CULTURE, NATION AND IMPERIALISM: ISEB AND U.S. CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN COLD-WAR BRAZIL AND JOAQUIM NABUCO, BRITISH ABOLITIONISTS AND THE CASE OF MORRO VELHO

By

Courtney Jeanette Campbell

Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Vanderbilt University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS in History

May, 2010

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:
Professor Jane Landers
Professor Katherine Crawford
# Table of Contents

I. Culture, Nation and Imperialism: ISEB and U.S. Cultural Influence in Cold-War Brazil .......................................................... 1

II. Joaquim Nabuco, British Abolitionists and The Case of Morro Velho ................................................................................. 36

Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 57
In 1919, the Brazilian writer José Bento Monteiro Lobato, best known for his writing of children’s literature, published an essay in the *Revista do Brasil* entitled “O perigo ianque” [The Yankee Danger].\(^1\) In this essay, Monteiro Lobato worries that “…with the rise in discussion over the new imperialist manifestations of the United States, Brazil remains in its preferred state, without even worrying about the choice of sauce with which it will be eaten.”\(^2\) Monteiro Lobato continues, describing how Brazilians are “astonished” by the thousands of incredible American skyscrapers, movies, and other products, before issuing a warning, that surely to many seemed quite fantastic just one year after the first World War – he compared the power to “protect” offered to the United States by the Monroe Doctrine to that offered to Japan by the League of Nations. The Brazilians, in this analogy, could find themselves in the same position vis-à-vis the United States as the Chinese, worried at the exaggerated zeal with which the Japanese carried out their mission, were to Japan.

This passage by Monteiro Lobato demonstrates that as early as 1919 Brazilian writers expressed concerns over the influence of the United States on Brazil and over the Brazilian population's attraction to United States consumer goods. Secondary historical

---


\(^2\) “Diante do capítulo dos perigos, os brasileiros temos a boa e santa filosofia do Sidarta, que é a de não ter filosofia alguma: ficam-se os olhos no umbigo, e como o umbigo não dá mostras de maiores perturbações, deixa-se correr o marfim. Sempre assim foi, desde que houve perigos sôbre a cabeça do índigena, e assim continuará sendo, enquanto houver perigos, umbigo e marfim. “Não é, pois, motivo de espanto que, levantada a discussão em tórnio das novas manifestações imperialistas dos Estados Unidos, o Brasil se ponha na sua atitude predileta, sem preocupar-se sequer com a escolha do mólho com que prefira ser comido.” Ibid, 233.
literature that analyzes Brazil-U.S. relations during the pivotal years following World War II, however, is strangely devoid of reference to Brazilian concerns over foreign cultural influence. When scholars do speak of twentieth-century cultural imperialism in Brazil, they tend to ignore the position of Brazilian intellectuals, limiting their focus to the actions of the United States government and media institutions on Brazil. This tendency is apparent even in titles of books, such as *A americanização do Brasil* and *The Americanization of Brazil* which inform the reader before the first page is turned that the incorporation of cultural products or symbols from the United States into Brazilian culture is a process derived from a subject-object relationship - the United States (actively) Americanizes; Brazil (passively) is Americanized. These works offer important analyses of the actions of the United States government and private enterprise in Brazil, but do not place these actions within the Brazilian cultural and intellectual context.

This study provides an analysis of one layer of this context – the intellectual discourse on culture and foreign cultural influence provided by five leading intellectuals associated with the *Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros* (ISEB) [Higher Institute of Brazilian Studies] published between 1954 and 1960, during the early (and pre-militant) years of this institute's action. Underlying this aim is the premise that in order to understand the proliferation and increasing social importance of North American cultural goods and models, it is of fundamental importance to analyze not only the actions of the United States government or private institutions, but also the Brazilian cultural context within which it took place. Consequently, this paper first provides a historical context within which to place the growing cultural hegemony of the United States after World
War II, then analyzes how Roland Corbisier, Nelson Werneck Sodré, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Guerreiro Ramos and Roberto Campos conceptualized the possibility of Brazilian culture, before, finally, presenting the shift in focus of the ISEB prior to its destruction on April 13, 1964 after the coup that would lead to Brazil's long military dictatorship. Writing during ISEB's early phases, when this institute still received enough funding through the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) to publish prolifically, the intellectuals studied in this paper were among the few Brazilian intellectuals in the early years of the Cold War who dared to provide form to the amorphous term “culture,” place it within an imperial framework, and even, in some cases, prescribe counter-imperial action.

The texts studied in this paper include three presentations on “Situações e alternativas da cultura brasileira” [Situations and Alternatives of Brazilian Culture] presented by Nelson Werneck Sodré, Roland Corbisier and Roberto Campos after ISEB's second semester of 1955 at the conference (that would later give name to the published collection) *Introdução aos problemas do Brasil*. In addition to these texts, this study examines the discourse on culture from Álvaro Vieira Pinto's *Consciência e realidade nacional* and Guerreiro Ramos' *O problema nacional do Brasil*, both published in 1960, and Roland Corbisier's presentation “Situação e alternativas da cultura brasileira,” presented in 1955 and later published (along with Corbisier's previously mentioned presentation) in *Formação e problema da cultura brasileiro* in 1959. Further, mention is made of Guerreiro Ramos' article “O tema da transplantação e as entelequias na interpretação sociológica no Brasil” published in *Serviço Social* in 1954, that while
produced before the formation of ISEB, gives background to debates on cultural mimicry found within other ISEB texts. The interpretations of culture within these texts are far from homogeneous, allowing for an analysis of the outer limits of Brazilian national developmentalism.

Due to insistence upon theoretical concepts such as alienation or the dialectical relationship between culture and economic development, on the surface, it could appear that these Brazilian intellectuals’ understanding of the role of culture was so theoretical and divorced from real events as to be mechanical and awkward in practice. However, this conclusion would only be possible in an analysis that isolates U.S.-Brazilian relations as a unique phenomenon, instead of placing these relations within the Brazilian process of national identity formation, whose foreign commercial, cultural and political influences were not limited to the United States. By focusing on the discourse on cultural influence at the beginning of the Cold War, through an analysis of Brazilian attempts to analyze and defend culture, this study first demonstrates that a dialogue existed among Brazilian intellectuals on the subject of culture, and further that this dialogue developed independent of United States influence. For Brazilian intellectuals, the need was not to defend existing Brazilian culture from American influence, but rather to create or find authentic Brazilian culture, previously suppressed and alienated by other imperial powers, that would liberate the Brazilian nation.

To understand these isebianos' (the term given to ISEB’s intellectuals) concern with establishing a culturally authentic nation, it is necessary to first turn to a brief historical background of the diverse foreign influences on Brazil up to the post-World
War II period. By the twentieth century Brazil had been a land populated by numerous and distinct Amerindian groups, a Portuguese colony, (at least partially) a Dutch colony, the Portuguese metropole, an Empire and a Republic. Portuguese Jesuits had sent missions to Brazil, but French Calvinists had set up settlements as well. For over two decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch successfully assumed the colonization of Northeastern Brazil, taking over and transforming the production of sugar cane - Brazil's most important crop at that time. The cultivation and harvest of sugar and coffee and the extraction of gold and diamonds required intense labor, carried out first by indigenous populations, then by the approximately 3 to 4 million enslaved Africans hailing from distinct regions including Angola, the Congo and Mozambique who survived the Middle Passage, and finally, of European and Asian immigrants who flowed into Brazil after the abolition of the slave trade in 1850 and even more so after the abolition of slavery in 1888.³

Brazil's diversity was not limited to the ethnicities of its people, but extended to its array of foreign investors. The quest for gold in Minas Gerais throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had brought British capitalists, and the pursuit of modernity had attracted American and British enterprises and workers in the construction of railroads.⁴ While Britain was not the only flavor of investment in Brazil, until World

³ For a succinct history of Brazil, see Marshall C. Eakin, Brazil: The Once and Future Country (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1997) or Thomas Skidmore, Brazil: Five Centuries of Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Figure on amount of enslaved Africans to survive the Middle Passage is from Eakin, 18.

⁴ In fact, so many English speakers lived in southeastern Brazil in the late nineteenth century as to warrant the publication of two English newspapers: The Anglo-Brazilian Times and The British American Mailer, later renamed The Rio News. An impressive body of work exists on electric companies and foreign capital in Brazil. See for example Duncan McDowall, The Light: Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, 1899-1945 (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1988), which deals with the Canadian-owned Light and Power Company operating in Brazil from 1912 to 1979 and known by Brazilians as “a Light,” and Catulo Branco, Energia elétrica e capital estrangeiro
War II it was the most influential and encouraged. Between 1825 and 1895, British investment in Brazil increased from 4 million to 93 million pounds sterling, and by 1913 had reached 254.8 million pounds.\(^5\) Even when, by 1930, North American and German investment in Brazil had increased to 557 million dollars (from 50 million dollars in 1914), this investment had still not reached British proportions.\(^6\) After World War II had crippled the European powers, the United States came to dominate foreign investment in Brazil.

This swap of investors took place within a Brazil in the midst of political and cultural change that would lead it to a desire to define the Brazilian nation. In 1922, political and cultural tumult culminated in a violent revolt of young military officers (or *tenentes*) in Rio de Janeiro, the founding of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and the realization of the *Semana de Arte Moderna* [Modern Art Week].\(^7\) Following the 1929

---

\(^5\) These numbers were taken from Irving Stone, “British Direct and Portfolio Investment in Latin America Before 1914,” *The Journal of Economic History* 37, no. 3 (Sep. 1977): 695 and 706.


\(^7\) The Semana Moderna de Arte was an event that represented Brazilian Modernism, whose objective was to express the Brazilian and Brazilian culture based on the new European surreal and futurist genres of expression. This movement stemmed from the generation of 1920, the designation which Daniel Pécaut employs when referring to the elite intellectuals of the beginning of the 20th century who sought to close the gap between intellectual and politician and to “place literature at the service of recovering ‘nationality’ and to make of it an instrument of social and political transformation.” Many of the artists and intellectuals associated with the generation of 1920 and the Semana Moderna de Arte would later become militant in the nationalist movement. “Porém inspirou-se também no que fora – em Lima Barreto e Euclides da Cunha, por exemplo – uma reação ao isolamento: uma vontade de colocar a literatura a serviço da recuperação da ‘nacionalidade’ e de fazer dela um instrumento de transformação social e política.” Daniel Pécaut, *Os intelectuais e a política no Brasil: Entre o povo e a nação*, Translated by Maria Júlia Goldwasser (São Paulo: Atica, 1990), 23. Pécaut offers an analysis of the Generation of 1920 and of the Semana Moderna de Arte on 19-27.
international economic crisis and the dispute between urban and coffee-growing elite that culminated in the resignation of Washington Luís as president (referred to as the “Revolution of 1930”), Getúlio Vargas became president. During his time in power, Vargas performed an exceptional balancing act negotiating between elite and laborer, urban and rural, and strategically pursued Brazilian interests abroad. It was Vargas who delicately negotiated with the United States government the terms and conditions through which Brazil would become the only South American nation to participate directly in World War II. Vargas would also come to characterize the beginning of the nationalist movement in Brazil – a legacy that his successor, Juscelino Kubitschek, would bring to full expression.

Gilberto Freyre was the most notable intellectual who dedicated his work to defining the uniquely Brazilian identity in this time period. In the now-classic *The Masters and the Slaves*, published in 1933, Freyre attempts to unite and elevate the mélange of peoples and ethnicities throughout Brazilian history. In this essay, Freyre provides an argument and a narrative to racially and ethnically define the Brazilian, and

---

8 The Vargas era spanned from 1930 to 1954 and included the “Second Republic” (in Marshall C. Eakin's vocabulary), from 1930 to 1937, when the officially elected Vargas branded his skills of mediation by neither fully pleasing nor fully abandoning the rural and urban elites and the burgeoning urban labor movements (with the exception of the PCB); the *Estado Novo* [New State], from 1937 to 1945, when Vargas ruled as a dictator; the presence of Vargas in Congress (in theory), from 1945 to 1950, as an elected representative; and finally, the re-election and return of Vargas to the presidency from 1950 until his suicide in 1954.

