumed by the individual, or attributed by others. There is nothing in the definition that restricts membership to identity categories as either self-ascription or as categorization by others. In consequence, Chandra’s definition describes what constitutes ethnic identity categories, but falls short of specifying who actually belongs to a given category.

In order to make it operationalizable, it is necessary to specify in the definition who defines membership. Three possibilities emerge: a) imposed identity, i.e.: letting other people define the membership of any given person to a category based on his or her attributes; b) letting some of the attributes define membership; and c) allowing each individual to identify herself.
Imposed or attributed identity (a) is entirely dependent on how other people perceive a person; while this mechanism of classification is likely to have some effect on individuals' interpersonal relations, it is obviously unviable in operational terms (at least for medium and large N analyses). Defining identity on the basis of attributes themselves (b) poses the problem of a lack of direct correspondence between attributes and identity categories (not all speakers of any given language are part of the ethnic group who speaks it generally); this possibility is discussed more thoroughly in the empirical section of this chapter, when the measurement of ethnic identity is considered. The only viable alternative seems to be c), letting the individual declare his or her own membership to some identity category; that is, to identify herself with one or more categories.

The definition of ethnic identification, this self-ascription to an ethnic identity, can be written paraphrasing Chandra in light of what has been discussed in the following way:

*Ethnic identification is the self-ascription of individuals to identity categories determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent.*

Some caveats have to be pointed out in relation to this definition. First, the definition of categories is a particularly sensitive issue. There are a number of relevant ethnic identity categories in each country or region, and the sets of categories are products of social and political processes. Defining these categories is usually a prerogative of the State based on the existence of self-recognized groups, but this process
is not value-free or politically neutral (Nobles 2000). So definition of categories itself is part of the sensitive – and political – process of construction of ethnic identities.

Secondly, ethnic identities are highly relational: How any given person self-identifies depends greatly on the context in which the act of self-identification takes place. Someone can feel part of her town or tribal origins when interacting with someone from another similarly local space; the same person can feel part of a regional or cultural identity which includes two different tribes or villages when interacting with someone from another region; the same person can also recognize her national origins when facing people from different nations; and the same individual can also appeal to a larger regional identity (such as African or Latino) in a context such as the streets of any large occidental city in the world. Appiah gives a good example of the multiplicity of ethnic identities available to people when he discusses his own matri-lineal versus patri-lineal origins, his identity as Ghanaian, as African, and as a person of mixed-blood (Appiah 1992).

Measurement of this contested concept has been heterogeneous. Most data, including most nationally representative data (e.g., census data) use simple labels as ethnic categories; these labels can become unquestioned ‘facts’ in domestic and international contexts and can be more the product of political decisions than the result of the scientific process of categorization. The result of using these simple labels is that scholars and policy makers often have a fundamentally flawed foundation on which to build their analyses (Chandra 2005; Laitin 2000).

This approach for measuring ethnic identity is consistent with a primordial understanding of identities, and not with the more nuanced understanding of identities
preeminent in contemporary social science. We have learned that identities are not fixed ‘natural’ categories, but social constructs, however, this finding has not been incorporated into the habitual practice of social scientists through empirical measures (Chandra 2001). The effort by Mozaffar, Scarrit and Galaich (2003) to develop constructivist measures of identities, the development of diversity indices capturing different dimensions of ethnicity (Fearon 2003), or the attempts to ‘model’ their change in time (Lustick, Miodownik and Eidelson 2004) are very interesting contributions, but do not fully resolve this issue given their focus on aggregate levels of analysis. The challenge for social sciences seems to be in transiting from essential (or primordial) categories of social grouping to constructivist categories that are operationally useful to capture reality without losing their theoretical appeal.

Ethnic Identity Categories in Bolivia and Guatemala

The definition of ethnic identity employed here is based on the existence of relevant categories into which individuals identify themselves. Pointing out the most relevant categories in the two countries studied is pertinent; the strategy of identifying politically relevant ethnic groups is suggested by Posner (2004). Of course, the level of aggregation employed for determining relevant categories is extremely important, as the discussion in the previous section makes clear; only the categories that are usually spoken of at the national level in Bolivia and Guatemala are discussed here. It is also important to make clear that the description of the categories presented does not imply any judgment about their legitimacy or any assertion about their origins; I simply give a brief description of the categories most commonly used at the national level in both countries.
**Guatemala**

Two central ethnic identity categories appear as relevant in Guatemala, *ladinos* and *indígenas*. These two categories represent most of the population in the country, and form a bi-polar scenario with only two main ethnic identity categories (Adams and Bastos 2003). A third category, *garífunas*, composed of descendants of the African slaves brought to the Americas, compose a minimal proportion of the country’s population (less than 1%), so this category will not be considered in detail in this section.

Guatemala’s indigenous population, (the *indígenas* category) are descendents of the different Mayan groups living in the territory of the country before the Spanish conquest in the 16th Century. According to the latest national census (2002), they make up for 39.3% of the national population. Currently, the census office recognizes 22 different indigenous groups as census categories (Achi, Akateko, Awakateko, Ch'orti', Chuj, Itza', Ixil, Jakalteko (Popti'), Kaqchikel, K'iche', Mam, Poqomam, Poqomchi', Q'anjob'al, Q'eqchi', Sakapulteko, Tektiteko, Tz'utujil, Uspanteko, Xinka). Many indigenous people live in relatively closed and isolated rural communities, what anthropologists have called ‘closed corporate communities’ (Wolf 1957).

_Ladino_ on the other hand, basically means ‘non-indigenous’. 'Ladino' meant Spanish speaking Indian during the colonial period; ladinos were Mayans who assimilated national language and culture. By the time of independence, the term meant 'mestizo'; after that it meant only non-culturally indigenous; the *castas* system, which established a system of differentiation based on percentage of Indian blood, became unviable after a few centuries because of mixing. Indians and ladinos were significant
categories throughout Central America, but persisted only in Guatemala (Smith 1990a). Ladino is an identity category constructed officially by the State and linked to citizenship privileges (Rodas Nuñez 2006).

Guatemala has notorious differences between indigenous and ladinos in terms of socioeconomic status. Indigenous individuals and communities are usually amongst the poorest in the country, and their levels of access to education and other services, and more generally, access to the benefits of the modern Guatemalan State, is significantly lower than those of average ladinos; indigenous women have particularly low levels of education (Adams 2005; Adams and Bastos 2003; Pascharopoulos 1993). Ladino and indígena, then, are ethnic identity categories which also imply strong differences in socioeconomic status; they are categories which not only name, but also stratify Guatemalan society.

These categories are assumed to be cultural, but also racial; people usually think of ethnic differences in Guatemala both as cultural differences and as racial differences (Smith 1998). There is also some correspondence between area of residence and ethnic identity; indigenous people are geographically concentrated in some areas, particularly in the country’s western territories.

Some observers have noticed an activation of the Maya identity during the last two decades. This also created a negative reaction among many ladinos, who felt in risk of being discriminated and treated unfairly with the emergence of a potentially powerful political movement (Hale 2005; Warren 1998). Claims of the sort of ‘no hay indios ni
ladinos, todos somos guatemaltecos’ (there are no indigenous nor ladinos, we are all Guatemalans) (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997) are part of this response.

In Guatemala, until the 1994 census, ethnic identity was defined by the interviewer during the data gathering process (Adams 1996). Only since the 2002 census have citizens had the opportunity to identify themselves with some of the available categories (a list of all indigenous groups is presented to the respondent).

**Bolivia**

In contrast with the Guatemalan case, Bolivia shows three major ethnic identity categories: *indígena* u originario (indigenous), mestizo (mixed), and blanco (white). While *indígena* is the word which refers to indigenous people in the Eastern region of the country, *originario* is the equivalent used in the Andes (Calla 2003; Molina B. and Albó 2006). A fourth category, *afroboliviano*, or African-Bolivian, applies to the black community living mainly in the Yungas area of La Paz, but their share of the national population is minimal.

According to the latest national census (2001), 62% of the national population should be coded as indigenous. However, this figure results from the use of a question which does not offer the categories mestizo and blanco as options, but are included in the option ‘none’ (the exact wording of the question and the national figures are discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter). This methodological decision has received a lot of criticism in the country, and has generated a long lasting debate on how the census
question should be asked and what proportion of the national population should be coded as indigenous\textsuperscript{10}.

There are about 30 different ethnic groups coded as indigenous, but only two of them, Quechuas and Aymaras, have more than a million members out of a population of approximately nine million Bolivians. The census question offers Quechua, Aymara, Guarani, Chiquitano, Mojeño, and other native ethnicities as response options for citizens.

White, or blanco, is a category employed by people who assume to be descendents of the Spanish conquerors or of migrants who arrived from Europe. As chapter III of this dissertation shows, the proportion of people who identify as whites in the country has been declining during the last years\textsuperscript{11}, which seems to be related to the political success of the indigenous movement in the country.

\textit{Mestizo} is an ethnic identity category which implies that the person has both white (Spanish) and indigenous blood; the origins of this question are clearly racial, though some observers have attempted to imply cultural mixture. The classification from which \textit{mestizo} comes from is the \textit{castas} system imposed by the Spanish colony, which organized society along hierarchically distinct ethnic categories. \textit{Mestizo} has traditionally meant a departure from the indigenous category, and has been employed often as a category that allows people to socially ascend through hierarchically distinct ethnic categories anchored in the colonial horizon (De La Cadena 2000; Harris 1995; Rivera C.\textsuperscript{10} This national debate has been taking place in different periodical publications and books. For some examples of the debate see (Albó 2004; Laserna 2004; Lavaud 2007; Lavaud and Lestage 2002; Moreno 2006; Moreno 2007b; Seligson, \textit{et al.} 2005). \textsuperscript{11} On this particular issue see (Moreno 2006).
Additionally, the national project that emerged from the national revolution of 1952 was based on the universality of the *mestizaje* (in a similar sense as in Mexico).

The existence of the *mestizo* category in Bolivia makes a difference in relation to Guatemala’s bipolar ethnic categorization; the existence of the *mestizo* as a majority category is similar to what Degler has named the ‘mulatto escape hatch’ in his comparison of Brazil and the United States (Degler 1971). *Mestizo* offers the possibility of being neither white nor indigenous, paraphrasing Degler’s title.

**Indigenous as the focus of the analysis**

The analysis of different measures employed for measuring indigenous ethnic identity in Bolivia and Guatemala is employed as a strategy for discussing measures of ethnic identity in general. I have selected the indigenous category as the focus of analysis of this research for several reasons. First, the emergence of indigenous politics has been particularly relevant in the region during the last couple of decades, as the introduction of this dissertation explains. Second, the proportion of indigenous people in both countries is subject of debate and discussion in academic and political circles. Third, indigenous is the only category present in both countries, so this category allows for a full comparison between the two cases of study.

The definition of who is indigenous has received a lot of attention from academics, international organizations, and from indigenous communities themselves (Anaya 1996; Brysk 2000; Corntassel 2003). Most of the definitions are based on the ideas of ancestry and cultural differences and historical sequences (Corntassel 2003; Gurr
1993; Riggs 1998; Wilmer 1993), but also on the idea of being conquered by another society (Riggs 1998; Wilmer 1993); for some others, the debate on what is indigenous is a matter of justice, by identifying people who have been wronged by colonialism (Metz 2006).

This research does not attempt to discuss the different definitions of indigenous nor to define the term itself. Indigenous is a relevant ethnic identity category, and what matters is self-identification of individuals into this category. The last section of the chapter, however, discusses the qualitative results from the fieldwork activities, in which the idea of what is to be indigenous was discussed with people who identify as such.

**Measuring Indigenous Identity in the LAPOP Studies**

Using data from the 2006 round of surveys conducted by LAPOP in Bolivia and Guatemala, different approaches for the measurement of indigenous identity are discussed in this section. Surveys were conducted over nationally representative samples in both countries, resulting in a database of 4,506 observations, 3,008 interviews in Bolivia and 1,498 in Guatemala. Results presented in this section include information on the characteristics of the sample for adequate calculation of standard errors and confidence intervals.

**Categorical measures**

The first measure considered is a categorical measure that derives from a simple survey question in which the respondent chooses an identity category from a list. Do you
consider yourself ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘indigenous’, or ‘mixed’? With some variations in the possible categories and the way in which the question is framed, this is the most common way in which survey research measures ethnic identity.

The proportion of people who identify as indigenous in this question is 39.2% in Guatemala, and 20.2% in Bolivia (which combines the indígena and originario options). Results are presented in Table 1 under categorical variable 1.

A different question was also asked in the two countries, one that asks about particular indigenous identity categories, specifying the ethnic group. The wording in each case followed exactly the wording used by each national census office. In Guatemala, the proportion of people who could be coded as indigenous under this second measure (33.2%) does not differ drastically from what had been found using the basic categorical measure described above. The correlation between the two variables is large and statistically significant ($r=.84, p<.001$), as Table 1 shows.

It is in Bolivia where the results vary in a dramatic way. Under the basic categorical measure, almost 20% of all Bolivians identify as indigenous, while 66.6% classifies themselves as mestizos; under the question that specifies the ethnic group (and excludes the mestizo option), almost 72% of all Bolivians identify as indigenous. As could be expected by these drastic differences, the correlation between the two variables is low ($r=.25$).

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12 In Guatemala, the question asked was: ¿Usted se considera ...? Indígena, Ladino, Garífuna, Otro. In Bolivia, the exact wording was: Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originaria.

13 In Guatemala, the question asked was: ¿A qué grupo étnico (pueblo) pertenece?, offering a list of 22 possible indigenous plus ladino, none, and other. In Bolivia, the census question asks: ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? Offering 5 indigenous identities, plus other native and ninguno (none).
Table 1. Percentage of people coded as indigenous in Bolivia and Guatemala according to two different categorical variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Categorical variable 1</th>
<th>Categorical variable 2</th>
<th>Correlation between variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006

The use of different questions has an enormous effect on the results obtained using two different questions in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala, where the two measures appear to be more robust and mutually reinforcing. The absence of the mestizo category, added to the direct reference to specific ethnic groups, impact drastically the measurement of ethnic identity.

Language Spoken as a Measure of Ethnic Identity

One of the cultural attributes usually related to ethnic identity is language. Members of an indigenous group are usually assumed to be speakers of the group’s language. Language is often used as an indicator of ethnic and cultural diversity, and as a marker of ethnic identity categories (See, for example, Alesina, et al. 2003; Fearon 2003; Horowitz 1985).

The LAPOP 2006 survey asks the respondent about his or her mother tongue, the language in which he or she first started communicating. The use of indigenous languages is, in general, more common in Bolivia than in Guatemala, as Table 2 shows. Indigenous languages are spoken in Bolivia by both indigenous and non-indigenous

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14 Respondents were asked what language they spoke at home during childhood.
people; around half of all Bolivians are bilingual, while less than one in five Guatemalans speak both an indigenous language as well as Spanish.

Table 2: Languages spoken during childhood, by indigenous identification and by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous ID*</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>Non-indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only indigenous language</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish and indigenous language</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Spanish</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Groups defined based on categorical variable 1 in Table1.
Source: LAPOP 2006

The relationship between ethnic identity and language spoken during childhood shows ambiguous patterns. In Bolivia, more than half of those who identify as non-indigenous speak an indigenous language (around 52% speak either only an indigenous language or both indigenous language and Spanish). In Guatemala, on the other hand, the use of indigenous languages is restricted almost exclusively to individuals who identify as indigenous; only 4.3% of those who identify as non-indigenous speak a Mayan language. Figure 1 below shows the relationship between language spoken and indigenous identity (measured with categorical variable 1).
The relationship between language spoken and indigenous identity varies significantly between the two countries. In Bolivia, the effect of the three-point language scale is linear on identification as indigenous, and being bilingual is a mid-point between Spanish and indigenous language monolingual speakers. Alternatively in Guatemala, speaking an indigenous language seems to be linked in a much more direct way with indigenous identity.

Graded Measure of Indigenous Identity

Measuring identity through a graded measure has been proposed as an alternative in the literature, under the theoretical assumption that identities can be thought of as a continuum between being part of that category and not being part (Brady and Kaplan...
The LAPOP 2006 surveys included a question which asks how strongly the respondent identifies with the country’s indigenous culture\textsuperscript{15}.

The average value for this measure is higher in Guatemala than in Bolivia (73.5 versus 48.1), but the standard deviation is also larger (32.8 and 28.6 respectively). This suggests that there is less variation in this variable in the Andean country when compared to the Central American one. If this variable would measure indigenous identity consistently with categorical measure of identity, we would expect high variability, with high values for some people (the individuals who identify as indigenous), and very low average values for non-indigenous.

Figure 2 below suggests that the relationship between this graded measure and the first categorical variable discussed in this chapter is clearer in Guatemala than in Bolivia.

\textsuperscript{15} In Guatemala, the Mayan culture was the term employed. In Bolivia, respondents were asked about the Quechua and the Aymara cultures separately; I averaged the two questions for producing the national measure of identification indigenous culture. Questions were originally coded on a 1 to 7 scale, in which 1 meant ‘very little’ and 7 ‘very much’; I recoded the variables into a 100 point scale for easier presentation.
A perfect relationship between a binary categorical measure and a graded measure would resemble a sigmoid curve (an S shaped curve). Despite being far from perfect, the relationship appears in a much clearer way in Guatemala than in Bolivia. Additionally, the correlation that this variable has with the linguistic indicator is much higher in Guatemala ($r=.55; p<.001$) than in Bolivia ($r=.29; p<.001$). Guatemala shows once again a higher consistency between measures than Bolivia.

Another possibility of establishing a graded measure of ethnic identity is the construction of multi-dimensional scales that combine different ‘dimensions’ of identity into a single indicator. A good example of this methodology is given in the scale that
combines self-identification and language spoken using census data in Bolivia (Molina B. and Albó 2006); along those lines, it is possible to think of an indigenous identity scale in the two countries of attention which combines self-identification and language spoken.

The ordinal variable resulting from this exercise has a 4 point scale with the following values: identifies as indigenous and speaks an indigenous language; identifies but does not speak; speaks an indigenous language but does not identify; and does not identify nor speak an indigenous language. The order of the second and third categories is not self-evident (who is more indigenous? someone who identifies as such but does not speak the language, or someone who speaks the language since childhood but does not identify as indigenous); however, I assume that self-identification is a more relevant indicator of identity than language, so I put those who identify as indigenous but do not speak an indigenous language closer to the indigenous extreme in the scale. Figure 3 below shows the proportion of people coded into each category in both countries.
The distribution varies substantially between the two countries. The most noticeable difference is in the proportion of people who speak an indigenous language but do not identify as indigenous, which in Bolivia is the largest category, while in Guatemala it is the smallest.

The relationship of this variable with the other measures of indigenous identity discussed so far is consistently strong, though it also presents some variation between the two countries (being stronger in Guatemala than in Bolivia). This bi-dimensional scale of indigenousness has a correlation of .33 with the grade measure of indigenous identity in Guatemala, while this correlation is .32 in Bolivia. With the language variable, the correlation is .74 in Guatemala and .65 in Bolivia; the correlation with the first
A categorical measure of indigenous identity is .96 in Guatemala and .89 in Bolivia (all correlations significant at the .001 level).

**Discussion**

Different measures of indigenous identity have been presented in this chapter. Out of these, which one better measures the concept of ethnic identity as defined here? It seems that, just as in the measurement of many other concepts through surveys, no measurement is perfect, though they all capture some element of the concept.

Despite its limitations, survey research has some advantages in relation to other forms of studying ethnic identity. First, asking the respondent about his or her identification in a survey setting greatly reduces the relational differential by which contextual features determine ethnic identification. All respondents are asked the exact same question and face a similar type of interviewer (i.e.: someone from a socioeconomic background as close to the respondent’s as possible) in or near the respondents’ place of residence. In other words, all observations are treated similarly, with no particular bias resulting from the interview process.

Second, survey research captures conscious identification, and not latent identity. I have defined the concept of ethnic identity not in objective terms, but in relation to a conscious decision of individuals of identifying as part of some category. In this sense, asking individuals about how they identify themselves is one of the few viable alternatives for measuring this explicitly conscious identification to which the concept refers.
And that takes me to discussing the measures treated here, particularly the one that employs language as measure of identification. Looking into an objective attribute (language) does not refer directly to how individuals identify themselves, so language could not be considered as a valid measure of indigenous identity. The relationship between language and ethnic identity is problematic; since early studies it has been shown that there is no direct connection between objectively defined cultural traits (such as language) and ethnicity (Barth 1969)\(^{16}\). For example, in the particular case of Central America, it has been demonstrated that there are native speakers of Mayan languages in Mexico’s Yucatan peninsula who reject being called indigenous and who do not identify as Maya (Gabbert 2004).

Language could be employed as a proxy for indigenous identity in some cases. Though this could be an acceptable strategy in Guatemala where the relationship between self-identification and language is closer than in Bolivia, it is important to highlight the fact that language does not measure identity per se, but that in some contexts could be correlated with it.

Part of the previous argument could be applied to the bi-dimensional measure discussed here, insofar as it combines language as an indicator with self-identity. However, the fact that this variable includes self-identity (and as a result of this its correlation with that variable is very high) suggests that this variable could be used as an alternative which combines objective and subjective elements; the definition of ethnic

\(^{16}\) On the normative side, see the persuasive work by Appiah in which the relationship between culture, ethnicity, and identity is discussed (Appiah 2006).
identity based on self identification, though, would have to be reconsidered in order to employ this measure.

Graded measures seem to work well as measures of identification with an indigenous culture. They capture the self-identification dimension clearly, and they correspond to a gradual understanding of identity, consistent with the constructivist definition of the concept. There is, however, a validity problem that would have to be addressed before using this type of graded measure as valid measures of ethnic identity: The wording of this question implies identification with some indigenous culture, and this does not necessarily mean identification with an ethnic category; i.e.: someone can by sympathetic with some culture without feeling part of the group who practices it. The fact that the graded measure discussed here does not behave as expected in relation to categorical variables in the particular case of Bolivia could be a manifestation of lack of validity of the measure.

Finally, categorical measures of ethnic identity seem to simultaneously solve the problem of self-identification existent in the language measures and the problem of inclusiveness in the identity category existent in the graded measure discussed here; the respondent identifies with a particular category in a subjective way, and this identification is determined in terms of being part of.

There are two problems with this approach. First, the high sensitiveness to the categories offered to the respondent; the Bolivian case shows the enormous effect that adding or removing options in the wording of the question can have for the results. Second, that this measure defines belonging to identity categories in either or terms,
which is more consistent with the primordial understanding of ethnic identities than with the modern definition of the concept. These problems, however, seem to have somewhat easy solutions. The sensitiveness to the categories problem could be ameliorated by including as many relevant identity categories as options for the respondent. The second problem could be solved by not making options mutually exclusive, so the respondent can chose to identify with more than one category, if he or she has such a desire. This strategy has been employed successfully in the US and the Canadian census\textsuperscript{17}, and has proven to be empirically viable.

As a conclusion, it might be advisable for researchers interested in measuring ethnic identity in survey research to focus carefully on defining the categories available as options for the respondent in categorical measures, and designing the items as multiple response questions; this should be understood as the minimum requirement for measuring identity in survey settings. The inclusion of language items and graded measures of cultural belonging is also advisable if the researchers are interested in wider aspects of identity.

Additionally, research strategies that combine survey data analysis with some form of qualitative research that allows us to better understand the pros and cons of each measure of ethnic identity seems highly desirable; during my field research, I have developed a strategy which allows for the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. This strategy and its results are described in detail in the section below.

\textsuperscript{17} On the evolution of the census measurement in the United States see (Snipp 2003).
Articulating Quantitative and Qualitative Methods in the Study of Ethnic Identity

After the consolidation of quantitative research in mainstream political science in the mid 1990s with the publication of Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane and Verba 1994), several authors have pointed to the importance of ‘rescuing’ qualitative methods as a central component of the discipline, and the discipline as a whole seems to have acknowledged this necessity (Brady and Collier 2004). The importance of articulating quantitative and qualitative research is at the core of the current disciplinary debate in Political Science. It is increasingly recognized that both approaches are necessary for the production of good quality social science, and that in many cases, the use of only one of them can provide inaccurate or incomplete explanations (Brady, Collier and Seawright 2006).

Despite this growing agreement, the actual existence of methods that effectively combine quantitative and qualitative approaches is rare (Tarrow 2004). In many cases, multi-method research ends up being no more than an addition of bits and pieces of different methodological approaches. In other words, truly multi-method research strategies and tools are scarce. This scarcity is related to the great epistemological differences between quantitative and qualitative approaches.

The combination of quantitative and qualitative research should be understood not in the framework of methodological orthodoxies, but on the face of the requirements of the object of study. Some research problems are better addressed with quantitative approaches which are able to provide evidence of causal inferences; while others may be better understood via ‘thick’ explanations, or the articulation of theory and evidence from
one or a few cases into a profound description of the mechanisms that guide social and political processes. Other research questions, probably most of them, require that at least some quantitative and qualitative information be combined into an explanation that is able to give an account of the particular specificities in a generalizable argument. How much of each methodological approach is employed in a research strategy means, at the end exists a trade-off by the researcher between width and depth; this trade-off can also be thought of as a compromise between richness in the contextual description and generalizability of the causal inference in a Popperian sense.

