THE SIBLINGS OF HISPANIOLA: POLITICAL UNION AND SEPARATION OF
HAITI AND SANTO DOMINGO, 1822-1844

By

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Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School at Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in
Latin American Studies

May 2011

Nashville, Tennessee

Professor William Frank Robinson
Professor Jane Landers
Professor Marshall Eakin
To Humberto Alejandro Rondón Liranzo a mentor without the title, as devoted family man and my source of inspiration.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The search for a thesis topic was wearisome beyond words. No other undertaking, however, has brought about such a feeling of fulfillment within me. Although the process of research, reading and writing were tiresome, each step was done with much animation and delight. My initial source of encouragement and orientation originated from Professor Celso Castilho and scholar Teresita Martínez Vergne. Their early assistance either in person or through the phone gave me the momentum I needed to root out a subject matter closely tied to my greatest source of stimulation. Once this undertaking was embraced, Sandra Alvarado Bordas promptly directed me to the best resources within the Dominican Republic. The information she provided to help start my research was incalculable.

Additionally, my thanks go to the staff of the Archivo General de La Nación. In particular, Quisqueya Lora and Raymundo Gonzalez were fundamental in broadening my bibliography. Their assistance even after I departed the island, allowed me to evade dead ends and quickly reach indispensable resources. In addition, special thanks go to Marcelina Rondón Liranzo for allowing me to stay at her home for the duration of my research in Santo Domingo. And to Francisca and Lucrecia Rondón Liranzo for ushering me to important research sites (such as the historic center of Santiago and Santo Domingo), which I would have found challenging to locate myself. My gratitude goes to my extended family for their encouragements throughout this challenging endeavor.

I am indebted to fellow student mentors, who were invaluable to me once I started writing. Both Laura Delgado and Chaz Yingling patiently and readily guided me through
the complications of the writing process. Their initial push permitted me start on time and on the right track. Additionally, thanks to the Posse Foundation and Sandy Stahl for helping me reach this most momentous achievement. The foundation and its members, my non-biological family, were indispensable to my entire university education. Also thanks to Paula Covington for always broadening the collection of Alexander Heard Library, whose catalog I have so often depended on. I am also in gratitude to the Interlibrary Loan service for assisting me in reaching important texts that would have been otherwise beyond my touch.

I am eternally indebted to the Center for Latin American Studies and to Vanderbilt University for giving me the financial license to obtain a Master’s of Arts degree. Lastly, much gratitude goes to the members of my committee: Frank Robinson, Jane Landers and Marshal Eakin. Thank you for taking the time to read and comment on my work. You have been essential to my academic growth over my approximately six-years stay at Vanderbilt and I am so thankful to have worked with you on this most enriching experience.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Differences in religion, language, culture, race and oppression are often the simplified explanation adopted in Dominican grade school textbooks to explain why today the island of Hispaniola stands politically divided.¹ In other words, because Dominicans speak Spanish, practice Roman Catholicism and are a racially mixed society, a match with Haiti (a black society that speaks French-Creole) is incompatible. However, this explanation based on multiple differences is unsatisfactory and even detrimental to understanding the path of unification and separation that these two societies embarked on from 1822 to 1844. Specifically, the problem lies in the terminology and the questionable conclusions that such an explanation produces. Scholars such as Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi choose to present Haiti as an ambitious imperialist force that occupied its neighbor to the East.² Indeed, Dominicans ultimately deemed the annexation unfavorable in 1844. However, official documentation attests that Dominicans freely chose to unite with Haiti.³

Although reputable scholars agree that the term “occupation” is flawed, most Dominicans still brand it as so. The current historical narrative is replete with passionate glorification of the independence movement of 1844 and defamation of Haitians. The

passion works to conceal key shortcomings with the independence movement of 1844. These flaws would produce a weak nationalist identity that was unable to ensure the sovereignty of the republic in 1860s against Spanish expansionist projects. The blinding nationalist sentiment of today impairs adequate scholarly evaluation of the twenty-two year period of Haitian annexation. Since the 1970s, Dominican scholarly attention to this period is far too abbreviated leaving the anti-Haitian legacy of Dominican dictator Rafael L. Trujillo to heavily dominate the narrative. Their combined fifty-year tenure, Trujillo and Joaquín Balaguer dedicated much effort to slander Haitians as imperialists who simply degraded Dominican society during those twenty-two years of annexation.

The resounding influence they exerted over the historiography leaves the impression that the narrative is complete. Thus, explains the absence of contemporary scholarship that explores this chapter in Caribbean history. Congruently, many of the sources used in this thesis are dated. My thesis attempts to highlight and breakdown silences within the narrative. This is thesis the first work in English to explore the twenty-two years of Haitian-Dominican unification and the only detailed work strictly dedicated to it in the last four decades. The relevance of this independence struggle must not be underestimated for it will allow us to consider issues of colonial rejection and abandonment that defined Dominican identity then but that are rarely considered today. It will help us determine the key factors that stimulated Haitians, and later Dominicans, to seek unification and which factors contributed to the ensuing their separation.

The main argument of this work is that Santo Domingo was annexed to Haiti because the Eastern municipalities considered Haiti (and President Boyer) as better positioned to incentivize the Dominican economy and ensure the military protection of
the island as a whole. And finally the union between the two communities unraveled because Dominican rejected Port-au-Prince’s economic policy and state-sponsored ethnic biases. Port-au-Prince was unable to check Dominican separatists’ engagements due to fighting within Haiti’s military and political spheres. In order to support the claims presented in this introduction, this work is divided into six chapters. As a bridge to the second chapter, this introduction will provide a short overview of the previous political divisions within the island, the Haitian invasions of 1802 and 1805, and the separatist movements of 1809 and 1821.

The second chapter considers the causes and effects of the pronouncements by various Dominican provinces that requested their annexation to Haiti, what Victor Garrido calls the Boyerian Movement. In addition, I shall consider why the capital city of Santo Domingo first abstained from producing a pronouncement favoring Haiti and instead opted for petition for a protectorate with Gran Colombia with the declaration of 1821. Why was this declaration destined to promptly expire? The third chapter will then explore the reasons behind Spain’s lukewarm and delayed reaction to the loss of its first colony in the New World to Haiti. What was happening in Spain from 1808 to 1830 that permitted it to be unmoved by the loss of Santo Domingo? This chapter also evaluates the persuasiveness of Spanish and Haitian claims over Santo Domingo during the territorial dispute of 1830. The fourth chapter reflects on President Boyer’s executive decisions and character. It takes particular note of Boyer’s accentuated emphasis on foreign and economic policy, the problems with state-sponsored racism and the lack of social services. The fifth chapter will explore the coup d’état against Boyer and how the

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manipulation of French diplomats propelled separatists groups in Santo Domingo (such as the *Trinitarios* and the *Afrancesados*) to seek the separation of the Spanish Part from Port-au-Prince in 1844. I shall also consider why this separation was not successful in igniting a nationalist identity among Dominicans. Before I reflect on the matter at hand, we must situate the key factors that preceded President Boyer’s triumphant march across Santo Domingo in February 1822.

Consult any world atlas, turn its pages to find the Caribbean and you will find at its center the island of Hispaniola, the second largest in the West Indies. Currently it is the most populous island in the hemisphere and the holder of more than half of the population of all the Antilles. Today the island is home to two countries: Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Christopher Columbus founded the first permanent European settlement in the Western Hemisphere in 1497 with the establishment of Santo Domingo. In the first 30 years of the Spanish colonization of the Americas, Santo Domingo quickly lost its primacy and became one of Spain’s many expendable pawns in the European struggle to colonize the region. Maybe because of the great size of the empire or because of increased importance of newly discovered territory in the mainland, the Spanish Crown increasingly neglected to strengthen military fortification and to bolster the economic security of Santo Domingo leaving it susceptible to squatters on its

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6 Scholars do not agree on whether Santo Domingo was founded on 1497, 1498, or 1502. The date 1497 is found in Frank Moya Pons, *Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo* (Santiago: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1977), 57.
western extremities.\textsuperscript{8} Santo Domingo was officially divided for the first time in 1697 with the Treaty of Ryswick that ceded the Western third of the island to France.\textsuperscript{9} This bilateral agreement produced the French colony of Saint-Domingue, the main world exporter of sugar in the 1700s and which would later become Haiti.\textsuperscript{10}

With Saint-Domingue’s growth in economic preeminence through the 1700s, its Spanish neighbor to the East was able to tap into its neighbor’s commercial pull. “By 1789 the French colony of Saint-Domingue was supplying two thirds of the imports and exports of France, a volume of foreign trade greater than that of the newly freed thirteen American colonies combined.”\textsuperscript{11} However, with the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s and the wars in Europe, global political and economic conditions were redefined. As a way to recuperate from France the lost Spanish territory east of the Rhine River in Europe, with the Peace of Basel in 1795 Spain agreed to cede its claim to the Eastern two thirds of the Hispaniola.\textsuperscript{12} France hoped that with Santo Domingo at hand it could produce more effective military assaults against the now rebellious colony of Saint-Domingue. The accords stipulated that all the inhabitants of the Eastern side could abandon the ceded colony within a year if they so desired. Those who had deemed Santo Domingo was a refuge from the storm raging in Saint-Domingue understood that the transfer of power from Spanish to the French would guarantee an extension of the violence into the Eastern Part of the island. Consequently, a massive population exodus ensued within Spanish

\textsuperscript{8} Juan Francisco Martínez Almanzar, \textit{Manual de Historia Crítica Dominicana}, 6\textsuperscript{th} ed. (Santo Domingo: Centro de Adiestramiento e Investigación Social, 1996), 143.
\textsuperscript{9} Price-Mars, 63.
\textsuperscript{12} Martínez, 191.
Santo Domingo. In short, the global revolutionary drive was undoubtedly unfavorable to Santo Domingo.\footnote{Moya Pons, \textit{Historia Colonial}, 345.}

In order to secure the advances made towards Haitian independence and undermine French ambitions on the island, on January 26, 1801, Toussaint Louverture invaded Santo Domingo with the acclamation and praise from many there.\footnote{Rodman, \textit{Quisqueya}, 38.} Louveture’s assurance to respect civilian life and economic tranquility was not enough to placate the thousands of white conservative Dominicans that chose exile in Cuba, Venezuela and Puerto Rico losing much of their possessions.\footnote{Carlos Esteban Deive, \textit{Las Emigraciones Dominicanas a Cuba (1795-1808)} (Santo Domingo: Fundación Cultural Dominicana, 1989), 97.} From January to June of 1802, the French general Charles Leclerc and his forces succeeded in driving Louverture out of Santo Domingo and brought about his demise by inciting division among the Haitian generals.\footnote{Dubois, \textit{Avengers}, 267.}

Jean-Jacques Dessalines would adopt Louverture’s aspirations with regards to Santo Domingo and proclaim the island as “indivisible” within the Haitian Constitution of 1804.\footnote{Price-Mars, 53.} Thus once he proclaimed Haitian independence, Dessalines launched the first Haitian invasion of Santo Domingo in 1805 after French authorities ordered the capture, enslavement and sale of any Haitian near the border.\footnote{Martínez, 203.} British traveler, James Franklin, noted in 1828 that “the city of Santo Domingo had rendered ineffectual all the efforts of the blacks to sow dissention among the people.”\footnote{James Franklin, \textit{The Present State of Hayti (Santo Domingo): With remarks on its Agriculture, Commerce, Law, Religion, Finances, and Population etc.} (Westport: Negro University Press, 1970), 184.}

In other words, Haitians considered the neighboring colony as a sanctuary for dissenters of abolition. French administration there
had to be dispelled. However, upon seeing French ships heading to Port-au-Prince, Dessalines deemed the invasion as a costly diversion and decided to return west leaving massive destruction, civilian casualties and further white flight.\(^\text{20}\)

With the leadership of cattleman Juan Sánchez Ramírez, in 1809 the criollo community in the Eastern colony embarked in an armed project to restore Spanish colonial authority there.\(^\text{21}\) The war to restore Spanish colonial rule sought to show Dominican support for Spanish King Ferdinand VII, who Napoleon Bonaparte had displaced from the throne in 1808.\(^\text{22}\) Sánchez Ramírez’s decision to return Santo Domingo to Spanish control was sparked after the French government had outlawed the sale of cattle and beef with Haiti, the unquestionable economic base of the Cibao and its neighboring regions.\(^\text{23}\) Sánchez Ramírez and his fellow colonialists were able to defeat the French at Palo Hincado and to drown the local nascent independent movement. Spain was unable to compensate its returning colony for its loyalty because it was facing rebellion all over the empire and rending it incapable of effectively administering itself. Thus, from 1809 to 1821, the era referred to as la España Boba, Madrid allowed Santo Domingo to descend into further economic and military decadence.\(^\text{24}\) The invasions from the west, the military menace of France, and the failures of Spanish colonial

\(^{\text{20}}\) Martínez, 205.

\(^{\text{21}}\) Ibid., 206.


\(^{\text{23}}\) Carlos Esteban Deive, “La Abolición de la Esclavitud y la Independencia de Santo Domingo,” in Rebeldes y Marginados: Ensayos históricos, (Santo Domingo: Banco Central de la República Dominicana, 2002), 43.

\(^{\text{24}}\) Martínez, 210.
administration left Santo Domingo with a population count of only 63,000; a fifty percent loss from the 125,000 residents it contained in 1797.  

The Haitian Revolution and the war of restoration forced Dominicans to seriously consider questions of sovereignty, emancipation, and identity. What ensued divided Dominicans who affiliated with either the Conservative or Liberal party. Starting in November 1821, the division was made clear when the provinces of Montecristi and later Dajabón declared their secession from the Spanish colony and asked to be annexed to Haiti. In December 21, in the city of Santo Domingo, José Núñez de Cáceres declared the colony separate from Spain and lobbied for the protectorate of Gran Colombia. As we shall see in the next chapter, Núñez de Cáceres’s failed to consult with the other provinces before producing the declaration of separation. His imperious actions alienated the rest of the colony, resulting in polarization that ultimately allowed Boyer to absorb his neighbor to the East.

25 Balaguer, 103.
CHAPTER II

ISLAND-WIDE FUSION: DIVERGENCE OF THE MUNICIPALITIES FROM THE MANDATE OF THE CITY OF SANTO DOMINGO

The union of Santo Domingo in 1822 to its neighbor to the West leaves historians today perplexed for it occurred relatively rapidly, with minimal violence and with no bloodshed. Considering the aggressive campaigns of 1801 and 1805 from the West side against Santo Domingo and the others destabilizing events that the Haitian Revolution caused there, it is difficult to conceive that within the same generation Dominicans would be poised to enter the Haitian state. Because of this perplexing turn of events, confusion exists as to why and how the project for island-wide union materialized in 1822. Scholars have assessed the situation differently branding the union as an occupation or domination. Both these terms are inadequate and misleading. They explicitly disregard fundamental evidence that attest to another scenario.

Important events and documentation generated in the months prior to Boyer’s march across Santo Domingo confirm that Haitian excursion there in 1822 was legal. With the restoration of Spanish colonial control, Santo Domingo experienced a drastic economic restructuring and subsequently a weakening its political command. Dominicans understood their precarious situation but disagreed on the right measure to address it. The disagreement left the colony’s capital city of Santo Domingo at odds with the municipalities it administered, which had developed a separate profitable market with the support of Haitian consumers. Contrasting economic foresight between the capital and
municipalities produced a deep political division within Santo Domingo that contrasted to that of a unifying Haiti in the early 1820s. The increasing internal and external isolation of the city of Santo Domingo provided Boyer with the conditions to absorb the colony entirely.

During the period of La España Boba, Dominicans would attempt to reverse the economic depression that followed the Haitian Revolution. French management of Santo Domingo had cost the island a severe population drain. Emigrants abandoned property and left vast lands unattended producing capital flight and thus an overall decline in consumption. Cattle raising and breeding was the main source of income for Dominicans from the late 1700s to the early 1800s. The Dominican market was dominated by conservative cattlemen with vast estates, what is locally understood as the hatero or ganadería industry (livestock industry).28 Their influence was such that they did not need to be near the capital city to be a considerable force. This explains why Sánchez Ramírez, a cattle rancher from the small and distant town of Cotuí, would be the main architect of the War of Colonial Restoration in 1809 and subsequently the governor of said colony once it was restored to Spain control officially in 1814.29

However, by the period of La España Boba the conservative ranchers’ power was irreversibly decimated with the fall of animal husbandry. The wars in Europe and in Haiti had diverted commerce away from Santo Domingo. Investment there was risky for it was the battleground for French and Haitian altercations. The pronounced emigration from Santo Domingo left ranchers without a substantial local consumer market. The evacuation of forty thousand residents from Santo Domingo by the start of the 1800s had

28 Martínez, 211.
29 Ibid., 206.
paralyzed the nascent economic activity of the 1700s. In other words, white flight shrunk the circulation of capital and local consumption became too costly. Consequently, fresh beef, a perishable product with no exportable quality, was no longer a viable base for economic growth.

Soon Dominican entrepreneurs gravitated to tobacco and timber. Timber (specifically mahogany) and the cultivation of tobacco involved small agriculture and not large slave estates. This was ideal for Santo Domingo since it was under populated. Sugar, cotton and coffee (the main exports of Haiti) would be unsustainable there for these required a large and cheap labor force, which was unavailable in the East. Timber would be planted in the Southwest and tobacco in the fertile central valley of the Cibao. The decision not to compete with the Haitian market allowed Dominican cultivators to develop a partnership with Haitian planters rather than competition. This allowed for substantial capital and labor osmosis across the border. Both mahogany and tobacco were exportable goods. The commercial interaction that ensued helped the Cibao and the Southwest to reinsert foreign capital the colony.

In contrast, the city of Santo Domingo could not revive the commercial vitality the its port once had. The city remained economically starved and lacked international commercial ambition. During the twelve years of the La España Boba (1809-1821), Spain would invest a total of fifty thousand pesos on Santo Domingo; such financial contribution arrived in one sum on July 1817. Given that Spain was unable to exert the role of provider, the governor of Santo Domingo hopelessly begged Cuba and Puerto

30 Rodman, 39.
32 Moya Pons, Historia Colonial, 409.
Rico for financial assistance. The profit emanating from the Cibao and the Southwest only covered half of the administrative expenditures and ultimately produced an incurring balance. The deficit complicated military and personal salary payments throughout the colony. As a result, municipal officials grew increasingly infuriated with the laxity that Spain and the city of Santo Domingo upheld. Unlike, the cities of Santiago, Puerto Plata, and San Juan de la Maguana, which had greater international foresight, the city of Santo Domingo stood by Spain for twelve unproductive years. Such a manifestation of loyalty was undoubtedly unfavorable for the capital city in the long run. The lack of money forced the city to focus on agricultural production for domestic consumption. Governor Carlos Urrutia transformed adjacent abandoned state lands into conucos or small plots of land used for the cultivation of local staple foods and fruits. Agriculture was force-fed to these city dwellers that were not accustomed to hard labor and favored white-collar jobs. In other words, the Cibao and the Southwest were export driven agricultural centers of production that had to sustain a poor and lethargic colonial capital. The contrast between the city of Santo Domingo and the provinces it administered is one that Dominican historians today rarely highlight but that is essential to understanding why these municipalities would later challenge the capital’s separatist campaign.

