CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF 2 CORINTHIANS 10–13
AND THE METHOD AND GOALS OF THIS STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Second Corinthians 10–13 is a letter (or part or fragment) that the apostle Paul wrote some time in the 50’s CE to the church he had established in the city of Corinth. Treated in this study as a complete or nearly complete discourse, it performs various speech acts, including rhetorical argument, through which Paul (1) responds to criticisms of his identity and activity as an apostle of Jesus Christ to these Corinthian believers and (2) seeks to prepare the way for a visit to them after they have received this discourse.

More than in any other portion of Paul’s undisputed letters, these chapters center on the more general topic of church leadership and governance because critics (including rivals) have charged...

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1 Scholarly judgment and key evidence that these chs. constitute a compositional unit justify limiting this study to them, without concern, within this study, for their specific relation to the rest of canonical 2 Cor. Scholars of 2 Cor unanimously judge these chs. to form a unit, and key evidence both underlying and justifying that judgment comes from the identical concerns of their opening and closing vv.: appeal for reformed behavior (10.1-2//13.5, 11); threat of severity if offenders do not repent (10.2–6//13.2, 10); desire to use authority to build, not to tear down (10.8//13.10). The chs. are also unified by the key speech acts performed through them: the appeal to the Corinthian believers (hereafter simply “believers,” without further qualification), the threat of severe discipline to unrepentant believers; Paul’s defense against criticisms, his counteraccusation against rivals, and his reproach and accusation toward critics among the believers.

Beyond this premise, this study requires only another: that canonical 2 Cor is genuine (the question of 6.14–7.1 excepted), a premise granted by its unanimous inclusion by scholars among the undisputed letters of Paul. Critical commentaries and specialized studies discuss and provide much bibliography about the history of the composition of 2 Cor (Ralph P. Martin, 2 Corinthians, [Word Biblical Commentary; Nashville: Nelson, 1986] xxvi, xxxviii–lii. Martin slightly modifies traditional endorsement of the unity of 2 Cor. He considers chs. 10–13 to be “a later work of Paul called forth by fresh outbreaks of trouble at Corinth”(xl), a work sent to Corinth very soon after the letter containing chs. 1–9 had been sent (xlvi) and presumably very soon thereafter appended to ch. 9 to create canonical 2 Cor. Victor Paul Furnish [II Corinthians, (Anchor Bible 32A; Garden City: Doubleday, 1984) 29–54, 58–95] considers chs. 1–9, in which “Paul expresses confidence in the congregation’s fidelity,” to be an earlier letter than chs. 10–13, in which such expressions of confidence are absent (31). Frederick W. Danker [II Corinthians (Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1989) 17–20] finds it probable that chs. 10–13 were written in a letter separate from chs. 1–9 but nonetheless describes the final four chs. as “an appropriate rhetorical climax” to Paul’s arguments (from the paradigm of social reciprocity) in chs. 1–9 [“Paul’s Debt to the De Corona of Demosthenes: A Study of Rhetorical Techniques in Second Corinthians,” in Duane F. Watson, ed., Persuasive Artistry: Studies in New Testament Rhetoric in Honor of George A. Kennedy (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991) 262–280].

This study endorses Danker’s stance: Without deciding how the two sections are related in the history of the composition of 2 Cor, this study analyzes the book in its canonical form, interpreting chs. 10–13 within its own micro-literary and -rhetorical world first, then within the larger world of canonical 2 Cor, then again within the world of 1 and 2 Corinthians, etc.
that Paul is not qualified to lead the Corinthian church. Paul’s critics and rivals express this charge in various ways.² Like tributaries merging into a single river, individual criticisms merge into one that attracts most of Paul’s response and may subsume all the charges: namely, Paul is too weak to lead.³

This study analyzes these chapters rhetorically in order to demonstrate the preceding claims and to explicate Paul’s response to his critics and their criticisms.⁴ In addition to the following topical theses, this study focuses on discerning the macro rhetorical form of this discourse. The goal of this dimension of this study is to identify the subsuming form through which the discourse accomplishes its purposes. Subsuming form is closely related to what the ancient rhetoricians called arrangement (ταξις; dispositio). Literary critic Ronald S. Crane describes his search for this form while writing and the frustration he feels, despite his best efforts in research, thought, and planning, until he finds it:

All too frequently, when I have attempted to write an essay after a long and interested concentration on the subject, and the noting of many exciting ideas and patterns of key terms, and the construction of what looked like a perfect outline, I have found myself unable to compose the first sentence, or even to know what it ought to be about, or, having forced myself to go on, to bring the thing to a satisfying conclusion, whereas, on other occasions, with no more complete preparation, no greater desire to write, and no better state of nerves, I have discovered, to my delight, that nearly everything fell speedily into place . . . in an order that still seemed to me the inevitable one when I came to reread the essay in cold blood.

. . . The best way I can explain [the difference between the two experiences] is to say that what I failed to attain in the former cases and discovered somehow . . . in the latter was a kind of intuitive glimpse of a possible subsuming form for the materials, . . . a form sufficiently coherent and intelligible, as a form in my mind, so that I could know at once what I must or could do, and what I need not or ought not to do, in what order and with what emphasis in the various parts, in developing my arguments and

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² Criticisms are expressed, implied, or alluded to in 10.1–3; 7–11; 11.5–7, 11, 29–30; 12.1, 11, 13, 16; 13.3, 5.
³ These vv. express or respond to the specific criticism that Paul is weak, in multiple senses of the term: 10.1, 3–6, 10; 11.5–7, 9, 21a; 11.30–12.11; 12.20–21; 13.3–4, 9.
⁴ In approving this dissertation, my examiners identified a number of topics they wished the study had addressed differently or more fully. They did not request that I revise the dissertation, yet I wish to acknowledge the topics for the benefit of readers. I hope to consider these further as I revise the dissertation for publication. The topics include these: discussion of this reading as compliant, rather than resistant; examination of the rhetoric of representation as it implies and expresses an ideology, which this study does not examine or critique; treating more fully the questions of the literary composition of canonical 2 Cor and of the genre of chs. 10–13; locating Paul and his textual rhetoric more definitively among Greco-Roman orators and writers; querying further the legitimacy of analyzing letters with rhetorical categories invented for the analysis of speeches; comparing Paul’s rhetoric with more Greco-Roman discourses and not mainly with handbook descriptions; treating invention, stasis especially, and not only arrangement in the analysis of 2 Cor 10–13; considering Paul’s rhetoric in light of other Greco-Roman rhetorics and discourses of authority; probing further the usefulness of the (by some contested) category of the sophist.
putting them into words. . . [S]uch a synthesizing idea . . . is more than a general intention, more than a “theme,” and more than an outline in the usual sense of that word; it is, as I have said, a shaping or directing cause, involving at the same time, and in some sort of correlation, the particular conceptual form my subject is to take in my essay, the particular mode of argument or of rhetoric I am to use in discussing it, and the particular end my discussion is to serve. . . .5

The ancients described subsuming form similarly, usually under the rubric of rhetorical arrangement. In the Phaedrus, for example, Socrates comments on coherent form as part of a true rhetoric when he asks Phaedrus about a speech by Lysias (Hamilton; §264):

Don’t the various parts of his speech give the impression of being thrown together at random? Do you see any intrinsic reason why the second topic, rather than any of the others, should be placed second? I am an ignoramus, of course, but it seemed to me that the writer showed a fine carelessness by saying whatever occurred to him. Can you point out any compelling rhetorical reason why he should have put his arguments together in the order he has?

Phaedrus responds briefly, and then Socrates offers this positive description of good form, or arrangement:

But I think you would agree that any speech ought to have its own organic shape, like a living being; it must not be without either head or feet; it must have a middle and extremities so composed as to fit one another and the work as a whole.

The chief aim of this study, with regard to method, is to discern and describe the subsuming form, the rhetorical arrangement of this discourse, so that we are able to answer questions like those Socrates posed: Why is the discourse as it is and not otherwise? Why do arguments and other speech acts occur in the sequence in which they do? How would the effect and effectiveness of the discourse differ if it ordered its parts differently? What is its “organic form” and what are the discernible, probable effects of it? In seeking to answer questions such as these, the rhetorical approach of this study makes explicit ways in which this discourse coheres in seeking to fulfill a specific purpose that includes affecting its implied audience in specific ways. It identifies the speech acts (rhetorical arguments among them) that constitute the discourse and considers how they seek to fulfill its purpose. This study also incorporates selectively insights from other readings of the discourse that result from various methods, including these: historical-critical (including form-critical), history-of-religions, social-world, and rhetorical. This study

then assesses how this rhetorical reading of the discourse compares with and differs from other notable readings of it.

As the analysis proceeds, several substantive, topical issues in the discourse emerge as interesting and worthy of study. From such analysis, the study supports the following, additional major topical theses:

1. In contrast to the general notions of Paul’s weakness scholars discuss from this discourse, this study shows that the criticism that Paul is too weak to lead the church does not arise from Paul’s experiencing hardship and suffering while his rivals avoid these in their lives of triumphalistic, miraculous power. Instead, critics call Paul weak because his speaking and personal presence is weak, judged by contemporary rhetorical standards and even by the forcefulness of his own letters. Moreover, because he leads the church “by the meekness and gentleness of Christ” and avoids exercising his authority severely, he is criticized for governing the church weakly, especially as his governance is compared with that of his rivals. They, according to this discourse, govern with a much stronger hand and, among other practices, demand or happily receive financial support from the Corinthians, a practice Paul steadfastly rejects during his mission of giving the gospel to Corinth. Late-coming rival ministers and believers unhappy with Paul have successfully influenced the church to believe that the ἐκκλησία of God should have leaders no less qualified than those for the ἐκκλησία of secular Corinth. Against such criteria, Paul does not measure up; and the present discourse expresses his response to this criticism and to the underlying beliefs about Christian leadership that fuel it.

2. Paul the weak leader in this discourse differs significantly from the Paul portrayed and critiqued on ethical grounds in recent studies. Graham Shaw’s *The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the New Testament* and Elizabeth Castelli’s *Imitating Paul: A
Discourse of Power\(^8\) attack Paul’s abuse of authority and power; and Sandra Hack Polaski's Paul and the Discourse of Power\(^9\) finds that Paul’s texts conceal “complex strategies of power” that interpreters should uncover. Polaski’s work shares with Castelli’s the criticism that Paul’s call to imitate him establishes a goal impossible to reach and simultaneously valorizes sameness in a way that diminishes freedom. In contrast, early critics of Paul, at least those whose criticism appears throughout 2 Cor 10–13, attack Paul’s abuse of or veiled grasping for power much less than his lack and ineffective use of it.

3. Paul's practice of "weak" leadership coheres with the Synoptics' portrayal of Jesus' practice and teaching on leadership (esp. Mark 10.41–45 par.), showing that in this regard Paul does not innovate beyond the canonical Jesus tradition.

4. Paul’s relationship with Greco-Roman rhetoric remains ambiguous, clear in some respects but unclear in others. He conflicts with rhetorically proficient rivals, and he has earlier rejected rhetorical eloquence as a way to proclaim the gospel (1 Cor 1–4), yet these chapters express effective rhetoric. Like Plato he uses rhetoric to fight rhetoric, but it is unclear from this discourse whether or not he had studied rhetoric, because his effective rhetoric could result from intelligent observation and experience alone, or whether he approved of any form or style of formally learned rhetoric in any dimension of Christian ministry.

5. Paul’s rivals, or opponents, are Jewish Christians who, because they value and practice rhetorical eloquence, may be described as sophistic if not identified as sophists and who are either precursors of or early participants in the Second Sophistic movement or, at least, manifest influence of sophistic culture. This identification does not exclude their being described also in other terms or their being seen to display practices of other groups or social types. This study, however, reading the discourse with rhetorical concerns in mind, emphasizes the evidence that Paul’s rivals were rhetorically proficient and that they behaved in other ways that identified them with contemporary sophists. The study does not pursue the question of the identity of the rivals further, so it does not synthesize its findings with other proposals about their identity and leaves open questions beyond claiming that the discourse indicates that Paul perceived them to behave like first-century sophists.

\(^8\) (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1991)
\(^9\) (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999)
6. While scholars have rightly considered that Paul did not conflict with his rivals primarily theologically (in this way unlike the conflict in Galatians), his conflict is nevertheless grave and with theological causes, consequences, and responses. From Paul’s perspective, the conflict centers on incompatible understandings of authentic Christian spiritual leadership. Paul condemns his rivals because they think and lead as sophists more than as Christians and have consequently imported by attitude and action a different Jesus, spirit, and gospel into the Corinthian church.

**Reasons for This Study**

The topical theses the study supports were not the aims that prompted the study itself but are instead largely discoveries the study occasioned. As to its origins, this study arose from a course paper I wrote on chs. 10–12 in which I wanted to find out what knowledge a reading of this discourse through the lens of Greco-Roman rhetoric might produce. That provisional study convinced me that various rhetorical and social conventions were embedded in the discourse, including rhetorical comparison (*synkrēsis*), the rhetorical forms of praise (*encomium*) and invective, irony, and conventions of gift-giving and -receiving within friendship. It also convinced me that understanding the discourse required the reader to be somewhat familiar with these conventions. Because this was a rhetorical reading, I wondered not only what effect it would exert on its implied audience but also how it produced such effects. Among the criticism I read, Christopher Forbes’ essay was among the better for its identifying and explaining various important socio-rhetorical conventions. Yet he only gestured at accounting for how the discourse would affect its implied (or historical) audience. One of his most effect-oriented comments follows his explaining Paul’s escape from Damascus (11.32-33) as a parody of the Roman *corona muralis*, awarded to the first soldier to scale the wall of a city under attack. In this parody, Paul highlights himself as the first to escape down the wall. Forbes comments: “The deliberate self-derision in which Paul indulges here could only have been profoundly disturbing and uncomfortable for his audience. How they would have understood his intentions is

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uncertain.” Such a comment raises questions such as these: “How would disturbing and discomforting his audience help Paul fulfill the purposes of this discourse? How would this response to this limited portion of the discourse cohere with the other significant responses implied in the discourse, and what would be the cumulative effect implied (and sought) by the discourse? How does this cumulative response cohere with the purposes of the discourse?”

Because the essay by Forbes and many other studies of this discourse do not ask or answer such questions does not in any way diminish their contributions. What I recognized in my earlier study was that such studies, including those I consulted that analyzed the rhetoric of the discourse, did not aim to account in this way for Paul’s rhetoric as fully as I hoped one might be able to. From that study came the broad purpose motivating the present study: namely, to account for Paul’s rhetoric in this discourse. By “accounting for Paul’s rhetoric,” I mean these acts: (1) identifying the subsuming form of the discourse and what it therefore does, including identifying significant rhetorical, literary, social, and other conventions and explaining how they function within the discourse; (2) understanding and explaining how the speech acts of the discourse, including those occurring in the significant conventions, would prompt the implied audience to respond to the discourse in a way that would fulfill its purposes. The study fulfills this initial purpose to the extent that actual readers are satisfied that its reading accounts plausibly both for how the discourse attempts to fulfill its purposes, which involve specific responses from the implied audience, and also for why it is reasonable to believe that the implied audience would (or would not) respond as the discourse seeks them to. In seeking to fulfill this purpose, the study also supports the six theses listed in the previous section.

11 Ibid. 21. He comments similarly when referring to Paul’s listing his sufferings in 2 Cor 11.21b–29: “It is hardly likely to have inspired confidence in Paul’s position, among the status-conscious leaders of the Corinthian church. ‘Labours’ is of course an entirely respectable topic, but imprisonments and beatings by both the Jewish and Roman authorities, not to mention stonings, are hardly calculated to inspire confidence in the respectability of anyone’s position. . . . [T]hese particular events have been deliberately chosen by Paul, and are seen as being ‘for Christ’s sake’ (1 Corinthians 4.10) and are intended for the imitation of the Corinthians (1 Corinthians 4.16) as an expression of the dying and rising of Christ (2 Corinthians 4.7–12)” (19). From such comments, I asked, “If this list would not inspire confidence, that is, if it would portray Paul negatively, why would Paul knowingly portray himself that way? What effect does he seek? Further, will these choices of sufferings be received by the audience as imitations of Christ? Because Paul asserts that they have received a different Jesus, what effect would this imitation of Paul’s Christ have on them, and why?” The ultimate question is “Why would the speech acts Paul performs in this discourse move the implied audience to respond as he wishes them to?”
RATIONALE OF THIS STUDY AND KEY DEFINITIONS

Among the options available for this study is the application of a synthesis of Greco-Roman rhetoric to this discourse exclusively. Studies approaching the Corinthian literature in this way include those written by these scholars, some of whose works are discussed further below: Hans Dieter-Betz, Margaret Mitchell, Stephen Pogoloff, Duane Litfin, Bruce Winter, and Brian Peterson. But I have chosen to use a hybrid method that begins with an understanding of the act of interpretation and then moves to analysis of speech acts en route to a discerning of the suasory shape of the discourse—a discerning of the structures that function to fulfill the purposes of the discourse. Greco-Roman rhetoric assists this process of interpretation, but the study is directed by that rhetoric less than it is aided by it, in the manner explained in the following paragraphs.

Definition of the Interpretive Act

This study proceeds from the following understanding of what one does to interpret a literary or rhetorical document. I begin with this definition of the task of interpretation from The Act of Interpretation: A Critique of Literary Reason by Walter A. Davis:

The task of interpretation is to apprehend the purposive principle immanent in the structure of a literary work which determines the mutual interfunctioning of its component parts. . . . Function, structure, and purpose, in that order, become the primary categories of interpretation: for parts function only by serving a purpose and structure is the process through which purpose is actualized. . . . The critic . . . takes the knowledge of backgrounds and conventions not as a critical conclusion but as a starting point. The task of interpretation is to discover, through internal analysis, the particular purpose, always potentially new, to which a writer puts the materials, conventions, and generic expectations he derives from his sources.


Unlike literary, or bellettristic, works, many suasory (therefore overtly rhetorical) religious works express their purposes. Second Corinthians 10–13 expresses its purpose at both its beginning (10.2) and ending (13.10), simplifying to some extent the task of interpretation, because the preceding definition of interpretation presumes the study of literary works that do not usually express but instead imply their purposes. Yet this study must treat these expressions as provisional and compare the unfolding analysis of the discourse with them to see if the posited purpose and the purpose revealed by the act of interpretation are the same. Apart from the assistance of an expressed purpose, this study proceeds according the series of tasks listed above and focuses on speech acts as the fundamental unit of analysis throughout the study. When each speech act is identified and assessed, the analysis focuses on function. The main question is “What does this statement mean?” less than “What is this statement (or exclamation or question, etc.) doing? What act is the discourse performing with this written utterance?”

Traditional understandings of meaning and this understanding of speech acts are related, and one can identify and name speech acts usually only after first deciding provisionally what a given utterance means. One must usually be able to interpret linguistic acts—discern probable semantic ranges for individual words, phrases, and clauses—before judging what speech act that linguistic act appears to perform. But discerning the action—what the utterance does, how it functions within the discourse—is the immediate task and goal. By identifying functions by means of assessing speech acts, one may then discern their organization into structures at micro to macro levels en route to discerning the purpose(s) of a discourse or confirming those purposes the discourse expresses.

The Sense in Which This Study Is a Rhetorical Analysis

What makes the interpretation offered by this study a rhetorical interpretation is its additional focus on the intended and implied effects of the discourse on its implied audience, that is to say, its goal of accounting for Paul’s rhetoric in the discourse. This approach to analyzing a written discourse has its place in M. H. Abrams’ useful classification of kinds of literary criticism in the

14 E.g., Faulkner’s short story “The Bear” and Twain’s novel Huckleberry Finn nowhere state an overarching purpose in the way 2 Cor 10.2 and 13.10 do. Some literary works, John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, for example, express a clear social or political aim that is at the same time their literary purpose in the sense described in the definition of the interpretive act.

15 which, I suggest, has often been the chief question that traditional exegeses have attempted to answer
first chapter of his *The Mirror and the Lamp*. Abrams puts the Work at the center of a triangle, with the three sides outside the Work occupied by these elements external to the Work: the Universe, the Author, and the Audience. By their choice of a focus among these elements, critics determine the kind of criticism they practice. Critics who focus on the work itself as an internally coherent autonomous whole, exclusive of the other elements, practice Objective Criticism, exemplified in the New Critics and the Chicago School of neo-Aristotelian criticism. Critics who study the work in relationship to the universe outside it, the world the work attempts to represent, and who judge the work by its fidelity to external reality, practice Mimetic Criticism, which claims Plato and Aristotle as its originators. Critics who study the work in relationship to the author and focus on the psychology of the creative act practice Expressive Criticism, exemplified in the Romantic criticism of Wordsworth and Coleridge and the special interest of Abrams’ study in this book.

Finally, critics who focus on the relationship between the work and the audience practice what Abrams calls Pragmatic Criticism and what this study calls rhetorical criticism. Abrams says that Pragmatic Criticism “looks at the work of art chiefly as a means to an end, an instrument for getting something done, and tends to judge its value according to its success in achieving that aim.”