My research question implies understanding what indigenous identity means for people; this is the identity content pointed out by some authors as a central element of identity categories (Abdelal, et al. 2006). Quantitative analyses of survey data allow me to identify patterns and relationships across countries and across time; but this approach does not provide the more interpretative perspective required for understanding what those identity categories and relationships mean for people.

Considering this requirement of the research, I developed a methodological strategy which produces qualitative information based on quantitative data and patterns. As Sidney Tarrow puts it, this task consists of ‘putting qualitative flesh on quantitative bones’ (Tarrow 2004:176).

This strategy, which could be termed Survey Responses Interpreted by Groups (SRIG), can be employed for different research projects based on survey data that are concerned with understanding what people mean when they answer survey questions without abandoning the generalizability potential of Large N analyses. In my own
research, SRIG was employed in the understanding of what identity categories employed in the statistical analyses of survey data really mean for people.

Basically, the methodology consists of discussing with people how they understand the questions being asked during a normal survey interview, as well as the answers given by them in comparison with results from the population on which the survey was administered. Four steps are involved in the strategy: 1. Organization of the focus group; 2. Gathering data from participants of the group; 3. Presenting results to participants; and 4. Discussing results with them. These steps are described in detail below.

Implementing the methodology in the field: The Bolivian experience

Resources

The resource requirements of this methodology are not very demanding. Having good contacts in the field, which allow for the selection of participants for the focus groups and for creating a sense of confidence between participants, is imperative. The presence of at least one research assistant in the field is also necessary, particularly for the phases of gathering data and presenting it to participants. Technologically, a laptop, a data projector, and a recorder are necessary for the implementation of the strategy. Additionally, this strategy implies a lot of on-the-go work entering data and producing charts and graphs quickly; therefore, a good and agile use of adequate software is also necessary. The actual meetings using this methodology last between 4 and 6 hours, so this time should be planned ahead.
Step 1: Organization

The focus groups conducted in Bolivia were organized in municipalities with sizable proportions of indigenous population; additionally, each of the groups represents a different indigenous people (or represents large differences within an ethnic group as in the rural and urban Aymara groups). A total of 4 in-depth focus groups were conducted; the four groups conducted were: 1. Aymara speaking people in a rural setting in Yanacachi, Provincia Sud Yungas, La Paz. 2. Aymara speaking individuals in an urban setting in El Alto, Provincia Murillo, La Paz. 3. Rural Quechus in Tapacari, Provincia Tapacari, Cochabamba. 4. Rural and urban Guarani people in Camiri and Charagua, Provincia Cordillera, Santa Cruz. A map detailing the location of each municipality is included in appendix A of this dissertation, which also includes a detailed account of the results produced in each session (in Spanish language). These municipalities were selected considering: a) the relevance of their population for the research in terms of quantity of mestizo and indigenous population; and b) the possibility of conducting research there given the accessibility and institutional contacts.

With the support of Ciudadanía I contacted different local organizations in order to prepare the meetings and gather some potential participants for the working sessions. In Yanachachi, the focus group was organized with the support of Fundación Takesi, an NGO investing in local development in the Yungas region in La Paz. Work in El Alto was organized with the kind help of Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos – El

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18 All focus groups were conducted and summarized with the generous help of Miguel Villarroel in Cochabamba.
19 Ciudadanía, comunidad de estudios sociales y acción pública, is a local Bolivian NGO based in Cochabamba with which I am associated. The support of Ciudadanía, with its institutional contacts, was crucial for the implementation of the SRIG focus groups in Bolivia. For more information on Ciudadanía visit www.ciudadaniabolivia.org.
Alto, a human rights activist organization. The Tapacari focus group was conducted in Cochabamba with support from Ayllu Majasaya, the traditional indigenous authority, and Alex Fernandez, an economist and advisor to the ayllu. The work in Camiri was conducted with help from the Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani, the supra-communal organization of the Guarani people.

The selection of participants attending each workshop was done considering the quality of the information that could be provided (local leaders were preferred, but I also insisted on having some non leader participants as a balance); after I had established contact with each of the local organizations that helped in the process, we discussed what kind of people were required for the process considering gender and geographic representation balance.

**Step 2: Gathering data from participants**

During the focus group, a set of questions from the 2006 national survey was administered to all participants as they arrived to the venue where the meeting would be held. The presence of at least one research assistant is necessary here, for data have to be gathered from different individuals simultaneously. It is important to carefully select the questions to be administered, and the process should take at most 10 minutes per person; for example, if the focus group has 10 participants, a researcher and two assistants would take around half an hour to interview them.

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20 The list and format of the questions used and the focus groups results are presented in appendix A.
During the time when participants introduce themselves and the methodology and goals of the meeting are explained to the participants, data are entered in the computer; while this could sound a little demanding for the team, entering 200 data points (20 closed-ended questions administered to 10 participants) should not take more than a few minutes for a researcher experienced in tabulating data. Graphs and charts are produced immediately after the data have been entered running syntaxes previously written and tested.

**Step 3: Presenting information**

Graphs are presented to the group comparing their results with the national averages obtained for the same items; the researcher ‘reads’ the graph for the participants, who become used to the graphical presentation of the results. Graphing the question in a simple and intuitive way is crucial for getting participants motivated and willing to talk about the meaning that their answers have for them. A data projector is used for this part of the activity. Some of the graphs presented to participants are shown in the results section below.

**Step 4: Discussing results**

Immediately after each series of results are presented, participants are asked to explain why they had chosen the answers they chose; this triggers the dialogue between researchers and participants of the session. This methodology gets most participants deeply involved in the process, explaining and defending their responses and suggesting
different interpretations to the results and the questions themselves. An added value of this methodology is that participants compare their responses with the national averages presented to them, trying to explain the differences and also offering explanations for the national results.

Results

Among the most important results that I obtained from this research is the finding of empirical evidence that suggests that indigenous identity has, in fact, a very strong political content in Bolivia. I identified political references in 4 types of identity content (normative, purposive, relational, and cognitive content). This finding suggests the existence of a very strong link between the national political process and ethnic identification.

For example, when asked to explain a stronger identification with the Aymara culture than the national average (see appendix A), participants to the Yanacachi meeting claimed that the Aymara culture is linked to using the Aymara language; and this use is also understood as a means of ‘resistance against the system’, understanding for that, resistance against the Bolivian State. Along the same lines, participants of the El Alto meeting go even further and claim that the Aymara Nation has never participated in the creation of the Bolivian State, and that is why an identification with Bolivian citizenship and Bolivian institutions is low among them.

The idea of discrimination was also widely present in the meetings; indigenous are discriminated by blancos and mestizos, and this idea seems to be stronger in the
Aymara communities than among Quechuas and Guaranies. Participants in the El Alto group also often claim that, indigenous people exercise discrimination against blancos and mestizos, as a response to the discrimination suffered constantly by them.

Identification as mestizo in the Aymara areas is seen as negative; mestizos are the ones who practice discrimination against the indigenous population, and are the visible representatives of the Bolivian state with its unjust and discriminatory practices. On the other side, Guarani and Quechua communities identify as mestizos, assuming that there is no blood purity in Bolivia and that most Bolivians are in fact a mix of indigenous and white ancestors; however, they feel that it is in their culture where their indigenous essence prevails.

Identification with other indigenous cultures (such as the Quechua culture for the Aymara) is usually strong because they believe in a larger identity as indigenous, an identity by which they shared the same struggle against domination and they face similar discrimination and mistreatment in the country. Indigenous seems to exist, indeed, as a relevant category for the people beyond their particular ethnic identities.

The difference between the terms indígena and originario are, as mentioned above, geographical. Indígena is the expression used in the eastern region, while originario refers to indigenous from the Andes. Both terms mean that the person descends directly from the people who lived in the same place since ancient times. The idea that the person is still linked to the local community and participates from the duties and responsibilities conferred by it is also a condition for being thought of as indigenous; those who emigrate from their communities cannot be considered indigenous anymore,
because they have broken their links with the land and the community. Guaranies, however, have a different point of view on this issue, claiming that most Guaranies, even when they emigrate, maintain their culture and world views; that is why, for them Guaranies are Guaranies anywhere they might be.
CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY: INDIGENOUS IDENTITY IN BOLIVIA AND GUATEMALA

This chapter focuses on correlates of indigenous identities in Bolivia and Guatemala, paying special attention to political factors. In contrast to most political science research to date, this research focuses on ethnic identity as the dependent variable, and hypothesizes that political factors (and their absence) might help explain different patterns in ethnic identification over time. To do that, I use statistical methods applied to survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), comparing results for the two cases in the study, and also comparing results across time in the case that currently presents the strongest example of a country with a politicized ethnic identity.

The Puzzle

The evidence that inspires this research shows that identity is in fact fluid and that it changes more rapidly than it is usually assumed. Figure 4 shows the percentage of people self-identifying as indigenous over a period of time in Bolivia and Guatemala. Data come from surveys applied on nationally representative samples that are comparable across time and cross-nationally, conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University and described in the methods section.

21 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association conference in Chicago, in April of 2007, where it benefitted from comments by Donna Lee Van Cott and other participants, and at the graduate seminar organized by the Center For the Americas, in March 2007, where it received comments from Vera Kutszinski and participants of the seminar.
Changes in the sample design were introduced in Guatemala in 2004 (so 2001 and 2004 are not fully comparable). However, 1999 and 2001, and 2004 and 2006 are fully comparable and the differences are substantively relevant and statistically significant (p<.001) in the most recent comparison. Likewise, changes in the design of the question were introduced in the 2004 Bolivia questionnaire; however, 2004 and 2006 are fully comparable, and the difference is also large and statistically significant (p<.001).

There is an additional piece of information that seems to confirm the trend in Bolivia. Figure 5 below shows the proportion of Bolivia’s national population that identifies as indigenous and as white between 1998 and 2006. It is evident that the
positive trend for indigenous identifications is linked to a negative one for identification as ‘blanco’ or ‘white’; at the same time, the ‘mestizo’ category has remained proportionally unchanged during this time period, with around 60% of respondents identifying with it.\footnote{I have presented this evidence previously (Moreno 2006). Figures for the indigenous population do not correspond exactly to the Bolivian 2001 census results because the question used here is different from the census question; however, when the Bolivian Census Bureau (INE) question was applied to the LAPOP sample, results where similar to the official ones (Seligson, et al. 2006; Seligson, et al. 2005); chapter II discusses this issue more thoroughly.}

What can explain ethnic identification and its changes across time? What can account for the differences in the patterns of ethnic identification in the two countries?
My central hypothesis is that political factors related to the relative success of the indigenous movement are central for explaining these different patterns: In Bolivia, the proportion of people who identify as indigenous grows as a consequence of the success of indigenous politics (which is discussed in detail in chapter IV of this dissertation); many individuals who used to identify as white now identify as *mestizo* (a category which can be thought of as a middle path between white and indigenous), and many *mestizos* now identify as indigenous. In Guatemala, in contrast, a decrease in the proportion of indigenous identifiers can be explained by the lack of a successful politicized indigenous identity.

**A Working Definition of Ethnic Identity**

The definition of ethnicity that I employ in this research, i.e., a socially constructed system of differentiation based on descent (or in the belief of it) (Chandra 2006; Gabbert 2006), implies that individuals can ‘choose’ their ethnic identity from a menu of possible options available to them. My central argument is that under some conditions that make an identity category contextually desirable, identification with this category will have a stronger political component than under the absence of these conditions.

In the concrete settings of this study, I expect indigenous identity to have clear connections to political factors when the indigenous movement is politically successful and a much weaker or even negative effect when the movement is weak. Simply put: people choose their ethnic identity based also on political considerations about the context in which they live and the opportunities it offers them. My theory of ethnic
identification and identity change grows out of the recent work of political scientists also concerned with this issue, particularly Madrid (who also analyzed data for one of the cases in this study) (Madrid 2006), Chandra (Chandra 2004), and Hoddie (Hoddie 2006).

Scholars often assume that ethnic identities are uncomplicated, unidimensional and fixed. Or so it would seem based on a review of questions in dozens of surveys that have been used world-wide that ask respondents a single-response ethnic self-identification item to measure the concept of ethnic identity.

Social sciences have advanced in the conceptualization of ethnic identity over the last few decades: The “primordial” understanding of ethnic identities as fixed entities that create immediate and strong loyalties among their members (Geertz 1963; Geertz 1973; Stack 1986) has been replaced by an almost consensual definition: ethnic identities are socially constructed23: Most researchers agree that a person’s identification as part of an ethnic group is contingent upon the socio-historic context. Moreover, most researchers today accept the notion that identities are ‘chosen’ from within a menu of possible options, and that this choice does not necessarily remain permanent (Cerulo 1997; Chandra 2001; Chandra and Laitin 2002; Gutmann 2003; Laitin 1998); demonstrating this theoretical standpoint, different recent empirical studies have shown that ethnic identity changes over time (Chandra 2004; Craemer 2006; Hoddie 2006; Posner 2005). In sum, there is a near-consensus in the social sciences with at least some ‘soft’ constructivist theoretical standpoint regarding ethnic identity. Even the ethno-symbolist approach (developed by the theoretical contributions of Anthony Smith) (Malesevic

23 For very clear reviews of the discussion between primordialism and constructivism see Chandra (2001), Yashar (2005), and Posner (2005). On the construction of identity see the review by Cerulo (1997).
2004; Smith 1986; Smith 1991), which argues that ethnic identities are based on cultural traits, particularly on the existence of a myth of common origin, recognizes that identities are invoked or can be promoted by the political work of elites (Lambert 2006).

In order to operationalize this concept, it is important to distinguish between identity dimension, identity category, and identity attributes (Chandra 2006; Chandra and Laitin 2002). Identity ‘dimension’ is one of the cleavages existing in a society which can become salient under particular circumstances (e.g., ethnicity, religion, class). Identity ‘category’ is one of the possible options in one dimension and it is assumed to be rational and strategic (e.g. African-American, Catholic). ‘Attributes’ are the features that are assumed to be characteristic of these categories (e.g. skin color, language, faith).

Additionally, identities have content; they have a meaning for people for whom they are relevant. In contrast with most instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity, I explicitly recognize that identity categories have content, and that it can be observed and studied, though it is permanently contested (Abdelal, et al. 2006). The inclusion of this dimension implies that the strategic choices of identity that a person can have are restricted to what is culturally meaningful to them.

By conceptualizing identity ‘categories’ nested in ‘dimensions’ and dependent on ‘attributes’, this definition recognizes the chosen character of identity and the dynamics of the space from which the person gets to choose an identity category, but also implies that the choice is restricted to a limited set of options available to the individual and

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24 Daniel Posner has convincingly argued that there is no single ethnic cleavage, but that they vary and the relevance of a particular one also determines the possible identity categories available to the person (Posner 2005; Posner Forthcoming). I acknowledge these different dimensions, but the fact that people identify as part of one ethnic category implies that a particular cleavage has been activated over other possible ones.
defined by attributes. Recognizing the existence of the ‘content’ implies acknowledging that there is a relevant cultural dimension in identity.

Research on Ethnic Identity in Political Science

Traditionally, most studies concerning ethnic identity in political science have considered it as a variable on the right side of the equation; ethnic identity, or more broadly ethnicity, has been treated as an objective explanatory variable, a fact that precedes and is exogenous to political phenomena.

Even if identities are assumed to be at least in part constructed, the explanation of the origins of ethnic identity for many researchers seems to be found exclusively in characteristics such as psychological and social features (as in the socio-psychological tradition started by Tajfel 1978), shared history, memories and culture (Smith 1991), an ‘imagined’ sense of community (Anderson 1991), the myth of collective ancestry (Horowitz 1985), language (Laitin 1998; Laitin 2000), and geographical location (as in the very interesting computer-based models developed by Lustick, et al. 2004). A recent evaluation of the disciplinary interest explaining identity, points to this lack of attention and calls for more efforts to understand identity formation from a political perspective (Smith 2004).

On theoretical grounds, the discipline seems very comfortable accepting the constructed character of identity, but that has not yet been completely translated into
empirical research (Chandra 2001). That explains why only recently political scientists have placed ethnicity on the left-hand side of the equation, attempting to explore the formation and dynamics of ethnic identity using political concepts and testing them with empirical evidence.

Recent ‘political’ explanations for ethnic identity include: Public policies that favor some ethnic groups have been signaled as a relevant factor that explains identity change (Hoddie 2006); the proximity of elections can increase the strength of ethnic identities and the likelihood that the person identifies in ethnic terms (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2007); decisions taken at the government level can produce particular identities (Brown 2005); participation in political organizations seems to partially explain identification with some particular ethnic categories (Madrid 2006); institutional settings seem to favor the creation of ethnic groups as a component of coalition building (Posner 2005), and that also seems to explain the success of ethnic parties (Chandra 2004). Sociologist Joane Nagel showed that the renewal of the American Indian identity over the last few decades was linked to several political facts, including the role of ethnic movements (Nagel 1995). My research builds on those approaches by hypothesizing that ethnic identities find at least some of their origins in political factors, particularly on the political success of ethnic based movements.

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25 As an example of this acceptance, Sidney Verba when interviewed about the advances of knowledge in the discipline of Political Science states that ‘we have learned that identities are not primordial. They may be created. Or, more likely, preexisting identities may be invoked by the action of strategic elites seeking support in democratic elections or nondemocratic struggles for control’ (Hochschild 2005: 324).
Research Strategy and Design

The cases

An ideal experimental setting for analyzing how political factors affect ethnic identification would be to have very similar cases and expose some of them to the ‘treatment’, or the presence of the political variables hypothesized to be relevant, and then to measure the dependent variable (identification) and compare results between the two groups. It is well known that these types of designs are rarely possible in the social sciences; however, sometimes reality produces a combination of cases and outcomes that can be considered as ‘natural’ experiments and can provide information that, in combination with other methods, can produce knowledge about a certain topic (McDermott 2002).

My research design capitalizes on the presence of two similar cases in which ethnic identity shows very different patterns: Bolivia and Guatemala. These countries, with the highest levels of ethnic diversity in the Latin American region (Fearon 2003), are cases usually assumed to have large indigenous populations (Gurr 1993; Yashar 2005) and are countries in which the indigenous movement has had at least some significance (Yashar 2005). What changes dramatically between the cases is the level of success of this movement, as chapter IV makes clear.

There are relevant differences in the degree of success of indigenous movements, an element that I argue is central for indigenous identification. Bolivia has had a very successful indigenous movement, particularly since 2000, that has become stronger and achieved power via democratic means (Albó 2003; Postero 2007a; Van Cott 2003) and
has improved the relationship between the State and indigenous citizens significantly (Seligson, et al. 2006). This process has been coupled with the already noted increase in the relative number of people who self-identified as indigenous in recent years.

Guatemala has also developed a very visible indigenous movement (with one of its leaders winning a Nobel Peace Prize), but with much less political success, becoming relevant at local and regional level politics but hardly making an impact at the national level (Yashar 2005). The creation of a Pan-Maya identity (Seligson 2005; Warren 1998) has also been a recent process that might be pointing out the emergence of a stronger identity-based political movement. Moreover, Guatemala has suffered from decades of political violence that was particularly vicious against indigenous groups, and the challenges the country faces emerging from the peace process have set a political scenario with much uncertainty.

The comparative design

This research design presents two levels of comparison that together provide considerable strength for the causal argument. First, I compare the effect of different variables on indigenous identification in the two countries using the latest survey data available (2006). This cross – sectional synchronic comparison gives information on whether the effect of political variables varies across countries with different levels of success of the indigenous movement. Second, I compare data from Bolivia in 2006 with data from a previous year (1998). This cross – time diachronic comparison allows me to see if there have been changes in the relationships between identity and politics during
the last eight years, an answer that can be linked to the role of the recent success of the indigenous movement.

The first step in analyzing the factors that could be related to identification as part of an identity category is to establish the group of people that could identify as members of that category. The definition of ethnic identity that I employ emphasizes the existence of attributes or conditions that a person must possess in order to identify as part of a particular category; this is equivalent to saying that not anybody can simply identify with just any ethnic category, but that the available options for each person are determined by some objective characteristics. Even if these attributes are permanently contested they are nonetheless objective and act effectively in the delimitation of social groups.

My hypothesis implies that, controlling for all other things, the presence or absence of certain political factors will affect the chances that individuals with similar socioeconomic and cultural characteristics identify as part of the indigenous category. Who then, could potentially identify as indigenous in the context of this study?

One obvious response refers to language. Language is often used as a marker of ethnic and cultural differences in a country; since the *Atlas Nadorov Mira*, different measures of ethnic and cultural fractionalization have been based on language (Alesina, *et al.* 2003; Fearon 2003). One would expect that, in order to identify as part of an ethnic category, a person is required to speak the language associated with it and believed to be spoken by most of its members (if different from that of the rest of society). However, data presented in Table 3 suggest that this assumption does not hold for indigenous identity in Latin America.
A second alternative is a cultural approach; under this perspective, somewhat closer to the ethno-symbolist approach, the central attribute for ethnic identity would be shared culture. Only those who share some particular culture could become members of the identity category related to this culture. This approach seems to fit the data in a better way, as it is shown in the section below.

**Data and Methods**

Data for this project come from the AmericasBarometer 2006 round of surveys carried out by the Latin American Public Opinion Project – LAPOP – at Vanderbilt University. The pooled two-country database has a total of 4,506 observations, 3,008 of them from Bolivia, and the remaining 1,498 from Guatemala. Surveys were conducted over a nationally representative probability sample in each country, and they are part of a series of survey studies conducted by LAPOP over time. Along with Spanish, five different Mayan languages were used for the interviews in Guatemala, while in Bolivia, Quechua, Aymara, and Spanish were used. For more information on LAPOP, the surveys, and for more details on the sample designs see [www.lapopsurveys.org](http://www.lapopsurveys.org).

Table 3 shows that the proportion of people identifying as indigenous who spoke an indigenous language during their childhood is relatively small. Language, so often viewed as a quintessential marker for ethnic identity, seems to be a poor predictor of ethnic identification, or at least does not seem to work for defining the ‘pool’ of individuals who could potentially identify as indigenous in Latin America.
Table 3. Percentage of people who identify as indigenous by language spoken during childhood

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish only</td>
<td>43.1 (243)</td>
<td>16.1 (94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish and indigenous language</td>
<td>39.9 (225)</td>
<td>65.0 (379)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous language exclusively</td>
<td>17 (96)</td>
<td>18.9 (110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006; Ns in parentheses

In the pooled two country database, 70% of those individuals identifying as indigenous spoke an indigenous language (either exclusively or combined with Spanish) at home. A sizable 30% of those who identify as indigenous only spoke Spanish during their childhood.

A second possible criterion for defining who could identify as indigenous is cultural identification. In 2006, respondents were asked how strongly on a 1 to 7 scale they identify with the country’s largest indigenous culture. I recoded this variable into a categorical variable with two groups: identifies with more than half of the scale (5, 6 and 7) or not. The resulting subset contains 2,677 observations; this is the group of respondents that were defined as potential identifiers with the indigenous ethnic category and are represented by oval B in Figure 6 below.

26 The question used is ‘How strongly do you identify with the (e.g. Quechua) culture? In Guatemala, the available option was Maya, and in Bolivia two different questions were used for Quechua and Aymara; I coded 1 if the respondent chose more than 4 in either of them. I decided to recode this variable because it can produce two groups of respondents, those who strongly feel part of an indigenous culture and those who do not, which is in turn useful for this study for establishing the set of individuals who could potentially identify as indigenous. As any other, this is a relatively arbitrary methodological decision based solely on the mid-point of the scale for separating one group (those who could potentially identify as indigenous) from the other; I am confident, however, that this decision being applied equally to both countries does not bias my results in any way.
Table 4. Composition of the subset of observations for the analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total pool of potential indigenous identifiers (B)</td>
<td>1,041 (69.5% of national sample)</td>
<td>1,636 (54.4% of national sample)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural identification and self-ID as indigenous (B and C)</td>
<td>499 (33.3% of national sample)</td>
<td>459 (15.3% of national sample)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006

The largest oval (A) in Figure 6 corresponds to the national population in each country; the surveys employed are representative of this population. The second oval (B) gathers all individuals who identify with an indigenous culture in more than half of the 7-point graded scale used for that question; that is, it represents people who, according to my argument, could potentially identify as indigenous. The smallest oval (C) represents respondents who positively identified as indigenous in the categorical question for ethnicity. Ideally, C is a subset of B which in turn is a subset of A; empirically, 83% of all observations in C are also in B.
This grouping is not perfect for the analytical aims of this chapter (i.e., all positive indigenous identifications are not a perfect subset of the group defined as potential identifiers as indigenous); however, it is much more accurate than the language classification and it contains most of the indigenous identifications. It is still necessary to understand what larger subset of each country’s population comprises the remaining sixth of all individuals who identify as indigenous. With this caveat, I will use this classification for the construction of the subset of observations that could potentially identify as indigenous.