The city of Santo Domingo further contrasted with its sisters for its constant defensive attitude towards Haiti. The capitaleños (residents of the city of Santo Domingo) supposed that since its establishment, Haiti sought to absorb the remaining two thirds of the island. This assumption stirred distrust among capitaleños with their neighbors to the West. Their attitude was founded on Haiti’s constitutional directive.

33 Ibid., 410.
34 Ibid., 408.
Articles one and eighteen in the preliminary declaration of the Haitian Constitution of 1805 stated that the island formally known as Santo Domingo would henceforth be identified as the “empire of Hayti” with all its adjacent islands (the island of Gonâve, Beata, Saona, and Tortuga island) as components of such empire.\[^{35}\] This island-wide assertion is known today as the “indivisibility” clause. In other words, Haitians officials agreed with Louverture’s declaration that the island of Haiti was “one and indivisible.”\[^{36}\] This clause predicted the invasion of 1805 and the article’s continuation throughout the early 1800s made the possibility of Haitian expansion an unyielding project. Dessalines was unable to successfully retain its neighbor in 1805 because of French and English interference. Furthermore, the violent and popular assassination of Dessalines in October 1806 placed an indefinite hold on any efforts to absorb Santo Domingo for no single executive was able to command all of Haiti.\[^{37}\]

The dispute polarized and fragmented Haiti into the separate states of the North and South. According to traveler James Franklin, Christophe (who was next in command to Dessalines) would control the territories in the North while Alexandre Pétion (commander-in-chief of Port-au-Prince) would command over the lands in the South.\[^{38}\] A divided state could not absorb another community. Christophe and Pétion were concerned with their mutual threats. They were able to unite forces on one particular objective, however, Dominicans had to be stimulated and assisted in expelling the French. Price-Mars explains that above the goal of annexation, stood the need to free the island of all

\[^{35}\] Price-Mars, 53.  
\[^{36}\] Ibid., 187.  
\[^{37}\] Frank Moya Pons, La Dominación Haitiana: 1822-1844 (Santiago: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, 1972), 16.  
\[^{38}\] Franklin, 202.
French control.\textsuperscript{39} Although few Dominican scholars give Christophe and Pétion credit for helping in the war for colonial restoration, without Price-Mars’ clarification it is hard to believe that Dominicans would have sufficient battle equipment and drive to present a substantial challenge against France (even with the support from Puerto Rico and Great Britain). The polarization in Haiti prolonged itself until Boyer was able to alienate Christophe from his military base in 1820 and unite the two territories.\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{Capitaleños} defensive attitude against Haiti was evident in 1820 under the governorship of Kindelán. Don Sebastián Kindelán y Oregón, the colony’s Governor from 1818 to 1821, was greatly troubled by the colony’s inadequate defenses. On January 31, 1821 Kindelán informed the Secretary of State and of the Office of Governance of Ultramar and in a separate letter the Secretary of State and the Universal Office for War in Madrid of the defenseless condition of the colony.\textsuperscript{41} He assessed that the “barracks,\textsuperscript{42} the guards corps, and the rest of the military edifications threatened to go to waste if the pitiful ruin that daily deteriorates them is not halted.”\textsuperscript{43} Kindelán’s urgent request for military equipment and improvement of the defenses was stimulated after Boyer sent a delegation across the border to campaign for an island-wide union. On December 5, 1820, Don José Lazala, Military Commander of Las Matas de Farfán, informed Kindelán that Haitian Commander, Dezir Dalmasi, was bribing him and other military officers in San Juan de la Maguana and Azua. Lazala reported that Dalmasi promised “better employment and a thousand other things” if they would not stand in the way of Boyer’s

\textsuperscript{39} Price-Mars, 105.
\textsuperscript{40} Franklin, 235.
\textsuperscript{41} Garrido, 25.
\textsuperscript{42} All translations in this thesis are the author’s.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 41.
armada upon their imminent descent onto the colony. This type of persuasive campaign directed at the opposition’s defenses sought to heighten anxiety and invoke egocentric ambition as a means to divide. This strategy of “divide and conquer” had effectively brought the demise of Louverture, Dessalines, and Christophe. Boyer understood its efficiency and he did not dally to use it against the weak armada to the East. He also sent his escort, Coronel Iznardi, to contribute to the propaganda. Iznardi announced that French ships docked in Martinique would soon overtake Santo Domingo. Particularly, he tried to convince Pablo Baéz (mayor of Azua) to join the annexationist cause by presenting him with the deceptive news that the neighboring towns of San Juan, Las Matas and Neyba had already yielded to Boyer’s command.

This propaganda sought to absorb the colony peacefully and circumvent a military expedition into the Eastern territory. Unlike Dessalines, Boyer did not resort to indiscriminate destruction. The campaign was based on rhetorical persuasion and deception rather than direct force. His desire for peace may have been sincere but Boyer may have also been trying to conserve his supply of military equipment. In short, the propaganda of Dalmasi and Iznardi was ineffective in delivering Santo Domingo in 1820. All the state officials that were bribed immediately informed Kindelán of the menacing campaign. Kindelán was able to act fast and called for the arrest of any Haitian enticer of annexationist propaganda and requested a formal explanation from President Boyer himself relating to this disruption. Boyer responded by declaring that “never had they [Dalmasi and Iznardi] been given any such mission.”

Renowned Haitian scholars

44 Ibid., 26.
46 Ibid., 40.
like Jean Price-Mars admit that Dalmassi and Iznardi were in fact following Boyer’s orders. However, the order of arrest against them was never carried out.

Why did Dominican officials abstain from detaining Dalmasi or Iznardi when they were under their jurisdiction? Dalmasi was well known in San Juan for it was principal residence. There he worked as a dealer in the animal husbandry market. Local officials did not arrest Dalmasi because they did not deem him as threatening. For Dominicans residing near the border this attitude of familiarity extended to most Haitians. Hence, while capitaleños feared Haitian excursion into Dominican territory, Dominicans elsewhere were unconcerned. This increasingly familiarity with Haitians was the result of their mutual increasing economic trade and territorial proximity. With the unification of North and South, Haiti’s consumer market consisted of 661,000 people. The depressed but ambitious export economy of the Cibao foresaw tremendous gains if it had greater access to the Haitian market. The Cibao and the Southwest understood that the local minuscule local market of approximately seventy thousand was not conducive to the economic recovery they sought to achieve with the export of tobacco and timber. Therefore, by 1821 the interior provinces had embarked on a considerable economic drift that positioned them at odds with its capital regency.

Consequently, it would be the interior provinces that would champion Boyer’s unification efforts and discard the opposition emanating from the capital city. In November 15, 1821 the adjacent towns of Monte Cristo (what today is Montecristi) and Dajabón in the Northwestern most point of the Spanish side made an official request to join Haiti. The pronouncement of the first read: the people “have judged opportune to

47 Moya Pons, Historia Colonial, 412.
48 Franklin, 404.
hoist the Haitian flag and we [the local authority] have consented...we expect that Your Excellency will protect that city that hence forth is part of the Republic of Haiti.”

This document that commanding officer, Diego Polanco, signed is the first out of a series of nine similar official pronouncements that summoned for Boyer’s military protection and agreed to their incorporation to the Republic. The pronouncement from Dajabón is similar in its language but includes three signatures and a request for ammunition in case that the municipality is “demanded to abandon the cause.”

The weight of these documents is significant for it was military and governmental officials rather than subversive forces from the underground that produced them. Also, in the case of Dajabón, they expressed explicit willingness to engage in armed conflict against the capital or Spain if they demanded for a change in course. It is unclear if the pronouncements were produced in spontaneous and independent fashion or if Boyer specifically asked for them to be written before hand. Simply put, Dajabón and Montecristi were voicing their dissatisfaction with the Spanish tutelage and wanted out.

The response of the city of Santo Domingo to the secession of Dajabón and Monte Cristo was in all measures alienating. With the help of military commander Pablo Ali, on November 30, 1821 the Judge Advocate and previous Lieutenant Governor, José Núñez de Cáceres arrested the newly appointed governor of Santo Domingo, Pascual Real, in order to secede the colony from Spain (by then Kindelán was reassigned to La Habana).

Without making much effort to recall back Monte Cristo and Dajabón to its fold, Núñez de Cáceres declared the colony’s separation from Spain and bid for the

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49 Price-Mars, 116.
50 Ibid., 117.
51 Moya Pons, La Dominación Haitiana, 29.
The declaration that Núñez penned opened with “no more dependency, no more humiliation, no more subjugation to the whims and caprice of the cabinet of Madrid.” The declaration was in its simplest form a detailed explanation for why Dominicans had grown dissatisfied with their custody under Spain citing Spanish rejection and neglect, which was responsible for poverty and ignorance among its faithful subjects there. Núñez recognized that Spain was economically and militarily in decline and thus unqualified to support any colony. He indicated solidarity with the other Latin American independence movements and paraphrases the political philosophy of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. With his declaration he also changed the name of the colony to the independent state of Spanish Hayti. Besides this instance, the word “Hayti” does not reappear on the document. The author does not provide the reader with any reason as to why he considers Dominican fusion with Gran Colombia as more favorable than with Haiti. Considering that two municipalities had already defaulted in favor of Haiti, addressing this matter was essential. His lengthy explanation concerning the inefficiency of Spanish colonization was superfluous since most Dominicans already agreed on this matter. Did Núñez presume that by pronouncing a separation from Spain, the provinces would have abstained from submitting to Haiti? Did he consider that the return of Dajabón and Monte Cristo was a lost cause? Nevertheless, his declaration does little else to discourage other provinces from following the lead of Monte Cristo and Dajabón. By

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53 Ibid.
sidestepping this critical matter Núñez made his project ineffective. Therefore, his declaration of 1821 was a document with minimal persuasive appeal.

Unequivocally the declaration failed to ensure the unity it was trying to preserve. The civil and military command of the various provinces was unconvinced by Núñez’s declaration. Within days, the municipalities of Saint-Yague (Santiago), Puerto Plata, La Vega, San Juan, Neyba, Azua, Cotuí and San Francisco de Macorís replicated the annexationist pronouncement from Monte Cristo and Dajabón in favor of Boyer. Victor Garrido refers to this chain reaction as the Boyerian Movement. All of these municipalities were in the Cibao or the Southwest region, which were significantly economically engaged with Haiti at the time. The pronouncement from Santiago specifically denounces Núñez’s declaration and repudiates the fusion with Gran Colombia when he calls it “antisocial” and having an effect of “universal dissatisfaction.” The provisional Junta Central that produced it explained that the decision made in Santo Domingo only reflected the interest of a “few particulars, sacrificing [the interests of] thousands of respectable heads of families.” In other words, Núñez failed to consult with the various municipalities when he wrote the declaration and also when drafting the constitution of Spanish Hayti. The self-driven attitude of Santo Domingo was highly alienating to these localities that demanded to be heard. This need for self-determination and political participation is evident as each pronouncement specified the names of the delegates that would represent them in Port-au-Prince. Therefore, Núñez was acting in a

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54 The order in which the municipalities appear correlates to time sequence in which they were produced. The last two towns of Cotuí and San Francisco de Macorís produced one joint pronouncement.
55 Garrido, 72.
56 Price-Mars, 118.
political vacuum that would quickly delegitimize the state apparatus he sought to construct. But why was the proposition to join Gran Colombia so unpopular among Dominicans?

Dominicans understood that Núñez de Cáceres was dumping the colony at the doorstep of yet another distant state that was politically and economically unfit to address the ills of the colony. Bolívar’s call for Latin American political unity appears to have captivated Núñez de Cáceres. However, Gran Colombia was a young state whose deep internal divisions perturbed its continuation as a state. Bolívar struggled greatly to appease the opposing political and economic interests there. In addition, Gran Colombia’s navy was in its infancy and thus could not protect an island across the vast Caribbean Sea. Nonetheless, Núñez quickly sent a delegation headed by Antonio María Pineda to Caracas to reach an agreement that would effectively incorporate Spanish Hayti to Gran Colombia. In the only letter referring to such a mission, Simón Bolívar wrote to Francisco de Paula Santander on February 8, 1822, “I have received the pleasant news from Santo Domingo… we must not abandon those who proclaim us because it mocks the good faith of those who consider us strong and generous… that very island can bring us, in a given political negotiation some advantage.” Bolívar ended his note by presenting Santo Domingo only as an advantageous but disposable pawn in a possible political compromise. The attitude of Gran Colombia was as dismissive and objectifying as that which Spain had previously manifested for said colony on repeated occasions. No other official mention of Santo Domingo’s annexation appears in the Dominican

57 Ibid.
58 R. Lepervanche Parparcen, Núñez de Cáceres y Bolívar: El Proyecto de Incorporación del “Estado Independiente de Haití Español” a la Gran Colombia (Caracas: Editorial Bolívar, 1939), 34.
archives. The fact that Bolívar debriefed Santander on the annexation project belatedly shows minimal interest in Gran Colombia for Núñez’s project. Núñez’s plan appeared even more flawed for he decided to hoisted the flag of Gran Colombia without reaching any prior agreement with Bolívar. This may explain why the provinces were clearly against the option of a Colombian protectorate. In other words, the proclamation of December 1, 1821 had no domestic or international muscle to back it up. In agreement with Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, Núñez’s proclamation put to the test Bolívar’s project for Spanish American unity and promptly assessed it as false advertisement.

The existence of Spanish Hayti was further jeopardized because Núñez failed to reach an agreement with Boyer. The sixth article of the Constitutive Act of 1821 dictated that another representative would be sent to formulate an accord with the Haitian president. This accord would promote cooperation between the western and Eastern Part of the island by establishing a commercial and defensive alliance. What factors made Núñez believe that Haiti may be interested in such an alliance? Why would Jean Pierre Boyer concede to the dealings of the capitaleños when he obviously was within grasp of executing the indivisibility clause of the Haitian constitution? This article shows that Núñez and his delegation were overestimating their bargaining situation. In short, it was a highly ambitious and obstinate campaign. Congruently, Victor Garrido deems Núñez as an impulsive leader lacking anticipation and unable to control the projects he undertook. He made his decision at an inopportune moment when Haiti was standing strong and united and Santo Domingo was weak and divided. Boyer also embarked on a

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59 Further research should be conducted in Colombian or Venezuelan archives on this matter.
60 Ibid., 39.
61 Garrido, 65.
persuasive propaganda with the provinces to the East that Núñez never undertook. In other words, Núñez did not assemble the appropriate mechanism to halt Haiti’s annexationist project. The only factor favoring his entire plan was that Spain was in no condition to retain the colony he was trying to liberate. Therefore, Garrido identified Núñez de Cáceres as directly guilty of the twenty-two years of Haitian “occupation.”62 However, such an accusation is too sweeping. With or without the proclamation of Spanish Hayti, Boyer would have marched triumphantly across Santo Domingo. Núñez’s actions just accelerated the fusion. But what validity has Garrido’s claims that Haiti occupied Santo Domingo?

Boyer’s threatening letters and the large military force that escorted him into the Spanish side may be grounds to call the project of 1822 an occupation. The existence of Spanish Hayti extended until January 19, 1822 (lasting only seven weeks) when Núñez wrote the pronouncement of Santo Domingo and recognized Dominican obedience to Haitian laws.63 The pronouncement was written immediately after Boyer’s public statement encouraging Núñez and any other opponent to the island-wide unity to yield. The letter dated January 12, 1822, answered the first nine pronouncements when it confirmed that their protection was guaranteed and rejected the proposition of a defensive and economic partnership with Spanish Hayti. Boyer also announced, “I shall make the visit of the entire Eastern Part with imposing force, not as conquistador (God willing may that title never approach my thoughts) but rather as a pacifier and conciliator of all interests in harmony with the laws of the state…I hope to encounter on all corners nothing but brothers, friends and sons to hug. There are no obstacles capable of detaining

62 Ibid., 68.
63 Price-Mars, 130.
me.” The language here is both threatening and soothing. The tone here is similar to that of Dalmassi and Iznardi who used the threat of force and reiterated the reassuring protection of Port-au-Prince to compel municipalities in San Juan de la Maguana to join the cause for unification.

Núñez wrote the pronouncement of Santo Domingo because he lacked the military capability to combat not just Boyer but also the defiant municipalities. The city of Santo Domingo could not afford the looming civil war that towns such as Dajabón forewarned. Just as this letter predicted, Boyer along with twelve thousand other men (divided in two columns originating from north and south) marched across the Eastern territory and reached Santo Domingo on February 9, 1822. If all of the municipalities of the Eastern Part had submitted to Boyer’s authority why did he consider it necessary to arrive with such imposing force? Leaders often orchestrate such display of military might in order to persuade a community that it is best to comply with the change in administration. Boyer’s heightened show of force provides grounds to denominate this encounter as an invasion. However, this is not the main evidence prominent Dominicans historians cite to sustain the label of “occupation.”

The term of “occupation” is not fully justified. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi and Manuel Peña Battle deem it preposterous that a people who Dessalines had ravaged only seventeen years prior would solicit the protection of said wrongdoer in 1822. Indeed, the campaigns of 1801 and 1805 from the West involved invading forces. The latter was

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64 Moya Pons, 34.
65 Ibid., 35.
66 The “Eastern Part” was the termed Haitians used for Santo Domingo during the twenty-two year period of annexation.
extremely violent and produced massive population flight. However, even then there were residents of the Eastern Part that favored annexation to Haiti. As early as 1805, Santiago (the second largest city in the Spanish side) requested its incorporation to Haiti but the proposal was recalled after Dessalines demanded from the Santiagueros a tax of a hundred thousand pesos, which they were in no position to pay. Therefore, this idea of union with Haiti did not sprout suddenly in 1821 as Peña Battle and Rodríguez Demorizi attest. This option resurfaced with Boyer, a new and more persuasive leader than his predecessors. Nevertheless, recalling the invasions of 1801 and 1805 to validate the branding of Boyer’s entrance in 1822 as an “occupation” is an evident use of a slippery slope. These campaigns may have had parallel goals but the strategy to achieve it was dissimilar. Dessalines and Toussaint entered forcefully, without significant Dominican inducement and producing armed confrontation. None of these factors apply in the case of Boyer.

Rodríguez Demorizi also supports the label of occupation by invalidating the pronouncements. “There is nothing more puerile then to attribute value to such banal and deceitful documents,” says Rodríguez Demorizi. He adds that these summons were produced by force and only reflected the voice of a “worse” and “isolated minority.” He presents no evidence that indicates Boyer forced Monte Cristo and the other municipalities to produce these convocations. Equally questionable is the claim that Boyer was attending to the whims of a few. Rodriguez Demorizi does not show how the pro-Hispanic or pro-Colombian parties outnumbered the pro-Haitian. The fact that most of the pronouncements were produced by a junta (Santiago) or by multiple signers

68 Price-Mars, 57.
69 Rodríguez Demorizi, Invasiones, 21.
(politicians and military officials) confirms that they reflected the will of a diverse and representative community. The same cannot be said of Núñez de Cáceres’s declaration in 1821, which no other town caucused to support. Even the Trinitarios (the political organization that founded the Dominican Republic in 1844) in their declaration of independence attests that most Dominicans welcomed with enthusiasm the entrance of Boyer in 1822. Evidently, the minority voice was in fact that of Núñez de Cáceres and the city of Santo Domingo, which attempted to forcefully have its way. Rodríguez Demorizi’s argument shows fundamental signs of bias. His partiality is reflective of the time under Dictator Rafael L. Trujillo who embarked on a ruthless thirty-year campaign to slander Haitians in general.