Edward P.J. Corbett promoted both the use of classical rhetoric in the

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17 Ibid. 26–28

18 Ibid. 8–14

19 Ibid. 21–26

20 Ibid. 15; cf. 14–21
teaching of writing\textsuperscript{21} and in the rhetorical criticism of aesthetic literature. In his \textit{Rhetorical Analyses of Literary Works}, he characterized this kind of criticism “as a mode of analysis that focuses on the text itself.”\textsuperscript{22} Rhetorical criticism shares this focus with objective criticism; but unlike the latter, rhetorical criticism “does not remain \textit{inside} the literary work but works \textit{outward} from the text to considerations of the author and the audience.”\textsuperscript{23} With this outward movement, what distinguishes it from forms of mimetic and expressive criticism that emphasize biography, history, sociology, and psychology? Rhetorical criticism welcomes contributions from other criticisms, but it focuses on the text and, through the text, on the author and audience based on evidence for both that the text itself provides: “Rhetorical criticism seeks . . . to ascertain the particular posture or image that the author is establishing in this particular work in order to produce a particular effect on a particular audience”\textsuperscript{24} and similarly with the audience, where the text is the basis for the “critic’s speculations about the disposition of the audience and the probable effects of the work on the audience.” That is, rhetorical criticism focuses on the author, audience, and universe witnessed to, or implied by, the text itself. Such criticism does not reject contributions from historical criticism, especially historical reconstructions that supplement its own constructions of author, audience, and universe; but its own constructions are its priority.

Corbett continues in describing the kinds of questions rhetorical critics ask: “When a critic asks why an author did \textit{this}, in \textit{this} order, and in \textit{these} words, and answers his question in relation to one or more of these reference points [—subject-matter, genre, occasion, purpose, author, audience—],\textsuperscript{25} he is probably operating as a rhetorical critic.”\textsuperscript{26} Although Corbett traces rhetorical criticism from the origins of Greek rhetoric\textsuperscript{27} through its mutations throughout western

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{21} During Corbett’s tenure at Ohio State University, he was one of a handful of scholars who revived the study of classical and other western rhetorics in American university English departments during the last third of the twentieth century. The 4\textsuperscript{th} edition of \textit{Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student}, revised with his former student Robert Connors, appeared in 1999 (New York: Oxford University Press).
\item \textsuperscript{22} New York: Oxford University Press, 1968: xvii. The following summary of the properties of rhetorical criticism depends on this work, xv–xxviii.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid. xvii–xviii
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid. xix
\item \textsuperscript{25} These “reference points” are listed in Corbett’s immediately preceding sentence.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid. xxvii
\item \textsuperscript{27} While noting Aristotle’s importance as a philosopher of rhetoric, Corbett says that rhetorical criticism in the sense he describes it does not originate with Aristotle, whose poetics proceeds from an objective critical stance: “As Richard McKeon has pointed out, ‘What later writers learned from Aristotle applicable to literature, they derived from the \textit{Rhetoric} rather than from the \textit{Poetics}.’” [“The Concept of Imitation in Antiquity,” \textit{Critics and Criticism}, ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1952), p. 171] Aristotle did acknowledge that two of the six parts of tragedy, Diction (\textit{lexis}) and Thought (\textit{dianoia}), were common to both poetics and rhetoric and that one of these, Thought, more properly fell
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history to its influence on English and early American literature, he makes clear that the practice of rhetorical criticism does not require one to render it “in terms of the ancient system in order [for it] to qualify as being distinctly rhetorical. . . . [O]ne does not have to be committed to any particular rhetorical school in order to operate as a rhetorical critic. And I suspect that some teachers and critics would be surprised—maybe even shocked—to learn that all along they have been engaged in rhetorical criticism of literature.”

Corbett’s volume compiles rhetorical analyses of works written by English and American authors from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries, arranged under four traditional concerns of rhetoricians: argument, arrangement, audience, and style.

I have discussed Corbett’s work first within this chapter’s discussion of matters rhetorical in order to emphasize that rhetorical criticism encompasses more than the rhetoric of any one rhetorician, school, or era. As defined and practiced in this study, it is a way of studying a discourse characterized by the questions Corbett lists in the preceding paragraph and aided by all other resources the critic can bring to the task. In slightly other words, the rhetorical critic is always asking “Why?”—“Why this expression, and why here and not somewhere else, and why in these words and not in others?”—in relation to the aims of the discourse and to the implied author and audience.

within the province of rhetoric. But it is clear that for Aristotle, as for Plato, rhetoric and poetics were distinct disciplines” (xiii–xiv). The predominance of rhetoric in classical schools contributed to the decline of mimesis “as the distinguishing mark of poetic discourse . . . and the notion of discourse as communication gained ascendancy. This shift had firmly established itself by the time that Horace had published his *Ars Poetica.*” (xiv) His view of the function of poetry secured its aesthetic function but also firmly included a didactic function as well, the latter of which invites rhetorical analysis of poetry as well as mimetic (or objective or expressive) criticism. From *Ars Poetica:* “Poets strive either to improve [*prodesse*] or to please [*delectare*], or to unite the agreeable with the profitable. . . . Make it a point to unite the pleasant [*dulce*] and the useful [*utile*] for the advice and the delight of readers” (ll. 333–334, 343–344).

28 *Rhetorical Analyses of Literary Works* xxvii. Much biblical criticism includes observations of a rhetorical nature, although the critics do not call what they are doing “rhetorical criticism,” nor do they usually consistently analyze their subject texts rhetorically.

29 Here is a sampling of the titles of the fourteen essays in the volume: Argument—“The Rhetoric of Newman’s *Apologia*” by Leonard W. Deen; Arrangement—“Order and Emphasis in Chapter XV of Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*” by William A. Gibson; Audience—“Antony in Behalf of the Play” by Kenneth Burke; “Control of Distance in Jane Austen’s *Emma*” by Wayne C. Booth; Style—“The First Paragraph of *The Ambassadors*” by Ian Watt.
Rationale for Rhetorical Analysis and Its Benefits

What of value may a rhetorical analysis of a discourse yield? Why would other exegetical methods likely not yield the same results as rhetorical analysis? To answer with questions: Why does drama persist, when the "points" of the drama can be summarized in few words that can be read and understood in far less time than it takes to perform the script? Why poetry, when poems may presumably be paraphrased into economical prose? In a more popular vein, why the body of the joke before the punch line? With the last, the questions moved from justifying whole genres to identifying one communication form's irreducible complexity: take away what comes before the punch line, and that line loses its “punch.” Rhetorical discourse shares with the lowly joke this quality of effect produced by the sequence of utterance: Take the passionate conclusion of a persuasive speech, relocate it in the middle before the arguments and other appeals have unfolded, and what might have been a great final effect may now be seriously diminished.

We can add to the above list of forms that of narrative, whether short, as in a short story, or long, as in a novel. Let us presume that it is possible to distill from Faulkner's "The Bear," a long short story, the views of the author and of the narrator and of the characters toward any number of topics: the South's guilt from slavery, the multi-edged sword of technological progress and various forms of alleged social progress, the enduring but complex appeal of the wild and of primitivism. If we can distill to a précis their views accurately on as many topics as the story touches upon, have we experienced the story fully, have we pulled the kernels from the husk and rendered narrative simply the container that delivered these propositions? If the goal is rightly receiving these propositions accurately, then what intrinsic value does the narrative itself have, apart from adorning the propositions with interesting dress that holds the attention of readers while they ingest the more important propositions?

A rhetorical reading compares similarly because it aims to re-present, to partially perform, the discourse so that readers may experience it as an event occurring through time, as a sequence of related symbolic acts, speech acts, each of which exerts force, seeking to affect readers in specific ways. These effects are shaped by the context and sequence in which they occur, and they may be seen in their immediate context and then in the broader context of the whole discourse, where their joint and cumulative effects may be discerned. In this way, rhetorical discourses and their performances in readings share in producing the kind of depth-knowledge that serious narrative produces.
Thus the rationale for and the value of such a reading includes but goes beyond the new propositional insight it may produce, including that of solving an existing interpretive crux. As the theses enumerated above indicate, this study, combining the results of a rhetorical reading with results from other kinds of exegetical studies, does contribute to propositional knowledge about this discourse, but the potential benefit of such rhetorical readings exceeds this benefit. For example, such a reading can assess what the implied audience thinks, feels, and believes throughout the action of the discourse, as it asks what each utterance and group of utterances imply about the audience. Further, it can indicate the emphasis, or intensity, of expression and effect within a discourse by considering features beyond the quantity of the discourse expressly devoted to a particular thought or emotion. While the analysis of such a reading expresses such insights propositionally, the realities to which the propositions point are both supra-propositional and important features of human knowledge.

In different terms, a rhetorical reading re-presents a critically imaginative experience of a discourse. It is critical in the sense that it is conscious not only of what has been said and done in the discourse but also of why and of the ongoing interactions between rhetor, message, and audience. It is imaginative in the sense in which every performance of a drama or speech or musical composition or dance composed by someone other than the performer must infer coherences that cannot be rendered in script, text, score, or choreograph in order to perform it as a coherent whole. The process of the reading consists of an imaginative performance of the discourse. The reading is then presented in a study such as this one, inviting others to participate in the imaginative performance and to experience something of the discourse’s power—it’s force and how it achieves its effect, while at the same time the study analyzes that power and its elements. These are authentic properties of the discourse, legitimate objects for observation and analysis, and objects that a rhetorical reading is designed to make visible.

Such an analysis that encourages a performance of the text (at least in the theatre of the mind) may result in (a) new understandings of the task the rhetor, or implied author, faced; (b) new understandings of the rhetor's choices in communicating with the audience (e.g., why he or she relies on certain types of argument or speech acts and not others); (c) new understandings of why the discourse would (or would not) accomplish its purposes with the audience implied; (d) new understandings of what message or what part of the message the discourse emphasizes most;
even (e) new understandings of the message itself. In addition to these potential results, rhetorical analyses benefit the quest for knowledge of discourses in these ways:

1. Rhetorical analysis provides topics and questions for analysis that can guide the interpreter to a nearly comprehensive reading. Three of the five canons of classical rhetoric—invention, arrangement, and style—help the interpreter today even as they guided the orator of antiquity by causing each to attend to thought (the “matter” of the discourse, including, from Aristotle’s perspective, logical, ethical, and emotional proof), then to sequence in expressing that thought, and finally to choices in diction, grammar, and syntax that help a discourse, whether spoken or written, to fulfill its creator’s purposes.\(^{30}\) These canons provide general topics that can organize the act of analytical reading and identify features to which a thorough reading should attend. Some results of such readings include discerning emphases within a discourse, recognizing how the meaning effected by utterances depends in part on where the utterances occur within the discourse, and identifying and accounting for the cumulative effect of a discourse.

2. Rhetorical analysis of discourses contributes to the creation of history. It performs the most fundamental of historical readings by taking seriously the task of interpreting a document, whether or not literary. Every attempt to create history that depends on written documents confronts the historian with the challenge of interpreting each document. Rhetorical readings can interpret responsibly because, to be thorough, they must attend to multiple relations within the discourse, the relation between the discourse and the implied audience and between the implied author and the discourse. In this way, such readings recognize the to-be-determined nature of the relation between the discourse and the historical author, circumstances, and audience. Recognizing that this relation between discourse and historical reality outside the discourse may not be simple or obvious contributes to the creation of critical history. Moreover, such analysis itself may create the best micro-histories because texts are often the most significant remains with which historians can work to create history; and the well-analyzed text is itself a primary source for history. Regarding the interests of New Testament students, Burton Mack recognizes the historical value of rhetorical analysis

\(^{30}\) Of course, such analysis does not have to proceed in this order but may instead proceed recursively, beginning with any feature of the discourse and continuing with any other.
because analysis of a New Testament text helps us see a brief video clip, as it were, of a part of early Christianity forming itself as a social movement.31

3. Rhetorical analysis deepens a reader’s experience of a discourse by supplementing the traditional focus on only the discursive “message” of a discourse. A rhetorical focus on the likely effect on the implied audience attends to how a discourse means, how it exerts an effect, as a key requisite for accounting for what is within its range of potential meanings and which are most plausible.

4. This deeper experience of a discourse can include, through rhetorical analysis, experiencing discourses as performances of potentially significant encounters among persons, including but not limited to only the communication of ideas. Rhetorical analyses are dramatistic;32 they conceive of the discourse as action, a sequence of acts expressed through language, usually between two or among more actors inscribed in the discourse. Such an approach to a discourse can join rigorous, critical efforts to create knowledge with a conception of knowledge that corresponds to the richness of human experience and is not narrowed to a quest for only propositional knowledge.

A from-within-the-discourse rhetorical reading brings to dramatic life dimensions of a discourse that other valuable exegetical methods do not. It can breathe into the text imaginative life that invites readers to experience the discourse as a live performance. Of course many dimensions of the original performances of an ancient biblical text may never be retrieved and performed again. But the work of many exegetical methods may be drawn upon to reconstruct plausible and perhaps probable dimensions of the earliest experiences of the reception of this discourse. These dimensions include, drawing upon the language of theatre, the stage, the characters of the cast, and the premises from which the play launches into live drama. With such dimensions reconstructed, a rhetorical reading becomes an analytical interpretive reading, explaining not only what is said and done in the discourse's own drama but also why utterances are as they are and located where they are in the chronological unfolding of the discourse, also what effects they aim to exert, both

immediately and also cumulatively as the discourse proceeds, and then finally how likely it is that the effects sought for would in fact occur with the audience the discourse implies.

5. Rhetorical analysis entails a kind of close reading that adds to a chorus of readings by similar or different methods that together approach expressing the potential meanings of a discourse, inviting comparison and contrast to enrich contemporary reception of a discourse.

**Resources for Analyzing Invention and Arrangement**

Classical rhetoric\(^33\) organized the activities of the rhetor under five canons:\(^34\) invention (ἐυρίσκων, inventio), which was the process of discovering arguments and other proofs; arrangement (τάξις, dispositio), which referred to the art of organizing the material that invention provided; style (λέξις, elocutio) referred to the expression the rhetor chose, including matters such as diction, sentence structure and rhythm, and figures of speech (tropes) and thought

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\(^33\) The phrase “classical rhetoric” is a shorthand phrase that poses problems that this study does not seek to resolve. I use the phrase to refer conveniently to the rhetorical theory and practice that arose and accumulated within the Greek and Roman worlds beginning with fifth-century Greece BCE and ending, somewhat arbitrarily, with the important Christian response to the classical tradition by Augustine in the fourth century CE. Although Augustine critiques classical rhetoric severely in *De Doctrina Christiana* for its inherent mendacity (see, e.g., Jan Swearingen’s chapter on Augustine in *Rhetoric and Irony: Western Literacy and Western Lies* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991]), he is nevertheless a product of this tradition, having been himself a successful teacher of Latin rhetoric before becoming a Christian. But in a significant way classical rhetoric is complete in its development no later than the time of Augustine, so that one of its last American champions, John Quincy Adams, in his 1806 lectures as Boylston Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard College, can say that “A subject which has exhausted the genius of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, can neither require not admit much additional illustration. To select, combine, and apply their precepts, is the only duty left for their followers of all succeeding times, and to obtain a perfect familiarity with their instructions is to arrive at the mastery of the art” (*Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory*, J. Jeffrey Auer and Jerald L. Banninga, eds. [New York: Russell and Russell, 1962] I:28–29). George Kennedy notes both the usefulness and the complexity of the phrase “classical rhetoric” at the beginning of his study, *Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*: “Classical rhetoric is superficially very easy to describe. It is that theory of discourse developed by Greeks and Romans of the classical period, applied both in oratory and in literary genres, and taught in schools in antiquity, in the Greek and western Middle Ages, and throughout the Renaissance and early modern period. Problems emerge, however, as soon as an effort is made to define the characteristic contents of this theory. How does it differ from universal or natural rhetoric anywhere else in the world? At what point in history, if ever, does the rhetoric taught in western schools cease to be ‘classical’ and begin to be predominantly some other, postclassical or modern rhetoric? Is this rhetoric an intellectual faculty, a science of persuasion, an art of speaking well, or a means of literary composition? The most famous discussion of rhetoric in Greek is surely that by Aristotle, but it was just as surely not rhetoric as described by Aristotle that was taught in schools for the next two thousand years. The most influential discussions of rhetoric written in antiquity are doubtless those by Cicero, but there is very little in Ciceronian rhetoric, which is original with Cicero, and as great as his influence was in the West, he was almost totally unknown in the Greek-speaking East. A definition of classical rhetoric that excludes Aristotle or excludes Cicero or excludes Byzantium is not a very satisfactory definition. This book as a whole is an attempt to define classical rhetoric and its tradition by examining the various strands of thought which are woven together in different ways at different times” (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 3.

\(^34\) first organized in this way some two hundred years after Aristotle: Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 77.
(schemes); memory (μνήμη, memoria) concerned various ways the rhetor could memorize a speech; and delivery (ὑποκρίσεως, pronuntiatio), which concerned the use of the voice and gestures, as well as the orator’s physical appearance. The rhetorical analysis of a work may include one, all, or any combination of these, depending on the purpose of the analysis and on the materials available. Analysis of a written discourse must confine itself to the first three, with the possibility of imagining the potential for delivery, especially when, as is the case with 2 Corinthians 10–13, the discourse being analyzed was created to be delivered orally. This study emphasizes invention and arrangement, while attending to only the more significant matters of style (in order to keep it to a reasonable length), and it conjectures reasonably about delivery where the analysis suggests that a specific choice in delivery would determine what effect the discourse would produce on the implied audience. As the study shows, each of these parts of classical rhetoric shows its importance in the discourse and as a topic for this analysis of it.

Analyzing Argument

In analyzing invention, the study does not propose to account for how Paul discovered the arguments and other speech acts that 2 Corinthians 10–13 contains. Instead, it “discovers” and describes or names the arguments and other speech acts that occur in the discourse. In discovering these, the study aims for these goals: (1) to identify all arguments present in at least a


36 Brian Peterson’s study centers on defining the rhetorical species and stases of 2 Cor 10–13, both of which are properly concerns of the rhetorical canon invention (*Eloquence and the Proclamation of the Gospel in Corinth* [SBL Dissertation Series 163; Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars, 1998]). It concludes that this discourse binds together judicial and deliberative rhetoric, constituting a discourse of mixed species (143–144). Regarding stasis, the discourse varies: The arguments expressed in 2 Cor 10.1–18 arise from the stasis of jurisdiction: Who is the legitimate judge in this situation, the critics and rivals, the Corinthian congregation, or Paul (148–151)? The arguments of 11.1–12.18 arise from the stasis of quality, specifically, of justification: What kind of ministry and minister does the Lord commend (152–157)? Finally, the arguments of 12.19–13.10 arise from the stasis of jurisdiction, again: God, not the congregation or the rivals, is the judge before whom Paul speaks (157–159). The present study concurs with Peterson’s conclusions, yet it differs in its lower evaluation of the necessity or usefulness of mastering the complex theory of rhetorical stasis as a tool for analyzing rhetorical discourse. Stasis developed to help chiefly the orator defending the accused in court. It was a tool that helped create a speech, not one created to analyze a finished speech. While this study concurs with Peterson’s conclusions on the basis of analyzing arguments and other speech acts and rhetorical arrangement, it does so without analyzing stasis. Stasis analysis may be able to add to the reading this study reports, but Peterson’s study, excellent though it is, does not convince me that, used as a technique of rhetorical criticism, it leads to critical insights that one cannot discover by other means. Primary sources for the study of stasis include Cicero, *De Inv.* 1.8.10—1.11.16; 2.4.12—2.39.115; *Ad Herennium* 1.10.18—1.17.27; Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.6.; secondary sources include Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric*, 88, 92–95, 101, 103–104; idem., *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 97–101.
rudimentary form; (2) to identify other speech acts that do not appear as rudimentary argument but which I presume to function in some way toward the fulfilling of the purposes of the discourse, such as, for example, metaphors; (3) to assess the interrelation of these constructions in order to explain what produces the suasory force of the discourse; (4) to infer from these constructions what kinds of reasoning are typical of the discourse and what warrants it uses (their use indicating that the implied author believed that the implied audience shared the beliefs, attitudes, and values contained in those warrants); (5) in this way to contribute to an inventoring and mapping of the premises, evidence, and warrants effective in earliest Christianity, which is part of the as-yet-incomplete description of the rhetoric of earliest Christianity.

I have referred to this focus on invention with the phrase “arguments and other speech acts” rather than “arguments” alone in order to emphasize that the study examines more than those constructions that display, or express, the rudiments of argument. These rudiments are, at the least, a claim, plus some kind of expressed support for the claim, whether by reason or example.37 Less than this does not constitute even rudimentary argument, yet expressions that lack either component may still exert suasory force within the whole of a discourse when they imply the elided component. For example, when Paul asserts that he betrothed the Corinthians to Christ, he performs at least two speech acts. First, his assertion supports the prior claim (10.12) that he dare not compare or classify himself with the super-apostles. The assertion is itself a reason supporting that prior claim, and it is also simultaneously evidence that the Corinthians have witnessed firsthand. This act is the first speech act. But the second act proceeds from unpacking the implications compressed into the metaphor expressed as a verb in “I betrothed you.” This metaphor compresses within itself any number of further assertions not expressed but arguably implied in its use. As this study argues in ch. 3, the betrothal metaphor supports but also intensifies Paul’s claim to have a unique relationship with the Corinthians, one that is not characterized by degrees that would allow rival ministers to add to Paul’s act of betrothal. The metaphor excludes, in its portrayal of the relations between Paul and the Corinthians, any other leader’s supplementing Paul’s act of betrothal. And this exclusive quality of betrothal goes unstated but arguably still rhetorically forceful in this discourse. As a result, to inventory all

37 Aristotle (Rhet. 3.13.1) reduces the arrangement of whole speeches to just these two elements: “It is necessary to state the subject [i.e., claim something], and then to prove it” [i.e., support it by reasons (rhetorical enthymemes) or examples (Rhet. 1.2.8)].
components of the discourse that contribute significantly to its suasory effects requires one to consider expressions, even one-word metaphors, that imply arguments that the discourse may not fully express.

Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca developed this kind of insight into the view of argumentation detailed in *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*.[38] Their work helped rescue rhetoric for the latter half of the twentieth century from the long-lasting effects of its sixteenth-century truncation by Peter Ramus[39] into only two canons: style (and this as mere ornamentation, irrelevant to argument) and delivery.[40] Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca put argumentation back at the center of rhetoric, going so far as to define rhetoric as audience-centered argumentation. This definition invigorated the viewing of all elements of discourse as contributing, in various ways, to the suasory effect of the discourse. Scholars continue to debate whether the New Rhetoric simply restates classical rhetoric within a different (our contemporary Western) culture or whether it fundamentally revises classical rhetoric by expanding its concept of argument.[41] Without constraining itself to the vocabulary of the New Rhetoric, this study proceeds in its spirit; but in order to use terms as near to their ordinary sense as possible, it uses “argument” without qualification for those structures within the discourse that express at least a claim with some kind of explicit support, without regard to the quality of the support or to the formal validity of the relation between one or more premises (appearing as support) and a conclusion (appearing as a claim). “Other speech acts” refers to other structures that express a claim without support or that do something else, such as instruct, direct, wish, and so forth. An ongoing aim of the study is to discern the act such structures perform and how their performances contribute to the purposes of the discourse.

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[39] Ramus, following the lead of Rudolph Agricola a century earlier, split invention and arrangement off of rhetoric and reassigned them to philosophy and dialectic, leaving rhetoric with only three canons: style, memory, and delivery, of which only style pertained to creating the discourse. But without notions such as topics, or lines of argument, and good and bad forms of argument, and a theory of rhetorical proof, Ramus’ amputation of the two canons from rhetoric created a form of rhetoric that came to deserve its reputation as little more than the art of flowery speech. Cf. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric* 208–213.
[40] Neoclassical rhetoricians such as Fénelon in France and George Campbell and Richard Whately in Britain succeeded in rejoining invention to rhetoric in different ways, but from Ramus forward, many in various periods, even to the present, have as their first thought about “rhetoric” that it is the art of excessively ornamented speech or writing.
For argument in this narrower sense, Aristotle’s treatment remains the most famous from classical rhetoric. Because most of his On Rhetoric investigates and explains rhetoric philosophically, his theorizing underlies most discussion of rhetorical argument since then and therefore deserves at least a brief summary here. One of Aristotle’s signal contributions to rhetoric was the central role he assigned to proof (πίστις), thus launching a tradition of informal logic, or practical reasoning, alongside formal logic. He criticized earlier rhetorics for their reliance on appeals to emotion and prejudice without any rigor in reasoning or argument.

Aristotle defined rhetoric philosophically, as the theoretical art of “discovering (θεωρεῖν) the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever,” and he identified it as an “offshoot” of dialectic. Dialectic is that form of reasoning arising from premises that are generally accepted and that deal with probabilities (things that can be different than they are), such as forms of government. Aristotle distinguishes dialectic (διάλεκτική) from demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), which reasons from scientifically true premises about things that cannot be other than they are, such as mathematics. Rhetoric is a form of dialectic, whose differences Aristotle does not stress, although some are clear: formally, rhetoric issues in continuous discourse, while dialectic occurs through debate. Rhetoric usually has one speaker addressing a group, while dialectic occurs between two persons or among a small group. “Dialectic is rigorous and constructs chains of argument; rhetoric is popular and expansive. It avoids complex

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42 The Rhetoric is, at its core, philosophical, carrying out the theoretical program his definition of rhetoric expresses. But along the way, Aristotle seems not to be able to resist including practical, even prescriptive, materials to benefit the practicing orator, and the book’s focus on rhetoric as rational proof becomes somewhat fuzzy (Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 72).

43 The debate about the extent to which Paul’s letters or other parts of the New Testament were written guided by the precepts of classical rhetoric is discussed below. More important than the resolution of that debate is the distinct issue of the usefulness of theories. It does not matter if, for example, Paul was or was not guided by any strand of classical or Hellenistic rhetoric if the theory of persuasion or argumentation or style from any one or more such strands persuades its users that it explains the pertinent phenomena in the discourses the critic studies. When a theory was propounded may not have anything to do with the breadth of phenomena it illuminates or explains.

44 Rhet. 1.1.3–4: “proofs are the only things in [rhetoric] that come within the province of art; everything else is merely an accessory. And yet they [previous “Arts” of rhetoric] say nothing about enthymemes, which are the body of proof.”

45 It is theoretical in Aristotle’s treatment because it consists of discovering and observing all the means of persuasion available and thus producing knowledge, one step removed from actualizing any of the means thereby discovered in an actual speech. Cf. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 63

46 Rhet. 1.2; cf. 1.1.14

47 as the ἀντιστρόφος, or counterpart, of rhetoric (ῥητορική); Rhet. 1.1.1. “Thus it appears that Rhetoric is as it were an offshoot of Dialectic and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably called Politics” (1.2.7).

48 Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 63–65; Aristotle, Topics 1.100a25–b23

49 ἀπόδειξις is the subject of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics; Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 62–63
argumentation and often employs things like maxims or fables which will appeal to an audience.”

This comparison of the two shows how important reasoning, or thought, was to rhetoric for Aristotle.

Rhetoric has two modes of proof: those which already exist and need only to be made use of, the non-artistic (ἄτεχνοι), or external, proofs, such as “witnesses, tortures, contracts, and the like”; and those that have to be invented by means of the art of rhetoric (ἐντεχνοι), the internal proofs. Aristotle’s greatest contribution to rhetoric may be his working out a comprehensive system of artistic proofs and, among them, of logical proof. There are only three artistic proofs (πίστεων): Ethos (ἦθος) is that form of rhetorical proof that the moral character of the speaker produces through the delivered speech; persuasion occurs by means of pathos (παθός) when the emotions of the hearer are aroused; and persuasion occurs by means of the speech itself (λόγος) “when we establish the true or apparently true from the means of persuasion applicable.”

Argument in the strict sense occurs as a part of only logical proof, while persuasion may result from ethical and pathetic proof, as well as from logical proof. It is for this reason that this study analyzes not only argument but also speech acts other than argument because they are capable of persuading, with argument or even by themselves.

Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of logical proof, deduction and induction, between reasons and examples. Induction (examples) may be actual and historical or invented. Deductive proof divides into two forms: maxims are general statements (although not comprehensive in their coverage) that are premises or conclusions of rhetorical arguments without the additional parts that would make them complete arguments. For example, Aristotle gives as a maxim: “No man is really free.” But when he appends to it this expression—“for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune”—he has converted the maxim into a rudimentary rhetorical argument. Maxims (including some proverbs) persuade “for because they are common, they seem to be true, since all as it were acknowledge them as such.”

The other form of deductive proof, to which Aristotle devotes greater attention, is the rhetorical argument, which he calls the

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50 Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric, 66
51 Rhet. 1.2.2
52 Ibid. 1.2.4–6
53 Ibid. 1.2.8, 19; 2.20
54 Ibid. 2.21.2
55 Ibid. 2.21.11
enthymeme. What exactly Aristotle means by the enthymeme and how it differs from the syllogism of demonstrative reasoning have provided an industry for scholars of Aristotle, philosophy, and rhetoric. Rather than descend into the primordial depths of this debate, this study takes the view that the enthymeme is first of all any rhetorical argument an orator or writer would use in a rhetorical discourse (as opposed to a scientific-demonstrative discourse). It is analogous to the demonstrative syllogism, and Aristotle calls it a rhetorical syllogism. But unlike the syllogism in dialectic and demonstration, with their greater logical rigor and their lack of audience-dependency that is characteristic of rhetorical argument, the enthymeme may occur in a rhetorical discourse (1) lacking a premise and (2) displaying the qualities of mere probability in the premises and the conclusion; that is, the enthymeme may not (and usually will not) measure up to the higher standards of validity and veracity essential to demonstration and also, to a lesser degree, of dialectic. Moreover, an enthymeme “begins with what is close at hand, with no concern for the ultimate basis of its argument [. and] . . . it skips steps that might have been thought necessary in the argument, provided the argument is clear, and the skipped steps are not controversial.” In contrast, a demonstrative or dialectical syllogism must proceed from “the most basic principles at its disposal . . . and . . . in formulating the steps used to arrive at the conclusion, . . . state all of them.”

Aristotle classifies enthymemes in two ways. The first way concerns the kinds of material that furnish the content of the enthymemes. These analyze into probabilities and signs.


57 Rhet. 1.2.8

58 although rhetorical enthymemes may appear with two premises and a conclusion as well, fully comparable, in this regard only, to the formal syllogism. As W. D. Ross argues, for Aristotle, the elision of an obvious premise in an enthymeme has nothing to do with the definition of an enthymeme and is instead “a purely superficial characteristic” (Prior and Posterior Analytics 500, cited by Ryan, Aristotle’s Theory 30).

59 In rhetorical argument “conclusions should not be drawn from necessary premises alone, but also from those which are only true as a rule,” Rhet. 2.22.3. But a rhetorical argument is still called an enthymeme even if its premises are certain (Rhet. 1.2.14).

60 Ryan, Aristotle’s Theory 41. Ryan continues: “Now if an enthymeme did not proceed in this way, it would lack clarity due to being too long, and it would be impossible for ordinary people to follow. If, on the other hand, it stated all that might have been thought necessary or useful for making the point, it would lose the interest of the listeners, since the speaker would appear to be prating in making everything explicit, even things about which there could be no dispute,” with reference to Rhet. 2.22.

61 Ibid.
Probabilities consist of premises about things that are not certain and, in rhetoric, things taken as true by one’s audience. Signs divide further into those that are fallible, or probable and those that are infallible, or necessary: τεκμήρια. The second way of classifying enthymemes is by the argument pattern each follows. Aristotle’s term for these forms of argument is τόποι, and later teachers of rhetoric refer to this part of Aristotle’s theory as his “topics.” The term is misleading today because contemporary use normally intends something like “subjects” for “topics,” and Aristotle’s topics is not a list of subjects one may refer to to help prepare a speech. Instead they are an array of structures, or molds, for forming convincing rhetorical arguments that writers or speakers can use by inserting terms, or propositions, that will fit. Such topoi are divided into two groups: common topics (κοινοί τόποι) that are useful in any species of rhetoric and special topics useful only in discourses treating specific subjects. The common topics are classified into four groups: past fact, future fact, possibility, and size. For each Aristotle provides a number of argument patterns. For example, under possibility, among other topoi, Aristotle gives a pair of similar topoi and a sample enthymeme produced by them: “When the end is possible, so also is the beginning; for all things arise from a beginning. And if that which is subsequent in being or generation can come into being, so then can that which is antecedent; for instance, if a man can come into being, so can a child, for the child is a beginning.” From Aristotle’s observation of persuasive rhetorical argumentation, he analyzed what made such arguments convincing and invented the topoi discussed in the Rhetoric.

Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical argumentation accounts for what kinds of arguments convince the audiences of rhetorical performances and what components form those arguments. Its

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62 Aristotle acknowledges that sometimes rhetorical arguments deal with certainties, but not usually (Rhet. 1.2.14). Usually rhetoric trades in what is commonly believed to be true and proceeds from this basis: “that which is concerned with things that may be other than they are” (Rhet. 1.2.15).

63 A wet street signifies that it has rained; but this sign is fallible, because other causes may account for the wet street: it may have been sprayed by firefighters or errant landscape sprinklers.


65 lit. “a place to look for a store of something, and the store itself”

66 Aristotle’s Rhetoric lists special topics for each of the three species of rhetoric: deliberative (1.4–8), epideictic (1.9), and forensic (1.10–14). By the way he establishes these three, it is clear that he intends them as universal species, not restricted to any particular political or social arrangement (Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric 72).

67 Rhet. 2.19.5–7
comprehensiveness and applicability to arguments from any period in the western tradition of rhetorical discourse account for its continuing usefulness; and this study draws from this theory in its analysis.69 This study draws upon one other theory of argument similarly well suited to rhetorical argumentation. The British philosopher Stephen E. Toulmin became interested in how people reason in everyday life, as well as in various disciplines. Convinced that such reasoning followed a logic of its own that differed from the often abstract calculations of formal, syllogistic logic, he studied the arguments people used and were satisfied with in such places, both familial-domestic and professional.70 From such explorations, he wrote in 1958 *The Uses of Argument* and invented a model of argument useful for analysis of all kinds of arguments, including rhetorical arguments. The model of a complete argument involves six elements, the most important of which are these three: Data, or Evidence, (D), which support a Claim, or Conclusion (C). Justification for the movement from (D) to (C) is provided by a Warrant (W), a general hypothetical statement that causes (D) to exert rational force supporting (C). In circumstances in which (W) allows the movement from (D) to (C) only tentatively and not necessarily, a full argument requires the use of a Qualifier (Q), which, Toulmin explains, expresses “the degree of force which our data may confer on our claim in virtue of our warrant.”71 A Rebuttal (R) may further qualify the Claim by “indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside.” Finally, a full argument offers Backing (B) for the Warrant: “Standing behind our warrants, . . . there will normally be other assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor

68 The common topics are discussed in 2.18–19. After his fuller discussion of enthymemes (2.22), he returns to topics and treats twenty-eight of them (2.23). After discussing fallacious enthymemes (2.23), Aristotle includes some discussion of topics when discussing enthymemes for refutation
69 Aristotle’s doctrines of enthymemes and topics are not used nearly as much as they could be because, I believe, authors of collegiate speech communication and English composition textbooks largely do not understand enthymemes in contrast to syllogisms or the topics as patterns for argumentation. Such books tend to introduce formal logic, seem to recognize that it differs categorically from rhetorical argumentation, then survey fallacies of argumentation (these are usually pertinent to rhetorical argumentation), and never mention or discuss Aristotle’s topics. Fortunately, some philosophers (such as Chaim Perelman and Stephen E. Toulmin) have shown interest in practical reasoning, alongside and distinct from formal logic, and from these students may infer kinds of good arguments, which they can find also in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* if they know to look there and are patient with its shifting focus (from philosophical to practical) and resulting unevenness.
70 Toulmin includes in his study of actual argumentation areas of reasoning that Aristotle treated as dialectic (reasoning in any professional discipline, for example). Aristotle stressed that the typical audience he had in mind for rhetorical discourse was uneducated and, in his view, uneducable, requiring that discourses for them keep matters as simple, concise, and interesting as possible (*Rhet.* 2.22.3).
currency."\(^{72}\) Toulmin urges that this model is universal to all argument in all disciplines. What changes from one field to another are the criteria for assessing arguments and the Backing used for Warrants; these are “field-dependent” variables. Toulmin recognizes that effective arguments occur frequently without expressing all six elements; but for these, it is theoretically possible to discover the missing elements. An example of the model follows:

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
{(D)} & (Q) & (C) \\
\hline
\text{Harry was born} & \rightarrow & \text{So, presumably, Harry is a} \\
\text{in Bermuda} & & \text{British subject.} \\
\text{since} & & \text{unless} \\
\text{(W) a man born in} & & \text{(R) both his parents} \\
\text{Bermuda will generally} & & \text{were aliens or he has} \\
\text{be a British subject} & & \text{become a naturalized} \\
\text{on account of} & & \text{American citizen} \\
\text{(B) the following statutes} & & \\
\text{and other legal provisions} & & \\
\end{array}
\]

This study endorses Toulmin’s model as a way of identifying what elements of argument appear in each argument expressed in 2 Corinthians 10–13.\(^{73}\)

**Analyzing Arrangement**

Classical rhetoric arranged complete orations elaborately. Aristotle had insisted that a speech needed only two parts, the πρόθεσις, or proposition (or thesis), and the πίστις, or proof, although he allowed, at the most, two other parts, a προοίμιον (prooemium, or exordium) and an ἐπίλογος (epilogue, or peroration).\(^{74}\) He discounted as ridiculous the more numerous divisions contemporary writers prescribed.\(^{75}\) Yet what other writers were doing in his time they generally continued to do in later rhetorical handbooks. The technical, anonymous Latin work *Rhetorica*

\(^{71}\) Such qualifiers include “probably” and “presumably.” *The Uses of Argument* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 101

\(^{72}\) Ibid. 103

\(^{73}\) Responses to Toulmin’s model along with other studies of argumentation, including bibliography, may be found in Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, and Francisca Snoek Henkemans, eds., *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments* (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1996).

\(^{74}\) *Rhet.* 3.13.4
ad Herennium prescribes six distinct parts for the courtroom speech, each with its own goals and methods: an *exordium* to introduce the speech and legal case; a *narratio* covering the events that led to the legal dispute; a *divisio* that outlined the points or steps in the argument to come; the *confirmatio*, the proof for the case; the *confutatio*, which refutes opposing arguments; and the *peroratio*, or conclusion with final appeals. One stream of New Testament studies has applied classical rhetoric to Paul’s letters with a goal (among others) of finding such speech parts in them. This practice acknowledges that letters are not merely written speeches but proceeds nevertheless with the hypothesis that, however the forms of New Testament letters vary from those of written orations, the letters still display significant characteristics of classical rhetoric that may be analyzed profitably through that perspective. Certainly the prototype, within the last quarter of the twentieth century, of such studies is Hans Dieter Betz’s *Hermeneia* commentary on Galatians. Betz argued that Galatians was a hybrid of epistle and oration that could be analyzed according to Greco-Roman epistolography and rhetoric. Betz acknowledges both epistolary features and the *partes orationis* of the forensic speech throughout Galatians. Through the remainder of the century, many studies followed Betz’s example and the encouragement of the classicist George Kennedy in applying the rhetoric and epistolography of classical and Hellenistic periods in various combinations to Galatians and nearly every other book of the New Testament.

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75 Ibid. 3.13.3
76 *ad Her.*, 1.3.4; 3.9.16
78 His commentary on 2 Corinthians 8 and 9 in the same series followed in 1985.
79 Here is his outline (*Galatians* 16–23):
   - Epistolary Prescript (1.1–5)
   - Exordium (1.6–11)
   - Narratio (1.12–2.14)
   - Propositio (2.15–21)
   - Probatio (3.1–4.31)
   - Exhortatio (5.1–6.10)
   - Epistolary Postscript (*Conclusio*, 6.11–18)
But a number of scholars familiar with New Testament-period rhetoric and epistolography object to such studies for various reasons. For some, the significant disagreements between analyses of the same discourses based on the same rhetorical and epistolary sources show that the discourse theories in such sources do not (and perhaps cannot) explain the canonical discourses effectively because New Testament authors evidently did not apply such theories when they composed their documents. Others emphasize that instruction in rhetoric and in letter writing were fully distinct in antiquity, with rhetorical sources hardly mentioning letter writing and epistolary handbooks similarly hardly referring to oratory so that one should not treat Paul’s letters as written speeches bracketed by epistolary prescripts and postscripts. R. Dean Anderson objects further that the rhetorical sources most often cited by biblical critics analyzing Paul’s letters, such as Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, while known during the New Testament period, nevertheless had limited influence during the time and should not be assumed to have been known by the canonical authors.

Such objections may have sufficient answers: The objection to discrepancies among the analyses of the arrangement of discourses presumes wrongly that rhetorical theory prescribes that speeches mark the beginning and ending of each of their parts clearly; and it further overlooks the existence of similar variations among analyses of Greco-Roman orations composed by celebrated orators and analyzed by critics whose knowledge (orators and critics) of ancient rhetorical theory no one should doubt. The objection that ancient rhetoric and epistolography

82 and especially of the division of those discourses into partes orationis
83 The phrase “discourse theories” means rhetorical theory and epistolary theory together.
85 except for discussions of style
86 and saying nothing about arrangement in letters corresponding to its major role in oratory
89 E.g., George Kennedy analyzes Demosthenes’ *De Corona* as follows: Prooemium, §1–17
Narration, §18–52
Proof, §53–296 (dominated by Demonsthenes’ ethical defense of his actions)
Peroration §297–324
were fully distinct overlooks potential evidence to the contrary from, for example, Demosthenes’ literary epistles and the apologetic and political letters of Plato, Isocrates, and Ps-Aeschines. The final objection counts most if the analysis aims to show that the canonical authors knew the rhetorical sources in question and intended to follow their prescriptions; otherwise, the objection counts less and even less still when we acknowledge how rhetorical prescriptions arose: From the more philosophically theoretical (e.g., Aristotle) to the more practically theoretical (e.g., Quintilian), rhetorical description and prescription arose from observation and experience of what rhetorical practices were effective. Classicist C. Joachim Classen doubts that Paul knew or followed explicit rhetorical theory but believes, on the basis of Paul’s effective Greek writing, that “he must have read a good deal of works written in Greek and thus imbibed applied rhetoric” from his reading and, I would add, from seeing and hearing daily speech in a culture in which rhetoric was ubiquitous and valued. Paul knew more than a little about Hellenistic rhetorical practice (if not theory), because, as this study argues, he rejects in 1 Corinthians

Yet Vince and Vince (LCL) assign only §1–8 to the exordium and assign §9–11 to responses to various charges; §12–17 introduce discussion of public policy; they label no section “narration”; instead, replies to charges are organized into three time periods: First Period, §18–52; Second Period, §60–109; Third Period, §187–251 (with general defense of Athenian policy of resistance in §188–210); attacks on Aeschines and further defense, §252–296; epilogue and recapitulation, §297–323; peroration in only §324 (Demosthenes II [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd, 1953] 14–15).