9 See Thomas Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil: 1930-1964 An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) and Moniz Bandeira, *Relações Brasil-EUA no contexto da globalização, II Rivalidade Emergente, 2 Ed.* (São Paulo: SENAC, 1997) for more details on Vargas and these negotiations, which included the construction of airstrips in the Brazilian Northeast and investment in the Brazilian steel production (the latter of these was never realized).


to exalt his/her qualities. Accordingly, Freyre's focus is on the ethnic groups that he believed to be most influential in the genetic formation of the modern Brazilian descending from the enslaved African, the “bicontinental” Portuguese and the hygienic and maternal Indian. In the years following World War II, however, the emphasis of the nationalist movement was not to define the Brazilian nation ethnically, but politically, ideologically and culturally. Throughout the nineteenth century, the British had not only been the greatest investors within Brazil, but also the greatest foreign ideological promoters, with British groups influencing politics and moral norms through liberal ideology and abolitionist pressure. In fact, it was with British pressure, supported and welcomed by Brazilian abolitionists, that both the slave trade and slavery were abolished in Brazil.\textsuperscript{12}

If the British influenced Brazil's economic and political ideology, the French inspired cultural, academic and intellectual respect and reverence. As Mario Carelli explains in \textit{France-Brésil: Bilan pour une relance} by mid-nineteenth century, “Brazil progressively ceased to be a land of [academic] exploitation to become a receiving country of [French] scientific knowledge” through the creation of scientific academic research institutions in Brazil.\textsuperscript{13} The Capanema Educational Reform of 1941 remodeled Brazilian schools around a French humanist curriculum and required students to begin studying the French language between eleven and twelve years of age.\textsuperscript{14} Further, the

\textsuperscript{12} See, for example, the case of the federal deputy Joaquim Nabuco and his connection with the British and Foreign Anti-slavery Society. Joaquim Nabuco, \textit{Cartas aos abolicionistas ingleses}, Org. José Thomaz Nabuco, (Recife: FUNDAJ, Editora Massangana, 1985).


\textsuperscript{14} For French and later U.S. influence on the Brazilian education system, see Otaíza de Oliveira Romanelli, \textit{História da educação no Brasil (1930/1973)}, 29 Ed. (Petrópolis: Editora Vozes, 1978). For
Brazilian Modernist movement relied heavily on French sources as did Brazilian sociologists and philosophers.

With the European infrastructure in tatters, in the 1940s the United States surpassed the British as the great economic and political advisors to the Brazilian elite, and through attention and investment, attempted to replace the now weakened French cultural presence within Brazil. But long before the Second World War, North American cultural presence in Brazil was already considerable. The spoken cinema arrived in Brazil in 1920; yet, already between 1928 and 1937, 85 percent of films shown in Brazil were Hollywood productions.\(^\text{15}\) In the Northeastern city of Recife, for example, *Flash Gordon on the Planet Mongo*, *Stagecoach* (with John Wayne), *Charlie Chan at Treasure Island*, and *The Little Princess* (with Shirley Temple) were among the movies shown in cinemas in 1940.\(^\text{16}\) In 1942, Coca Cola, Kibon ice cream and *Reader’s Digest Seleções* arrived for consumption.\(^\text{17}\) According to Antônio Pedro Tota, this initial cultural presence “acted as frontline troops that prepared the invasion” and eased the job of the newly formed Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations in 1940, later named the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), led by Nelson Rockefeller, which recruited cinematographers such as Walt Disney and Orson Welles.\(^\text{18}\)

---


16 See Roland Paraíso, *O Recife e a II Guerra Mundial* (Recife: Bagaço, 2003), 82 and 88 for more details.

this time period that historian Sérgio Buarque de Holanda encouraged the maintenance of a moderate position regarding the United States, acknowledging the disparities between the two countries, but also the existence of similarities that could be seen as “factors of solidarity.”

With the end of World War II and the increasing pressures of the Cold War, however, the cultural presence of the United States in Brazil (and internationally) took a decidedly political character. Upon the creation of the United States Information Agency and the United States Information and Education Service, promotion of United States cultural products, values and way of life came under the direct responsibility of United States governmental agencies. Everything from political propaganda (often written or broadcast under a fictitious non-political name) to magazines, films, student and professional educational exchange programs, basketball and even Donald Duck and Mother Goose were promoted by these agencies through the U.S. Embassy, consulates and newly formed binational cultural centers.

The new emphasis on the dissemination of United States cultural goods was part of a global effort by the United States government to improve its image and to support the spread of diplomatic interests abroad. Nonetheless, there were several particularities in the Brazilian case that led it to receive increasing attention from the United States

---

19 “fatores de solidariedade.” Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, “Considerações sobre o americanismo,” in Cobra de vidro, 22-27 (São Paulo: Livraria Martins Editora, 1944). According to a preliminary note written by Buarque de Holanda, the essays in this collection were published between 1940 and 1941. Both Buarque de Hollanda and Gilberto Freyre were also on the original Board of Trustees of ISEB.

government. Rising unrest among peasants and the growing influence of the PCB throughout Brazil drew the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as early as 1953. This interest was particularly noted in the Northeast where 8 deputies in the state of Pernambuco, and 12 of 25 city councilors for the state’s capital of Recife were elected from the PCB in 1947. In the same year, Manoel Rodrigues Calheiros of the PCB became the first communist mayor to be elected in Brazil in Recife’s neighboring municipality of Joboatão dos Guararapes, while in 1958, Miguel Arraes became governor of Pernambuco with PCB backing. Due to its immense geographic space, large population, economic potential, trade importance and geopolitical influence in South America, Brazil gained two U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) headquarters (one in Rio de Janeiro, the other in Recife) in 1961, two visits by Robert Kennedy to the Northeast (one in 1963, and again in 1965 when he gave a speech from atop a car in downtown Recife) and substantive agreements for short- and long-term loans and technical support (from police and military training to educational policy advising) through the Alliance for Progress, though not all promised aid was realized.


23 With the USAID agreements, Brazil became the only country to house two headquarters. For USAID and Alliance for Progress activities in Brazil, see Ricardo Alaggio Ribeiro, “A teoria da modernização, a Aliança para o Progresso e as relações Brasil-Estados Unidos,” Perspectivas 30 (2006): 151-175; for MEC-USAID educational agreements see Romanelli, 193-259; for Robert Kennedy’s visits to the Northeast see Vandeck Santiago, “O plano Kennedy para desenvolver o Nordeste: A surpreendente
Meanwhile, intellectual debate was taking place within Brazil over the Brazilian nation and its development. A group of intellectuals referred to as the Itatiaia group (thus named for the location of its meetings), led by political scientist Hélio Jaguaribe, in 1953 sought and gained permission from the Minister of Education, Cândido Mota Filho, to form the Instituto Brasileiro de Economia, Sociologia e Política (IBESP) [Brazilian Institute of Economics, Sociology and Politics] in order to analyze, in the words of Caio Navarro de Toledo, “all of the work and materials that the modern capitalist state is now obliged to realize.”

IBESP, however, had limited resources and range of action, leading to the articulation of a larger project immediately under MEC. ISEB was formed in 1955 under the short-lived administration of the Brazilian President João Café Filho, but would become the governmental think-tank responsible for developing the ideology of developmental nationalism under the administration of Juscelino Kubitschek. President Kubitschek (1956-1961), who proposed fifty years of development in a five-year span, described ISEB's mission as that of forming "a mentality, a spirit, an atmosphere of intelligence for development" through the formulation of an ideology of "national development."

Until the military dictatorship closed ISEB's doors in 1964, diverse intellectuals would unite to develop and teach classes and to publish literature on the industrial and

---


25 “uma mentalidade, um espírito, uma atmosfera de inteligência para o desenvolvimento.” Toledo, 32; Pécaut, 110.
The intellectuals associated with ISEB shared the common label of “nationalist,” but the views of each ideologue on the “problemas,” or questions, concerning the Brazilian nation and its development, along with the assumptions that supported these, were not homogeneous. The isebianos discussed in this paper were no exception: Roland Corbisier was the first Director of ISEB, a philosopher and a Marxist-Leninist; Álvaro Vieira Pinto, who would replace him in 1960, moved through differing shades of Hegelianism to Marxism; Guerreiro Ramos was critical of Marxist-Leninism, considering himself a “postmarxist;” Nelson Werneck Sodré, an active military officer, was not only Marxist, but a Communist; and Roberto Campos was a diplomat well-known for working closely with the U.S. government in this time period and during the Brazilian military dictatorship.

The following pages offer an analysis of the interpretations that these intellectuals provided of the connections between culture and development, pointing out common themes, while also examining the divergences between them. The differences and similarities found in the ISEB arguments are not just details or marginalized footnotes of

---


27 Caio Navarro de Toledo in “ISEB intellectuals, the Left and Marxism” warns of the dangers of generating a homogeneous ISEB argument by stating that “There were differences among them depending on their individual theoretical training, ideological motivation and political backgrounds, and sometimes their views were diametrically opposed. Although one could point out some congruencies and points of agreement among them, it is doubtful whether we can suggest that there was any unified and coherent pattern of thought. Conflicts about theory and ideology, leading at times to crisis and dissension, lasted as long as the institution.” 109.
their discussion; with their similarities forming a core and their divergences etching the outer edges, they provide a common framework which each of these intellectuals – from the militant Marxist to the conservative economist – subscribed to and promoted.

When employing the term “culture,” Roland Corbisier, in the conferences that he presented on this theme in 1955 and 1956, does not refer “solely to intellectual and artistic, religious, literary or scientific aspects” of culture, “but to the totality of vital manifestations that together characterize and define the Brazilian people.”

This explanation allows for a distinction between nature and culture and for an emphasis on the historical elements of culture. As Corbisier states, the “formation of Brazilian culture” is also the “formation of the Brazilian people.” Culture, then, is an historical process, not to be confused with a moment in time or a set of cultural products. The process-focused definition of culture was also expressed in Nelson Werneck Sodré’s definition of culture as “the development of ideas;” however, in Guerreiro Ramos’ definition, culture appears to be produced by historical process and social practice. As Guerreiro Ramos explains, culture includes “material and non-material products resulting

---

28 “Ao empregar a expressão ‘cultura brasileira’ de cuja formação nos vamos ocupar, não nos queremos referir apenas aos aspectos intelectual e artístico, religioso, literário ou científico de nossa cultura, mas à totalidade das manifestações vitais, que, em seu conjunto, caracterizam e definem o povo brasileiro.” 53. Both conferences “Situação e alternativas da cultura brasileira” (1955) and “Formação e problema da cultura brasileira” (1956) were published in Roland Corbisier, Formação e problema da cultura brasileiro (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1959); as mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the former was also published in Introdução aos problemas do Brasil, 185-218 (Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, 1956). The page numbers given in the footnote references refer to the collection published in 1959.

29 For the distinction between “nature” and “culture,” Corbisier found support in Hegel, 13. For culture as an historical process, he relied on Alfred Weber and Burckhardt, as seen in the quotation: “Ao falar na formação da cultura brasileira, portanto, queremos aludir à formação histórica do povo brasileiro, no mesmo sentido em que Jacob Burckhardt se refere à ‘História da Cultura Grega’ ou Alfred Weber à ‘História da Cultura’.”Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 54.

from the transformative activity of peoples, through which an interpretative idea of man and the world is expressed.”31 This broad conceptualization of culture allowed Roberto Campos to include “modes of behavior” and Nelson Werneck Sodré to include arts, teaching and political ideas in their definitions of culture. It also made possible a notion of culture that, to Guerreiro Ramos, “carries no connotation of value.”32

The concept of alienation was central to the arguments provided by Ramos, Corbisier, Sodré and Vieira Pinto. According to these authors, the process of the formation of Brazilian culture, having had taken place within a colonial framework, was a process of alienation that could only produce an alienated culture. Sodré, in “Estudo histórico-sociológico da cultura brasileira,” provides an analysis of the progression of Brazilian culture to demonstrate that from the very beginning of the colonial project, the people were divorced from intellectuals and intellectuals from the culture that they presented. This first becomes apparent through the importance of the Society of Jesus in Brazil as the only “elements endowed with an intellectual dimension.”33 As the Jesuits did nothing to upset the colonial structure and were in charge of Brazilian education, there occurred a “juxtaposition” as opposed to a “fusion” between intellectual and environment, leading to an overly theoretical erudition.34 Later the Industrial Revolution

---

31 “Cultura é conjunto de produtos materiais e não materiais resultantes da atividade transformadora dos povos, mediante os quais se exprime uma ideia interpretativa do homem e do mundo.” Guerreiro Ramos, O problema nacional do Brasil. 2 Ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Saga, 1960), 241-242. Corbisier described the material and non-material products to which Guerreiro Ramos refers as objectifications of the spirit, manifested objectively in the object created or subjectively through the appropriation of objective culture by the subject, 18.


33 “... elementos dotados de dimensão intelectual.” Sodré, “Estudo histórico-sociológico ...”, 165.

34 “... o que existe não é fusão, mas juxtaposição entre os dois elementos, o meio e os religiosos, no que
forced Brazil to allow free trade, “breaking the rigid structure of seclusion and monopoly.” When political independence did take place, however, “the transformation of the old colonies into autonomous nations occurred with minimal internal alterations, maintaining the skeleton of the existing economic regime, assuring the permanence of the system of production.” As professions that had once been provided by the metropole now became necessary in the colony, the need for education increased, causing the appearance of the first Brazilian intellectuals who were not religiously affiliated. In this time period, according to Sodré, two points of view were born: those who sought solutions for Brazil through “pure and simple copying of external models” and those who sought “an objective and realist vision for Brazilian problems.”

Guerreiro Ramos dedicated an article to these two options in 1954, but the former – that of mimicry and transplantation - is a theme that repeats throughout ISEB literature on culture. Álvaro Vieira Pinto, in the second volume of Consciência e realidade nacional characterizes the “alienation of knowledge” that Brazil suffers as manifested through “mimicry, transplantation, the horror at Brazilian issues, [and the importation of] metropolitan language,” while Roberto Campos points out the “habit of displaying accepted formulas, rather than rethinking them” and of “imitating forms of consumption, without the same capacity of copying the habits of production.”