In contrast to Peña Battle and Rodríguez Demorizi, most Dominican Historians today agree that the pronouncements are authentic and valid. Víctor Garrido, Joaquín Balaguer, Frank Moya Pons, and Juan Francisco Martínez Almanzar are some of the numerous scholars that agree to the authenticity of the documents presented in Price-Mars’s book. In particular, Juan Bosch clearly affirms that Haiti was not an “imperialist state.” Even so, all of them continue to call the twenty-two year period of Haitian and Dominican political unity an “occupation” and “domination.” The reason why the period merits either term is never explained. Therefore, the label is one that is taken for granted in Dominican historiography. The only scholar that provides an explicit explanation on the matter is Pedro Troncoso Sánchez. According to him the unification effort of 1822

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71 Juan Bosch, “XIV: Las Causas de la Invasión Haitiana de 1822,” in Composición Social Dominicana: Historia e Interpretación, 10th ed. (Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega, 1999), 220.
was not the result of “a voluntary accession, nor an annexation, nor in general an incorporation in which existed sincere cooperation from the Spanish part…it was simply the realization of biological and psychological laws that the conquistador [Boyer] astutely reverted with the appearance of conscious and voluntary acts.” In other words, Troncoso agrees with Rodríguez Demorizi and Peña Battle that Boyer fabricated the pronouncements for purposes of legitimizing his expedition to the East.

This argument, however, does not hold with the primary sources. In an anonymous poem from 1830, the author refers to the Colombian campaign as a bearer of “more desolation to this coveted land” and referring to Boyer’s arrival he paints a celebratory mood that contrasts heavily to that when Christophe entered in 1805. “Radiant with joy, mixes the acclamations with happiness, saying: Live, long live in perpetual peace President Boyer who rescued us from such sorrow…giving the rightful thanks to God…for concluding this enterprise without one gunshot.” The contrast presented in the poem clearly favors the legitimacy of the Boyerian Movement. The fact that the poem was found in Cuba may indicate that a Dominican migrant subsequently dissatisfied with Boyer’s policies produced it, thus attributing the poem’s author more value since it was someone from across the political spectrum that wrote it. The absence of violence, the joy of the people, and the fact that it was the powerful white criollos and the mulattos of the Cibao and Southwest that sponsored the fusion shows that Boyer did not arrive uninvited. However, is the absence of unanimous agreement within Santo

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Domingo in 1822 concerning the Boyerian Movement enough to validate the labeling of Haiti’s entrance an occupation?

Certainly not. This twenty-two year period should simply be labeled as an “annexation” or “unification.” Occupations and invasions involve the unwarranted injection of a foreign entity within a given community. The municipalities’ pronouncements, the local popular support confirmed in the poem above and the absence of conflict confirms that Boyer’s entrance was solicited. Annexation, fusion and union are better terms for what occurred in 1822 because mutual agreement was evident between two majority parties. In accordance with Juan Bosch, the improper use of labels is the result of Dominican scholar subjugation to “a climate of passion that has prevailed in every referent” to this period. Contemporary volatile feelings with regards to Haiti have been blended with the antecedent attitudes of 1822 producing an accentuated distortion of the scenario being studied. Therefore, term “occupation” is the result of biased historians who refuse to believe that Santo Domingo would enter into union with a nation-state they considered as inefficient and too alien to themselves.

The annexation of Santo Domingo to Haiti in 1822 was the result of President Boyer’s persuasive unification campaign among Dominicans, the empowerment of the Cibao and the Southwest regions and the increased political and economic isolation of Santo Domingo. The Cibao and the Southwest identified significant economic and defensive advantages with their incorporation to Port-au-Prince. The annexationist campaign of Núñez de Cáceres to Gran Colombia in 1821 lacked domestic popular support. Its alienating effect among the various Dominican provinces was not the single

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74 Bosch, 236.
factor that contributed to the success of Boyer’s unification campaign but it accelerated its realization. Unlike the invasions of 1801 and 1805, no sympathetic international force assisted the conservative elite of Santo Domingo in undermining Haitian ambition to administrate its eastern neighbor. The city of Santo Domingo was ultimately overruled domestically and unaided from without. The effect of Boyer’s march was intimidating to some but favored by most. Although both Núñez de Cáceres and the pro-Haitian community summoned foreign states to take on the Dominican political tutelage, today only the latter succeeded and is deemed an occupation. The use of the terms “occupation” and “invasion” is obviously the result of scholars who struggle to distance themselves from present biases. Giving this historical development more balanced analysis will allow us to better understand the evolution of Dominican identity and how political and economic standing shaped it.
In just twelve years, Santo Domingo had morphed from a French to a Spanish colony and then to a Haitian territory. This sudden political change is just one of the many in the 1800s that Dominicans would experience because of its easily destabilized and shrunken political sphere. Nonetheless, the reasons behind the transformation of 1822 did not simply reflect turbulence within the local administration in Santo Domingo. The marriage of the Eastern and the Western portions of Hispaniola was also the result of the prolonged indisposition of the Spanish monarchy. Liberal reform that sprouted from 1809 to 1823 not only incapacitated the Spanish sovereign from effectively administering its various colonial possessions but also Spain itself. The powerful liberal thought that enveloped Europe crossed the Atlantic to reach the West Indies.

The successes of the rebel forces within Spain provided a reproducible blueprint for pro-Haitian forces within Santo Domingo to sever the tie with the mother country starting in 1821. Nonetheless, was there ever any effort to reclaim Santo Domingo once Spain achieved political stability? Yes, in 1829 a more cohesive Spain interceded and requested the return of its former Caribbean colony from Haiti. However, the Crown’s decision to reclaim Santo Domingo using diplomatic means did not originate from Madrid but it was rather the suggestion of Dominican exiles and the Catholic Church. This chapter evaluates Spain’s legal challenge and Boyer’s defense in determining who
had license to govern over the disputed territory. Also focus will be directed on how President Boyer dealt with the situation.

The return of Ferdinand VII to the throne in 1814 failed to bring equilibrium to Spain because the King was unable to mediate between the conservative and liberal philosophies that sought to reshape the monarchy. During the six-year French captivity (1808-1814) of Ferdinand VII, broad disapproval of French authority over Spain stimulated the citizenry to revolt in demand for the return of the “desired one” (Ferdinand VII) and the exit of the usurper, Napoleon’s brother Joseph.\footnote{Carr, 85.} Meanwhile, liberal Juntas and the Regency governed in Ferdinand VII’s stead. They produced a constitution in 1812 that significantly reduced the role of the Church and the Crown and elevated the liberties of the people. Upon his return to Madrid in 1814, Ferdinand VII used the masses, the army and the Church to invalidate this new liberal constitution.\footnote{Ibid., 84.} The debate over conservatism and liberalism, however, did not end there. Liberalism spread across the Atlantic, making a return to a conservative past unfeasible.

Spain was polarized with the King at the center of the debate. With the Revolution of 1820 in Spain, the army and the masses turned against the Crown, placed a bankrupt Ferdinand VII under house arrest and restored the Constitution of 1812.\footnote{Charles J. Esdaile, “Restoration and Revolution” in \textit{Spain in the Liberal Age: From Constitution to Civil War, 1808-1939} (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000), 55.} The King’s reign was not restored until 1823 with the invasion from France of the Hundred Thousand Sons of St. Louis.\footnote{Carr, 141.} By then, the reinstalled Ferdinand VII accepted the liberal consensus but the damage the debate inflicted on the Spanish empire was irreversible.
The invalidation of the Constitution of 1812 and the second removal of Ferdinand VII were major triggers to the waves of rebellion in Latin America that ultimately materialized into successful independence movements. Spanish control in the Americas was reduced to just the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Therefore, the effects of the Revolution of 1820 were not restricted to Spain.

A closer look at the 1820 revolution in Spain shows that there was agreement between the military strategies implemented in Spain and those that the pro-Haitian affiliates adopted to cripple the political authority of Madrid over Santo Domingo in 1821. In January 1820, two junior officers from within the government’s Andalusian expeditionary army “pronounced for the Constitution of 1812.” This pronouncement was a deliberate intervention of the military in political matters. It manifested a disagreement over the Crown’s philosophies concerning government. The “negative pronunciamiento” voiced military dissatisfaction with the Crown’s management of the economic troubles resultant since 1808 and it expressed frustration with the lack of fundamental civil rights within Spain. Specifically, the pronouncement demanded increased freedom of press, opening of public space and the eradication of feudal privileges. The proceedings in Spain mirror those employed in Santo Domingo prior to its annexation to Haiti. The pronouncements of Santo Domingo were produced just a few months after those of Spain and likewise military officers were their main champions. The pronouncements sought to challenge the political directive emanating from Madrid.

Both pronouncements sided with the party the Crown rejected. In the case of Spain, the military defaulted in favor of the liberals, which Ferdinand VII tried to muffle.

79 Ibid., 124.
80 Ibid., 126.
In the case of Santo Domingo, all forces chose distance themselves from the Crown. More specifically, the military and the functionaries in the municipalities explicitly recognized the Haitian constitution as the supreme law; a document that the regency in the city of Santo Domingo rejected. In other words, it sought to redefine the implemented legal framework. Like the demands in Spain, the pronouncements of the Cibao petitioned for an end to specific infringements on liberties. In this case, they advocated for the emancipation of slaves. The pronouncement of Santiago specifically rejected the Constitutive Act of December 1 because it “maintains slavery disdaining the fundamental bases of every political society.”\textsuperscript{81} The document insists on emancipation when it states that the recognition of the Haitian constitution is attached with the “wish of general liberty for the slaves.”\textsuperscript{82} This challenge from Santiago was also stimulated because of disadvantageous economic conditions that defined local conditions from 1809 to 1821. The same document from Santiago explicitly condemns the Crown for demanding the service of soldiers without compensation. Therefore, it is possible that the pronouncements of 1821 in Monte Cristi and Dajabón were inspired more by the example from liberals in Madrid rather than from the order or suggestion of President Boyer.

If Spanish liberal philosophy had such anti-colonial effects then why was Spain able to hold on to Cuba and Puerto Rico? An answer may lie in Hispaniola’s political impasse and restructuring from 1795 to 1822. Unlike the unfavorable effects that the Haitian Revolution had in Santo Domingo, both Cuba and Puerto Rico experienced tremendous economic and population gains from it. First, the turmoil in Saint-Domingue shifted the sugar export industry to Cuba and Puerto Rico. Powerful planters and

\textsuperscript{81} Price-Mars, 117-118. \\
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 118.
merchants in both these islands were pleased with the profit that resulted. The growing
dependence on sugar made slavery the base of the economy in both of these islands.
Second, the white flight that the Haitian Revolution produced within Santo Domingo
helped to increase the population of its Spanish sisters in the Antilles. The influx of
conservative migrants there also fortified their growing slave system. Thus, the exit of
conservative and pro-Spain colonists weakened the political weight of said party in Santo
Domingo while it strengthened the same in Habana and San Juan. In turn, a growth in the
conservative elite strengthened the bond the islands had with Spain. The favoritism that
Spain had developed for these two Caribbean colonies had now increased with the loss of
its other colonies and the lucrative ascension of their agricultural production. The
continuous out migration of whites from Santo Domingo permitted Boyer to annex the
Eastern Part of Hispaniola with minimal objection from within Hispaniola.

However, the emigration of political dissenters from a given society usually does
not translate to a complete eradication of the opposition. The objection of these exiles to
the Boyerian Movement would emanate from abroad. Influential Dominicans managed to
relocate themselves within the high-ranking positions of the government of La Habana.
With their newfound political influence these exiles were able to challenge their previous
political adversaries from abroad. In this new society their political activity was no longer
irregular but rather welcomed and even protected. When Boyer facilitated the departure
of Dominican whites in 1822, he did not foresee that people like Felipe Fernández de
Castro would undertake an insistent campaign to undermine Port-au-Prince’s
administration of Santo Domingo. Fernández de Castro was the Controller General of
Santo Domingo in 1822 and that same year would go into exile successfully positioning
himself as the Commissariat General of La Habana.\textsuperscript{83} As early as August 1822, Fernández de Castro requested Rafael Morán (the highest official at the Secretary of Hacienda of the Indies in Madrid) for “the temporary license” to visit his homeland to reclaim his patrimonial belongings and to determine the possible measures to recuperate the Crown’s possession of said colony.\textsuperscript{84} Why was it Fernández de Castro who took on this project and not another immigrant? How much property did he lose in Santo Domingo? The documentation available does not clarify either of these matters. Historians do concur that Fernández was not alone in the endeavor of returning Santo Domingo to Spanish control. Since 1822, Dominican emigrants residing in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Spain had mobilized, “playing all their cards to reach the Spanish monarch.”\textsuperscript{85} These immigrants were displaced individuals who had lost much of their estate once Boyer expropriated them. The expropriation they considered as theft and felt annoyance at having to struggle in order to regain their prominence in lands that were already well populated by the affluent. However, they knew how to navigate the system and reach the ear of the monarch. The restoration of Spanish authority in Santo Domingo was important because it could facilitate the recuperation of their lost assets.

Morán consented to this request and allowed Fernández to travel to Haiti in January 5, 1824. Once he arrived in the port of Cap-Haitien, Fernández explained that his travel was a response to the decree of February 8, 1823 that gave absent Dominicans four

\textsuperscript{83} Carlos Nouel, \textit{Historia Eclesiástica: de la Arquidiócesis de Santo Domingo Primada de América} (Santo Domingo: Imprenta la Cuna de América, 1914), 367.
\textsuperscript{85} Nouel, 366.
months to claim their abandoned property.\textsuperscript{86} Although the allotted time for property reclamations had passed, Boyer agreed to meet with Fernández. In his account, Fernández observed that Boyer wanted to determine if Spain planned retaliation due to the loss of the colony. Boyer was highly diplomatic upon their encounter; supplying great details and credible reasons for why Santo Domingo had rightfully fallen under Haitian control and even agreeing to return all of Fernández belongings.\textsuperscript{87} Fernández wrote this account on July 6, 1824 as a survey of the conditions of the Eastern Part. The survey could give the Crown material that could strengthen their claims there. Since the account was originally written to persuade Spain to act, its depiction is clearly biased against Port-au-Prince. It provided a detailed and negative evaluation of the Boyer administration, citing recent local conspiracies in the East against the government and in favor of Spain, reported on the miserable salary of soldiers (two pesos per month), on the impediment of the free movement of blacks, of the poor access to education, and of Boyer’s inability to populate and develop the Eastern Part. The conclusion was simple: dissatisfaction with Boyer’s administration was widespread.

Fernández’s account has much in common with Columbus’ letters to Spain written three centuries prior during his first voyages to the Americas. Both communiqués were directed to the Crown and sought to encourage Spain to invest in the colonization of Santo Domingo. Both confirmed local sympathy for Spanish colonialism, the colony’s strategic location and the inadequacy of present administration there. Like the Columbus before him, Fernández’s letter also exhibits flaws in its key arguments. Specifically, he concluded that Port-au-Prince saw no “advantages from [keeping] the Eastern Part” for it

\textsuperscript{86} Moya Pons, \textit{la Dominación Haitiana}, 50.  
\textsuperscript{87} “Independencia de 1821,” 68.
is a “costly” and “an unfriendly neighbor.” However, Boyer’s defensive attitude and his efforts to show a more favorable depiction of his administration indicates continued interest in the annexed territory rather than disenchantment. Nonetheless, Fernández de Castro wrote and sent Madrid two other letters that were postmarked on July 8 and 11 respectively. Both letters provided a recent historical background on Santo Domingo and emphasized that the residents of the Spanish Part “are disposed to gathering their efforts at the first cry” in favor of separation from Haiti. Fernández acknowledged that he was deeply invested in Santo Domingo’s recovery.

Fernández’s investment in Santo Domingo, however, contrasts with Spain’s apathy. It took four years for Spain to formally endorse the committee for colonial restitution that Fernández requested. The National Archives of Cuba housed a “very reserved” text emanating from Madrid on August 24, 1829. This “soberana resolución” names “the Commissariat General of Cuba Sir Felipe Fernández de Castro in class of commissioner and in company of a trustworthy person that may serve as secretary and may be transferred in a ship of the Real Armada to Port-au-Prince with the objective of addressing the President of Hayti about the return to his Supreme Majesty of the Spanish Part of the island of Santo Domingo.” This resolución agrees to pay for possible costs that the commission may incur while in their stay at Haiti. Madrid opened by explaining that its internal problems in the recent past impaired her from exerting its “soft and paternal dominium” over Santo Domingo.

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88 Ibid., 75.
89 Ibid.
It then shifted to presenting its case for why it possessed the license to govern the territory in question. This letter encouraged the delegation to present Boyer with the following demands and conditions in diplomatic and friendly manner: Spain sought the return of its lost colony, once the restoration was effective Haiti would be compensated for the losses it may have incurred during their stay in the Eastern Part, there was no deadline for Haitian evacuation, and once the colony was returned Spain would recognize Haitian independence. In this “sovereign resolution” Madrid maintains a very generous tone that avoids conflict and appeals for a future accord on the issue. The reason behind the letter’s moderate tone may lie in the fact that for seven years Madrid neglected to emit even the softest whisper of objection after Boyer took control of the Eastern Part. Madrid may have expected Port-au-Prince to reject the claim that because of political turmoil it was unable to reclaim its colony. By 1829 (when the resolution was written), Madrid had enjoyed six years of stability. So if it was political instability that kept Spain from reclaiming its lost colony, then why did it not place its reclamation soon after stability was reinstituted in 1823? It was no news to anyone that Spain had a lukewarm relationship with Santo Domingo. Thus, the lack of urgency in Spain’s claim may be less the sign of diplomacy and more a sign of apathy. If it were not for Fernández’s persistent letters to induce Spain to act, it is doubtful that the Crown would have ordered such a mission. Spain’s indifference is confirmed by the delegation’s composition, which consisted of few or no political negotiators originating directly from Spain. Since the Crown did not dispatch one of its official advisors to command or even observe the

91 Ibid., 68.
mission, one can infer that Spain did not intend to revisit the matter in the future if Fernández failed to deliver the lost colony.