Francis P. Donnelly, S.J., analyzes the speech as follows:

Exordium, §1–8
Proposition and Division, §9 (Narration absent)
Confirmation—Outside the Indictment, §10–52 (Kennedy has Proof [= Confirmation] begin at §53)
Confirmation—Inside the Indictment, §53–296
Peroration, §297–324


My point is not to endorse one analysis over the other but to exemplify how experts in ancient rhetoric differ in analyzing an often-studied ancient oration whose composer we know to have been well trained in rhetorical theory and practice. If such experts can analyze such a discourse diversely, (a) similar differences among rhetorical analyses of New Testament documents discredit classical rhetorical analysis of them no more than these differences discredit the same analysis of De Corona and (b) well-composed orations may, as a matter of course, not mark the passing from one to another of the partes orationis as sharply as some critics of classical rhetorical analysis of New Testament documents presume that they do.

91 “St Paul’s Epistles and Ancient Graeco-Roman Rhetoric,” in Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from the 1992 Heidelberg Conference, ed. Stanley Porter and Thomas H. Olbricht (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993) 265–291. His observation in full appears on p. 269: “Anyone who could write Greek as effectively as St Paul did, must have read a good deal of works written in Greek and thus imbibed applied rhetoric from others, even if he never heard of
sophistic rhetoric as a means for proclaiming the gospel and responds in 2 Corinthians to rivals and critics who value sophistic rhetoric. In at least the canonical Corinthian correspondence, then, we should not be surprised to find Paul practicing elements of rhetoric even if in a campaign against sophistic rhetoric, even if he had never studied rhetorical theory. Moreover, apart from rhetoric’s being a substantive issue in the Corinthian correspondence, we should similarly not be surprised if Paul’s skillful writing and speaking, influenced by his location in rhetoric-saturated Hellenistic culture and by his intelligent observation, his reflection on his experience as a writer and speaker, and his natural aptitudes, practiced rhetoric, occasionally or more often, that those trained in theory would judge to be proper and effective, even if he knew no rhetorical theory.92

For this study, uncertainty about Paul’s training in and relation to contemporary rhetorical theory does not interfere with reading the present discourse rhetorically. To some extent restating preceding claims, this study justifies its practice of rhetorical analysis in these ways: (1) This discourse, 2 Cor 10–13, is rhetorical, using words to accomplish specific purposes through a discernible strategy and with specific verbal tactics. It is therefore amenable to various kinds of rhetorical analysis. (2) The discussion above of resources for analyzing argument and arrangement uses rhetorical theory from antiquity and the twentieth century, as does this study. The study’s use of ancient rhetoric without demonstrating that Paul followed rhetorical theory is appropriate for these reasons: (a) The provenance of the subject discourse is the Hellenistic world in which Greco-Roman rhetorical theory and practice was ubiquitous. Such rhetoric was therefore likely to influence how persons communicated, who, like Paul, engaged Hellenistic culture anywhere along its cultural spectrum. (b) Greco-Roman rhetoric (theory and practice) documents how skilled orators and teachers believed that communication and social conventions worked within that culture. This statement of belief and experience is valuable for reading a discourse from the same period and culture, even if the discourse was not composed according to any rules of rhetorical theory; thus, even if one could prove that St Paul was not familiar with the rhetorical theory of the Greeks, it can hardly be denied that he knew it in its applied form.[]”

92 Other topics one may study to attempt to clarify Paul’s relation to contemporary rhetorical training and theory include these: speculation on his own education and the nature of the rhetoric he experienced as a Pharisee with Roman citizenship in Tarsus and during whatever time he may have spent in Jerusalem before he became an apostle of Jesus as Messiah; how much the writing of an amanuensis for Paul skews our ability to describe his rhetoric; and how he learned to write Greek. Hellenistic (non-Jewish) sources indicate that students learned to write Greek within a curriculum imbued with explicit reference to and training in rhetoric.
that rhetoric and may vary from its prescriptions in a number of ways. As such a statement of belief and experience, this rhetoric can help interpreters imagine and describe how the rhetoric evinced in a period discourse (such as 2 Cor 10–13) would function and the effects it would achieve, with plausibility, if not probability, within that culture. (c) Moreover, Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, while incorporating his observations of fourth-century BCE oratory in Athens and his reading of other extant rhetorics, does not merely observe and report on successful contemporary oratory but theorizes philosophically about rhetoric in a way that invites readers to analyze rhetoric of other times and cultures using his system (which has been done throughout the Western history of rhetoric into the present). Thus Aristotle’s theory pretends to universality, transcending time and culture and useful in analyzing specimens of rhetoric composed without any knowledge of the theory. It is therefore proper to analyze 2 Cor 10–13 with it, without determining whether or not Paul composed those chapters with the aim of conforming to any version of Greco-Roman rhetoric. (3) As mentioned above, contemporary Hellenistic rhetorical practice confronts the reader of 1 and 2 Cor unavoidably, because (as argued below) Paul rejects sophistic rhetoric for gospel proclamation in 1 Cor, and he responds to sophistic rivals in the church at Corinth in 2 Cor 10–13.

The study’s use of some modern rhetorical theory along with ancient theory is likewise appropriate for these reasons: (1) Modern theory extends the explanatory power of ancient theory and, as used in this study, helps readers of this study unfamiliar with ancient rhetoric to benefit from the study without greater knowledge of ancient rhetoric. (2) Modern theory treats arrangement less rigidly and more fluidly than do the ancient rhetorical handbooks. It therefore melds well with Aristotle’s philosophical, non-prescriptive approach to arrangement and at the same time meets the objection to the use of ancient rhetoric that Paul’s letters do not follow

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93 Examples of this intent are (1) Aristotle’s description of the necessary parts of the speech: namely, only those truly necessary by virtue of their function—a statement, or proposition, then its proof, or support; and (2) his identification of three and only three species of rhetoric. Forensic, deliberative, and epideictic (or ceremonial) species envision the court, the boulē, and funeral and other ceremonial occasions of Aristotle’s times; but he does not distinguish the species by their differing fora. He distinguishes them instead by their differing listeners (judge of past events, judge of future events, and spectator, respectively), chief actions (accusation or defense, exhortation or dissuasion, or praise or blame), times (the past, the future, and the present, respectively), and ends, or ideal objectives (the just and the unjust, advantage and harm, and the honorable and the shameful), Rhet. 1.3.1–5.


95 exemplified in the works of Pereleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Toulmin, and John Searle.
ancient prescriptions for the *partes orationis* convincingly. This study does not impose a
classical rhetorical arrangement on the subject discourse, although it assesses for each section
how well or poorly it fits the speech part that other interpreters claim to discern. A major goal of
the study is to describe as objectively and insightfully as possible the argument (and other speech
acts) and arrangement that constitute this discourse and that account in a major way for its
implied effect, without regard to whether or not either or both conform to classical rhetorical
rules consistently.

Beyond rhetoric (which emphasized oratory far more than writing in antiquity), ancient
epistolary theory also helps explain the arrangement of 2 Cor 10–13. Important sources pertinent
to Paul’s letters include the examples of the more literary letters of Seneca96 and the Cynic
epistles,97 as well as the only two extant ancient epistolary handbooks, τύποι ἐπιστολικῶν
(*Epistolary Types*) from Ps.-Demetrius (c. first century BCE) and ἐπιστολικοὶ χαρακτῆρες
(*Epistolary Styles*) from Ps.-Libanius (c. fifth century CE).98 The work by Ps.-Demetrius
describes and exemplifies twenty-one kinds of letters, while that by Ps.-Libanius defines and
exemplifies forty-one kinds. Ps.-Libanius seems not to have known of Ps.-Demetrius, and while
these two are all such handbooks extant, other evidence indicates that there were more Greek
epistolary theorists.99 Although this study does not draw from epistolary resources as often as
from rhetorical resources, it notes throughout John T. Fitzgerald’s analysis of 2 Cor 10–13 using
epistolary handbooks and endorses his views that examples from these handbooks illuminate
various portions of this discourse and that this discourse is a mixed-type letter.100

96 used by Stanley Stowers in *The Diatribe and Paul’s Letter to the Romans* (SBLDS 57; Chico, CA: Scholars Press
97 including Socratic epistles, used by Benjamin Fiore in *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and
98 used by John T. Fitzgerald in his essay “Paul, the Ancient Epistolary Theorists, and 2 Corinthians 10—13: The
Purpose and Literary Genre of a Pauline Letter,” in David L. Balch, Everett Ferguson, Wayne A. Meeks, eds.,
Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1988).
100 This study might be stronger if it explored ancient epistolography more, but I became convinced too late in my
writing that ancient epistolary theory and practice was potentially as important to understanding the rhetoric of this
discourse (with rhetoric defined as consciously using language, oral or textual, to accomplish specific purposes) as
was ancient rhetorical theory. Yet from what I have explored, using epistolary sources more would not have
modified key claims of this study. For example, this study finds the key acts of the discourse to be the same as those
Fitzgerald lists on the basis of his analysis guided by the ancient epistolary sources: namely, appeal, threat, defense,
METHOD OF THIS STUDY

This study moves from close readings that inventory what is present in the discourse to reflection on the function, structure, and purpose of these discourse components, with these considered recursively and not in a strict hierarchical sequence. Specifically, each discourse unit is analyzed in these ways:

1. **Analysis of the discourse into shorter units, using established criteria of form.** It analyzes such sections and sub-sections according to the following steps before synthesizing them into the whole.

2. **An inventory of surface linguistic acts expressed through grammatical and syntactical analysis.** Analyzing the linguistic acts means discerning whether a clause or sentence declares, directs, or interrogates, etc. This analysis is usually obvious so that this written study does not report it except when it is significant to the following steps in the study.

3. **Identification and assessment of the speech acts performed on or through the linguistic acts.** Speech acts are the performative dimensions of language, the way, as J. L. Austin said, that people do things with words.101 For example, Paul’s expression at 11.21—“To my shame, I counterattack against rivals, and reproach and accusation toward the Corinthians (“Ancient Epistolary Theorists” 193–200).

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101 Because this study performs a practical act of criticism, that is, because it offers a specific kind of reading, it does not examine the philosophical basis of speech act theory as developed by J. L. Austin and John Searle and applied to literary studies by Mary Louise Pratt (Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977]) beyond applying its most basic insights. The fundamental insight is that utterances (whether written or spoken) may perform speech acts quite different from the linguistic acts they embody. It is this quality of human language that makes all but the most controlled linguistic interactions among persons dramatic. They are dramatic in the sense that utterances are performed, and what meanings and effects the performer intends are usually more and other than those meanings and effects indicated by discerning only the grammar, syntax, and most common semantic senses of the words that constitute the utterance. Searle, in his later study revising and extending his original theory, identifies five categories of illocutionary acts: “We tell people how things are (Assertives), we try to get them to do things (Directives), we commit ourselves to doing things (Commissives), we express our feelings and attitudes (Expressives), and we bring about changes in the world through our utterances (Declarations)” (Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979] viii). Adequately discerning the performer’s intentions requires interpreting also pertinent features of the communication situation and drawing upon a cultural grammar of speech acts which together guide the recipient to likely interpretations that may match or nearly match the intent of the performer. The work of psycholinguists such as Deborah Tannen (e.g., idem., ed., Gender and Conversational Interaction [New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1993]) and Suzette Haden Elgin (e.g., Genderspeak: Men, Women, and the Gentle Art of Verbal Self-Defense [New York, N.Y.: Wiley, 1993]) explain how American women and men intend different speech acts through identical linguistic acts. For example, a husband and wife driving in a car may have this interchange: She says to him, “Wouldn’t you like to stop for a cold drink?” He hears the linguistic act of asking a question and interprets the speech act identically. He answers, “No.” But she intended a speech act other than identifying his wish: She meant, “Would you please stop so I can have a cold drink?” and “I would like for you to want one and...
must say, we were too weak for that!”—as a linguistic act is a declarative or exclamatory statement; but as a speech act, it is an ironic concession. What Paul does through the linguistic act is to concede, tongue in cheek, that he is weaker than his rivals. But he concedes this weakness in a dramatic context that forceful implies the superiority of non-abusive weakness over abusive power. At this step, the study integrates literary, rhetorical, and social conventions, along with insights from other readings of the same sections and subsections. Identifying (and naming) the speech acts is the greatest challenge of this step and of the study as a whole. The process is more art than science, as are acts of humanistic interpretation, whether of visual, dramatic, literary, or musical arts. But one can move from considering the linguistic acts through a recursive and ill-defined process of weighing the rhetorical and dramatic situation one discerns at a specific point in the discourse, along with other readings of the same portion, to imagining various dramatic performances of the portion. Each distinct, imagined performance enacts a speech act, and one may judge which seem to cohere better or worse with immediate and then broader contexts in order to decide on the one or two that seem to synthesize the immediate context with the purposes of the discourse and a plausible response from the implied audience that would likewise help fulfill the discourse purposes. Literary critic George Steiner asserts that performance is the best interpretation.

4. **Synthesis of sections and sub-sections into larger discourse units, assessing how groups of such acts function as sub-units and then larger units.** The study then integrates pertinent conventions and insights from other readings as in the previous step. It considers these topics and, where the results of this analysis warrant it, reports them in the written study:

   **Translation:** The Greek text is translated into English with the purpose of expressing features that seem to be rhetorically significant.

enjoy having a break from driving by enjoying a drink with me.” Her linguistic act of asking what he would like to do was a speech act requesting him to do something with her and to enjoy it. This example shows how complex an even simple linguistic interchange can be when speakers and auditors fully understand the other’s vocabulary, language, and general culture. This study presumes that the use of language in antiquity is similarly complex and that the attempt to understand such language requires of today’s readers no less of an openness to the dramatic dimensions ancient texts bear than do texts produced in one’s native, contemporary culture. This study is the smallest of gestures towards such a depth understanding of the dramatic acts performed in the subject discourse, 2 Corinthians 10–13. But it is an effort to show that what interpreters have accepted as traditional exegesis can be broadened to acknowledge the dramatistic character of the language of human interaction and to benefit from the enhanced understandings of biblical discourses that such speech-act-enriched exegesis can produce.
Speech Acts: As discussed above, each phrase, clause, and sentence is analyzed two ways: (1) what is the linguistic act it expresses? (declaration, exclamation, request, command, interrogation, etc.); leading to (2) what is the speech act that linguistic act performs? The goal is to identify what the micro-unit does rhetorically.

Coherence: Words, phrases, clauses, and sentences are analyzed to see how by thought or diction they cohere with preceding expressions in the discourse. This step of inventory helps the interpreter to note chains of recurring words or ideas, to see how various textual units relate and function together, and to elicit potential linking ideas that, as is normal in informal discourse, may be elided but truly implied. The inventorying of occurrences of coherence is often a heuristic task that gives the interpreter a way of attending to textual features closely. Sometimes this practiced attention yields insights other than identifying features that cohere.

Pertinent Background—Terms and Concepts: As needed, this category is used to accommodate usually lengthy discussions that fit better apart from “Rhetorical Structure and Development” because the terms treated apply to more than one textual unit.

Intertextuality: Words and ideas that allude to or expressly refer to or quote other discourses are noted and the possible rhetorical interaction between the discourses in the thought of the present writer or his/her audience is explored.

Rhetorical Structure and Development: This most important step seeks to apprehend the subsuming form of the discourse by identifying structures at or above the sentence level in which speech acts at the sentence-level (or lower) function. For example, a full, if brief, argument must include a claim supported by a reason or some other kind of evidence. Other structures include speech acts that involve more than one sentence. Once such supra-sentence-level structures are identified, the interpreter queries their function in executing the discourse purpose and goals and traces how the rhetoric of the discourse is developing. (E.g., this study shows a progression in the acts of ministry Paul narrates (10.13—11.21) as he demonstrates his beneficial, self-less service to the Corinthians and contrasts that with the harmful acts of his opponents. It argues that each following act narrated in some quasi-logical way goes beyond the immediately preceding narrated act.) It is at this step that one begins to apprehend the plausible cumulative, overall effect of the discourse.

Rhetorical Style: The interpreter examines words, phrases, and clauses alone and in relation to other similar components selectively to see how sub-sentence-level structures contribute to
the rhetorical force of the discourse. The components the interpreter looks for includes figures of speech (tropes) and figures of thought (schemes). The goal is not merely to label occurrences but to consider how such art in the details of the discourse helps fulfill the purpose of the discourse. Because this study focuses on sentence-level and larger structures, examination of style is selective, not comprehensive.

Implications: Effective rhetoric proceeds from the beliefs, attitudes, and values of the audience to the purpose and goal toward which the speaker or writer aims his or her rhetorical efforts. By the nature of rhetorical discourse, in its contrast with formal philosophical, mathematical, or scientific demonstration, rhetorical argumentation often elides, or implies, ideas and expressions that the rhetor’s knowledge (presumed or actual) of the audience allows him or her not to have to express fully. But to a hearer or reader not part of that audience implied in the discourse, such implications may be neither obvious nor shared. To apprehend the intended rhetorical transaction, the interpreter attempts to discern the stock of shared and implied beliefs, attitudes, and values that complete the rhetorical discourse to make it more fully intelligible to a later audience. These implications may point to the deepest shared beliefs that supply claims, evidence, and warrants that make abbreviated, rhetorical argument effective, despite its failing to express each such claim, item of evidence, or warrant.

Rhetorical Effects: In this most conjectural of the steps in this analysis, the interpreter moves from the effects inscribed in the text (what the discourses desires the discourse to accomplish, with the desires constructed from the analysis of the discourse) toward a necessarily subjective assessment of what the discourse likely could have accomplished with the audience implied in it. Rhetoricians, perhaps beginning with Aristotle, attended to the characteristics of one’s audience in an effort to construct rhetorical discourse that would fit it and appeal to it in ways that would move it to the desired response. Aristotle in his *Art of Rhetoric* of 2,400 years ago and authors of today’s speech communications textbooks offer general psychologies of various ages, genders, and motivational types to help speakers adhere their theses to the present commitments of their audiences. Information such as this helps the interpreter suggest, with some rational basis, the likely effect of components of rhetorical discourse and of such discourses as a whole.
Recapitulation of Rhetorical Performance: After a group of discourse sub-units that cohere into a unit, the interpreter seeks to discern and communicate the rhetorical force the discourse has accumulated to that point.

Relation to Ancient Rhetoric: Where appropriate, the analysis of sub-units and units queries how these components do or do not express the claims and prescriptions of classical and Hellenistic rhetorics. Of special interest throughout this study is the question of whether or not 2 Corinthians 10—13 conforms to the *taxis*, or *dispositio*, of forensic or deliberative speeches as prescribed by Greco-Roman rhetorical handbooks and extant discourses.

5. *Assessment of larger units within the discourse* in order to clarify what are the purposes, structures, functions, and effects on the implied audience of discourse parts and the discourse as a whole.

6. *Comparison of results of this study with other readings and suggestions for further study.* The study compares its own reading with readings offered by other scholars, especially when such readings make similar or different claims on especially the theses enumerated at the beginning of this chapter. This comparison occurs sometimes in the main text and sometimes in footnotes.

**BACKGROUND OF THE THESES SUPPORTED BY THIS STUDY**

Of the six major theses stated above, the first, second, and fifth and sixth together benefit from being developed further before presenting this study’s reading of 2 Cor 10–13. The other theses require no other development now and are supported within the reading that fills chapters two through five of this study.

*Background to Thesis One:*

*Paul responds to the criticism that he is too weak to lead with both denial and acceptance.* Most, if not all, of the criticisms of Paul expressed in 2 Cor 10–13 cohere with the several explicit references to Paul as weak. This criticism therefore imbues the whole discourse. Other studies agree that the criticisms in the discourse attack Paul’s claim to be an authentic apostle

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102 The charges related to money (11.7–11; 12.16–18) may or may not relate directly to the charge of Paul’s weakness. The rest of the criticisms relate to “weakness” directly.
(perhaps even an authentic Christian), but this study argues that the issue is even more specific: From the perspective of the discourse itself, the fundamental charge is that Paul is weak (in various ways) and that his weakness disqualifies him from being the apostle he has claimed to be. How accurate this representation is historically is another matter; what this study attends to is how “weakness” is the central criticism and the focus of Paul’s response in the discourse.

“Weakness” expresses various meanings in this discourse. Beyond commonly accepted senses of “without strength, feeble, sickly; poor; insignificant,” Christopher Forbes’ 1978 Macquarie University BA thesis argues that Greek terms for “weakness” (and “strength”) often serve to express judgments about the social status of persons in Greek antiquity. Recent studies of 2 Cor tend to accept this broadened semantic range for ἄσθενεια and its cognates and to relate Paul’s weak rhetoric to his being looked down on by critics who denigrate him as their social inferior. Anitra Bingham Kolenkow’s essay on this topic further specifies the most pertinent semantic range of “weakness” in this discourse. She challenges the view that Paul represents early Christians who follow “the model of a suffering Christ” while his rivals in 2 Cor 10–13 “seek a power based exclusively on miracles and visions.” Such a view leads to the common interpretation that the hardship list in the Fool’s Speech contrasts Paul’s life of suffering apostleship over against the (presumed) triumphalist, wonder-working life of his rivals. But

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103 especially pertinent at 2 Cor 10.7, where Χριστοῦ ἐναι is taken by some to refer simply to being a Christian [e.g., Oostendorp, D. W., Another Jesus: A Gospel of Jewish Christian Apostolic Authority in II Corinthians (Kampen: Kok, 1967) 18–19; E. Käsemann, Die Legitimität des Apostels (Darmstadt, 1964) 11–12], by others to refer to Paul’s claim to be an apostle [e.g., Dieter Georgi, Di Gegner des Paulus im 2 Korinther (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1964) 227; H. D. Betz, Der Apostel Paulus and die sokratische Tradition: eine exegetische Untersuchung zu seiner ‘Apologie’ 2 Korinther 10–13 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1972) 133–134; Ralph Martin, 2 Corinthians (Word Biblical Commentary; Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1986) 308–309].