---

36 “... a transformação das antigas colônias em nações autônomas devia processar-se com mínimo de alterações internas, mantida a ossatura do regime econômico existente, assegurada a permanência do sistema de produção.” Ibid, 168.
37 “... na cópia pura e simples de modelos externos... ” and “... uma visão objetiva e realista para os problemas brasileiros.” Ibid, 175.
39 “... alienação do saber, mimetismo, transplantação, o horror aos problemas brasileiros, o modismo metropolitano.” Álvaro Vieira Pinto, Consciência e realidade nacional. 2 vol. A consciência crítica (Rio
While other Brazilian intellectuals generally criticized the act of mimicry, these authors saw imitation as an inevitable effect of the colonial system. Guerreiro Ramos points out that whether Portuguese, Spanish, French or Dutch, colonization inevitably leads to cultural mimicry that intellectuals are bound to perform until conditions are ripe for national development. As such, mimicry itself was not the problem, but simply the most visible symptom of cultural alienation. As a colonized nation’s culture does not progress from its own history but that of another, and as its objective or “destiny” is to fulfill the needs of another, the colony does not have its own “being,” or existence; it is hollow, without essence. The colony, then becomes alienated from its right to authentic culture, existence, destiny and freedom. Brazilians exported raw materials and consumed metropolitan cultural products, including ideas, which, Corbisier adds, were

---

40 Guerreiro Ramos, “O tema da transplantação ...”, 76.

41 In Corbisier’s words: “The colony ... is to the metropole an instrument ... like a slave is to the master. Its essence is alienation. Now, in a social context that is globally alienated, culture is inevitably condemned to inauthenticity. If an authentic culture is one that is elaborated according to and in function of its own reality, of the 'being' of the country that ... consists of the project or destiny that it tries to realize, the colony can not produce an authentic culture for the very reason that it does not have its own 'being' or destiny. Its culture can only be a reflex, a sub-product of the metropolitan culture, and the inauthenticity that characterizes it is an inevitable consequence of its 'alienation.'” The italics here are Corbisier's. And later: “The lack of critical consciousness in relation to ourselves is explained by alienation, since the content of the colony was not a being with its own shape, but merely a could be, a raw material upon which the metropole could stamp the shape that characterizes its culture.” I have added the italics for ease of understanding in the English translation. “A colônia, portanto, está para a metrópole como o instrumento para o sujeito que dêle se utiliza, como o escravo para o senhor. A sua essência é a alienação. Ora, em um contexto social globalmente alienado, a cultura está inevitavelmente condenada à inautenticidade. Se uma cultura autêntica é a que se elabora a partir e em função da realidade própria, do ‘ser’ do país que, como vimos, consiste no projeto ou no destino que procura realizar, a colônia não pode produzir uma cultura autêntica por isso mesmo que não tem ‘ser’ ou destino próprio. A sua cultura só poderá ser um reflexo, um subproduto da cultura metropolitana, e a inautenticidade que a carateriza é uma conseqüência inevitável da sua ‘alienação’.” Ibid, 40.
received as “ready and finished, like industrial products.” If the shoes and clothing that we wore were English,” explains Corbisier, “the books that we read and the ideas that we used were French.”

This mimicry was an inevitable symptom of alienation, but also promoted it. In perhaps his most widely reproduced lines, Corbisier reminds that:

... to produce raw materials is to produce a non-being, the mere virtuality, the mere possibility of being; that which will only become when it is transformed by others, when it receives the shape that others impress upon it. To import a finished product is to import the being, the shape that incarnates and reflects the cosmovision of those who produced it. When importing, for example, the cadillac [sic], gum, coca-cola [sic] and the cinema we are not simply importing objects or merchandise, but also a whole complex of values and conduct that are implied in these products.

If this was the case for objects produced elsewhere, then it was even more so for finished ideas. Brazilians were unable to “change and assimilate” these ideas “... simply because we lack the organ that would permit this transformation, the instrument, ... that would be its correlate or equivalent in industry ...” and so became “... the empty

42 “Exportamos 70% das nossas vendas para o exterior, e com o café importamos desde sapatos e tecidos, máquinas e veículos, trigo e perfumes, até as ideias que também recebemos prontas e acabadas, com os produtos industriais.” Ibid, 39.

43 “Se eram ingleses os sapatos e as fazendas das roupas que vestíamos, franceses eram os livros que liamos e as ideias de que nos utilizávamos.” Ibid, 40.

44 “... produzir matéria prima é produzir o não ser, a mera virtualidade, a mera possibilidade de ser, aquilo que só virá a ser quando for transformado pelos outros, quando receber a forma que os outros lhe imprimirem. Importar o produto acabado é importar o ser, a forma que encarna e reflete a cosmovisão daqueles que a produziram. Ao importar, por exemplo, o cadillac [sic], o chicletes [sic], a coca-cola [sic] e o cinema não importamos apenas objetos ou mercadorias, mas também todo um complexo de valores e de condutas que se acham implicados nesses produtos.” Ibid, 69. According to the second wife of the then leader of the PCB Luiz Carlos Prestes, who published her memoirs under her pseudonym “Maria Prestes,” Luiz Carlos Prestes shared this concern over the transfer of values and conducts through the consumption of Coca-Cola, thereby prohibiting the entrance of this soda into their clandestine residence. To Prestes “through Coca-Cola, imperialism was reinforcing its ideology.” Anecdotally, a street vendor brought this beverage to the house as a gift and, while pouring out all of the contents before the children could see it, Maria Prestes took one sip. Luiz Carlos heard her confession, made a joke of it and quickly forgave her. “Para Prestes, através da Coca-Cola, o imperialismo estava reforçando sua ideologia.” Maria Prestes, Meu companheiro: 40 anos ao lado de Luiz Carlos Prestes (Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1992), 79.
The adoption of foreign ideas and perspectives caused the most damaging aspect of cultural alienation: Brazilians, having merely copied criteria and analytical tools from abroad, could not authentically view, analyze or critique themselves or their culture. With a metropolitan perspective, Brazilians saw their reality “through imported interpretations” and held of themselves “the same idea that was convenient to the colonizers for us to have, the idea that coincided with the interests of exploitation and justified it.” This perspective included racial prejudices that Brazilians copied from the “imperialists” and used then to rationalize their own inferiority. According to Sodré, “The race and color prejudice of the European is the same as that of the Brazilian landowner …”

Brazilians, then, in addition to having an alienated culture, had an alienated history and an alienated identity. In the words of Corbisier, “We were foreigners in our wrapping of a content that is not ours because it is foreign.” Brazil had inherited an empty, hollow, alienated culture, that had neither its own objective nor destiny.

---

45 The complete excerpt is: “No plano cultural importamos idéias prontas e acabadas, que não conseguimos transformar e assimilar simplesmente porque nos falta a órgão que permitiria essa transformação, o instrumento que, no plano do espírito, seria correlato e o equivalente da indústria. Não possuímos o instrumento que nos tornaria capazes de triturar o produto cultural estrangeiro a fim de utilizá-lo como simples matéria-prima, como suporte de uma forma nossa, original. Exportamos o não ser e importamos o ser. Somos o invólucro vazio de um conteúdo que não é nosso porque é alheio. Enquanto colônia não temos forma própria porque não temos destino.” Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 69-70.

46 “Víamos a nossa realidade através de interpretações importadas.” Guerreiro Ramos, 243; “Tinhamos de nós mesmos a ideia que convinha aos colonizadores que tivéssemos, a ideia que coincidia com os interesses da exploração e os justificava.” Ibid, 41.

47 “O preconceito de raça e de cór do europeu é, pois, o mesmo do senhor de terras brasileiro … o Retrato do Brasil, na verdade, o retrato de uma classe – são tanto dos viajantes europeus que nos visitam quanto dos ensaístas nacionais que nos interpretam …” Sodré, “Estudo histórico-sociológico …”, 180. Corbisier also states: “... 'the inferiority complex,' typical problem in the psychology of colonized nations, is aroused in these nations by the domination project of imperialist nations, whose ideology implies a thesis of racial and cultural superiority.” “... ’o complexo de inferioridade’, problema típico da psicologia dos povos colonizados, é suscitado nesses povos pelo projeto de dominação dos povos imperialistas, cuja ideologia implica a tese de sua superioridade racial e cultural.” Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 73.
own land,” with a history that was only that of “Portugal in America.” If alienation was an inevitability of the colonial structure and independence in Brazil had not upset the colonial structure, but had left Brazil still “... economically and culturally a colony,” then how could the isebianos themselves bear the tools, criteria and perspective to perform their analysis?

Corbisier explains that in order for a dependent country within a colonial structure to break away from the inevitability of alienation and its symptoms, the nation must have an awakening or cultural epiphany of sorts. This awakening is not driven by the “whims of individuals or isolated groups, but is an historical phenomenon that implies and signals a break from the colonial complex.”

Corbisier provides a list of factors that can cause this breakthrough in consciousness. The first factor is war. Wars exaggerate dependence, but can also force a greater independence, since the products that the colony usually consumes, but can not produce itself, become more difficult (or impossible) to obtain. This sudden lack forces the nation to “become aware of the economic process in its totality and of the instrumental function” that the colony carries out. Corbisier reminds that “the two industrial leaps in Brazil coincide with the two world wars.”

More importantly, at least for this analysis, is the “global cultural crisis” that resulted from World War II – a term that Corbisier attributes to the Uruguayan scholar

---

48 “Éramos estranhos em nossa terra” and “A história do Brasil era a história de Portugal na América.” Ibid, 47 and 63, respectively.
49 “... ainda somos econômica e culturalmente uma colônia.” Ibid, 39.
50 Corbisier employs the term “tomada de consciência,” which translates roughly in English to “breakthrough” or, perhaps, “sudden gain of awareness.”
51 “Compreendemos hoje que a tomada de consciência de um país por êle próprio não ocorre arbitrariamente, nem resulta do capricho de indivíduos ou de grupos isolados, mas é um fenômeno histórico que implica e assinala a ruptura do complexo colonial.” Ibid, 41.
52 “Lembremos de que os dois surtos industriais no Brasil coincidem com as duas guerras mundiais.” Ibid, 42.
Alberto Zum Felde. In *El problema de la cultura americana*, Zum Felde explains that with the fall of France in World War II, Latin America found itself in a “cultural crisis.” France, a nation whose culture “possesses less typical nationalist character, and greater ecumenical category of universality” than any other country, having had served as a support to Latin American cultures for so long, had now left these countries in a “very dangerous moment,” as they had been left “alone and helpless.” The future strength of Latin American countries would depend upon “the development of our own personality in the post-war phase.”

Latin Americans would have to do this alone now, since, as Zum Felde stated, the English would not be able to, “much less our North Americans,” since both lacked the universality of culture and intellectual sophistication that France had exhibited.

To Corbisier, “it is perhaps the moment to try to walk on our own feet.”

Other factors that could cause a breakthrough in critical awareness were internal crises, whether caused by domestic or international forces, like the international economic crisis of 1929 and the Brazilian Revolution of 1930. In addition, Corbisier explains that the importation of political institutions, like universal suffrage or national political parties, in a country that contains “every time period of culture … primitive ... archaic ... and modern” might lead to crises of the “limits of tolerance to alienation.”

---


54 “¿Quién para nosotros, podría sustituir a Francia, en su tradicional magisterio? No, por cierto, Inglaterra, y aún menos nuestra América del Norte, no obstante los valores que poseen, porque a ambas les falta aquella virtud intelectual que ha hecho de Francia, no sólo el emporium viviente de la cultura contemporánea, sino su órgano de imperialidad universal, equilibrando el Sur y el Norte, y uniendo lo antiguo a lo moderno.” Ibid, 52.

55 “... é talvez o momento de tentarmos andar com os próprios pés.” Corbisier, *Formação e problema* ..., 43.

56 “... é possível que em um país como o Brasil, no qual coexistem tôdas as épocas da cultura e que não é
In the last item on Corbisier's list of causative factors, we arrive at the iseibiano moment. Corbisier reveals that a nation might gain consciousness “through new economic and cultural relations, of the demands of development that denounce … an obstacle to emancipation movements.” In the Brazilian case, this factor corresponds to the “advent of a national 'intelligentsia’” that is prepared to tackle the problems facing the country and to offer solutions, the “advent of a national popular awareness,” the “formation of a national workers movement,” and “the organization of a national liberation movement.” “Only now … in this transitional phase,” states Corbisier, “… do the conditions arise that allow us to launch the foundations of an authentic national thought.”

