A joint project of the Graduate School, Peabody College, and the Jean & Alexander Heard Library

Title page for ETD etd-10042006-080240


Type of Document Dissertation
Author Ji, Lu
URN etd-10042006-080240
Title Three Essays on Multi-Round Procurement Auctions
Degree PhD
Department Economics
Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title
Tong Li Committee Chair
Keywords
  • Multi-Round Auctions
  • Secret Reserve Price
  • Dynamic Auction Model
  • Procurement Auctions
  • Structural Econometric Model
  • Counterfactual Analysis
Date of Defense 2006-08-22
Availability unrestricted
Abstract
My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve prices. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices usually lead to no trade. However, prior research has not paid much attention to the possibility that the seller can auction unsold objects from previous rounds and a trade is therefore still likely to occur.

My dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analyses of auctions with multiple rounds. It first develops a game-theoretic bidding model for the multi-round auctions with non-forward looking bidders. It then establishes a structural econometric model in order to conduct a structural analysis of the INDOT data. Lastly it introduces dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and uses a dynamic control approach to analyze the bidding behavior and policy issues. The main findings are: (1) rational bidders reduce their markup across periods in multi-round auctions; (2) simulations show that using secret reserve price is sometimes better than public reserve price for the procurement auctioneer; (3) counterfactual analyses indicate that on one hand, when bidders are not forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price; on the other hand, when bidders are forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price when the discount factor is low and to use a public reserve price when the discount factor is sufficiently high.

Files
  Filename       Size       Approximate Download Time (Hours:Minutes:Seconds) 
 
 28.8 Modem   56K Modem   ISDN (64 Kb)   ISDN (128 Kb)   Higher-speed Access 
  dissertation_LuJi2006.pdf 651.33 Kb 00:03:00 00:01:33 00:01:21 00:00:40 00:00:03

Browse All Available ETDs by ( Author | Department )

If you have more questions or technical problems, please Contact LITS.