Once in Port-au-Prince, Fernández’s committee appeared to have employed a more forceful attitude than had been integrated within Madrid’s resolution of 1829. Upon their arrival, Boyer received the Crown’s delegates and immediately arranged for them to convene with General Baltazar Inginac, Senator Jean François Lespinasse and Coronel Marie Eustache Frémont on January 17 and 18 and later through written mode from January 19 through the 30th, 1830. As part of their claim, the Spanish delegation sustained that Haiti lacked the proper license to govern over the Eastern Part. Specifically, they stated that the Treaty of Paris of 1814 confirmed that Ferdinand VII enjoyed full authorization to govern the disputed territory. On the other hand, the Haitian constitution and the pronouncements from the East, they argued were not legitimate certificates that validated Haitian rights over the Eastern territory. Dominicans did not have the right to self-determination, unless his majesty had agreed to it. This right was reserved to the colonial state and not the colonist. And they sustained that Haiti’s constitution lacked international effect. There was no title under Haitian possession that Spain or any other international party endorsed that justified their camping in the East. The only international document that the Haitians possessed was the French ordnance of April 27, 1825. However, the document limited itself to recognizing the Haitian Republic as consisting of only the territory formerly known as Saint-Domingue. The commission clarified that the momentary occupation of said territory was warranted only if the occupier sought to protect the wellbeing of said population from an invading force. Such

invading force never existed. In conclusion, Fernández argued that Haiti’s entrance into Santo Domingo was irregular and its legitimate title-holder (Spain) requested an end to Haitian administration there. The delegation’s argument was direct, coherent and highly persuasive. The only piece the mission failed to possess was a French to Spanish translator.

In contrast to Fernández’s tighter argument, Haiti’s defense had significant defects. The Haitians argued that the Peace of Basel of 1795 ceded the Eastern Part to France; Haiti occupied this territory since 1801 and was therefore since an integral part of the Haitian territory. This first argument was unconvincing since Haiti did not exist as a state until 1804 and disappeared from 1807 to 1819 after it was partitioned into two territories. Also, all annexationist excursions from the West to the East had failed until 1822. This claim could not be verified for Haiti had no documentation that could confirm effective Haitian administration of the territory since 1801. The Haitian deputation also stated that from 1809 to 1821 Spain never objected to the Haitian Constitution, a document that clearly recognized the Eastern territory as integral. This assertion holds true for Spain and the city of Santo Domingo neglected to challenge the indivisibility clause of the Haitian Constitution although both were well aware of its language. However, Haiti was equally guilty of failing to present objection to another document. Haiti never objected to the Treaty of Paris of 1814, which returned Santo Domingo to Spanish control. In the contrary, Pétion and Christophe (the political heads of Southern and Northern Haiti respectively) had actually assisted in the War of 1809 to restore Santo

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93 Ibid., 474.
94 Ibid.
Domingo to Spanish control. Consequently, before 1821 Port-au-Prince lacked any official license to enter into Santo Domingo. It does not appear that Fernández’s delegation pointed out flaw in the Haitian’s defense.

The Haitian delegation’s key claim to legitimacy was the pronouncements of the Eastern provinces. Haiti argued that the majority of inhabitants of the Eastern territory had officially recognized the Haitian constitution’s supremacy there by 1822. The failure of the French Ordinance of 1825 to recognize the Eastern territory as Haitian did not invalidate Haitian rights there. They concluded that Haiti would not cede any portion of its territory, nor abandon the citizens it agreed to protect. Even though Spain considered them as irrelevant, the pronouncements from the Cibao and the Southwest were a strong asset to Boyer’s defense. If the mother country refused to take charge of its colony, colonists had the right to part with it and determine their own destiny. Again Spain chose to overlook the well-accepted liberal understanding that sought to empower the people.

The Spanish mission’s subsequent rebuttal on January 21 built upon their initial complaint. According to Fernández, the legitimacy of the pronouncements as reflecting the will of the people was no longer applicable since several revolts had shaken the Eastern Part since 1822, which sought to break away from Port-A-Prince. Fernández was specifically citing the alarming disturbances at Samaná in 1822, Alcarizos in 1824 and other smaller revolts. Fernández continued to invalidate the pronouncements when he argued that if the people wanted separation, the colonial power had to recognize the validity of such request. The acquisition of any given territory must be achieved

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95 Price-Mars, 105.
96 García, 478.
97 Ibid.
through proper channels such as war, treaty or ultimatum, not through silence. A formal declaration of war or treaty was never adopted. At the end of the deliberation it was clear that the Spanish mission was winning the debate. Boyer intervened on January 30 and brought the deliberations to an abrupt culmination. Boyer stated that if there was no other subject besides the return of Santo Domingo that the Crown sought to address, the conference was now closed.98

These deliberations sent chills across Haiti, as Port-au-Prince foresaw a Spanish invasion to or an internal revolt from the departments of Santo Domingo and the Cibao. Fernández’s mission failed to reach a diplomatic resolution to the issue and returned to La Habana empty handed. Still, the mission’s vitality and persistence put Port-au-Prince on the defensive. Fearing a naval invasion to the East from Puerto Rico, Boyer sent Coronel Tavares to Santiago, Coronel Moret to Samaná, and the Haitian army to Azua, San Juan de la Maguana, Montecristi, and La Vega.99 He also called for the doubling of agricultural production for the subsistence of troops. Also well-known sympathizers of Ferdinand VII were rounded up and persecuted. And Boyer ordered the removal and replacement of the Spanish coats of arms, which was stamped on public spaces, churches, convents, and substituted them with the republic’s in June 1830.100 Why did Boyer wait eight years to rid public spaces of the Spanish Crown’s seal? It is improbable that Boyer had considered the effect of such an emblem before the debate highlighted it. Nonetheless, Boyer wanted to ensure that Dominicans were not organizing in accordance with separatist ambitions. Boyer’s conspiracy theories concerning a Spanish invasion of

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 479.
100 Moya Pons, *la Dominación Haitiana*, 87.
Santo Domingo arose at least a year before Madrid’s communiqué to Fernández de Castro in 1829. On November 16, 1828, General Gerónimo M. Borgella tried to debunk rumors that a diplomatic accord between Spanish and Haitian diplomats had restored the Eastern Part to Spanish colonial status.\textsuperscript{101} In his speech, he mentioned the interception of letters from San Juan and La Habana warning eminent invasion of the Spanish armada to reclaim the Eastern Part and explained that accordingly the presence of the Haitian army on that side of the island was strengthened. He warned that “if there was to be any turbulence in the public tranquility,” its instigators would be severely disciplined.\textsuperscript{102} Boyer also wanted to discourage any discussion on the issue, particularly within mass homilies. Priests often used homilies to broadcast disapproval towards Boyerian policy.

Consequently, as a result of Fernández’s mission the most prevalent of the persecuted was the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Pedro Valera y Jiménez. Although the Church had hesitantly welcomed Haitians in 1822, it quickly grew averse to the Boyerian liberal thought. Boyer welcomed Protestantism and the Freemasonry, stripped the Church of its role in social services (particularly education and healthcare) and its authority over the processing of civil documentation such as certificates of marriage, birth, and death.\textsuperscript{103} The relationship between President Boyer and Archbishop Valera was strained also because Valera refused to satisfy Boyer’s request for the archdiocese to administer the disorganized Church in Haiti. Valera’s faithfulness to Ferdinand VII was unwavering and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[102] Ibid.
\item[103] Fernando Pérez Menem, \textit{La Iglesia y el Estado en Santo Domingo (1700-1853)} (Santo Domingo: Editora Universidad de la UASD, 1984) 478.
\end{footnotes}
his interest in cooperating with Haiti was minimal. Although the Archbishop was not directly involved with Fernández’s mission in 1830, with the end of the deliberations Port-au-Prince considered him persona non grata. Both Pérez Memen and Nouel argue that Haitian authority’s irritation with the bishop escalated to the point that they arranged for his assassination. The assassin, Romero, failed to carry out the order and Valera was forced into exile to La Habana on July 23, 1830.

Why did Boyer wait until July to expel the Archbishop if the deliberations ended in February? There must have been another altercation between the Church and Boyer that stimulated this confrontation. Again, the sources available make no reference to such an event. Nonetheless, Valera was highly popular in the city of Santo Domingo and, therefore, the general Dominican population did not receive favorably his exit and attempted assassination. The Church was the main influential body that remained in the Eastern Part after the annexation. Consequently, the expulsion of Valera was not only unwarranted but also counterproductive. Boyer was confronting his opposition using force rather than diplomacy. His increased coercive strategy would soon backfire transforming him from the “pacifier” to the instigator. The victimization of the Church brought the Dominicans masses to identify very strongly with this institution and grow increasingly disheartened with Port-au-Prince.

Boyer would realize belatedly that Fernández de Castro’s mission lacked substantial military force. He dispersed his troops in the aftermath of the conference in order to be cautious and prepared. But it was again an unnecessary display of force that must have produced discomfort in an already annoyed population. Indeed, Fernández’s

104 Ibid., 508.
105 García, 480.
mission was forceful in their demands but they arrived with a single warship.\textsuperscript{106} The limited quantity of the force that accompanied Fernández’s commission in January 1830 should have given Boyer an indication of Spain’s minimal interest in the recuperation of Santo Domingo. The contrast in military muscle of the French Ordinance of 1825 and that of Spain in 1830 was significant; the French did not arrive with a tone of pacific discussion as had Spain but with stern compulsion. Haiti could not alter the Ordinance; it was to be ratified promptly and unaltered and its implementation was immediate. Thus, Boyer’s defensive response to the conference manifested itself as groundless paranoia. As was to be expected, Spain silently acknowledged the loss of Santo Domingo. It never invaded nor did it readdress the subject of reclamtion in any other diplomatic forum. The fact that it was Fernández and other Dominicans that pushed for the effort rather than Madrid, shows that from the beginning the \textit{soverana resolución} was a onetime arrangement intended to satisfy the insistent whim of a displaced people.

In effect, the tangible efforts of the Catholic Church and the Dominican exile community did not awaken Spain’s interest in Santo Domingo. Although Fernández’s delegation made their case well, Spain opted out of the reclamation effort and thus solidified Port-au-Prince’s effective hold over the Eastern Part. Spain’s indifference here is peculiar for an empire that fought against its disintegration. Spain’s disregard for Santo Domingo could no longer be explained through civil unrest in Madrid. Indeed, it never had been. Spain had forgotten about Santo Domingo since the Peace of Basel in 1795 when it was ceded to France. With French confirmation of Haitian sovereignty and Spain’s lack of interest in Santo Domingo, it became evident that no other colonial power

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid., 458.
would try to interfere directly in Haiti. Boyer’s response to Fernández’s mission, however, strained the support he had established in the East. When it came to its hold over Santo Domingo, Boyer had won the battle against international forces but, as we will examine in the next chapter, he was losing the battle at home.
CHAPTER IV

BOYER’S HAITI: THE THREAT OF ACCRUED DEBT AND RACISM

With the unification of the North, South, and East Boyer had quadrupled his territorial command and demarcated the surrounding sea as the only recognizable border of the Haitian Republic. By 1822, his diplomatic campaign and the strategic segregation of functionaries had allowed him to consolidate politically an island that was previously splintered because of political distinctions. The failure of his challengers (Christophe, Núñez de Cáceres, and Ferdinand VII) to promptly respond to local demands and mediate among factions were fundamental circumstances that allowed Boyer to fulfill the indivisibility clause of the Haitian Constitution. Although Boyer’s accomplishment was sizeable, it lacked international scope. After almost two decades with effective and resilient sovereignty, Haiti still lacked international recognition as a nation-state. Boyer understood that if Haiti was to grow economically, its integration among nations was fundamental.

However, Boyer had overestimated the strength of the federation he had recently created. Diplomacy had delivered optimism to Haitians but was far from establishing lasting unison. Boyer was able to amalgamate Haiti but the nation was nothing more than a cracked glass; splintered because of linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences. He managed to preserve this cracked glass for twenty years through policies that kept Haitians uneducated and without access to reliable infrastructure. Also, Boyer built an enduring base of support by engendering a local peasantry through massive redistribution
of land and the eradication of slavery in the East. However, Boyer quickly made foreign affairs a priority leaving domestic policy often inadequately formulated and executed. His increased investment in diplomatic affairs resulted in French recognition of the Haitian Republic in 1825. The recognition came at a cost that was incongruent with nation’s revenue capability. Boyer would spend the subsequent years trying to placate popular frustration with the newly incurred debt. In addition, Boyer’s constant disregard for social services and the abundance of state-sponsored racial discrimination impaired the process of nation building. These errors would culminate in the spectacular unraveling of his administration.

Boyer contrasted with his predecessor for he was able to use diplomatic and military tools in conjunction to expand his political support within all of Hispaniola. The Haitian Revolution ensued in a two decades civil war that petrified locals and the international observer alike for its sanguineous propensity and its deep racial hostility. The Revolution left Haiti consumed in indefinite civil unrest and economic decline. Military betrayal brought the demise of Toussaint Louverture and Henri Christophe. Massacre and assassinations defined the rule of Jean-Jacques Dessalines and famine that of Alexander Pétion. Moreover, it was aggression that had brought all of these leaders to power. However, Boyer was a transition from this precedent. After the natural death of Pétion in 1818, Boyer rose to power in a quick, smooth, legal and bloodless procedure; a first since the start of the Revolution in 1791.107 The then forty-year old leader opted to continue with Pétion’s mild republicanism instead of Christophe’s imperial system. The contrast in the living conditions between the North and South was very wide, a fact that

increasingly favored Boyer for the South had a less oppressive system. Specifically, Michel-Rolph Trouillot explains that hundreds of Haitians died constructing Christophe’s palace of Sans Souci; some because of harsh labor and others “because they faced a firing squad for a minor breach in discipline.”¹⁰⁸ Christophe’s authoritarian regime had installed a robust economy in the North. He also attributed greater importance to education than his counterpart had in the South. But his administration was destined to expire due to inefficiency with regards to the organization of advisors. In August 1820, the military split after many of its top officers demanded to overthrow Christophe, who ultimately committed suicide rather than be a witness to his own demise.¹⁰⁹ As the regime to the North collapsed, Boyer marched with a small army to claim control there. Instead of calling for a blood bath of all of Christophe’s supporters, Boyer called for the composure from all parties. He had arranged for the protection and relocation of the wife and daughters of Christophe, escorting them as guests first to Port-au-Prince and later to England.¹¹⁰ James Franklin does not directly associate Boyer with any murder that transpired there instead he paints Boyer as a pacifier who acted quickly to placate the uprising. It takes a persuasive figure to penetrate an insurrection with a small force and bring about the subjugation of its people without resorting to aggression. Consequently, Haitians soon called him the “benefactor” and the “unifier.”¹¹¹ 

Boyer succeeded in his expansionist efforts because of patience and rhetorical persuasion. Similar to his procedure in the North, Boyer managed to absorb its eastern

¹¹⁰ Franklin, 230.
¹¹¹ Moya Pons, *La Dominación Haitiana*, 22.
Spanish neighbor without resorting to the use of force.\footnote{Franklin, 238.} As explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Boyer had vigorously invested in polishing his image among locals there. He waited for an invitation into the territory, which came more than a year after the consolidation of the northern and southern territories in August 1820. He was determined to follow the legal protocol for territorial annexation rather than resorting to a coerce invasion. Again, he was not the first Haitian leader to covet Santo Domingo. In particular, Christophe hoped to use much of his abundant treasury (nine million francs) to purchase Santo Domingo from Spain.\footnote{Ibid., 299.} This approach proved inconclusive after years of force labor decimated Christophe’s popular base that increasingly viewed him as despotic.

Boyer did not wish to buy Santo Domingo (granted Boyer no capital to complete such a purchase) or to take it by force. He wanted the colony to join his tutelage on its own account.

His calculating and paced proceeding may have been an effort to erect a nation that was based on his personality. Creating a favorable legacy appeared to be almost an obsession for Boyer for twice he explicitly rejected his cataloging as a “conquistador” and instead favored the classification of “pacifier” and “conciliator.”\footnote{Vega B, 169.} Boyer’s clarification is explicit in his letter to Núñez de Cáceres on January 11, 1822 and in the verbal address he made upon arriving to Santo Domingo on February 9, 1822. Once there, as an act of humility, Boyer reportedly rejected the keys of the city, which Núñez de Cáceres offered to him.\footnote{Ibid., 174.} With such an action Boyer might have attempted to channel the icon status that had kept Pétion in power until death. His soft seeming authoritarian
command stimulated the respect and support of the masses. Boyer had played the game well, marching into both the North and Santo Domingo as a pacifier that effectively placated an imminent civil war. However, Boyer is to some extent the instigator of these internal conflicts. He was always behind the background persuading and misinforming generals and state functionaries in order to sway them to his cause and away from their respective administrators in Cap-Haitien and the city of Santo Domingo. The strategy worked like a charm; showcasing to those closest to Boyer his competence in diplomatic manipulation. But if Santo Domingo was a wretched colony and therefore a possible burden to develop why was Boyer so interested in annexing it?

Boyer annexed both the North and the East in order to consolidate his power and eliminate the competition. Juan Bosch argues that Boyer sought the annexation of Santo Domingo as a vehicle to consolidate the resulting surplus of generals that previously composed Christophe’s military entourage. With the incorporation of a vast and under populated territory, Boyer could form new municipalities and garrisons and appoint this surplus of politically divergent generals to administrate them. The relocation and strategic segregation of Christophe’s former associates to a distant land allowed for Boyer to secure his authority over Port-au-Prince. Therefore, it is Bosch’s argument that the annexation of Santo Domingo was a necessary byproduct in order to preserve the unification of northern and southern Haiti. José Gabriel García agrees with Bosch citing that only with the incorporation of said territory could Haiti overcome the wars among interests, specifically between castas or wars among races.

116 Bosch, 221.
117 García, 472.
However, Juan Martínez Almanzar flatly rejects Bosch’s argument. Martinez argues that the aspiration to annex Santo Domingo existed long before Christophe’s suicide.\textsuperscript{118} Certainly the attempt to appropriate the Eastern territory was a cause that all of Boyer’s predecessors championed. According to \emph{British and Foreign State Papers} of 1821-22, it was Boyer who in 1806 proposed an article to that year’s constitution that “declared the entire island of Santo Domingo as comprising an indivisible republic.”\textsuperscript{119} Most politicians of the time agreed that having a defenseless and desolate colony in the East was greatly disadvantageous for the protection of the republic. Therefore, Price-Mars affirms that the annexation of Santo Domingo was an “absolute necessity” that Boyer would have pursued even if the pronouncements of the eastern provinces were never forged.\textsuperscript{120} Nevertheless, Boyer actively pursued and waited for the pronouncements’ legalizing effect. The pronouncements functioned as international accords with local officials that could be used if ever a foreign or local authority questioned the validity of the annexation. Thus, Bosch’s argument just does not hold since even with Santo Domingo under his wing, Boyer would ultimately lose control over the military and political structure he presided over. In fact, the greatest threat to the infant unification was not military disagreement but racial, social and political inequality.