Corbisier employed the most enthusiastic language in his descriptions, but he was not alone in believing this to be a unique moment for finally claiming an authentic Brazilian culture. Vieira Pinto believed this moment to be caused by “intense development” which inspired “an era of original existence” while Guerreiro Ramos stated that Brazil was changing its “articulation with universal history” and with “the world” due to transformations in the economic system.

uno porque é ao menos tríplice – primitivo, com índios seminus, às margens do Araguaia; arcaico, em quase todo o interior e sobretudo nas regiões do norte e do nordeste; moderno, urbano e industrial, nas regiões do centro-sul —, é possível que em um país assim, 'museu de sociologia retrospectiva e de história comparada', como diria Oliveira Viana, instituições políticas como o presidencialismo, os partidos nacionais e o sufrágio universal, instituições importadas, anexadas à nossa realidade talvez sejam inadequadas à estrutura do País revelando, pelas crises que periódicamente provocam, os 'limites de tolerância à alienação', a que nos referimos.” Ibid, 43-44.

“... a partir das novas relações econômicas e culturais, das exigências do desenvolvimento que denunciam, no quadro da dependência, um obstáculo aos movimentos de emancipação.” Ibid, 44.

“... advento de uma 'intelligentzia' nacional, aberta aos problemas do país e empenhada em sua solução, capaz de converter-se em órgão da consciência nacional; advento de uma consciência nacional popular, esclarecida em relação aos problemas de base do País; formação de um movimento operário … organização de um movimento de libertação nacional.” Ibid, 44.

“Só agora, portanto, nessa transição de fase em que nos encontramos, começam a surgir as condições reais que nos permitirão lançar as bases de um pensamento nacional autêntico.” Ibid, 86.

“... só agora, quando ingressamos na fase de intenso desenvolvimento, estamos em condições de produzir de modo consciente, e em forma crítica, aquilo que antes desejávamos fazer, – exprimir o nosso próprio ser –, mas objetivamente não conseguíamos, porque não dispunhamos de condições para
The isebiano texts analyzed here recognize a dialectic between economic and cultural development. Culture was affected by the economy, as “an economically colonial or dependent nation also will be dependent and colonial from the point of view of culture.” Corbisier, in explaining why this dialectic occurs, relies on the interpretation of colonialism as a “system” offered by Jean-Paul Sartre to describe colonialism as a “complete social phenomenon.” Corbisier is careful, however, to not set up a strict cause and effect relationship between culture and economics stating that “without economic independence there is no cultural independence, however, as we have already seen, the conquest of the former does not mean, necessarily, the creation of original culture.”

---

61 Corbisier, in explaining why this dialectic occurs, relies on the interpretation of colonialism as a “system” offered by Jean-Paul Sartre to describe colonialism as a “complete social phenomenon.”

62 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Le Colonialisme est un Système,” Les Temps Modernes, no. 123 (Mar.-Apr. 1956): 1371-1386. In this article, Sartre criticizes French colonialism in Algeria, or, better said, criticizes French surprise at violence committed by Algerians against them. Sartre claims that “the Algerian problem is first economic” but is also social, psychological and political. It is possible that Corbisier also borrowed the argument about the colonial “inferiority complex” from Sartre, as he mentions this when discussing the psychological component of colonialism. It is also worth mentioning that Sartre believes that the Algerians’ “liberation and that of France can only come from the disintegration of colonization,” so it can be said that Sartre saw colonialism as a complete system integrating and restricting the colonial power as well as the colonial, 1371 and 1372, respectively. The italics are Sartre's. “Le problème algérien est d'abord économique,” 1371; “complexe d'infériorité,“ 1371; “… leur libération et celle de la France ne peut sortir que de l'éclatement de la colonisation,” 1372. Corbisier also refers frequently to an article written by Georges Balandier, another French writer, who offers a series of definitions (dependence, colonial situation, etc.) and a structural interpretation of the phases of colonialism, cultural mechanisms that accompany it (including a discussion on the adoption of racial constructs), and factors that might lead to a “prise de conscience.” Georges Balandier, “Contribution a une Sociologie de la Dependence,” Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie, 12 (1952): 47-69.

63 “... um povo economicamente colonial ou dependente também será dependente e colonial do ponto de vista da cultura.” Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 32.

64 Vieira Pinto, Consciência e realidade ..., 505. “O caráter transplantado de nossa cultura decorreu do modo particular, isto é, colonial, como o Brasil ingressou na história. E, assim, sômente quando se modificar o modo de sua articulação à história universal poderá ser transformado o caráter de sua cultura. Exatamente é um novo modo de articulação com o mundo que está surgindo no Brasil, graças às transformações do sistema econômico. Do ponto-de-vista econômico, o Brasil está em vias de superar o estatuto colonial de exercer o comando independente de seu aparelho de produção.” Guerreiro Ramos, O problema nacional ..., 242-243.

23
Corbisier describes this relationship as one of “dialectic implication” where changes that occur in one “provoke analogous transformations in the other.”

A new development model would afford Brazilians the possibility to create their own being, their own essence, and their own culture; conversely, the new Brazilian awareness caused by international and internal crises and changes would stimulate this new development model and alter the economic structure. Economic independence, while “necessary” for “cultural emancipation,” was not “sufficient” to create it. As Vieira Pinto explains:

The culture of the nation will become richer, broader and more original as the development of its material conditions of existence becomes more advanced; but reciprocally, the more awareness obtained from its cultural personality, [and] more identified it feels with the objects of its scientific and artistic creation, better resources will it have to understand its reality, and, as such, more efficient instruments to intervene in it modifying its reality to its benefit.

Roberto Campos dedicates his conference paper “Cultura e Desenvolvimento” to a discussion of this interdependence between culture and economic development. Campos identifies two points of intersection: “compatibility between the system of cultural values of a community and its economic development” and “efficiency of this

verificamos que sem independência econômica não há independência cultural, embora, como já observamos, a conquista daquela não acarrete, necessariamente a criação de uma cultura original.” Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 68.

“O que nos parece existir, entre os dois planos é uma ‘implicação dialética’, de tal sorte que as modificações que se operam em um provocam ou tendem a provocar transformações análogas no outro.” Ibid, 83.

“... a independência econômica é condição necessária, embora não seja condição suficiente, da emancipação cultural.” Ibid, 66.

“Será tanto mais rica, extensa e original a cultura do povo quanto mais adiantado o desenvolvimento das suas condições materiais de existência; mas, reciprocamente, quanto mais consciência adquirir da sua personalidade cultural, mais identificado se sentir com os objetos da sua criação científica ou artística, melhores recursos terá para compreender a sua realidade, e por tanto mais eficazes instrumentos para nela intervir modificando-a em seu proveito.” Vieira Pinto, Consciência e realidade ..., 506.
culture in the promotion of its development.” Relying heavily on the writings of W. W. Rostow, Arthur Lewis and Walter Rochs Goldschmidt, and injecting English phrases, such as “General theory of employment, interest and money” and “expansibility of wants” throughout his essay, Campos explains that while all cultures are compatible with economic development, some are more so than others. A culture that is adequate to economic development, he explains:

... is that which, in the first place, satisfies the physical needs for the well-being of its members, and in the second, is organized to continue satisfying, indefinitely, these needs; and, finally, that offers these members the necessary satisfactions for the adjustment of their personality to the context of their own system of values, as long as it does not exploit, physically or psychologically, any other population or segment of the population.

Analyzing “attitudes of consumption” and “accumulation of goods,” the “propensity to accept innovations,” the “possibility of appropriation of the fruits of labor,” and “social mobility,” Campos offers that in the Brazilian case, “the problem with efficiency is more serious than that of compatibility” with the most serious difficulties residing “on the side of savings and accumulation” since “Mediterranean races in general seem to have the

67 “... a questão do grau compatibilidade entre o sistema de valores culturais de uma comunidade e o seu desenvolvimento econômico ...” and “... a questão do grau de eficácia dessa cultura na promoção do desenvolvimento.” Campos, “Cultura e desenvolvimento,” 223.


69 “Seguindo os passos de Goldschmidt, definirei como cultura adequada ao desenvolvimento econômico aquela que, em primeiro lugar, satisfaz as necessidades de bem-estar físico de seus componentes; que em segundo, está organizada para continuar satisfazendo, indefinidamente, essas necessidades; e, finalmente, que oferece aos seus componentes as satisfações necessárias para o ajustamento de sua personalidade ao contexto de seu próprio sistema de valores, desde que não explore, física ou psicológicamente, alguma outra população ou segmento da população.” Ibid, 224.
hedonistic vice from which we did not escape.” A weak technological heritage, the lack of “social audacity” and a tendency towards mimicry led Brazil to under-development.

Campos and Sodré, whose diplomatic and military responsibilities, respectively, kept them from full participation in ISEB in the early years provide arguments that are relatively free of ISEB rhetoric. While the other isebianos discussed here – Guerreiro Ramos, Álvaro Vieira Pinto, and Roland Corbisier – held a common argument expressed in a shared vocabulary of the inevitably alienated “being” of a Brazilian culture that was dialectically connected to the colonial structure, Campos used neither the term “alienation” nor “colonial” in his essay, and the straight-forward approach of Sodré's paper suggests that he would scoff at the term “being” or “essence.” Campos, while recognizing the importance of the material well-being of the populace, suggests that “it's more important to maximize the rhythm of economic development than to correct social inequalities” since “we don't have the cultural vocation to endorse a socialist project.” Meanwhile, Sodré states that the “national” is only so if it is “popular,” while suggesting that the popular only now can take hold due to the growth of the middle class that neutralized the power of the rural landed class.

Both of these excerpts are found on Campos, “Cultura e desenvolvimento,” 233. While Corbisier relies heavily on

70 “atitude em relação ao consumo de bens econômicos,” Ibid, 225; “acumulação de bens de produção,” 225; “propensão a aceitar inovações,” 227; “a possibilidade de apropriação dos frutos de esforço,” 228; “mobilidade social,” 229; “o problema da eficácia é mais sério que o da compatibilidade,” 229; “As dificuldades que surgem estão do lado de poupança ou da acumulação. As raças mediterrâneas em geral parecem ter um vêzo hedonístico a que não escapamos,” 229-230.


72 “A opção pelo desenvolvimento implica a aceitação da ideia de que é mais importante maximizar o ritmo do desenvolvimento econômico, que corrigir as desigualdades sociais. Se o ritmo do desenvolvimento é rápido, a desigualdade é tolerável e pode ser corrigida a tempo.” and “Não temos vocação cultural para endossar um projeto socialista, com todos os perigos de frustração política e ferocidade tirânica que ele encerra.” Both of these excerpts are found on Campos, “Cultura e desenvolvimento,” 233.

73 “... só é nacional o que é popular.” This is the last line in his paper, Sodré, “Estudo histórico-sociológico ...”, 183. Guerreiro Ramos, in O problema nacional ... indirectly agrees with Sodré stating “The people are the true genius of national culture. There are only national culture and sciences from the point of view of the people.” “O povo é verdadeiro gênio da cultura nacional. Só existem cultura e ciências
French, German and Latin American authors to set up his arguments, Campos refers to
texts written in English by two North American and one St. Lucien author, and Sodré
refers exclusively to Brazilian authors.

Nonetheless, Campos and Sodré, two writers who appear to be on opposite
fringes of the debate on culture within ISEB (from the conservative economist to the
Marxist) accepted many of the same underlying assumptions associated with
modernization theory: that Brazil was essentially underdeveloped, that this under-
development was characterized by cultural deficiencies and a lack of industrial
capitalism, and that the time was ripe in the early 1950s to correct these flaws through
industrial development. The difference between these two intellectuals was simply who
should carry out this developmental enterprise. For Campos, who would later work
closely with U.S. technocrats during the Brazilian military dictatorship, anyone with
capital was a likely candidate, while for Sodré only o povo, the people, of Brazil could
create a truly national culture to carry forward national development.

The examples of Sodré and Campos offer the outer limits of a modernization
framework within which Corbisier and Guerreiro Ramos fit comfortably. The isebiano
belief in progress and modernization was so great that Guerreiro Ramos accepted
colonialism as an evil, but a necessary one by explaining that it was due to colonialism
that a country once dominated by indigenous tribes “leaped several stages of
development.” Corbisier too saw colonialism as a modernizing process that, while in the

---

nacionais, do ponto-de-vista do povo.” 244. Vieira Pinto and Corbisier share the more overtly Leninist
stance that while the essence of culture comes from “the people,” it is important for intellectuals to
guide and nurture this process.

74 “Graças a elas [as transplantações do Portugal] saltamos várias etapas de desenvolvimento, um território
sôbre o qual se distribuíam várias tribus na idade da pedra lascada passou de repente para o plano da

27
short term brings alienation, in the long term leads to a “process of liberation.” Of course, this process of liberation could only begin with intense industrial development and the economic and cultural expansion that it would bring.

Perhaps more importantly to this paper, all of the intellectuals studied here saw the question of Brazilian culture as a Brazilian question. While it was a problem derived inevitably from a colonial structure, only the Brazilian people could make the decision or choose the option to proceed away from colonialism and toward development. Whether the choice was to create a coherent, authentic, national ideology (in the case of Corbisier) or through economic investment stemming from domestic and foreign sources (in the case of Campos), the choice had to be made by Brazilians and could not be forced from the outside. As Corbisier states, “We finally understand that we are Brasil, that Brasil isn't outside of us, but is in us, it is part of our body and soul” and later, “We can conclude that the issue of Brazilian 'culture' isn't 'outside' of ourselves, but, to the contrary, is our own, personal problem, belonging to each one of us.” To the isebianos, the Brazilians, in this time period, were poised to move from the position of object to subject, from tools of colonialism to bearers of their own cultural being.