As stated above, I expect to find a weaker relationship between indigenous identity and political factors in those countries and moments in time in which indigenous movements are relatively weak. In the concrete settings of this comparative design, I
expect the effect of political variables in identification as indigenous to be stronger in Bolivia 2006 than in Guatemala in the same year or than in Bolivia in 1998.

Variable description

The dependent variable is *Indigena*, a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 if the person identifies with the indigenous ethnic category, and 0 if he or she identifies as part of a different category in the ‘how do you identify yourself’ question.

With regards to the explicitly ‘political’ explanations for ethnic identity, I focus on political and civic engagement as variables that refer to how active individuals are in the public sphere of their local communities. Political engagement refers to the exercise of political rights by citizens, particularly to: a) having an ideological position (ideology); b) knowing about politics (political knowledge); and c) having interest in politics. Civic engagement refers to some elements of social capital, and is measured by d) involvement in community activities, and e) talking about politics with other people. The relevance of these factors on the exercise of citizenship rights has been treated previously in the literature (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Galston 2001).

If the hypothesis which holds that identification as indigenous has a strong political component particularly in the case of Bolivia 2006, the variables that measure political and civic engagement should have a strong relationship with identification as

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27 The question used for self-identification is “How do you identify yourself?” with two wordings in Spanish, “*Usted se considera...*” (Guatemala) and “*Usted se considera una persona de raza...*” (Bolivia and Ecuador), offering options such as ‘blanco’, ‘mestizo’, ‘indigena’, ‘negro’, ‘ladino’, and other relevant categories for each country. Figures presented here represent the proportion of people identifying as indigenous (includes *originario* in Bolivia).
indigenous. The logic behind this is that, *ceteris paribus*, people who identify as indigenous do so because they are actively exposed to political practice at the local level.

*Ideology* refers to the political positioning of a person in relation to the ‘left’ and the ‘right’, and might be a good reference for comparing the overall political position of some individuals versus others. The question used for measuring this asks the respondent to place herself on a 1 to 10 scale in which 1 means ‘left’ and 10 means ‘right.’ Not all of the respondents find it easy to position themselves on this ideological scale: approximately 28% of all cases in the pool of potential indigenous identifiers used here could not give an answer to this question, and were coded as ‘missing’.

*Political knowledge* is a variable that measures the level of knowledge that a person has about international politics. This is a variable composed of two questions in the questionnaire: does the person know who the presidents of the US and Brazil are\(^{28}\); if the two answers are correct, the variable takes a value of 2, 1 if only one is correct, and 0 if none. I expect that this variable should have a positive effect on indigenous identification in the cases in which indigenous self-identification is on the rise.

*Involvement in community* activities is a variable coded 1 if the person responded positively to a question that asks whether he or she has contributed to the solution of a problem in his or her community during the last year, and 0 if the person has not participated in such an activity. This variable is a proxy for active participation in public

\(^{28}\)This question is not a perfect measure for political knowledge, and the definition of the two reference countries is based only on the assumption that these are the two most powerful countries in the hemisphere; however, this measure is a useful *proxy* to how much the person knows about international politics.
activities at the local level, and a positive answer implies that the person is concerned and involved in the public sphere.

*Interest in politics* is a variable resulting from a question that asks the respondent how strongly he or she is interested in politics. The variable is coded 0 for ‘none’, 1 for ‘some’, 2 for ‘much’, and 3 for ‘very much’.

*Talking politics* comes from the question ‘How often do you speak about politics with other people?’; it assumes a value of 0 if the person answered ‘never’, 1 if ‘rarely’, 2 if ‘a few times a month’, 3 if ‘a few times a week’, and 4 if ‘daily’. This is a measurement of active involvement in the discursive practice of politics and thus a direct indicator of involvement in politics.

Other variables included in the analysis as socioeconomic controls are:

- *Female*, coded 1 for female and 0 for male.
- *Age*, expressed in years.
- *Education*, the education level the person obtained, with a value of 0 if no education, 1 if elementary education, 2 if high school, and 3 if the person attended at least some university.
- *Wealth* measured by number of capital goods in the household, with a maximum value of 9 and a minimum of 0. Items include phone, washing machine, water service in the house, among others.
• *Rural*, a dummy variable coded 1 if the person lives in an area populated by less than 2,000 inhabitants.

• *Exposure to media*, from four questions that ask the respondent how often does he or she consume news on the radio, television, newspapers, and the internet, with values 1 for ‘daily’, 2 for ‘once or twice a week’, 3 for ‘rarely’, 4 for ‘never’.

• Indigenous *language*, coded 0 if the person spoke only Spanish during her childhood; 1 if she spoke both Spanish and an indigenous language; and 2 if her home was monolingual in one native language.

Statistical models and methods

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, a series of logistic regression models were fitted for the analyses; these models calculate the change in the probability that the outcome of the dependent variable is positive with a variation of one point of the scale in the independent variable. These models are particularly sensitive to the specification, and all results are conditional to the inclusion and the values of the other independent variables (Hoffmann 2004; Kleinbaum, et al. 1998; Long 1997). Results are presented in terms of odds ratios, which represent the ratio of the probability of the outcome with a positive increment in the independent variable in reference to the base group (Hoffmann 2004).

The analyses were conducted using the appropriate calculation for the standard errors considering the sample specifications in each case; this implies that observations are not independent of each other, but they are clustered in the Primary Sampling Units.
that form each of the strata defined for each probability sample design (Kish and Frankel 1974; Rust 1985; Skinner, Holt and Smith 1989). Stata 9.2’s SVY commands were used for computations.

**Results**

**Differences between countries**

Is the effect of the different independent variables the same across the cases selected for the study? Table 5 below presents the effects of each independent variable on the probability that a person in the potential pool of indigenous identifiers actually identifies as indigenous.

**Table 5: Results of the logistic regression for indigenous identification in each country (odds ratios and t statistic in parentheses)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Guatemala 2006</th>
<th>Bolivia 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.944 (.28)</td>
<td>.618 (-2.68) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.991 (.96)</td>
<td>.986 (-2.01) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.565 (-3.16) *</td>
<td>.637 (-3.83) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>.981 (-2.4)</td>
<td>.708 (-3.30) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>.981 (.07)</td>
<td>.996 (.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News: Radio</td>
<td>.745 (-2.81) *</td>
<td>1.05 (.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News: TV</td>
<td>1.280 (1.60)</td>
<td>.896 (-1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News: Newspapers</td>
<td>1.023 (.24)</td>
<td>1.177 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News: Internet</td>
<td>1.791 (2.09) *</td>
<td>1.087 (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>16.989 (6.16) *</td>
<td>1.854 (3.71) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>1.001 (.02)</td>
<td>.926 (1.90) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.621 (-2.40) *</td>
<td>.908 (-.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in community</td>
<td>.955 (-.19)</td>
<td>2.179 (3.91) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>1.317 (1.13)</td>
<td>.965 (-.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking politics</td>
<td>.583 (-2.71) *</td>
<td>1.008 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>1,163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+: p<.1; *: p<.05
Dependent variable: *Indigena*, identification as indigenous
It is useful to keep in mind that the reference group is not the national population, but the people who feel part of an indigenous culture, as represented by oval B in Figure 6. The group with a positive response in the outcome encompasses those individuals who actually identify as indigenous (oval C in Figure 6).

The differences between the effect of each independent variable in the two countries are evidence of the existence of different constructions of indigenous identity. A detailed examination of the results for each variable yields surprising results:

First, the odds that a female respondent from the pool of individuals who could potentially identify as indigenous actually identifies as such are almost 40% smaller than those of a male in Bolivia. Thus, controlling for all socioeconomic and political factors already specified, being female significantly reduces the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Bolivia, but seems to be statistically irrelevant in Guatemala.

Age also has a significant negative effect on indigenous identification in Bolivia: every additional year of age reduces the chances that a person identifies as indigenous by approximately 3%. All other things being equal, younger individuals are more likely to identify as indigenous in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala. Higher levels of education and wealth have a generally negative effect on indigenous identification in both countries, though the differences are not always significant.

Contrary to what could be expected, living in a rural area does not increase the chances that a person in the subset of observations considered here identifies as indigenous in any of the two cases.
With reference to exposure to the news, Guatemala shows two significant relationships: First, individuals who identify as indigenous are more likely to consume news via the radio than similar people who do not identify as indigenous. Second, controlling for socioeconomic and political variables, individuals with indigenous identity use the internet as a source of news less than other respondents. In Bolivia there are no apparent differences in the source of consumption of news.

The effect of speaking an indigenous language at home during childhood is significant and positive. However, in substantive terms, the effect is much greater in Guatemala than in Bolivia. In Guatemala, the odds that a person who spoke a native language during childhood identifies as indigenous are 17 times those of someone who spoke only Spanish (related findings are discussed in chapter II); in Bolivia the effect seems to be much milder: the odds of identifying as indigenous for indigenous language speakers are only twice the odds of non indigenous language speakers identifying as indigenous.

Turning now to the analysis of the results for the political variables considered in the model, they show, in general, the effect that was expected from the hypothesis discussed in this chapter.

**Ideology** has an effect such that a position further to the right negatively affects the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala. That means that, other things controlled for, indigenous identity seems to be associated with a leftist ideological position in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala.
Political knowledge: Respondents who identify as indigenous know significantly less about the international political sphere than other individuals who do not identify as indigenous but feel part of the Mayan indigenous culture in Guatemala. This difference is non-existent in Bolivia, where identification as indigenous does not seem to be associated with a lack of political knowledge once it is controlled for socioeconomic factors.

Involvement in community: Participating in community activities greatly increases the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Bolivia, where people who participate in community activities are 2.2 times more likely to identify as indigenous than those who do not get involved in solving the problems of their communities. In Guatemala, in contrast, this participation has no effect whatsoever on identification as indigenous.

Interest in politics: Contrary to what I had expected, the level of interest in politics does not seem to matter in either country. What has a very clear negative effect on indigenous identification in Guatemala is ‘talking’ politics; individuals who often talk about politics are far less likely to identify as indigenous than respondents who very rarely or never express their political opinions in public.

The implications of the evidence presented here are discussed thoroughly in the discussion section of this chapter.

Differences across time within Bolivia (1998 and 2006)

For this comparison, I used the complete national sample to establish the correlates of indigenous identification. This procedure is less efficient than the one used
in the previous section because it lacks the definition of the ‘pool’ of individuals who could potentially identify as indigenous; this is because the question on how strongly the person identifies with an indigenous culture was not present in the Bolivia LAPOP questionnaire until 2006. The statistical analyses conducted here, then, compare the features of those who identify as indigenous with the rest of the Bolivian population, and not with a subset of it who could potentially identify as indigenous as in the previous analyses.

In statistical terms, unsystematic error is included in the analysis by changing the reference group from ‘potential indigenous identifiers’ to any individual in the sample. However, as the model is the same for the two years, this technique is useful in identifying changes in the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. All tests were conducted using the appropriate standard error calculations for complex sample data.

Given that not all variables used in the previous models were present in the Bolivia 1998 questionnaire, models have a different specification than the ones used in the between-country comparison. One variable that had not been used before is employed in these models: Income, an ordinal variable with 8 possible values corresponding to total family income last month (0=no income, 7=more than 20,000 bolivianos).

There is another difference in the dependent variable in these equations compared to the between-country tests: In Bolivia, the ‘originario’ category was included as an option in the questionnaire since 2004; before that, the question only included ‘indígena’. ‘Originario’ is a category that has been commonly used particularly in the Western
region of the country as a synonym of indigenous, with which some people find easier to identify with given the negative connotation of ‘indio’29 (see chapter II). Table 6 presents the results for the variables included in the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Bolivia 1998</th>
<th>Bolivia 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.630 (-2.67) *</td>
<td>.632 (-2.27) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.980 (-2.32) *</td>
<td>.984 (-2.31) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.537 (-4.68) *</td>
<td>.586 (-3.01) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.765 (-2.26) *</td>
<td>.670 (-3.65) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>1.519 (1.43)</td>
<td>.916 (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involvement in community</td>
<td>1.829 (3.03) *</td>
<td>1.902 (2.51) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>.933 (1.63)</td>
<td>.826 (-4.11) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>1,881</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p<.05
Dependent variable: Indigena, identification as indigenous

Results for both years are very similar, despite the differences in the political strength of indigenous movement between 1998 and 2006 in Bolivia. The only noticeable difference is the coefficient for ideology. Ideology shows a very relevant effect on indigenous identification in Bolivia in 2006, but not in 1998. In 2006, each ‘step’ to the right in the 1 to 10 left to right ideological scale significantly reduces the odds that a person identifies as indigenous by approximately 17% (with a probability of error of less than 1 in 1,000); in other words, the further to the right a person is the less likely he or she is to identify as indigenous. In contrast, the effect of ideology in identification in 1998 was not significant at all.

29 ‘Originario’ can be translated as ‘original from the land’ and it is used to refer to the peoples that were in the country before the Spanish conquest. This category was amply used during the colonial period and it was relevant for taxation purposes (Platt 1982).
Discussion

Several findings point out that the construction of indigenous identity in 2006 was different in Bolivia than in Guatemala, and that political factors have also significantly different effects on indigenous identification. The socioeconomic variables considered yield results that contribute to the argument provided here. First, the effect of gender. Why are women less likely to identify as indigenous in Bolivia but not in Guatemala? A possible explanation has to do with differences in gender roles associated with contrasting experiences of political socialization and participation. My hypothesis here is that Bolivian males are more exposed to spaces in which political issues are discussed, particularly at the grassroots level, and that it is this political socialization what reinforces identification as indigenous. If this argument holds, the implication would be that those spaces for political socialization are either inexistent in Guatemala, or that they are equally available for men and women. As a complementary explanation, previous literature has pointed out that ethnic mobility is particularly difficult for indigenous women (De La Cadena 1995); it seems possible that less women identify as indigenous precisely because doing so is more ‘expensive’ for them than for males, and that not identifying as indigenous is a way of escaping from the bottom of the social hierarchies established on the basis of gender and ethnicity.

The difference in the coefficient for age tells a similar story. The fact that in Bolivia younger individuals are more likely to identify as indigenous than older people is evidence that directly contradicts the assimilation claim that privileges a culture-based
definition of ethnic identity over the more political one I use here\textsuperscript{30}. Age does not have any effect on identification in Guatemala, and that suggests the existence of different processes in the two countries.

Education and wealth decrease the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in the three countries; this could very well be a result of the already documented disadvantaged socioeconomic conditions for people of indigenous descent in the region (Pascharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). After centuries of colonial and post-colonial regimes of exploitation and exclusion loosely based on ethnicity (Hale 2005; Rivera C. 1993), indigenousness has been so deeply intertwined with poverty that the causal relationship between these socioeconomic controls and indigenous identification is not straightforward.

Speaking an indigenous language at home during childhood has a clear and positive significant effect on indigenous identification. However, the effect is much smaller in Bolivia, while maintaining very high levels of statistical significance. This suggests that the construction of indigenous identity is less associated with the cultural factor of speaking a particular language in Bolivia than in Guatemala. It could also mean that indigenous identity in Bolivia is in general less determined by cultural factors than in Guatemala, and that these attributes are weaker requisites of identification.

Ideology is the first explicitly political factor that was included in the analysis. Identification with the indigenous category seems to be associated with a leftist

\textsuperscript{30} The assimilation argument of ethnic identity contends that there is a process of cultural assimilation by which new generations of people who come from ‘traditional’ cultures are assimilated into the mainstream culture, resulting in weaker identification with the native culture among youths than among older people.
positioning on this scale in Bolivia, though the coefficient is only marginally significant. In Guatemala, ideology does not seem to have any effect at all on identification, and that can be understood as a signal of weaker influence of political factors on identity.

The emergence of Evo Morales as the most conspicuous leader of both the new left and the indigenous movement in Bolivia signals the ‘marriage’ of indigenousness and leftist ideology in that Andean nation. This relationship is relatively new; while indigenous leaders have recently publicly embraced a leftist ideology, during the 1960s and early 1970s the pro-US right-wing military governments relied heavily on their support from the campesino movement as their social bases. More recently, during the ‘golden’ years of the neoliberal modernization project, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, an Aymara leader, was Vice President to Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in an administration responsible for a series of reforms that, after the privatizations and free trade agreements, directly benefited indigenous people (like the Participación Popular, or the INRA law).

Paradoxically, these ‘neoliberal’ reforms seem to have opened the opportunities for the success of the indigenous movement and for Evo Morales’ Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS). These constitutional reforms and laws promoting institutional change in the region established new mechanisms of participation, both at the local and the national levels, which were crucial for the emergence and consolidation of the indigenous movement (Albó 2002b; Assies, van der Haar and Hoekema 1999; Van Cott 2005). Chapter IV covers this subject in depth.

In Guatemala, on the other hand, the indigenous movement has not been under a unified leadership with the political left (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997);
indigenous political organizations appear, in large part, to be fragmented, disarticulated
from larger political organizations, and seem to lack the organizational capabilities for a
more successful participation in the national political scene (Cojti and Fabian 2005). The
fact that in Guatemala people who identify as indigenous are less knowledgeable about
the international political sphere than non-indigenous identifiers also suggests the
absence of a relevant role of politics on indigenous identity in the country.

People who identify as indigenous in Bolivia tend to participate more in activities
oriented toward the solution of problems in their communities than other individuals. The
general level of participation is not very different when the national samples are
considered. The usual explanation for this difference would probably suggest that
indigenous people in the Andes have a strong culture of participation and stable local
organizations that contribute to the materialization of this participation, and that these
organizations were seriously damaged in Guatemala by political violence. While I do not
reject this explanation, I would argue that it is likely that the opportunity of participating
in these activities increases the chances that a person identifies with the indigenous
category.

Perhaps the element that most clearly portrays the unpolticized status of
indigenous identity in Guatemala is the strong negative effect that talking politics has on
indigenous identification, a variable that is irrelevant in Bolivia; the more frequently a
person talks with other citizens about politics, the less likely he or she is to identify as
indigenous. In general, Guatemalans talk about politics less frequently than Bolivians, but
Guatemalans who identify as indigenous are even less likely to talk about politics. A
logical explanation points again to the recent history of armed conflict in Guatemala;
more than three decades of war and state-sponsored violence that was particularly vicious within indigenous communities seems to have left a long lasting fear toward public involvement in political activities among ordinary citizens. This idea is explored more in depth in the following chapter.

The additional piece of information with which I build my case is the difference in the effect of ideology in Bolivia in 2006 compared with 1998; a coefficient that previously was not significant is now very strong and beyond reasonable statistical doubt. Identity as indigenous seems to have gained a lot of ideological weight in less than a decade, becoming very much linked to being ‘on the left’ of the political spectrum. This change shows first that identity changes over time, that the contents and meaning of being indigenous is different now than eight years ago; this finding supports the theory that ethnic identity is fluid, that its contents are permanently contested, and that it is more dynamic than what we usually think. Second, the change also shows that identity in Bolivia has become more political during the last few years, and this finding supports the hypothesis that the dynamics of identity change that inspire this research might be caused by political factors in a context of a very successful indigenous movement.

The possibility that this political process increases the proportion of people identifying as indigenous has previously been suggested by anthropologist Andrew Canessa (2006). This chapter has found support for this hypothesis.

Is it possible to infer from the results presented here that some people may have a purely instrumental use of identity? In other words, do some people say that they identify with an identity category only because it is circumstantially convenient for them? In
order to claim this it would be necessary to have information on whether people who started identifying as indigenous actually obtained some benefit from the State or other source as a result of that identification, and those data are currently not available; besides that, the Bolivian Government does not keep any record of people’s ethnic identity as a tool for policy implementation. What seems more likely is that people get a psychological benefit from having a person with similar ethnicity as president, as Chandra suggests (Chandra 2004).

Finally, the fact that not all positive indigenous identifications are part of the pool of potential indigenous identifiers defined here raises a question about the nature of the subset of observations that should be considered as the baseline for similar analyses. It seems clear that people can ‘choose’ what identity category they feel part of if they have or if they acquire the necessary attributes associated with that category. But, what does it take to identify as part of an identity category? What exactly are these attributes? Evidence shows that language is not the most important one, and it is very likely that dress, skin color or phenotypical characteristics are not definitive either. I have defined the potential pool of identifications by cultural affinity, and this decision is empirically more accurate than the others, but it is still not perfect.
CHAPTER IV

EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS
IN BOLIVIA AND GUATEMALA

In December 2005, Evo Morales, an indigenous leader from the Bolivian highlands, won the presidential election with an unprecedented 54% of the national vote in an election with the highest historical turnout in Bolivia’s history. In striking contrast, in September 2007, Rigoberta Menchú, a Guatemala Mayan Indian recipient of the Nobel Peace prize and one of the most internationally and nationally visible Guatemalan personalities, obtained 3% in a presidential election in which she, the only indigenous candidate, finished seventh among 14 candidates. Given that at least 50% of the population in both countries could be considered indigenous under most criteria (though see the discussion about this in chapter II of this dissertation), the differences in the political success of indigenous people between the two countries are, to say the least, dazzling. What are the factors that contributed to the political success of the indigenous movement in capturing the commanding heights of political power in Bolivia but not in Guatemala? This chapter attempts to answer this question using a combination of survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, and qualitative information gathered during fieldwork in both countries during 2006 and 2007.
Studying the Success or Failure of Indigenous Politics in Latin America

The study of the indigenous movements

Different approaches have been used for attempting to explain the political performance of indigenous people in Latin American democracies. One of them is defining the indigenous movement as the unit of analysis itself, constructing a narrative of the macro-historical path that each of them followed until their current success or failure. The information produced from this perspective is mainly qualitative, as is its analysis, and has very much in common with the sociology of social movements. This methodological approach has been employed by different studies that give an account of the state of the indigenous movements all over the continent.

For example, Deborah Yashar has shown authoritatively how the indigenous movements of Bolivia and Ecuador flourished during the aftermath of the neoliberal reforms in the region, but failed to do so in Peru (Yashar 2005; Yashar 2007); Van Cott has shown how the same movements became political parties, participating in elections and winning several of them (Van Cott 2003; Van Cott 2005). Bastos and Camus have made note of the path followed by the indigenous movement in Guatemala, highlighting its prospective for the future (Bastos and Camus 2003b) (see also (Warren 1998)); Lucero has given detailed account of the trajectories of the Bolivian and Ecuadorean movements, focusing on the internal competition for representation (Lucero 2002; Lucero 2006). The

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31 On the discussion of different methodological approaches in political science see, among others, (Brady and Collier 2004; King, et al. 1994; Martin and McIntyre 1994).
list of good qualitative studies about the indigenous movements in the region is not short and has very strong exponents.

By focusing on the indigenous movements and organizations themselves, this type of research is useful in the identification of key features and circumstances that define the organizational maturity of the movement and its contextual opportunities. By focusing on the role of indigenous leadership, this line of research can identify the crucial decisions that conjugated organizational characteristics and contextual opportunities into more or less successful political outcomes.

The main disadvantage that this line of research has consists in ignoring the individual by looking only at the aggregate unit of analysis. The problem with this approach is that it assumes *a priori* that indigenous people act organically, as a group, and that ethnic categories such as ‘indigenous’ can be equated to individuals and their behaviors. This is a problem termed in the statistical literature as the ‘ecological fallacy’, an error of interpretation produced by assuming that individuals share the average characteristics of the group (King 1997; Seligson 2002); the inferences over individuals produced under these circumstances can be problematic. The problem is then, one of levels of analysis.

**Party systems and electoral behavior**

The second approach, less well developed in the literature on indigenous movements in Latin America, is the study of the relationship between ethnic cleavages

32 On the criticism to the view of ethnic categories as ‘groups’ see (Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2006).
and party systems in the region, using mainly national and sub-national units of analysis. In the general body of the party system literature, party stability is usually explained by the stability of the cleavages on which the party system is based; ethno-cultural cleavages are usually considered as very stable and can act as cues for voting and party identification (Horowitz 1985; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This relationship has held constant in most advanced democracies, but is not at all smooth and clear in consolidating democracies (Birnir 2007a).

Ethnic cleavages have not produced stable party systems in Latin America, or at least the small number of studies concerned with this issue have not found empirical support for the theoretical expectation. Instead of stable parties resulting from societal cleavages, ethnic diversity appears to have generated even more instability and electoral volatility, mainly because political parties traditionally did not cater to ethnic groups (Birnir 2007b; Madrid 2005a; Van Cott 2000b). It has also been shown that, at least in Guatemala, the inexistence of an indigenous party does not seem to be product of the institutional design (Instituto Interuniversitario de Iberoamérica 2005).

During the past decade, a wide variety of ethnic parties have been emerging in Latin American countries, with a performance that has varied substantially from country to country (Van Cott 2005). Some evidence shows that, under conditions of high politicization, ethnicity can work as a stable reference for voting behavior in the region (Birnir 2007a). It is likely that the emergence of new ethnic parties will play a role in decreasing electoral volatility and increasing the stability of the party system in the region (Madrid 2005a; Madrid 2005b); in fact, the emergence of the Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS) as a competitive political party in Bolivia suggests that this is the
trend at least for the Bolivian case. At the regional level, this line of research might become more relevant in the future, but the results obtained so far show a weak relationship between ethnic cleavages, party system, and voting behavior.