With a larger and more diverse field to govern, Boyer would be tested on his ability to consolidate this different and larger Haiti. By February 1822, Boyer’s agenda should have included the following national issues: emigration and land abandonment, racial discrimination, linguistic and cultural divergence, investment in human capital,  

\textsuperscript{118} Martínez, 212.  
\textsuperscript{119} Baur, 316.  
\textsuperscript{120} Price-Mars, 191.
improvement of infrastructure, fortification of the export economy, the creation of a local peasantry, the establishment of new municipalities and appointment of their respective administrators and diplomatic recognition of the Republic. Boyer chose to focus first on economics and the restructuring of the political apparatus. Boyer’s first policy change was the abolition of slavery in accordance with the demand of the pronouncement of Santiago. Roberto Cassa indicates that the emancipation of slaves was not wide in scope or significance for the newly acquired territory only encompassed eight thousand slaves or about eleven percent of the total population of Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{121} Thus, the eradication of slave labor in 1822 did not translate to a mayor economic transformation in Santo Domingo for the economy was minimally dependent on it. The recent and extended struggle for freedom in the West had progressively drained Santo Domingo of its developing \textit{latifundista} sector through the emigration of much of its ruling class. With the abandonment of the large estates, slavery did not expand as did in Puerto Rico and Cuba. The conditions of slaves in the East were increasingly dissimilar to those who had been slaves in the West. James Franklin confirms this scenario when he elucidates that “there were but few slaves in this part of the island, and those were living in so great a state of equality with the people, that slavery was only known by name, and they evinced no desire whatever to throw off their adherence to their masters, and join their brethren of the West.”\textsuperscript{122} Other primary accounts, such as that of Jonathan Brown and John Candler, agree that slaves on the Spanish side enjoyed a more paternalistic relationship with their masters and consequently explains why they were disinclined to replicate a slave

\textsuperscript{121} Cassa, \textit{Historia Social}, 317.
\textsuperscript{122} Franklin, 184-185.
revolution in the East. Nevertheless, by 1821 emancipation was a widely desired objective in the East.

Congruently, the emancipation of slaves should not be belittled. Why would the pronouncement of Santiago specifically demand for emancipation if it were not significant? The effect of eleven percent of the population is not as small as statistics may indicate and as Cassa sustains. If slaves lived in such harmony with the free, it is possible that the free desired the improvement of slaves’ condition. There may have existed a close association between the small slave community and the more substantive free mulatto population in Santo Domingo. Nevertheless, Boyer’s economic policies would significantly benefit the rural and Afro community of Santo Domingo. A large portion of the emancipated (then called the “liberated of the palm”) was drafted into the military to compose Battalion 32. This newfound position of authority was a significant ascension for men that were previously destined for just one occupation: brute hard labor. The success of these early measures gave Boyer significant momentum to continue policies that ensured both effective security and the establishment of a peasantry.

The next step was the incorporation of the Eastern Part into the managerial political body. Among his first measures was redefining political divisions of the state that in 1822 now constituted six departments: the North, Gonaives, West, South, Ozama and Cibao. The last two departments consisted of the entire territorial area of the former Spanish colony and as mandated by the decree of February 27, they were now entitled to nominate delegates to the legislative Chamber of Deputies for a five-year term.

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123 Brown, 139
125 Martínez, 222.
The delegation represented lower districts called communes of which include: Santo Domingo, Las Matas de Farfán, San Juan, Neiva, Azua, Bani, Seibo, Higuey, Samaná, Cotuí, La Vega, Santiago, Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi. The representation in the Chamber between west and east was unequal but proportional since Santo Domingo was greatly under populated. As for the Senate, all of the Spanish Part was allowed one representative, Antonio Martínez Valdez, which was elected for a nine-year term. The historiography does not indicate if Martínez remained as senator for the twenty-two years or if there was ever a successor, leaving many to believe that Santo Domingo lacked senate representation for much of the 1830s. The representative inequality within the Senate is significant since, this body had greater influence and access to the President than the Chamber of Deputies. The voice of Dominicans would be greatly muffled by the preponderance of Haitians within the Senate. President Boyer would also silence Dominican political participation by making municipal governance there presidentially appointed positions. Congruently, he appointed trustworthy Dominicans and Haitians to these posts, functionaries who may have not even spoken the language of the people they governed in the East.

The nomination of Haitian military and political elite to municipal government positions in the East intentionally disempowered the local white elite. The city of Santo Domingo had always been the center of the Hispanic and Catholic consensus within the island. The city’s resolution to undermine Port-au-Prince’s unification efforts with the declaration of Spanish Hayti in 1821 would render all of its sponsors as unqualified for political activity. Similarly to how he dealt with the residual military forces of

126 Garcia, 433.
127 Ibid.
Christophe’s regime, Boyer sought to dispel the base of the pro-Hispanic party within Santo Domingo. The effect of the discrimination against divergent parties was obvious, culminating in the emigration of conservative elites of such as José Núñez de Cáceres, who relocated to Venezuela and later to Mexico. With the exit of Santo Domingo’s main political architect, Boyer hoped to strengthen his support base within the city, which had traditionally been very weak. This move is a classic political strategy known today as the spoils or patronage system, employed by presidents such as Andrew Jackson. However, making politics exclusive was contrary to the unification effort that the republic required. In a recently integrated society that suffers from resounding cultural, linguistic, religious and racial diversity, the practice of the spoils system is counterproductive to the confederacy for the variety of representative voices is shut out from government. Rather than governing as delegates, public officials mandate without representative legitimacy. In essence, Boyer was diverging from his diplomatic propensity and establishing a system that echoed only his own ideas. This echoing effect would be problematic since Boyer’s liberal ideals contrasted heavily with Dominican conservatism and it disfavored Haitian blacks.

The political silencing of the pro-Hispanic party transferred congruently to the economic policies that Port-au-Prince opposed. One of the first and major policy excursions was the redistribution of lands in Santo Domingo on October 12, 1822. The decree stated that the state would confiscate 1) the property belonging to the Spanish and French Crown, 2) the convents, ecclesiastical hospitals, chapels and all mortgage of the

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128 Ibid., 432.
Cathedral, and 3) property of all absentees and political criminals.\textsuperscript{129} There was vast extends of fertile lands that were uninhabited and thus unproductive. For instance, in 1809 Dorvo Saulastre notes that there was only a small hamlet between Cotuí and the city of Santo Domingo, a distance of 105 km.\textsuperscript{130} Considering that migration from the Eastern Part only increased after that year, it must follow that population decreases only worsened by 1822. Therefore, Boyer had to address land redistribution and population growth if agriculture was to develop in the East. The republic was within its rights to expropriate Crown’s territory and to regulate the exploitation of these abandoned lands.

However, the expropriation of the Church’s and emigrants’ property was counterproductive to Boyer’s efforts to gain a support base in the city of Santo Domingo. Among the first to protests were the relatives of the absent who deemed themselves as the legitimate keepers of these estates. The indignation was so great that on February 8, 1823, Boyer would decree that immigrants could reclaim their lands if they returned within four months to live permanently in Haiti.\textsuperscript{131} Few answered this timeline and thus much of the land was eventually confiscated. More importantly, the decree was widely unpopular among Catholics. The Church and peasants who exploited ecclesiastical land were the most injured by the law. The Church was being sacked of its several hospitals, all of its rents and even its lodging (five convents and all within their premises). Although the legislature approved the measure, the Church deemed it unlawful for it trampled over its constitutional rights of private property and unrepresentative because the legislature was a pawn of Boyer and not of the masses. The state’s sequestering of ecclesiastical

\textsuperscript{129} Moya Pons, \textit{La Dominación Haitiana}, 48.
\textsuperscript{130} Jorge Machín, “Orígenes del Campesinado Dominicano Durante la Ocupación Haitiana,” \textit{Eme Eme} 1, no. 4 (1973), 19.
\textsuperscript{131} Rodríguez Demorizi, \textit{Invasiones}, 309.
property was not a policy simply adopted in Haiti but also in neighboring infant states such as Mexico. This assail on the Church’s property rights was a byproduct of the liberalism emanating after the French Revolution, which sought to check the Church’s power by regulating its economic influence. Much of the confiscated property was intended to propel a land reform that sought to establish a local peasantry. Unlike the emancipation efforts in Brazil and the United States, Haiti in fact donated land to the freed so that they could engage in independent agriculture.\(^ {132}\) The concept of attaching emancipation to economic freedom was a sound undertaking. Political liberty is not conducive to freedom if the venue for degradation is primarily a financial one.

Nevertheless, the Church was distraught with the proceedings. The Governor of the Department of Ozama, General Gerónimo Borgella, was selling for his own profit much of the sequestered property to friends or awarding them to military officers and functionaries of the republic rather than to peasants and the freed.\(^ {133}\) This expropriation was clearly tainted with corruption and it disproportionately favored a few affluent Haitians at the expense of white *criollos* and Catholics. Accordingly, the Church felt victimized and effectively subjugated. Essentially, the dispossession of the Archdiocese of Santo Domingo was yet another strategy to decapitate the economic stronghold that whites enjoyed in Santo Domingo and that Boyer saw as threatening to his administration. However, the expropriations did not attempt to expel the Church from the island. Boyer was not the epitome of anti-clericalism as many would like to paint him. As Fernando Pérez Memen points out, Boyer had invited Archbishop Valera to administrate

\(^{132}\) Moya Pons, *La Dominación Haitiana*, 45.
\(^{133}\) Peréz, 473.
the Church of western Haiti and to relocate his seat in Puerto-Au-Prince, offer which the Valera rejected in good reason.\textsuperscript{134}

Nevertheless, the decision to dispossess the Archdiocese of Santo Domingo was by all measures detrimental to the nascent confederacy. The Church enjoyed tremendous popularity within Santo Domingo; they had been the only entity to remain within the colony throughout its various political transitions in the three hundred year history of western European presence. No matter how popular Boyer had become over the past four years, his popularity was incomparable to that of the Archbishop of Santo Domingo, Pedro Valera y Jiménez. The popular backing of the Church would manifest itself with the formidable incident at the Alcarizos in February 1824, which sought to reinstate Ferdinand VII’s command over Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{135} The failed projected of Alcarizos involved the participation of a diverse and prominent membership: three captains of the National Guard, a clergyman, sub-lieutenants, several policeman, members of the elite and many regular private citizens. The diversity, scope and organization of this incident showed that Boyer’s recent legal undertakings were simply unsatisfactory. Concurring that the extent of Church expropriations was excessive and detrimental, the legislature had to amend the expropriation law on July 8, 1824, and designated Catholic priests and nuns as state salaried functionaries, an offer which the Archdiocese also rejected.\textsuperscript{136} As with the amendment that granted immigrants four months to return and reclaimed their sequestered property, Port-au-Prince was resorting to amending recent laws that were obviously incongruent with public sentiments. The inefficiency of Boyer’s administration

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 501.
\textsuperscript{135} García, 448.
\textsuperscript{136} Rodríguez Demorizi, \textit{Invasiones}, 311.
was manifesting itself with these amendments. Even with pronounced manifestation of disapproval, however, the legislative body would continue to disregarded the popular will and retract on policies it should have not passed in the first place. The continuation of the spoils system as means to govern a diverse and disjointed population would subject all future economic legislation to similar paths of disapproval and early expiration.

Port-au-Prince’s focus on property regulation went beyond the premises of the Church. In the first three years, Boyer was determined to reanimate the economy’s pre-Dessalines dynamism but these early policies were contradictory to that goal. In 1823, Boyer suspended all commercial communications between Haiti and the other islands in the Caribbean. The first law specifically terminated the profitable and diverse trade between the ports of Puerto Plata and Monte Cristi with Jamaican ports. This impediment diminished demand severely troubling the outlet for the agricultural goods (such as tobacco, rice, beans, peas, Indian corn, mahogany, horned cattle and dye-wood) produced in La Vega Real. This policy specifically disfavored the very eastern region that had welcomed Boyer with open arms, the Cibao. If Boyer sought to fortify Haitian economic activity then why did he obstruct already existent profitable trading venues?

The historiography bypasses this early policy in order to analyze the more alienating effects of successive economic policies. But such bypass of Boyer’s first political excursions can conceal much about the leader’s early agenda. On April 12, 1823 the Niles Weekly Register published and translated Boyer’s isolationist proclamation. In it Boyer explained that the decree was warranted because the adjacent islands and the communities on the mainland had the “most embittered slanders” that insulted “our

137 Franklin, 293.
national character” and depicted Haiti as an aggressor. Moreover, these states supported the “traffic in human flesh,” and encourage “smuggling” into Haiti. With this isolationist policy Boyer may have also been trying to use commerce to compel its neighbors to reconsider their support for Haiti’s political isolation. Frank Moya Pons adds that Haiti isolated itself commercially because these communities saw Port-au-Prince’s presence within the Spanish side as illegal. Nevertheless, only merchants who became naturalized citizens of Haiti were allowed to sustain commercial interaction with places such as Curacao and Saint Thomas. The effectiveness of the policy is doubtful although islands like Saint Thomas immediately asked Port-au-Prince to retract this measure and new political dialogue did follow.

In general this policy and those following distressed those in the East. People on the Spanish lobbyied to unify with Haiti because they sought to expand their consumer base and develop their commercial potential. The isolationist policy of 1823 had the adverse effect. The following economic policy that Boyer legislated in 1823 presented yet another abrupt disruption to commercial traditions, the eradication of communal land rights. Dominicans saw this as unnecessary interference on traditional patronage. Boyer saw it more as a regulation of property titles. It was an effort to develop a productive relationship between people and land. By 1824, Boyer had delivered substantial land reform. Out of the 316,544 people living in the French side 126,617 were landed property owners and the remaining 189,927 were exploiting the land either as

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138 Niles Register, “Republic of Hayti,” April 12, 1823, 96.
139 Moya Pons, 51.
140 García, 441.
141 García, 452.
squatters or salaried laborers. Nevertheless, now that the state had acquired and regulated all this land how did it ensure that it was put to productive use?

In order to jump start the economic performance of the island, Boyer passed the Rural Code in 1826. The Code attempted to reinforce a system of agricultural feudalism based on a system of compulsory labor, which generated exportable products. All except state functionaries were compelled to work under a contractor, all those who wished to set up shop in towns rather than work in agriculture needed to obtain a legal license from a Justice of the Peace and children were expected to continue their parents’ occupation rather than attend schools. The Code obstructed the free movement of labor, discouraged entrepreneurship and education. Like the economic policies before it, it tried to meddle with key cultural diversions of the Eastern Part. Specifically, the Code abbreviated the plethora of saint's days and outlawed cockfighting except for Sundays in order to discourage worker idleness. The infringement reached across both religious and secular cultural traditions, indicating an unwarranted broadening in the power of government. For decades, both Southern Haitians and Dominicans were greatly accustomed to soft and distant governments. However, the Code was the return of a long forgotten encomienda like system that attempted to coerce people into labor. Due to its radical authoritarian nature, the Rural Code was unsuccessful. As Roberto Marte points out, the new system fell short of completely breaking with pre-capitalists traditions. For example, workers were not compensated through a fixed salary but were entitled to a

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142 Roberto Marte, Estadísticas y Documentos Históricos Sobre Santo Domingo (Santo Domingo: Amigo del Hogar, 1984), 14.
143 Baur, 334.
144 Ibid.
145 Balaguer, 15.
146 Marte, 14.
portion of the rent that the land generated. Due to their inability to opt out of such labor, the recent emancipation and the land reform were deficient in quality. Not only was the legislature continuing to pass policy that was out of tune with the attitude of the masses but also these laws were in direct opposition to the previous ones. Boyer’s first decrees sought to develop an independent peasantry though emancipation, land reform, and the drafting of freed males. The Rural Code was simply incompatible with these previous economic reforms for it involved coerced labor and a continuation of slave-like employment proceeding. The policy was an effort to remedy the deficit inherent with the ratification of an international treaty.

The Rural Code was a desperate byproduct of the French Ordinance of 1825. On July 3, 1825, French envoy Baron Mackau arrived with three warships (carrying white flags) to deliver a treaty to Port-au-Prince, which recognized its former colony of Saint-Domingue as the newly constituted Republic of Haiti. France was the first nation to recognize Haiti, a distinction that Boyer and all Haitians alike had desired with earnest. However, King Charles X had placed a price tag on the newfound independence of 150 million francs to be paid in five annual installments. The money would serve as reimbursement for the French plantation owners that were dispossessed and displaced with the Haitian Revolution. The Ordinance involved an unprecedented fee for diplomatic recognition and was especially ludicrous for a state that still struggled to reanimate its economy. As Price-Mars explains, the treaty is coined today the “French Ordinance” for it did not lend itself to any significant reform from the Haitian party. In

147 Price-Mars, 234.
148 Cassa, Historia Social, 320.
149 Price-Mars, 235.
other words, Mackau was not empowered to make any further negotiation when in Haiti. It should be noted that it was President Boyer himself who proposed the idea of indemnification for state recognition without fixing a numerical figure to such reimbursement.\textsuperscript{150} Port-au-Prince had been courting Paris and other world capitals for years with the idea of recognition. This proactive diplomacy turned reckless as the ratified treaty effectively diminished the de facto independence that was already at hand by placing the national treasury in a state of prolonged indebtedness. Essentially, King Charles X had put Boyer’s diplomatic appeal to the test and it had failed miserably. Robert Lacarte argues that with the Ordinance, Charles X intended to slowdown Haitian economic interaction with Great Britain and the U.S. and maintain Haiti locked within the French economic orbit. Certainly, Haiti was Britain’s third largest economic partner, claiming half of all Haitian exports in 1832.\textsuperscript{151} The treaty sought to divert Haitian exports away from London (Paris’ main competitor), the sabotage would stimulate further Haitian distrust of the Caucasian community and curtail the development of a profitable relationship with the British.

Boyer ratified the treaty not because of naïveté but because of international isolation and French pressure. London, Washington, and other capitals refused to recognize Port-au-Prince in part because of its pronounced constitutional bias against whites, which were not allowed to own land.\textsuperscript{152} The impediment for foreigners to own the means of production placed Haiti as a place where foreign investment was tactless. With the Ordinance Paris was guaranteeing Haitians an end to French invasions and economic

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
reassurance, offer that no other state had presented. The offer was seductive but Boyer understood that Haiti lacked the means to fiscally sustain the accord. The treasury was depleted and the economic reforms already implemented had failed to stimulate commerce. In addition, the Ordinance did not supply any venues for significant profit for Haitians. Under the treaty, all French merchandise would enter the Haitian market free of import taxes for the first five years, after these five years expired said export would only pay half duties and enter ports with preferential status. In addition, any Haitian imports entering French ports would pay discounted tariffs. The treaty was akin to a free trade agreement. Haitians could not benefit from such a partnership for there was no capital at home with which to purchase goods and infrastructure was unsatisfactory for the transport of products from the interior to the ports. The Ordinance further complicated matters when it failed to recognize Haiti as encompassing the whole island, thus excluding the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo from the agreement.

Therefore, Haitian expansion into the East was deemed irregular.