It may be for this reason that of the texts studied here, only one mentions the

---

75 “O processo de colonização se converte, senão ao curto pelo menos a longo prazo, em um processo de libertação econômica e cultural dos povos colonizados.” Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 31.

76 Along these lines, Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, in the already referenced article “O conceito de desenvolvimento do ISEB rediscutido,” refers to the ISEB mission as one of promoting Brazil's “capitalist revolution.”

77 “Compreendemos finalmente, que somos nós mesmos e o Brasil [sic], que o Brasil não é exterior a nós mas está em nós, faz parte do nosso corpo e da nossa alma. Compreendemos que o problema da cultura brasileira é um problema nosso, um problema pessoal, e que a nossa existência será dependente e autêntica enquanto for dependente e inautêntica a existência do País” and “... podemos desde já concluir que o problema da 'cultura' brasileira não nos é 'exterior', mas, ao contrário, é um problema próprio, pessoal, de cada um de nós.” Corbisier, Formação e problema ..., 50 and 70, respectively. The italics are Corbisier's.
United States by name, and even that mention is made in passing. The writers of ISEB were so focused on creating a new theoretical framework for the development of the new Brazil, and so inspired by the energy of the post-World War II moment that, had Corbisier not mentioned the Cadillac, bubble gum and cinema, while reading these texts the reader could easily forget that United States culture, cultural programs and cultural goods were metastasizing and multiplying throughout the urban centers of Brazil. But this lack of mention of the threat of United States culture to Brazil also shows that at root the nationalist movement was just that – nationalist. The intellectuals studied here did not consider their positions to be a reaction to the United States, but rather to be part of a process that preceded U.S. influence in Brazil.

Unlike the earlier example of Monteiro Lobato provided at the beginning of this paper, these intellectuals, in their conceptualizations of foreign cultural influence on Brazil did not mention the United States but chose to focus on theoretical aspects pertaining to the historical process of the formation of Brazilian culture or on the connection of culture to economic model. In doing so, they ignored the appearance of U.S. cultural goods within Brazil and underestimated the ability of U.S. cultural products and associated way of life to align with the model of cultural and economic development that they themselves were promoting – one of modern industrialized growth and consumption. The lack of focus on the United States during this time period partially explains the more contemporary scholarly indifference toward analyzing the Brazilian intellectual and cultural context when researching U.S. cultural influence in post-World War II Brazil. Nevertheless, the work of these isebianos provides an important context.

78 Corbisier mentions a text by Edward Spranger about the United States.
within which any study of the spread of United States cultural influence should be placed. While these intellectuals at ISEB ignored, or at least underestimated, North American influence in their quest to create an authentic national culture, American cultural influence grew, spread and took root swiftly and with limited resistance.

This lack of mention of U.S. cultural influence does not mean, however, a complete lack of discourse about the United States within ISEB or among its intellectuals. In fact, anti-imperialism as anti-americanism (and vice-versa) was an accepted point among several authors. Nonetheless, the focus of this anti-imperial discourse revolved around economic and political, and not cultural issues. Given the arguments for the dialectical implication between culture and economic structure, this would seem a curious omission, were it not for the assumption that the question of Brazilian culture, while posed within an imperial framework would be faced and answered on Brazilian terms – Brazilian, that is, as defined by the intellectuals of ISEB.

It was a rift caused by the interpretations of one of the original and most prominent members of IBESP and later ISEB over foreign investment and privatization that would serve as one of the greatest factors leading to ISEB's radical change in focus in its final years of action. In *O nacionalismo na atualidade brasileira*, Hélio Jaguaribe, member of ISEB's board and Director of the Department of Political Science, demonstrated a drastic turn in thought. Jaquaribe presented nationalism as a means to an

---

end, rather than as an end in itself. This conception of nationalism allowed him to suggest that privatization, leading to the possible purchase of Brazilian oil resources by Standard Oil, was not necessarily a negative possibility, as long as the foreign investors administered these resources efficiently. In addition, Jaguaribe suggested repression and illegality of the PCB and the creation of a South American security mechanism to provide severe repression of communist agitation. Vieira Pinto released a stream of arguments to counter this line of reasoning, while, Guerreiro Ramos suggested the expulsion of Jaguaribe from the institute, and, with the support of Corbisier, proposed the dedication of ISEB towards militant, rather than theoretical, objectives. Jaguaribe’s positions provoked a strong reaction, not only from fellow isebianos, but from the União Nacional dos Estudantes (UNE – National Union of Students), who supported Guerreiro Ramos' positions.

Ultimately, this disagreement led to the intervention of the Minister of Education and the modification of the statutes regarding ISEB's organization and orientation. As of 1959, ISEB gained greater space for theoretical pluralism within the institute. In addition, the former board of trustees was substituted by a board of professors. This phase of ISEB's operation also signals the beginning of a significant change in the body of the

---

80 Toledo, in ISEB: Fábrica de ideologias, offers the following passage from Ideologias e segurança nacional: “... what makes the current policy on petroleum nationalist is not that Petrobrás is an enterprise of the Brazilian state, directed by natural born Brazilians etc. In thesis, the nationalist policy on petroleum could be realized by Standard or any other enterprise, as long as concretely, in the present situation of the country, this was the most efficient way to exploit Brazilian petroleum and to provide the national economy with full use and control of this raw material.” “ o que torna nacionalista a atual política do petróleo não é o fato de a Petrobrás ser uma empresa do Estado brasileiro, dirigida por brasileiros natos etc. Em tese, a política nacionalista do petróleo poderia ser realizada pela Standard ou qualquer outra empresa, desde que concretamente, na situação presente do país, essa fosse a forma mais eficaz de explorar o petróleo brasileiro e proporcionar à economia nacional o pleno uso e controle de tal matéria-prima.” 134-135.

81 Pécaut, Os intelectuais e a política .., 111.
professors involved with the institute. After the modification of the ISEB statutes, Jaguaribe, Campos and three other ISEB professors resigned from the institute. Guerreiro Ramos, while not officially resigning took a decided step away from direct action with ISEB. Then, in 1960, after a year in which ISEB dedicated itself mostly to electoral politics, Corbisier also left the institute to become a state deputy in Guanabara through the *Partido Trabalhista do Brasil* (PTB), thereby leaving ISEB without a Director. After some debate between UNE and the Ministry of Education and Culture, Vieira Pinto was chosen as Corbisier's successor, leading to a distinct phase of ISEB militancy.

While sectors of the Brazilian press, notably *O Globo*, had long dedicated numerous pages to accusing ISEB of being an institute directed by communists to carry out communist intentions, it was only in these final years that ISEB took a radical shift toward the left. In 1961, now under Jânio Quadros' presidential administration, MEC greatly reduced ISEB's budget, removing the possibility of continued publication and forcing Vieira Pinto into an administrative crisis. At this point, and especially under João Goulart's presidential administration, ISEB intellectuals began to dedicate their energy to the *reformas de base*, or fundamental reforms necessary to carry out the Brazilian revolution, such as in the areas of education, land reform, and labor organization. As a source of supplemental income for ISEB’s actions, Vieira Pinto

---


84 Pécaut, *Os intelectuais e a política* ..., 113. The iseibiano Osny Duarte de Pereira highlights the revolutionary nature of these reforms stating that “Every revolution, peaceful or violent, must concern itself with fundamental reforms, otherwise it is not a revolution.” “Toda revolução, pacífica ou violenta,
coordinated a collection called *Os Cadernos do Povo*, upon the request of editor of *Civilização Brasileira*, Ênio Silveira.\(^{85}\) In addition, ISEB began to work with the Centro Popular de Cultura (CPC – Center of Popular Culture) of the UNE.\(^{86}\) In 1963, isebianos were among those who assisted in the creation of the Comando dos Trabalhadores Intelectuais [Intellectual Workers' Comando].\(^{87}\) During this time period, as well, ISEB intellectuals began to reject the previously formulated ideology of development, recognizing that this development, in the words of Osny Duarte de Pereira presented at the inaugural session of ISEB’s classes in 1963, “would only make the the dominant

\(^{85}\) The objective of this collection was to “… place within the reach of every reader – by the nature of the themes, by the way that they will be presented, by the accessible price of each volume – the honest and realistic study of the great national problems. In other words, it will attempt to broaden the pool of thinking elite in the country … and it will not pause in criticizing whoever it might or in breaking with prejudices and taboos created by or derived from the socio-economic system currently in place.” “… colocar ao alcance de todos os leitores – pela natureza dos temas, pela forma como serão tratados, pelo preço acessível de cada volume – o estudo honesto e realista dos grandes problemas nacionais. Em outras palavras, procurará ampliar a elite pensante do país … e não terá receio de criticar a quem quer que seja ou de romper preconcebidos e tabus criados pelo ou decorrentes do sistema sócio-econômico vigente no país.” Cited in Freitas, Álvaro Vieira Pinto …, 166. ISEB contributions to this collection include Vieira Pinto’s *Porque os ricos não fazem greve*? [Why do the rich not strike?], Sodré’s *Quem é o povo no Brasil?* [Who is the nation in Brazil?], and Osny Duarte Pereira's *Quem faz as leis no Brasil?* [Who makes the laws in Brazil?]. These *Cadernos* were published under the motto “Only when well-informed can a nation emancipate itself” and first released at the first Festival de cultura popular [Festival of Popular Culture], organized by the CPC da UNE. The *Cadernos* were also disseminated by the CPCs and UNE. Miliandre Garcia, *Do teatro militante à música engajada* (São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2007), 39 and Roderick, “ISEB and National Developmentalism …”, 138.

\(^{86}\) Pécaut, *Os Intelectuais e a política …*, 113. The first CPC was established in the headquarters of UNE in Guanabara in December of 1961. According to Garcia, the Teatro de Arena, which provided a space for artists engaged in the creation of nationalist popular art served as a forerunner of this organization. Within the CPC da UNE various artists, such as Ferreira Gullar, who was at one time its director, Vinicius de Moraes and Baden Powell rubbed elbows. The CPC was not formulated around a particular theory or methodology, but many of the artists involved in the CPC da UNE claimed to be strongly influenced, and even inspired, by Corbisier's *Formação e problema da Cultura Brasileira*. Garcia, *Do teatro militante …*, 7-9 and 36-37. The two most active CPCs acting in Brazil at this time were the CPC da UNE in Guanabara and the *Movimento de Cultura Popular* [Popular Culture Movement], known as the MCP, in Recife, within which Paulo Freire was an active participant.

\(^{87}\) According to Toledo, this organization “proposed to participate in forming a single democratic and nationalist front alongside other popular forces united in a movement to improve the structure of Brazilian society.” Toledo, “ISEB Intellectuals …”, 129.
classes richer and the oppressed classes poorer ...".88 According to Sodré, by January of 1964, the U.S. Secret Service had categorized ISEB as a “center of communists.”89 ISEB, once a promoter of developmental nationalism, was now a center that opposed this ideology, seeking instead to fundamentally transform Brazilian society through reformas de base and militant action.

But April of 1964 revealed a different destiny for ISEB. On April 13, in the weeks following the military coup, both ISEB and UNE were forcibly closed, their documents and publications seized and burned.90 Some ISEB intellectuals, like Sodré, Corbisier and Vieira Pinto, were interrogated by the military regime. Vieira Pinto left Brazil, but even upon his eventual return never again partook in the intellectual course of his country.91 Both Sodré and Corbisier lost their political rights and were briefly incarcerated.92 Gueirreiro Ramos also had his political rights revoked, and in 1966 left Brazil to become a professor at the University of Southern California.93 Campos, however, supported the military coup and remained active within it throughout.94

......With the more U.S.-friendly military dictatorship came new forms of U.S. influence, while only a fragmented, weakened, and at times tortured, group of intellectuals remained to criticize or resist it. Faced with this abrupt ending to the story of institutions and organizations like ISEB, the CPCs and UNE, the question becomes irresistible: Had the

---

89 “centro de comunistas.” Sodré, A verdade sobre …, 62.
90 Toledo, ISEB: Fábrica de ideologias …, 191; Pécaut, Os Intelectuais e a política …, 113.
92 Ibid, 204.
94 Ibid, 190-191.
military coup not been successful would the intellectuals of ISEB have confronted U.S. cultural influence head on? Providing an answer to this question is not merely a counterfactual exercise; it provides the opportunity to carry forward the ISEB rationale on Brazilian culture. Following through with the arguments analyzed in this paper, it becomes clear that according to ISEB logic, for differing reasons perhaps, the answer would be a simple “no.” The isebiano view was that Brazil had finally reached a position at which it could define and create its own culture, independent of imperial influence. Further, isebianos saw Brazilian intellectuals as able to support the nation in this process, in ISEB’s early years through the creation of an ideology of national development and, later, during its more militant years, by carrying out a revolution of fundamental reforms. To the isebianos, had their project been successful, United States cultural influence would be irrelevant to this uniquely Brazilian process of cultural emancipation.
JOAQUIM NABUCO, BRITISH ABOLITIONISTS AND
THE CASE OF MORRO VELHO


O Sr. Ignácio Martins: – Como Sabia?! Então porque V. Ex. não denunciou, se já sabia?