Seeking answers in public opinion research

The approach that I use in this chapter differs from the two approaches discussed above, but it feeds from elements distilled from both. Based on a most similar system design (Lijphart 1971; Lijphart 1975; Peters 1998), I look at the individual level of analysis in the two countries using public opinion data, in the understanding that it is at this level where manifestations of the actual determinants of success and failure of indigenous politics can be found.

In the vein of the Causal-Process Observations suggested by advocates of qualitative research (Brady and Collier 2004), I use qualitative data produced during my fieldwork to identify two crucial differences between the two countries which could explain the differences in the outcome of indigenous politics. One of them, the heritage of violence and fear left by the armed conflict in Guatemala, is derived from the first line of research discussed here, i.e., the process study of indigenous movements themselves. The second, the profound process of municipal decentralization that took place in Bolivia since the mid 1990s, is related – though somewhat loosely – to the institutional dimension existent in the electoral behavior studies.

The explanation that I offer for the differences in the political success of the indigenous people between the two countries consists of two elements. First, the armed
conflict that Guatemala went through during decades of civil war; I argue that this conflict decimated civil society, particularly indigenous organizations, and left people disenfranchised from public activities and fearful of participating in them. Indeed, the military targeted such organizations, in the end murdering some 200,000 people over the course of a decade. Second, the process of municipal decentralization that Bolivia experienced since the mid 1990s opened spaces for political participation and allowed for the existence of cohesive indigenous organizations networked at the national level.

As it is not possible to directly observe in the present two events that took place decades ago (the armed conflict and the municipal decentralization), I look at public opinion data in an effort to find empirical evidence of their effects. While causality cannot be directly proven (as is usually the case in the social sciences), different pieces of information put together in a coherent way can provide a solid explanation.

Hypotheses

In order to make it empirically testable, this explanation can be formulated into two main interconnected hypotheses which, combined, provide practical evidence of the plausibility of the explanation.

H1: Violence and fear reduce participation in local politics and also in national-level politics. Individuals who experienced political violence or who fear getting involved in different public activities will also tend to participate less in politics both at the local and at the national level.
H2: Participation in local politics increases the likelihood that a person will also participate in political activities at the national level. Individuals who are actively engaged in public activities in their communities and municipalities will also tend to be more interested in and to participate more in national level political activities.

This chapter also tests other hypotheses implied by different theoretical approaches and cited in the literature. These alternative hypotheses are:

H3: Protestantism weakens indigenous organizations and disenfranchises indigenous people of their political participation. As Guatemala has had a larger proportion of the indigenous population converted into non-Catholic Christian religious groups, indigenous people have weaker organizations than in traditionally Catholic Bolivia, and tend to participate less in both local level and national level activities.

H4: Indigenous people in Guatemala have a weaker attachment to the nation than members of other ethnic groups in the country, and that results in a reduced participation in politics. The generally disadvantaged position of indigenous people in the Guatemalan society generates a weaker attachment to the nation than that of other ethnic groups, discouraging them from participating in activities of the national political community.

Two assumptions are crucial for the logical coherence of this explanation. While these two assumptions remain untested in this chapter due to the impossibility of obtaining adequate data, they are fairly obvious and do not require a great leap-of-faith of the reader. First, ‘fear’ of participating in different public activities in present-time Guatemala is a consequence of La Violencia, or the State-sponsored violence experienced by the Guatemalan people for decades, but particularly during the notorious
1980s. While it is true that violence now is not currently exercised by the State as it was during the violent period (Seligson and Azpuru 2001), the widespread presence of guns in the streets, as well as the large number of people trained to use them, are direct consequences of the armed conflict.

Second, relevant institutional changes can increase levels of social and political participation at the national level. Changes in the institutional design, as those introduced in Bolivia since the implementation of the Law of Popular Participation, can boost participation at the local level and strengthen civil society and social capital. The impact of institutional design and changes on ethnic mobilization has been discussed in the context of Africa by Posner (2005).

**Armed Conflict vs. Strong Unions**

Guatemala: A history of violence

Guatemala has witnessed State organized violence for decades. In her excellent work explaining the violence prevailing in Guatemala versus the more pacifist and democratic Costa Rica, Yashar traces back the violence in Guatemala to a response from the elites to the radical reforms made by the progressive governments that the country had during the 1940s and 1950s (Yashar 1997). Popular organizations resisted that violent reaction, and, with the influx of other Latin American countries a guerrilla movement was established. During the 1970s and early 1980s, clashes between the guerrillas and the government forces became a constant. So did the ‘dirty war’, or the systematic kidnapping and murdering of people suspected to be involved with the
guerrillas. Entire communities, most of them rural and indigenous, were wiped off the map by the belligerent forces, in most cases by the Army or by related armed groups (such as the Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil). The final death toll was calculated by the Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico in 1999 at 200,000 people, 93% killed by the State; 85% of the killed were indigenous (Bastos and Camus 2003a).

During this period, the ‘official’ representation of the indigenous movement was more concerned with cultural demands rather than with the political change sought by the guerrillas (Esquit Choy and Galvez Borell 1997; Esquit 2004). That is why some observers argue that indigenous people were trapped between two fires (Stoll 1993), the one established by the guerrillas and the one by the Government military action. Other authors claim that the participation of indigenous groups in the guerrilla forces during the armed conflict was more organized and systematic than it is was widely thought to be. Indigenous communities and organizations are not only innocent ‘victims’ of the conflict, but also direct participants of it (Bastos and Camus 2003b).

Independent of how the participation of the indigenous movement in the armed conflict is characterized, most voices agree in that the violence was particularly severe against indigenous individuals and communities. Different authors have argued that the violence occurred during the civil war, or La Violencia as it is locally known, was particularly vicious against indigenous individuals and communities. La Violencia eliminated leadership and organizations in indigenous communities (Adams and Bastos 2003) and it left a long lasting scar on people, leaving indigenous people “apprehensive” about being politically conspicuous (Adams 2001).
During the fieldwork performed in Guatemala, most of my interviewees pointed to the armed conflict and the State sponsored violence that prevailed in Guatemala during the 1970s and 1980s as the explanation for the lack of organization among indigenous people and for the weakness of the country’s civil society in general. For example, indigenous leaders and activists understand the civil war as a *descabezamiento* (beheading) of the indigenous movement (Tecpan meeting); while others go further and mention *genocidio* (genocide) and *exterminación* (extermination) of the indigenous population.

**Bolivia: The strength of social movements**

Bolivia, in marked contrast to Guatemala, has never in its republican history faced an armed conflict to the degree experienced in Guatemala. Even the national revolution of 1952 was relatively short and did not produce a large number of casualties (Malloy 1970). Social movements have traditionally been strong, and unions show very high levels of internal cohesion and strength. The strength of the civil society has made some authors refer to the existence of a ‘dual power’ (state and civil society) as the political conditions of government in Bolivia (Zavaleta 1987).

One of the apparent causes for the strength of unions and social movements in Bolivia is the organizational inheritance received from the mining working class, which almost disappeared from the country when international prices of minerals collapsed in the mid 1980s. After most jobs in the State owned mining industry closed, former mine workers emigrated from the Altiplano to the Chapare region, where they organized themselves into *sindicatos campesinos* (peasant unions), and started producing Coca
leaves and other crops. These organizations proved to be particularly strong defending the Coca cultivation, and made alliances with other indigenous and campesino organizations, culminating with the organization of a political party (first, the Asamblea para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (ASP), then the Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP), and after that the Movimiento Al Socialismo) (Van Cott 2005), whose candidate, a Coca grower who emigrated from the Altiplano, is now the president of the country\textsuperscript{33}. During my fieldwork, most indigenous people I spoke with identify clearly with the president, using phrases such as ‘he is one of us’, or ‘now we can really expect changes’.

Indigenous communities in Bolivia have adopted different types of organizational forms during the years. During the Agrarian Reform of the 1950s, most Andean indigenous communities organized themselves into sindicatos campesinos (peasant unions), which were later networked into a larger nationally-based organization, the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) (Calderón and Dandler 1984; Rivera C. 2003). CSUTCB was the basis for the formation of the ASP. CSUTCB has also been part of the larger Central Obrera Boliviana (COB); while the campesino and indigenous organizations had a secondary role in this organization during the preeminence of the mine workers, during the late 1990s they began having an increasingly important role in the organization. The strength of Bolivian unions is directly related with the strength of the indigenous movement in the country.

\textsuperscript{33} On the path of success of the Movimiento Al Socialismo, see, among others (Van Cott 2003; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005)
During this same period, *indigenist* discourses begun to be more common, and the *campesino* organizations claimed their indigenous origins. The crisis of the Bolivian representation system between 2000 and 2005, with 6 different presidents in office and 2 national elections, contributed to the activation of the ethnic cleavage and to the emergence of the two new ethnic parties (Evo Morales’ MAS and Felipe Quispe’s Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti – MIP).

**Municipal Decentralization**

The Ley de Participación Popular in Bolivia

In 1994, the Bolivian Government passed the *Ley de Participación Popular*, or Law of Popular Participation. This law established municipalities in the whole country, determining that all the territory of the country be part of some *municipio* (until then, only urban areas where part of the *municipios*). The *municipio* was defined as the territorial basis for local government, transferring significant resources and responsibilities to municipalities, which were also open for electoral competition. For a good initial description of the process see (Rojas 1996; SNPP 1996; SNPP 1997).

The process was quickly embraced by indigenous organizations and individuals, who started participating directly in the *municipios* and obtaining electoral wins throughout the country (Albó 2002a; Albó, Rojas and Ticona 1995). Participation in municipal elections was still restricted to political parties (in the 2004 amendment to the constitution, other forms of citizen organizations were allowed to participate in elections), so most indigenous candidates participated in the lists of existing parties.
The Law of Popular Participation meant a dramatic change in Bolivia’s citizenship: the inclusion of indigenous and rural people into the political life of the country from which they had been historically excluded (Calla 2003; Calla and Molina B. 2003; Moreno 2000). Many citizens in rural areas had, for the first time in their lives, the possibility to interact with the Bolivian State (in its local form), which in turn had now the presence, the resources, and the technical capacities to take care of people’s demands.

This extension of citizenship increased the legitimacy of the Bolivian political system as a whole, but also raised the expectations that citizens had from it. It has been shown that good performance of local institutions can bolster support for the political system at the national level (though a poor performance can hurt it) (Hiskey and Seligson 2003). Along these lines, the Law of Popular Participation was, for some, ‘insufficient’, and the subsequent crisis of the political system was in part evidence of the limitations that ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ had (Postero 2007b).

A particularly relevant feature of the decentralization process in Bolivia is that, through the Law of Popular Participation, the State legally recognized all existent local organizations, either sindicatos campesinos and comunidades indígenas, in rural areas, as well as juntas vecinales in the cities. While the latter had already been previously recognized and played some role in the life of their municipios, the former had never been recognized formally before. Suddenly, thousands of indigenous and other local organizations became political actors in a new scenario with resources, potentialities, and significance; this created an avalanche of participation at the local level, which began to network into trans-municipal organizations (mancomunidades municipales). The municipio appeared as a scenario where the practice of politics was valid and interesting.
It is hard to tell how many of the municipal seats were occupied by indigenous leaders in the first municipal election of 1995, though the two indigenous parties obtained 4.4% of all votes cast. In the latest municipal elections Bolivia held in 2004, MAS won 18.6% of total votes with 452 of the total 1,804 available municipal seats in the country. This was also the first year in which indigenous peoples were allowed to participate directly in elections, presenting their candidates; these organizations obtained a total of 105 municipal seats. These figures show clearly the high political performance of the indigenous movement in the context of the Law of Popular Participation.

Slow process in Guatemala

The local level has historically been relevant in Guatemala. For different authors and observers, the most relevant type of identities in Guatemala is locally based. Municipal boundaries are usually coincident with ethno-cultural distinct populations, creating strong local level identities, with the resulting fragmentation present at the national level (de Paz 2007; Smith 1990b). This idea was widely mentioned during the interviews performed in Guatemala as part of the fieldwork activities.

Inspired by a region-wide trend, Guatemala has also recently started a decentralization process which places more resources at the municipal level and highlights the potential of this level for promoting human development. The implementation of the new legal framework aims to generate a process of development.

---

34 In 2002, the Guatemalan government passed the Ley del Código Municipal, the Ley de los Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural, and the Ley General de Decentralización.
based on the municipalities, changing the fact that Guatemala spends very little on local
government, less than most other countries in the world (Seligson 2005)\textsuperscript{35}.

However, the implementation of the decentralization process has shown to be
particularly slow and marked by a very limited participation of local and communal
organizations. A possible explanation for this is that, in contrast to the Bolivian
experience, the Guatemalan process lacks the legal recognition of local territorially-based
organizations. The \textit{Ley de Consejos de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural} promotes the creation
of new organizations (the \textit{Consejos Municipales de Desarrollo}) instead of legally
recognizing local organizations as the basis of active citizen participation in municipal
activities\textsuperscript{36}.

Two elements seem to determine the limited breadth of municipal decentralization
in Guatemala. First, the limitations in the legal framework itself, which transfers a limited
amount of resources to \textit{municipios} and fails to recognize existent local organizations.
Second, the weakness of civil society, which does not seem to possess the levels of
organization and participative political culture to make optimal use of the opportunity and
take over the process as happened in the Bolivian case. The novelty and limitations of the
decentralization process in Guatemala impede the activation of an already weak civil
society, missing the opportunity to develop politically and to integrate into a nation level
political movement.

\textsuperscript{35} In fact, low State investment is a characteristic of Guatemala; the country has a very weak state measured
in terms of expenditure of Gross National Product on government programs (Seligson 2005).
\textsuperscript{36} The Guatemalan law recognizes pre-existent local organizations, such as the \textit{Alcaldías Comunitarias} and
\textit{Alcaldías Indígenas}, which are indigenous forms of representation but not of communal organization. For a
detailed description of results in municipal elections in Guatemala see (Mack 2006).
Alternative Explanations

Attachment to the nation

When Guatemalans are asked directly about the lack of political success of the indigenous movement in the country, a very common explanation of the weak engagement of indigenous people in national politics is the supposedly weak sense of national belonging that indigenous Guatemalans have when compared to ladino citizens. “Indigenous people don’t feel Guatemalan” is an expression that is part of the discourse of many Guatemalans.

This argument is consistent with the alleged permanent political and cultural struggle between Indians and the State in Guatemala, which might also be the source of indigenous participation in the armed conflict (Adams 2001; Smith 1990b). Discrimination is a very pervasive feature of Guatemalan society. Indigenous people are discriminated at many levels by the ladino population; there are several accounts of ethnic discrimination and hatred (Hale 2005). Discrimination against indigenous people permeates as a practice even within state official activities (Casaús Arzú 1998), and for the state, oftentimes, the indigenous population is only a tourist attracting face of Guatemala (Hendrickson 2001). This is what has made Richard Adams name Guatemala a ‘ladinocratic’ state (Adams 2001). Along the lines of contemporary cultural studies theory, and to put it in Cojti’s words, the Guatemalan state is ‘prisoner of the homogenizing vision of a mono ethnic and mono cultural nation’ (Cojti 1998).
As the theoretical insight indicates, attachment to the nation is a condition for political participation (Linz, Stepan and Yadav 2007; Rustow 1970). Is it possible, then, that indigenous people participate less in Guatemalan politics, and thus are less successful in it, because they feel less attached to Guatemala as a nation? That is the logic behind hypothesis #4 presented as an alternate explanation in this chapter.

Protestantism

Guatemala has witnessed a growing importance of Protestantism during the last decades, with thousands of churches and high rates of conversion (Garrard Burnett 1989; Garrard Burnett 1998; Gill 1994; Stoll 1990). Many leaders and public personalities are converted Protestants, and the proportion of people who are members of some non-Catholic Christian group has been increasing steadily during the past four decades. Ríos Montt, the dictator who ruled the country between 1982 and 1983 and whose government was responsible for a large number of deaths and an increase in the violence against indigenous communities, was himself a born-again Christian.

In contrast, while it is true that the proportion of non-Catholic Christians has been growing in Bolivia during the last two decades, it has been doing so at a much lower rate. This is true for both people who identify as indigenous and for those who identify as mestizo and white. The Bolivian population remains still primarily Catholic, and the traditional forms of organization and participation prevail in many indigenous communities.
Table 7 below shows the proportion of people who are members of some non-Catholic Christian group in Bolivia and Guatemala, specifying indigenous vs. non-indigenous. Data come from the 2006 round of surveys conducted by LAPOP in the two countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>Non-indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-catholic Christian</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religion</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006

Considering the country as a whole, the proportion of people with a non-Catholic Christian faith is 75% greater in Guatemala than in Bolivia. When only individuals who identify as indigenous are considered, the difference is evident; almost 2 out of every 5 indigenous people in Guatemala are Protestant, while less than 1 in 5 are in Bolivia. If we add the fact that conversion into the Protestant faith might have a negative effect on the chances that a person identifies as indigenous in Guatemala, then the importance of non-Catholic Christians among indigenous people in Guatemala could be even greater.

Could it be, then, that the much lower profile of indigenous people in Guatemalan politics is a consequence of a larger number of indigenous people converted into Protestantism than in Bolivia? The empirical evidence regarding this alternative hypothesis is discussed in the results section.
Hypotheses Testing

Data and measurement

Data employed in this chapter come from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) database. The surveys conducted by LAPOP in Bolivia in 2006 and in Guatemala in 2004 and 2006 are employed here; these surveys were implemented on nationally representative samples following rigorous scientific standards. The total number of observations for Bolivia is 3,008; the Guatemalan sample has an N of 1,498 interviews.

Dependent variables

Three dependent variables are considered alternatively for the analyses; these variables refer to how actively a citizen exercises his or her citizenship rights. The variables are a) a measure of participation in municipal activities; b) a measure of whether the person talks about politics as part of his or her everyday life; and c), a dummy variable for having voted in the most recent presidential election (2005 in Bolivia and 2003 in Guatemala).

Having participated in a municipal meeting during the last year is measured with the item: During the last year, have you participated in an open municipal meeting? 11% of all respondents claimed to have participated in such meeting over the last year.

37 For more information on LAPOP and the surveys visit www.lapopsurveys.org; for more information on the Bolivian and Guatemalan studies see (Azpuru and Pira 2006; Azpuru, Pira and Lucas 2004; Seligson, et al. 2006).
Talking politics is measured with: ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? (How frequently do you talk about politics with other people?). The variable is measured using a 5 point 0 to 4 scale in which 0 means ‘never’, 1 ‘rarely’, 2 ‘a few times a month’, 3 ‘a few times per week’, and 4 ‘daily’. Mean value of the scale is 1.2, and standard deviation is 1.12.

Finally, a dichotomous variable, voted in national election, is coded with the value of 1 if the person voted in the most recent presidential election and 0 if he or she did not vote. 78% of all respondents voted in the respective election. I excluded as missing cases those respondents who were not yet old enough to vote in the previous election.

Independent variables

Participation in community activities is measured with a dichotomous variable resulting from this item in the LAPOP questionnaire: En el último año usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad? (During the last year have you contributed to the solution of a problem in your community?).

Indigenous: A dichotomous variable coded 1 if the person identifies as indigenous (or as indígena and originario in Bolivia\(^{38}\)).

A measure of violence experience, defined by whether the respondent lost a family member during the armed conflict (only asked in Guatemala).\(^{39}\)

\(^{38}\) *Indígena* is the word used in the eastern lowlands of the country for indigenous people; in the Andes, *originario* is more commonly used (Calla 2003); see chapter II of this dissertation.
Measures of fear of participating as candidate in an election and fear of voting in an election are also included (only asked in Guatemala).40

National pride, measured with the item: How proud do you feel of being Bolivian / Guatemalan? on a 10 point 0 to 9 scale.

Non-Catholic Christian, a dummy variable coded 1 if the person has a Protestant or other non-Catholic religious preference, and 0 otherwise.

Also included as socioeconomic controls are: gender; age (in years); wealth measured in household goods in the respondent’s home; level of education attained; estimated family income.

Results

Participation in local politics and communal activities

An implication of hypothesis 2 discussed is that the participation in national politics should be higher in countries in which citizens are active in local politics than in countries where citizens are more passive at the local level. As a consequence of being more involved in local politics, Bolivian citizens should participate more in local politics than an average Guatemalan citizen.

39 The question asked was ¿Ud. ha perdido algún miembro de su familia o pariente cercano, a consecuencia del conflicto armado que sufrió el país? (Have you lost any family member or close relative as a consequence of the armed conflict that the country suffered?). 2004 was the last year in which this question was employed in the LAPOP questionnaire, so data from that year are used.

40 The questions employed were ¿Con cuánto temor se postularía para un cargo de elección popular? (How much would you fear participating in the solution of problems in your community?) and ¿Con cuánto temor votaría en una elección nacional? (How much would you fear voting in a national election?); options are coded into a three point scale corresponding to without fear, with some fear, with a lot of fear.
Data from the 2006 AmericasBarometer by LAPOP show that this is in fact the case. The percentage of people who claim to have participated in some type of municipal meeting during the last year in Bolivia is 13%, while in Guatemala is only 7.5%. When people who identify as indigenous are compared in the two countries, 16% of Bolivian indigenous participate in municipal meetings, while only 9% of Guatemalan indigenous do. Both differences are statistically significant (p<.01) employing the appropriate standard errors for complex sample data analyses\(^4\).

Hypothesis 2 implies differences in participation in national politics; an average Bolivian should show higher levels of participation in politics at the national level than an average citizen from Guatemala, and the difference should be even higher among individuals who identify as indigenous. The analyzed data seem to support this argument: Bolivians seem to be more interested and more engaged in politics than Guatemalans. Official turnout data confirms that proportionally more Bolivians voted in the most recent national election (2005) (84.5%) than compared to Guatemalans (54.5%).

Among respondents to the LAPOP national surveys in each country, the proportion of citizens who voted in each case is not very different from the official figures (91% in Bolivia and 57% in Guatemala). An advantage of survey data is that it is possible to determine the characteristics of citizens who voted and of those who did not.

A serious obstacle for political participation in some Latin American countries is that many citizens simply do not have a valid identification, and thus are not registered to

\(^4\) Analyses of data from complex samples requires that larger than usual standard errors be computed due to clustering and stratification procedures (Kish and Frankel 1974; Knott 1991; Rust 1985; Skinner, et al. 1989).
vote. Ineffective registration systems have been shown to be a factor reducing electoral turnover (Perez-Liñan 2001). The proportion of people who are not registered to vote is greater in Guatemala than in Bolivia, and is also much larger among indigenous citizens. Table 8 below presents the percentage of people registered to vote in each of the two countries, comparing the indigenous and the non-indigenous respondents.

Table 8: Percentage of people registered to vote in Bolivia and Guatemala, by ethnic group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bolivia</th>
<th>Guatemala</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>Non-indigenous</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not registered</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Non-indigenous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registered to vote</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not registered</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006

The final model for political participation, Table 10, shows the effect on participation in national politics that participating in communal activities and in municipal politics has.

Violence and fear

Evidence from the 2004 survey conducted by LAPOP in Guatemala (these items were questioned in the Guatemala surveys only until 2004) confirms the assumption that the armed conflict had a larger toll among the indigenous population. When asked whether the respondent had lost any family member during the armed conflict, 11% of non-indigenous families had lost a member; while the percentage among indigenous families rises to 16% (difference between the proportions is statistically significant at the .01 level). While this sad figure is remarkably high for the whole country (in average,
13.5% of all respondents claim to have lost a family member during the conflict), violence seems to have affected indigenous families at a higher rate than non-indigenous families. This relationship is robust even after controlling for socioeconomic factors, including area of residence (armed conflict was more wide-spread in rural areas than in the cities); when a logistic regression is fit on the 2004 data, the probability that the respondent lost a family member during the armed conflict is 65% higher among individuals who identify as indigenous when compared to non-indigenous respondents⁴².

The effect that the direct experience with violence has on levels of local and national political participation is large and relevant, though contrary to what was expected. Table 9 below shows the results of logistic regressions fit on two dependent variables, one of them local: whether the respondent participated during the last year in a municipal meeting; and the other, a measure of participation in national politics: whether he or she voted in the last national election. Under the assumption that fear would also have a negative effect on political participation, the models include the fear measures discussed above. Age, gender, and education are also included as socioeconomic controls.

⁴² The percentage of increase in the probability that the outcome is positive is obtained from the odds ratios produced in the logistic regression model (Hoffmann 2004; Long 1997).
Table 9: Effect of experience of violence in local and national participation.
Guatemala 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voted in elections</th>
<th>Participates in municipio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Odds ratio</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence experienced</td>
<td>1.54*</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears voting</td>
<td>.75*</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears participating as candidate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.02*</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.71*</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.08*</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N / Nagelerke R Square</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p<.05


Surprisingly, having experienced violence has a large positive effect on political participation, both at the national and at the local level. The relationship is straightforward and clear: Individuals who experienced violence during the armed conflict are more engaged in both local and national politics than those who did not lose a family member during the armed conflict. The probability that a person who lost a family member during the internal war voted in the most recent election is 54% higher than the same probability for someone who did not experience violence directly. Likewise, the same experience of violence increases the probability that the person participated in a municipal activity by 129%.