So, if Haiti consisted of only the French side of the island, was Paris basing the 150 million francs settlement fee on Saint-Domingue’s revenue prior to 1790? The historiography does not expand on the tools Paris used to arrive at the 150 million francs indemnification price. Nevertheless, the 30 million expected as the first yearly installment was incongruent with the island-wide revenue of 1825. Thus, in order to increase the gross domestic product Boyer put forth the ambitious Rural Code and compelled Dominican cities to share in the economic burden when it requested that they contribute 4.5 million gourdes (the then national currency in Haiti) annually to accredit

153 Price-Mars, 220.
Although Dominicans were only responsible for paying fifteen percent of the annual installment, many felt that the East had no debt to pay to France. In their defense, the treaty consciously excluded Dominicans as parties in the settlement. Why should Dominicans pay for damages resulting from a revolution that they had not been a part of? The passage of the Rural Code only aggravated the displeasure that the signing of the Ordinance caused a few months prior. The forced labor that the Rural Code sponsored further infuriated citizens on both parts for they saw it as a crude trampling of their constitutional rights of liberty and to state protection. Specifically, article 178 stated that children would be compelled to work along side their parents rather than seeking a divergent condition.\(^{156}\) This was a continuation of slave like policy that derogated residents to a fixed profession. Although Haiti had been triumphant during the revolution, it was being compelled to pay a defeated enemy. Also, Dominicans felt deceived by Boyer’s promises of military and economic incubatory protection. If the Ordinance and the Code were so widely unpopular, how did Boyer’s administration survive such a mistake?

Although the elite deemed the recent international accord disadvantageous, their dissatisfaction with the regime did not escalate to destabilizing effect for Haiti did experience significant gains from 1820 to 1830. Population growth within the Spanish Part accelerated quickly surpassing that net growth in other countries of the time.\(^{157}\) Roberto Marte claimed that this growth was a byproduct of Boyer’s land reform. There was significant growth in the harvest and exportation of mahogany, logwood, and

\(^{155}\) Ibid., 71.
\(^{157}\) Marte, 12.
tobacco and stability in the sale of cacao.\textsuperscript{158} Most of these crops were grown on the Cibao and Southwest, regions that had sponsored the Boyerian Movement of 1821. These crops were more adequate for small plot holders for they did not require massive labor.\textsuperscript{159} To some degree, the profitable situation of these merchants allowed Boyer to hold on to power. The credit they acquired helped ease the regnant absence of capital that kept Boyer under constant problems of deficit and paper money deflation.\textsuperscript{160}

The other factor that saved Boyer’s administration was the quick eradication of many of the unpopular policies adopted. The implementation of the Rural Code extended itself for less then a year. Acknowledging the severe unpopularity that both the Ordinance and the Code had produced, in 1827 Boyer decided abolished the Rural Code.\textsuperscript{161} The Ordinance was the only policy he could not retract, and which led to the adoption of further debt from French banks in order to pay each installment (Haiti did not possess any banks at the time). In short, his administration survived the alienating effects of these policies because by 1830, Boyer had heavily invested in land and population redistribution, stimulated the growth of a local peasantry, strengthen the tobacco and mahogany industry in the East, obtained diplomatic recognition from France and later from Great Britain and effectively fought off Spanish reclamation for Santo Domingo. Also, Boyer was still less authoritarian then both Dessalines and Christophe. Nevertheless, he overlooked two fundamental problems within Haitian \textit{de facto} management: \textit{de jure} racial discrimination and underinvestment in human capital.

\textsuperscript{158} Robert Cassa, “La Sociedad Haitiana de los Tiempos de La Independencia” in \textit{Duarte y la Independencia Nacional} (Santo Domingo: Ediciones Intec, 1976), 63.
\textsuperscript{159} Marte, 32.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{161} Cassa, \textit{Historia Social}, 323.
Boyer was unconcerned with the racial exclusive environment within Haiti. In 1804 Haiti became the first Black republic, a distinction which mulattos and blacks everywhere found laudable. For mulattos on the Cibao, the political entity across the border was not an arbitrary construction but a society they admired and wish to join. However, Dessalines, Pétion, and Boyer and to a lesser extent Christophe were hesitant to incorporate whites as contributors and members of the nascent nation-state. Haitian independence came riding on a wave of racial bias. The mutual racially charged condescension and the manipulation that resulted between blacks and whites stimulated Haitians to declare within article 14 of the Constitution of 1805 that all Haitians would be “denominated generically as blacks.”

Equating nationalism with race was understandable for Saint-Domingue had fervently coalesced around the idea of black freedom and black empowerment. It presented itself as a safe haven for all blacks within the Americas, a generally rejected and abused people in the hemisphere. Nonetheless, in 1816, Pétion’s constitutional revision eliminated this clause from the document. Possibly because he found the language personally threatening as he and most of his advisors were mulattos.

However, the revision felt short of purging the document entirely of ethnically-based biases. Some of its most controversial segments include article 38 that outlawed any white from acquiring land, article 39, which states that only whites who had not joined the state before 1806 could enjoy the privileges of Haitian citizenship and finally article 44 states that any black, indigenous person or any who possesses such background no matter their place of birth shall be recognized as Haitian if he wished to relocate to

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162 Ibid.
163 Price-Mars, 198.
Haiti.\textsuperscript{164} Since 1805, Price-Mars explains, legislators believed that by stripping whites of
the right to own property they would ensure the infinite extinction of slavery in the state.
Although Santo Domingo possessed a strong white conservative population count, Boyer
did not amend out these articles with its annexation in 1822. Boyer was unconcerned with
winning the support of whites in the Eastern Part and thus felt little remorse when
hundreds of white fled the island after his agrarian reform, which disproportionately
violated the interests of this community. He chose to fill their void by sponsoring the
relocation of six thousand freed blacks from Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia, and
Boston to Hispaniola from 1824 to 1826.\textsuperscript{165} Boyer expected these city dwellers to settle
in rural locations across the island\textsuperscript{166} to help exploit fertile abandoned lands. Upon
arriving, these immigrants scattered to the cities and hundreds returned to the U.S.
disappointed with the rural, culturally divergent and racially charged setting that they
found in Haiti.\textsuperscript{167} In other words, the courting of American black migration made it clear
that Boyer was not only disinterested in enticing the return of Dominican conservative
whites but was uninterested in white immigration to the island in general. This attitude
went against the common immigration preferences exercised by most of Haiti’s
neighbors.

The harassment of whites in Santo Domingo should not be simplified as immoral
and racist. Boyer was a result of his time, a player who wanted his team (mulattos in
Port-au-Prince) to win against the another competent opponent (whites conservatives in

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 197.
\textsuperscript{165} Dennis Hidalgo, \textit{From North América to Hispaniola: First Free Black Emigration and
Settlements in Hispaniola} (Ph.D. diss., Central Michigan University, 2001), 2.
\textsuperscript{166} Their descendents still live in places like Samaná, continuing with Protestantism and
speaking English.
\textsuperscript{167} Baur, 327.
Santo Domingo). He understood that cooperation was unfeasible because the contender could not be trusted. They were engaged in a zero sum game where only one could win. The presence of the other within the exclusive circle of influence allowed for the possibility that the losing side could return and displaced the previous winner with the passage of time. The de facto disadvantage that whites endured under the annexation to Haiti, Price-Mars sustains, may have provoked whites to self-identify as light skinned mulattos or mestizos in order to avoid legal persecution.\textsuperscript{168} Such a scenario would contrast heavily with present local and regional encouragement to whiten in order to attain effective suffrage and be more employable. This enticing hypothesis also merits further archival research. Particular attention should be given to property deeds and Catholic baptism records. Does the count of ethnically mixed people in the Catholic registry match the frequency with which these appeared within property records?

Nevertheless, the racial problem within Haiti was not specific to whites. There was also evident discrimination against blacks under Boyer. With the demise of Dessalines and Louverture, the separation between South and North was not just a political one but also encompassed a division based on ethnicity, Pétion and Boyer (mulattoes) against Christophe (black). Pétion and Boyer were members of the small but dominant mulatto community in Haiti, which kept the black masses often at a distance from all matters of influence. The chorus of disappointed voices concerning the racial issue in Haiti included the American Jonathan Brown. Brown wrote in 1837, “prejudice of color existing among the mulattoes in relation to their fellow citizens, the blacks, is almost as great as that once entertained by the whites of the colony against the class of

\textsuperscript{168} Price-Mars, 204.
The common conclusion was that mulattos generally wanted to keep blacks uneducated and in a state of abjection; a condition many like Brown considered a disappointing result of the Haitian Revolution. Felix Darfour (an immigrant from the Sudan) best paints the disadvantage of blacks. In August 1822, Darfour read a famous petition addressed to the Chamber of Deputies that vocalized his disgust with the racial bigotry against blacks and demanded political reform that made government more reliable and accessible. Boyer and his official newspaper Le Telegraphe deemed the manifestation seditious and ordered the arrest of senators, deputies, judges and other functionaries who had sponsored Darfour’s reading and ordered the execution of the petition’s reader. The degraded condition of blacks within Haiti invalidates the claim of Manuel Peña Battle that Dominicans were the only victims of racial exploitation under Boyer. In effect, only mulattos in the West enjoyed the full range of citizenship rights.

The only venue available for socio-economic mobility was military involvement. Mimi Sheller sustains that then “citizenship was defined by the elements of duty, obedience, and obligation (what the citizen owed the state), which far outweighed the rights-based elements of what the state owed to its citizens.” The military was the only venue for social ascension. The influence of the military was such that it received the largest portion of public expenditures within Boyer’s budget and all communes were effectively administrated under the authority of the Commandant de Place and his

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170 Price-Mars, 265.
171 Ibid., 267.
troops. This picture shows a clear union between the civil and military spheres. The comfortable condition of men in uniform reveals much about the state of key social services such as education and healthcare. According to James Franklin, Boyer had closed the various schools Christophe had erected in the North and recycled the space into “barracks for the military.” Under Boyer the military grew at the cost of education and other social services. This is best depicted after Boyer brought about the closure of the University of Santo Tomás de Aquino with the military draft of December 1823, which compelled all males from the age of 16 to 25 to join the armed forces. By cutting off its main consumer base, the oldest university in the Western Hemisphere was forced to close its doors permanently. The situation left the Church (who administered the institution) ruined for most of its avenues had now vanished. John Chandler observed on 1842, that Port-au-Prince funded the existence of only two schools: an unsatisfactory public elementary school (with eighty two students on the roster) and a reputable lyceum (with a hundred and fifty students on the roster) both of which mainly served mulatto boys. The carelessness with regards to education may also indicate negligence in sanitation, infrastructure, and nutrition. Robert Lacerte expands on the issue of scarcity when he informs that people had limited access to flour, bread, salt, beef, pork, fish and lard. In effect, Boyer’s refusal to produce human investment, his failures with economic policies and the unsatisfactory results in foreign policy stimulated a slow but certain shrinkage of his base of support.

173 Sheller, 99.
174 Franklin, 398.
175 Moya Pons, *La Dominación Haitiana*, 54
177 Lacerte, 510.
The persecuted political dissenting voice in Haiti managed to coalesce and expand through effective use of the media and legislative elections. According to Mimi Sheller, the small community of educated youth within Port-au-Prince increasingly deemed Boyer’s republic as a farce, highlighting the evident problems with citizenship, race, political participation and social services.\footnote{Sheller, 113.} They publicized their dissatisfaction through establishing newspapers and running for office using the campaign platform of reform. Newspapers were the only venues of power that the youth had at their disposal since aging functionaries commanded over most civil and military leadership positions.\footnote{Ibid., 116.}

*L’Union* and his editor Emile Nau vocalize the opposition within the capital.\footnote{Price-Mars, 273.} On the electoral campaign field, the two political forces behind Boyer’s slow but sure demise were Herárd Dumesle and David Saint-Preux, two young deputies who were illegally expelled from the Chamber in 1833 for fiercely pushing for reforms that Boyer disfavored.\footnote{Ibid., 280.} With such a measure Boyer was again making sure that the opposition was checked and silenced. However, the electorate challenged Boyer’s executive order when it reelected in 1837 and again in 1842 these same previously ejected representatives (from the communes of Cayes and Aquin respectively).\footnote{Sheller, 119.} Furthermore, both election cycles ushered the liberal opposition to majority status within the Chamber of Deputies. Their victory was facilitated with the media’s sponsorship of the rising liberal wave. Particularly, an article in *Le Manisfeste* demanded for equality before the law, access to education, and commercial credit for workers.\footnote{Sheller, 119.}
The stage was set for a clash between the relentless opposition of youth and the stubbornness of the Boyerian doctrine. Boyer refused to accept a consecutive electoral defeat and was adamant about further cooperation with the opposition. He tried to use the National Guard against the popular mulatto politicians seeking reform. Boyer, the “pacifist,” now rejected diplomacy and chose coercion. This stalemate produced the Revolution of Praslin, which brought the eventual demise of Jean Pierre Boyer in 1843 after the military refused to carry out his orders.\footnote{183 Baur, 348.} Boyer’s fatal blow had not come from white Dominicans, Catholics, blacks or the military, but rather from the sons of those closest to him. Furthermore, these subversive forces came from the South; the region which first brought him to power. In a sense, those who best vocalized their dissatisfied with the administration were those closest to Port-au-Prince, young insiders who had long enjoyed effective suffrage.

In short, Boyer was a despot but he could govern. His early diplomatic predisposition propelled him to use his newfound leadership over the South to successfully invest and gamble for the control of an island that was long divided because of political greed. His patience and rhetorical allure were more effective weapons than Christophe’s arms and Núñez de Cáceres’ isolated political campaign. His deliberate focus on economics materialized in significant successes of which include: the emancipation of slaves in the Eastern Part, the birth of a rural peasantry with the execution of sweeping land reform, and the fortification of the tobacco and mahogany industry in the East. On the other hand, Boyer made substantial mistakes in his approach to domestic and international political disagreement. The ratification of the French
Ordinance of 1825 and the passage of the Rural Code were costly missteps in the President’s genuine effort to reanimate the Haitian economy. His overemphasis on economics was counterproductive in the long run. Other crucial matters such as education and ethnic bigotry he entirely disregarded in a misguided effort to ensure the survival of the established social order. Without Jean Pierre Boyer the unification of the island could not be achieved and with him it could not be maintained. His exile in 1843 followed an almost century-long period of Haitian political stability and economic decline. Boyer’s inability to install a republic that was dependable to all of its residents drove Dominicans and Haitians alike on separate journeys to determine the basis of their national identity, the purpose of their governments, their relationship to each other and to the conglomerate of nations.
CHAPTER V

THE EAST’S SEPARATION FROM HAITI AND THE LIMITATION OF DOMINICAN NATIONALISM IN 1844

The removal of Jean Pierre Boyer in 1843 ushered in substantial administrative reform to Haiti. This reexamination of the government’s structure prompted a review of state-sponsored racial prejudices. The review resulted in a power struggle between blacks and mulattos to determine who would be the new executive-in-chief. Similar to the political impasse that occurred in 1807 with the death of Dessalines, the exit of Boyer introduced a fierce dispute that threatened the indivisibility of the island. Although the intensity of the disagreement was most apparent in the Western side of the island, the quieter Eastern Part was the side vying to break with Port-au-Prince. Boyer had not delivered on his promises to integrate Dominicans as full-fledged Haitian citizens, his flaring authoritarian presence there was deemed degrading and his policies counterproductive. Consequently, Dominicans wanted separation from Haiti.

However, the conservative (Afrancesados) and liberal (Trinitarios) parties could not agree on whether separation entailed sovereignty. The debate over Santo Domingo’s political future was further complicated with the manipulation from French diplomats, who sought to establish a French protectorate there. Contrary to popular understanding, the Afrancesados always had the upper hand in all political matters. Although the Trinitarios were working in a political and economic vacuum, they attempted to reverse their isolated condition through a substantive persuasive campaign that also hoped to
prompt Dominican nationalism among the masses. However, their ambitious pitch for independence did not elicit a majority backing in the 1840s. Therefore, the Dominican Republic was founded under the wing of a hesitant elite class and a weak nationalism. The birth of this republic in 1844 came about because the Afrancesados were unable to convince any given world power to establish a protectorate over the breakaway territory.

After the demise of Jean-Pierre Boyer, the ruling class of Santo Domingo could only agree on single plan, separation from Haiti was necessary. On January 16, 1844 approximately 150 of Santo Domingo’s most influential residents signed the “Act of Dominican Separation from the Haitian Republic.” According to the document, separation was necessary for a number of compelling reasons: Dominicans never received Haitian citizenship, right to privacy was disregarded, the condition of commerce and agriculture worsened, the rights to property were trampled with the law of 1824, the church was dispossessed, local Hispanic and Catholic traditions were not respected, Dominicans were forced to pay a debt184 they did not contract, and Riviere (Boyer’s successor) did not include Dominican representatives among his advisors.185 Based on the Act’s list of motifs, the traditional explanation that the separation came about because of religious and ethnic differences and because Port-au-Prince oppressed residents on the East (the reasons that Rodríguez Demorizi, Peña Battle and others embraced) is a misleading oversimplification of this matter. The primary criticism of the union was that Haiti failed to protect the economic interests of Dominican elites and the bourgeoisie; as a result, this segment was the most interested in separation. Unlike Santo Domingo’s first

184 After extensive negotiations, France reduced Haiti’s debt from 150 to 60 million francs on 1838.
185 Vega B., 189-199.
declaration of independence in 1821 written by Núñez de Cáceres, this second attempt consisted of a more diverse backing including the voices of conservatives, liberals, the military, mulattos, whites, and priests. After providing the reasoning behind the separation, the document announced the creation of a democratic regime under the name, the Dominican Republic, which would ensure fundamental rights to education and property and secure freedom of speech, press and religion.

The act, however, does not explain why the Republic merited the name “Dominican.” The term “Dominican” to classify the residents of the Eastern Part is employed in Núñez de Cáceres’ 1821 declaration of independence. Therefore, the birth of a Dominican identity did not result from Port-au-Prince’s twenty-two years governance over Santo Domingo. According to Esteban Deive, the term’s origin dates to sometime in the 1700s. Deive clarifies that the first written account that associates the term “Dominican” with the settlers of Hispaniola is in Luis Joséph Peguero’s work, Historia de la Conquista de la Isla Española de Santo Domingo Trasumptada en año de 1762. However, this source does not expand beyond the association it makes. Many today speculate that the Dominican Catholic order inspired this noun. Further research is needed to explain why this specific term was coined and why it survived. Nevertheless, there is a clear embrace of “Dominicana” over other similar names such as Quisqueya,

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186 Vega B., 162.
187 Carlos Esteban Deive, “Cuando y por qué Empezó a Haber Dominicanos,” in Los Dominicanos Vistos por Extranjeros (Santo Domingo: Banco Central de la Republica Dominicana, 2009), 36.
188 Haiti is a Taíno word understood to mean high or mountainous land. The name is fitting since the island of Hispaniola is 1/3 mountainous and holds the highest point in the West Indies, the Pico Duarte. On the other hand, Martir de Angleria invented the term “Quisqueya” in the early 1500s. Although Quisqueya should hold less legitimacy, today it is a widely used synonym of Dominican.
Santo Domingo, Spanish Haiti (this was the name that Núñez de Cárèeres sponsored), and the Spanish Part (term Boyer embraced). The choice of the Act’s signers indicates a complete rejection of the Taino word (*Haiti*), which would hence be an exclusive referent to the Western portion. Boyer allowed locals in the East to uphold their divergent traditions and coalesce under the term “Dominican” through his use of discriminate legal coercion such as prohibiting the use of Spanish in official government matters. President Boyer was just not that invested in the “Haitianization” of the Eastern territories. By closing down schools and discouraging education, Boyer ensured the survival of a separate identity to the East.