O Sr. Galdino das Neves: – Não, eu não sou denunciante.


From Brazilian parliamentary debate of August 26, 1879 on the Morro Velho case, initiated by Joaquim Nabuco, o denunciante.

Agostinho Mathildes should have been a free man by 1859. Three laws – one international, the other two Brazilian – assured his freedom. Yet on October 23, 1877, Mathildes was publicly punished as a slave, serving as an example before the black workers of the Morro Velho mine by receiving 24 lashes for “insubordination and resistance.” According to the Superintendent's Diary of the St. John d'el Rey Company Limited, which owned and operated the Morro Velho mine, Mathildes had been punished “more severely than ordinarily … in consequence of the rumour spread among the Cata Branca blacks respecting their freedom.”

Along with 384 other individuals rented from the Brazilian Mining Company, Mathildes had lived and worked as a slave for the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company

95 Superintendent's Diary, Saint John d'el Rey Company Limited, Nova Lima, October 23, 1877. In future notes, Saint John d'el Rey Company Limited will be abbreviated as SJDR and Nova Lima as NL.
Limited at the Morro Velho mine in Minas Gerais since 1845. Once the case of these men, women and children illegally held in captivity came to his knowledge, Joaquim Nabuco initiated a debate on the case in the Brazilian Parliament. While a legal case had already been in the courts since 1877, after Nabuco's speech, it gained visibility and momentum through coverage in both domestic and international newspapers. In addition, through Nabuco, the case gained the support of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society-- founded in London on April 17, 1839 to “internationalize the struggle,”-- who sent letters of support and documents from London.96

Through legal and political pressure, the British had invested a form of moral capital against slavery in Brazil since the turn of the century. This moral high ground had drawn the respect of the young senator Nabuco, whose Anglophilia had led to accusations within Brazil of a lack of patriotism.97 The correspondence between Nabuco and British abolitionists in the case against St. John d'el Rey would seem yet another instance of support to these claims, save for one detail: the St. John d'el Rey Company was not Brazilian but British-owned and managed.98

In this paper, company and legal documents, newspaper articles, and diplomatic and personal correspondence unite to establish a richer understanding of the interaction between British and Brazilian abolitionists in this case against British subjects residing in

Brazil. As Leslie Bethell and José Murilo de Carvalho state in the introduction to the newly published collection of 110 letters exchanged between Nabuco and British abolitionists, “One of the least studied aspects of Joaquim Nabuco's fight against slavery is his relationship with the British abolitionists.”

Richard Graham in A Inglaterra e os abolicionistas brasileiros addresses this relationship; however, as the correspondence available between Nabuco and the British abolitionists begins in 1880, Graham and Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho focus on the relationship between British and Brazilian abolitionists during the later years of the Morro Velho case.

This study first presents brief descriptions of the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company, the Cata Branca slaves and the Morro Velho case, before analyzing Joaquim Nabuco's role, both domestically and abroad, and the press coverage inspired by his actions. This analysis emphasizes that further study into the Morro Velho case is important for several reasons. First, it suggests that the exchange between these two groups occurred prior to 1880 and that this interaction was pivotal to legal success. In addition, while Nabuco intended to bring international attention to the case, his actions brought the debate into domestically published newspapers, generating greater publicity and pressure not only abroad, but also within Brazil's borders. Interaction between Nabuco and the British and Foreign Antislavery Society strengthened the case against the largest and most powerful mining company in Minas Gerais, making public and tangible


the anti-slavery debate within Brazil. This public debate promoted by Joaquim Nabuco and British abolitionists provoked a backlash against the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company from the Brazilian Parliament, Brazilian courts, Brazilian and international media and members of both the Brazilian and British public. The effects of this case were not limited to its legal outcome: newspapers like *The Rio News* continued to provide greater space to slavery and abolitionism after the resolution of the Morro Velho case and Nabuco carried the attention that this case gained into future antislavery debates.

Eighteen British companies arose out of the gold-mining boom of nineteenth century Brazil. Of these, few were profitable and many failed, with the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company surviving 130 years to become “the most successful of all the British gold-mining ventures in Latin America.”\(^1\) A group of British investors formed St. John d'el Rey as a joint stock company in 1830 and after a few false starts, in 1834, acquired the Morro Velho mine and the 136 slaves which worked it, bringing its total slave labor force to around 186. Due to mine renovation and expansion, the company only began to pay dividends to stockholders in 1842, but continued to regularly pay dividends every year thereafter with the exception of a seven-year period following a mine collapse in 1867 and an eight-year period between 1874 and 1882 characterized by administrative change, another mine collapse and the construction of a new mine. Overall, in the period between 1830 and 1887, St. John d'el Rey paid dividends 60 percent of the time.\(^2\)

St. John d'el Rey relied on free as well as slave labor. By the mid-1850s, a community of about 150 British subjects had formed in Morro Velho, about half of which

\(^1\) Eakin, *British Enterprise* ..., 16. Libby refers to St. John d'el Rey as “... um dos mais lucrativos empreendimentos realizados na América Latina no século XIX,” Libby, 31.

\(^2\) Eakin, *British Enterprise* ..., 24-26 & 67-68.
were mine workers, while the remaining British residents were family members of workers, as well as an Anglican clergyman and his wife who served as a school teacher. With few exceptions, Europeans held the supervisory and administrative positions at the mine, while slaves and Brazilian free laborers held manual labor and lower-level positions. In 1834 captive labor already formed just under forty percent of the total labor force. Over the next few years captive labor would come to dominate the labor force at Morro Velho, only dropping below fifty percent in the decade preceding abolition in 1888. In the early years, the directors of St. John d'el Rey claimed that scarcity of free labor and the “lack of responsibility” of free workers led it to rely on slave labor.\textsuperscript{103} By the 1860s, the company held approximately 1400 slaves, making it, according to Marshall C. Eakin, likely “the single largest employer of slaves in Minas Gerais, the province with the largest slave population in Brazil.”\textsuperscript{104}

In 1842, a bill introduced in the British Parliament suggested the prohibition of possession or rental of slaves by British citizens in any part of the world.\textsuperscript{105} Nonetheless, the British “Act for the More Efctual Suppression of the Slave Trade” (Ato para a Mais Efetiva Supressão do Tráfico Negreiro) passed in 1843, prohibiting ownership, but not rental, of slaves by British subjects “wheresoever residing or being, and whether within the Dominions of the British Crown or of any Foreign Country.”\textsuperscript{106} This act set the stage

\textsuperscript{103} “falta de responsabilidade.” Ibid., 27-32 and Libby, 92. The quotation is from Libby.
\textsuperscript{104} Eakin, \textit{British Enterprise ...}, 33.
\textsuperscript{105} Libby, 60.
\textsuperscript{106} This act pertains to the 6\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} Victoriæ, chapter 98, section 3. Reference to the act is found in Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, \textit{British and foreign state papers}, v. 158 (HMSO, 1879), 409. The UK Statute Law Database lists the excerpt referred to here on their website, with amendments. Office of Public Sector Information, “Slave Trade Act 1843,” \textit{The UK Statute Law Database}; available from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1843/cukpga_18430098_en_1; Internet; accessed August 25, 2009.
for the Aberdeen Act of 1845 which would allow the British Admiralty to treat Brazilian
slave ships as pirate vessels.\textsuperscript{107}

With slave ownership now illegal for the British-owned St. John d'el Rey, this
company chose to “rent” slaves – a practice common in Minas Gerais during this time
period – from several failed mining ventures in Minas Gerais.\textsuperscript{108} In 1845, St. John d'el
Rey absorbed the assets of the collapsed Brazilian Mining Company, one of several
enterprises formed in London in the 1830s and 1840s to mine gold in Minas Gerais.\textsuperscript{109} On
June 27, 1845 in London, the two companies drew a rental contract whereby the 385
slaves who had worked the Cata Branca mines for the Brazilian Mining Company would
work for St. John d'el Rey until the end of 14 years of service.\textsuperscript{110} At the end of the
contract, in 1859, the slaves were to be freed. In addition, those who were minors at the
time of the contract would become free upon reaching 21 years of age, as would any
children later born of these slaves. This contract was later ratified and recognized in
Brazil on March 4, 1846.\textsuperscript{111}

The 385 slaves included in the Cata Branca agreement had no say in their labor

\textsuperscript{107} For more on the Aberdeen Act, see David Baronov, \textit{The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil: The
“Liberation” of Africans through the Emancipation of Capital} (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000), 152
and Richard Graham, \textit{Britain and the Onset of Modernization in Brazil 1850-1914} (Cambridge:

\textsuperscript{108} On the renting of slaves, see Libby, 94.

\textsuperscript{109} Eakin, \textit{British Enterprise} ..., 19 & 34; Libby, 62.

\textsuperscript{110} Primary and secondary sources on this subject often lead to confusion on two basic points: names and
numbers. I will use the following terms: St. John d'el Rey, the Brazilian Mining Company, the Cata
Branca slaves and the Morro Velho case. Also, there is some confusion regarding the number of slaves
originally contracted from the Brazilian Mining Company and the number of slaves that were
eventually released. This paper refers to the official number as corroborated by the contract and
company documents.

\textsuperscript{111} Jacintho Dias da Silva, \textit{O Supremo Tribunal pela verdade, e a justiça, Victoria dos pobres ex-escravos
da extinta companhia Catta-Branca contra a prepotente companhia S. João D'el-Rei (Morro-Velho)
(Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Perseverança, 1881), Public Records division of British Foreign Office
(FO), 131/18, 286 which contains the full text of the original contract; also an unidentified “fluminense”
newspaper cut-out and Anglo-Brazilian Times article found in FO 131/18, 441. The original contract
was also published in “Illegal Slavery,” \textit{The Rio News}, Ano VI, no. 22 (5 September 1879), 1.
contracts and left no record of their voice behind. However, through court and company
documents we do have access to some demographic details. Of the 309 adult slaves, 221
were men, while only 88 were women. Among the 76 children, the sex ratio was closer,
with 43 male and 33 female children.112 The last names found in this group provide
insight into the diversity of the St. John d’el Rey workforce, such as those of Helena
Congo, Maria Mina, Ignez Creoula, Catharina Benguella, Francisca Cambinda, and
Josepha Mosambique.113 While 149 of the slaves worked within the mines, 21 worked in
the forges. The largest occupation for women was that of spallers (those who manually
broke ore into small fragments) of which they were 35 in number, while 20 male workers
also did the same work.114 The rest of the slaves were scattered through various
occupations necessary to any small community – stone layers, carpenters, cooks, and
nurses, among others.115 If patterns of the general slave population at Morro Velho apply
to those of the Cata Branca slaves, teenagers and older laborers worked in “menial labor
and domestic service,” while children and the elderly did little work.116

According to the contract of June 27, 1845 the Cata Branca slaves would be free
as of 1859; however, at the passage of the Rio Branco law in 1871, the slaves still
remained in captivity.117 As of 1872, St. John d’el Rey found itself trapped between the

112 This according to the original contract cited in previous footnote.
113 These names are found in the document entitled “Relação de todos os pretos da Companhia da Cata
Branca; os existentes no Morro Velho, e os já fallecidos e libertados desde 1o de janeiro de 1860,” in
FO 131/18, 210-220. It should be noted that each of these women, with the exception of Josepha
Mosambique, died in captivity after 1860, when they, by any calculation, should already have obtained
their freedom.
114 Eakin, British Enterprise ..., 196.
115 This according to the original contract reprinted in Silva, FO 131/18, 287-291.
116 Eakin, British Enterprise, 196. For more information on slave life in the Morro Velho mines, see Ibid,
196-202; and, Richard F. Burton, Explorations of the Highlands of the Brazil; A Full Account of the
Gold and Diamond Mines. Also, Canoeing down 1500 Miles of the Great River Sao Francisco, from
Sabara to the Sea (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1869), 221-278.
117 The date of legal freedom for the Cata Branca slaves throughout the documents consulted ranges from
aforementioned British legislation which outlawed owning slaves and the Rio Branco law. The Rio Branco Law, passed in 1871, required slave-owners to matriculate all of their enslaved workers. In addition, a clause appended to the Rio Branco Law on June 8, 1872 stipulated that no individual previously conceded liberty could be re-enslaved.\footnote{Robert Edgar Conrad, \textit{The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850-1888} (Malabar: Krieger, 1993), 75. For more on the Rio Branco Law and its effects, see Conrad, 64-83.} With this law serious questions arose for the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company: How could the slaves rented from the Brazilian Mining Company be registered? The St. John d’el Rey Company was not the legal owner of these slaves, so it could not register them. But, the official owner of the slaves, the Brazilian Mining Company, no longer existed. Further, the Cata Branca slaves, per contract, were free as of 1859. Could their current status as slaves of St. John d’el Rey be considered a relapse into slavery counter the Rio Branco Law?