Fear has the expected effect on political participation. Every additional step in the three point fear of voting scale reduces the probability that a person voted in an election by 25%. Consistently, fear of participating as a candidate reduces the probability that a person participates in municipal meetings by a similar proportion.
After socioeconomic factors are controlled for, indigenous and non-indigenous Guatemalans react in a similar way to the variables considered here. Having an indigenous identity does not seem to affect the level of political participation at the two levels. Women, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to participate than men both in national elections and at municipal meetings. Age and education increase the chances that a person voted, but have no effect on municipal participation.

Final models

Table 10 below shows the results for the final equations for the three dependent variables using the LAPOP 2006 data. *Municipal meeting* and *vote in election* show odds ratios from the exponentiation of the coefficients resulting from the logistic regressions fitted on the data. *Talking politics* presents the odds ratios from the ordered logistic regression ran on the 5 point ordinal scale of the dependent variable. T values are presented in parentheses. Results are presented with the appropriate standard errors that account for design effects of the sampling procedures.

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43 An LM test was ran and the data do not violate the proportionality of odds across response categories assumption required for this statistical model (Hoffmann 2004; Long 1997; Williams 2006).
Table 10. Results of the final models for the three dependent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Municipal meeting</th>
<th>Talking politics</th>
<th>Vote election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pooled dataset</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal meeting</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking politics</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears voting</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fears participating as candidate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community participation</td>
<td>3.96*</td>
<td>(11.90)</td>
<td>3.88*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National pride</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>1.42*</td>
<td>(2.66)</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Catholic Christian</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>(-1.34)</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.54*</td>
<td>(-5.28)</td>
<td>.51*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>.88*</td>
<td>(-2.86)</td>
<td>.83*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.25*</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
<td>1.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>.54*</td>
<td>(-4.06)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: p<.05
Odds ratios / (t value)
Source: LAPOP 2006. Standard errors adjusted for design effects.

The predictor that presents a very strong and robust effect on the three dependent variables across the board is participation in community activities. This variable increases the chances that a person participates in municipal meetings by almost 300% (the probability that a person who participates in community activities also participates in municipal meetings is almost four times that of someone who does not participate). The variable also significantly increases the odds that someone will talk about politics, and increases the probability of voting in a national election by 55% in Guatemala and 36% in Bolivia.
As it was noted before, the levels of participation are much lower in Guatemala than in Bolivia. After controlling for the effect of all other variables in the table, the probability that a respondent from Guatemala participates in a municipal meeting is only 54% of the same probability for a Bolivian respondent. A similar effect of the Guatemala dummy variable can be evidenced in the models for the other dependent variables.

In the additive logic of the statistical models discussed here, participating in a municipal meeting increases the likelihood that a person will engage in conversations about politics on a regular basis. In the same logic, both variables – participating in a municipal meeting and talking politics – have a positive effect on the probability that the citizen votes in a national election. The only exception is participating in a municipal meeting, which does not have any significant effect on voting in Guatemala.

Indigenous people are more likely to participate in municipal meetings than non-indigenous in Guatemala, but not in Bolivia. Conversely, Indians are more engaged in national politics than people who have other ethnic identities in Bolivia but not in Guatemala.

Being part of a non-Catholic Christian religious faith does not have any effect on any of the three dependent variables considered in the analyses. Employing the same statistical model discussed here, I tested this relationship for the subpopulation of those who identify as indigenous separately, and the relationship also misses any statistical significance. It seems safe to conclude that this alleged relationship is nonexistent.

Table 10 shows that attachment to the national political community has a relevant effect on how often people talk about politics, at least in Bolivia; national pride, as part of
the attachment to the national political community, is a relevant predictor for system support and, in general, a condition for the well-functioning of democracy\textsuperscript{44}. Could it be that indigenous people in Guatemala are less attached to the nation and that is why they are less active in politics? I have tested this relationship in different multiple regression models, and once socioeconomic factors are controlled for, there is no relationship between indigenous identity and any measure of attachment to the nation. This finding confirms what is presented in the multi-country analysis in chapter V of this dissertation.

Among the socioeconomic controls included in the models, gender has a robust effect across the table. Women are systematically less likely to participate in the political activities discussed here, and that is valid for both Guatemala and Bolivia. Education has a positive effect for all cases too; higher educated people are more likely to participate in politics. The only exception for both gender and education are municipal meetings in Guatemala, the dependent variable for which both predictors miss statistical significance.

The effect of every additional household good available at the respondents home is positive for talking politics and for voting in a national election, but is negative for participation in municipal meetings in Bolivia. This finding suggests that municipal spaces are used much more frequently by individuals of lower socioeconomic status than by wealthier people.

\textsuperscript{44} On this subject, see chapter V of this dissertation and (Moreno 2007a).
Discussion

Violence, fear, and political participation

Guatemala systematically shows much lower levels of participation in local and national politics than Bolivia; this difference is particularly noticeable when indigenous populations are considered. The sequels of fear and violence resulting from the armed conflict that Guatemala suffered seem to have some relationship with the differences in political participation in general, but also in the participation of indigenous people in particular.

The effect of fear on voting turnout and participation in local politics confirms the expectations I had about this variable, and gives empirical support to hypothesis 1: fear reduces political participation. The relationship presents itself with much more strength in the 2004 Guatemalan data (Table 9) than in those of 2006 (Table 10). This difference might be related to the fact that fear has been decreasing across time, as has been the memory of the armed conflict, particularly among the younger generations.

However, and contrarily to what I had expected, having had a family member killed during the armed conflict in Guatemala increases the chances that a person participates both at the local and at the national level. This type of experience with violence does not seem to deter political participation, but to encourage it. This surprising result could have two explanations. First, it is possible that families who are more politically active were the ones who experienced violence more directly than less active families; as a result, those who participate more now are members of the same families
who lost a member decades ago. Second, having experienced violence could be triggering a motivation for participation in politics as an altruistic desire for solving the problems that caused the loss of a family member before. These two hypotheses should receive further attention in specific research.

Participation in local politics

All variables related to participation in local and municipal activities show a very strong positive effect on participation in national politics. Consistently with Putnam’s social capital theory (Putnam 2002), participating in communal activities drastically increases the chances that the person will be engaged actively in political activities both at the municipal and at the national level. The more active a person is in trying to solve the problems in his or her community, the more likely that she will also practice her political rights as a citizen; in the results discussed here, it is the indigenous people as the group of citizens who precisely practice the least of these political rights.

The frequency in which people talk about politics is also another relevant predictor of participating in a national election. If we consider that talking politics usually takes place among neighbors, family members, or members of the local community, then this is another variable that refers to civic engagement in the local space. Participating in politics locally, including engaging in conversations about political issues increases the chances that the citizen will be active at the national level.

Participating in municipal meetings increases the probability that the person also participates in national politics; that happens clearly in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala.
The fact that, in Guatemala, participation in municipal meetings does not have a significant effect on the probability that citizens vote in a national election is also meaningful. The lack of a positive effect can be interpreted as another sign of the weakness of the municipal decentralization process in Guatemala, which does not seem to make individuals more interested in political activities. Despite the finding that indigenous people tend to have a better relationship with the municiptios than ladinos\textsuperscript{45}, participating in Guatemalan municipal spaces does not increase the chances that a person also participates in national politics. This result (the lack of a relationship), is another ‘smoking gun’ signaling the different role of municipal spaces in the formation of a participatory culture among citizens.

**Discussing the alternative hypotheses**

Since the ground-breaking study of Protestantism by Max Weber in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Weber 1946 (1905)), we know about the effect of religious visions on personal ethics and behavior. It seems at least plausible that a change from more community-based Catholicism to a preeminently individually-based Protestantism would also bring along consequences to the way people interact, organize themselves, and participate in community activities, including politics. This religious change would be particularly felt on the prevalence of local indigenous traditions, including organizational ones (Cleary and Steigenga 2004; Eber 2000); this idea was also mentioned often during the interviews I conducted in Guatemala.

\textsuperscript{45} This relationship has been noted previously in LAPOP studies (Azpuru and Pira 2006).
However, this relationship, implied in hypothesis 3 does not seem to exist in the
data from the two countries. Individuals who converted to Protestantism are no different
at all in their political participation than citizens who are Catholics or members of other
religious group. This is the case for the two countries and for the subpopulation of those
who identify as indigenous. These results suggest that the alleged negative effect of
Protestant conversion on indigenous people’s political capacities should be, at the very
least, revised.

Hypothesis 4, the second alternative hypothesis presented here, also fails in
finding support in the data. Confirming what is discussed at a more general level in
chapter V, there is no empirical evidence supporting the claim that indigenous people feel
less attached to the national political community in Guatemala. Attachment to the nation
in both countries has been shown in previous studies to be affected more by
socioeconomic status than by ethnic identity (Moreno 2008); it is not that indigenous
people feel less attached to the nation, but that occupying a disadvantaged socioeconomic
position significantly reduces the strength of the bond between citizens and the State,
independent of their ethnic identity.

Indigenous communities in Guatemala do not include autonomy and self-
determination as part of their usual demands46; on the contrary, they demand from the
Guatemalan State and society more inclusion and policies aimed at equalizing society in
the larger framework of multicultural recognition (Bastos 2006; Bastos and Camus
2003b; Cojti, Son Chonay and Rodriguez Guajan 2007). The fact that indigenous

46 On the implications of inclusion versus self-determination demands and policies see, among others,
(Barry 2001; Kymlicka 2001; Taylor and Gutmann 1994).
communities demand inclusion in the Guatemalan society instead of self-determination seems to reinforce, from a different point of view, the finding that the indigenous in Guatemala do not feel less attached to the nation than do other Guatemalans.
CHAPTER V

NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY IDENTITIES IN THE AMERICAS

This chapter focuses on the connection citizens have to their national political community. In particular, it explores the relationship between ethnic identity and the sense of national belonging, testing different hypotheses and integrating levels of analysis in the search for a comprehensive explanation of the relationship in the Americas.

The relationship between ethnic identities and the nation has become more relevant in the last two decades, during which ethnic identities have become more important as part of a trend that could very well be called global (Brysk 2000; Connor 1994; Kymlicka 1995). In the 1990s, the breakdown of Yugoslavia and the civil war in Rwanda were the most visible signs, albeit not the only ones, of the potentially negative consequences of the exacerbation of identity on political stability in those countries.

In this chapter responses are sought for the following questions: Following a world-wide trend of politicization of ethnic identities, do ethnic minorities feel less attached to the nation than majority groups? What variables might explain the relative strength of the link between the citizen and the national political community? In order to perform this analysis, data from LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer for the year 2006-07, comprising 22 countries in the Americas, are used.

47 An earlier version of this chapter was published in a comparative volume prepared by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) (Moreno 2007a).
48 The extent by which the emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America is a product of the globalization process has been recently questioned by some authors (Yashar 2007).
The National Political Community and the Citizens

The sense of national belonging is one of the most important conditions for democracy. In order to feel motivated to participate in democracy as well as to abide by the law, citizens need to recognize the State they live in as legitimate (Linz and Stepan 1996; Linz, et al. 2007). From this insight, and following the line drawn by Mill (1993), Rustow suggests that the strength of the bond between citizen and State is an indispensable condition for democracy (Rustow 1970).

Being part of a nation in some way implies that one’s own destiny is joined to that of the rest of that nation’s citizens. It also implies that all citizens accept and recognize the legitimate power of the State. The national political community, the nation of citizens, can therefore be understood as an imaginary community, as it has been defined in Anderson’s (1991) seminal work; that is, as a community of persons who, without knowing each other, imagine they share the same bond of fraternity and equality.

In spite of the importance of this area of study, comparative politics has paid very little attention to this matter, and empirical studies based on quantitative information have been scarce or nonexistent (Juviler and Stroschein 1999). Notable exceptions are the Smith and Jarkko study (2001), and the recent Elkins and Sides paper (2006) (See also (Dowley and Silver 2000)).

Most studies that deal with national identity do so only tangentially, often stemming from the greater concept of system support, as part of what has been called “diffuse support” (Dalton 1999; Dalton 2004; Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Muller, Jukam and Seligson 1982; Norris 1999). In this chapter, an explicit distinction is made between
the concepts of support for the system and that of belonging to a national political community. Although it seems clear that feeling oneself part of a political nation is a necessary condition for showing support for the political and institutional system, it should not be considered part of the same theoretical construct.

**Measuring attachment to the national political community**

This chapter empirically analyzes two variables that refer to the strength of the bonds that link citizens to the national political community. The first stems from the following question used in the LAPOP surveys: *How proud are you of being (Mexican, Guatemalan, etc.)*? The second variable comes from the question that reads *In spite of our differences, as (Mexicans, Guatemalans, etc.) we have values that unite us as a country. To what extent do you agree with this statement?* Both questions were initially measured on a 1 to 7 scale, in which 1 means “Not at all” and 7 “Very much”; values were recoded into a zero to 100 scale to present the results more easily. These questions are normally used in studies regarding this topic, and are supported in the literature (Norris 1999; Sinnott 2005).\(^{49}\)

The two variables measure two different dimensions of the bond between individuals and the national political community (a multidimensional concept (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989)). The first one directly addresses the level of pride that a person feels for his or her nationality and is based on the idea that the feeling of belonging to a national community is reflected in the pride of being a part of it; this

\(^{49}\) On the discussion about different dimensions in attachment to the nation see (de Figuereido and Elkins 2003).
variable is thus called *National Pride* throughout this chapter. The second focuses on the idea that the nation exists beyond the territory of the State, in the values shared by its citizens (or at least in the belief that these values exist); I refer to this variable as *Common Values* in this paper. These two variables have a correlation of .247 (p<0.001), which means that they are related but not very highly, which suggests that the variables do indeed measure different dimensions of the concept.

Figure 7 below illustrates the average values for both variables in each of the countries in the dataset.
It can be seen that national pride averages are relatively high in all countries in the study, while the variation is much higher for the item that measures the level of agreement with the idea of common values. The United States is the country with the highest national average for this variable, and seems to stand out among the rest. Following the U.S. is the group including the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Canada, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Mexico. Next is the group made up of Colombia, Guyana, Honduras, Ecuador, Chile, El Salvador, Paraguay, Brazil and Guatemala. Much lower values belong to Bolivia and Nicaragua, whereas Panama has an even lower average which sets it apart from any other country in the series.

**Ethnic Minority Status and Attachment to the National Political Community**

One of the central defining characteristics of individuals, which in theory, at least, can become a focus point for strengthening the bond between the citizen and the state or nation, is ethnic identity. There are authors for whom ethnic diversity represents an obstacle to liberal democracy (Chua 2003; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Snyder 2000); the main argument for this point of view is that ethnic identities, understood as the “primordial” identity (Geertz 1963; Stack 1986; Van Evera 2001), create stronger alliances among members than those bonds created by national states that are made up of different ethnic groups. Tragic examples such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s are commonly used as evidence for this supposed contradiction between democracy and strengthened ethnic identity.

However, this position has been increasingly debated, primarily using a less “essentialist” conception of ethnic identity, in which identities are understood as
complex, fluid, and malleable social constructs. This means that for some authors, ethnic diversity is not necessarily a problem for the democratic stability of a country (Abizadeh 2002; Chandra 2006; Gutmann 2003; Kymlicka 2001) and that ethnic differences are relevant only when they go hand in hand with social and economic differences that systematically transform ethnic patterns into mechanisms for social stratification.

One implication of the “primordialist” position in this debate is that ethnic identities would tend to be stronger than national identity (Davis and Brown 2002; Dowley and Silver 2000; Sidanius, et al. 1997). This means that ethnic minorities in the countries studied should exhibit a weaker feeling of belonging to the national community than individuals who belong to the majority ethnic group. In order to test this theory, a dichotomous variable, ethnic minority, was created assigning a value of 1 to individuals who identify themselves as part of a minority group in the country and 0 to those who identify as part of the majority ethnic group.

**Measuring ethnic minority status**

The ethnic minority variable was generated from the question: *How do you describe yourself?* This question was included as an item in the LAPOP questionnaire with slight variations in question wording and adjustments to the possible categories listed for each country. In most Latin American countries the majority was considered to be a group constituted by a combination of respondents who identified themselves as “white” and “mestizo” (mixed Native American and European), whereas “indigenous”
(Native American) and “afro descendants” are coded as part of the minority category; in the United States those who identify themselves as “white” were classified as the majority, whereas in Canada the individuals classified as part of the majority did not identify themselves with any other category except Canadian (principally French-Canadian). In Brazil, individuals who identified as ‘branco’ and ‘pardo’ where coded as non-minorities. In Haiti, those identified as “white” were classified as the minority. Three of the twenty-two countries surveyed by LAPOP in 2006 were not included in the analysis: Paraguay, where there were no questions regarding ethnic identification on the questionnaire, as well as Jamaica and Guyana, where classifying individuals according to the options on the questionnaire is particularly complicated.51

Table 11 below presents the proportion of respondents coded as ‘minorities’ in each of the countries included in the study.

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50 Although it is true that in the particular cases of Guatemala and Bolivia the majority population is “indigenous” (Gurr 1993; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005), the national governments that have historically been in power have been comprised of citizens who can be classified as “mestizos” or “white” Of course, the recent election of Evo Morales in Bolivia represents a substantial change in these power relations, and this has had important effects on citizen opinions and attitudes vis-à-vis the State, as confirmed by LAPOP studies (Seligson, et al. 2006).

51 Details of those questionnaires applied in the surveys for each of the countries are available on the LAPOP internet web page (www.lapopsurveys.org). For a more extensive discussion of ethnic identity measurement see chapter II of this dissertation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>22106</td>
<td>3911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LAPOP 2006
Is there any relationship between ethnic minority status and the strength of the attachment to the national political community? There are relevant differences in the strength of attachment to the nation when ethnic majorities and minorities are considered in several of the countries for which data are available. Figure 8 below gives an account of this.

![Figure 8: Differences in National Pride and Common Values by Country](image)

In a bivariate relationship, minorities tend to feel, in general, a weaker attachment to the national political community than ethnic majority groups. In the pooled dataset with 19 countries, minority status has a significant negative effect both on the measure of national pride and on the agreement with the idea of common values. In the individual countries included in the dataset, the statistically significant relationship holds
consistently in Canada, Peru, and Honduras, and is partially evident in Guatemala and Panama where national pride is lower among minorities. Only in the case of Costa Rica a positive, though very small in substantial terms, significant relationship can be observed (minorities appear to have stronger national pride).

The key question that arises from these observations is: What factors cause ethnic identity to have a significant effect on the sense of belonging to the national political community in some countries and not in others? Why are ethnic differences relevant in these survey results in Peru but not in Ecuador, relevant in Honduras but not in Nicaragua? In other words, what do Canada, Honduras and Peru have in common that differentiates them from the rest of the countries in the sample?

**Seeking answers at the national level**

In order to answer the questions above, and following the available literature, four different hypotheses are tested focusing on the mean differences for the two variables at the national level: The level of development hypothesis, the ethnic fractionalization hypothesis, the institutional design hypothesis, and the discrimination hypothesis.

1. The ethnic fractionalization hypothesis

The ethnic fractionalization hypothesis points to the level of ethnic and cultural fractionalization in each country as the source of differences. Different authors have argued that ethnic and cultural fractionalization are factors that cause disunity in a national society; a larger number of ethnic and cultural groups implies less cooperation
between members of society, and has been pointed out as an obstacle for development and the provision of public goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1997; Easterly and Levine 1997)\textsuperscript{52}. Contradicting evidence has also been found (Arcand, Guillaumont and Jeanneney 2000; Collier 2001), and this topic remains hotly debated in the discipline (Cederman and Girardin 2007; Fearon 2003).

There are two clear logical implications of this theory for the strength of the national political community that are considered in this chapter. First, countries with higher levels of ethnic and cultural and ethnic fractionalization should show lower averages in citizens’ strength to the national political community. Second, the relative size of the minority population should be negatively related to the strength of the attachment that minorities have to the nation.

2. The institutional design hypothesis

The institutional design hypothesis follows the theory of consociationalism within the comparative institutionalism line of research developed among others by Lijphart (1999) and tested extensively in the literature (Lijphart and Waisman 1996; Lustick, et al. 2004; Norris 2004; Saideman, et al. 2002; Sartori 1994). The argument behind this theory asserts that the electoral rules, particularly the type of electoral system, have a direct effect on the legitimacy of the State and the stability of the political system. Proportional representation, and the sharing of power derived from it, is signalled as a source of legitimacy for the political system in plural societies.

\textsuperscript{52} For an ample discussion on this see (Fearon 2003) and (Cederman and Girardin 2007).
The central implication of the theory being tested here is whether higher proportionality decreases the differences between majority and minority groups. The basic hypothesis derived is that more proportional electoral systems should produce smaller differences in the strength of the attachment to the nation between majority and minority groups; in other words, the relative gap in attachment to the national political community between majorities and minorities should be smaller in countries with high proportionality in the electoral system.

3. Discrimination hypothesis

The discrimination hypothesis argues that political and economic discrimination is the cause of ethnic conflict (Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985). This line of research is related to Social Identity Theory, and is based on the idea of stable patterns of dominance established along ethnic and racial lines (Sidanius, et al. 1997; Sidanius, et al. 1999; Tajfel 1978). Put simply, this theory suggests that people who feel discriminated against will have lower levels of system support than other individuals; also, ethnic cleavages in a hierarchical society can be associated with consistent discrimination patterns, resulting in that ethnic minority groups will be more discriminated against than non-minority groups.

For the case of the attachment to the national political community, one clear implication of this theory can be formulated as a hypothesis to be tested: In countries where discrimination is more common, the relative difference between majorities and minorities in the attachment to the national political community will tend to be larger.
4. Level of development hypothesis

Since Almond and Verba’s classic work (Almond and Verba 1963), different accounts of the positive relationship between the level of socioeconomic development and the legitimacy of the political system have been offered through time (Hagopian 2000; Inglehart 1997; Jackman 1973; Norris 2004; Przeworski, et al. 2000).

The level of development hypothesis claims that more developed countries will have stronger national political communities because the state has been able to provide enough benefits for society in general and that has a positive effect on its legitimacy. Legitimacy of the State is linked to its perceived neutrality and its capacity for providing development to all groups (Brown 1998). Evidence supporting this claim has been presented previously (Smith and Jarkko 2001). Two implications of this theory can be formulated as empirically testable hypotheses for this research: First, countries with higher levels of socioeconomic development should show higher averages for the Common Values and the National Pride variables. Second, differences between majorities and minorities in the strength of the attachment to the nation should be smaller in more developed countries.

Data and Analysis

1. Ethnic fractionalization hypothesis

The two central dependent variables considered here are the national averages of National Pride and the agreement with the idea of Common Values. As the measure of ethnic and cultural fractionalization, I use the ethnic and cultural fractionalization indices
developed by Fearon (2003)\(^{53}\). These indices have a relatively high correlation with other measures of ethnic fractionalization, and are reliable estimates of the amount of diversity in each country. While the ethnic fractionalization index focuses on the country’s relative share of the population by minority ethnic ‘groups’\(^{54}\), the cultural fractionalization index focuses on the linguistic ‘distance’ between groups. As the measure of the relative size of the minority population in each country I use the proportion of people coded in each country as minority in the LAPOP database as described above.

Is ethnic and cultural fractionalization related to the mean attachment to the national political community? A series of bivariate linear regression models were fitted on the database consisting of 19 observations, and no evidence of any relationship between the national averages and the two measures of fractionalization is evident. Consistently, and contradicting previous findings (Elkins and Sides 2006), the size of the minority population resulting from the survey data coding does not show any relationship with the national averages of National Pride and Common Values. In other words, more diverse countries do not necessarily have weaker average attachments of their citizens to the national political community.

The level of fractionalization has, however, a clear effect on the difference between ethnic majority and minority groups. In the 19 countries database, the more diverse a country is, the larger the differences between the ethnic majority and minorities in the attachment to the nation. The effect of the cultural fractionalization index on

\(^{53}\) Fearon recognizes that it cannot be assumed that the existence and size of relevant ethnic “groups” is exogenous from political and economic processes. This issue is treated at length in chapter III of this dissertation; the use of the fractionalization measures in this chapter does not imply assuming such independence either.

\(^{54}\) For a discussion on the ‘groupness’ of ethnic categories see (Brady and Kaplan 2000; Brubaker 2004; Chandra 2006).
differences in the Common Values measure related to ethnic minority status is large and statistically significant (R square=.22, sig. p<.05); when differences in National Pride are considered, the effect is also relevant (R square=.23, sig. p<.05). Both relationships hold significant even when the level of development of each country is controlled for. Figure 9 below shows the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the differences between minorities and majorities in the Common Values dependent variable.

![Figure 9: Effect of cultural fractionalization on differences between ethnic majorities and minorities](image)

The size of the minority population also seems to have some effect on the differences in National Pride; the larger the size of the minority population, the larger the difference in National Pride between non-minority and minority groups. In the 19
observation dataset, a bivariate regression of differences in National Pride on relative size of the minority population produces marginally significant results (R square=.17; sig. p<.1).