104 A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1871)

105 “‘Strength’ and ‘Weakness’ as Terminology of Status in St Paul: The Historical and Literary Roots of a Metaphor, with Special Reference to 1 and 2 Corinthians.” Forbes studies such terms in Greek writings at every period to conclude that they often express the judgment of others about one’s social location and, consequently, the extent to which others accept or reject one. In such uses, a weak person is viewed as socially inferior and unacceptable for the relationship of friendship, which exists, ideally, among social equals. (I was not able to borrow this BA Honours thesis and have had to rely on references to it in other literature, including Forbes’s other writings. WorldCat, the international library database, shows no library holding the thesis except Macquarie University, Australia, the school for which Forbes wrote it.)

106 One notable exception is David Alan Black’s Paul, Apostle of Weakness: Astheneia and Its Cognates in the Pauline Literature (American University Studies Series, 7; Theology and Religion, 3; New York: Peter Lang, 1984). This study omits considering the social-world dimensions of the term and its cognates and thus fails to communicate crucial dimensions of Paul’s experience of weakness as an apostle.

Kolenkow’s wide-ranging study of early New Testament and other Christian texts, as well as her anthropological study of spiritual guide-leaders in various faith traditions and times lead her to different conclusions. Study of the hardship catalogs throughout Paul’s letters and of “Q’s” catalog of sufferings shows that meekness and suffering are as much criteria for legitimate apostleship as are miracles and gospel proclamation and lead to this conclusion:108

There was a common expectation (and pattern) that Christian apostles not only perform miracles but suffer deprivation as well, and there are various verbal structures [such as hardship catalogs] with which these demands are conveyed. These latter serve as the common ground between Paul and his opponents – the basis upon which Paul attempts to justify himself in 2 Cor 10–13.

Thus as Paul faces his rivals, he shares with them lineage (being a Hebrew), deprivation (expressed in the hardship catalog of the Fool’s Speech), visionary experiences, and miracles. What divides them is not these properties but their differing ways of expressing authority and governing churches. Paul is accused of acting in a worldly, shameful, duplicitous way because he claims power when absent by means of his letters (2 Cor 10.10) but does not actually wield it when in person at Corinth (10.1–2, 10).109

In Paul’s presentation of the opponents, they are strong, they accept money (11:20, cf. 12:13–15; hence they are γονηζεζ), and they are willing to apply force and authority. They have moved into Paul’s mission territory and seized power. Paul knows that they consider him weak (yet strong in absentia). Paul maintains a consistency in weakness: he is weak with the churches, he was weak at the time of his commissioning, and, indeed, he was ordained to weakness. On the very issues of money and judgment (as well as the bad behavior of followers), he himself uses terms related to ταπεινονύς, a term used in the lowliness catalogues of 11:7, 12:21. In 11:30–12:12, Paul resumes his defensive stance (weakness and signs). Two more issues enter here, each heightened by Paul’s announcement of a “third coming” after having raised issues of burdening (12:14–18) and behavior (13:1–11); he is accused of not keeping order and not having power. The central issues of 2 Cor 10–13, then, pertain to church government.110

Most interpreters of this discourse do not express the social dimension of weakness and strength as often as it is pertinent, and they frequently refer to Paul’s weakness(es) without specifying which senses from its semantic range are most pertinent in specific occurrences of the terms.

108 Q texts include Luke 6, Matthew 4, 5, 10; other pertinent early Christian texts include Herm. Man. 11.7–16, Did. 3, Acts of Thomas, 85-86, 94, etc; also 1 Cor 13.1–3 gives “the most comprehensive list of attributes of persons of power, from eloquence, prophecy, miracle-doing, to being poor and giving one’s body to be burned,” Kolenkow, “Paul’s Opponents,” 354–364.
109 Ibid., 364.
110 Ibid., 364–365.
Consequently, such interpretations fail to communicate how serious, specific, and comprehensively condemning was the charge that Paul was weak. This study identifies the senses of the lexicon of weakness and strength most pertinent in occurrences throughout this discourse.

This study further discerns a strategy by which the discourse responds to this charge: First, 10.1–11.21a denies that Paul is weak in any way that keeps him from being an effective missionary-apostle. The discourse denies his weakness explicitly in 10.3–6, 8, and 11. It then demonstrates this denial through a running *synkrisis* that contrasts Paul’s ministry in the past and present with the activities of his rivals: Paul brought the gospel to Corinth first, while rivals violated the divine assignment by inserting themselves into an established work; Paul betrothed them to Christ, while rivals seduced them to another Jesus, spirit, and gospel; Paul humbled himself to serve them in the gospel as a gift, relying on support from other churches, while the rivals burdened believers; and he loved believers, while his rivals abused them (10.13–11.21a).

Most other studies do not discern how denial of the main charge of weakness unifies this portion of the discourse. Such studies either overlook or minimize the denials that Paul is weak at the beginning of the discourse (10.3–6), and they do not treat Paul’s contrast between himself and his rivals (10.13–11.21a) as support for the thesis expressed in 10.12—that Paul dare not compare or classify himself with his rivals. They further do not relate the explicit denials of weakness before 10.12 to the function of the ongoing contrast (10.13–11.21a) as specific examples of Paul’s effective apostleship that refute the charge of weakness. Instead, such studies rightly note Paul’s two requests that believers bear with his foolishness (11.1, 16) but claim that at one or both of these requests he actually begins his performance of that foolishness. As a result, they focus on Paul the fool too soon and minimize the persuasive force of his straightforward denial of weakness supported by strong evidence that the believers have witnessed firsthand.

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Second, after denying straightforwardly that Paul is weak, the discourse accepts the charge of weakness ironically through the foolish discourse of 11.21b–12.10. It first parodies the boasting of rivals by matching (11.21b–22) and then exceeding (11.23–29) their boasts by far. The hardship catalog of 11.23–29 does not boast in weakness, contrary to majority scholarly opinion. Instead, it demonstrates that Paul is a better servant of Christ than his rivals. (The study explores the simultaneously straightforward and ironic effects Paul’s consciously adopted role of the Greco-Roman mimic fool exerts throughout the hardship list.) At 11.29 Paul confesses his weakness, and at 11.30 Paul takes what his critics consider his vice and transforms it into virtue by beginning to boast of his weakness. Paul the mimic fool boasts of his escape from Damascus and of his exceptional visionary experience that leaves him mute and divinely chastened by a painful thorn. Paul’s prayer brings no deliverance, but instead, in the climax of Paul’s response to his critics, the divine oracle commends Paul in his weakness. Because believers tend to accept such charismatic utterances, the discourse rightly expects that they would accept the oracle as genuine. It meets the criterion of 10.18 and shows that the Lord refutes Paul’s critics.

The remainder of this discourse performs two other key acts concerning weakness: One, it locates weakness within Christ (13.3–4), warranting it christologically, in addition to evaluating it properly by the oracle of 12.9. Two, it defines by use one sense of weakness as leniency, an attitude for the good of believers, regardless of how well or poorly they evaluate Paul’s identity and performance as apostle (13.6–11), joining the end of the discourse to its opening note of “the meekness and gentleness of Christ” (10.1).

Much more occurs in the discourse than responding to criticism, and this study makes these other acts explicit as well; however, this study emphasizes what other studies have not, namely, this macro-strategy in the discourse as a response to the criticism that Paul is weak.

**Background to Thesis Two:**

Paul the weak leader in this discourse hardly resembles the Paul portrayed and critiqued on ethical grounds in recent studies. Considered by Burton Mack to be “devastating” in its force,\(^{112}\) *The Cost of Authority: Manipulation and Freedom in the New Testament*, by Anglican

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\(^{112}\) Betz, *Der Apostel*. The chief study that highlighted weakness as subsuming all, or nearly all, the criticisms expressed in 2 Cor 10–13 is Anita Kolenkow’s “Paul’s Opponents.”

clergyman and college chaplain Graham Shaw, examines Paul’s letters and the Gospel of Mark to show that the New Testament witnesses to a gospel of freedom and reconciliation but also betrays it, starting the history of Christianity’s failure to fulfill its promise. Shaw aims to appraise these texts that assert and exercise Christian authority by a standard of “how authority is to be authenticated and used legitimately.” Using “authority” and “power” synonymously, Shaw postulates the following about power: (1) Because the exercise of human power is ubiquitous and unavoidable, we critique only its uses, not its existence. (2) “The oppressive use of authority derives from the determination to perpetuate a position of power which is threatened by an instability it cannot ultimately evade.” That instability is, humanly, mortality, and institutionally, the impermanence of social arrangements. Illusions of permanent power blind secular ideologies, such as Stalin’s, but also appear in the New Testament: “Jesus lives. Christ is declared to be the same, yesterday, today and forever. Jesus is represented as saying that ‘heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away’. The eternity and unchangeability may be attributed to God, but his human representatives easily appropriate to themselves something of the same qualities.” Such illusions foster insecurity, which resists criticism. This resistance prohibits, silences, and censors; it demands undivided attention, nervously warns of false prophets, and excludes critics by anathema.

Paul’s letters and the Gospels consolidate and defend power, illegitimately, in Shaw’s view, by similar means: “the manipulation of eschatological anxiety, and the offer of privilege in another world; the divisive emphasis on divine judgment to provide sanctions to control behaviour, the stress on secrecy which gives to the initiates a special status, the prestige derived from persecution, and explanations of dissent, which render it harmless; ... a stress on internal unity at the cost of external antagonism, the fusion of the crucified identity with asceticism, the legitimation of the New Testament by reference to the Old, the exploitation of the social impact

113 (London: SCM Press, 1983) 2–12. Shaw rejects these efforts to evade the failure of Christianity to perform the ideals it professes: a “selective focus on good and suppression of the bad in history and experience”; historical relativism that spares condemning acts of the past using today’s moral standards; and denial that “whatever offends ‘is not really Christian,’” promoting a self-justifying sectarianism that denies history and fails tests of truth and reconciliation. His brief recital of the history of Christianity’s failure leads him to conclude “that the origins of the problem lie in the New Testament. As long as the New Testament remains fundamentally uncriticized, it will function as a carrier of those destructive attitudes which have surfaced repeatedly in Christian history” (11).  
114 Ibid. 14  
115 Ibid. 17  
116 Ibid. 17
of prayer; above all a continuity in the conception of the Christian privilege, as sonship, inheritance, election, and the possession of the Spirit.” Both groups of documents express “ambivalence towards the audience, and . . . distrust of the world. Cosmic dualism and the unresolved conflict between flesh and spirit mark the Gospels as deeply as the epistles. Both sets of documents assert the miraculous.”

This summary of Shaw’s general critique shows how much he finds wrong with the faith and the authority these documents express. Yet Shaw finds in the Jesus he retrieves from the Gospels an example of proper authority and power: Jesus anticipated and accepted his death and was thus liberated to use his power for the freedom and reconciliation of others. Because he accepted the temporary nature of his power, Jesus did not need to repress criticism, but could listen to it. “He lives surrounded by questioners and dies to a background of abuse.” His parables “do not look to another world for vindication” but seek “assent from the listeners’ experience of a world . . . common to speaker and audience alike. The emphasis on the neighbour, on the public fruits of religion as well as its secret motives, the confidence in everyday perceptions as a guide to religious truth, are all important correctives to the esoteric and privileged tendencies of much New Testament teaching. For unlike the esoteric and privileged versions of that teaching, they facilitate criticism rather than evade it.”

This study intersects Shaw’s work on two levels: First, it responds to his commentary on the subject text, 2 Corinthians 10–13, showing by its reading that Shaw’s reading of Paul as manipulative and oppressive is improbable because it ignores much exculpatory evidence and it imputes to Paul ill motives without arguing for them. As an example of ignoring exculpatory

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117 Ibid. 18
118 Ibid. 24
119 Ibid. 20–22. Shaw continues: “Authority which recognizes the temporary nature of its position of power is not threatened by the outlook and experience of others. It can therefore adopt a much more open and inclusive social stance because it knows that its own identity cannot be preserved indefinitely. It has no need to foster antagonism or insecurity. Instead it can use its power to encourage the autonomy of others, while respecting their integrity. . . . [I]t can sit loosely to all forms of visibility because it does not need continually to draw attention to itself. . . . [M]uch in the New Testament . . . reflects this. Jesus’ eating with publicans and sinners deliberately questions the rigid distinctions of contemporary religion, and the church’s openness to Gentiles is only an extension of the same attitude. The teaching of forgiveness is subversive of all legal distinctions, and the criticism of Sabbath observance, circumcision and food laws all repudiate a divisive visibility. The teaching on rank, reinforced by the parable of Jesus washing the feet of his disciples, extends this teaching to religious authority itself—the distinction between disciples and master is deliberately confused. In one sense the whole insistence on incarnation is the culmination of this liberating reversal. Orthodox stress on the otherness of God tends to legitimate social alienation. In the New Testament it is replaced by a radical identification of God and man. I John [4.9–11] correctly sees this as the legitimation of the inclusive, forgiving love which is one of the distinguishing marks of the New Testament.”

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evidence, Shaw does not credit Paul with consciously not influencing followers through esoteric, privileged knowledge, even though this decision looms large in the Fool’s Speech. Paul shares his visions and revelations minimally and only because he believes circumstances require such foolishness; but he shares only as a fool, only to boast in his weaknesses, and in contrast to his principle that believers should evaluate him only by the “everyday perceptions,” to use Shaw’s term, of what they can see and hear of him firsthand (2 Cor 12.6). The contrasting readings—this study’s and Shaw’s—will show that Shaw’s decision not to converse with current New Testament study in his reading discouraged him from exploring and appraising perspectives other than his thoroughly suspicious view. Second, the study notes what Shaw’s reading leaves out and what it imports: His reading leaves out any serious reckoning with the nature of the opposition Paul faced, which would provide a contemporary standard for appraising Paul’s rhetoric and other acts. Shaw bypasses the issue not only of the identity of Paul’s opponents, which admittedly has been a major problem in Corinthian studies, but also of the nature of their opposition. As a result, Shaw publishes a reading of Paul that he thinks, oddly, to be better for not having examined its polemical context and its implications for Christian faith. If, as this study argues, the opposition to which this text responds is sophistic, readers who want to appraise Paul well would want to know what were the alternatives between Christian life and faith advocated by Paul and by his sophistic rivals. This study argues that between these two (as represented in this text), Paul’s gospel affords more freedom and reconciliation than its competitor, but because Shaw has read superficially, he judges Paul to be manipulative and says nothing about Paul’s rivals, concerning whom the evidence of the Fool’s Speech is strong that they sought to impress and influence believers on the basis of their privileged, esoteric knowledge and experiences. At the same time, Shaw imports his own faith, which is at odds with Paul’s in numerous, crucial ways. Part of Shaw’s faith, or his ideology, is a notion of freedom

120 Ibid. vii. Shaw further claims that “the questions with which this book is concerned have not received close attention, and those questions have themselves suggested a distinctive method of understanding the New Testament,” one in which Shaw by-passes conversation with scholars of Mark and Paul, as well as studies on authority and power in Paul’s letters. Related studies were available before Shaw’s work was published: John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and Bengt Holmberg, Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline Epistles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980). Shaw acknowledges neither.

121 Among the differences are Shaw’s denial of the Resurrection or of the Spirit and of their importance to the gospel of “human freedom and of reconciliation between men” (13): “Once it has been granted that charismatic phenomena have a social rather than a supernatural origin . . . , much of Paul’s gospel crumbles. The divisive and repressive
and reconciliation that he does not define, argue for, or treat as at all complex in its relation to authority, sin, evil, or salvation. This study demonstrates that Paul’s discourse expresses this relationship with greater complexity and subtlety, which Shaw’s study neither discerns nor matches.

Also cited by Mack as devastating in its force is Elizabeth Castelli’s study, *Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power.*\(^\text{122}\) Using Foucault’s notions of discourse and power relations, this study locates Paul’s calls to imitation\(^\text{123}\) within the ancient discourse of imitation that usually presumes and endorses an ontologically hierarchical cosmology.\(^\text{124}\) Situated thus, the Pauline call to imitation produces several crucial effects: It valorizes and continually drives toward sameness and marginalizes and devalues difference;\(^\text{125}\) it creates or supports hierarchy in Pauline communities because Paul’s asserting his status as model-to-be-imitated distinguishes him from believers,\(^\text{126}\) who must attempt continually the finally impossible task of fully conforming to the model, which is itself poorly defined in the calls to imitation;\(^\text{127}\) and it supports and enhances Paul’s authority through the striving of believers to imitate Paul, an authority that believers soon perceive to be natural and inevitable and not as one of several possible ways that power might be arranged in the young Christian communities.\(^\text{128}\) As perhaps the most crucial, enduring effect on earliest and subsequent Christianity, the Pauline call to imitation supports Christianity’s developing into a religion of exclusivity, with it alone offering access to salvation and consequently distinguishing sharply between Christian and non-Christian.\(^\text{129}\) Following Derrida’s deconstructive aim, Castelli aims to “complicate the call to sameness” characteristic of “Western (Christian) culture,” in order to “reinscribe difference as itself a multiplicity constituted by both


\(^{123}\) 1 Thess. 1.6; Phil. 3.17; 1 Cor. 4.16; 11.1

\(^{124}\) Castelli, *Imitating Paul* 60–87; against representing this discourse as univocal and monolithic, 59, 86

\(^{125}\) Ibid. 21–22, 114–117

\(^{126}\) Because Paul confuses his identity with that of Christ and God and because hierarchy in the ancient discourse of mimesis is usually ontological, Castelli’s study implies that Paul’s discourse of mimesis distinguishes him from follower-believers not merely economically but ontologically.

\(^{127}\) Ibid. 16, 105, 109–111, 114

\(^{128}\) Ibid. 116–117

\(^{129}\) Ibid. 56–57, 96–97, 103, 114–115
similarities and differences,” “to think differences differently” for the good of at least Western culture.\(^\text{130}\)

Castelli’s study reads Paul’s calls to imitation in light of theories of Foucault and, to a lesser extent, Derrida and is therefore more explicit about the theoretical basis for its reading than is Shaw’s study. While differing in this important regard, Castelli carries forward Shaw’s notions of Paul’s occasional but important confusion of his identity with Christ and God,\(^\text{131}\) of the inability of Paul’s exercise of authority to tolerate significant differences in faith and practice, and of the New Testament’s own contribution to the forming of Christianity as a religion that fails to reconcile persons as much as it divides them antagonistically.

Castelli’s study intersects the present study chiefly in its judgment that Paul exerted his authority wrongfully because he enhanced it while excluding and suppressing difference. Her study does not read any portion of 2 Corinthians, but it does read Paul’s call to imitation in 1 Corinthians 4.16 somewhat closely\(^\text{132}\) and 11.1 more briefly.\(^\text{133}\) Responding to Castelli’s reading is complicated by the significant differences in method distinguishing her study from the present study. Castelli’s study makes explicit power relations invoked by Paul’s call to imitation to which other scholarly studies have not attended through the theoretical lenses of Foucault and Derrida. Her study makes its ultimate aim\(^\text{134}\) most explicit in the final section of the final chapter.\(^\text{135}\) The aim is to change fundamentally what the study terms “the dominance of the binary structures that frame conventional thought in the West”\(^\text{136}\) and that produce, inevitably, “Christian discourse [that] is radically overextended in the area of identity.” Paul’s call to imitation is only one, but a key, instance of this discourse.\(^\text{137}\) Castelli’s study thus builds the case that such binary structures dominate conventional Western thought by constructing “the ancient discourse of mimesis,” which expresses and implies such structures and into which Paul’s call to imitation is located, showing that Christian discourse transmits with a new religious authority the already-existing ideology of exclusivism and sameness. With such an ideological and

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\(^{130}\) Ibid. 134–136

\(^{131}\) Ibid. 32, 91, 95, 110–111

\(^{132}\) Ibid. 97–111

\(^{133}\) Ibid. 111–115

\(^{134}\) Summarized at the end of the second paragraph before this one in this study

\(^{135}\) Castelli, “Reading Mimesis Otherwise or, What’s the Difference?” in *Imitating Paul* 124–136

\(^{136}\) Ibid. 135

\(^{137}\) Ibid. 134–135
philosophical focus and aim, Castelli’s reading of Paul attends to features of his texts that correspond to the ideology that it disapproves of and desires to “complicate,” while it skirts features of his texts that, read more carefully, would complicate its portrayal of Paul’s “discourse of power.” Further, while Castelli’s study supports its reading of Paul’s texts at times with traditional exegetical criteria, at other times it dismisses readings supported in that way in favor of readings that are determined by weighing extra-textual constructs (e.g., “the ancient discourse of mimesis”) more heavily. The study thus expresses a theoretically unresolved tension between (a) readings derived from historical exegesis that weigh the particulars of a specific text more than an extra-textual construct invoked to help read the text and (b) others that weigh the particulars of a specific text less and impute to the specific text meanings derived from an extra-textual construct. Because the present study reads its subject text by means of rhetorical exegesis, a form of historical exegesis, the differences in theory and method distinguishing the two studies make it difficult to relate their readings and results in a dialogue that would satisfy both authors. Nevertheless, Castelli’s study attends to important dimensions of Paul’s texts as they have been received by generations of readers and listeners. These have been taught, preached, and heard in oppressive ways, and Castelli’s study explains with theoretical sophistication how Paul’s texts have produced such effects. The present study will provide a largely contrasting reading of 2 Cor 10–13 that attends to different dimensions of this discourse and therefore discovers different effects.