Lodged between British and Brazilian legislation, St. John d'el Rey sought a complicated solution. In 1872, James Gordon, the director of St. John d’el Rey and also Vice-Consul of Great Britain to Minas Gerais, registered the captive workers to the Brazilian Mining company. Only later did he seek power of attorney from the Brazilian Mining Company’s remaining (and possibly fictitious) representatives in London to do this, which he gained.\footnote{John Hockin, St. John d’el Rey Mining Company, Limited, \textit{Memorandum in Regard to the Original Agreement Between the Brazilian (Cata Branca) and the St. John D’El Rey Companies and its Renewal}. FO 131/18, 169; and according to speech of Ignacio Martins in “Sessão de 26 de Agosto de 1879,” FO 131/18, 185.} In effect, the slaves were registered by the director of the

---

1859 to 1860. The slaves were to be freed in 1859, if one calculates 14 years from the date that the contract was drawn in London; while they were to be freed in 1860, if one calculates 14 years from the date that the contract was registered in Brazil. These hypothetical dates become more important in the latter years of the legal process when St. John d’el Rey and the courts argue over from which date back wages should be paid. In these later disputes, an additional year is added to the debate - that of the decision of 1879, when the slaves were deemed free.
company that “rented” (but did not own) them, in the name of an extinct company that owned (but did not employ) them. The registration was egregiously fraudulent, and the fraud was noticed.

After the fraudulent matriculation of the slaves, a citizen by the name of Antonio Carlos Rebello Horta denounced the false registration to the municipal judge of Sabará, under whose jurisdiction the Morro Velho mines resided. The judge, Dr. Chassim Drummond, placed the slaves into a status of legal limbo referred to as “in deposit,” which changed their status on paper, but had no bearing on their physical reality. Drummond named Coronel Jacintho Dias da Silva as trustee and defense attorney for the slaves and this five-year legal case, that eventually freed the remaining Cata Branca slaves, officially began.

On June 11, 1877 Silva filed for the slaves' freedom based on Gordon’s false registration. The courts ruled, though, that Silva had to file an *acção de liberdade*, an official suit for freedom. The company requested additional time to pull together its paperwork and on July 21, nearly a month later, presented new evidence for their case. St. John d'el Rey claimed to have reached a new agreement with the Brazilian Mining Company before the Cata Branca contract had expired. St. John d'el Rey produced for the courts a second contract, supposedly made on June 27, 1857, two years before the slaves were to be released. According to St. John d’el Rey, this new agreement canceled the

---

120 This according to the speech of Ignacio Martins in “Sessão em 26 de Agosto de 1879” in *Annaes do Parlamento Brasileiro. Câmara dos Srs. Deputados. Segundo Ano da Décima-sétima legislatura, Sessão de 1879*, tomo iv (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Nacional, 1879), 186. Sr. Martins does not give the year or date that Carlos Rebello Horta made this denunciation, nor does he elaborate on the title or position of this man.

121 Ibid, idem. Confirmed in *Superintendent’s Diary*, SJDR/NL, June 14, 1877.

122 Sabará sentence of October 14, 1879 in article in Anglo-Brazilian Times, FO 131/18, 441.

123 Ignacio Martins in “Sessão de 26 de Agosto de 1879,” 186.
obligatory emancipation of the slaves, requiring only that the company manumit Cata Branca slaves at the same rate per year as it did its own.\textsuperscript{124}

Many assumed that the second contract presented to the courts by St. John d’el Rey was an invention produced in 1877 to justify the retention of the Cata Branca slaves.\textsuperscript{125} This assumption provides a simple explanation of the case: a British company, out of extreme greed, kept workers in illegal captivity. However, while the June 27, 1857 agreement was not registered in London or in Brazil, the company’s archives house discussions between St. John d’el Rey and Brazilian Mining Company representatives around this date. On May 8, 1857 John Hockin, who served on the Board of St. John d’el Rey communicated to Thomas Walker, then Superintendent of the company at Morro Velho, that “The British Company will offer no obstacle to our carrying out our own views whether for the emancipation before the expiring of the term of those that may be thought deserving or qualified” and that “emancipation should be a reward for good conduct, and that those only should be emancipated whose previous conduct would in a measure be a guarantee of future good conduct.”\textsuperscript{126} Later in St. John d’el Rey’s board minutes from the same month, a certain Mr. Harding of the Brazilian Mining Company stated that “he considered the emancipation of the negroes, which had been contemplated to take place at the end of the agreement was a measure wholly unadvisable, in every

\textsuperscript{124} Sabará sentence of October 14, 1879, FO 131/18, 20-28; also reprinted in English in article in Anglo-Brazilian Times, FO 131/18, 441 and in \textit{Rio News}, Ano VI, no. 25 (5 October 1879), 2. According to Eakin, \textit{British Enterprise} ..., 35, St. John d’el Rey had established a goal in the 1850s of emancipating twenty of its own slaves per year – ten on St. John’s Day and ten at Christmas, with an elaborate ceremony dedicated to each holiday emancipation.\textsuperscript{125} These assumptions were expressed in Nabuco’s parliamentary debates as well as in the Sabará court decision of 1879, FO 131/18, 441.\textsuperscript{126} John Hockin to Thomas Walker, SJDR/NL, May 8, 1857.
point of view and particularly with reference to the welfare of the negroes themselves.”127 On May 22, 1857, the board minutes inform that it was resolved that “the Brazilian Company be invited to authorize their company to grant emancipation to such number of the Blacks hired from them as may represent an equal proportion to those which may be emancipated belonging to this Company.”128 In a letter from June 8, 1857, Hockin communicated to Walker that five Cata Branca and five St. John d’el Rey slaves “be annually freed.” Hockin also advised that the freed slaves be “men or women having families, whose freedom they would be likely to be anxious to purchase ... as the prospect of being able to purchase this freedom, by their own earnings would be likely to act as a stimulant to labour for some time at least.”129

These records show that the board of St. John d’el Rey had developed a strategy to resolve the contradiction between the preference for a free labor force and the conditions that made it difficult to retain a free labor force. By “rewarding” slaves who demonstrated “good conduct,” the company justified maintaining the Cata Branca workers in slavery after the expiration of the first contract by, in their view, encouraging if not creating an ethic for free labor. This “gradual emancipation” then, served two purposes: it assured a continued labor force for St. John d’el Rey and it resolved any moral or intellectual conflicts by participating in slave manumission and improvement of work ethic.

While the company claimed to have a contract based on these decisions, it was registered neither in Brazil nor in England. Nonetheless, the contract presented to the

127 Board minutes, SJDR, University of Texas (UT), v. 3, May 18, 1857.
129 John Hockin to Thomas Walker, SJDR/NL, June 8, 1857.
courts effectively paralyzed the case from June 1877 to September 1879.

It was not until Joaquim Nabuco was made aware of the case that it gained widespread domestic and international publicity. Already in 1877, the St. John d’el Rey Mining Company correspondence alludes to certain concerns over a mention of the “ugly issue” in the British press, and even suggests that the man who had written of the case be “managed” and that “some little thing” be put “in his way.”\(^{130}\) According to a letter in *The Rio News*, Charles H. Williams, then director of mines in Cocais, “ferreted out the condemnatory documents” while Nabuco's “brilliant oratory and humane appeals in the Chamber of Deputies, to the national justice, gave effect to these documents.” The letter further states that Williams “in 1879, by some ingenious play in a side question with the Morro Velho Company, found out everything, and in person followed up his information on the spot, and in Rio to the successful issue by different means, but chiefly by Deputy Nabuco's generous advocacy.”\(^{131}\) In a letter responding to Nabuco, Williams states that he is “anxious to withdraw my original copy of the contract which is now with the [word illegible], and which I am refused till the sentence is given.”\(^{132}\) Through these letters it becomes apparent that Williams, who also forwarded correspondence to Nabuco from the

\(^{130}\) John Hockin to Pearson Morrison, July 6, 1877, SJDR/NL. In the August 26, 1879 parliamentary debate on the Morro Velho case, Sr. Ignácio Martins mentions an article in the *Jornal do Comércio* that (supposedly) inspired earlier government inquiries after the case had become stagnant. It is unclear whether these articles are related.

\(^{131}\) R.H. Gunning, “The Catta Branca Blacks,” *The Rio News*, Ano VII, no. 15, 2. This letter is part of a series of communication published in *The Rio News* over a dispute that arose when a certain Reverend E. Vanorden of the Brazilian Christian Mission of Rio Grande do Sul wrote that Dr. Gunning was responsible for freeing the Catta Branca slaves. *The Rio News* printed the words of Vanorden and questioned Gunning's role. Dr. Gunning wrote to the paper to give credit to Williams and Nabuco. Other readers wrote additional letters defending and criticizing Dr. Gunning. Letters referring to this dispute are found in the May 15, 1880 (no. 14, 4), May 24, 1880 (no. 15, 2), June 5, 1880 (no. 16, 1), June 24, 1880 issue (no. 18, 1) and July 15, 1880 (no. 20, 1) issues. While Gunning's role was denied (by himself and others), the role of Williams and Nabuco was upheld by all.

\(^{132}\) Charles Williams, “Carta 4: Williams a Nabuco, 9 de agosto de 1880,” in Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, 64.
British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, had provided Nabuco with the documents necessary to condemn the St. John d'el Rey Mining Company. In these activities, Williams served as an important link between Nabuco and the British Abolitionists not only after, but likely before the court decision. This relationship between Nabuco and Williams existed prior to 1880 and was pivotal to the success of this legal case.

On August 26, 1879 Nabuco, armed with the documents provided by Williams, presented the case to Parliament, urging the Minister of Justice to take action. Nabuco filed a requerimento that the Minister of Justice provide the Chamber with information as to who the official owners of the Cata Branca slaves were, whether the government indeed had on register the contract of June 27, 1845 and what steps had been taken to guarantee the slaves' freedom and punish those who held them in captivity.

While government response to Nabuco's speech lagged, the press responded immediately. A Província de São Paulo published an article summarizing Nabuco's speech just three days later on August 29, 1879. The Rio News published an article that covered the first page and spilled over to the fourth on September 5, 1879, to be followed by articles in nearly every issue for the rest of 1879. The Jornal de Comércio published articles on September 13 and 20, 1879 and future articles on the Morro Velho.

---

133 Charles Williams sent a previous letter to Nabuco in which he forwards a copy of a resolution approved by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, as requested by that society. Charles Williams, “Carta 2: Williams a Nabuco, 14 de fevereiro de 1880,” in Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, 53.


136 The first article to appear was “Illegal Slavery,” The Rio News, Ano VI, no. 22 (5 September 1879), 1. Future articles are included in the following issues (titles are included when given): no. 23 (15 September 1879), 2; “Illegal Slavery,” no. 24 (24 September 1879), 1; two articles in no. 25 (October 5 1879), 2; “The Morro Velho Slaves,” no. 26 (15 October 1879), 1; two articles in no. 27 (24 October 1879), 2 and 4; no. 28 (5 November 1879), 2; “The Judgement in Favor of the Cattá Branca Blacks” and untitled article in no. 31 (5 December 1879), 1 and 4. The Rio News continued to follow the case through 1883.

*The Rio News* was the most vigilant of the newspapers that published accounts of Nabuco's speech. This newspaper, based in Rio de Janeiro and printed in English for British and American readers in Brazil and abroad, published both of the contracts that St. John d'el Rey presented to the courts, Nabuco's second speech to Parliament, and later, court decisions, letters from the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society addressed to Nabuco and his responses to these. *The Rio News* was so aggressive, in fact, that when St. John d'el Rey chose to reply to the new attention brought to the case, it addressed its defense not only to Nabuco's Parliamentary speech, but also to arguments made in this newspaper.  

The first article published in *The Rio News* on this case, on September 5, 1879, is so detailed as to suggest that Nabuco himself aided in its publication.

In providing such wide coverage, *The Rio News* not only brought publicity to the case, but also provided its readers in Brazil and abroad with direct access to relevant documents and opened a space for public debate on its pages. Further, *The Rio News*  

---

137 An article in *A Província de São Paulo*, anno VII, no. 2183, 1 quotes an article from the *Gazeta*. The articles published in the *Jornal do Commercio* were reprinted in *The Rio News*, Ano VI, no. 23 (15 September 1879), 2 and no. 25 (5 October 1879), 2. An article from *The London Daily News* was reprinted in *The Rio News*, Ano IX (22 July 1882), 3. The article “Slavery in Brazil,” *The New York Times* (30 July 1882), 9 reprints a portion of an *Anglo-Brazilian Times* article. The reference to the *Révue des deux mondes* comes from Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, 22.