2. Institutional design hypothesis

The dependent variables considered here, are, once again, the relative difference in Common Values and National Pride between ethnic majorities and minorities in each country. Data come from the aggregated AmericasBarometer 2006 dataset, by LAPOP. The independent variable is a measure of Mean District Magnitude (MDM) as a proxy for proportionality of the electoral system.\(^5\) Data for this variable were obtained from different sources, considering the most recent for each country.\(^6\)

Is there any relationship between MDM and the relative gap in the attachment to the national political community of majorities and minorities? The evidence appears to be inconclusive. After the deletion of Peru from the database (Peru has a MDM of 120, much higher than any other country in the database; its deletion was necessary in order to avoid the high leverage that the country exerted over the analysis), and with only 17 observations, proportionality has a marginally significant negative effect on differences in the Common Values dependent variable (R square=.17; sig. p<.1), but no effect whatsoever on the National Pride one.

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\(^5\) This strategy has been used repeatedly in the literature (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Elkins and Sides 2006).

\(^6\) Sources considered are: Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador (Morgenstern and Vásquez-D'elia 2007); Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Venezuela (Golder 2005); Bolivia, Nicaragua (Jones 1997); Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guyana (Jones 1995). No reliable information was found for Haiti.
Figure 10 below illustrates the effect of MDM on the differences in Common Values.

![District Magnitude and Differences between Majorities and Minorities](image)

Source: Different sources and AmericasBarometer 2006, by LAPOP

**Figure 10: Effect of District Magnitude on differences between ethnic majority and minorities**

Whether proportionality in electoral systems by itself improves representation of different minorities or not is something very much debated in contemporary political science, and the evidence is not yet conclusive (Lustick, et al. 2004; Norris 2004). For example, it has also been shown that, under conditions of geographical concentration of ethnic minorities, Single Member District (SMD) systems can improve representation of minorities (Van Cott 2005).
3. Discrimination Hypothesis

Data for levels of political discrimination were obtained from the Minorities At Risk project database updated until 2003 (MAR 2007). The political discrimination variable has a 0 to 4 ordinal scale in which 0 means no discrimination; 1 implies the existence of explicit neglect remedial policies; 2 means that no policies have been implemented to solve a historical condition of neglect of some minority group, but no deliberate exclusion is present; 3 implies substantial underrepresentation of minority groups; and 4 signifies that public policies explicitly restrict some of the groups’ political participation (MAR 2007).

A second measure of discrimination used here is the difference between the perception of discrimination by ethnic majorities and minorities. This variable is produced by subtracting the average level of discrimination felt by minority groups from the average level of discrimination reported by members of the ethnic majority in the LAPOP surveys in each country. The measure of discrimination is the discrimination index described in the individual level of analysis section of this chapter. In other words, this is a measure of the distance in perceptions of discrimination felt by ethnic minorities and majorities.

Is there a relationship between the national level of discrimination as measured by the MAR project and the differences between majorities and minorities? The bivariate lineal regression models fitted with the data show no evidence of any relationship between differences in attachment to the nation and the national values for political discrimination. Differences in the attachment to the nation of minorities and majorities
cannot be explained by the societal amount of discrimination, at least as measured by the MAR political discrimination index. Consistently, the difference in the perception of discrimination does not explain differences in attachment to the nation.

4. Level of development hypothesis

The measure of socioeconomic development I used in this chapter is the Human Development Index as measured by the UNDP for the year 2006 (UNDP 2006). This measure combines indicators of income per capita, life expectancy, and average levels of education for each country. It has a maximum value of 1. Alternatively, I use the gross domestic product measurement also calculated by the UNDP for the same year. While the HDI is a more comprehensive measure of socioeconomic development, GDP focuses only on the economic side of it.

The first testable implication proposed for the analysis is whether people who live in more developed countries tend to feel a stronger attachment to the nation than people living in less developed countries. The evidence supports this relationship at least for the National Pride variable employed here. The level of development significantly increases the average pride in nationality that people have (R square=.21; sig. p<.05; N=22). This effect is robust even when the level of democracy is controlled for. Figure 11 below shows this relationship.
Figure 11: Effect of HDI on Average National Pride

The Common Values dependent variable does not seem to be influenced by the Human Development Index, but shows some relationship with the purely economic GDP measure. GDP increases the national average for Common Values, and this relationship is statistically significant (p<.05).

The second testable hypothesis of this theory suggests that the difference between minorities and majorities in attachment to the nation should be smaller in more developed countries. While the Common Values measure shows no relationship at all, differences in National Pride seem to be related with the level of development but in the opposite way it was expected: in the 19 case database, more developed countries tend to have larger differences than less developed countries (R square=.19; sig. p<.1; N=19).
Is this difference really due to the level of socioeconomic development or is there some other possible explanation? Unfortunately, with only 19 observations in the dataset, the inclusion of additional covariates at the right side of the equation is problematic.

It can be argued, however, that what increases the differences is not socioeconomic development itself, but the amount of democracy available in each country. Democracy, with the liberties it gives, can result in an exacerbation of ethnic identities as opposed to the identity of the national political community (Chua 2003; Snyder 2000). The data discussed here seem to suggest that this explanation is plausible. Figure 12 below illustrates the empirical relationship between the Freedom House scores and the differences in the national pride dependent variable between ethnic minorities and majorities.
While the lineal relationship fails to be statistically significant, the pattern shown in the graph suggests that the likelihood of having differences in National Pride increases with the level of democracy. In other words, more democratic countries seem to give their citizens the opportunity to be critical of the state, and that does not seem to happen in more authoritarian countries.

Considering national averages at the country level, the different independent variables employed weigh heavily when predicting both the country averages for National Pride and Common Values, as well as the differences between ethnic majorities and minorities. Using national averages in this type of analysis is helpful when
comparing countries or registering the effects of contextual variables on matters germane to this study. However, national averages do not tell the whole story; the great differences among citizens within each country are best explained by individual characteristics, and not those of the country. This problem in the analysis is known as the “ecological fallacy” and is a common failing in the analysis of cross-national survey data (King 1997; Seligson 2002).

**An Individual Level Analysis of Attachment to the National Political Community**

What characteristics of the individuals can predict the level of attachment to the national political community? This chapter focuses on the potential differences caused by ethnic minority status, and one of the central hypotheses discussed here is that minorities will, in general show weaker attachment to the nation than national ethnic majorities. Does this have empirical support? This section presents the results of a series of multivariate models fitted on the LAPOP database consisting of 26,017 observations in 19 countries for which the minority status information was available.

A list of statistical controls was included in the analyses: a discrimination index, age, gender, level of education, and level of interpersonal trust. The discrimination index counts the number of scenarios in which a person claims to have felt discriminated against, and ranges from 0 to 3; the logic behind the inclusion of this item is that people who feel discriminated against will feel a weaker attachment to the nation. Following the
logic discussed in the national level of analysis section, an interaction term of minority status and the discrimination scale was included in the equations as well.

Age, gender, and the level of education that the person has were also included as statistical controls. Additionally, a measure of interpersonal trust was included in the models testing the assumption implied in the social capital theory (Putnam 2002), that higher interpersonal trust is likely to produce a stronger link with the national political community.

Table 12 below presents the results of the linear regression models for the two dependent variables of attention for this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Var.</th>
<th>National Pride</th>
<th>Common Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff.</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority status</td>
<td>-.96*</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination Scale</td>
<td>-1.65*</td>
<td>-.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority X Discrimination</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Women)</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>.05*</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td>-2.38*</td>
<td>-.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>93.67*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
<td>.0163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>23,142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sig. p<.05

When the pooled 19 country LAPOP database is employed, both the ethnic minority status and the discrimination scale variables seem to have the expected effect on the two dependent variables, i.e., they decrease the strength of the attachment that citizens have to the national political community. However, the effect is only statistically
significant for the measure of national pride (though the T value for the discrimination scale index approaches statistical significance for the common values measure).

The interaction term between minority status and the discrimination scale also finds statistical significance, but only for the national pride variable. This means that the effect of perceived discrimination on the attachment to the national political community is conditional of ethnic minority status; in other words, when compared with citizens of the ethnic majority group, the link that binds ethnic minority citizens to the nation seems to suffer more with perception of discrimination. This is a relevant finding for the purposes of this chapter, and it is consistent with the argumentative line suggested in the hypotheses discussed early.

Of the statistical controls included in the models, age and interpersonal trust appear to be robust predictors of the attachment to the nation. The older the person is, the stronger her link to the nation will be, and this claim is valid for both the national pride and the common values measure of attachment to the national political community.

Another variable which seems to exert a strong effect on the attachment to the nation is the measure of interpersonal trust included in the LAPOP dataset\textsuperscript{57}. In the statistical models discussed here, this variable is, in fact, the strongest predictor of attachment to the national political community, as the beta coefficient shows in both models. In other words, the level of trust among citizens is a very relevant explanation of a strong attachment to the national political community.

\textsuperscript{57} This variable was originally measured in an inverted four point scale in which 1 means that the respondent finds other people in his or her community very trustworthy, while 4 means that she finds members of her community to be very untrustworthy.
Two other control variables have some effect only on one of the two dependent variables, the measure of agreement with the idea that there are common values that unite citizens of each country; these variables are gender and the level of education. Women seem more convinced of the existence of common values for national societies than men, as do more educated people. The level of education, then, is the second variable that increases the average agreement with the idea of the existence of common values in the nation.

It is also worth noting that the alpha coefficients (or constants) are relatively high for the two equations, particularly for the one with national pride as the dependent variable. As shown in Figure 7, the average level of national pride is high for most countries, and the variables discussed here tend to have a negative effect on attachment to the nation. In numerical terms, once the factors presented in this section are controlled for, the average respondent in the dataset has a score of almost 94 out of 100 for the recoded national pride scale.

**Building a Multi-Level Explanation: Integrating Individual and Country Level Variables**

Until now, I have analyzed different hypotheses at the national level, finding support for the ethnic fractionalization hypothesis and the level of development hypothesis. I have also presented an individual level analysis of the causes of strength in the attachment to the national political community, pointing out that minority status, perception of discrimination, and interpersonal trust are the most important predictors of National Pride and Common Values. But, is there a way of integrating these two
approaches and building an empirical account of the factors that explain attachment to the nation that considers both individual level characteristics and nation level features?

There are statistical tools available to researchers that allow us to do exactly that; it is possible to determine the influence that national factors, such as the Human Development Index or the gross national product, exert simultaneously with the effect that individual factors have, such as the person’s gender and age, or personal status as a member of an ethnic majority or minority. Multi-Level statistical analysis, also called Hierarchical Linear Modelling, allows for the combining of information regarding national and individual factors (Gelman and Hill 2006; Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Singer and Willett 2003). A multi-level analysis model is basically a generalized linear regression model (GLM) in which the independent variable effects are allowed to vary randomly, that is to say, that they are not constant.58

According to the previous results in the individual level and the national level analyses, I expect to find significant interaction effects in the multi-level combinations of ethnic fractionalization and minority status (the cultural fractionalization variable is the only one that proved to have a statistically significant relationship with the differences between ethnic majorities and minorities in the national level analyses of this chapter). To test for this effect I followed a series of steps for multi-level modelling59, concluding with the fitting of a series of random-intercept random-coefficient models on the data using

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58 The model used is known as Random Effects Maximum Likelihood (REML).
59 The basic steps to be followed for hierarchical lineal modeling are 1) understanding the multi-level nature of the data; 2) establishing whether enough variance of the dependent variable lies within countries; 3) fitting random intercept models in which the variables of interest show statistical significant effects on the dependent variable.
The results for the model applied to each of the two dependent variables are presented in Table 13 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Var.</th>
<th>Dependent Var.</th>
<th>National Pride Coefficient (z value)</th>
<th>Common Values Coefficient (z value)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority status</td>
<td>.629 (.62)</td>
<td>.178 (.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>.013 (.07)</td>
<td><strong>2.04 (10.08)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Years)</td>
<td><strong>.037 (4.36)</strong>*</td>
<td>.041 (4.13)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal trust</td>
<td><strong>-1.86 (13.67)</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>-2.37 (14.91)</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Fractionalization Index</td>
<td>-.699 (-.14)</td>
<td>-7.96 (-1.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Women)</td>
<td>-.06 (-.24)</td>
<td><strong>.781 (2.7)</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority X Cultural fractionalization</td>
<td><strong>-5.84 (-1.86)</strong>*</td>
<td><strong>-5.11 (-1.67)</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>93.5*</td>
<td>79.2*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD Minority/ Constant / Residual++</td>
<td>2.43 / 4.73 / 20.62</td>
<td>2.16 / 6.47 / 23.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N individuals / country</td>
<td><strong>28,276 / 19</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,696 / 19</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

++ Random Effects Parameters

\( \uparrow p<.1; * p<.05 \)

In the two-level model that interacts ethnic minority status and the cultural fractionalization index, both single-level independent variables (i.e.: ethnic minority status at the individual level and the cultural fractionalization index at the national level) show no significant effect on either dependent variable considered here; these two variables proved to have a significant effect on the attachment to the national political community in the single level analyses.

The variable that has a relevant effect on both dependent variables is the interaction term formed by the multiplication of minority status and the cultural fractionalization index\(^{60}\). In other words, the effect that being part of an ethnic minority has on the attachment to the national political community is conditional to the level of

\(^{60}\) As the number of observations for level 2 (or country level) is low in the statistical analysis (19), I have accepted the .1 threshold for statistical significance.
cultural fractionalization in each society. Members of an ethnic minority group tend to feel less attached to the nation in countries where cultural fractionalization is higher than in more homogeneous countries. This applies for both measures of attachment to the national political community considered.

This finding is novel for the literature, and its theoretical implications are relevant insofar as they signal the latent fragility of highly diverse multi-cultural societies. In more fractionalized societies, ethnic minorities tend to feel less attached to the nation, and this could potentially lead to the generations of tension between ethnic minorities and majorities, and to a crisis of legitimacy of the national State as perceived by the minorities.

Why are members of ethnic minority groups less attached to the nation in highly fractionalized societies than in more homogeneous countries? A possible answer for this dazzling question is that, being a larger proportion of the population than in other countries, ethnic minorities actually conceive the idea of having some form of government relatively autonomous from the dominant ethnic group. In these cases, the possibility of forming a particular political community, either within the State or as a separate one, could be deemed as real by members of minority groups. The political movements aimed at giving Quebec some autonomy from Canada or the Zapatista movement in Mexico seem to be empirical examples of this logic. However, a more thorough understanding of this relationship should be produced through further specific studies.
Other factors that prove to be relevant predictors of both measures of attachment to the nation in the multi-level model are the age of the respondent, and the measure for interpersonal trust. Older people tend to feel more proud of their nationality and more convinced of the idea of common values than younger individuals, and people who trust other citizens more are also more attached to the nation. Confirming what was discussed previously, agreement with the idea of Common Values uniting the country is also affected by the level of education (more educated people tend to agree more with this idea), and by gender (women seem more convinced of this proposition).
CONCLUSIONS

Using the Latin American cases of Bolivia and Guatemala, this dissertation has produced findings in four different areas of the relationship between ethnic identities and national politics. The learnings obtained from this research are useful for understanding the general relationship between indigenous people and the national states in the Americas, and might also give clues about the general relationship between ethnic minority identities and the national political sphere.

The first area in which conclusions can be drawn is the definition and measurement of ethnic identities. This area of knowledge has advanced with the finding of empirical evidence supporting a particular theoretical definition of ethnic identities (a constructivist definition), and with the comparison of different commonly used indicators of ethnic identity; this comparison has allowed me to point out the indicator that performs better. In a context in which only two opposed ethnic categories exist, as in Guatemala, different measures seem to produce relatively consistent results; under a context which allows for the mid-point mestizo option, as in Bolivia, results vary substantially from measure to measure. This area of the research has also produced a methodological tool which allows for the combination of qualitative information with the quantitative data obtained from survey research.

The second area of findings has been the relationship between ethnic identification and political processes. Individuals have a repertoire of ethnic identities available to them, which is defined by their possession of certain descent-based attributes
related to identity categories. People choose their ethnic identity from that repertoire, and this choice seems to be influenced by political factors. A highly politicized ethnic category can become appealing for individuals, who identify with it and gain psychic gains when a political movement based on the category becomes successful. This seems to be the case in Bolivia where identification as indigenous has been proportionally growing since the election of an indigenous leader as president for the first time. This is possibly due to the existence of the mid-point *mestizo* category, which, in essence means being both indigenous and white. This category is absent in Guatemala, where the ethnic identity alternatives are the bipolar *ladino* and indigenous, making identity change less likely and fluid.

The conditions in which a political movement based on a particular identity category can thrive is the third area in which this dissertation has produced relevant findings. Participation in local organizations and in community activities seems to be a very important predictor of political engagement at the national level. Guatemala’s armed conflict has had a large toll on the organization capacities of indigenous communities, and on citizens’ interest for participating in local and national level political processes. Bolivia’s decentralization process, on the other hand, has generated massive participation of indigenous grassroots organizations into local politics, and has generated the basis for the formation, consolidation, and electoral success of an indigenous party.

Finally, the relationship between ethnic minority status and attachment to the national political community is the fourth area in which this dissertation contributes to the understanding of the relationship between ethnic identities and national politics. People who identify as part of an ethnic minority group do not necessarily feel less
attached to the nation than members of ethnic majority groups, though these differences can sometimes be affected by the level of development, the institutional design, and the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the country.

On the Definition and Measurement of Ethnic Identities

Findings obtained in this research corroborate the constructivist definition of ethnic identity, i.e., a socially constructed identity category based on the idea of descent which is fluid and might change across time. The finding that all else being equal, people who identify as part of ethnic minority categories do not necessarily feel less attached to the nation than members of the majority groups can finally reject the primordial understanding of ethnic identities, whose direct implication would suggest the opposite. The finding that suggests that people do sometimes change their identity category choice as a result of the political context reinforces the idea of fluidity of identities.

Measuring identification with ethnic identity categories in survey studies is a tricky methodological task. This research has shown that no single indicator is able to validly and reliably measure the concept of ethnic identity; results obtained using different measures of ethnic identity vary substantially, particularly when no opposite bipolar identities exist. Results of official measures of identity, usually through national censuses, are employed in policy making and are also used as a political resource. That is why measures of ethnic identity are so hotly contested and debated by different political and social actors.
There are noticeable differences in the structure of ethnic categorization in the two countries. There are two relevant categories in Guatemala, indigenous and ladino (which basically means non-indigenous); in Bolivia, there are three categories: indigenous, white, and mestizo, which refers to a racial and cultural mixture of indigenous and white ancestors. Indigenous is the only relevant category shared by the two countries, despite the large linguistic and cultural differences between members of indigenous groups; this is a broad category enclosing different identities particular to ethno-linguistic groups assumed to be descendent of the inhabitants of the Americas before the Spanish conquest, and large proportions of the population identify with it.

Different measures of ethnic identity perform in a more consistent way in Guatemala than in Bolivia. The reason for this is the intermediate mestizo category, existent in the Andean nation but not in the Central American one. Ethnic identification has a bipolar structure in Guatemala, and individuals have their options restricted to identifying either as indigenous or as ladino. Additionally, there is a high correspondence between the use of an indigenous language and indigenous identification in Guatemala, where speaking a Mayan language is restricted almost exclusively to those who identify as indigenous. In Bolivia, on the other hand, the existence of the mestizo category – which is the category with which the majority of Bolivians identify – produces substantial differences among various indicators of ethnic identity that include or exclude this category.

Among different measures commonly used in surveys, the best option seems to be a simple categorical variable in which the respondent ‘chooses’ an identity category from a list of possible options; however, in order for this to be a valid measure of the concept
of ethnic identity, choosing multiple options should be available for the survey respondent.

The definition of the list of available categories seems to be crucially important for the quality of any categorical measure of ethnic identity. Evidence shows that the inclusion or exclusion of a single relevant category can produce variations of grand magnitude in the results. A profound knowledge of the relevant ethnic categories in a particular context, as well as their content, seems to be a requisite for the researcher designing questions aiming at measuring ethnic identity.

The best methodological strategy for understanding ethnic identities seems to be the combination of quantitative analyses of survey data with qualitative methods which allow for a more in-depth view of what identity categories mean for people. However, the literature offers few methods that actually combine qualitative and quantitative approaches in survey settings. Using focus groups techniques, I have developed a methodological strategy which produces qualitative information about how people understand identity categories, and why they choose the answers they give in a survey interview; this is done without compromising the power of generalizability derived from large N survey studies. This methodological strategy, Survey Responses Interpreted by Groups, has performed satisfactorily in fieldwork activities, and could be employed in other research areas and settings.
On the Relationship Between Ethnic Identification and Political Processes

Although the strength of the attachment of indigenous citizens to the nation is similar in Bolivia and in Guatemala, this research has found noticeable differences between the two cases in the way in which indigenous identities relate with the nation; these differences also extend to the role of indigenous identities in national politics. Evidence supports the hypothesis that the indigenous identity category was highly politicized in Bolivia 2006, but not in Guatemala during the same year nor in Bolivia in 1998. It has also been shown that there has been a positive quantitative change in Bolivia, but not in Guatemala, in the proportion of people who identify as part of the indigenous identity category.

If the proportion of people identifying as indigenous has been growing in Bolivia, it is because the indigenous movement has been politically successful in the country; in Guatemala, the poor electoral performance of the indigenous candidates seems to be related with the decline in the proportion of people identifying as indigenous (though this decline is less evident for the absence of the mestizo category).

While there are no evident material benefits of indigenous identification in Bolivia after the electoral triumph of Evo Morales (e.g., the Government does not have a redistributive policy based on ethnic identification which benefits indigenous people), qualitative information gathered during fieldwork suggests that people who identify as indigenous have ‘psychic gains’ related to the image of the President and the ethnic-based discourse of his Government. These psychic gains are particularly relevant if the election of Evo Morales is filtered through a discursive logic which emphasizes the
historical domination of indigenous people in the country. Along these lines, people ‘gain’ something out of sharing the identity of a president who is often seen – and who also often plays the role of – a leader of high symbolic transcendence in the emancipation of indigenous people.

Political factors can play a relevant role in the formation of ethnic identities; in the case of Bolivia, political success of the indigenous movement seems to increase the chances that a person identifies as indigenous, provided that the person possesses some of the attributes required for this identification. People can, thus, ‘choose’ their ethnic identity from among the repertoire of categories available to them. This does not mean that any person could potentially choose any identity category just because it is politically appealing; being in possession of the attributes defined as constitutive in the (permanently contested) content of the identity category is a requirement.

In Bolivia, the mestizo category implicitly involves descending from both the Native American peoples, and from the Spanish colonizers who ruled the territory of the country until 1825 (or from other European immigrants). Mestizo is a category that bridges indigenous and white; meaning being neither indigenous nor white, but also being potentially indigenous or white; in other words, many of the individuals who identify as mestizos could potentially identify as whites, while many others could identify as indigenous. And this is precisely what seems to be happening in Bolivia, with the proportion of ‘whites’ decreasing across time, while the proportion of indigenous increases and the proportion of mestizos remains stable.
The possibility of something similar happening in Guatemala appears to be limited by the inexistence of the *mestizo* category. The bipolar construction of ethnic identities in the Central American nation, with only indigenous and ladinos as the relevant identity categories, makes the possibility of identity change much more remote for Guatemalans. Additionally, the overlapping of ethnic identities with cultural attributes, such as use of an indigenous language, contributes to the relative lack of fluidity of ethnic identification in Guatemala.

**On the Success or Failure of Ethnic Politics**

This research finds evidence in public opinion data for an explanation of the differences in the success of indigenous politics in Bolivia and Guatemala based on two elements. The first one has to do with the internal war suffered by Guatemala, which I argue has decimated civil society, particularly indigenous organizations, leaving behind people disengaged from political activities. In fact, many Guatemalan citizens, particularly those who identify as indigenous, claim to be afraid of participating in politics, and refer to the violence, both past and present, as the explanation for this fear. The second factor refers to the profound process of municipal decentralization experienced by Bolivia, which generated the opportunity for indigenous citizens to organize, participate locally, and network into larger organizations which later defined the success of indigenous politics in the country.

Searching for evidence for this explanation, two hypotheses are operationalized and tested: First, that fear and violence reduce political participation. Second, that participation in local politics makes people more prone to participating in national
politics. The statistical analyses discussed here have found mixed evidence for the fear and violence hypothesis, suggesting that fear reduces participation, but experience of violence seems to increase it in the Guatemalan case. This finding should receive more attention in the future, clearly establishing the causal mechanism linking experience of violence and higher political participation.

The hypothesis about local and national political participation has found plenty of empirical support; the more active a person is at the local level, the more likely that person will also be active in national politics. The alternative hypotheses, an increase in Protestantism and weaker attachment to the nation in Guatemala, found no empirical support whatsoever in the data.