Sandra Hack Polaski’s study Paul and the Discourse of Power follows Castelli’s in her use of Foucault’s notions of discourse and power relations but differs in two key ways: (1) by locating Paul’s texts not within the ancient discourse of mimesis but instead in the ancient discourse of revelatory authority;138 (2) by acknowledging that Foucault’s perspectives and methods do not produce good exegesis of single, ancient texts.139 Moreover, unlike Castelli, Polaski does not target the binary structure of conventional Western thought as unethical, focusing instead on reading Paul’s texts closely. Her chief aim is to “uncover” and describe “certain relations of power”140 implied or expressed in Paul’s texts. Polaski’s study intersects the present study in these ways: (1) It affirms the value of rhetorical readings in making explicit

138 Sandra Hack Polaski, Paul and the Discourse of Power (Gender, Culture, Theory 8; The Biblical Seminar 62; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 43.
139 Ibid. 18–20
assertions and strategies of power deployed through texts,\textsuperscript{141} and it interprets texts by reading them closely more than by imputing to them readings of other related texts. (2) It reads various Pauline texts persuasively in showing how expressions that may seem inert to modern readers express Paul’s claim to and exertion of authority and power.\textsuperscript{142} In this way, it shows how religious language may be used to conceal assertions of authority and power that non-religious language would reveal and, revealed, likely elicit resistance from addressees.\textsuperscript{143} Polaski acknowledges Paul’s success in exerting authority and describes how he may be a worthy example for others: “In Paul’s writings I find evidence of an individual who was able, despite numerous limitations imposed on him by legal and traditional authority, to locate and use his power to further the purposes to which he believed he had been divinely called. This Paul is an example for persons who experience even greater opposition, oppression and the denial of their ability to make a difference.”\textsuperscript{144}

This study responds to the intersecting claims of Polaski’s study in the same terms as it does to Castelli’s: From the perspective of 2 Cor 10–13, Paul the weak leader correctly excludes sophistic values and behaviors from those deserving to be called “Christian” and correctly valorizes sameness by calling believers to follow his example instead of the example of his sophistic rivals.

\textit{Background for Theses Five and Six:}

These theses contain three key assertions. Assertion 5(b) sets the rest of the study in a specific historical location that requires evidence and argument to establish its probability. Development of assertion 5(b) is consequently somewhat lengthy, and its exposition of sophistic culture provides sufficient background for arguing Thesis 6 in the body of this study. All discussion follows this statement of the assertions:

5(a) Paul’s rivals are Jewish Christians. This study agrees with the numerous studies that affirm that 2 Cor 11.22 conclusively identifies Paul’s rivals as Jewish Christians.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. 49
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid. 47, 59
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid. 35. Polaski notes modern distinctions between “authority” and “power” as discussed, e.g., in Sally Purvis, \textit{The Power of the Cross: Foundations for a Christian Feminist Ethic of Community} (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1993).
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. 135
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. 136
5(b) They value and practice rhetorical eloquence and therefore may be called sophists. They are either precursors of or early participants in the Second Sophistic movement.

6 From Paul’s perspective, the conflict between him and his rivals centers on incompatible understandings of authentic Christian spiritual leadership. Paul condemns his rivals because they think and lead as sophists more than as Christians and have consequently imported a different Jesus, spirit, and gospel into the Corinthian church.

**Paul’s Rivals Are Sophists: Rhetoric in the Situation at Corinth**

That Paul faced a sophistic culture in his mission to Corinth is not a new assertion from New Testament scholars. Nearly fifty years ago, Johannes Munck described the situation expressed in 1 Cor 1–4 as follows:145

> Because [the Corinthian Christians] know only the popular philosophy and the professional orator or sophist, who understood how to captivate a Greek audience by his learning and eloquence, the outward form\(^ {146}\) is conclusive for them. The apostle, who has not forgotten the apprehension with which he began to preach about Christ in Corinth,\(^ {147}\) suddenly sees himself compared with a professional sophist who, with painted face and theatrical gestures, invites an audience of a thousand people to suggest to him a theme on which to improvise.

Even Walter Schmithals and Ulrich Wilkens recognized sophistic influence at Corinth, although neither of these nor Munck developed their observations.\(^ {148}\) But four recent doctoral studies of 1 Corinthians have probed the influence of Greco-Roman rhetoric in the church at Corinth:

Stephen Pogoloff’s *Logos and Sophia: The Rhetorical Situation of 1 Corinthians* (1992), Duane Litfin’s *St. Paul’s Theology of Proclamation: An Investigation of 1 Corinthian 1-4 and Greco-Roman Rhetoric* (1994), Michael A. Bullimore’s *St. Paul’s Theology of Rhetorical Style: An Examination of 1 Corinthians 2:1–5 in the Light of First Century Graeco-Roman Rhetorical Culture* (1995), and Bruce W. Winter’s *Philo and Paul among the Sophists* (1997). Both Litfin’s and Winter’s works are revisions of their dissertations, published a decade or more after

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145 Munck, *Paul and Salvation* 153
147 1 Cor. 2.3–5
completion of their originals. In his published work, Winter shows that he was aware of and
drew upon the work of Pogoloff and Litfin, but the works seem otherwise to have been
completed independent of each other. It is therefore somewhat remarkable that all of them would
be published in the same decade and be united in their rejection of the trend to understand 1 Cor.
1–4 through Philonic and Gnostic Wisdom hypotheses that had gained prominence as a result of
Ulrich Wilcken’s *Weisheit und Torheit* and Walther Schmithal’s *Gnosticism in Corinth*. Apart
from Bullimore’s thesis that Paul rejected only the florid Asianist style of Hellenistic rhetoric,
the three other studies agree that when Paul protests that his proclamation was οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ
λόγου (1 Cor. 1.17) and not ἐν σοφίᾳ ἔνθρωπων (2.5), he disavows any reliance on
contemporary rhetorical practice for his mission among the Corinthians.149

Sophists at First- and Early Second-Century CE Corinth

Because Winter’s study benefits from Pogoloff’s and Litfin’s and because it argues more
fully that Paul’s rivals were sophists, the following summary of aspects of the historical and
rhetorical background to 2 Cor 10–13 depends on his work more than on the work of the
others.150 The present study could proceed directly to its rhetorical analysis without advancing

149 Pogoloff’s survey of Greco-Roman rhetorical sources demonstrates that Hellenistic readers would understand the
important phrase σοφία λόγου (1 Cor. 1.17; 2.1, 4, 13) to refer to rhetoric, specifically to “sophisticated speech”;
will undermine the community is nothing other than rhetoric,” “On the Discord in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 1–4 and
Ancient Politics,” *JBL* 106 (1987) 102, cited by Pogoloff 111. Others concurring with this or a similar translation of
the phrase include C. K. Barrett (“rhetorical skill”), *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* London and New York:
Harper & Row, 1968 and A. & C. Black, 1971) 49; A. D. Litfin (“the dynamic of Greco-Roman rhetoric”), *St Paul’s
Theology of Proclamation* (SNTSMS 79; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 188–192; Gordon D. Fee
(sophia in 1 Cor. “reflects the Greek philosophial or sophist tradition,” adopting J. Munck’s position), *The First
Epistle to the Corinthians* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 64–65, n. 79; and Bruce W. Winter (“rhetorical
skill”), *Philo and Paul among the Sophists* (SNTSMS 96; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 187.

150 Pogoloff develops a notion of sophistic influence on the rhetorical situation at Corinth, pertinent to 1 Cor. 1–4,
but he cites the standard studies that date the genesis of the Second Sophistic to a century after Paul (*Logos and
Sophia* 65, 95). Litfin’s views cohere largely with those of Winter, except that Litfin does not use the catalog of
primary materials he compiles to argue for the existence of the Second Sophistic movement during the time of Paul
in Corinth as Winter does (*St Paul’s Theology of Proclamation* 187–201). Litfin wrongly excludes the ‘Diogenes
speeches’ of Dio because he thinks they refer to 4th-century BCE Corinth, but Dio uses Diogenes “as a mouthpiece
for critical comments” on 1st-century CE Roman Corinth (Litfin, *St Paul’s Theology* 146, n. 39; Winter, *Philo and
Paul* 8–9; cf. C. P. Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* 47). Others whom Winter cites as overlooking the
Corinthian evidence for the existence and activity of sophists include these: George A. Kennedy, who uses Paul’s
letters for studies in rhetorical criticism, but who “makes no mention of their witness to the sophist movement in
Corinth during an important period of its development” (both *Classical Rhetoric* (London: Croom Helm, 1980) 130–
132 and *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1984) esp. chap. 7; C. P. Jones, who wrote chapters on cities in Dio’s world, did not write on Corinth, because
this historical and rhetorical construction, and its analysis could arguably be completed without risking any kind of specific historical reconstruction. But I have chosen to acknowledge the reconstruction that on the whole lurks in my mind while analyzing the rhetoric of 2 Cor 10–13. I believe that its main assertions are probable and that they allow the rhetorical analysis that follows to reveal a sharper, fuller image of the transactions occurring between Paul and his converts at Corinth.\footnote{If readers find any parts of this reconstruction implausible, I invite them to evaluate the rhetorical analysis of the following chapters apart from those parts of the reconstruction that they may find unconvincing.}

Winter first argues that we have substantial primary sources showing that the Second Sophistic movement was already underway in Alexandria (three sources) and Corinth (six sources) during the times of Philo and Paul. The sources that indicate that sophists were influential in Pauline Corinth are these: (1) two orations of the former sophist turned anti-sophist Dio Chrysostom, \textit{Or.} 6 and 8, the “Diogenes speeches,” which describe sophistic activity in Corinth during his exile from Rome, \textit{c.} 89–96 CE; (2) the Corinthian oration of the noted sophist and pupil of Dio, Favorinus, the Roman Hellenophile who experienced both the highest acclamation and the fickle disparaging of the Corinthians; (3) an epigraphic description of Herodes Atticus, famous sophist and benefactor of Corinth and centerpiece of Philostratus’ account of the Second Sophistic in his \textit{Lives of the Sophists}; (4) Plutarch’s “slight evidence” from his visits to Corinth that indicates the status enjoyed by Corinthian sophists; (5) Epictetus’ familiarity with Corinth and his discussion with a rhetoric student from Corinth that inform us about conditions at the end of the first century CE; (6) Paul’s Corinthian letters, which themselves point to sophistic activity in the city and in the church.\footnote{Philo and Paul among the Sophists (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 7–8} Except for Paul and his opponents, all these were literary men of public standing whose lives were intertwined. Opponents of the sophistic movement were Epictetus, Dio, Plutarch, and Paul; proponents were Favorinus, Herodes Atticus, and the Jewish Christian ministers whom the Corinthian church
embraced after Paul left Corinth. Except for Epictetus (and perhaps Paul), all were trained in Greek rhetoric.¹⁵³

Winter sets for himself these tests to ensure that the portrait of sophistic activity and culture at Corinth truly pertains to the church issues expressed in 1 Corinthians 1–4, 9, and 2 Corinthians 10—13: (1) that the strife (ἐρήμ) and jealousy (ζημιόζ) expressed in 1 Cor. 1.11 and 3.3 “are clearly related to the sophistic movement”; (2) that Paul’s manner of ministry, according to 1 Cor. 2.1–5, answers to “the conventions of sophists ‘coming’ to a city and operating in it”; (3) that he critiques the sophistic movement in 1 Cor. 1–4; (4) that “his own ministry has been critiqued by those trained within the sophistic tradition using its canons in 2 Corinthians 10–13”; and (5) that his response to opponents in 2 Cor 10–13 shows that he is arguing with “Christian orators or sophists who are now within the Christian community.”¹⁵⁴

Five Witnesses to Sophistic Activity in First-Century Corinth

From these, as well as other contemporaneous sources, arises a portrait of sophistic culture. Epictetus’ essay “On personal adornment” (Περὶ καλλωπισμοῦ) deals with the personal appearance, public presence, and career expectations of a young rhetoric student from Corinth. The student was overdressed, with coiffed hair, heavy use of jewelry, and body hair plucked for audience appeal. Epictetus argues that true excellence consists of virtues, not hair, jewelry, clothing, or pandering to an audience; and he points out that a hairless body would be a liability if one seeks the highest office. This exchange indicates careers open to students of rhetoric later in life: They could become (in an ascending order of importance) an ‘administrator of the city’ (ἄρχων Ἀστυ), ‘the superintendent of the ephebi’ (ἐφήβικαρχος), ‘a magistrate’ (στρατηγός), or ‘superintendent of the games’ (ἀγωνοθέτης); and Epictetus reminds him that his son could become a ‘fine citizen’ (καλὸς πολίτης), ‘a senator’ (βουλευτής), and ‘an orator’ (ῥήτωρ).¹⁵⁵ As evidence from Epictetus and from E. L. Bowie’s study “The Importance of Sophists” indicate, sophists came from “the powerful and wealthy families.”¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Ibid. 114–115
¹⁵⁴ Ibid. 13–14
¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 115–117, 119, 121; Epictetus III.1.1
¹⁵⁶ Winter, Philo and Paul 116–121; Bowie, Yale Classical Studies 27 (1982), 30
In “To those who read and discuss for the purpose of display” (Πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγγελώσκοντας καὶ διαλέγονένους ἐπιδεικτικός, 3.23), Epictetus accurately depicts sophists’ activities, including declamations. Winter finds Epictetus’ purpose to be either setting boundaries for declamation by philosophers or attacking sophistic declamation, convincing philosophers “of the inappropriateness of the sophists’ methods for [philosophical] discourse.” Epictetus (#33-34) refers to four discourse types, or styles (χαρακτήρ): exhortation (προτρεπτικός), refutation (ἐλεγκτικός), instruction (διδακτικός), and display, or declamation (ἐπιδεικτικός). He notes that a crowd hardly attends to exhortation, seeking happiness in the “wrong place,” a large hall used for declamations (#35): “To achieve [happiness] must a thousand benches be placed, and the prospective audience be invited, and you put on a fancy cloak, or a dainty mantle, and mount the speaker’s stand, and paint a word-picture of how Achilles died?” Contrasting sophists from true philosophers, Epictetus concludes, “Is this what listening to philosophy amounts to?” (#38), expecting a vigorous “No!” in response. Epictetus asks why he should listen to a declamation (ἐπιδείκνυς), and he receives no answer, except “but praise me” (ἀλλ’ ἐπιλειφθέν με), which means “Bravo!” or “Marvellous!” (#23-24, 32). Such praise is the task of disciples, or students, and sophists are commonly critiqued because they clamor for such praise (#9).

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157 Winter (121–122) cites these reasons why this discourse has been largely overlooked for its evidence about sophistic declamation: because (1) Epictetus does not refer to any sophists by name, though he does mention philosophers and orators (Epic. 3.5, 20, 27, 30, 38; Stanton, “Sophists and Philosophers” 358, 1st–2nd cent CE: philosophers may be referred to as “orators” but not as “sophists”); (2) the Loeb trans. by Oldfather obscures: it renders ἐπιδεικτικός as ‘display,’ not ‘declamation’; and ‘discussion,’ not as the preferable ‘discourse’ or better ‘lecture’ (see #23; there Epictetus uses διαλέγονειν, to discuss,’ when the following section explains it as ἐπιδείκνυμι. Philostratus uses διαλέγονειν to refer to delivery of a formal διάλεξις (Lives of the Sophists, 604); (3) “because of the deliberate distancing of the philosophers from the sophists,” philosophers didn’t “disparage rhetoric even if they did criticize its misuse by their opponents,” cf. Epic. 2.23.46. So Cicero: philosophers are to benefit from oratory and orators/sophists from philosophy. Also Seneca the Elder acknowledges the value of declamations at Rome (J. Fairweather, Seneca the Elder (Cambridge, 1981) 118-119, 320–323.) Winter notes, “Even philosophers were forced to respond to audience demands” (122).

158 Russell, Greek Declamation 76, n. 14: Declamations were attended by 1,000 or more in large, splendid halls; so Lucian, De domo. 1.58; also Dio, Or. 32.8-9.

159 Winter 122–123. Here are Winter’s reasons that Epictetus refers to sophists, not philosophers: (1) philosophers did not send invitation; sophists did (#27; also Aristides, Or. 51.29); (2) sophists dressed elaborately; philosophers didn’t; (3) declamations did not lead to changed conduct in listeners; they only judged the performance; (4) Epictetus’ conclusion: “Is this what listening to a philosopher amounts to?” requires a “No!” But such judgment (although with an affirmative response expected by the speaker) of the performance was what it meant to listen to a sophist declaim.

160 Ibid. 124. Epictetus (3.23.10–11) describes a sophist’s soliciting praise: “The other day, when your audience gathered rather coolly, and did not shout applause, you walked out of the hall in low spirits. And again the other day, when you were received with applause, you walked around and asked everybody, ‘What did you think of me?’ “It
The 6th and 8th orations of Dio of Prusa (c. 40–112 CE) reflect the sophistic movement in Corinth in the late first century. Dio, under Domitian, is exiled (c. 89-96) and writes with the persona of the founder of the Cynic sect, Diogenes of Sinope (c. 400-325 BCE), but he describes the Corinth of his own day. Or. 8, “On Virtue,” describes sophistic activity during the Isthmian games in Corinth. Dio seeks to give Corinth wisdom, but they reject his treatments for “folly, wickedness and intemperance”; no one would listen to him (#8). Through Diogenes’ voice, Dio contrasts the superficiality of the sophists with his aim of steering people to virtue (8.9). Sophists rival each other, as do their students and disciples, sometimes expressed in professional quarrels of factional and political or intercity rivalries. Officials, even the emperor, could intervene because of, in Bowersock’s words, “the very eminence of the sophists.” In his first discourse on kingship, Dio uses to indicate the degree of commitment involved in being a of a sophist. Dio combines the two terms to characterize the ideal king’s devotion to Zeus. But directed toward sophists, this zealous discipleship results in “great personal for sophists who, like ‘gorgeous peacocks’ are ‘lifted a lot on the wings of their fame (δόξα) and their disciples.’” Dio, the anti-sophist, does not recruit disciples, because he, like Socrates, denies having anything to teach (Cf. Or. 12.13). Dio similarly critiques forensic orators who pervert justice through their arguments. They stroll the temple precincts during the games, not to advise potential clients but in order to present was marvelous, sir, I swear by my life.’ ‘How did I render that particular passage?’ ‘Which one?’ ‘Where I drew a picture of Pan and the Nymphs?’ ‘It was superb.’”


162 Winter 128; cf. Bowersock’s Greek Sophists, “Professional Quarrels”

163 Winter 128; Bowersock, Greek Sophists 100; he discusses the social status of sophists at 32-36, and Bowie’s careful analysis of sophists in “The Importance of Sophists” confirms and amends Bowersock’s discussion.

164 Winter 130. cf. Dio Or. 55.3


166 Winter 130. στρέφειν here for “pervert justice” is used of a wrestler trying to avoid an opponent and metaphorically of arguments; therefore, wrestling with justice by trying to avoid it.
controversia, speeches on legal topics for display, referred to in Quintilian and papyri.\textsuperscript{168} Orators engaging in suasoria or epideictic\textsuperscript{169} also declaim and engage in rhetorical tricks, \textit{θαύμα}.

Dio’s Corinth is flush with sophists, orators, and poets. Rivalry abounds among sophists and their ‘disciples.’ Because of their educational prowess, sophists thought they knew more than others. They are pictured most clearly at the Isthmian games, \textit{Or. 8.9}, but also as part of everyday life in Corinth, \textit{Or. 6.21}. They swell with pride when the crowd acclaims them but shrivel up when not praised (#32–33).\textsuperscript{170} Dio’s final words, through the persona of Diogenes, have him describe the sophists, raising “their din, like frogs in a pond when they do not see the water-snake” (8.36).