Another significant feature of the Act of 1844 was that it opted against using the word “independence,” which Núñez used in his pronouncement of 1821. The word is completely absent from the text. Victor Garrido agrees with Leónidas García Lluberes that the word “independence” is absent because the two words were interchangeable in 1844 Santo Domingo.\(^{189}\) The argument has validity since although Núñez’s used the word “independence,” a protectorate with Gran Colombia rather than sovereignty was his main objective. Therefore, the “independence” he sought lacked autonomous substance. The probability that his successors would have a similar take on this word is probable since both generations belonged to a parallel educational background. Whether the exclusion of the word “independence” within the Act of 1844 was a conscious decision or not, it is clear that the endeavor for sovereignty was not one that Dominicans universally embraced. Haiti’s political structure had collapsed and the time was ripe for the disgruntled whites and conservative class in Santo Domingo to choose a different course.

\(^{189}\) Garrido, 88.
The options were two: to create a sovereign republic or to mobilize and establish a protectorate under the wing of France, Spain or Great Britain. The influential ranchers and merchants of the Dominican south preferred France, which is why today they are classified as the *Afrancesados* (the French leaning). This was a group of economically and politically connected individuals, which included Buenaventura Báez, José Caminero, Tomás Bobadilla and Pedro Santana. They sustained that a new republic lacked the resources to protect itself from Haiti and from covetous imperialist forces. In addition, they feared that alone Santo Domingo would sustain indefinitely its economic depression.

With these fears in mind the *Afrancesados* supported the Levasseur Plan. Nicolás Andrés Levasseur was the counsel general of France in Port-au-Prince during the 1840s; a manipulative diplomat who Jean Price-Mars claims was sabotaging Haiti with the introduction of fake paper money and by encouraging separatist movements in the Eastern Part with the promises of French military support. Buenaventura Báez met privately with Levasseur in the months prior to the drafting of the Act of 1844. Their meeting produced an accord known today as the Levasseur Plan, which planned to subordinate Santo Domingo under a French protectorate and stipulated for the secession of the peninsula of Samaná to France in perpetuity in order to incentivize Paris to accept the Plan. With this Plan the *Afrancesados* were returning Santo Domingo to its previous condition in the early 1800s, when Santo Domingo (then under French

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191 Price-Mars, 386.
administration) was used as a land bridge to recuperate the lost colony of Saint-Domingue.

Under the manipulation of French diplomats, the *Afrancesados* were positioning Santo Domingo to re-embark on the same path a preceding generation had rejected just thirty-five years prior. In order to give continuity to Dominican separatist inclinations, Levasseur arranged for the appointment of another French consulate on the island, this time locating it in the city of Santo Domingo under the administration of his associate, Eustache de Juchereau de Saint-Denys in 1843.¹⁹³ The Plan was the exclusive undertaking of these two ambitious and scheming diplomats. Since the Levasseur Plan was not an initiative that Paris proposed, both Saint-Denis and Levasseur engaged in extensive persuasive dialogue with France’s Minister on Foreign Relations, Guizot.¹⁹⁴ The numerous letters¹⁹⁵ among them give extensive reports on the unfolding situation in western and eastern Haiti, all intended to persuade France to accept Santo Domingo’s self-offering. Only the determination of Boyer for island unification in 1818 could match the ambition of these diplomats. It appears that Paris entertained the diplomat’s idea for months before reaching a final decision.

In direct opposition to the *Afrancesados* was a group of urban bourgeois youth, who self-identified as the *Trinitarios*. This independent secret society was installed in July 16, 1838 under the presidency of Juan Pablo Duarte, the iconic figure Dominicans consider today as the founder of the republic.¹⁹⁶ Few scholars explain why the formation

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¹⁹³ Price-Mars, 303.
¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 304.
¹⁹⁵ These letters are so numerous that Rodríguez Demorizí compiled them in a book titled *Correspondencia del Cónsul de Francia en Santo Domingo*.
¹⁹⁶ García, 500.
of the *Trinitaria* happened on this date rather than at an earlier or later time. José Gabriel García explains that Duarte had just then arrived to Santo Domingo from his studies in Europe and must have noticed that the departments in the East were undergoing a continuous and pronounced decayed under the governorship of General Carrie. There churches and buildings for public services were in ruins, streets were impassable with the unchecked growth of weeds and the unregulated transit of cattle that stopped to graze there, and the agriculture of coffee and cacao had turned into impenetrable forests.\(^{197}\) Duarte’s incentive to start the *Trinitaria* may have resulted from a combination of his immersion in the revolutions of Europe and Latin América and his disapproval of seeing his countrymen adopt a passive attitude in the face of their lamentable condition.

In an effort to built support among the masses, Duarte designed the *Trinitaria* to appeal to Catholics, to the young, and to those who enjoyed the arts. Doubts still exist concerning how the society got its name. One of its founding members, José María Serra explains that the name was chosen because there were nine founding members, who were subdivided into groups of three and thus constituting a trinity. Duarte’s sister, Rosa Duarte, challenges this explanation by asserting that the organizations’ founding members consisted of more then nine. It is possible that the reasoning behind the name was more religious than structural. The *Trinitaria* was an outlier within Santo Domingo; few locals espoused their agenda of forming an independent republic in the East. In addition to the merchant class of the central south, the Catholic Church also disapproved of the cause for independence. The Church’s disapproval of their mission was a significant hindrance to the realization of their mission. The Vicar General of the

\(^{197}\) Ibid., 499.
Archdiocese of Santo Domingo, Tomás de Portes e Infante, championed the path of a French protectorate.\(^{198}\) Although there were some priests such as Gaspar Hernández who inclined in favor of a protectorate under Madrid, Portes chose France because Espartero’s regime in Madrid had adopted an anticlerical attitude, which the Holy See saw as conducive to the destruction of the Church there.\(^{199}\) The odds were against the *Trinitarios* for they lacked basic support from influential circles. As a means to increase their sponsorship, the society intertwined their political agenda to Catholicism. Christianity was a critical element of the organization, being present in their induction oath and their motto (Dios, Patria y Libertad), in the flag they designed and which Dominicans still raise today (with a dominant white cross separating the rectangles and at its center the coat of arms with a bible headed by a yellow cross), and christening the country they created as “Dominican” (alluding to a Catholic order). In other words, naming their organization as “the trinity” gave continuity to their Christian based agenda. The unquestionable Christian inspiration behind the *Trinitaria* may have been a strategy to invite Catholics to join the cause.

The *Trinitarios* also used theater and drama as a medium to prompt patriotism among the masses of the capital. In Rosa Duarte’s notes she explains that in 1838 the organization created an auxiliary society named the “Filantrópica” or the Philanthropic. This society showcased classic theatrical dramas that that showed how the people “day by day understood their duties with their fatherland.”\(^{200}\) The Philanthropic produced dramas such as Vittorio Alfieri’s *Bruto Primo: Roma Libre*, Martínez de la Rosa’s *La

\(^{198}\) Peréz, 613.

\(^{199}\) Ibid.

\(^{200}\) *Apuntes de Rosa Duarte: Archivo y Versos de Juan Pablo Duarte*, ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Santo Domingo: Editora del Caribe, C. por A, 1970), 47
Viuda Padilla, and Eugenio Ochoa’s Un Día del Año 23 en Cádiz. As John Leslie explains, the use of Alfieri’s drama to advance a political agenda was simultaneously practiced in places like Montevideo, thousands of miles away from Santo Domingo. This theatrical phenomenon emanated from Spain and was commonly showcased from 1813 to 1830, the age of revolution. The selection of the plays is thus a direct result of Juan Pablo Duarte’s stay in the Iberian Peninsula. The Philanthropic did not only serve a purpose of acculturation or of stimulating patriotism, it was also a cover to the Trinitaria for its political vendetta against Port-au-Prince. Using theater rather than writing as means of mobilizing the masses was well guided tactic for illiteracy was rampant. Also the hidden message of the plays allowed viewers to engage in an activity that they would have rejected if it involved a more overt political propaganda. In accordance with Maríano Saviño, dramas also provided a means to survey the opinions of the masses concerning separation with Haiti and to help finance the purchase of ammunition (tickets cost eight pesos). It is not apparent, however, that the Philanthropic consisted of a traveling theater since the records indicate that it was only reserved to the Cárcel Vieja, “an imposing building situated next to the Palace of the Haitian governor.” Also, their plays might have only engaged a regular and nearby audience, thus limiting their reach to remain mostly cyclical and restricted rather than dispersive and expansive. In other

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204 Saviño, 9.
205 Ibid., 8.
words, the extent of their persuasive campaign was reserved to the city of Santo Domingo.

This proved to be a problem since the most fervent political opposition stemmed from people who were highly mobile, merchants. Merchants were constantly on the move trying to collect and sell merchandize across the provinces. Their agility allowed them to be well versed on various contemporary issues and to establish a far-reaching network of supporters. Since Santo Domingo lacked fundamental mediums for information distribution such as newspapers (all of which were in the Western part and all of which were in French), merchants and other mobile individuals became the informants for the masses. The oral accounts these merchants provided were influenced by their political ideas, which often leaned on the conservative side. Therefore, the *Trinitario’s* goal to evolve Dominican identity into nationalism was running against a whole oral tradition of communication that went against their agenda. In other words, if the *Trinitarios’* were to realize their mission they needed to branch beyond the capital city and bring their campaign to other municipalities. As evidenced in 1821, the influence of the municipalities could drown the conservative mandate from the city of Santo Domingo. However, the *Trinitarios* lacked the resources that Boyer as a head of state had in 1821 to deliver such a favorable change in attitude. In their defense, Duarte and his affiliates attempted unsuccessfully to obtain significant support abroad in places like Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and even in Port-au-Prince.

Due to the friction existent between *Afrancesados* and *Trinitarios*, the Act of Dominican Separation had an element of impasse and thus lacked immediacy concerning post-separation projects. This impasse is revealed when we consider the question: if the
Act were signed in January why was the military declaration of separation delayed for more then a month? It appears that the document was not publicized immediately after it was ratified. Haitian authorities continued to administrate Santo Domingo in tranquility and ignored the existence of such document. A full frontal assault against Haitian authorities could not be carried out since more then half of the Act’s signers (the Afrancesados) were still waiting to hear from Paris on whether it had ratified the Levasseur Plan and whether it had approved the promised military aid to Santo Domingo. Without these reassurances from France much of the backing behind the document refused to enforce it or broadcast it until April 25. As a way to undermine the negotiations with France, the Trinitarios pushed forward the official proclamation of separation from Haiti to February 27. If the Afrancesados was the party that wanted to hold out, why did the Trinitarios wait a whole month to declare the separation? According to Moya Pons, the Trinitarios were fervently trying to persuade the powerful ranchers of El Seibo, Pedro and Ramón Santana, to support the cause for independence. An endorsement from Ramón Santana (the politically moderate of the brothers) was fundamental to the survival of the independence. In addition, the absence of the society’s leader, Juan Pablo Duarte, may have stalled the proceedings even further.

Now under the leadership of Francisco del Rosario Sánchez and Ramón Matías Mella, the Trinitarios would declare the formation of the Dominican Republic because

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206 Moya Pons, La Dominación Haitiana, 162-163.
207 Ibid., 164.
208 Juan Pablo Duarte and other Trinitaria founders were forced into exile to Venezuela on August 2, 1843 after Haitian President Charles Herárd descended onto the Eastern departments incarcerating all known separatists.
they were able to obtain key endorsements. On February 27, a handful of armed
*Trinitarios* took hold of the La Puerta de la Misericordia and La Puerta del Conde, the entryway to the city of Santo Domingo.\(^{209}\) These insurgents were able to present a successful campaign against the Haitian defenses because they managed to convert Haiti’s main body of defense to their cause, the freed black and mulatto soldiers that composed Regiments 31 and 32.\(^{210}\) This major support was realized not simply because the *Trinitarios*’ reassurance that slavery would not be reinstituted within the new republic but also because the alternatives (a return to French or Spanish control) were detrimental to their overall ambitions within the military. It should also be noted that the insurgents were able to obtain the temporary support of politician and *Afrancesado*, Tomás Bobadilla.

The *Trinitarios* were able to masterfully overcome their limitation, temporarily displace the majority voice (*Afrancesados*), paralyze the local Haitian regency, and produce their preferred outcome. Under the mediation of French Counsel Saint-Denys, the *Trinitarios* demanded the orderly evacuation of all Haitian functionaries from the Eastern Part within ten days.\(^{211}\) The insurgents had left Haitian authorities of Santo Domingo in such a defenseless condition that they resorted to the protection of the French diplomats. Their defenseless condition was not just the result of the desertion of Regiments 31 and 32, but also because the Eastern Part had never attained a strong French Creole-speaking presence. In other words, because Haitian authorities did not encourage the free movement of its citizens across the island, they stood alone in Santo

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\(^{209}\) Moya Pons, *La Domininación Haitiana*, 164.

\(^{210}\) García, 556.

\(^{211}\) Price-Mars, 312.
Domingo and unable to recruit possible supporters. The Spanish Part was a backwater within Haiti, a place barren of opportunities that could not stimulate Creole-speaking Haitians to relocate there. Also the poor condition of the infrastructure and the uncertainty of the Haitian political apparatus made it difficult to quickly summon and relocate Port-au-Prince’s military to Santo Domingo to ensure island-wide unity. As agreed upon, Haitian functionaries handed the city over to a Governmental Junta on February 29, then left by boat on March 8, while other Haitian civilians were required to leave within a months.\(^{212}\) Due to the eminent threat of war, the *Afrancesados* had to accept the premature realization of Santo Domingo’s separation. Haiti had refused to grant Dominicans the independence they sought, for Haitian leaders believed that Dominicans lacked the tools and the will to institute a sovereign state. Port-au-Prince was aware of the *Afrancesados*’ inclination to return Santo Domingo to French control, a project that it wanted to prevent at all costs. Haitians had invested extensively since the early 1800s to ensure the end of European dominance on the island. This threat was reassured with the incorporation of *Afrancesados* within the newly instituted governing Junta in the East.\(^{213}\)

However, Haitian authorities were unable to challenge Dominican ambitions since their military competence had diminished with the exit of Boyer. President Rivière Hérard responded to the separation by sending thirty thousand armed men to recapture the territory on March 15, 1844. The forces planned to pacify the Eastern Part with the reapportionment of forces into three wings: the one heading southeast headed by Herárd, the second descending from the north lead by General Pierrot and the third approaching

\(^{212}\) Ibid., 313.
\(^{213}\) Ibid., 382.
from the center led by General Souffrant. This was the first invasion of Haitian forces since 1805 into the Eastern territory and the second overall. By March 18, Herárd’s forces were able to take hold of the municipalities of San Juan de la Maguana and Las Matas fairly easily. The Haitians vastly outnumbered (even more so after the first and third wings combined in battle at Azua) the Dominican soldiers, which did not surpass the ten thousand. The victory in the Southwest would be the only major triumph for the Haitian side, however. The troops never reached Santo Domingo because local defenses in Santiago and Azua impeded their progress southeast. According to José María Imbert’s (the General defending Santiago) report of April 5, 1844 to Santo Domingo, “in Santiago, the enemy did not leave behind in the battlefield less then six hundred dead and…the number of wounded was very superior…[while on] our part we suffered not one casualty or a wounded.” The disproportionate loss of Haitian lives against Dominicans leaves historians to this day dumbfounded. It is specially perplexing considering that this was the army that a generation earlier had defeated the imposing force sent from France, Great Britain and Spain and that in 1844 a small and immature guerrilla combats were quickly overpowering.

Boyer’s mistakes and his exit crippled Haitian defenses rendering it ineffective in defending the unity he had established. A reason behind the unsatisfactory performance of Haitian troops was that they did not understand the importance of the cause for which they were fighting. Santo Domingo was a distant, peripheral place, where most soldiers did not sustain any connection and thus they deemed as alien. Boyer and his successors

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214 Ibid., 331.
215 Ibid., 332.
216 Ibid., 336.
kept Santo Domingo underdeveloped and disconnected. When the Eastern Part became restless, those to the West were indifferent to it. Therefore, the Haitian-Dominican War was an unpopular affair in the West. Did soldiers determined to spill their blood in order to prevent the loss of Santo Domingo? Did they consider President Herárd as their legitimate commander-in-chief? Many within the Haitian military wanted to eject Herárd from office. As Price-Mars explains soldiers were suffering from conflicting political ideologies that distracted them from solely concentrating on the mission at hand, securing the East.

In addition to the glaring political discrepancy, the morale of the troops descended further due to the deplorable conditions they were fighting under. Soldiers were being asked to walk barefoot and with minimal food supply a distance of 330 kilometers and the replenishment of ammunition was not guaranteed. The combination of all these unfavorable elements produced significant troop desertion in Herárd’s wing while in Azua. Furthermore, the lack of communication between the wings descending from the North and the South increased uncertainty and decreased optimism among the Haitian troops. This lack of interaction allowed the North wing to accept false rumors of President Herárd’s death during the battle in Azua. This rumor stimulated Pierrot to sign a peace treaty with General Imbert on March 30 in Santiago and soon after brought him to promptly return to Haiti. As evidenced by Imbert’s letters to the Junta in Santo Domingo, communication among the Dominican front was effective giving them yet another advantage besides motivation, access to food, etc. Although President Herárd did

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217 Ibid., 334.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid., 341.
not die in Azua, his political career would expire while fighting there. The liberal forces that President Herárd had solicited to overthrow Jean Pierre Boyer would call for his removal after he closed the Haitian National Assembly in 1844.\textsuperscript{220} The altercation that ensued in the West forced Herárd to suspend the assault on Azua by April. The Piquet Rebellion forced Herárd into exile in Jamaica and cleared the way for Phillippe Guerrier to quickly replace him.\textsuperscript{221} Henceforth Haiti would not see the type of stability that Boyer commanded, as presidents would come and go without following legal succession procedure. Nonetheless, Haitians armies would repeatedly threaten Dominican independence until 1856 when Port-au-Prince finally recognized its sovereignty on the East.

Although Dominicans had managed to hold off the assault from the West, the political disagreement between \textit{Afrancesados} and \textit{Trinitarios} did not dissolve with the victory at Azua and Santiago. The invasion of Herárd’s army had temporarily united Dominicans in order to expel their common adversary. As a means to produce a stronger defensive front against Herárd’s invading army, Sánchez and the \textit{Trinitarios} forfeited leadership of the Junta in early March to Bobadilla and other conservatives. Once Herárd was no longer a problem, the existent conflict of interests between these two factions would reemerge and cause a power struggle. The proactivity of the \textit{Trinitarios} on February 27 brought them island-wide fame, a status that positioned them as influential individuals possessing credibility and bargaining leverage. Duarte, Pérez y Piña, and other exiles \textit{Trinitarios} returned to the liberated Dominican territory on March 15. Soon upon their return Duarte and his affiliates commenced an island-wide march to multiply

\textsuperscript{220} Sheller, 134.  
\textsuperscript{221} Sheller, 137.
their popular support. The mission sought to overwhelm conservative projects that intended to replace the republic with a protectorate. On June 9, the Trinitarios and Coronel Gabino Puello led a successful governmental take back, which involved the removal of Bobadilla and his affiliates from the Junta. Duarte quickly was called the “patriarch of the fatherland” and gained the rank of General. Such early titles testify to his persuasive appeal and his increasing influence within the early military. Duarte also collaborated with the recent war hero, General José María Imbert. Their collaboration and Duarte’s march into the Cibao delivered the Trinitarios unquestionable popularity within the main cities of the region, Santiago and La Vega.