These findings suggest that the explanation given here for the differences in the success of indigenous politics in Bolivia and Guatemala is at least plausible. The legacy of civil war and violence in Guatemala seems to play a relevant role in the weakness of civil society, particularly among indigenous people, in the Central American nation. The lack of a similarly violent event in Bolivia, plus a deep process of municipal decentralization, seems to explain the conditions in which indigenous politics were allowed to thrive in Bolivia.

It is also possible that the existence of the mestizo category in Bolivia is also involved in the electoral success of Evo Morales. The logic behind this is that people who identify as mestizo would find it easier to vote for an indigenous (or a white) candidate than in the Guatemalan case, where the two categories have a larger distance between each other; however, the fact that Guatemalan indigenous vote for ladino candidates
suggests that the explanation might have more to do with the politicization of particular identities than with the existence of intermediate categories.

One of the most important learnings that can be obtained from this research is the relevance that local spaces have for increasing the levels of participation of traditionally disadvantaged social groups. Participation in local community activities and in local level politics greatly increases the chances that the person will also participate in national politics. A theoretical model of political engagement, then, should look at the local space as a one of its more relevant predictors. Making use of local social capital can create a dynamic of political participation that can exceed the limits of local spaces and become a national phenomenon.

On the Relationship Between Ethnic Minority Status and the National Political Community

Among the similarities shared by Bolivia and Guatemala, indigenous people do not feel less attached to the nation than the rest of the national population. While in a handful of countries in the Americas ethnic minorities feel less attached to the nation, this is not the situation in the two cases studied here (nor is it in most of the other countries in the region). Once other factors are controlled for, indigenous Bolivians and Guatemalans feel like citizens of their nations, so their attachment to the national political community seems to be as strong as that of other citizens.

Among the research goals of this dissertation, I have attempted to develop an explanation of the strength of the attachment that citizens, particularly members of ethnic minorities, have in relation to the national political community of which they are a part.
This explanation has departed from several theoretical perspectives, and has empirically tested different hypotheses emerging from them. The process of hypotheses testing was based on both national and individual level theories, and also integrated the two levels of analysis in a statistical model that allows for the interaction of individual level variables and variables that measure certain characteristics of the countries in which they live.

When countries are used as the unit of analysis, no evidence supporting the societal discrimination hypothesis is found; in countries where discrimination is higher, ethnic minorities do not necessarily feel less attached to the nation. Mixed evidence is found for the level of development and the institutional design hypotheses, suggesting then, that in some cases, these two conditions are relevant predictors of the differences in national pride between ethnic minorities and majorities. On the other hand, empirical support is found for the hypothesis that suggests that in more fractionalized countries the difference between minorities and majorities is larger than in more homogeneous countries.

The multi-level statistical analyses in which individual and country level variables are interacted confirm that the effect of being part of a minority is conditional to the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization that a country has. Ethnic minorities feel less attached to the nation in more culturally heterogeneous countries, and that probably has to do with their relative size and the possibility of conceiving cultural communities as alternative political communities to the one existing at the national level.

Despite its relatively high levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, evidence discussed in this research suggests that indigenous people in Guatemala do not feel less
attached to the nation than other Guatemalans. The causes of this apparent anomaly should receive particular attention in specific studies before a general theory about the relationship between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and attachment to the nation is elaborated.

Supporting the theory of social capital, a variable that proves to have a very large effect on both measures of attachment to the nation is interpersonal trust: independently of ethnic minority status and other considerations, people who trust their neighbors more tend to feel a stronger attachment to the nation than people who feel their neighbors are less trustworthy. The fact that this variable has the strongest effect of all covariates in the analyses suggests that, if policy makers are interested in strengthening the legitimacy of the State in a particular society, they should focus on increasing social capital and the sense of trustworthiness among its members as a realistic way of convincing people to become more attached to their nation.

The sample of countries employed in this study is representative of the region of the Americas, and covers countries with widely different levels of development and democratic consolidation. However, it is still a truncated sample of all countries in the world. That means that the results found for this sample could reflect more general relationships, and that further studies using a larger number of countries as observations could be performed to test them.
SRIG Focus Groups in Bolivia
Results and instruments used
May – August 2006*

* Focus groups were conducted and systematized with the kind help of Miguel Villarroel from Ciudadania in Cochabamba.
Municipality: YANACACHI, Provincia Sud Yungas, Department of La Paz, Bolivia
Organized with support from Fundación Takesi, Yanacachi.
June 19, 2006

Results:

Apoyo a la democracia
*Tribunales de justicia garantizan un juicio justo:* La calificación que otorgan no es muy alta porque antes del actual gobierno, la mayor parte de las personas en Bolivia era discriminada por el propio sistema democrático. En el tema específico de la justicia, ésta sólo funciona para las personas que tienen plata debido al gran índice de corrupción dentro del sistema de justicia –incluida la Policía-. Otro aspecto que se critica es que los jueces no son “nombrados de manera democrática” y, por lo tanto, no son “justos”, entre otras cosas debido a que por lo general discriminan a las personas de bajos recursos y siempre tienden a volcarse del lado de su “propia clase”, es decir, de los de “cuello blanco”. Otro aspecto negativo de la justicia boliviana es que es muy lenta, pues los trámites tardan demasiado.

Los talleristas tienen la esperanza de que los aspectos negativos arriba mencionados van paulatinamente a mejorar debido, principalmente, a que las personas están ahora más informadas y “capacitadas”, además, la población ya no es tan pasiva como antes y hace sentir sus reclamos mediante marchas, que es la “única forma” verdadera en que el pueblo logra hacerse escuchar. Por otro lado, gracias al nuevo gobierno –de carácter indígena– la justicia ordinaria está cambiando para bien. Se espera que la Asamblea Constituyente contribuya a mejorar el sistema de justicia de Bolivia.

![Diagram](image_url)
Respeto por las instituciones políticas: El respeto por estas instituciones es importante porque, si bien son instituciones de índole político, también son “públicas”, es decir que son ellas las que nos gobiernan, por lo tanto deben ser apoyadas.

¿Derechos básicos del ciudadano son protegidos? La calificación es baja porque las instituciones tardan mucho en reaccionar cuando algún derecho de alguna persona ha sido violado. El sistema es corrupto y lento, además existe discriminación.

Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano: Un motivo de orgullo es que actualmente las personas indígenas y originarias pueden acceder a cargos públicos de importancia. Se destaca el hecho de que puedan ejercer sus cargos vistiendo sus indumentarias tradicionales. También en la administración pública ha disminuido la discriminación hacia las personas pobres, “del pueblo”. También se expresa que se sienten orgullosos porque ahora gran parte del Estado estará manejada por personas de origen aymará. El actual presidente Evo Morales es otro motivo de orgullo debido a que él es indígena y por tanto está más dispuesto a escuchar las demandas de los campesinos y los pobres. Otro motivo de orgullo: los pobladores de Yanacachi están bien organizados como sociedad (y en general en todo el país), Bolivia es un país rico en recursos naturales, los bolivianos son muy trabajadores.

Motivos para no estar orgulloso: Tradicionalmente ha existido mucha discriminación y falta de respeto entre los bolivianos (entre hombres y mujeres, entre caballeros y campesinos, etc.). La discriminación existe a todo nivel, incluso dentro de un “pueblo chiquito”. La culpa de la discriminación en Bolivia es de ambas partes (clase alta y media vrs. baja-campesina-indígena), porque ninguna respeta a la otra. Gracias al actual presidente este panorama va a cambiar paulatinamente. Otros motivos para no estar orgullosos: Elevado índice de corrupción a todo nivel –la corrupción empieza por nuestras casas-, la educación es pésima, no existen industrias.

Se expresa que, en comparación con otros países, en Bolivia las personas se sienten menos orgullosas de pertenecer a su sistema político, debido quizá a que en esos otros países la gente es mejor tratada por su propio gobierno, y tienen “mayor respeto e igualdad”, en cambio en Bolivia esto no ocurre. También influye que Bolivia esté subdesarrollada y no exista trabajo para todos, sobre todo en comparación con otros países.

Identidades particulares
En Bolivia existe mucha discriminación entre las regiones y los departamentos, sin embargo, afirman que los Yungueños son más tolerantes que la gente del resto del país. El cuartel es una institución importante porque permite que los bolivianos se conozcan entre sí y que conozcan otras regiones del país. El respeto debe ser el valor primordial para la convivencia entre los bolivianos y esta debe ser la principal meta hacia delante.

Las divisiones entre los bolivianos, incluso a nivel municipal, tienen su origen en la Colonia, han sido impuestas por los españoles y ahora son difíciles de erradicar porque forman parte de “las costumbres” de las personas.
**Valores que nos unen como país:** La división de Bolivia perjudicaría a todos los departamentos, sobre todo porque el nuestro es un país pequeño, si fuera grande quizás no afectaría tanto. Uno de los principales temores en cuanto a la posible división del país es que los recursos generados por los recursos naturales del Oriente ya no serían redistribuidos en el Occidente. Se tiene la visión que el departamento de La Paz no cuenta con recursos naturales suficientes y que depende necesariamente de los recursos provenientes del resto del país.

La Guerra del Chaco es vista como un hito importante de integración nacional, puesto que fueron bolivianos de todas las regiones a defender el país y el petróleo. Por esto la división del país es inadmisible y los recursos económicos generados por la explotación de los hidrocarburos pertenecen a todos los bolivianos.

**Identidad regional vs. departamental y nacional:** Expresan que lo primero que se sienten es yungueños antes que paceños, sin embargo, a medida que conocen las ciudades (La Paz y El Alto) empiezan a “modernizarse” y por tanto a sentirse mucho más orgullosos de ser paceños que de ser yungueños. En Yungas, al parecer, muchas personas provienen de diferentes provincias, sobre todo del departamento de La Paz, y esto influye en que, a la larga, el sentimiento que predomine sea el de sentirse paceños. Otras autoidentificaciones dependen del lugar donde uno se encuentre (en el extranjero, en otro departamento, etc.).

**Identidad aymará:** Se basa sobre todo en el uso de la lengua aymará, lo cual es un motivo de orgullo para los talleristas, sin embargo, el uso de este idioma se está perdiendo entre los más jóvenes debido que ellos prefieren hablar exclusivamente en castellano, además que en sus casas tampoco les hablan en aymará. Por otro lado, en las escuelas se privilegia el uso solamente del castellano. Otras cosas que los identifican con la cultura aymara son las costumbres ancestrales que aún se practican en la región. Expresan que “lo aymará” son sus raíces.
El mantener el uso y conocimiento del idioma nativo es como tener un arma para combatir contra el sistema. El uso de otros idiomas es positivo y quisieran que sus hijos los aprendan, sobre todo el inglés, ya que esto ayuda a facilitar la comprensión de las personas. También es importante para ellos que sus hijos aprendan y dominenle castellanos, ya que esto también es un arma la cual les va a facilitar entrar en el dominio de las instituciones (públicas y privadas), en las cuales el idioma principal que se usa es el castellano.

¿Qué es ser originario, indígena o mestizo? Es aquél que conoce el lugar donde está, conoce sus costumbres, lo que produce, cómo es la región y hasta dónde llega, etc. Originarios también son las personas cuyas familias han vivido en la misma región por muchísimas generaciones. Indígena, en cambio, hace referencia sobre todo a los pueblos originarios del Oriente. Hay dentro el taller opiniones al respecto que todas las autodenominaciones son falsas, ya que todos los seres humanos son iguales sin importar su color de piel, cultura o procedencia. Estas diferencias únicamente tienen el propósito de dividir a los bolivianos.

Los mestizos son los descendientes de los españoles, y son quienes actualmente discriminan a los indígenas y originarios. Pero son descendientes de españoles mezclados con sangre indígena, ya que la mayor parte de los que vinieron era hombres quienes eventualmente se juntaron con mujeres del lugar y tuvieron descendencia.
También mencionan que los jóvenes que se van a estudiar o a trabajar a las ciudades eventualmente pierden las tradiciones de sus lugares de origen y se “modernizan”, ocurre entonces que estos jóvenes empiezan a identificarse con los mestizos y ya no quieren saber nada de su propia gente a la cual incluso empiezan a discriminar o ignorar.

**Participants:**
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- Lucio Mendoza
- Marina Chávez
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- 2 people did not sign list
Participants at the Yanacachi Focus Group, June 19, 2006
Municipality: EL ALTO, Provincia Murillo, Department of La Paz, Bolivia
Organized with support from Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de El Alto.
June 22, 2006

Results:

Apoyo a la democracia
Argumentan los talleristas que uno de los problemas de vivir en la Sede de Gobierno (de la cual son vecinos) son los constantes bloqueos, marchas y protestas sociales que ocurren. Estas cosas no ocurren en otras formas de gobierno y son exclusivas de la democracia, pues esta permite que ocurran. También dicen que las personas “se aprovechan de la democracia”, es decir, se exceden en sus libertades (como las de protestar). Sin embargo, por otro lado, las protestas sociales son un derecho de las personas y una de las formas que tiene la gente para hacerse escuchar por el gobierno.

Expresan que la democracia es preferible a otras formas de gobierno principalmente porque les permite expresarse libremente.

Apoyo al sistema político boliviano: En el tema político nacional, mencionan que algunas cosas están bien y otras no lo están, y en muchas ocasiones los políticos no dicen la verdad a la población. Una de las cosas que no está bien es el sistema de justicia, pues esta solamente funciona para las personas que tienen dinero.

El sistema político actual merece tener mayor apoyo que los anteriores debido sobre todo a que el presidente es indígena como ellos, y también porque la mayor parte de la población de El Alto votó por el MAS. El actual gobierno les permite participar y expresarse, lo cual no ocurría con anteriores gobiernos ya que ni siquiera les permitían ingresar a las instituciones o hablar con las autoridades, es decir, la discriminación a la
gente del pueblo ha disminuido, sobre todo por parte del Estado, lo cual a su vez va a ayudar a generar un proceso en el cual la discriminación que aún persiste hacia ellos en otros sectores de la sociedad vaya poco a poco disminuyendo.

Otro aspecto positivo del actual gobierno es que el Presidente se ocupa de visitar los rincones y poblaciones más olvidados y pobres del país, lo cual no sucedían con anteriores gobiernos.

Entre los cambios positivos que observan con el nuevo gobierno mencionan la nacionalización de los hidrocarburos y el apoyo a los pobres. Sin embargo, expresan que en el tema de la justicia y los derechos democráticos las cosas siguen igual que antes, pero esperan que con el tiempo estas cosas van cambiando poco a poco. Otros aspectos negativos son: falta de fuentes de trabajo, cuoteo político dentro las instituciones. Desde la perspectiva de los talleristas, la gente que trabaja en las instituciones del Estado es la misma que en otras gestiones de gobierno, no se ha producido el cambio que proclamaba el MAS durante su campaña política. Debido a estas razones el apoyo al gobierno de Evo Morales en El Alto ha bajado.

**Discriminación:** Desde la opinión de los talleristas ningún tipo de discriminación es buena, y ni los quechuas ni los aymaras tienen por tradición discriminar otras formas de cultura o de ser. El origen de la discriminación se halla en la conquista y la colonia –es decir en el blanco, el español-, así como en las instituciones y prácticas que estas originaron. Desde este punto de vista, los aymarás jamás van a discriminar a otros pueblos o culturas en Bolivia o donde sea. También mencionan que no tienen nada en contra de personas o empresas que vienen del exterior, siempre y cuando las mismas tengan la voluntad de trabajar en beneficio del pueblo boliviano. Quienes sí discriminan son las élites, sobre todo aquellas personas que ahora viven en Bolivia pero proceden de otros países (los croatas de Santa Cruz por ejemplo), y lo mismo las trasnacionales y algunas ONGs. Según los talleristas, la mayoría de la población de la ciudad de Santa Cruz procede de otros países.

Los verdaderos cambas son otros y no la gente que ha llegado de afuera. Los verdaderos cambas (originarios) siempre han estado unidos al resto de los pueblos indígenas de Bolivia y a todo el país en general. Arguyen que el desarrollo del Oriente ha sido posible gracias al aporte y esfuerzo de departamentos como Potosí y Oruro. Entre los verdaderos cambas y el resto del país no existirían verdaderas diferencias. En este sentido, la propuesta autonómica cruceña es tan sólo de las élites y de los inmigrantes.

Si bien la cultura aymara no promueve la discriminación hacia los otros, debido a la historia de abusos cometidos en contra de los campesinos por parte de los patrones y hacendados, existe cierto resentimiento por parte de la gente humilde hacia las personas de “cuello y corbata”, y esto ocasiona que también exista cierta discriminación hacia ellos por parte de los aymaras u otros pueblos oprimidos. En general Bolivia es una sociedad donde la discriminación es practicada en todos los niveles y por todos los grupos y clases sociales.
También en la conformación de los representantes ante la Asamblea Constituyente existen procesos discriminatorios, ya que a ella no asisten, desde el punto de vista de los talleristas, personas “originarias”, es decir, que vivan en el campo. Los representantes electos son personas que viven en las ciudades y no saben nada del campo. En relación a temas de género también existen diferencias, ya que las mujeres que irán a la Asamblea Constituyente lo hacen únicamente como “pantallas”, por que la Ley obliga, pero estas mujeres van a estar “calladitas”, ya que es normal que sólo los hombres participen, hablen y decidan.

**Respeto por las instituciones:** El respeto a las instituciones no es muy elevado debido a que los talleristas creen que las mismas juegan con la población y les mienten. Las instituciones, y las autoridades, únicamente “utilizan” a la población como un medio para llegar o tener poder, luego “se olvidan” de la gente. Esta desconfianza es sobre todo respecto a los partidos políticos, dentro de los cuales inclusive incluyen al MAS ya que también este partido los “ha defraudado”.

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**Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano:** Un motivo para no sentirse totalmente orgulloso es que los bolivianos no han logrado entender del todo qué es Bolivia, quiénes son los bolivianos, cómo viven los bolivianos y hacia dónde vamos como país, y la principal causa para que esto ocurra es la discriminación y las divisiones entre los propios bolivianos. También a los bolivianos les falta motivación para hacer y promover cambios que incidan sobre el bien común.

**Orgullo de ser boliviano:** Las opiniones de los talleristas están divididas, mientras algunos expresan que se sienten igual de orgullosos de ser bolivianos con este gobierno que con los anteriores, otros dicen que desde el año 2003 (Guerra del Gas en El Alto, caída del gobierno del MNR, etc.) la gente, sobre todo los más excluidos, se sienten más orgullosos de ser alteños, de ser bolivianos, ya que han demostrado ser un pueblo que lucha y que logra hacer cambios. Otros motivos de orgullo: porque Bolivia es un país rico en recursos naturales, porque los bolivianos son trabajadores.
Algunos motivos por los cuales los bolivianos no se sienten tan orgullosos de ser de su país están relacionados con la corrupción y al hecho que tradicionalmente los gobiernos no trabajaban por el bien del pueblo, así como tampoco nunca se han proporcionado buenos servicios en educación y salud. Esto ha ocasionado que la gente crea que Bolivia “no sirve” y que “nunca vamos a salir de esta situación” o que en Bolivia “no existe futuro”, lo cual a su vez incentiva el deseo de las personas a emigrar a otro país. Otra razón para no sentirse orgulloso son las drogas y el narcotráfico, ya que esto da una mala imagen de los bolivianos en el exterior y hace que las personas se avergüencen cuando están en el extranjero pues allá creen que todos los bolivianos son narcotraficantes y por eso somos discriminados.

Identidades particulares
La mayor parte de los alteños no son oriundos de esta ciudad pues han nacido en diferentes provincias de los departamentos de La Paz, Oruro, etc. De esta manera, su autoidentificación como alteños, en cierto sentido ha sido impuesta por las circunstancias, sin embargo, el sentimiento de alteño es más fuerte que el de paceño o de boliviano.

![Diagrama](Grupo focal: El Alto)

Valores que nos unen como bolivianos: Una de las cosas comunes a todos los bolivianos es que cada región tiene su propia cultura (vestimentas, comidas, tradiciones, etc.). Estas diferentes culturas son apreciadas y respetadas por todos los bolivianos. Otra cosa que une a los bolivianos es el hecho de que en todos los departamentos hay inmigrantes provenientes de otras partes de Bolivia, es decir, Bolivia es una gran mezcla de personas de todos los orígenes, por lo tanto, también las culturas y tradiciones están mezcladas.

¿Quiénes son bolivianos? Hay personas que han nacido en Bolivia pero son de ascendencia extranjera, más aún, sus valores culturales están orientados al extranjero. Estas personas tienen la nacionalidad boliviana pero no pueden en verdad ser
considerados “verdaderos bolivianos” en tanto no aprecian la gente y la cultura verdaderamente bolivianas, en otras palabras, “no les interesa el país” (ejemplo: Goni). Para ser un verdadero boliviano no interesa factores como el color de la piel, de los ojos o el apellido, y sí que la persona quiera, respete y acepte las culturas tradicionales y originarias de toda Bolivia. El aprendizaje de una lengua originaria debería ser una obligación para todos los bolivianos.

Existen extranjeros, incluso turistas, que han llegado a Bolivia, han gustado de nuestras tradiciones, han trabajado por el desarrollo del país y finalmente se han asentado en nuestro territorio; estas personas se sienten “más bolivianas que los propios bolivianos” y por lo tanto deben ser considerados como “verdaderos bolivianos”.

¿Qué es ser parte de la cultura aymara? Lo aymara es lo antiguo –miles de años-, lo ancestral de la cultura de los talleristas. Forman parte de esta cultura: el idioma, ayudarse el uno al otro, trabajar de forma solidaria –ayni-, y en general la forma de vida propia de las zonas donde viven los aymaras.

La noción de “Nación Aymara” no es usada en gran medida por los pobladores de El Alto, y si más bien por aquellos que viven fuera de los límites de esta urbe o por gente que vive en las provincias del Altiplano. Los talleristas no están muy de acuerdo con el uso de esta noción con fines separatistas, ya que según ellos “Bolivia es una sola”. A medida que los inmigrantes de las provincias llegan al El Alto, se urbanizan y van perdiendo poco a poco la fuerte autoidentificación aymara que traen consigo. La “Nación Aymara” implica una no identificación con el Estado ni con sus instituciones, y ello debido fundamentalmente porque los aymaras, como cultura, no han participado de la creación del Estado boliviano. La “Nación Aymara” no se compone de territorio, sino que engloba el lenguaje, identidades, cultura y raza.
**Razones por las cuales se identifican con otras culturas, como la camba:** Sobre todo porque en otras regiones también hay gente campesina, hay indígenas y originarios. En diferentes luchas sociales han conocido a esta gente originaria de otras regiones y se han dado cuenta que ellos también luchan por temas comunes como la tierra, etc.

**Diferencias entre: mestizo, indígena y originario:** Las diferencias entre los denominativos: indígena, originario, hermano, compañero, campesino, etc. son falsas, el uso de una o otras depende de las preferencias y las costumbres de cada lugar, pero en el fondo remiten a lo mismo. En Bolivia casi la totalidad de la población es mestiza, en el sentido de la mezcla de sangres, sin embargo, cuando las personas se autoidentifican como originarias lo hacen en alusión a las costumbres que han adoptado, a las tradiciones y culturas ancestrales que practican, al apego a la tierra (cuya propiedad se remonta a los abuelos de sus abuelos), y no a la mezcla de su sangre. La palabra mestizo, y la autoidentificación de la personas como tales, está mal vista, sobre todo en el campo, debido a que ella hace referencia a la Colonia y a la discriminación racial que ella instauró.

**Participants:**

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- Virginia Ugarte Condori
- Luís Villca Garincha
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Municipality: TAPACARI, ProvinciaTapacari, Department of Cochabamba, Bolivia
Organized with support from Ayllu Majasaya and Álex Fernández in Cochabamba. July 5, 2006

Results

Apoyo a la democracia
Justicia y apoyo a las instituciones: No hay justicia para todos porque los comunarios no conocen los reglamentos. También porque hay corrupción y sobornos (coimas).

En cuanto al respeto a las instituciones políticas, ellos sólo respetas aquellas que ven convenientes para sus propios fines, es decir, que les sean beneficiosas (que les quieran ayudar). De principio hay desconfianza a cualquier institución pública o privada que entre a la zona. Mencianan que, por lo general, no permiten a las instituciones políticas trabajar en su zona.

En el tema jurídico, falta redactar nuevas leyes que correspondan a las expectativas de la comunidad. Las leyes que en este momento existen sólo son para los ricos y la gente de la ciudad. Las transnacionales son una de las principales trasgresoras de las leyes. Sin embargo esto está cambiando con este gobierno, y esta comunidad apoya estos cambios.

Entre las nuevas leyes que deben redactarse se mencionan salud y educación, en cierta manera también se debe tocar el tema de los recursos naturales, agua entre otros. El lugar donde se debatirán estas nuevas leyes y visiones es en la Asamblea Constituyente, pero dentro de ella esperan muchas peleas y discusiones.
El tema de los derechos, en general, está mejorando a partir del gobierno de Evo Morales, pero aún faltan muchas cosas (salud, vivienda, agua potable, etc. –no se escucha–). Entre las cosas que han mejorado están el tema del gas y el seguimiento o juicios de responsabilidades a los ex presidentes –otros no se escuchan–. Ahora ellos se sienten más seguros de caminar en las ciudades y de ir a las instituciones públicas con sus propias indumentarias, es decir, se sienten menos discriminados por su apariencia. Actualmente sienten que se les respeta más en los ámbitos públicos.