Favorinus of Arles (\textit{c. CE 80–150}) was from the Roman equestrian order and a leading pupil of Dio Chrysostom.\textsuperscript{171} He visited Corinth three times, and his Corinthian oration (\textit{Or. 37}) was delivered on his final visit. On his first visit he had “impressed the δῆμος and magistrates with his eloquence (\textit{λόγος})” and won their friendship (#1, 9). On his second visit, the Corinthians tried to get him to stay and erected a bronze statue of him, placed prominently in their library, to feature him as a model for Corinthian youth. The inscription described him as “the noblest among Greeks” (\textit{ἀριστος Ἑλλήνων}, #22), “high praise indeed for a Roman,” Winter notes.\textsuperscript{172} Favorinus adopted Greek ways religiously (#25), at great economic and political cost to himself. He studied oratory in Athens and athletics in Sparta, persuaded many barbarians to study Greek wisdom (#26), and believed the gods had equipped him to be an example (\textit{παράδειγμα}) to all; yet his statue was overthrown, for no clear reason (#20).\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{168} referred to in \textit{P.Oxy. 2190}. Quintilian, \textit{Inst. 2.4.33; 4.2.94, 97}
\textsuperscript{169} despite LCL’s translation ‘jugglers’; \textit{θαυμαστοποιεῖν} is used of orators who ‘strain for the marvellous’; Winter 131.
\textsuperscript{170} Winter 132
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. 133
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. 134. The removal of his statue baffled Favorinus, who saw the act as, in Winter’s words, “an affront to ‘the Greeks’ and their sense of right, which was something he could not bear from a city renowned for justice” (136). Other cities were employing him in embassies and honoring him with statues, but the Corinthians “in effect banished him” by removing his statue (#16, 37). He knew of no charge against him. Loeb translator H. Lamar Crosby links Favorinus’ reference to Aphrodite to the possible charge of immorality [Dio Chrysostom IV (LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946) 1 and \textit{Or. 37, #33, n. 7}]. Philostratus says he was charged with adultery with wife of a consul (\textit{Lives of the Sophists} 489–90). Litfin observes that the Corinthians “had not the slightest compunction about standing in judgment on the orators who came before them” but attributes the judgment against
Favorinus’ Corinthian Oration (Or. 37) witnesses to the Corinthians’ embrace of the sophistic movement not long after the time of Paul. They—including women and children—received Favorinus’ oratory with great enthusiasm during his first two visits (#1, 8–9, 33). Litfin says of this evidence that the Corinthians “loved eloquence, lionized its practitioners, and were concerned that their own youth excel in it,” an attitude “broadly based among the Corinthian populace.”¹⁷⁴ Part of this embrace of sophistry included participation in rivalries among leading sophists. Philostratus describes Favorinus’ prolonged professional quarrels with one sophist Polemo of Laodicea. The city of Ephesus favored Favorinus, and Smyrna favored Polemo. Bowersock identifies these as rivals for pre-eminence in Asia Minor.¹⁷⁵ When the pair went to Rome, the rivalry intensified, and their speeches were filled with an invective that overshadowed the question of the truth of their claims. Philostratus shows that the rivalry was sustained and intensified by students of the sophists and by their appreciative listeners of high social standing—in Rome including “consulars and sons of consulars.” Having such partisans increased the reputation of both sophists, as well as that of their followers.¹⁷⁶ Beyond this specific rivalry, Philostratus identifies rivalry generally as an identifying mark of a true sophist: “When people called Favorinus a sophist, the mere fact that he had quarreled with a sophist was evidence enough.” He also cites Hesiod, who observes that one always competes with others in same craft.¹⁷⁷ Philostratus does not fault sophistic rivalry itself, which can be forgiven, because “human nature holds that the love of glory never grows old.”¹⁷⁸ He censures instead the invective that this specific rivalry produced, which, in Bowersock’s words, “kindles the keenest envy and malice in the hearts of wise men.”¹⁷⁹

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¹⁷⁴ Winter 135, citing Litfin, *St Paul’s Theology of Proclamation* 144–145. Other values of Favorinus’ Or. 37 include these: It 1) evidences the degree to which an orator could be praised and why: Favorinus masters Greek rhetoric to the point that he inspires Greeks and their children (#26); 2) shows the extent to which Greek culture became *de rigueur* in Rome: Favorinus refers to his serving as role model for Romans—encouraging them to value Greek *paideia*—and how he had taken “Rome by storm” when he spoke there in Greek, acclaimed even by those who could not understand Greek; 3) shows that Greek *paideia* was exported to peoples beyond the Romans: Favorinus says that he is a paradigm also for Celts and barbarians, who also can attain Greek *paideia* (#27).


¹⁷⁶ Bowersock, *Greek Sophists* 91

¹⁷⁷ Winter 137; *Lives of the Sophists* 491, citing Hesiod, *Works and Days* 25

¹⁷⁸ Winter 137; Philostratus, *Lives* 491

¹⁷⁹ *Greek Sophists* 91; cited by Winter 137
The fourth witness to the first-century sophistic movement at Corinth is the most eminent of Favorinus’ pupils, Herodes Atticus (c. 101–177 CE), the sophist and benefactor specifically of Corinth. For Philostratus, who treated him at greatest length in his *Lives of the Sophist*, Herodes is at the center of the Second Sophistic.\(^{180}\) He was a wealthy benefactor from Athens who donated, among other things, the theatre at Athens and the roofed theatre at Corinth. The high esteem in which Corinthian leaders held Herodes is indicated by the *boulē*’s inscription on the statue of his wife Regilla that Herodes gave to be displayed in Corinth. The inscription reads, in part: [\'Αττικός Ηρώδης μέγας ὁ πασεν ἔξοχος ἀλλοι / παντείης ἀρετῆς εἰς ἄκρον εἰκόμενος—“It was given by great Herodes Atticus, pre-eminent above others, who had attained the peak of every kind of virtue.” Winter puts this praise in context: “No other extant Corinthian inscriptions of the first half or middle of the second century surpass the superlatives heaped upon Herodes.”\(^{181}\) Philostratus says that “youths from all parts of the world hung on his lips, and they flocked to Athens in their desire to hear his eloquence.”\(^{182}\) Such testimonials witness to the fame and status of sophists among Corinthians. According to Philostratus, Herodes enjoyed and was not the least embarrassed by any praise he received, including that of being counted among the ten Attic Orators. He thought of himself as better than Andocides, the Attic orator that Greek and Roman critics accused of stylistic faults. Herodes’ own *synkrisis* of himself with Andocides was judged ἀστειότατος (most pretty, most elegant and refined) by Philostratus.\(^{183}\)

Herodes had many rivalries and loyal students, among whom his most distinguished student Amphicles led in the humiliation of the sophist Philagrus of Cilicia.\(^{184}\) In one instance, Herodes’ students baited Amphicles to declaim on a topic on which he had declaimed elsewhere and even published it. Amphicles began speaking and continued until opposing students began reading the declamation aloud.\(^{185}\) They laugh and he raged, because such recycling of declamations breached the rules of declaiming in Athens, and the students’ response was typical of an audience to such a recycling. “These incidents . . . aimed to humiliate and drive out other sophists and illustrate the lengths to which followers would go to gain victory through the permanent humiliation of

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\(^{180}\) Winter 137, citing Anderson, *Philostratus* 108; and *Lives of the Sophists* 545–566


\(^{182}\) *Lives*, 562; referring to Herodes’ style of oratory, 564–565; cited by Winter 139

\(^{183}\) *Lives*, 564

\(^{184}\) Winter 140; *Lives* 203, 578–579
rival sophists. . . . Herodes Atticus epitomizes all that a virtuoso rhetorician should be. . . . Of his success as a declaimer there is no doubt. Furthermore he was well born and had vast financial resources. . . . E. L. Bowie’s discussion of the status of sophists surely finds its focus in this man who may rightly be called wise, powerful, and well-born.”

Plutarch of Chaeronea, Greece (c. 50–120 CE), corroborates Dio’s observations of the presence of orators and sophists at the Isthmian games and their high social status in *Quaestiones Conviviales* (99–116 CE) and *Moralia*. Plutarch visited Corinth often, especially during the games, having as a friend the three-times *agonothete* Antonius Sospis, along with many other friends of high status at Corinth. His *Moralia* 675d, 723 records two meals where leading officials dined with orators. Plutarch further illuminates the relations between teacher-sophists and their students. He mentions a student’s presenting his award from an oration at the games to his teacher, Herodes Atticus, as a special honor to the teacher, who accepted the honor and returned the palm frond and plaited wreath award. Such an honor recognizes that the teacher was responsible ultimately for the prize. Beyond describing the activity of sophists, Plutarch, like Dio and Philo, criticizes them often, noting that some orators and sophists are “led by ‘repute and ambition’ (δόξα καὶ φιλότιμον), others by ‘pecuniary interests’ (μισθόχος), and still others . . . [by] rivalries for political supremacy.” Plutarch contrasts sophists against philosophers, showing the former to “be motivated by selfish ambition and to care little for their audience or their disciples’ welfare.”

In summary, Dio and Plutarch, according to Bowersock, performed on “the eve of the most colourful period of the Second Sophistic; and although not a part of it, their lives adumbrated many of its pronounced characteristics”: They performed imperial service, addressed magistrates and citizens of cities, and socialized among the elite of the East and emperors of Rome.

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185 Winter 141
188 Winter 142
189 Ibid. 143
190 Winter treats Philo while discussing the witnesses to sophistic activity in the Roman East, particularly at Alexandria. Of greatest value to this study is Philo’s contrast between sophists and their opponents in *Det.* 33–34. See discussion below.
191 Ibid., also citing *Moralia* 131a; Stanton, “Sophists and Philosophers” 351–353; Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* 14
192 Winter 143; Bowersock, *Greek Sophists* 112
Epicurus shows a student of rhetoric preoccupied with sophistic concerns in Corinth. Dio and Plutarch present orators and athletes as major public figures in Corinth, with orators more influential. Orators were highly esteemed, as the example of Favorinus shows. He was enthusiastically accepted by all levels in society and became the paradigm for all peoples in Corinth—Greeks, Romans, and barbarians. Both he and Herodes were highly praised in public statues and inscriptions, signifying probably the opinion of the city fathers. Dio notes jealousy among sophists, and Philostratus documents such rivalry in detail, in the cases of Favorinus and Herodes Atticus. Plutarch’s “table talk” indicates that orators and sophists had ready access to Corinthian upper society.193

Paul and I Corinthians as a Witness to Sophistic Activity in Corinth

Winter argues that 1 Corinthians 2.1–5 and 1 Corinthians 9 defend Paul’s consciously anti-sophistic mission to Corinth. The former passage expresses his anti-sophistic coming to Corinth, while the latter expresses the non-sophistic basis of his ongoing work in Corinth.194 These readings, as well as this study’s reading of 2 Corinthians 10—13, presume that these texts respond to the expectation of some influential believers at Corinth that Paul would work among them as a sophist.195

193 Winter 144
194 Regarding Paul’s coming, Winter 147–161; regarding his ongoing work there, Winter 162–176
195 Sharing this presumption, E. A. Judge claims that Paul would have been seen as a sophist “in his social position at any rate,” on the basis of Judge’s study of the names of persons appearing in Paul’s letters. Judge counts some forty persons as financial supporters of Paul, patrons who remained in one location but contributed toward Paul’s itinerant work, and another forty as Paul’s professional following, those who traveled and worked with him. “The Early Christians as a Scholastic Community: Part II,” Journal of Religious History 1 (1960) 130–134. This quotation elaborates the sense in which Judge labels Paul a sophist (135–136): “What other touring preacher established a set of corporate societies independent of himself and yet linked to him by a constant traffic of delegations? . . . [Paul] is always anxious about the transmission of the logos and the acquisition of true gnosis. . . . The Christian faith, therefore, as Paul expounds it, belongs with the doctrines of the philosophical schools rather than with the esoteric rituals of the mystery religions. . . . A study of Paul’s peers and rivals would also sharpen the point. [Paul attacks] points of academic belief and moral practice [, while] the religious activities of the Christian societies, the organization and conduct of the cult, are only of minor concern. Paul frequently denounces his opponents as sophists in the most pejorative sense, and in the same connection vehemently dissociates himself from their methods. Paradoxically, all of Paul’s protests about not having professional qualifications or using the accepted methods of persuasion imply the opposite. They make it clear for one thing that he was himself attacked on the same charges that he brought against his competitors. . . . [I]t can be shown that he only refused [financial maintenance] to make a point, that he always insisted on his right to support, and did in fact accept it in the normal way where it was not an issue. . . . [H]is direct renunciations of sophistry are explicitly made in order to cast the opprobrium of professionalism on to his opponents, and lead not to the claim that he was incompetent, but, ultra-sophistically, to the claim that his skill was by special endowment and, therefore, in fact superior to theirs. The final answer to this question lies, of course, in the literary appraisal of Paul’s own work, which would easily demonstrate that his style
Paul Flouts Sophistic Conventions: 1 Corinthians 2.1–5 and 9

A sophist in the first or second centuries CE could win high honors from a city if he established himself in both *politeia* and *paideia*. Citizens would of course expect the sophist to reciprocate by benefiting the city by being politically useful in an embassy and providing benefactions to the city. Cities would then, in turn, grant citizenship to such sophists.\(^{196}\) Establishing himself required a sophist to come to the city in a conventional way. On the initial visit, the sophist would demonstrate his eloquence in a preliminary way. If he was successful, the citizens would endorse him, and the door would be open to his benefiting the city and benefiting from it. Following are examples of sophists visiting Corinth and other cities:

On his third visit to Corinth, Favorinus reminds the Corinthians of his initial visit and the sample of his eloquence that established friendly relations among him, the *demos*, and magistrates.\(^{197}\) D. A. Russell cites Aristides’ initial visit to Smyrna, c. 176 CE: People come out to greet him, and the most distinguished young men offer themselves as his students; a lecture is planned and invitations issued. But before the scheduled time, Aristides dreams that he should declaim earlier, at 10 o’clock that day. The earlier time is advertised and his “impromptu” appearance hastily arranged. The council chamber is packed. He delivers his first speech sitting down, but the second—the declamation—standing up, and the audience receives his speeches and himself enthusiastically. Aristides therefore triumphed over a rival Egyptian sophist declaiming the same day.

Philostratus describes the coming of three sophists to Athens. On his first visit to Athens, Polemo broke convention in several ways: He did not give an encomium, which would have been easy with Athens as the topic. He did not deliver a lengthy oration about his own renown—the *dialexeia*—which was customary among sophists in order to win favor for their declamations.\(^{198}\) His neglect was attributed to arrogance, as was his declaiming immediately after agreeing on the topic, when sophists usually took a day after the naming of the topic to prepare

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possesses a versatility and force, unconventional maybe by the standards of professional rhetoricians, but so effective as to rank him as an orator and writer of rare distinction.”

\(^{196}\) Winter 149

\(^{197}\) Or. 37.1 and Winter 149

\(^{198}\) Winter 150; also Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 535; Russell, *Greek Declamation* 79; E. Anderson, *Philostratus* 45
their declamations. According to Philostratus, Polemo succeeded in spite of violating various conventions.

But Philagrus of Cilicia, a reputed sophist, failed to impress Athenians because of the effects of his quarrel with Herodes Atticus. While he first elicited their disapproval because he digressed at length in his encomium to the citizens in order to lament his late wife, he caused his coming to Athens to fail by delivering as an original oration one that had been published elsewhere. As mentioned above, while delivering this oration, Herodes’ disciples read aloud from their copy of the published speech while Philagrus was yet delivering it. These acts tarnished his reputation irreversibly. Philostratus says further that he had unbecoming appearance and a weak voice, which Athenians would condemn, because they insisted on an appropriate “presence” (ὑπόκρισις). Philagrus later became the chair of rhetoric in Rome, but despite this glory, he continued to be remembered in Athens for his professional misconduct and humiliation. Alexander of Seleucia succeeded in his coming to Athens because, according to Philostratus, his διάλεξε praised Athens, and his ἀπολογία flattered the Athenians by explaining why he had not visited earlier.

Dio’s turn-of-the-century 47th Oration, delivered after his return home from exile, shows what reception a famous orator could expect to receive when visiting great cities of the empire. Responding to the suggestion that he abandon his beleaguered efforts to complete the campaign to beautify his city, Prusa, Dio visualizes the option of traveling as an orator to cities where he would be “escorted with much enthusiasm and éclat (θλοτμία),” his hosts grateful for his visit, begging to be addressed and advised (λέγεις καὶ συμβουλέως), flocking at his doors from early morning, all without his “having incurred any expense or having made any contribution.” But despite having experienced such favor earlier in his life, Dio distances himself from the sophistic conventions that elicited such favor from the leading citizens of major cities. Dio warns his audience not to expect an extraordinary or remarkable discourse (as sophists would strive to provide) and not “one composed to produce a kind of pleasure or to exhibit beauty or σοφία.”

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199 Lives of the Sophists 535; Russell, Greek Declamation 80
200 Winter 151; Lives of the Sophists 579–580
201 Winter 151; Lives of the Sophists 572
202 Winter 151; Dio, Or. 47.22. Epictetus 3.23.23 mentions the convention of inviting a speaker into a private home for a performance.
203 Or. 47.1
He used to be able to declaim, to deceive “the public and all the cities,” but he no longer remembers how. Instead, he promises an “amateurish and commonplace” speech, fitted to the concerns of the speech—overcoming lately developing resistance to his Prusan beautification campaign—and not to the largely entertainment aims of sophistic declamation. Dio’s “feigned loss of memory concerning declamation” was thus a calculated tactic in his invective, focusing attention on the absurdity of his opponents and “denying the audience what they most desired from this golden-tongued orator: a declamation.” In his Corinthian letters, Paul likewise has reasons for not expressing his message in sophistic rhetoric.

Several expressions in 1 Corinthians 2.1–5 bear important rhetorical senses that fit well with the hypothesis that Paul responded to sophistic culture in this discourse. First is the language of his coming to Corinth. Verse 1 does not focus on the simple fact that Paul arrived in Corinth as much as it stresses “the stance he adopted when he arrived”:

Some of the rhetorical potential in this verse is realized by Hans Conzelmann’s translation of part of the v.: “When I came to you I did not come in such a way as to distinguish myself in eloquence or wisdom [while proclaiming to you the witness/mystery of God].” With this

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204 Ibid. 47.8
206 Winter 153. Aristides similarly refuses to declaim because the young men of the city in ingratitude have neglected his lectures: Or. 33.24–25
208 Winter 156
209 taking καθ’ ύπεροχήν with ἡλίθων and not καταγγέλλων, so that kata refers to the manner of Paul’s coming—“not with the superiority of eloquence or wisdom” (cf. BAGD #5.b.b). Cf. Conzelmann, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, ET (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 53, n. 2.
210 The choice between μυστήριον and μαρτυρίον is close. Nestle’s 26th reads the former, while the 25th edition read the latter. Gordon D. Fee favors the latter on textual grounds, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 63, and it accords well with the rhetorical significance of the passage. The sophist’s μάρτυς—the witness of his successful lifestyle (cf. Philo, Det. 33)—vouched for the truth of his method. Paul, of course, proclaims a far different witness, that of God’s power through the crucified Messiah (1 Cor. 2.1c–2).
rendering, καθ’ ὑπεροχήν is connected with ἠλθόν rather than with καταγγέλλων, and κατά refers to the manner of Paul’s coming. ὑπεροχήν is rendered variously: by E. A. Judge as [not with] “‘excessive’ reliance on speech or wisdom”;211 by Aristotle as the superiority men feel based on γένος, δύναμις, and ἀρετή,212 a sense well fitted both to this clause—“not with superiority of speech or wisdom”—and to the immediately preceding context of 1.26, which notes how few Corinthian believers were persons of high social status. This sense expresses Paul’s rejection of a sophistic coming to Corinth, with all of its performance expectations. While Dio notes how (possibly Corinthian) sophists sought the esteem of the crowds as eloquent men of superior knowledge, Paul seeks nothing of the kind.213 Γὰρ at the beginning of 2.2 indicates that v. 2 supports the claim of v. 1, in this case explaining why Paul did not rely on oratory to fulfill his purpose for coming to Corinth: Paul limits his communication with them to a single topic, Jesus, the crucified Messiah. Like Dio in Or. 47, Paul here indicates that his speech is fitted to its topic, which does not fit with the self-display characteristic of sophists.

The contrast with sophistic behavior continues in v. 3. Paul characterizes his coming—ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῷ—in terms opposite those of sophists: Philo contrasts the ἰσχύς of the sophists against the ἀσθενεία “at this sort of thing” of those without rhetorical training.214 Sophists were presumed to exude confidence, forcefulness, and persuasiveness.215 Peter Marshall labels the series of adjectives in v. 3 the “trilogy of shame” and aligns them with the rivals’ criticisms of Paul as servile, weak, and contemptible in 2 Cor 10.1, 10.216 Paul clearly did not project the characteristics of an orator that would elicit cries, as Epictetus described, of “Bravo!” or “Marvelous!”217 Verse 4 contains terms (underlined) common in the semantic field of rhetoric: Paul’s speech and proclamation were not ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας ἀλλ’ ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δύναμεως. πειθό often denotes “persuasiveness” and appears often in definitions.

212 Rhet. 2.2.7. See other comments below on 1 Cor. 1.26–28.
213 Or. 6.21; Winter 157
214 Det. 35
215 Winter offers an example: “Philostratus describes the late first-century sophistic Scopelian as one who argued ‘with great skill’ in his διάλεξις, and then was ‘even more impressive and vigorous’ when he stood to declaim. He did not need time to compose the suggested topic but began immediately in an ‘extremely melodious voice’ with ‘charming pronunciation’ and excelled in ‘covert allusions.’ He did not have the bearing of a ‘timid speaker’ but ‘entered the lists to win glory for himself.’” Winter 157–158, citing Lives of the Sophists 519.
216 ταπεινός, ἀσθενής, ἐξουσιοδοτός; Enmity in Corinth 389.
of rhetoric.\textsuperscript{218} ἀπόδειξις, “proof” or “demonstration,” is important in the rhetorical tradition, with a range of nuances: For Aristotle, rhetorical “proof is a sort of demonstration” (ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις), although Kennedy notes that “Aristotle here inconsistently uses the word apodeixis to include probable truth.”\textsuperscript{219} Aristotle usually reserves ἀπόδειξις for the sense of demonstration from scientifically true and certain premises.\textsuperscript{220} To Quintilian it means “a clear proof,” “a method of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain”; to Cicero, “a process of reasoning that leads from things perceived to something not previously perceived.”\textsuperscript{221} Winter notes these rhetorical uses of δύναμις: Aristotle defines rhetoric as the “faculty [or power] of discovering the possible means of persuasion,” and Quintilian draws upon δύναμις when he identifies “the power of persuasion” (vis persuadendi) as a common definition of rhetoric. Dio Chrysostom calls the gift of eloquence δύναμις.\textsuperscript{222}

Verses 4 and 5 put these rhetorical terms to an anti-sophistic use: The demonstration, or clear proof, is not from dialectic or rhetorical eloquence but from the Spirit and (presumably, the Spirit’s) power, with this result: believers’ πίστις rests on God’s power,\textsuperscript{223} not in human wisdom, that is, in the effects of rhetoric as persuasion, “with its strategy of ingratiation.”\textsuperscript{224} While elsewhere in Paul’s letters πίστις may not occur within the semantic field of rhetoric, here a sense common to rhetorical use fits.\textsuperscript{225} As discussed above, one key contribution of Aristotle to rhetoric was his theory of proof, comprising three proofs (πίστις τρία) whose aim is persuasion (πιθανόν).\textsuperscript{226} The Spirit effects clear proof (or demonstration, ἀπόδειξις) with or through Paul’s proclamation, resulting (ἐν) in conviction (πίστις) residing in believers, resting on, or arising from, God’s power and not from the art of rhetoric.\textsuperscript{227} Paul accepts the end of rhetoric,

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{winter} Winter 158; Epictetus 3.23.23–24.
\bibitem{rhetoric} \textit{Rhet.} 1.1.11; \textit{Classical Rhetoric} 67
\bibitem{rhetoric2} \textit{Rhet.} 3.13.2
\bibitem{rhetoric3} Winter 154; \textit{Institutes} 5.10.7; \textit{Academica} 2.8
\bibitem{rhetoric4} Winter 154–155; \textit{Rhet.} 1.2.1; \textit{Institutes} 2.15.2–4; Chrysostom, \textit{Or.} 33.3.
\bibitem{rhetoric5} especially as expressed and revealed in “the word of the cross,” 1 Cor. 1.18
\bibitem{winter2} Winter 159
\bibitem{rhetoric6} The same sense, i.e., “conviction,” fits other Pauline uses of πίστις, but these occur in contexts that probably do not express the topic of rhetoric.
\bibitem{rhetoric7} \textit{Rhet.} 1.2.3; 1.2
\bibitem{kinneavy} The study of contemporary rhetorician James Kinneavy supports this reading: \textit{Greek Rhetorical Origins of Christian Faith} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). Because Kinneavy is not a biblical scholar nor a regular contributor to biblical studies, his study been overlooked unfortunately by students of rhetoric and the New Testament.
\end{thebibliography}
conviction, but he rejects it as the means to this end. Paul hereby forestalls a consequence unacceptable to the life of faith in God’s power through Christ: If the “human wisdom” of rhetoric convicted initially, believers would rely on rhetoric to sustain such conviction; and God’s power, as Paul conceives of it, would be a lesser cause, at best; or not a cause, at worst, for their conviction. Identifying how this text may envision the Spirit’s accomplishing this “demonstration”—for example, through which features of Paul’s preaching or of its observable effects, or through which works of power perhaps accompanying Paul’s preaching—deserves its own study. The important point for the present study is Paul’s awareness and rejection of sophistic eloquence because it is unsuitable for proclaiming “the word of the cross” and thereby for establishing the Corinthian church.