138 The first contract was published in the first article on the subject in *The Rio News* on September 5, 1879, while the second was printed in the October 5, 1879 issue. Nabuco's second speech appears in the October 15, 1879 issue. The Sabará Court decision is printed in the December 5, 1879 issue and letters to and from Charles H. Allen of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society appear in the May 15, 1880 (“A Well-Earned Recognition,” Anno VII, no. 8, 1) and April 24, 1880 (“Sr. Joaquim Nabuco and the Anti-Slavery Society,” Anno VII, no. 13, 1) issues.

gathered additional evidence and cultivated new angles and arguments on the issue that Nabuco himself incorporated into his second Parliamentary address on this issue.\textsuperscript{140} These close ties between Nabuco and the English-speaking press should not be viewed as coincidental, but as strategic since, according to Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, “Nabuco was fully aware of the importance of the international, and particularly British, opinion of the Brazilian elite, including the Emperor.”\textsuperscript{141}

Nabuco addressed a second speech to Brazilian Parliament on September 30, 1879, renewing his previous requerimento and highlighting the responsibility of the Brazilian government to act on this case. While Nabuco's discourse in Parliament “gave him international notoriety as a defender of the slaves and brought him closer to the Anti-Slavery Society,” it also brought new pressures to the case through governmental, media, public and international pressures.\textsuperscript{142} This case, which had sat stagnant for nearly two years, finally landed in the courts of Ouro Preto, and, on October 14, 1879, the Sabará court decision determined the slaves to be free. The remaining Cata Branca workers, including Agostinho Mathildes, after 34 years of captivity were freed on December 9, 1879 – four days after a \textit{Rio News} article states that the slaves were still held in captivity-- although many stayed at Morro Velho as free laborers.\textsuperscript{143} Of the original 385

\textsuperscript{140} For example, in the September 5, 1879 issue of \textit{The Rio News} there is mention of emancipation documents signed for some Cata Branca slaves by St. John d’el Rey (and not Brazilian Mining Company) officials, who justified their signatures by claiming that the Brazilian Mining Company was “extinct.” Nabuco incorporates this argument into his September 30, 1879 address, 257.

\textsuperscript{141} “Nabuco tinha plena consciência da importância da opinião internacional, e britânica em particular, sobre a elite brasileira, nela incluído o Imperador.” Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, 35.

\textsuperscript{142} “Ihe deu notariedade internacional como defensor dos escravos e o aproximou da Anti-Slavery Society.” Ibid, 22.

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Sabará sentence of October 14, 1879}, FO 131/18, 20-28; also in English in article in Anglo-Brazilian Times, FO 131/18, 441; \textit{Superintendent’s Diary}, SJDR/NL, December 9, 1879. The now free workers were offered the choice of remaining in company houses at low wages or of leaving the company grounds to live amongst the free workers outside the mines. According to company correspondence, many of the slaves chose to remain within the company’s labor force. John Hockin to Pearson Morrison,
Cata Branca slaves, only 123 workers remained at the time of the Sabará court decision; most had died, while few had gained their freedom before the court decision. After further years of struggle through the lower and Supreme Court, the company finally paid an unspecified sum in back wages on April 14, 1882. On April 8 of 1880, Nabuco responded to the congratulations offered by Charles H. Allen, Secretary of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society stating that he “had only in view to call the attention of the country to that scandalous conspiracy, and give it the largest publicity.”

After the Sabará court decision Nabuco remained active in the Morro Velho case, maintaining contact with the British and Foreign Antislavery Society in London. In January of 1882, Nabuco wrote to Edmund Sturge, Honorary Secretary of the same abolitionist society, requesting information regarding the “extinct Catta Branca Company” that “the representative of the Blacks against the Morro Velho Company wants to know.” From November 1881 through February 1882, several letters were exchanged between Nabuco and the Society to prepare for a criminal case in London. This correspondence between Nabuco and the British abolitionists demonstrates not only that Nabuco continued to use ties with the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to

SJDR/NL, February 23, 1880. The Anglo-Brazilian Times article reprinted in The New York Times on July 30, 1882 affirms that “... nearly all the blacks freed by the company, as well as those freed by the Catta-Branca Company, are now living on the St. John Del Rey Company's property and working in their service,” 9.

The sentence itself states that 123 workers remained; the final list of slaves “existing” or who had been freed or had died after January 1, 1860 only lists 122 living slaves. The same document lists 161 slaves who had died and 51 who had been freed since 1860. The remaining slaves had either died or been freed prior to 1860. FO 131/18, 210-220.


gain documents for the Morro Velho case, but that the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society also requested documentation and information to prepare a criminal case against St. John d'el Rey in England.148

According to Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho “Contact between them [Nabuco and the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society] meant a partnership consciously sought by Nabuco with the purpose of expanding the scope of the struggle to the international scene.”149 While Nabuco was aware of this society well before the Morro Velho case – he had helped his father by translating the Society's publications in his youth-- this case offered the opportunity for Nabuco to forge close ties with the Society, upon whose model the Sociedade Brasileira contra a Escravidão was based and with whom he worked more closely upon his return to London in 1881.150 In addition, contact with Nabuco gave the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society the opportunity to act against the rental of enslaved workers by British mining companies in Minas Gerais, an issue which had long been on its radar.151

Nabuco held deep admiration for the “English spirit” which he defined as “the tacit norm of conduct to which all of England seems to obey, the center of moral

148 I refer here to the following letters in Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho: “Carta 20: Allen a Nabuco, 22 de novembro de 1881,” 118-121; “Carta 23: Nabuco a Allen, quinta-feira [janeiro de 1882],” 128-129; “Carta 27: Sturge a Nabuco, 24 de fevereiro, 1882,” 140-141. After the Supreme Court decision to remunerate the Cata Branca Slaves, the issue of a criminal case in London fades from the correspondence. The *London Daily News* article reprinted in the *Rio News* on July 24, 1882 states “for some reason, which will no doubt be explained, they [the British government] have at length decided that they will not prosecute.”

149 “O contato entre eles significou uma parceria buscada conscientemente por Nabuco com a finalidade de expandir a arena da luta para o cenário internacional.” Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, 13.

150 Ibid, 13 and 23; “Carta 7: Sociedade Brasileira Contra a Escravidão À British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society 20 de Dezembro [1880]” in Ibid, 74-77; Cartas 8 a 16 in Ibid, 78-105 refer to this time period.

151 This concern is mentioned in the *Proceedings of the General Anti-Slavery Convention, Called by the Committee of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, and Held in London, from Friday, June 12th to Tuesday, June 23rd, 1840* (London: British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, 1841), 516-518.
inspiration that governs all of its movements.”

In Nabuco’s understanding, abolitionism and the English spirit were intrinsically connected, as abolition was “a reform that the English spirit puts before all others and all order of sentiment.”

Despite the deep respect that Nabuco held for England and British society, he expressed no ambivalence or anxiety over his defense of the Cata Branca slaves against the British-owned St. John d’el Rey Mining Company. In fact, he claimed that he was performing a service not only to the slaves or to Brazil, but also to the crown of Great Britain. In his September 26, 1879 parliamentary discourse, Nabuco related that, to him, what was most curious about the case was not only the Brazilian government’s lack of involvement, but rather the interest of the English nation. Nabuco stated: “… the English government desires to obtain by any means possible the liberty of these unfortunates, which still today has not been obtained by Brazilian justice.”

Later, in his April 8, 1880 letter to Allen of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society Nabuco related:

The fact that a great English Company has lent itself, for twenty years, to be the chief instrument for the illegal enslaving of hundreds of men, for whose freedom it had solemnly pledged itself by a public contract, could nowhere excite so much indignation as in England. It is for that that the S. João del Rey Mining Company and its accomplices had never more constant and uncompromising enemies than Her Britannic Majesty's Representatives in Brazil. I was perfectly aware then that I was rendering a service, both to the English nation and to the slaves of Morro Velho, by denouncing the spoliation of human freedom perpetrated by an important gold mining enterprise of South America under the protection of the British flag.

152 “a norma tácita de conduta a que a Inglaterra tôda parece obedecer, o centro de inspiração moral que governa todos os seus movimentos.” Joaquim Nabuco, Minha Formação (Rio de Janeiro: Edições de Ouro, 1966), 135.

153 “uma reforma que o espírito inglês anteporia a tôdas as outras por tôda ordem de sentimento.” Ibid, 139.

154 “o governo inglez deseja poder obter por qualquer fórma a liberdade desses infelizes, que até hoje não pôde ser obtida das justiças brasileiras.” “Sessão em 26 de Agosto de 1879,” 183.

155 “O fato de uma grande companhia inglesa se ter prestado durante 20 anos a ser o instrumento principal da escravidão ilegal de centenas de homens cuja liberdade havia sido solenemente prometida por um contrato público em nenhum outro lugar poderia ter suscitado mais indignação do que na Inglaterra. É por essa razão que a S. João del Rey Mining Company e seus cúmplices nunca tiveram adversários mais
In the Brazilian Parliament, Nabuco had spoken of St. John d'el Rey as a foreign company that had not upheld a contract registered by Brazilian law. However, while Nabuco used Brazilian law to argue the case, in this letter to the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, Nabuco presented himself as a representative of the English spirit of abolitionism.

Nabuco recognized that the importance of the Morro Velho case transcended that of an individual legal battle – the case was important in his own career and within the abolition movement in Brazil. As part of his campaign for election to represent the district of Recife (1o distrito de Pernambuco), on November 16, 1884, Nabuco gave an address at the Teatro Santa Isabel where he placed the Morro Velho Case within his successes as a politician and abolitionist. Nabuco used this occasion to dispel the idea that his alliance with the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society was carried out to “defame Brazil” and to emphasize that the case itself was against a British-owned company, before describing his role within it. Nabuco, in this speech, affirms his alliance with British abolitionists against slavery in any country, including Brazil, as in his words, “I think and feel like it [The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society] does; I am an enemy of slavery in all parts of the world, and much more than anywhere else in my own country.”

constantes e mais intransigentes do que os representantes de Sua Majestade Britânica no Brasil. Estava perfeitamente ciente de que prestava um serviço tanto à nação inglesa quanto aos escravos do Morro Velho quando denunciou a espoliação da liberdade humana perpetrada por importante empresa de mineração de ouro da América do Sul sob a proteção da bandeira britânica.” “Carta 3” in Bethell and Murilo de Carvalho, 54-55.


54
The Morro Velho case invigorated the abolitionist spirit not only of Nabuco, but also of *The Rio News*. While prior to this case slavery was rarely mentioned within its pages, after the appearance of the first articles referring to St. John d'el Rey in the last quarter of 1879, *The Rio News* began to regularly publish editorial articles on slavery and abolition in Brazil, presenting cases, arguments and statistics for its readers. Articles bearing the titles “The Emancipation Law,” “The Emancipation Question,” “Slave Population of Brazil,” “Slavery Notes,” and “Slavery in Brazil” made regular appearances on the pages of this paper beginning in 1880, as well as reports on slave abuse “brutalities” that “will some day overwhelm the people that permit them.”

By acting upon the information and documents gained through cooperation with Charles H. Williams in 1879 and later through Charles H. Allen and Edmund Sturge of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, Nabuco provided legal support to a stagnated case in danger of disappearing. Further, his parliamentary speeches and cooperation with the press brought publicity that effectively jump-started a stalled case. The importance of this legal battle and the relationships forged through it, though, transcends the Morro Velho case – they brought abolition in Brazil into a public debate on an international level, with Nabuco as its recognizable representative.

It is difficult to imagine how a single public defender in Minas Gerais might tackle a case against one of the most successful British enterprises in Latin America. Jacintheo Dias da Silva, the Cata Branca slaves’ public defender, was aware of the challenges that his case faced, so much so that he seemed surprised by the slaves’ victory.

---

The quotation is from *The Rio News*, Ano VII, no. 15 (24 May 1880). In 1880, issues that include articles on slavery and abolition include (but are not limited to) nos. 2, 13, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, and 36.
over “British haughtiness” and the “arrogance of money.” He later expressed that the Cata Branca slaves’ case should serve as a reminder to “maintain the propriety of your work, and against whoever presents himself counter it, no matter how powerful they may be.” This case, which drew the abolition debate into public forums, though, was not fought only with dedication, solid legislation and honest courts, but through the publicity and pressure that Joaquim Nabuco provided to it through practical support and documents gained through his connections with British abolitionists in Brazil and abroad.

158 Silva, FO 131/18, 271-298.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

CULTURE, NATION AND IMPERIALISM: ISEB AND U.S. CULTURAL INFLUENCE IN COLD WAR BRAZIL

Online Databases

Marxist Internet Archive, www.marxists.org

Printed Primary Sources


**Secondary Sources**


________, Org. Intelectuais e política no Brasil: a experiência do ISEB. Rio de Janeiro:
Revan, 2005.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

JOAQUIM NABUCO, BRITISH ABOLITIONISTS AND
THE CASE OF MORRO VELHO

Archives, institutions and data bases

Saint John d'el Rey Company Limited, Nova Lima
Saint John d'el Rey Company Limited, University of Texas
British Foreign Office, Public Records Division
UK Statute Law Database

Newspapers and Periodicals

The Anglo-Brazilian Times
The London Daily News
New York Times
A Provincia de Sao Paulo
The Rio News

Printed Primary Sources


Burton, Richard F. Explorations of the Highlands of Brazil; A Full Account of the Gold and Diamond Mines. Also, Canoeing down 1500 Miles of the Great River Sao Francisco, from Sabara to the Sea. London: Tinsley Brothers, 1869.


**Secondary Sources**