Mencionan que a las personas diferentes a ellos mismos (blancos, extranjeros, etc.) las respetan siempre y cuando estas personas las respeten a ellos primero. Dicen que la marginación y la discriminación no es buena de ningún lado y son cosas que deben desaparecer poco a poco y ceder lugar al respeto mutuo, debe primar la igualdad y el derecho de todos a plantear y defender sus propias ideas.

Orgullo de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano: Ahora se sienten más orgullosos, ya que antes de este gobierno se sentían discriminados. Antes la política era sólo de los ricos, pero esto ahora está cambiando. Hay que apoyar al actual sistema político boliviano porque por primera vez hay un gobierno de izquierda, del pueblo; los que quieren separar al pueblo son los gobiernos tradicionales de derecha.

No hay nada en común entre los diferentes pueblos y culturas de Bolivia; todos somos diferentes.

En el Oriente las personas tienen grandes extensiones de terrenos, en occidente estos comunarios dicen no tenerlas, a lo máximo unas pocas hectáreas. Arguyen los talleristas que ellos tienen derechos, o por lo menos sus hijos, a ser dotados –de manera gratuita- de tierras en el Oriente.
Orgullo de ser boliviano: Se sienten muy orgullosos sobre todo porque son “antiguos”, es decir, originarios de las tierras donde viven. Otro motivo de orgullo es la existencia de gran cantidad de recursos naturales dentro el país –Bolivia es un país rico-. En otros países las personas, la gente del lugar u originarios, no son tan discriminados como en Bolivia. Por eso en otros países las personas se sienten más orgullosas de ser de su país.

¿Quines son originarios? Algunos dicen que sobre todos los indígenas/originarios, es decir los nacidos en el lugar igual que sus abuelos y los abuelos de sus abuelos, pero otros talleristas mencionan que, incluso los que tienen ascendientes del extranjero, por el hecho de haber nacido aquí, ya son “bolivianos” –en todo caso la opinión está dividida-. Coinciden, sin embargo, en que los derechos deben ser iguales para todos. También se dice que para ser originario, se debe contar con la aprobación de la asamblea de la gente del lugar, es decir, con la aceptación de la comunidad de la cual uno pretende ser originario. Otro requisito para ser originario es cumplir con las obligaciones comunales, tales como: asistir a las asambleas, participar de las tareas y trabajos comunales, etc.; en otras palabras, se debe mantener vigente el vínculo con la comunidad.

Otro motivo por el cual los talleristas se sienten originarios de Tapacarí, es que ellos confeccionan sus propias indumentarias, además que tienen su “propias y ancestral cultura”.

Arguyen que no hay diferencia entre indígena y originario. Por tanto, las personas que emigran, como los citadinos, ya no son indígenas ni originarias, son “residentes”.

La gente que ha migrado al Chapare, por ejemplo, sobre todo los nacidos allá, tienen una manera de pensar y valores muy diferentes a los de estos comunarios, y por ellos ya no hay mucho “entendimiento” con ellos y sí muchos problemas y diferencias.

La autoidentificación es primero del ayllu, luego la provincia, luego el departamento y después el país, pero esto depende sobre todo del lugar donde uno esté. Sin embargo, arguyen que se sienten con más fuerza de Tapacarí antes que bolivianos.

Identidades particulares: Se sienten de igual manera quechuas y aymaras debido sobre todo a que ambas culturas conservan y practican su lengua. También se sienten parte de la cultura camba porque la gente de esas regiones también es originaria y tiene su propia cultura, al igual que ellos, los “quechuas”.  

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¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Camba?
¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?
¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Aymara?

La experiencia del Cuartel –Servicio Militar–, según ellos, es un gran estímulo para el sentimiento de “unidad nacional”, porque les sirvió para conocer y dar a conocer otras culturas.

Parte de la cultura tradicional, sobre todo la referida a la confección de textiles se está perdiendo, debido a que los jóvenes ya no tienen la voluntad de preservar este conocimiento.

Las sectas religiosas están afectando de alguna manera la cohesión de las comunidades, ya que obligan a los individuos a dedicarse primero a sus deberes “espirituales” antes que a las obligaciones “comunitarias”. Por otro lado también satanizan algunas prácticas culturales tradicionales, así como debilitan el “respeto” a los demás –sólo existe Dios, ya no la comunidad–.

Participants:
- Francisco Chipata Mina
- Martín Espeñoza
- Leonardo Choque Mamani
- 2 persons did not sign list
Participants at the Tapacari – Cochabamba Focus Group, July 5, 2006
Results

Apoyo a la democracia

*Justicia y apoyo a las instituciones*: Poca confianza en la Policía debido a los altos niveles de corrupción dentro de esta institución, además de que a las provincias son asignados los peores policías, muchas veces incluso como castigo. Tampoco los fiscales provinciales funcionan adecuadamente debido sobre todo a las distancias. La justicia no funciona: quien no tiene plata no consigue justicia. En los altos niveles de justicia (Corte superior, Suprema, etc.) no existen ni habrán personas que conozcan la cosmovisión de los pueblos originarios, por ello jamás funcionará el sistema judicial. En Bolivia, un problema es que se somete a las minorías a la decisión de las mayorías; para los guaraníes este sometimiento no es democracia. Como solución a este problema proponen la descentralización de la justicia, en el sentido de justicia comunitaria de acuerdo a usos y costumbres de cada región y pueblo. La justicia comunitaria no se la puede impartir como una clase universitaria; las personas nacen dentro de ella, es parte de la cultura.

*Apoyo al sistema político boliviano*: El apoyo es muy fuerte, pero, es al actual sistema político boliviano, es decir, desde la asunción a la presidencia por parte de Evo Morales. Antes de este gobierno no existían sentimientos de apoyo al sistema. Los pueblos originarios han apoyado al actual presidente para que llegue al poder debido sobre todo a que es indígena y para que logre cambiar el sistema para hacerlo más justo. La confianza que tienen en el actual sistema político (léase gobierno) es sólo hasta cierto punto y está supeditada a los cambios que puedan producirse, y estos no se dan, este apoyo y confianza inmediatamente serán retirados. Los cambios son esperados en un plazo de 1 a 4 años. El gobierno sólo no puede realizar los cambios, para ello necesita el apoyo de todo el pueblo. En este momento la clave del cambio es la Asamblea Constituyente, y si el Presidente Morales trata de cambiar o no respeta los planteamientos del pueblo Guarani en torno a cómo debe ser la nueva CPE, entonces ellos le retirarán su confianza. Otras posibles fuentes de desconfianza son o podrían ser: la actual política del gobierno de enfrentamiento con las religiones; si el gobierno no lucha por la defensa de las tierras (léase territorio – reconstrucción de los territorios perdidos) a favor de las comunidades originarias; si el gobierno no apoya un sistema educativo acorde a las realidades del pueblo guaraní; y otros temas relacionados con los recursos naturales y el IDH.

Para los guaraníes no es válida la propuesta de que las comunidades indígenas se reconstituyan a partir de las TCOs; para ellos el Chaco es el territorio guaraní. No demandan la creación de un décimo departamento igual a los otros nueve, sino como la
reconstitución de un territorio perdido. Los pueblos guaraníes plantean también la protección del medio ambiente a partir de la reconstitución de los territorios.

Para los guaraníes, las personas que conforman el Movimiento Sin Tierra, son principalmente oriundos del occidente del país (Potosí, Oruro), y por tanto no saben del manejo de los bosques ni entienden los ecosistemas del Chaco, así como tampoco entienden la noción de territorio, pues lo único que ellos quieren es su parcela. En este sentido el gobierno debe cambiar sus políticas, pues no se tata de dotar de tierra a cualquier persona, así sea esta originaria (per o del occidente), antes se debería enseñar a los migrantes cómo son las normas y cómo se maneja el suelo en el Chaco; los originarios occidentales no pueden imponer su propias normas en la región del Chaco, y si lo hacen serían considerados extranjeros en este territorio.

Expresan que, antes de la democracia, los pueblos originarios no tenían el derecho a decir lo que pensaban. Sin embargo, la democracia de los últimos años no ha sido una democracia tan plena como la que actualmente se está viviendo a partir del nuevo gobierno. La democracia previa estaba plagada de marginamiento, discriminación y hasta represión a los pueblos indígenas. La democracia debe ser la senda, el camino, para lograr una participación plena del pueblo, de los pueblos, bolivianos, y de esta manera lograr los cambios que sean necesarios en el país.

Valores comunes de los bolivianos: Bolivia es un país muy diverso en cultura, y gran parte de sus habitantes aprecian las manifestaciones culturales no sólo de sus propias regiones, sino las del resto. Para los guaraníes, la unidad del país significa mucho, ya ellos, si se aíslan o se separan del resto del país piensan que se debilitarían como pueblo. A los bolivianos, los que los une es la voluntad de luchar contra el sistema globalizador y, en última instancia, proteger el planeta. Lo que los guaraníes buscan es la igualdad, que
nadie sea más que nadie. El “pensamiento boliviano”, según los guaraníes, es reconocer los valores culturales tradicionales.

Antes no se tomaba en cuenta a los “verdaderos bolivianos”, a los “dueños del lugar”, es decir, a los pueblos indígenas. Ahora, sin embargo, existen algunos progresos al respecto.

Las marchas, como forma de protesta de los bolivianos, son vistas de mala manera o leídas de forma errónea por algunos grupos sociales en el país (p.ej.: la Unión Juvenil Cruzénista), ya que las marchas se constituyen en una herramienta para hacer llegar la voz de las personas hacia el gobierno, y por lo general esta es la única vía para lograrlo. Los grupos que critican las marchas tratan de dividir a los pueblos del oriente, haciéndoles creer que por realizar este tipo de protestas no son “cambas de verdad”.

Respecto a la Medio Luna, esto no corresponde al sentimiento de los pueblos originarios de estas regiones, sino que corresponde al pensamiento de un grupo de élite u oligarquía asentada en ellas. La supuesta apertura de las élites y grupos de poder cruzeños hacia los pueblos y representantes guaraníes no es sincera y es un ardid para afianzarse en el poder. Mediante la unidad de los bolivianos, el pueblo guaraní plantea aislar a estos grupos de poder mezquinos y “convertirlos”, es decir, enseñarles cómo se debe vivir en esta tierra a partir de los valores de los pueblos originarios.

La política educativa de los grupos dominantes no está pensada hacia Bolivia, sino que mira hacia fuera. Desde el colegio se forma a las personas con la visión de dejar el país y residir en el exterior. Cuando las élites contratan mano de obra, no es porque “quieren dar empleo”, sino porque necesitan de los trabajadores para su acumulación capitalista. La élite boliviana no tiene por objetivos el de irse a vivir a una provincia, o el de casarse con “una persona sencilla”, por si es originaria.
Orgullo de ser bolivianos: Se sienten orgullosos sobre todo debido a la diversidad cultural de los pueblos bolivianos. Los guaraníes dicen no ser “inteligentes” sino “sabios”, y ello debido a su legado cultural, y por ello se sienten orgullosos. También se sienten orgullosos al saberse “originarios” de sus tierras, y porque sus ancestros pertenecían a ella desde muy atrás en el tiempo.

El resto del mundo tiende a caracterizar a Bolivia como un país del tercer mundo, como a los más pobres; pero esto es mentira, porque Bolivia es riquísima, tanto en recursos naturales como en cultura. La educación, el sistema educativo, durante los últimos 50 años ha tenido mucha influencia en la subvaloración de los bolivianos respecto a sí mismos y en el hecho de que muchas personas hayan querido dejar de ser lo que eran antes. La creación del décimo departamento está ligado a esto último pues supone autonomía indígenas, es decir, recuperación de los valores culturales tradicionales. Los guaraníes ya no van a permitir que nadie les venga a decir qué es lo que tienen que comer, o cómo se van a vestir o de qué manera se van a educar, etc. Muchos de ellos han empezado a abandonar sus nombres occidentales-castellanos y a cambiarlos por nombres tradicionales guaraníes, y esto no sólo de manera simbólica sino también jurídica, es decir, han comenzado los trámites legales para su cambio de nombre.

Otro factor que incide en la mala imagen de Bolivia en el exterior y en la falta de orgullo de las personas por ser bolivianas, es que nuestro país es considerado uno de los más corruptos de la región e incluso del mundo. Se piensa que, con el nuevo gobierno, esta realidad va a ir cambiando para bien.

Identidades particulares:

¿Qué es ser guaraní y quiénes son guaraníes?: Los guaraníes se identifican como tales principalmente debido a su cultura ancestral (idioma, costumbre, etc.), la misma que es compartida por todos y desde tiempos inmemoriales. Los guaraníes siguen siendo lo sin importar dónde viven o si se han ido a las ciudades o cuánto tiempo ha pasado, siempre y cuando sigan respetando y queriendo su cultura ancestral.

Los guaraníes no se consideran indígenas pues este en un término impuesto por los occidentales, además que corresponde a un error histórico (Colón y Las Indias). Los guaraníes son una nación (y por tanto originarios) que está asentada en un territorio u espacio físico específico (Norte de Argentina, Uruguay Paraguay, Sur de Bolivia y Sur del Brasil). Otro equívoco se produjo cuando los antropólogos les pusieron el sobrenombre de Chiriguano.

Ser guaraní significa ser guerrero, ser astuto, ser sabio, y eso se ha demostrado históricamente. El guaraní debe poder leer el pensamiento de las personas (mediante cigarrillos), es el “superinteligente”. A pesar de las adversidades, un guaraní jamás está triste o lloroso, pues ellos son “gente siempre alegre y optimista”.

Hay casos de pérdida de identidad o de sentido de pertenencia al pueblo Guaraní, y pasa sobre todo con jóvenes que se han ido de las comunidades a las ciudades por largos períodos de tiempo, y que al regresar ya no comparten los valores y costumbres
tradicionales pues han adoptado otras nuevas. Otro lugar donde los guaraníes tienden a perder con rapidez su identidad es el las fronteras. La castellanización forzada en las escuelas también contribuyó (y aún lo hace debido a que casi no existe educación intercultural-bilingüe) en gran medida a la perdida de identidad de los guaraníes. Por otra parte, actualmente son pocos los padres que les enseñan o hablen en guaraní a sus hijos (sobre todo en las familias que ya no viven en las comunidades), aunque esta tendencia se espera que vaya a cambiar. Desde hace aproximadamente un año se está impulsando, desde el sistema educativo y con la participación de todos sus miembros, la recuperación de los valores tradicionales del pueblo guaraní.

Manifiestan que para los guaraníes es importante que, aparte de su lengua originaria, sus miembros (sobre todo los jóvenes) aprendan correctamente otras lenguas (castellano, inglés, etc.). Lo importante es que estas personas que aprendan otras lenguas no pierdan la “esencia de su ser”.

En el caso específico de los jóvenes, mencionan que la mayor parte quienes han ido a estudiar a las ciudades en el lapso de un año dejan de sentirse o por lo menos de parecer guaraníes y adoptan las costumbres y el habla del lugar donde estén. Es muy frecuente que simultáneamente nieguen sus orígenes y se hagan pasar por “cambas” o “carays”. El motivo principal para este cambio es que los guaraníes tradicionalmente han sido discriminados por la sociedad boliviana.

Si los guaraníes se sienten también identificados con otras culturas como la quechua y especialmente la aymara es debido a que esos pueblos, al igual que ellos, mantienen y practican sus valores culturales tradicionales y a donde sea que vayan siguen siendo ellos mismos y continúan hablando sus idiomas nativos. Los aymaras y los guaraníes tendrían visiones culturales similares a pesar de vivir en medioambientes muy diferentes. Estas visiones similares los unen en una sola causa.
¿Qué es ser originario?: Los guaraníes piensan que las personas (de cualquier parte de Bolivia), en la medida en que han nacido en nuestro país “ya son bolivianos”, pero “no serían originarios”, sin embargo, esta distinción no implica ninguna forma de discriminación o privilegios para cualquiera de los dos. En la medida en que “los bolivianos” se identifiquen con su cultura (la guaraní), ellos los van a respetar. Por ejemplo, si bien todos los que viven en esta región (Chaco) pueden ser considerados “chaqueños”, no todos son originarios, sin embargo, debe existir igualdad de derechos para unos y otros.

Relación entre raza e identidad: A pesar de las diferencias de color y culturales “todos somos bolivianos”. Los guaraníes aceptan el hecho del mestizaje y, en este sentido, no creen estar “intactos” como raza, sin embargo, lo que no han perdido es la “esencia del ser guaraní”.

Participants

- Gonzalo Maratua Pedraza
- Francisco Cuyupori Quezada
- Manuel Pastillo López
- Constanza Moreno
- Edwin Cuellar A.
- Edda Sambequiri Flores

Some participants at the Camiri Focus Group, August 1, 2006
Map of Bolivia showing each of the municipalities where SRIG Focus Groups were conducted

Source: SIGEL 2006
Plan para los talleres con grupos focales

Fase introductoria (Total 45 min).

1. Recepción de los participantes y realización de encuestas mientras se junta el grupo.
   a. Los dos responsables hacen las encuestas
2. Presentación de los objetivos y metodología del taller. Presentación de los participantes.
   a. Uno presenta el taller y el otro responsable mete los datos comparados de los resultados.

Discusión sobre apoyo a la democracia (Total 30 min.)

3. Presentación de resultados comparados de asistentes del taller y el promedio nacional
4. Discusión por ítems. Preguntas claves: por qué le damos esa valoración; qué habría que hacer para que esa valoración suba.
   a. B1.¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?
   b. B2.¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?
   c. B3.¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?
   d. B4.¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?
   e. B6.¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?
   f. ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?
   g. Otras instituciones: Congreso, CNE, Autoridad Originaria, Sindicatos (SI HAY TIEMPO)

Discusión sobre pertenencia a la comunidad política (Total 45 min)

5. Presentación de resultados comparados de asistentes del taller y el promedio nacional
6. Discusión por ítems. Preguntas claves: **por qué le damos esa valoración; qué significa ser boliviano; cuáles son los valores que nos unen como bolivianos.**
   a. B43. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de ser boliviano?
   b. PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?
   c. NEWTOL7. Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o... 2) Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país debería dividirse.
   d. ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano boliviano?

Discusión sobre identidades particulares (Total 60 min)

7. Presentación de resultados comparados de asistentes del taller y el promedio nacional
Discusión por ítems. Preguntas claves: **por qué le damos esa valoración; qué significa ser del departamento? Qué significa ser indígena? Es lo mismo sentirse parte de la cultura aymara o quechua y ser indígena? Por qué hay personas que se identifican como indígenas en una pregunta y no en otras? Qué relación hay entre la percepción de los padres y su propia auto adscripción étnica? Qué relación hay con el lenguaje? Qué relación hay con la migración? Existe una cultura indígena en Bolivia?**
   a. ETID3 [BETID2]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted... [paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuquisaqueño, potosino, tarijeño, beniano]?
   b. BOLETID3 [BETID3]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Aymara?
   c. BOLETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?
   d. BOLETID5 [BETID5]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Camba?
   e. ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?
   f. ETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones)

Conclusiones (Total 30 min)

8. Discusión de las conclusiones en torno a las siguientes preguntas clave:
   a. Cómo puede tenerse al mismo tiempo una identidad particular (regional o étnica) y ser parte del mismo país?
   b. Cómo deberían las propuestas de autonomías enfrentar estas diferencias en el país?
   c. Todos los bolivianos deberían tener la misma identidad o se deberían respetar las identidades particulares de cada quien?
### Preguntas para los talleres focales

Taller Focal: ............................

Fecha: .................................

|---------------------------------------------|

| Q2. Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? ________ años |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIS1: En la escuela, colegio o universidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS2: En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS3: Cuando buscaba trabajo en alguna empresa o negocio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS4: En reuniones o eventos sociales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS5: En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|---------------------------------------------------------------|

|-----------------------------------------------------------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VB1. Está usted inscrito para votar?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VB2 [VBPRS05]. Votó Ud. en las elecciones presidenciales de 2005?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOLVB3 [VBPTY05]. Si votó en las elecciones de 2005=&gt; Por cuál partido o candidato votó para presidente? (No lea las alternativas) (Pasas a VBPRS02)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Ahora (entregue tabla # 2) vamos a usar esta tabla... Esta tabla contiene una escalera de 7 gradas, cada una indica un puntaje que va de 1 que significa nada, hasta 7 que significa mucho. Por ejemplo si yo le pregunto: “hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?”, si a Ud. no le gusta nada elegiría el puntaje de 1; si por el contrario, le gusta mucho ver TV me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho, Ud. elegiría un puntaje intermedio. Hagamos la prueba. “hasta qué punto le gusta ver TV?” léame el número por favor. (ASEGURESE QUE ENTIENDA) Usando esta tabla.....

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Escala</th>
<th>Nada</th>
<th>Mucho</th>
<th>NS/ NR</th>
<th>No conoce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tribunales de justicia de Bolivia garantizan un juicio justo?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene respeto por las instituciones políticas de Bolivia?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político boliviano?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político boliviano?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa que se debe apoyar el sistema político boliviano?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B10A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B21 [B30]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
partidos políticos?

<table>
<thead>
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<th>B11</th>
<th>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Corte Nacional Electoral?</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</th>
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<th>B11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B13</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Congreso?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B18</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la policía?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B20</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Iglesia Católica?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLB37 [B21]</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los periodistas?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>BOLB37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B21A</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el Presidente?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B21A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLB22B [B22B]</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la autoridad originaria?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8 9</td>
<td>BOLB22B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B23</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en los sindicatos?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>B23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B43</td>
<td>¿Hasta qué punto se siente orgulloso de ser boliviano?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continuar con tabla 2) Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier forma de Gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?</th>
<th>Escala Nada Mucho</th>
<th>NS/ NR</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>ING4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los bolivianos tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>PN2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NEWTOL7. Suceda lo que suceda, el país debe permanecer unido o... 2) Las diferencias en el país son muy grandes, el país debería dividirse
El país debe permanecer unido [1]
Bolivia es un país muy diverso y por lo tanto cada uno de nosotros puede identificarse con diferentes aspectos de nuestra cultura. Por ejemplo, uno puede identificarse como boliviano y al mismo tiempo también como paceño o como camba. En esta misma escala, en donde 1 significa “nada” y 7 significa “mucho”...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(seguir con tabla 2)</th>
<th>Escala</th>
<th>NS / NR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ETID1 [BETID1]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted ciudadano boliviano?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8 ETID1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encuestador: Para la siguiente pregunta utilice la referencia de acuerdo al departamento donde realiza la encuesta:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETID2 [BETID2]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted...</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8 ETID3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[paceño, cruceño, cochabambino, orureño, chuquisaqueño, potosino, pandino, tarieño, beniano]?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLETID3 [BETID3]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Aymara?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLETID4 [BETID4]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Quechua?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLETID5 [BETID5]. ¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la cultura Camba?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLETID6 [BETID6]. Algunos periodistas se refieren a los departamentos de Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Chuquisaca y Tarija como la “región de la Media Luna”. ¿Ha oído usted hablar de esta idea?</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encuestador: si responde NO anote [9] y pase a la siguiente</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>¿En qué medida se siente usted parte de la “Media Luna”?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que Ud. aprobó [encierre en un círculo el último año que aprobó el entrevistado(a)]. [Para los que han tenido alguna educación técnica, agregar estos años al total. Por ej. si la persona terminó Básico y además hizo dos años de educación técnica, marque el 7]

- Ninguna : 0
- Básico: 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 => Primaria
- Intermedio: 6 - 7 - 8 => Primaria
- Medio: 9 - 10 - 11 y 12 => Secundaria
- Universidad : 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18
- Pos grado: 18 – 19 -20 -21- 22 -23 -24

ED2. Si tuvo alguna educación => Estudió Ud. en escuela o colegio fiscal o particular?
Escuela fiscal [1]
Escuela privada [2]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estudió en los dos sistemas [3]</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETID. Ud. se considera una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETID</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETIDA. Considera que su padre es o era una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETID A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETIDB. Considera que su madre es o era una persona de raza blanca, chola, mestiza, indígena, negra u originario?</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETID B</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ETID2. [Census] ¿Se considera perteneciente a alguno de los siguientes pueblos originarios o indígenas? (leer todas las opciones)</strong></td>
<td><strong>ETID 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LENG1. Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? (acepte una alternativa)</strong></td>
<td><strong>LENG1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LENG1A. Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? (acepte una alternativa)</strong></td>
<td><strong>LENG1 A</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban</strong></td>
<td><strong>LENG4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG2. ¿En qué departamento nació?</td>
<td>MIG2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>[1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>[2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>[3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>[4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>[5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>[6]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>[7]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>[8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>[9]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIG3. ¿Nació en la ciudad capital del departamento o en alguna de las provincias?</th>
<th>MIG3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ciudad capital</td>
<td>[1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincia</td>
<td>[2]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observaciones:
REFERENCES


———. "Cuoteo étnico:¿sí o no?" Pulso, 3-9 diciembre 2004.


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