Paul fails to fulfill contemporary economic and social expectations of the coming of a sophist in two other ways: He promises no material benefaction to the city and thereby loses an effective entrée into the city’s favor. Instead, he offers the gospel itself as his gift (δωρεάν). The economic manner by which he offers the gospel further distinguishes him from sophists. Paul works with his hands, “night and day” to support himself, and his language in 2 Cor 11.7 shows that he knows that his gift of the gospel, supported by his own labor, transgresses a social more: “Did I commit a sin by humbling myself . . . ?” High-status Greeks and Romans disdained manual labor as something for slaves and women, an attitude Plutarch elaborates:


228 Cf. 2 Cor 12.12; Rom 15.18–19; Gal 3.5
229 Lars Hartman notes that this passage “provides a theological interpretation of [Paul’s] behaviour when[,] defending himself in the first chapters of 1 Corinthians[,] he became a kind of ‘anti-rhetorician’ in order that it might be evident from whence came the power and the effect,” “Some Remarks on 1 Cor. 2.1–5” 120, cited by Winter 161.
231 2 Cor 11.7
232 1 Thess 2.9; 1 Cor 4.12; 2 Cor 6.5; cf. Acts 18.3; 20.34
While we delight in the work [of craftsmen artisans], we despise the workman. . . . Labour with one’s hands on lowly tasks gives witness, in the toil thus expended on useless things, to one’s indifference to higher things. . . . [I]t does not necessarily follow that, if the work delights you with its graces, the one who wrought it is worthy of your esteem.\footnote{Lives. Pericles, i.4–ii.1.2; cited in Winter 163. Ronald Hock’s The Social Context of Paul’s Ministry: Tentmaking and Apostleship (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980) argues that Paul’s choosing to support himself by manual labor forestalls the criticism that he offers the gospel for personal gain (61), which would ally him with sophists (although Hock portrays Paul as following the Cynic tradition, not as opposing the sophistic tradition). It also places him in a social status lower than at least some of his converts at Corinth and is part and parcel of his understanding of spiritual leadership that follows the example of Jesus, the crucified Messiah. The question of the effect of his refusing Corinthian support is discussed later in this study.}

As we shall see later in this study, Paul could have relied on the support of Corinthian believers, but he argues in 1 Cor. 9—against a dominical command he bypasses\footnote{See discussion by Gerd Theissen, “Legitimation and Subsistence: An Essay on the Sociology of Early Christian Missionaries,” in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, John H. Schütz, ed. and trans. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 27–67, especially 42–54. But see also Margaret M. Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation 243–250, who identifies 1 Cor. 9 as a hypothetical apologia and asserts that it is historically implausible that Paul responds, in 1 Cor., to the charge that he took no money from the Corinthians. Mitchell (246, n. 332) critiques Marshall, Enmity in Corinth 174, 242, for reading back into 1 Cor 9 the later issue of Paul’s refusal to receive the Corinthians’ gift expressed in 2 Cor 11.7–15 and 12.11–15. Mitchell describes 1 Cor. 9 as argument that supports Paul’s example in 8.13 of not taking advantage of his freedom and authority when doing so would hinder the gospel (246, 249). Mitchell’s depiction of 1 Cor. 9 as an exemplification of 8.13 is convincing, but she dismisses the possibility that critics criticized Paul for not taking Corinthian money without considering how the sophistic practice of students paying their sophist-teachers would socialize followers of Paul to expect to pay him for his gospel declamations and teachings while resident at Corinth. While 1 Cor. does not refer to Paul’s refusing to receive Corinthian gifts, 2 Cor does, and that leaves open the question of whether or not that act occurred before the writing of 1 Cor. and is not addressed because Paul does not yet know that some Corinthians felt wronged by his refusal.}

— that he is free, for the sake of the gospel (9.23), both to benefit from his right to be supported and also not to benefit from that right. So Paul both works to support himself and offers the gospel free of charge (9.18; cf. 4.12), not accepting support from the Corinthians while residing with them, two behaviors that distinguish him from contemporary sophists, who, according to Philo, “knew nothing of labour”\footnote{Det. 34} and could become wealthy from teaching and declaiming.\footnote{Evidence that sophists received fees for declamations and for teaching is ample. G. B. Kerferd’s study, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 27–30, reports that from the late fifth century BCE onward, sophists were considered professionals because they charged fees for their instruction. They earned more from teaching in their schools than from public display lectures (ἐπίδεξις). Philostratus says that fees originated with the early sophist Protagoras, and the sophists of the mid-first century CE his Lives of the Sophists describes charged fees, a practice he defends (Lives 495). This practice attracted ongoing criticism from Plato’s time until the early third century CE. Winter summarizes: “Two widely-held perceptions circulated by the first century AD. Firstly, only the wealthy could afford instruction in the sophists’ schools. Secondly, the sophists were impostors and flatterers motivated by love of glory and money” (164–165, citing E. L. Bowie, “The Importance of Sophists,” Yale Classical Studies 27 (1982) 21, and G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) 21, 49–50, 95–97).}
Beyond contrasting how he came to Corinth and how he lived while at Corinth from a sophistic coming and lifestyle, 1 Cor. also witnesses to other aspects of sophistic culture as it impinged upon the church. Sophists enrolled students in their schools as μαθηταί;²³⁸ and they were also described as ζηλωταί because they expressed loyalty to their teachers and zeal for their reputations that led to open rivalry (ἐρως or ἐριστός²³⁹) among students of different sophists.²⁴⁰ The sophist Aristides speaks of the “distinguished young men [who] offered [or “gave,” δούνατ] themselves [as students]” to him even before he reached the city gates on his coming to Smyrna.²⁴¹ Language and expressions in 1 Cor. appear to portray similar relationships and acts in the church at Corinth. Paul cites believers quarreling (ἐρως) among themselves over the leaders to which they belong (1 Cor. 1.11–12; 3.4), and he considers that behavior to express ζήλος καὶ ἐρως among them, which he takes as indicating that they are still σαρκικοί . . . καὶ κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖτε, “behaving in a thoroughly secular fashion” (3.3–4, 1). The believers relate to their spiritual leaders the same as secular Corinthians do to their sophist teachers. Clarifying this rivalry among followers of church leaders ties 1 Cor. 1–4 to sophistic culture more strongly. Paul’s appeal to stop dissensions lists four leaders in 1.12, but when the topic is resumed directly in 3.4–6 and later in 4.6, only Paul and Apollos are mentioned (although Cephas is mentioned with Paul and Apollos in 3.22). This evidence suggests, with further details about Apollos, that rivalry among followers of Paul and Apollos constituted the chief problem, from Paul’s perspective.²⁴² Acts 18.24–28 describes Apollos’ entrance into Paul’s sphere of ministry at Corinth: He is an Alexandrian Jew and an “an eloquent speaker” who used Scripture effectively in public debates. Rhetorical activity was flourishing at this time in Alexandria, called by F. H. Colson “the chief centre of Hellenistic culture.”²⁴³ ἀνήρ λόγιος, used here of Apollos, is

²³⁸ Winter 129–130, 170
²⁴⁰ Dio, Or. 11.8; also “Professional Quarrels” in Bowersock, Greek Sophists 89–100, which discusses the rivalries between Herodes Atticus and Polemo and between Favorinus (Ephesus) and Polemo (Smyrna), among others.
²⁴¹ Or. 51.29
²⁴² so also Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (New International Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 56: “Indeed, the most natural understanding of 4:6 is that Paul for all practical purposes has narrowed the issue in chaps. 1—4 to himself and Apollos and that Corinthians are ‘puffed up’ in favor of the one (Apollos) against the other (Paul).”
²⁴³ Philo 1 (LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929) ix
the same phrase Philo uses to refer to those with rhetorical training. Apollos could have been seen as a Christian minister comparable in rhetorical and leadership skill to contemporary secular leaders and orators and therefore desirable to those believers who liked their church leaders being much like their secular, civil leaders. The rivalry Paul combats in 1 Cor. 1–4 may then have developed primarily between those loyal to Apollos and those loyal to Paul, with the result that Apollos, deferring to Paul, refuses to return to Corinth, despite his followers’ request (1 Cor. 16.12b). That request would signal that Paul is not welcome by some at Corinth, an attitude consonant with the criticisms to which 2 Cor 10–13 responds.

Paul Critiques Sophistic Conventions: 1 Corinthians 1–4

First Corinthians 1–4 deals with overcoming dissensions within the church that were aided by sophistic culture. From them we see that Paul not only flouts sophistic conventions in his coming to Corinth, but he also critiques three sophistic attitudes and practices harming the Corinthian church: (1) the conceit arising from sophistic status, with the corresponding sense of inferiority felt by those without it; (2) the self-serving relation between sophists and students; and (3) sophistic boasting. Paul’s critique of sophistic culture binds together the opening thanksgiving (1.4–9), the thesis of the letter (1.10), and the first major section of the epistle (1.10–4.21).

1. Paul thanks God because God has enriched believers with the result that they lack no, with Winter cites numerous sources expressing...
the sense of inferiority felt or placed upon those who lack Greek *paideia* that featured rhetorical training.\(^{249}\) Dio Chrysostom gives a syllabus of readings to such a man who desires no longer to be “looked down on” (*καταφρονεῖονθαλ*) because of his lack of rhetorical training in youth.\(^{250}\) Demosthenes charges Aeschines with lacking education and only pretending to have culture, while Isocrates contrasts the Lacedaemonians, “who have ‘fallen behind’ in *paideia,*** with the Athenians, who excel as either disciples or teachers.\(^{251}\) And Philo shows how sophists characterized their opponents, “the so-called lovers of virtue,” as “almost without exception obscure people, looked down upon” by others who, like the sophists, are “men of mark and wealth, holding leading positions, praised on all hands.”\(^{252}\)

As examination of 1 Cor. 1.26–28 will show, Paul portrays the majority of the believers as persons without high status or the benefit of *paideia,* and these could feel culturally inferior and be looked down upon by others of higher status. Verses 4–6 thus apply Paul’s gospel to such believers and assure them that, in Christ, God has enriched them in every way, including speech and knowledge, two terms of particular import in sophistic culture. Both terms occur together again in the Corinthian letters only in 2 Cor 11.6, where this study argues that they bear the specifically rhetorical sense of “effectively delivered speech and rhetorical knowledge.” The same or a similar sense, along with the semantic field of rhetoric and rhetorical education, fits the context of the present text as well. As a result of this divine enrichment, believers do not fall short of anyone else\(^{253}\) and are thus empowered to resist viewing themselves as inferior to others because they lack *paideia* and the rhetorical training and resulting social status it included.\(^{254}\)

2. Paul’s response to the dissension between followers of Apollos and of himself critiques students’ commitment to and zeal for their sophist teachers as both harmful and idolatrous.

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\(^{249}\) Winter 182–183
\(^{250}\) Or. 18.1–2 and note by J. W. Cohen, *Dio Chrysostom,* LCL, II, 209; Winter 182
\(^{251}\) Demosthenes, *De Corona* 128; Isocrates, *Panathenaicus* 209; Winter 182–183
\(^{252}\) *Det.* 34; Winter 183. Further similar expressions occur in Plato, *Republic* 53c, and Epictetus, *Discourse* I.8.10
\(^{253}\) the sense preferred by Gordon Fee over its alternate (that they do not fall short of normal Christian experience), which he recognizes as the majority view but declines in favor of the former sense because it restates the affirmation of v. 5, only negatively; *First Epistle* 41.
\(^{254}\) Winter 182

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The sophistic milieu can illuminate the connection between ἐρως (1 Cor. 1.11) and baptism (vv. 13–17). As students committed to a sophist, enrolling in his school and beginning to attend his public declamations, so Corinthian converts at baptism allied themselves with and began receiving instruction from their Christian teachers.255 When Paul emphasizes that none were baptized in his name (v. 13), “J. Munck suggests that Paul criticises converts who have put ‘the teachers they invoke—he mentions himself as an example (1.13)—in the place of Christ.’”256 As part of Paul’s critiquing this idolatrous attachment of converts to Christian teachers, he rejects the sophistic pattern in which disciples belong to the sophist and exist for his glory. In the community of the gospel, everyone belongs to Christ, Christ to God (3.23), and all for the glory of God. Converts may not boast in or of their leaders (3.21), because they do not belong to them. On the contrary, Christian leaders—“whether Paul or Apollos or Cephas”—belong to believers (3.22) and are God’s servants (3.5; 4.1)257 assigned to serve the needs of the community. Christian teachers exist to benefit converts and the church: In the church, “‘the sophist’ belongs to the μαθηταί,” not the sophistic reverse.258

3. In 1 Cor. 1.17–31 Paul critiques sophistic rhetoric and its inherent boasting as inimical to the “word of the cross” in more than one way.259 First, as already discussed, using rhetoric to convict (or, persuade) hearers of the truth that Jesus crucified is Christ empties the cross of its power (1.17); it bypasses God’s power as the agent producing conviction (πίστις; 1.18; 2.4–5), leaving the convert dependent on human wisdom (2.5), on rhetoric with its display of the orator’s skill and charm, to sustain conviction. But second, such rhetoric manifests human wisdom through which the world (ὁ κόσμος) has not known God (1.21). Citing Isa 19.14b, Paul claims that God has destroyed worldly wisdom, rendering it truly foolish and weak, by saving Jews and Gentiles alike through the weakness and folly (from the perspective of worldly wisdom) of Jesus crucified, the Christ of God (1.18–19, 20–25). Verses 20 and 26–29 speak directly to the culture that accompanied sophistic rhetoric. Three of the four

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257 3.5.e,d: διάκονοι δι’ ὧν ἐπιστέασε, καὶ ἐκάστῳ ὡς ὁ κύριος ἔδωκεν

258 Winter 195
rhetorical questions in v. 20 refer to categories of persons who represent worldly wisdom opposed to the “word of the cross”: the σοφοὶ, the γραμματεῖς, and the συζητηται τοῦ αἰώνος τούτου. Scholars have identified these terms in numerous ways. E. A. Judge considers these to be the “three main types of tertiary scholar of [Paul’s] world: the rationalistic philosopher (“the wise”), the Jewish legal expert (“the scribe”) and the rhetorician (“the debater of this age”).

Verses 26–29 illuminate the identity of the final category, the category most important to this study. Recent work on sophists by G. W. Bowersock and E. L. Bowie shows that the key adjectives in v. 26—σοφοί, δυνατοὶ, and εὐγενεῖς—refer widely among first-century writers to sophists and their students and to the high social class from which sophists came, which, in specifically the eastern cities, was the ruling class. Contemporary critics of such references include Dio of Chrysostom, who objects to using social strata and wealth as criteria for identifying who is “well-born” (εὐγενεῖς) and “noble” (γενεσιοῦ), as well as ignoble (ἀγενεῖς) and mean (ταπεινοὶ). Also Philo denounces “those who spring from great houses, who ‘boast and glory’ in the splendour of their race.”

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259 Winter 186–194
260 For which see the commentaries.
263 Or. 15.29–32; also 31.74, 47.14, 52.16, cited by Winter 190
Stark evidence of the boasting of sophists and of their unrelenting attitude of superiority over their moral critics and social inferiors comes from Philo’s portrayal of sophists and non-sophists represented allegorically in the dispute between Cain (the self-lover) and Abel (the God-lover) in *Quod Deterius Potiori insidiari solet* ("That the Worse Is Likely to Attack the Better"). Sophists defend their lifestyle in this way: Because the body is the soul’s house, physical senses surrounding the soul are its allies and friends and are equal in value to the soul. Because nature intended that pleasures appeal to our senses, they must be legitimate; therefore, the πλοῦτος, δόξα, τιμή, ἀφχή and “everything else of that sort” exist for the sophists’ security, but also for their happiness (*Det.* 33). Their success “proved that they were right while their opponents—the so-called seekers after virtue—were wrong.” Sophists proclaim themselves to be, in Philo’s words, “men of mark and wealth, holding leading positions, praised on all hands, recipients of honours, portly, healthy and robust, reveling in luxurious and riotous living, knowing nothing of labour, conversant with pleasures which carry the sweets of life to the all-welcoming soul by every channel of sense” (*Det.* 34b). Via antonyms Philo’s sophists portray opponents as “almost without exception obscure people, looked down upon, of mean estate, destitute of the necessities of life, not enjoying the privileges of subject peoples or even of slaves, filthy, sallow, reduced to skeletons, with a hungry look from want of food, the prey of disease, in training for dying” (*Det.* 34a).

These sophists would be properly described by the adjectives of 1 Cor. 1.26—σοφοί, δυνατοί, and εὐγενεῖς—according to the “worldly standards” of secular Corinth. To these sophistic qualities, Paul lists his own antonyms (vv. 27–28): τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου, τὰ ἀσθενή τοῦ κόσμου, τὰ ἐξουθενημένα, and τὰ μὴ ὄντα. Although the “debaters of this age” boast in their μάρτυρες—their successful life of wisdom, power, and noble birth—God, according to Paul’s gospel, shames these boasters by calling their inferiors, characterized by opposite qualities, so that no one “may boast before God” (v. 29), particularly those who, like the sophists, believe themselves worthy of being called by God.

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264 *Philo II* (LCL) #33–34; Winter 107–109, 192–193
265 *Det.* 34: sophists v. opponents: ἐνδοξοί v. ἀδοξοί, πλοῦσιοι v. ἐκαταφρόνητοι, ἡγεμόνες v. ταπεινοὶ, ἐπαινοῦμενοι v. τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεικτες, συμμόρφωμεν v. ὑπακόουν καὶ δούλων ἀτιμότεροι, ὑγιεῖνοι v. ῥυπόδωτες,
CONCLUSION

This study seeks to make visible the rhetorical form, or logic, of this discourse so that it can account for the rhetoric of the discourse. Its method is eclectic, rhetorical in the sense that it seeks to discover how the discourse works, what it attempts to do, and how and with what likely effect on its implied audience. It proceeds from recognizing that the discourse responds to criticisms that Paul is too weak to lead and to the request or demand that Paul boast about his ministry in the way that his rivals have boasted of theirs. Of the six topical theses the study supports, two advance recent claims about Paul and this discourse. Anitra Bingham Kolenkow has shown that the weakness Paul manifests is, most importantly, his lenient manner of governing the church, which critics misunderstand as debilitating weakness. So this study will seek to show what senses of “weak(ness)” are most pertinent throughout the discourse. Bruce W. Winter has documented for the first time the existence of the sophistic movement in mid-first-century Corinth. His description of sophistic attitudes, social location, and practices mesh with evidence in 2 Cor 10–13 to identify Paul’s rivals with some confidence as sophists or as orators influenced heavily by the nascent Second Sophistic. This study synthesizes the Kolenkow and Winter theses in explaining the criticisms of Paul, the comparison he finds himself forced to perform, and the rhetorical logic of this discourse.

Winter’s monograph has just been released in a second edition, *Philo and Paul among the Sophists: Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). G. W. Bowersock, expert on the Second Sophistic, writes in the Foreword: “[T]hrough his mastery of both New Testament scholarship and Roman history Bruce Winter has succeeded in documenting, for the first time, the sophistic movement of the mid-first century. Inspired by a remarkable papyrus from Oxyrhynchus and supported by a rich documentation for Philo’s Alexandria and Paul’s Corinth, Winter has uncovered the foundations of the Second Sophistic.” Because this edition arrived so late, all references in this study are to the first edition, published by Cambridge University Press.