Duarte’s march across the Cibao was important but inopportune. Pedro Santana, the General who defeated Herárd at Azua, refused to be compliant with the increasingly influential Trinitarios. He penetrated Santo Domingo with more then two thousand soldiers, demanded the title of commander-in-chief and the dissolution of the liberal Junta. A massive entourage ushered Duarte to the North, effectively draining the capital of his affiliates and guaranteeing Santana a quick takeover of the city. Santana’s counter-revolutionary move reignited the classic conflict between the Central-south and the Cibao. On July 19, Santiago and other municipalities of the Cibao declared Duarte “president of the Dominican Republic, with the condition that he salve the country from foreign domination and that he may convoke the constituency and remedy the crisis of the Public Treasury.” The now pro-Trinitario Cibao threatened to secede the infant republic without Duarte. The Afrancesados in the capital chose to silence the Cibao’s

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222 Rosa Duarte, 72.
223 Henríquez, 197.
224 Garrido, 130.
225 Rosa Duarte, 87.
request and demanded for the blood of the *Trinitarios*. The capital’s despotism increased the potential for a civil war and the self-destructive of the republic.\textsuperscript{226} The *Trinitarios* understood the importance of the Cibao, a region that in 1822 had silenced the capital and granted Boyer the Eastern territory. However, the liberals underestimated Santana’s ambition and his swiftness. The removal of Bobadilla and Báez was a significant step, but the real military force behind the conservatives lay in Santana. Therefore, the liberals should have checked Santana’s forces before leaving the capital city. This mistake would cost them the political and military leadership they had just attained.

Why did Santana’s counter-revolution wait an entire month after the *Trinitario*’s revolution of June? Was Santana waiting for the *Trinitarios* to vacate the capital city? Or was this delay the result of hesitation on behalf of the General to counter attack and if so who convinced him to do so? The degree of manipulation that Saint-Denys exerted over Santana is glaring. Acting as the controllers of the conservative chess pieces, Saint-Denys reports, “I have obligated Santana to refuse the dictatorship… and to conserve the Junta… eliminating the members introduced with the coup d’état of June 9 and arranging for the return of those arbitrarily expelled.”\textsuperscript{227} Saint-Denys’s letter implies that Santana answers to him. His advise to Santana was very practical. According to the diplomat, if Santana declared himself dictator rather than president of the Junta, this declaration would alienate the Cibao and usher in a civil war. What is less clear is what was the response of the *Trinitarios*. Gabriel García sustains that Duarte capitulated in favor of Santana in order to impede the evolution of war.\textsuperscript{228} Neither the notes of Rosa Duarte nor the writings

\textsuperscript{226} García, 598.  
\textsuperscript{227} Garrido, 131.  
\textsuperscript{228} García, 597.
of the *Trinitario*, José María Sierra, expand on this specific account. The reason as to why the *Trinitarios* fell so easily when they enjoyed the full backing of the Cibao is another area that merits further study.

This black and white imagery, where Duarte is self-sacrificing and Santana and Saint-Denys are despotic is troublesome and over simplistic. Since the regime of Rafael L. Trujillo, the *Trinitarios* are increasingly lauded as heroes while their opponents are deemed as obstructionist extremists. If this depiction were accurate, Santana would have never enjoyed such support from a people that understood well and rejected dictatorial policy. On July 12, 1844, the United States chose to paint Santana in a more favorable light describing the General as possessing much courage, “prudence and modesty,” of being “laborious,” generous and that he genuinely “desires the best for his country.”

His actions are not that different from those that Boyer took in 1822 or the *Trinitarios* in June 1844; all of these parties opted to persecute and remove the opposition from political participation. Such intolerance is more reflective of a society that is unacquainted with the democracy they wished to establish and less an indication of vile individuals. Although Santana persecuted the *Trinitarios*, he did not call for their assassination. In accordance with Saint-Denys, Santana pushed for the political ostracism and the expulsion from the republic of all the *Trinitarios* and their families in September 1844. Due to his pronounced manipulative style, Saint-Denys is someone who merits also a more detailed study. He was no ordinary diplomat. Saint-Denys had managed to convince educated mature men that they were defenseless against this same enemy they had just defeated. Moreover, he had had degraded a victorious and united community to

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229 Garrido, 132.
turn against itself in spectacular fashion and managed to remediate the eminent war, which his manipulation may have produced. The diplomatic manipulative quality of Saint Denys runs parallel to that of Boyer.

But even with all of Saint-Denys’ manipulative skills, however, his letters failed to convince the French Crown. On March 19 and again on July 20, Foreign Minister Guizot writes Saint-Denys and Levasseur, “it is not convenient for France to again take hold of that island.”\(^{230}\) According to Guizot, Paris refused to pacify an island that continued to be the theater of obvious and continuous “interior dissentions.” He reaffirmed France’s respect for Haitian sovereignty, promised recognition of Dominican autonomy and encouraged all other world powers to do the same.\(^{231}\) However, there is more behind Guizot’s abstinent and diplomatic demeanor. French policy on foreign affairs was one that involved a standstill concerning direct intervention in Latin American affairs. Favorable commerce between France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States had forged a collaborative association among these states. French intervention within Santo Domingo would have given France an irregular advantage over the others and negatively affected their intertwined commercial flows.\(^{232}\) Unlike conservatives in Santo Domingo who had forgotten the toll the French domination had exerted over the colony, Paris recognized and rejected the cost that such a restoration entailed. Ultimately, both the British and the French reaffirmed that only Spain had the right to intervene in Santo Domingo, offer that the Spanish again discarded.

\(^{230}\) Price-Mars, 524.
\(^{231}\) Ibid., 526.
\(^{232}\) Peréz, 616.
Therefore, it was mainly because of imperialistic restraint that the Dominican Republic became an independent state in 1844. The autonomous liberal movement had failed against the conservative protectionist consensus, positioning the republic to be merely a temporary condition. The republic was officially on the path to termination on June 1, 1844 after the governmental Junta ratified the “Reiteration of the Petition for the Recognition and Protection of France.” Although Duarte and Sánchez retracted their signatures from this document with the coup they sponsored that month, the counter-revolution of Santana put a definite silence to the independent struggle. It was mainly because Paris and Madrid decline to accept this political tutelage that the republic was born in 1844 and persisted beyond that year. Therefore, Joaquín Balaguer was misinformed when he stated that Santo Domingo was highly “coveted by all the colonizing powers of the 18th and 19th century.”²³³ To the contrary, the list of states that rejected Santo Domingo’s self-offering is lengthy: Gran Colombia in 1821, Spain in 1830 and 1844, and France and Great Britain in 1844.

Dominicans would be forced to remain a nation-state because they refused to be part of Haiti and because they were rejected by all others imperialist forces. This hesitation within the ruling elite to establish a nation-state also impeded the promotion of Dominican nationalism. The feeble nationalism engendered in 1844 was one of the main reasons why the republic expired in 1861 with its annexation to Spain. The annexation was a direct breach of the noninterventionist restrictions that the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. This Doctrine was a U.S. foreign policy that discouraged the European powers from renewing their colonialist presence in the Americas. It happened simultaneously as

²³³ Balaguer, 182.
France intervened in Mexico. The Spanish annexation of Santo Domingo and the French intervention in Mexico attest to the limited enforceability of the Monroe Doctrine at a time when the United States was caving into civil war. Nonetheless, Santo Domingo became a persistent thorn in Spain’s side, whose prolonged indecision concerning autonomy enticed separatist’s discussions in Cuba and Puerto Rico.

The Dominican Republic was the idea of a group of bourgeois young men called the *Trinitarios* who lacked political influence but who possessed tremendous ambition. Their motivation stemmed from the liberal campaign that dominated public discussion both in Europe and on the American mainland. As detailed under the Act of Dominican Separation, the desire for separation from Haiti was based on the disapproval over Port-au-Prince’s approach to citizenship, its execution of economic policy, its attacks against Hispanic and Catholic traditions, and the lack of Dominican representation within President Herárd’s administration. Although the Act had a tone of immediacy, it was not written for instantaneous broadcast. Its conservative signers, the *Afrancesados*, proved a consistent hindrance against the independence that the *Trinitarios* pronounced in February 27, 1844. Two intrusive diplomatic agents from France who sought to reinstall Hispaniola as a French satellite encouraged conservative unease with Dominican sovereignty. Although both divergent parties came together to defeat the vast but disjointed Haitian army in March, their unity was short lived.

The diplomats’ manipulation accentuated the differences between liberal and conservatives, hampered their potential cooperation and threatened to splinter the new republic. The severity of the division was made clear in July, when the Cibao refused to

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acknowledge the legitimacy of governmental Junta that Pedro Santana and his
Afancesados presided over. Although the Trinitarios were a formidable obstacle to the
Levasseur plan, the main impediment to the protectorate came from Paris itself and other
competing world capitals. The world powers jointly refused to accept the self-offer of
Santo Domingo, forcing the victorious conservative party to hesitantly preserve for
seventeen years the sovereignty their competitors had realized. The ruling Dominican
class could not see beyond their present condition in 1844 and therefore would set the
society they headed on a cyclical historical course that repeated the mistakes of the recent
past and slowed the development of the infant nation-state. These conditions of feeble
nationalism would ultimately bring Dominicans to willingly return to the tutelage of
Spain in 1861. The independence of 1844 was, therefore, tentative and inconclusive.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The relationship between Dominicans and Haitians is one of coexistence. Both of these nations have been intricately tied together through commercial interaction and cultural osmosis. The notion that each of their respective nationalities is contradictory to one another is simply ungrounded. It was because of commonalities with an Afro-Caribbean past and because of their mutual history with colonial exploitation that the two entities united politically for the first and last time in 1822. The coalescing of both communities under the Haitian flag was not achieved through Port-au-Prince’s employment of force as is commonly upheld by domestic and international scholars alike (except for Haitian historians). The annexation of the Eastern Part was obtained with the successful persuasive campaign of Jean Pierre Boyer. Although Boyer was not the first Haitian president to desire such a union, he was the first to do it through strictly legal means as evidenced by the pronouncements of the Eastern municipalities. Therefore, the best term to describe Santo Domingo’s incorporation to Haiti is a union or an annexation. The municipalities’ summons for Haitian annexation showcased a fundamental division within Dominican society that still exists today: the rivalry between the Cibao and the capital city. Today these rivalries still play out in baseball and political elections. Consequently, the overemphasis on the duality between Haitians and Dominicans overlooks pertinent divisions within Dominicans themselves.
Nonetheless, Spain’s reaction to regaining (in 1809) and losing (in 1821) Santo Domingo was that of resounding indifference. There are two explanations for Madrid’s apathy: Madrid was politically unfit to hold onto its colony and Santo Domingo was not worth the cost that entailed the maintenance of its colonial status. Santo Domingo was underdeveloped, under-populated and highly unattractive for foreign investment after being a battleground for the altercations among the French, black slaves, British and the Spanish. Any ties of affection for its first colonial settlement in the Americas were lost with the Peace of Basel on 1795. The Archdiocese of Santo Domingo and Dominican immigrants abroad tried fervently to reanimate Madrid’s interest in Hispaniola, efforts that are apparent with the diplomatic conference of 1830, led by Fernández de Castro.

Spain’s multiple rejections of Santo Domingo may explain why Dominicans do not define their nationality in contrast to Spain but rather continuously reference it. Madrid’s rejection also ensued a longing for colonial patronage within the city of Santo Domingo that is evident in 1808 with the war for colonial restoration, with the campaign of 1830 (led by Fernández de Castro) and in 1861 with the annexation to Spain. In contrast, to Dominicans’ contemporary evocation to their Spanish heritage, a negative reference is often evident when referencing their past with Haiti. Congruently, local classification of the Dominican union to Haiti and Spain involves contrasting sentiments: the union with Haiti is deemed an “occupation” while the union with Spain in 1809 and 1861 merit softer terms such as “restoration” and “annexation.” The divergence in terminology is significant since both partnerships resulted from internal request and were ultimately deemed unbenefficial to the consensus of elites in Santo Domingo. Nonetheless, the current coinage of these terms reflects an anti-Haitian bias not
representative of the independence movement of 1844. The Act of separation of 1844 is void of any ethnic based prejudice against Haitians.

Boyer’s administration concentrated much of its political agenda on the economic development of the island. Four major undertakings defined his economic policies: the abolition of slavery in the East of 1822, the land and property reform law of 1823, the French Ordinance of 1825 and the Rural Code of 1826. With the exception of the first, these measures failed because they were devised without taking into consideration local inclinations. Moreover, the failure of these policies was eminent because they were conducive to ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, Boyer’s administration did have favorable effects on the island overall. Boyer was the first to realize the indivisibility clause of the Haitian constitution through legal means. He managed to instill a local peasantry through slave emancipation and land reform, stimulated the tobacco and mahogany industries of the Cibao, and gave Haiti its longest period of political stability in the 19th century.

Boyer’s campaign to keep the masses uneducated, to maintain the legislature closed to divergent voices, and his refrain from bridging the distinct identities within Haiti (through improved infrastructure and literacy) not only brought about his removal from office but also unraveled the superficial political confederacy he had installed. Moreover, Boyer dismissed key local issues in order to attend to international policy that could deliver Haiti diplomatic recognition.

The lack of island cohesion permitted the preservation of contrasting identities (blacks v. mulattos, urban v. rural, Cibao v. city of Santo Domingo, etc). The severity of their disassociation stimulated the Eastern Part to seek separation in 1844. Although a Dominican identity existed long before Boyer’s rise to power, it was the unity under Haiti
that brought easterners to embrace this self-identification. However, the presence of a “Dominican” identity was insufficient to usher independence to this breakaway territory. French diplomats sponsored local insecurities concerning economics and military readiness. In turn, these insecurities discouraged the transformation of said identity into a national consensus. Their campaign resonated most among conservative elites, who rejected sovereignty and instead opted to return Santo Domingo under French control. In opposition to this plan, a society of urban bourgeois youth, the Trinitarios, would champion the project of independence. Against the dominant conservative consensus, the Trinitarios delivered Dominicans sovereignty on February 27, 1844.

However, according to Pedro Troncoso Sánchez, the Dominican awakening of 1844 was indecisive.\textsuperscript{235} The Trinitarios failed to convince sufficient people of local capability to ensure Dominican self-defense and economic growth. Therefore, national consensus they were trying to install in Santo Domingo matured late. This was because the ruling class saw the republic as a temporary condition that should be abandoned at the first indication that a greater power was willing to take on its tutelage. The Trinitarios had forced-fed independence to the elite, an option that they had always plainly rejected. This rejection manifested itself just nine days after the Trinitarios declared independence at the Puerta del Conde. In 1844, the Junta in Santo Domingo produced two official “solicitations” that confirmed to Paris their willingness to submit to their regency. The first was named “Solicitud de Protección Francesa a Cambio de a Cesión de la Península de Samaná” ratified on March 8 and the second was titled “Reiteración de la Solicitud de

\textsuperscript{235} Troncoso, \textit{Bosquejos Filosoficos}, 77
Reconocimiento y Protección de Francia” ratified on June 1st. The Junta and much of the ruling class agreed that separation from Port-au-Prince was eminent. Therefore, the separation of the Eastern Part from Haiti would have happened with or without the Trinitarios.

Although the Trinitarios were the orchestrating force behind the declaration of independence in 1844, it was Paris’s rejection of the Levasseur Plan and the hesitation of other world powers that delivered Dominicans a premature independence. If Minister Guizot had agreed to succumb to Levasseur’s and Saint-Denys’s plan, the maneuverings of the Trinitarios would have been quickly discarded for they were the minority party within the local political circle. Juan Pablo Duarte and his affiliates came too early or were not given enough time to definitively awaken Dominican nationalism. Also they came short of installing a government with republican qualities. The republic of 1844 was not all that different from their neighbors to the West. In other words, Santana installed an authoritarian regime much like that found in Haiti, probably as autocratic as that of Boyer. The weakness of Dominican nationalism throughout the early and mid 1800s brought Santo Domingo to produce three separate declarations of separation: 1821, 1844, and 1863. In contrast to Haitians whose drive towards independence was tied to the need for freedom, the Dominican drive to separation was tied to communal protection and citizenship, demands that in the case of the later were not exclusively realized with the establishment of an independent nation. The main concern of the elite was security and prosperity, which they did not see as tied to sovereignty.

Furthermore, in contrast to Troncoso’s argument, the restoration of the Dominican Republic in 1865 was also indecisive. The ruling class was still uninterested in the continuation of the republic. By January 1868, Dominican President Buenaventura Báez (the main Dominican architect behind the Levasseur Plan) was negotiating the cession of Samaná and other Dominican territory to the United States.237 The partial cession of Samaná to the U.S. was expanded later that year to include the Dominican territory as a whole, when both President Báez and Andrew Johnson agreed to the annexation. The treaty of annexation would again be presented the following year with the reassurance and blessing of President Ulysses Grant. Both times the measure was killed at the Congressional level. The Dominican Republic would have ceased to exist on 1869 if just one Senator had voted for its annexation, Charles Sumner, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.238 Therefore, 1844, 1861, 1868, and 1869, were years when the local ruling coalition had defaulted against saving the republic. The political influence of Afrancesados, like Santana and Báez, left Dominican nationalism for decades on crutches. It would not be until their definitive exit in the 1870s that the republic that Duarte, Sánchez and Mella founded would have the opportunity to persist unimpaired.

The feeble nature of Dominican nationalism was the result of a hesitant conservative elite from the city of Santo Domingo. The spirit of nationalism was strongest in the Cibao and the Southwest and weakest in the capital city. This contrast is confirmed with the Cibao’s early support for the cause of the Trinitarios and their prompt rejection of the annexation to Spain. Dominican historians do not admit to the tardy

237 Alfonso Lockward, La Doctrina Monroe y Santo Domingo (1823-1868): “Documentos para la Historia de las Relaciones Dominico-Americanas” vol. 2 (Santo Domingo: Taller, 1994), 402
238 Martínez, 325.
nationalist awakening of the city of Santo Domingo and the duality that existed between it and the surrounding municipalities. To overlook this important dichotomy is to misunderstand the birth and evolution of the Dominican Republic. The narrative is not yet complete. One of the many glaring gaps is why did the *Trinitarios* disappear in July 1844 if they enjoyed the full backing of the municipalities and the support of much of the military community. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has stated, there are always silences within the historical narrative because the plethora of voices lack equal access and influence over archives.\(^{239}\) Let us not stop asking questions, for the portrait of the past is never completely faithful to the subject it tries to recollect.

\(^{239}\) Trouillot, 58.
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